Group 1

Powell v. McCormack
395 U.S. 486 (1969)
Facts:
Powell was elected by the citizen of NY to be
their Representative in the House for the 90th
Congress. When the oath was being administered he
was asked to step aside.
A Select Committee
determined that although Powell
met the
Constitutional requirements, they felt because he
asserted an unwarranted privilege of immunity from NY
courts, and wrongfully diverted funds, and made false
reports on expenditures of foreign currency, he should
be excluded from taking his seat. House speaker
McCormack determined that a majority vote would
render Powells seat vacant, and a vote thereby was
rendered.

G.R. No. L-18684, September 14, 1961, 3 SCRA 1

(1961)
Facts:
Petitioners request that respondent officials be
prevented from implementing Republic Act 3040 that
apportions representative districts in this country. It is
unconstitutional and void, they allege, on the three
grounds because: (a) it was passed by the House of
Representatives without printed final copies of the bill
having been furnished the Members at least three
calendar days prior to its passage; (b) it was approved
more than three years after the return of the last
census of our population; and (c) it apportioned
districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of
the several provinces.
Issue:
Whether or Not implementation of R.A No.
3040 is unconstitional and it is a justiciable question.

Issue:
Whether the House alone, under Article I, Sec.
5, has the power to determine who is qualified to be a
member, under the textual commitment, to be the
judge of the qualifications of is own members?
Holding:
No, the House can only judge the three
qualifications as set forth in the Constitution.
Procedure: District Ct. dismissed for lack of
jurisdictional subject matter.
Ct of App affirmed
Dismissal. Reversed.
Rule: Requirements for a seat within the
Congress, AI; S2, age, citizenship, and residence.Ct.
Rationale: Article I, Sec 5 does not confer
judicially unreviewable powers upon the Congress as it
relates to the setting of qualifications of its members.
If it did that would be a political question that this court
would be barred from entering into. Historically the
Constitution leaves the House without authority to
exclude persons, who met the Constitutional
requirements, and who have been duly elected by their
constituents. Congress has the power to punish its
members behavior, and expel but it does not have the
Constitutional power to exclude or deny entrance.
PL A: The Constitution provides definite criteria
for entrance into the House of Representative, and
does not confer the power to exclude afterward to
members of the House.
Def A: Under the Constitutions AI, S5 the House has
power to determine the qualifications necessary for
membership within.
Political Questions: Lack of respect due a
coordinate branch of government, or involvement in
the initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.
LAMBERTO MACIAS et.al Vs. THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS et.al

Held:
Yes. The court ruled that Republic Act 3040
clearly violates the constitutional provision of Article VI,
Section 5 Paragraph 3 and 4 that states (3)" Each
legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city
with a populaton of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one
representative. and, (4) Within three years following
the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section.", in several ways
namely, (a) it gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal
with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it
gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a
bigger population got three only; . . .;. Such violation of
the Constitutional mandate renders the law void.
On the printed-form, three-day requirement.
The Constitution provides that "no bill shall be passed
by either House unless it shall have been printed and
copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at
least three calendar days prior to its passage, except
when the President shall have certified to the necessity
of its immediate enactment." Petitioners presented
certificates of the Secretary of the House of
Representatives to show that no printed copy had been
distributed three days before passage of the bill (on
May 10, 1961) and that no certificate of urgency by the
President had been received in the House.
AGAPITO vs. AQUINO
GR No. 120265 9/18/1995
FACTS:
Agapito Aquino ran as a representative of 2 nd
district of Makati in May 1995 election. In his certificate
of candidacy, he indicated in the residence portion
that he lives in Makati for 10 months. The MOVE
MAKATI, a political party and Mateo Bendon, chairman
of Lakas NUCD-UMDP filed a petition to disqualify
Agapito Aquino, for he lacks the residency requirement
of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the May
1995 election.

Pending resolution from the COMELEC,

Aquino won the election garnering the highest number
of votes as against his opponent. On May 15, 1995
COMELEC en banc issued an order suspending the
petitioners proclamation and on June 02, 1995, the
COMELEC en banc issued a final resolution declaring
the disqualification of the petitioner.
The petitioner raised his contention, that
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to determine his
disqualification since he has already won the election.
The HRET would be the right venue to judge or to
determine whether he is disqualified on the May 1995
election. He further contended, that he has been
residence of Makati in fact he engaged in a lease
contract of his condominium unit.

Marcos, filed an amended/corrected certificate

of candidacy with the COMELEC but it was denied
because it had already lapsed the period in which it has
to be filed. On April 24, 1995 COMELEC issued a
Resolution, disqualifying the petitioner to run as
Representative of 1st district of Leyte on the reason that
she lacks 1 year residency as provided in the
Constitution. COMELEC asserted that even if the
petitioner considered Tacloban as her domicile, there is
no showing of any intention on her part to live there
permanently considering that she has several
residencies prior to running a position in one of the
districts of Leyte. Moreover, the COMELEC reserved the
National Board of Canvasser, not to proclaim Marcos in
the event she won the election.
ISSUE:

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not petitioner is disqualified in
running for Representative of 2nd district of Makati.
(2) Whether or not the COMELEC has
jurisdiction to resolve the disqualification case of the
petitioner.

(1) Whether or not petitioner is disqualified in

running for Representative of 1st district of Leyte.
(2) Whether or not the COMELEC has
jurisdiction to hear and judge the disqualification of
herein petitioner.
HELD:

HELD:
The court ruled that COMELEC was correct in
disqualifying the petitioner. It is clear in the 1987
Constitution, Section 6 of Article VI that a residence of
at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of
election is one of the requirements to be a member of
the House of Representative. The court further ruled
that the residency referring hereto is one that of
domicile which is pertaining to a permanent
residence. In this case, the petitioner failed to prove
the Makati is his domicile, in fact he possessed a
condominium unit on a lease contract which is an
indication that he will never intend to consider it as his
permanent home.
On the second issue about jurisdiction, the
court ruled that COMELEC is still in the right position to
resolve the disqualification issue of the petitioner,
because the latter was not yet proclaimed as
Representative of the 2nd district of Makati. As long as
he has not yet taken an oath of office, he cannot be
said to be a member of the house of representative.
MARCOS vs COMELEC
GR No. 119976 9/18/1995
FACTS:
On March 8, 1995 Imelda Romualdez Marcos
filed her candidacy for Representative of 1 st District of
Leyte. In her certificate of candidacy she wrote 7
months as the period of her actual residency of the
constituency which she seeks to be elected. Her
opponent, private respondent in this case, filed a
petition to disqualify her on the ground that she was
not able to satisfy the at least 1 year residency
requirement immediately preceding before the day of
election in the same year.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The

residence which referred to by the Constitution as one
of the requirements in running for a position of a
District Representative is one that of having a
characteristics of domicile. A domicile is a kind of
residence which one is absent for business or pleasure,
has the intention of returning back. In other words this
is pertaining to a permanent residence. The court
further states that one may choose to have several
residence because of some reasons like business or
engaging in a profession, but there is only one domicile
in which that certain person or individual has an
attached relationship with the place or community. A
domicile ceases to be one if there is an intention to
abandon it, but it is not conclusive that when you have
several residences you automatically disregard or
abandon the domicile.
In the instant case, the petitioner believes that
Leyte is her domicile because it is where she grew up,
it is where most of her relatives live and she always
comes back during her lifetime. There was no concrete
evidence contrary to the allegation of the COMELEC,
that would show that she abandoned it. Therefore the
Supreme Court convinced that the 7 months she wrote
in her certificate of candidacy was an honest mistake
of fact. Based on the evidence, the petitioner was able
to establish that 1st district of Leyte is her legal
residence or Domicile. Hence she cannot be
disqualified in running the said position.
On the second issue of jurisdiction, the
COMELEC has the authority to judge the election,
returns and disqualification of the petitioner, since the
petition was filed before the actual election has been
made and it was pending even at the time of the actual
casting of vote. Even though Marcos garnered the
highest vote, she is not considered yet to be a member
of the House of Representative until she took an oath.

HRET is a sole judge in matters of election, returns and

disqualification of its members as provided in Section
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution , the law
contemplates member to be one who has already
taken an oath.

domicile.

Tess Dumpit-Michelena vs.

163619-20, Nov. 17, 2005

Facts:

Boado,

G.R.

No.

Facts:
Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the
position of mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union
during the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and
Local Elections. Engineer Carlos Boado, Rogelio L. De
Vera, Fernando Calonge, Benito Carrera, Salvador
Carrera and Domingo Carrera sought DumpitMichelena's disqualification and the denial or
cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the
ground of material misrepresentation under Sections
74 and 78of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Boado, et al.
alleged that Dumpit-Michelena, the daughter of
Congressman Tomas Dumpit, Sr. of the Second District
of La Union, is not a resident of Agoo, La Union. Boado,
et al. claimed that Dumpit-Michelena is a resident and
was a registered voter of Naguilian, La Union and that
Dumpit-Michelena only transferred her registration as
voter to San Julian West, Agoo, La Union on October 24,
2003. Dumpit-Michelena countered that she already
acquired a new domicile in San Julian West when she
purchased from her father, Congressman Dumpit, a
residential lot on April 19, 2003. She even designated
one Gardo Fontanilla as a caretaker of her residential
house. Dumpit-Michelena presented the affidavits and
certifications of her neighbors in San Julian West to
prove that she actually resides in the area. COMELEC
rules in favor of Boado et al. The COMELEC En Banc
denied in its ruling the motion for reconsideration filed
by Dumpit-Michelena. Hence, the present recourse by
Dumpit-Michelena.
Issue:
Whether or not Dumpit-Michelena satisfied the
residency requirement under the Local Government
Code of 1991.
Held:
No. Dumpit-MIchelena failed to comply with the
1-yr. residency requirement in the place where she
intends to be elected. Her purchase of a parcel of land
in San Julian West where she eventually built a house is
not an indication of the right to vote or to be voted for
an office. Further, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, there must be
concurrence of the following requirements:(1) an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts
which correspond with the purpose. Dumpit-Michelena
failed to establish that she has abandoned her former
domicile. Evidence shows that her house in Agoo is
beach house and a beach house is at most a place of
temporary relaxation. It can hardly be considered a
place of residence. Moreover, her designation of a
caretaker only shows that she does not regularly reside
in the place. She also has a number of residences but
the acquisition of another one does not automatically
make the most recently acquired residence her new

Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona

G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998
During the first regular session of the eleventh
Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly
elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2.
Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of
Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of
the minority, he was assuming the position of minority
leader. He explained that those who had voted for
Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only
those who had voted for him, the losing nominee,
belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested
that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had
chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader.
Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that
he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 LakasNUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected
Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue
thereof, the Senate President formally recognized
Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo
warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been
usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to
them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction
over the petition.
(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation
of the Constitution in the election of senate officers.
Held:
(1) Yes. In light of the allegations of the
petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction
over the petition. It is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the
exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
(2) No. The interpretation proposed by
petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution,
the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from
practices of the Upper House. The term majority,
when referring to a certain number out of a total or
aggregate, it simply means the number greater than
half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the
Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate
must be elected by a number constituting more than
one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide
that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso
facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect
the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit in the manner
of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it
is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the
other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that
the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that each

House shall choose such other officers as it may deem

necessary. The method of choosing who will be such
other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed
by the Senate itself, not by the Court.

Group 2
PACETE VS COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
Facts:
8-31-1964 - petitioner was appointed by Pres Marcos as
a Municipal Judge in Pigcawayan, Cotabato
9-11-1964 - assumed the office as a Municipal Judge
1965 session - time when his appointment was
submitted because in 1964, the Congress was in
recess.
5-20-1965-appointment was confirmed
2-7-1966 (9 months after confirmation), the Secretary
of Justice, through Judicial superintendent advised
petitioner to vacate in his position due to the motion
for reconsideration filed by one of the members of COA
(Guanzon), in view of the derogatory information he
has received, Secretary of COA informed the Secretary
of Justice. "The mere presentation of such matter will
automatically vacate the position in question"
Petitioner's contention: Motion for Reconsideration
should be approved as a BODY, not by a single person.
Issue: WON the appointment tot he petitioner is valid
despite
the
presence
of
MFR?
Held: YES, under Rule 21, Revised Rules on
Commission.
The law states that " 1 days after approval, If a
majority of the members present concur to grant a
reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened to
reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on
the table, shall be final disposition of such a motion"
-The Action was filed 9 months after the confirmation of
the appointment.
-The motion for reconsideration was not concurred by
the MAJORITY of the members, the MFR was filed by
one member of the COA, and Secretary of COA already
reported the matter to Secretary of justice which is
improper.
-The President shall have thepower to make
appointments during recess of COngress but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission of appointments of next
adjournment
of
Congress.
-----------------------------------------CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO, INC VS HON
PEDRO GIMENEZ (AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINES)
AND
HON
ISMAEL
MATHAY
(AUDITOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK)
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609,
otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee
Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July
1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee
of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To

supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a

memorandum
establishing
the
procedure
for
applications for exemption from the payment of said
fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609.
Several times in November and December 1959, Casco
Philippine Chemical Co., manufacturer of synthetic
resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by
plywood and hardwood producers bought foreign
exchange
for
the
importation
of
urea
and
formaldehyde(which are raw materials for the
production of glues)
The amounts:
(1) 33,765.42
(2) 6,345.72
Petitioner asked for the refund first on the 33k, then 6k,
paid as the margin fee. Central Bank issued vouchers
but Auditor of the bankrefused to pass in audit and
approve
vouchers stating
that
the
urea
and
formaldehyde are not exempted and in accord with sec
2,par 18, RA 2609.
Issue: WON the law exempts urea and formaldehyde in
RA 2609?
Held: No. (Gimenez won)
Legal basis: sec 2,par 18, RA 2609
" The margin established by the Monetary Board
pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall
not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for
the importation of the following:
XVIII. Urea
formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and
hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use
of end-users."
Urea and formaldehyde is not Urea formaldehyde (the
latter is a synthetic resin formed as a condensation
product from definite proportions of urea and
formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to
temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This
produce when applied in water solution and extended
with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost
adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood.)
the intent is
formaldehyde

the
not

senate
urea

is to
and

exempt urea
formaldehyde.

Osmena vs. Pendatun

G.R No. L-17144, October 28, 1960
Bengson, J.
Facts:
Congressman Osmea took the floor on the one-hour
privilege to deliver a speech, entitled A Message to
Garcia wherein said speech contained serious
imputations of bribery against the President. Being
unable to produce evidence thereof, Osmea was then
found to be guilty of serious disorderly behaviour by
the House of Representatives. Osmea argues that the
Constitution gave him complete parliamentary
immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he
ought not to be questioned.
ISSUE:
Whether said disciplinary action by the House is in
violation of Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution.
RULING:

Said disciplinary action is not in violation of the

Constitution. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that for any speech or debate in Congress,
the Senators or Members of the House of
Representative shall not be questioned in any other
place. Although exempt from prosecution or civil
actions for their words uttered in Congress, the
members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself. Observe that they shall
not be questioned in any other place in Congress.

rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de

Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to
pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from
notice. Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker
of the House of Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno,
in his capacity as Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuao, Cashier,
House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief,
Property Division, House of Representatives, filed the
petition
for
certiorari.

Casco Philippine Chemicals v. Gimenez

7 SCRA 347

Issue: Whether the suspension provided in the AntiGraft law is a penalty or a precautionary measure; and
Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude
the members of Congress from the mandate of R.A.
3019.

FACTS:
On July 1, 1959, pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign
Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the
Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on
foreign exchange transactions. Petitioner had bought
foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde, raw materials for resin glues, and was
thus paying for the margin fees at that time. Relying on
Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of the said
bank declaring that the separate importation of urea
and formaldehyde is exempt from the said fee, the
petitioner sought for a refund of the margin fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not urea and formaldehyde are exempt
from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee
HELD:
Urea and formaldehyde are not exempt from fees by
law. RA 2609 only exempts urea formaldehyde and not
the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde as
they are different, the former being a finished product.
The enrolled bill which uses the term urea
formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts. The
courts cannot speculate that there had been an error I
printing of the bill as this shall violate the principle of
separation of powers. Shall there have been any error
in the printing, the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by a judicial decree.
DE VENECIA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
GR NO. 130240, 5 FEBRUARY 2002
Facts: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as
Criminal
Case
18857)
was
filed
with
the
Sandiganbayan
(First
Division)
against
then
Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur
for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended).
After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution
filed a Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite.
In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the Sandiganbayan
granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to
suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not comply.
Thus, on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18
August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt of court.
Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a
motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on
separation of powers and claiming that he can only
act as may be dictated by the House as a body
pursuant to House Resolution 116 adopted on 13
August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan

Held: As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v.

Sandiganbayan (GR 118354, 8 August 1995), the
suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is
mandatory and is of different nature and purpose.
It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a
precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of
valid
Information.
As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan,
et al., the doctrine of separation of powers does not
exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of
RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by
Republic Act 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the
above constitutional provision is a punitive measure
that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
upon
an
erring
member.
Ratio: Its purpose is to prevent the accused public
officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing
witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence
and from committing further acts of malfeasance while
in office. It is thus an incident to the criminal
proceedings before the court. On the other hand, the
suspension or expulsion contemplated in the
Constitution is a House-imposed sanction against its
members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly
behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its
proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not
be deemed to have effectively excluded members of
Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its
sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes that each of
the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate,
branches of the government the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive
prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of
influence and effectively prevents one branch from
unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either
branch.
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
VIRGILIO
O.
GARCILLANO,
petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES
ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND
SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
INFORMATION
AND
COMMUNICATIONS

TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL

REFORMS,
respondents.
Facts: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new
controversy arises. During the 2007 election the
conversation of President Arroyo and the herein
petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional
director, regarding the desire of the president to have a
favourable outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such
conversation was recorded and was played during the
house of representative investigation. Because of such
turn of events, a petition was filed before the court
praying that such playing of the illegally seized
communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the antiwire tapping law. Also such petition for injunction
prays that the Senate committee be prevented from
further conducting such investigation for the basic
reason that there was no proper publication of the
senate rules, empowering them to make such
investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.
Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of
the rules as to empower the senate to further proceed
with
their
investigation?
Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the
conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without
duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation
of
the
constitutional
requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that "the Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to
satisfy
the
basic
requirements
of
due
process.Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be
the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2
of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall take
effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that
the rules have never been amended since 1995 and,
despite that, they are published in booklet form
available to anyone for free, and accessible to the
public
at
the
Senates
internet
web
page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any
amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates
defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic
law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
only in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure, and does not make any distinction whether
or not these rules have undergone amendments or
revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said
rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition
followed
by
the
Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of

R.A. No. 8792,otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more
incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data
message or an electronic document as the functional
equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary
purposes.In other words, the law merely recognizes the
admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of
electronic
data
messages
and/or
electronic
documents.It does not make the internet a medium for
publishing
laws,
rules
and
regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate
Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative
inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate
has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid
of legislation cannot proceed for the reason that the
rules that they will observe was not properly published
as provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such
inquiry if allowed without observance of the required
publication will put a persons life, liberty and property
at stake without due process of law. Also, the further
assertion of the senate that they already published
such rules through their web page, in observance of
the RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was only
viewed by the court as matter of evidence and still
does not conforme with what the constitution
propounded.
In this regard the high court granted the petition for
injunction preventing the senate to conduct such
inquiry in aid of legislation.
ALEJANDRINO V. QUEZON, 46 PHIL. 83 (1924)
FACTS: The petitioner in this original petition for
mandamus and injunction is Jose Alejandrino, a Senator
appointed by the Governor General. to represent the
12th Senatorial District. The casus belli is a resolution
adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the
respondent Senators, On February 5,1924, depriving
Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments of his office for the period of 1 yr from
1/24 having been declared guilty of disorderly conduct
and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for
having treacherously assaulted Sen. de Vera on the
occasion of certain phrases being uttered by the latter
in the course of the debate regarding the credentials of
Mr. Alejandrino. The burden of petitioner's complaint is
that the resolution is unconstitutional and entirely of no
effect.
ISSUE: WON the Supreme Court by mandamus and
injunction may annul the suspension of Senator
Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to
reinstate him in his official position?
HELD. The general rule is that the writ will not lie from
one branch of the gov't to a coordinate branch, for the
very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.
Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its
members, or its officers, to compel the performance of
duties purely legislative in their character w/c therefore
pertains to their legislative functions and over w/c they

have exclusive control.The courts cannot dictate action

in this respect without a gross usurpation of power.
Precedents have held that where a member has been
expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no
power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right
or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his
reinstatement

that majority. And at any session hereafter held with

thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all
controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here
about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the
said twelve senators who approved the resolutions
herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby
place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

AVELINO V. CUENCO

Group 3

FACTS:
The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto
proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful
Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano
Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanadas request to
deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against
then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the
leadership of the Senate President followed by his
supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent
Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his
supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to
adjourn the session then walked out. Only12 Senators
were left in the hall. The members of the senate left
continued the session and Senator Cuenco was
appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and
was recognized the next day by the President of the
Philippines.

G.R. No. 22041

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly
approved.
HELD:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the
subject matter is political in nature and in doing so, the
court will be against the doctrine of separation of
powers. To the first question, the answer is in the
negative, in view of the separation of powers, the
political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.192;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect
its own president, which power should not be interfered
with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to
take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of
the electors of the suspended senators were alleged
affected without any immediate remedy.
A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affect only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them.
Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable,
the majority of the Senators want petitioner top reside,
his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the
Supreme Court.2. It was held that there is a quorum
that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four
justice agree that the Court being confronted with the
practical situation that of the twenty three senators
who may participate in the Senate de liberations in the
days immediately after this decision, twelve senators
will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will
side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious
to declare the latter as the rightful President of the
Senate, that office being essentially one that depends
exclusively upon the will of the majority of the
senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the
President of that body being amenable at any time by

September 11, 1924

JOSE
ALEJANDRINO,
petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL L. QUEZON, ET AL., respondents.
Note: Under the enrolled bill in the outline but the
issue of the case is about discipline of members.
Facts:
The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine
Senate composed of the respondent Senators, on
February 5, 1924, depriving Senator Alejandrino of all
the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his
office for the period of one year from the first of
January, 1924. That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino,
Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby
declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant
violation of the privileges of the Senate for having
treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera,
Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of the
debate regarding the credentials of said Mr.
Alejandrino.
Issue:
WON the Congress may suspend Alejandrino for 1
year?
Held:
No. The power of the Senate to punish its members for
disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend on
appointive member from the exercise of his office for
one year. The Constitution has purposely withheld from
the two Houses of the Legislature and the GovernorGeneral alike the power to suspend an appointive
member of the Legislature. Suspension deprives the
electoral district of representation without that district
being afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy.
By suspension, the seat remains filed but the occupant
is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to
qualified expulsion or removal. It is beyond the power
of any branch of the Government of the Philippine
Islands to exercise its functions in any other way than
that prescribed by the Organic Law.
Osmea vs. Pendatun
GR No. L-17144, October 28, 1960
Note: Under the enrolled bill in the outline but the
issue of the case is about discipline of members.
FACTS:
In a privilege speech before the House of
Representatives, Congressman Sergio Osmea from
the 2nd District of Cebu made serious imputations of

bribery against then President Garcia. A Resolution No.

59 was then passed that a special committee of 15
membersto be appointed by the Speaker, wherein
Pendatun is one of the members, shall be tasked to
investigate the truth of the charges against Garcia and
for Osmea to substantiate his charges with evidence
including papers and witnesses.And if he fails to do so,
he show cause why he should not be punished by the
House. However, Osmea refused to comply. Hence, he
was suspended for 15 months for disorderly behavior.
Osmea then filed a petition in the Supreme Court,
invoking his rights for parliamentary immunity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House has the power to discipline
Osmea with suspension for unparliamentarily
conduct?

was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the

Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who
was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan
ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend
Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of
a member of the Senate without violating the
Constitution.
HELD:
Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each
house may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with
the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:

HELD:
Yes. Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
provides that Each house may determine the rules of
its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and with the concurrence of two-thirds of all
its Members, suspend or expel a Member. Rules of
proceedings are needed for the orderly conduct of the
sessions of Congress. Unless such rules violate
fundamental or individual rights, they are within the
exclusive discretion of each House to formulate and
interpret and may not be judicially reversed.
Furthermore, parliamentary immunity guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear
of being made responsible in criminal and civil actions
before the courts or any other forum outside the
Congressional hall. However, it does not protect him
from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered
disorderly or unbecoming.
In the case at bar, the special Committee performed its
task, reported it to the House and the majority
approved the suspension order by reasons of serious
disorderly behavior; all in accordance with the above
provision. Hence, the petition of Osmea was denied
and affirmed the suspension order.
356 SCRA 636 Political Law The Legislative
Department Suspension of a Member of
Congress Violations of RA 3019
FACTS:
Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then
Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID)in October 1988, approved the
application for legalization of the stay of 32 aliens. Her
act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith
and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act) and a violation of
Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the
legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized
by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be
disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against
Santiago. Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of
the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against
Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty
since she was just recovering from a car accident which

Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent

public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under Title
7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended
from office.
Should she be convicted by final
judgment, she shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if she is acquitted, she shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which she failed to receive during suspension,
unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019
is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension
contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a
punitive measure that is imposed upon determination
by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may be,
upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which
is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
rescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of
the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its
coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore,
the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order.
Even if Santiago was still the CID commissioner when
she committed the act, Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019 does not state that the public officer concerned
must be suspended only in the office where she is
alleged to have committed the acts with which she has
been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of
the word office would indicate that it applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and
not only the particular office under which he stands
accused.
Moreover, the law does not require that the guilt of the
accused must be established in a pre-suspension

proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither

does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the
strength of the evidence of culpability against her, (2)
the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or
not her continuance in office could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of
the records another evidence before the court could
have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension
pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the
accused was adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity or regularity of the proceedings against her,
such as, that she has not been afforded the right to
due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to
him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his
mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is
subject to quashed on any of the grounds set out in
Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
procedure.

the Philippine Legislature when there is in existence a

copy signed by the presiding officers and the
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof
of the provisions of such Act and of the due enactment
thereof."

Article VI. ENROLLED BILL

These considerations of public policy

led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and
unimpeachability to legislative records.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN

PONS, defendant-appellant.
1916 August 12
G.R. No. 11530
FACTS:
GabinoBeliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte were
charged and convicted (except Lasarte) with the crime
of illegal importation of opium last April 10, 1915.
Beliso
and
Pons
appealed
the
conviction.Pons counsel alleged and offered to prove
that the last day of the special session of the Philippine
Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that
Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if
found guilty was not passed or approved on the 28th of
February but on March 1 of that year; and that,
therefore, the same is null and void.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the law was null and void because,
as the accused alleged, when it was passed by
Congress, it was no longer in session.
(2) The question whether or not the
printed Act (no. 2381), published by authority of law, is
conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed

(2) Yes. The question whether the

printed Act (no. 2381), published by authority of law, is
conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed
- counsel in his argument says that the public knows
that the Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28,
1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of
the discussion of all pending matters.
If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as
here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as
compared with that of altering the probative force and
character of legislative records, and making the proof
of legislative action depend upon certain oral evidence,
liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on
account of the treachery of memory.

Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory

ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS
G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974
714)

(56 SCRA

FACTS:
On March 30, 1964 in the Senate, they debated
a bill called House Bill (HB) No. 9266, a bill of local
application,and then they revised it. Afterwards, the
one that they printed is the original one.
For some reason, the Senate President and the
House Speaker signed the bill without reading. And the
President signed it also. The bill thereupon became RA
4065. The controversy started when the respondent
city mayor mounted public denunciation and Sen.
Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled
copy of HB 9266 signed into law was a wrong version
of the bill actually passed by the senate because it did
not embody the amendments introduced by him and
approved by the senate.

RULING:
(1) No. The Supreme Courtcited that it
was stated in the journal that it was passed on time so
we cannot examine the contents of the journal. We
cannot examine if it is true or not. It is conclusive upon
the courts.
Section 313, of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that;
"Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2)
The proceedings of the Philippine Commissions, or of
any legislative body that may be proved for the
Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journal of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the
clerk or secretary or printed by their order: Provided,
That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or

As a consequence, the senate president

informed the President of the mistake and withdrew his
signature on the enrolled bill. Thereupon, the President
also withdrew his signature on the bill.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the enrolled bill theory shall prevail
Whether or not the journal entry rule shall prevail
RULING:
(1) No. According to the Supreme Court, it is no
longer enrolled because it lacks the number of
signatures required under the enrolled bill doctrine.
Thus, the so-called RA 4065, otherwise known as the
revised charter of the City of Manila, was declared not

to have been duly enacted and therefore did not

become a law.
There is an enrolled bill when a bill is
finally approved by both Houses signed by the 3
officers- the Senate President, Speaker of the House
and President. It has the force of law considering that it
has already been approved.While the journal is the
abbreviated content of the proceedings such as the
summary or minutes.
(2) Yes. When the Supreme Court
rejected the erroneous bill, as indeed both the
President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did,
when
they
withdrew
their
signatures
therein,consequently, their being no enrolled bill to
speak of.Now, what evidence is there to determine
whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such
case, the entries in the journal should be consulted.The
journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is
not an ordinary record. The Constitution requires it.
While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and
is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors,
the point is irrelevant in this case.
In order to resolve the issue whether the text of
HB No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the
same text passed by both Houses of Congress,under
the specific facts and circumstances, the Court decided
to resort to the Senate journal for the purpose.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25554
October 4, 1966
PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
ISMAEL
MATHAY
and
JOSE
VELASCO, respondents.
FACTS:
The 1965-1966 Budget (R.A. No. 4642) implemented
the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of
the House of Representatives set by Republic Act 4134,
approved just the preceding year 1964.
The petitioners contend that such implementation is
violative of Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, as
amended in 1940, that provides as follows:
SEC. 14. The Senators and the Members of the House
of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by
law, receive an annual compensation of seven
thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems
and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive
only of traveling expenses to and from their respective
districts in the case of Members of the House of
Representatives, and to and from their places of
residence in the case of Senators, when attending
sessions of the Congress. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving
such, increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives shall each receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos. (Emphasis
supplied)
The reason given being that the term of the eight
senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the
approval of Republic Act No. 4134, will expire only on

December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of

the House who participated in the approval of said Act
expired on December 30, 1965.
ISSUE:
Does Section 14, Art. VI, of the Constitution require
that not only the term of all the members of the House
but also that of all the Senators who approved the
increase must have fully expired before the increase
becomes effective?
HELD:
YES. It is admitted that the purpose of the provision is
to place "a legal bar to the legislators yielding to the
natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that
the power to provide for higher compensation is
lacking, but with the length of time that has to elapse
before an increase becomes effective, there is a
deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need
for it is clearly felt" (Taada& Fernando, Constitution of
the Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 867).
Significantly, in establishing what might be termed a
waiting period before the increased compensation for
legislators becomes fully effective, the constitutional
provision refers to "all the members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives" in the same sentence,
as a single unit, without distinction or separation
between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized
by the fact that the provision speaks of the "expiration
of the full term" of the Senators and Representatives
that approved the measure, using the singular form,
and not the plural, despite the difference in the terms
of office (six years for Senators and four for
Representatives thereby rendering more evident the
intent to consider both houses for the purpose as
indivisible components of one single Legislature. The
use of the word "term" in the singular, when combined
with the following phrase "all the members of the
Senate and of the House", underscores that in the
application of Article VI, Section 14, the fundamental
consideration is that the terms of office of all members
of the Legislature that enacted the measure (whether
Senators or Representatives) must have expired before
the increase in compensation can become operative.
Such disregard of the separate houses, in favor of the
whole, accords in turn with the fact that the enactment
of laws rests on the shoulders of the entire Legislative
body; responsibility therefor is not apportionable
between the two chambers.
As recorded by the Committee on Style, and as finally
approved and enacted, Article VI, section 5, of the
Constitution of the Commonwealth, provided that:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of the Members of
the National Assembly elected subsequent to the
approval of such increase.
Under the present Constitution, if the increase is
approved in the 1965 sessions immediately preceding
the elections in November of that year, the higher
compensation would be operative only on December
30, 1969, also four years later, because the most
recently elected members of the Senate would then be
Senators chosen by the electors in November of 1963,
and their term would not expire until December 30,
1969.
.The reason for the minimum interval of four years is
plainly to discourage the approval of increases of
compensation just before an election by legislators who

can anticipate their reelection with more or less

accuracy. This salutary precaution should not be
nullified by resorting to technical and involved
interpretation of the constitutional mandate.
In resume, the Court agrees with petitioners that the
increased compensation provided by Republic Act No.
4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when
the full term of all members of the Senate and House
that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired.
Consequently, appropriation for such increased
compensation may not be disbursed until December
30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (19651966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the disbursement of
the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid,
it also violates the Constitution and must be held null
and void.

incoming members of Congress when the full term of

all members of Congress (House and Senate) that
approved the increase (such as petitioner) will have
expired, by virtue of the constitutional mandate of
Article VI, section 14 of the 1935 Constitution, it is selfevident that the "rate of pay as provided by law" for
members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969
such as petitioner must necessarily be P7,200.00 per
annum, the compensation they received "as provided
by law" and the Constitution during their term of office.
G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:

G.R. No. L-34676 April 30, 1974

BENJAMIN
T.
LIGOT,
petitioner,
vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY, Auditor General and JOSE V.
VELASCO, Auditor, Congress of the Philippines,
respondents.
Facts:
Ligot served as a member of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for
three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelveyear span from 1957 to 1969. During his second term
in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 "fixing the
salaries of constitutional officials and certain other
officials of the national government" was enacted into
law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1,
1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators
and congressman) were increased under said Act from
P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act
expressly provided that said increases "shall take effect
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."
Ligot was re-elected to a third term (December 30,
1965 to December 30, 1969) but was held not entitled
to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third.
Ligot lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the
1969 elections and his term having expired on
December 30, 1969, filed a claim for retirement. The
House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in
the sum of P122,429.86 in petitioner's favor as his
retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum. Respondent Velasco as
Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant. Velasco
formally requested petitioner to return the warrant and
its supporting papers for a recomputation of his
retirement claim.
Issue:
WON Ligot is entitled to the 32,000 per annum as basis
for the computation of his retirement pay?
Ruling:
No. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum
for members of Congress under Republic Act 4134
could be operative only from December 30, 1969 for

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a fullfledged member of Congress who is now confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness
on six counts[1] is pending appeal. The accusedappellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to
fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of first impression.
ISSUE:
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused
from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general?
HELD:
No. The present Constitution adheres to the same
restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to
surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of
the law. The requirement that he should be attending
sessions or committee meetings has also been
removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough
that Congress is in session.The accused-appellant
argues that a member of Congress function to attend
sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum
to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from
day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as
such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any
reason why he should be exempted from the operation
of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members
to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of
more than six months is not merely authorized by law,
it has constitutional foundations.Accused-appellants
reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos[2], which
states, inter alia, that : The Court should never
remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would be to
deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.

When a people have elected a man to office, it must be

assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his
life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave
his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It
is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the
people.The Constitution guarantees: "x xx nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of laws." [6] This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall
be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed.[7] The organs of government
may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the
same class as all persons validly confined under law?

In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the

"Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV
was charged, along with his comrades, with coup detat
defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained
in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and
won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term
commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22,
2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch
148, an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and other Related
Request.
By Order of July 25, 2007, the trial court denied all the
requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration. The trial court just the same denied
the motion by Order of September 18, 2007.
ISSUE:

The performance of legitimate and even essential

duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by
the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. A strict
scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or
otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor
of or against groups or types of individuals.[8]
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded.[9]
We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest
and confinement are germane to the purposes of the
law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
[]
mprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal
liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent
the free exercise of his power of locomotion.[11]
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is
the restraint of ones liberty. As a punishment, it is
restraint by judgment of
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

WON Trillanes election as Senator provides legal

justification to allow him to work and serve his
mandate as senator, such as attendance to all official
functions of the Senate (whether at the Senate or
elsewhere).

Antonio F. Trillanes vs Honorable Oscar Pimentel

Sr.
GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that

petitioners application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the
evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
hearing of an application for bail or imported from a
trial courts judgment of conviction, justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his
right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso
that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is
"regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such
justification for confinement with its underlying
rationale of public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted
prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.

FACTS:
On July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily
armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and
publicly demanded the resignation of the President and
key national officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion. A series of
negotiations quelled the teeming tension and
eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of
the militant soldiers that evening.

RULING:
No.It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a
crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. No less than the Constitution
provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
The Rules also state that no person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal action.

Nicanor Jimenez, et al vs Bartolome Cabangbang

GR No. L-15905, August 3, 1966

FACTS:
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense when he caused the publication in
several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines of an open letter to the President of the
Philippines, dated November 14, 1958. The letter
describes the allegedly three (3) operational plans
under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers,
with the aid of some civilian political strategists.
I. The first plan was said to be "an insidious plan or a
massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National
Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and
glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to
become a candidate for President in 1961".To this end,
the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk
that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy
No. 1 in the Philippines. It further adds that the
planners have under their control 1) Col. Nicanor
Jimenez of NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3)
Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel
Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the
Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose
Reyna of the Public information Office, DND.
II. Plan No. II was said to be a "coup d'etat", in
connection with which the "planners" had gone no
further than the planning stage, although the plan
"seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future
developments".
3. Plan No. III was characterized as a modification of
Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the
public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which
Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the
authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally
the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain
popular and civilian support.
An ordinary civil action was instituted by
Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban,
of several sums of money, by way of damages for the
publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant
Bartolome Cabangbang.Upon being summoned, the
Cabangbang moved to dismiss the complaint upon the
ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and
that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication.
ISSUE:
WON the open letter is covered by the privilege
communication endowed to members of Congress.
RULING:
No. Article VI Section 15 provides that: The
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of
the peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any
speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned
in any other place. The phrase "speech or debate
therein" that is to say, in Congress used in this
provision refers to utterances made by Congressmen in
the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in
the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as
well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same
is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the

premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of

their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform
its functions as such, at the time of the performance of
the acts in question.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to
this category. According to the complaint herein, it was
an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated
November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was
not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be
published in several newspapers of general circulation
in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious
that, in thus causing the communication to be so
published, he was not performing his official duty,
either as a member of Congress or as officer or any
Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding
made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication
is not absolutely privileged.
Group 4
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a fullfledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory
rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The
accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted
in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the
basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his
constituents to be represented
ISSUE:Whether or not accused-appellant should be
allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives
HELD:Election is the expression of the sovereign power
of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected
may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always
been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It
may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why
he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11,
Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if
the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is
not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5
days or more in a week will virtually make him a free
man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position.
Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accusedappellants status to that of a special class, it also
would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.

________________________________________________________
Adaza v. Pacana
135 SCRA 431

administrative body" and SEC was an administrative

body. The prohibition being clear, Assemblyman
Fernandez did not continue his appearance.

FACTS:
Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana
is the vice-governor. Their respective term of office
expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in the
Batasang Pambansa (BP) elections in 1984 and
respondent lost to petitioner. On July 23, 1984, Pacana
took his oath of office as the governor. Petitioner has
brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom,
claiming to be the lawful occupant of the position.

When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned

out that Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased on 15
May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the
deed of sale was notarized only on 30 May 1979. He
then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for
Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI
shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation,
which motion was granted by the SEC Commissioner.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not a provincial governor who was
elected as Mababatas Pambansa (MP) can exercise the
functions of both simultaneously; and
2) whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the
position of MP but lost, can continue serving as vice
governor and subsequently succeed to the office of
governor if said office is vacated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening
in the SEC Case, is in effect appearing as counsel,
albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in
contravention of the Constitutional provision.

HELD:
Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and
unambiguous. A member of the BP may not hold any
other office in the government. A public office is a
public trust. A holder thereof is subject to regulations
and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot
complain of any restrictions on his holding of more
than one office. The contention that Pacana, as a mere
private citizen, runs afoul of BP Blg. 697 which provides
that governors, or members of sangguniang or
barangay officials, upon filing a certificate of candidacy
be considered on forced leave of absence from office.
When respondent reassumed the position of vicegovernor after the BP elections, he was acting within
the law. Thus, the instant petition is denied.
________________________________________________________

HELD:
The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the
Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez
cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His
appearance could theoretically be for the protection of
his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against
the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez. He had
acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He
acquired them "after the fact", that is, on 30 May 1979,
after the contested election of Directors, after the quo
warranto suit had been filed, and one day before the
scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And
what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
signified his intention to appear as counsel for the
Acero group, but which was objected to by petitioners
Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the
objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the
ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.

PUYAT vs DE GUZMAN
113 SCRA 31
The suit is for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction poised against the Order of
respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), Hon. Sixto T. J. De
Guzman, Jr., granting Assemblyman Estanislao A.
Fernandez leave to intervene in a SEC Case.

Under those facts and circumstances, there has been

an indirect appearance as counsel before an
administrative body, which is a circumvention of the
Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an
afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the
proceedings in some other capacity.

FACTS:
On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of
the International Pipe Industries (IPI), a private
corporation, was held six of the elected directors
were herein petitioners that may be called the Puyat
Group, while the other five were herein respondents,
the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in
control of the Board and of the management of IPI.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the

constitutional
provision
ineffective.
All
an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an
administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the "interest" of the client and then
"intervene" in the proceedings. That which the
Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by
indirection or by a general legislative act which is
intended to accomplish the objects specifically or
impliedly prohibited.

On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC

quo warranto proceedings questioning the election.
Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the
Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds the
appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a
member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as counsel
for the Acero group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973
Constitution, then in force, provided that no
Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx any

Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in

the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the prohibition
contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent
Commissioner's
Order
granting
Assemblyman
Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC Case was
reversed and set aside.
________________________________________________________
BELGICA vs OCHOA

710 SCRA 1
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R.
No. 209251.
FACTS:
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in
the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds
of the members of the Congress. It underwent several
legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to
the latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or
PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in
the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done
in the following manner:

questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel

system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system
is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is
constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is
unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it
violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers

a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house;

broken down to P40 million for hard projects
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools,
etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship
grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to
P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to
P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for
realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members
may request for the realignment of funds into their
department provided that the request for realignment
is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It

regulates the release of funds (power of the purse).
The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws
this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of.
Only the executive may implement the law but under
the pork barrel system, whats happening was that,
after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators
themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF
funds should be allocated to a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted a violation of the
principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older
case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork
barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide
Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel
funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning
the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
The president does have his own source of fund albeit
not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork
barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya
Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been
around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund
which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this
has been around since about 1983.

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in

Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are concerned).
That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by
Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was
delegated to it by the Constitution.

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Exceptions to the rule are:
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged
by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle
blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the
last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system
had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had
been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel
funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that
government funds are being used in legit existing
projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An
audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit
and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of
Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several
others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court

(i) delegated legislative power to local government

units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national
emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of
the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the
individual legislator to identify the projects to which his
PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on

non-delegability of legislative power. The power to

appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the
two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in
the individual members. Further, nowhere in the
exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate
the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is
the power of the president to veto items in the GAA
which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power
is already being undermined because of the fact that
once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now
identify the project to which he will appropriate his
PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto
the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA
again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given
power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to
manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop
their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of
the members of the house of representatives, whats
happening is that a congressman can either bypass or
duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as
his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer)
meddles with the affairs of the local government and
this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the
Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if thats all
that is happening under the pork barrel system but
worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on
the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the
presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides

that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a
General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall
be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of
Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to
be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
________________________________________________________
ABBAS VS SET
166 SCRA 651
FACTS:
This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and
set aside the Resolutions of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988,
denying, respectively, the petitioners' Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for
Reconsideration thereafter filed.
Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were
being asked to inhibit themselves in hearing SET Case
No. 002-87 as they are considered interested parties,
therefore leaving the Senate Electoral Tribunal
senateless, and all remaining members coming from
the judiciary.
ISSUE:
WON the SET can function without the Senator
members.
HELD:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari
for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the
Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or
disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case where he
sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases
would stand in the way of an objective and impartial
judgment.
________________________________________________________
SAMPAYAN vs DAZA
213 SCRA 807
FACTS:

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910,

which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869
(as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs
charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:

Petitioners filed a petition seeking to disqualify Daza,

then incumbent congressman of their congressional
district in Makati, from continuing to exercise the
functions of his office on the ground that the latter is a
greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of
the United States. They also alleged that Mr. Daza has
not by any act or declaration renounced his status as
permanent resident thereby violating the Omnibus
Election Code (Section 68) and the 1987 Constitution
(section 18, Article III).

(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees,

among others, collected from certain energy-related
ventures shall form part of a special fund (the
Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further
finance energy resource development and for other
purposes which the President may direct;

Respondent Congressman filed his Comment denying

the fact that he is a permanent resident of the United
States as evidenced by a letter order of the US
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles,
U.S.A, he had long waived his status when he returned
to the Philippines on August 12, 1985.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork

comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a
particular legislation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified
as a member of the House of Representatives for
violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
RULING:
The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case,
first, the case is moot and academic for it is evident
from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April
6, 1992, that they seek to unseat the respondent from
his position as Congressman for the duration of his
term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending
June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case
rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal.
Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election returns and
qualification of its members.
The petitioners appropriate remedy should have been
to file a petition to cancel respondent Dazas certificate
of candidacy before the election or a quo warranto
case with the House of Electoral Tribunal within ten
days after Dazas proclamation.
________________________________________________________
Bondoc vs. Pineda
201 SCRA 792
FACTS:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano
Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were
candidates for the position of Representative for the
Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed
winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is
composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the
SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of
Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1
member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had
been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda.
Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC
Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to
proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision,
Congressman Camasura received a letter informing
him that he was already expelled from the LDP for
allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of
Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP
members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party.
On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the
Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the
Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP,
the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman
Camasura to the HRET.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the
request of the dominant political party therein, may
change that partys representation in the HRET to
thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by
the tribunal in an election contest pending therein
HELD:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating
the Electoral Commission was to provide an

independent
and
impartial
tribunal
for
the
determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be nonpartisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality and independence
even independence from the political party to which
they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of
party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion
of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman
Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience
vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of
the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the
recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of
discretion, an injustice and a violation of the
Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion
resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of
tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of
congressional election contests, are entitled to security
of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore,
membership in the HRET may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the
members congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political
party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation
with another political party or removal for other valid
cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that
he has formally affiliated with another.
________________________________________________________
PENA V. HRET
G.R. No. 123037
FACTS:
Pena and Abueg were rivals for the Congressional seat
in Palawan during the May 8, 1995 elections.
Apparently, Abueg was proclaimed winner.
On May 22, Pena filed a petition AD CAUTELAM with the
HRET, claiming that the elections in the 2 nd district of
Palawan were tainted with massive fraud, widespread
vote--buying, intimidation and terrorism and other
serious irregularities committed before, during and
after the voting, and during the counting of votes and
the preparation of election returns and certificates of
canvass which affected the results of the election.
Because of these irregularities, Pena stated that he lost
the election by almost 7k votes. He then assailed
Abuegs proclamation.
Abueg filed an answer and a motion to dismiss on June
23, averring that the HRET has not acquired jurisdiction
over the petition, the same being insufficient in form
and substance. In essence, the motion to dismiss
anchors its challenge on the fact that the petition failed
to allege the precincts where the massive fraud and
disenfranchisement of voters occurred, nor did it point

out how many votes would be gained by the protestant

as a result of the same.

raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to

the lapse of the statutory period for filing the protest.

Pena later submitted a list of specific contested

precincts on July 10, or 17 days after Abuegs answer.

Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power

to annul an election should be exercised with the
greatest care as it involves the free and fair expression
of the popular will. It is only in extreme cases of fraud
and under circumstances which demonstrate to the
fullest degree a fundamental and wanton disregard of
the law that elections are annulled, and then only when
it becomes impossible to take any other step.
________________________________________________________

In October, the HRET ruled that while it had jurisdiction

over the petition, as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives, the said
petition, however, fails to state a cause of action, and
is therefore, insufficient in form and substance,
meriting its dismissal.
Pena filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the HRET committed GAOD in dismissing Penas
petition ad cuatelam for lack of substance (which Pena
later cured)? NO.
HELD:
Penas petition lacking substance, dismissal proper
A perusal of the petition Ad Cuatelam, reveals that
petitioner makes no specific mention of the precincts
where widespread election, fraud and irregularities
occurred. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the
very substance of the protest.
The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in
form and substance means that the petition must be
more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations
contained therein are unsupported by even the faintest
whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no
other course than to dismiss the petition, otherwise,
the assumption of an elected public official may, and
will always be held up by petitions of this sort by the
losing candidate.
The defect in the instant case arises from the failure to
allege the contested precincts. Only a bare allegation
of massive fraud, widespread intimidation and
terrorism and other serious irregularities, without
specification and substantiation of where and how
these occurrences took place, appears in the petition.
We cannot allow an election protest based on such
flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise, the whole
election process will deteriorate into an endless stream
of crabs pulling at each other, racing to disembark
from the water.
Substantial amendments may be allowed but must be
within time period (10 days
after winners
proclamation)
The Court has already ruled in Joker P. Arroyo vs. HRET,
that substantial amendments to the protest may be
allowed only within the same period for filing the
election protest, which, under Rule 16 of the HRET
Rules of Procedure is ten (10) days after the
proclamation of the winner.
Exception to liberal construction
While it is conceded that statutes providing for election
contests are to be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officers
may not be defeated by mere technical questions, the
rule likewise stands, that in an election protest, the
protestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had

GUERRERO VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 137004
FACTS:
On May 8, 1998, Farias fi led his Certifi cate of
Candidacy with the COMELEC, substituting
candidate Chevylle V. Farias who withdrew on April
3, 1998.
On May 9, 1998, Ruiz fi led an "Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion To Resolve Petition" with the COMELEC,
attaching thereto a copy of the Certificate of
Candidacy of Farias.
On May 10, 1998, the Second Division of the
COMELEC dismissed Ruizs petition, and stated,
"[T]here is none in the records to consider
respondent an official candidate to speak of without
the filing of said certificate. Hence, there is no
certificate of candidacy to be cancelled, consequently,
no candidate to be disqualified.
On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed through
as scheduled. The post-election tally of votes in
Ilocos Norte showed that Farias got a total of
56,369 votes representing the highest number of votes
received in the first district. Farias was duly proclaimed
winner.
On May 16, 1998, Ruiz filed a motion for
reconsideration, contending that Farias could not
validly substitute for Chevylle V. Farias, since the latter
was not the official candidate of the Lakas ng
Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP), but was
anindependent candidate. Another person cannot
substitute for an independent candidate.
On June 3, 1998, Farias took his oath of offi ce
as a member of the House of Representatives.
On June 10, 1998, petitioner herein filed his "PetitionIn-Intervention" in COMELEC Case No. SPA 98-227.
Petitioner averred that he was the official candidate
of the
Liberal
Party
(LP)
in
said
elections
for Congressman, and stood to be adversely affected
by Case No. SPA 98-227. Guerrero contended that
Farias, having failed to file his Certificate of Candidacy
on or before the last day therefor, being midnight of
March 27, 1998, Farias illegally resorted to the remedy
of substitution provided for under Section 77of the
Omnibus Election Code and thus, Farias disqualification
was in order.
Guerrero then asked that the position of Representative
of the first district of Ilocos Norte be declared vacant

and special elections called for, but disallowing the

candidacy of Farias.
Petitioner Guerrero argues that the refusal of
the COMELEC to rule on the validity or
invalidity of the certifi cate of candidacy of Farias
amounted to grave abuse of discretion on its part. He
claims that COMELEC failed in its Constitutional duty to
uphold and enforce all laws relative to elections.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in holding that the determination of the
validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent
Farias is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunal of the Houseof Representatives, and
whether or not the COMELEC failed in its Constitutional
duty to uphold and enforce all laws relative to
elections.
HELD:
NO. SC found no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the COMELEC when it held that its jurisdiction over
Case No.SPA 98-277 had ceased with the assumption of
office of respondent Farias as Representative for the
first district of Ilocos Norte.
While the COMELEC is vested with the power to
declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its
refusal to exercise that power following the
proclamation and assumption of the position by Farias
is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries
separating the COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives (HRET).
Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the
HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relative to the election, returns, and
qualifications
of
members
of
the
House of
Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office
as a member of the House of Representatives,
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating
to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
Thus, the COMELECs decision to discontinue exercising
jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to
the HRETs own jurisdiction and functions.
________________________________________________________
CODILLA vs DE VENECIA
G.R. NO. 150605
FACTS:
Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and
Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the
position of Representative of the 4th legislative district
of Leyte. A petition for disqualification was filed against
Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election
Code, alleging that he used the equipment and
vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to
extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the
residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the
purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to
vote for him.

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the

disqualification case was still pending so Codillas
name remained in the list of candidates and was voted
for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes.
However, his proclamation as winner was suspended
by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his
disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered
disqualified.
Codillas votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus
proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and
subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed
a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec
and also sought the annulment of Locsins
proclamation.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the
proclamation of a Representative
Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to
recognize Codilla as the legally elected Representative
HELD:
First. The validity of the respondents proclamation was
a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration
seasonably filed by the petitioner.
xxx
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division
suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the
COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to
review the validity of the said Order of the Second
Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet
unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely
filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its
execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the
assumption in office of the respondent as the duly
elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant
case.
xxx
(a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved
by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of
respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged
by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The
issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot
assume jurisdiction over the matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the
doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been
made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is
this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election
contest involving members of the House of
Representatives, could not have been immediately
applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the

very COMELEC pronouncements themselves. This is

because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review
resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether
issued by a division or en banc.
(b)The instant case does not involve the election and
qualification of respondent Locsin.
xxx
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the
grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility
of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that
she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume
office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed
against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed
for having obtained the highest number of votes but
whose eligibility is in question at the time of such
proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin
cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in
the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a
wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her
premature assumption to office as Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the
beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the
respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the
winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.
Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of
office of a winning but nevertheless unproclaimed
candidate
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for
mandamus when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, and there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. For a petition for mandamus to
prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the
petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and
not purely discretionary on the part of the board,
officer or person, and that the petitioner has a welldefined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant
thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary
act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is
one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or
the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide
how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment.
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the
registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of

the House of Representatives representing the 4th

legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of
discretion on the part of the public respondents. The
facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner
garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin
who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001
elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially
ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on
Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set
aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the
proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the
COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this
Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has
become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally
settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional
body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law
demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of
the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law
except the reign of chaos and confusion.
Group 5
GROUP 5 : TACDER-YANONG-COSTAN-INOK-NALA
Commission on Appointments
Cunanan v Tan
5 SCRA 1 (1962)
FACTS:
Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment
of Jorge Tan, Jr. as acting Deputy Administrator of the
ReforestationAdministration.Carlos
Cunananwas
formerly appointed in the same positionbut was later
on rejected by the Commision of Appointment
prompting the President to replace him with Jorge Tan,
Jr. immediately without his consent. Filing the quo
warranto proceeding to the Supreme Court, Cunanan
questions the validity of the convened Commission of
Appointments citing irregularities as to the numbers of
members comprising the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of Jorge Tan, Jr. is
invalid.
HELD:
With the reorganization of the Commission of
Appointment, it was ruled that such is a power vested
in the Congress as they deem it proper taking into
consideration the proportionate numbers of the
members of the Commission of Appointment members
as to their political affiliations.However,with their
reorganization, this affected a third party's right which
they rejected as its result. To correct this, the Supreme
Court declared the reinstatement of the petitioner and
ordered respondent to vacate and turn over the office
in contention.
Case Digest by : Yanong, Maria Anny G.
DAZA V SINGSON
G.R No. 86344
December 21 1989

FACTS:
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political
realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty
four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned
from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its
number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their
former party to only 17 members. On December 5,
1988, the chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members
except the petitioner and including therein respondent
Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this court on January 13, 1989,
to challenge his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the
respondent briefly stated, the contention of the
petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the
Commission on Appointments because his election
thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in
Cunanan v. Tan.
For his part, the respondent argues that the question
raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains
that he has been improperly impleaded, the real part&
respondent being the House of Representatives which
changed its representation in the Commission on
Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he
stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required
that the political party be registered to be entitled to
proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the reorganized LDP can be deemed a
stable political party;
2. Whether it is necessary for the party to be registered
to be entitled to proportional representation in the CA
HELD AND RATIO:
Both petitioner and respondent invoke the case of Cunanan v.
Tan. In the said case, 25 Members of the Nacionalista Party
reorganized themselves and formed the Allied Majority. 3
Nacionalista Congressmen, originally chosen,were deprived of
their seats by colleagues who joined the Allied Majority. Carlos
Cunanans ad interim appointment was rejected by the CA.
Jorge Tan was designated in his place. Cunanan contended the
validity of the rejection. The Court agreed that Allied Majority
was merely a temporary combination; officially, they were still
part of the Nacionalista Party. Thus, the reorganization of the CA
at that time was not based on proportional representation. The
Court held that mere shift of votes should not affect the
organization of the CA, or else, it would forever be at the mercy
of the House of Representatives. The petitioner argues that
LDP is not a permanent party and has not yet achieved
stability. However, the LDP has already been inexistence for a
year. They command the biggest following. They not only
survived but prevailed. Regarding being a duly registered
party, the LDP was granted its registration as a political party
by the COMELEC. Thus, shattering the argument of the
petitioner that registration is required.
Case Digest by : Yanong, Maria Anny G.

Coseteng vs Mitra
(G.R. No.86649) (1990)
FACTS:
Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in
representatives from diverse political parties Petitioner
Anna Dominique Coseteng was the only candidate
elected under the banner of KAIBA.
A year later, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino or
LDP was organized as a political party. As 158 out of
202 members of the House of Representatives formally
affiliated with the LDP, the House committees,
including the House representation in the Commission
on Appointments, had to be reorganized. Petitioner
Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra
requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be
appointed as a member of the Commission on
Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal.
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives,
revised the House majority membership in the
Commission on Appointments to conform with the new
political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP,
with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, however, Congressman
Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member
representing the House minority.
On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this
Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs praying that the
Supreme Court declare as null and void the election of
respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco,
Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat,
Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the
Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from
acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents
from recognizing them as members of the Commission
on Appointments on the theory that their election to
that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of
proportional representation
ISSUE:
1. WON the question raised is political.
2. WON the members of the House in the Commission
on Appointments were chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties
therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
HELD:
1.
No, it is not. The political question issue was
settled in Daza vs. Singson, where this Court ruled that
the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of
filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed
by the Constitution is justiciable, and, even if the
question were political in nature, it would still come
within our powers of review under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1,
of the Constitution, which includes the authority to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been
committed by any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
2.
Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on

Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate,
as ex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve
Members of the House of Representatives elected by
each House on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act
on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission.
The commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.) The composition
of the House membership in the Commission on
Appointments
was
based
on
proportional
representation of the political parties in the House.
There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They
represent 79% of the House membership (which may
be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12
members in the Commission on Appointments would
equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten
(10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats
were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna VeranoYap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority
and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal
opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that
this apportionment of the House membership in the
Commission on Appointments was done on the basis
of proportional representation of the political parties
therein. There is no merit in the petitioners
contention that the House members in the Commission
on Appointments should have been nominated and
elected by their respective political parties. The
petition itself shows that they were nominated by their
respective floor leaders in the House. They were
elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of
their election to the Commission on Appointmentseleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from
the minority-is unassailable.

Commission
be
based
on
the
representation of the political parties.

proportional

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18.
HELD:
We find the respondent's claim to membership
in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and
election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in
accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and therefore violative of the same
because it is not in compliance with the requirement
that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties
represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional
membership of the political parties in the Commission
on Appointments by adding together two halves to
make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional
representation because it will give the LDP an added
member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional
membership of the minority political party, who is
deprived of half a representation.
The Constitution does not require the election and
presence
of
twelve
Senators
and
twelve
Representatives in order that the Commission may
function. Article VI, Section 18 which deals with the
Commission on Appointments, provides that "the
Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the
members", and in Section 19 of the same Article, it is
provided that the Commission "shall meet only while
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a
majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers
and functions as are herein conferred upon it". In
implementing these provisions, the Rules of the
Commission on Appointments provide that the
presence of at least thirteen (13) members is
necessary to constitute a quorum, "Provided however,
that at least four (4) of the members constituting the
quorum should come from either house".

Case Digest by : Yanong, Maria Anny G.

Case Digest by : Yanong, Maria Anny G.

GUINGONA v. GONZALES
214 SCRA 789 (1993)
FACTS:
It is an established fact to which all the parties agree
that the mathematical representation of each of the
political parties represented in the Senate is as follows:
LDP

7.5
LP-PDP-LABAN

.5
NPC

2.5
LAKAS-NUCD 1.5
The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional
half membership into a whole membership of one
senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to
elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's
fractional membership was correspondingly reduced
leaving the latter's representation in the Commission
on Appointments to less than their proportional
representation in the Senate. This is a clearly a
violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in
compliance with its mandate that membership in the

B. Legislative Process
- Requirements as to bills
Valentin Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board
151 SCRA 208
The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill
Delegation of Power Delegation to Administrative
Bodies
FACTS:
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board was
enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to
regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The
said law sought to minimize the economic effects of
piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of
videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie
industry. The proliferation of videograms has
significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from
the movie industry, and that such loss may be
recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of

the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts

payable to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred
that it is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on
gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the
subject matter of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power
to the VRB, an administrative body, because the law
allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other
government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the
said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tios arguments are
correct.

Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another

municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the
Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the
President, recommended to Comelec that the operation
of the statute be suspended until "clarified by
correcting legislation."
4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute
should
be
implemented
unless
declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An
Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios
located in another province Cotabato is
unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject
in the title

HELD: No.
HELD: YES. RA 4790 is null and void
1. The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title
be comprehensive enough to include the general
purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case
at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane
to,
and
is
reasonably
necessary
for
the
accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which
is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB
as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not
inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject
and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the
regulatory
and
control
mechanisms
scattered
throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to
the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was
conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to
seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and
implementation of the law. Besides, in the very
language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to
solicit such assistance is for a fixed and limited
period with the deputized agencies concerned being
subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].
Case Digest by : Tacder , Lovella Fe M.
Lidasan v Comelec
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
Sanchez, J.:
Facts:
1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached
portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for
the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA
4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions
implementing the same for electoral purposes be
nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato are
transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This
brought about a change in the boundaries of the two
provinces.
2.
Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the
municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and
that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo,
Tabangao,
Tiongko,
Colodan
and

1.
The constitutional provision contains dual
limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to
refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is
to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the
legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here
is the second directive. The subject of the statute must
be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional
requirement "breathes the spirit of command."
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation
to read during its deliberations the entire text of the
bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which
became RA 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House where the
bill, being of local application, originated.
2. The Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if
the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire
into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same,
take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not
it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in
express terms where it is clearly inferable from the
details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to
or indicating one subject where another or different
one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of
the act, is bad.
4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" projects

the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur

is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the
slightest intimation is there that communities in the
adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this
new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of
Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion,
makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known
fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose
combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality
of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the
towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of
Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two
municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from
Lanao del Sur.
5.
Finally, the title did not inform the members of
Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang
in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that
part of their territory is being taken away from their
towns and province and added to the adjacent Province
of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as
to what towns and provinces were actually affected by
the bill.
Case Digest by : Tacder , Lovella Fe M.
Requirements as to certain laws
Demetria vs Alba
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
Justice Marcelo Fernan
Procedure: prohibition with prayer
preliminary injunction

for a

writ of

FACTS:
1.) Petitioners filed as concerned citizens of the
country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan
Pambansa representing their millions of constituents,
as parties with general interest common to all the
people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital
interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs
2.) Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the first
paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No.
1177, otherwise known as the Budget Reform Decree
of 1977 on the ff. grounds:
- It infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing
the illegal transfer of public moneys
- It is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify
the objectives and purposes for which the proposed
transfer of funds are to be made
- It allows the President to override the safeguards,
form and procedure prescribed by the Constitution in
approving appropriations
- it amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers
on the transfer of funds by the President and the
implementation thereof by the Budget Minister and the
Treasurer are without or in excess of their authority and
jurisdiction
- The threatened and continuing transfer of funds by
the president and the implementation thereof by the
budget minister and the treasurer of the Philippines are
without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction.
3.) Solicitor General, for the public respondents,
questioned the legal standing of petitioners. He further
contended that:

-The provision under consideration was enacted

pursuant to Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973
Constitution
-Prohibition will not lie from one branch of the
government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the
performance of duties within the latters sphere of
responsibility
4.) On February 27, the Court required petitioners to
file a Reply to the Comment. Petitioners stated that as
a result of the change in the administration, there is a
need to hold the resolution of the present case in
abeyance.
5.) The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion
to dismiss setting forth as ground therefore, abrogation
of Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the
Freedom Constitution, which has allegedly rendered the
petition moot and academic
ISSUES
1. WON the case is justiciable.
2. WON the Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential
Decree No. 1177 is unconstitutional.
HELD
1. The case is justiciable. The court cited Ecelio Javier v.
COMELEC where it said that: This Court will not
disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic
and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot
and academic. - According to Pascual v Secretary of
Public Works, ... taxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by
taxation
and
may
therefore
question
the
constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys..As regards taxpayers suit, this Court
enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or
not (Tan v Macapagal).
- Where the legislature or the executive branch acts
beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the
other branches of the government had assumed to do,
as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred
by the Constitution in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
2. YES. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential
Decree No. 1177, being repugnant to Section 16(5)
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is null and void.
- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: The President
shall have the authority to transfer any fund,
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General Appropriations Act,
to any program, project or activity of any department,
bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment.
- Section 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows: No law
shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President, the Prime
Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions
may by law be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.

- Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical.

For flexibility in the use of public funds, the
Constitution provided a leeway in which the purpose
and condition for which funds may be transferred were
specified.
- The constitution allows the enactment of a law
authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of
augmenting an item from savings in another item in
the appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body concerned
- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 unduly over-extends the
privilege granted under Section 16(5), and empowers
the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from
one department, bureau, office or agency of the
Executive Department, which are included in the
General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, or office included
in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard to whether or not the funds
to be transferred are savings, or whether or not the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to
which the transfer is to be made.
- It completely disregards the standards set in the
fundamental law, amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative power
Case Digest by : Tacder , Lovella Fe M.
Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague
G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991
FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic
appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and
P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise
known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of
P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS
amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is
authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand
Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign
Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the
Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD
No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee
and Payment Positions of the Republic of the
Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of
Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds
For The Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality
of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being
higher than the budget for education, therefore it is
against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution
which mandates to assign the highest budgetary
priority to education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt
service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the
budget for education.
HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV

of the Constitution Congress is mandated to assign
the highest budgetary priority to education, it does
not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the
imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided
only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation,
that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is
not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit
standing of the country. More especially, the very
survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the
process Congress appropriated an amount for debt
service bigger than the share allocated to education,
the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation
cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional
Case Digest by : Tacder , Lovella Fe
PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
FACTS :
This Court is called upon to rule on the conflicting
claims of authority between the Legislative and the
Executive in the clash of the powers of the purse and
the sword. Providing the focus for the contest between
the President and the Congress over control of the
national budget are the four cases at bench. Judicial
intervention is being sought by a group of concerned
taxpayers on the claim that Congress and the President
have
impermissibly
exceeded
their
respective
authorities, and by several Senators on the claim that
the President has committed grave abuse of discretion
or acted without jurisdiction in the exercise of his veto
power.
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of
1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both
houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed,
it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items
of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members
of Congress to propose and identify projects in the
"pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their
respective operating budgets.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill
into law, and declared the same to have become
Republic
Act
No.
7663,
entitled
"AN
ACT
APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE
TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of
1994). On the same day, the President delivered his
Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of
the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain
conditions.
ISSUE:
WON the conditions imposed by the President in the
items of the GAA of 1994 is constitutional:
RULING:
A member of the Senate, and of the House of
Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing
to question the validity of a presidential veto or a
condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without

or in excess of the authority vested on the President by

the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible
intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the
Legislature arises. To the extent the power of Congress
are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury, which can be questioned by a
member of Congress.
It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism
for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy,
however, is available only when the presidential veto is
based on policy or political considerations but not when
the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case,
it becomes the duty of the Court to draw the dividing
line where the exercise of executive power ends and
the bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin.
The Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the
constitutionality of a veto, the same as it will presume
the constitutionality of an act of Congress. The veto
power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a
part of the legislative process. That is why it is found in
Article VI on the Legislative Department rather than in
Article VII on the Executive Department in the
Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge
in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden
shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show
that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
Under his general veto power, the President has to veto
the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the
general veto power is the power given to the President
to veto any particular item or items in a general
appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec.
27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire
item.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
Case Digest by : Nalla, Glene

TOLENTINO VS.SEC. OF FINANCE

G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995
FACTS:
These are motions seeking reconsideration of our
decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for
the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716,
otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax
Law.
The matter was submitted for resolution.
Power of the Senate to propose amendments to
revenue bills.
Some of the petitioners reiterate previous claims made
by them that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution. Although
they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of
Representatives where it passed three readings and
that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after
first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and
Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did
not pass it on second and third readings. Instead what
the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No.
1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner
Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should

have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by striking out

the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of S.
No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House
bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only
the text) of the House bill."
ISSUE:
WON the Senate can propose amendments to revenue
bills.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit.
Art. VI, 24 of our Constitution reads:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
The addition of the word "exclusively" in the Philippine
Constitution and the decision to drop the phrase "as on
other Bills" in the American version, according to
petitioners, shows the intention of the framers of our
Constitution to restrict the Senate's power to propose
amendments to revenue bills.
This is the history of Art. VI, 18 (2) of the 1935
Constitution, from which Art. VI, 24 of the present
Constitution was derived. It explains why the word
"exclusively" was added to the American text from
which the framers of the Philippine Constitution
borrowed and why the phrase "as on other Bills" was
not copied. Considering the defeat of the proposal, the
power of the Senate to propose amendments must be
understood to be full, plenary and complete "as on
other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are required to
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
the Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own
without such bills. After a revenue bill is passed and
sent over to it by the House, however, the Senate
certainly can pass its own version on the same subject
matter. This follows from the coequality of the two
chambers of Congress.
In sum, while Art. VI, 24 provides that all
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills must "originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments." In
the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an
entirely new bill as a substitute measure.
Case Digest by : Nalla, Glene
Group 6
DIGESTS OF THE FOLLOWING LEGISLATIVE CASES:
PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS (110 PHIL
331)
TAN VS. DEL ROSARIO, JR. (237 SCRA 324)
GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (211 SCRA 219)
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS VS CA 237 SCRA 519 (1994)
FABIAN vs. DESIERTO (295 SCRA 471)
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, supra
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ
(235 SCRA 506)
GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, JR. (191 SCRA 452)
SECTION 29.

1. NO MONEY SHALL BE PAID OUT OF THE TREASURY

EXCEPT IN PURSUANCE OF AN APPROPRIATION MADE
BY LAW.
2. NO PUBLIC MONEY OR PROPERTY SHALL BE
APPROPRIATED, APPLIED, PAID, OR EMPLOYED,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, FOR THE USE, BENEFIT, OR
SUPPORT OF ANY SECT, CHURCH, DENOMINATION,
SECTARIAN INSTITUTION, OR SYSTEM OF RELIGION, OR
OF ANY PRIEST, PREACHER, MINISTER, OTHER
RELIGIOUS TEACHER, OR DIGNITARY AS SUCH, EXCEPT
WHEN SUCH PRIEST, PREACHER, MINISTER, OR
DIGNITARY IS ASSIGNED TO THE ARMED FORCES, OR
TO ANY PENAL INSTITUTION, OR GOVERNMENT
ORPHANAGE OR LEPROSARIUM.
3. ALL MONEY COLLECTED ON ANY TAX LEVIED FOR A
SPECIAL PURPOSE SHALL BE TREATED AS A SPECIAL
FUND AND PAID OUT FOR SUCH PURPOSE ONLY. IF THE
PURPOSE FOR WHICH A SPECIAL FUND WAS CREATED
HAS BEEN FULFILLED OR ABANDONED, THE BALANCE,
IF ANY, SHALL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE GENERAL
FUNDS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS (110 PHIL
331)
FACTS:
Wenceslao Pascual, Provincial Governor of Rizal,
instituted an action for declaratory relief, with
injunction, assailing the approval of the Republic Act
No. 920, entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for Public
Works and the Donation made by Jose Zulueta, who at
the time of the passage and approval of the said Act,
was a member of the Senate of the Philippines.
RA 920 (Act appropriating funds for public works) was
enacted in 1953 containing an item (Section 1 c[a]) for
the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals (the
projected and planned subdivision roads, which were
not yet constructed, within Antonio Subdivision owned
by Senator Jose C. Zulueta). Antonio Subdivision was a
private property of Zulueta. Zulueta donated said
parcels of land to the Government 5 months after the
enactment of RA 920, on the condition that if the
Government violates such condition the lands would
revert to Zulueta. The provincial governor of Rizal,
Wenceslao Pascual, questioned the validity of the
donation and the Constitutionality of the item in RA
920, it being not for a public purpose.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the item in RA 920 is constitutional.
Whether or not the donation made by Zulueta was
valid.
HELD:
It is a general rule that the legislature is without power
to appropriate public revenues for anything but a
public purpose. The right of the legislature to
appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax,
under constitutional provisions against taxation except
for public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a

tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to

another purpose, no appropriation of state funds can
be made for other than a public purpose. The validity
of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at
the time of its passage or approval, not upon events
occupying, or acts performed, subsequently thereto,
unless the latter consist of an amendment of the
organic law, removing, with retrospective operation,
the constitutional limitation infringed by said statute.
Herein, inasmuch as the land on which the projected
feeder roads were to be constructed belonged to
Senator Zulueta at the time RA 920 was passed by
Congress, or approved by the President, and the
disbursement of said sum became effective on 20 June
1953 pursuant to Section 13 of the Act, the result is
that the appropriating sough a private purpose and
hence, null and void.
The land on which projected feeder roads are to be
constructed belongs to a private person, an
appropriation made by the Congress for that purpose is
null and void, and a donation to the Government, made
over 5 months after the approval and effectivity of the
Act for the purpose of giving a semblance of legality
to the appropriation, does not cure the basic effect. As
a result, a judicial nullification of said donation need
not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of
said appropriation.
TAN VS. DEL ROSARIO, JR. (237 SCRA 324)
FACTS:
These are two consolidated special civil actions for
prohibition challenge, in G.R. No. 109298, the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, known as
Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme (SNIT),
amending the certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code, and in G.R.109466, the validity
of Sec. 6, Revenue Regulations, promulgated by public
respondents pursuant to the said law.
G.R. No. 109289
Petitioner claims that the enactment of RA 7496 or the
Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme violates the
following provisions of the Constitution:
Article VI Sec. 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
Article VI Sec. 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The Congress shall embrace
evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Article III Sec. 1 No person Shall be deprived of x x
x property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of laws.
The full text of the title of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme reads:
An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation
Scheme For the Self-Employed and Professionals
Engaged In the Practice of Their Profession, Amending
Sections 21 and 29 of the National Revenue Code, as
Amended.
Section 21(f) Tax on Citizens and Residents indicate, a
tax is imposed upon the taxable net income of selfemployed and/or professionals engaged in the practice
of their profession in accordance to the tax schedule

provided by the law. The Schedular approach is a

system employed where the income tax treatment
varies and made to depend on the kind or category of
taxable income of the taxpayer. Section 29 Deductions
from Gross Income indicate specific direct costs that
are allowed to be deducted from the taxable income.
Petitioner asserts that RA 7496 attempts to tax single
proprietorship and professionals differently from the
manner it imposes tax on corporations and
partnerships and thus violates Article VI Sec. 28(1) of
the Constitution. The Court views the legislative intent
of the amendatory law to increasingly shift the income
tax system towards the schedular approach in the
income taxation of individual taxpayers and to
maintain, by large, the present global treatment on
taxable corporations. Global treatment is a system
where the tax treatment views indifferently the tax
base and generally treats in common all categories of
taxable income of the taxpayer.
Petitioner gives an extensive discussion on the merits
of the law, illustrating, what he believes to be an
imbalance between the tax liabilities of those covered
and those who are not by the amendatory law.
G.R. No. 109446
The questioned regulation reads:
Sec. 6. General Professional Partnership The general
professional partnership (GPP) and the partners
comprising the GPP are covered by RA 7596. Thus, in
determining the net profit of the partnership, only the
direct costs mentioned in said law are to be deducted
from partnership income. Also, the expense paid or
incurred by partners in their individual capacities in the
practice of their profession which are not reimbursed or
paid by the partnership but are considered direct costs,
are not deductible from his gross income.
The objection of the petitioner lies is focused on the
administrative interpretation of public respondents that
would apply RA 7496 or SNIT to partners in general
professional partnerships.
According to the National Internal Revenue Code,
partnerships are either taxable partnerships or
exempt partnerships. The GPP is an example of an
exempt partnership and that it cannot be similarly
identified as corporations nor even considered as
independent taxable entities for income tax purposes.
The Code states that a general professional partnership
must be formed for the sole purpose of exercising a
common profession, no part of the income of which is
derived from its engaging in any trade business;
otherwise, it is subject to tax as an ordinary business
partnership or, which is to say, as a corporation and
thereby subject to the corporate income tax. A general
professional partnership, unlike an ordinary business
partnership (which is treated as a corporation for
income tax purposes and so subject to the corporate
income tax), is not itself an income taxpayer. Here,
partners themselves, not the partnership (although it is
still obligated to file an income tax return [mainly for
administration and data]), are liable for the payment of
income tax in their individual capacity computed in
their respective and distributive shares of profit.
ISSUES:

In G.R. No. 109289, whether or not RA 7496 or the

Simplified
Net
Income
Taxation
Scheme
is
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 109446, whether or not public respondents
have exceeded their authority in promulgating Sec. 6,
Revenue Regulations, to carry out RA 7496.
HELD:
NO. Petitions are dismissed.
G.R. No. 109289
Article VI Sec. 26(1) of the Constitution has been
envisioned so as (a) to prevent log-rolling legislation
intended to unite the members of the legislature who
favor any one of unrelated subjects in support of the
whole act, (b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the
legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people, through
such publications of its proceedings as are usually
made, of the subjects of legislation. The above
objectives of the fundamental law appear to us have
been sufficiently met.
The contention that RA 7496 violates Article VI Sec.
28(1) clearly forgets that such a system of income
taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to
RA 7496. Uniformity of taxation merely requires that all
subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to
be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities.
Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as:
(a) the standards that are used are substantial and not
arbitrary, (b) the categorization is germane to achieve
the legislative purpose, (c) the law applies, all things
being equal, to both present and future conditions, and
(d) the classification applies equally well to all those
belonging to the same class. This classification implied
in the legislative intent of the amendatory law to
increasingly shift the income tax system towards the
schedular approach in the income taxation of individual
taxpayers and to maintain, by large, the present global
treatment on taxable corporations is not arbitrary and
inappropriate.
On the point raised by the petitioner on what he views
as an imbalance between the tax liabilities of those
covered and not covered by the amendatory law, the
court cannot freely delve into those matters which, by
constitution fiat, rightly rests on the legislative
department. With the legislature primarily lies the
discretion to determine the nature (kind), object
(purpose), extent (rate), coverage (subjects), and situs
(place) of taxation.
The due process clause may be correctly invoked only
when there is a clear contravention of inherent or
constitutional limitations in the exercise of tax power.
No such transgression is so evident to the Court.
G.R. No. 109446
Under the Tax Code, the general professional
partnership is deemed to be no more than a mere
mechanism or a flow-through entity in the generation
of income by, and the ultimate distribution of such
income to, respectively, each of the individual partners.
Section 6 of the Revenue Regulation, alleged to carry
out RA 7496, did not alter, but merely confirmed, the
above standing rule as now so modified by RA 7496 on

basically the extent of allowable deductions applicable

to all individual income taxpayers on their noncompensation income.
There is no evident intention of the law, either before
or after the amendatory legislation, to place in unequal
footing or in significant variance the income tax
treatment of professionals who practice their
respective professions individually and of those who do
it through a general professional partnership.
SECTION 28.
1. THE RULE OF TAXATION SHALL BE UNIFORM AND
EQUITABLE. THE CONGRESS SHALL EVOLVE A
PROGRESSIVE SYSTEM OF TAXATION.
2. THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, AUTHORIZE THE
PRESIDENT TO FIX WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS, AND
SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS AS
IT MAY IMPOSE, TARIFF RATES, IMPORT AND EXPORT
QUOTAS, TONNAGE AND WHARFAGE DUES, AND OTHER
DUTIES OR IMPOSTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE
NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM
OF
THE
GOVERNMENT.
3. CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, CHURCHES AND
PERSONAGES OR CONVENTS APPURTENANT THERETO,
MOSQUES, NON-PROFIT CEMETERIES, AND ALL LANDS,
BUILDINGS, AND IMPROVEMENTS, ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY,
AND EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE,
OR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM
TAXATION.
4. NO LAW GRANTING ANY TAX EXEMPTION SHALL BE
PASSED WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF A MAJORITY
OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS.
GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (211 SCRA
219)
FACTS:
Nov 27, 1990, President issued EO 438 which imposed,
additional 5% taxes and charges for imports including
crude oil and other oil products. Subsequently
increased to 9% by EO 443 on Jan 3, 1991. On July 24
1991, Dept of Finance requested Tariff Commission (TC)
to initiate the process required by the Tariff and
Customs Code for the imposition of a levy for crude oil
and other petroleum products covered by Sec 104 of
Tariff and Customs Code as amended. TC scheduled a
public hearing to give interested parties an opportunity
to be heard and to present evidence in support of their
respective positions. Meantime, EO 475 was issued on
Aug 15, 1991 reducing taxes to 5% except for the
crude oil and other products which remained at 9%.
After the hearing, the President issued EO 478 on Aug
23, 1991 which levied a special duty of P.95/liter or
P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per
liter of imptd oil products.
Petitioner assails the validity of EO 475, 478 and
argues that they are violative of Sec 24, Article VI of
1987 Constitution which states that all appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills for the increase of public
debt, bills of local application and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,

but the Senate may propose or concur with

amendments. (Not the president). Vilative also of Sec.
401 which authorizes the president for such act only to
protect local industries but not the purpose of raising
addtl revenue for the govt.
ISSUE:
1) constitutionality of EO 475 and 478 2) legality of EO
475 and 478
DECISION:
Prohibition and /mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Costs against the petitioner
RATIO:
1) it does not follow that EO 475 and 478 are prohibited
to the President. Accdg to, Sec28, (2) of Article VI of
the Constitution , the Congress may by law authorize
the President to fix within special limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the
Government.
The Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and Sec
104 and 401 are the provisions which the President
invoked in promulgating EO 475 and 478
Sec 104- imptd articles have to pay the rates of duty
indicated in this Section
Sec 401- A.for the interest of national economy,
general welfare/ national security and subject to the
limitations, the president, upon the recommendation of
NEDA is empowered to a) increase not lower than the
basic of 10% nor higher than 100% or remove rates b)
to establish quota 30 to impose addtl duty
B. public hearing
recommendation

by

the

Commission

before

C. the power of the President to increase or decrease

rates
There is nothing in Sec 104 or of 401 that suggests an
absolute authority. Custom duties in the name given to
taxes on the importation and exportation of
commodities. the levying of custom duties protects
local industries and simultaneously produces govt
revenues. Increased tariffs in the case at bar must
have protected the local crude oil industry as well.
Protection of consumers is an impt dimension of the
national economy, general welfare and national
security and so customs duties may be reduced or
removed for the purpose of protecting consumers from
the high prices that may be otherwise impose upon the
community.
SECTION 30.
NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED INCREASING THE
APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT AS
PROVIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION WITHOUT ITS
ADVICE AND CONCURRENCE.
FIRST LEPANTO v. CA 237 SCRA 519

FACTS:
This is a MR of the previous case.
Petitioner's
contention is that Circular No. 1-91 cannot be deemed
to have superseded art. 82 of the Omnibus
Investments
Code
of
1987
(E.O.
No. 226) because the Code, which President Aquino
promulgated in the exercise of legislative authority, is
in the nature of a substantive act of Congress defining
the jurisdiction of courts pursuant to Art. VIII, 2 of the
Constitution.

against him on July 24, 1995. She sought Agustins

dismissal for violating Sec 19, RA no. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Sec 36 of PD no. 807
(Civil Service Decree)
Jan 31, 1996: Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez
issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty of
grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. But
Deputy Ombudsman, Hon. Jesus F. Guerrero,

RULING:
YES (as in previous case). Art. 78 of the Omnibus
Investment Code on Judicial Relief was thereafter
amended by B.P. Blg. 129, 3 by granting in 9 thereof
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the CA over the
decisions and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies.
When the Omnibus Investments Code was promulgated
on July 17, 1987, the right to appeal from the decisions
and final orders of the BOI to the Supreme Court was
again granted.
By then, however, the present
Constitution had taken effect. 4 The Constitution now
provides in Art. VI, 30 that "No law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice
and concurrence." This provision is intended to give the
Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed
under its appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and
thereby undermine its essential function of expounding
the law in its most profound national aspects.
Now, art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code,
by providing for direct appeals to the Supreme Court
from the decisions and final orders of the BOI,
increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Since
it was enacted without the advice and concurrence of
this Court, this provision never became effective, with
the result that it can never be deemed to have
amended BPBlg. 129, 9.

exonerated
private respondent from
the administrative charges.
Based from Sec 7 of Rule III of AO No. 7 (Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), when a
respondent is absolved from all administrative charges,
the decision of the ombudsman is FINAL AND
UNAPPEALABLE.
Fabian is arguing that the Office of the Ombudsman
has no authority under the law to restrict, in the
manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of
appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit
the power of review of this Court. For Sec. 27 of RA No.
6770 states that all administrative disciplinary cases of
the Office of Ombudsman MAY BE APPEALED TO THE
SC by filling a petition of certiorari within 10 days from
the receipt of the written notice of the order in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
But RA no. 6770 violates Sec 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that no law shall be
passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC
as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
consent.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and
orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected
unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the
appellate court is involved in which case it may be
raise at any time or on the courts own motion. Thus, if
a statute on which a courts jurisdiction in a proceeding
depends is unconstitutional, the court has no
jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it
necessarily follows that it may inquire into the
constitutionality of the statute.

FABIAN vs. DESIERTO (295 SCRA 471)

ISSUE:

FACTS:

Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides

for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from
the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is valid.

ISSUES:
W/n Mariwasa correctly filed its appeal with the CA.

Teresita Fabian was the major stockbroker and

president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the
construction business. Private respondent, Nestor V.
Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First
Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED).
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government
construction projects including those under the FMED,
and Agustin, reportedly taking advantage of his official
position, inveigled Fabian into an amorous relationship,
which lasted for some time. During the said
relationship, Agustin gifted PROMAT with public works
contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning
the same in his office.
When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship,
private
respondent
refused
and
resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of
employing acts of harassment, intimidation and
threats. Eventually, Fabian filed an administrative case

RATIO:
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought
through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in
Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders
of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the CA on a verified petition for review,
under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43
which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide
for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasijudicial agencies.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an
appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art.
VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the

appellate jurisdiction of the SC. Otherwise, the

indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the
Court
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that
said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which,
being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by
this Court under its rule-making power, especially if it
results in a diminution, increase or modification of
substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law
is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing
consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue
against the exercise of the rule-making power of this
Court. This brings to fore the question of whether
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or
procedural.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
a disregard or infraction of them.
If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. But if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals
merely with procedure
If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it
may be classified as a substantive matter.
For this reason a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases
involving a review of decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to
the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with
exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to
procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to
appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the
law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure
by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been
changed.
Therefore, it has been generally held that rules or
statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to
another, are procedural and remedial merely and that,
as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the
time the statute went into effect or, in the case at bar,
when its invalidity was declared.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7,
Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any
other provision of law or issuance implementing the
aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby
declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred
to the Court of Appeals for final disposition, with said
petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro
hoc vice as a petition for review under Rule 43.
TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, SUPRA
FACTS:

Some of the petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc.,

Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)) reiterate
previous claims made by them that R.A. No. 7716,
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, (which seeks to widen
the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance
its administration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code.) did not "originate exclusively" in the
House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of
the Constitution.
Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the
House of Representatives where it passed three
readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate
where after first reading it was referred to the Senate
Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the
Senate did not pass it on second and third readings.
Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own
version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24,
1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate
committee should have done was to amend H. No.
11197 by striking out the text of the bill and
substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it
is said, "the bill remains a House bill and the Senate
version just becomes the text (only the text) of the
House bill."
ISSUES:
1. WON RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of
the Constitution.
2. WON the Senate bill violated the three readings on
separate days requirement of the Constitution.
HELD:
1. No. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the
bill which initiated the legislative process culminating
in the enactment of the law must substantially be the
same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates
power not only to concur with amendments but also to
propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution
simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the
public debt, private bills and bills of local application
must come from the House of Representatives on the
theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the
Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a
body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The power of the Senate to propose or concur
with amendments is apparently without restriction. It
would seem that by virtue of this power, the Senate
can practically re-write a bill required to come from the
House and leave only a trace of the original bill.
2. No. Article VI, Section 26, Para 2 enumerate an
instance wherein a bill may not require to pass the
three reading requirements, which is "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." President had certified S. No. 1630 as
urgent. Apparently, the members of the Senate
(including some of the petitioners in these cases)
believed that there was an urgent need for
consideration of S. No. 1630, because they responded
to the call of the President by voting on the bill on
second and third readings on the same day.
Hence, the presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. That upon the
certification of a bill by the President the requirement

of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and

distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the
weight of legislative practice.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ENRIQUEZ (235 SCRA 506)

ASSOCIATION

VS.

FACTS:
RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General
Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled An Act
Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the
Government of the Philippines from January 1 to
December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes was
approved by the President and vetoed some of the
provisions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a
member of Congress to realign his allocation for
operational expenses to any other expense category
claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the
Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised
before the Supreme Court.
PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare
unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide
Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of
the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the
Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and
Management and the National Treasurer and questions:
1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the
President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the
constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in
the appropriation for debt services.
Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of
the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the
same
respondents.
Petitioners
contest
the
constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions
added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and
DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President
in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGUs, DPWH, and Natl Highway Authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the president on four
special provisions is constitutional and valid?
HELD:
Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided
for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the
entire appropriation for debt service. The said
provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/
debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot
be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation.
VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said
provision allows for the use of income & creation of
revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas
State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres.
Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so by existing
law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law.
VETO VALID.

Special Provision on Road Maintenance Congress

specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of roads
be contracted according to guidelines set forth by
DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire
appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is
not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be
veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO
VOID.
Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. AFP
modernization, prior approval of Congress required
before release of modernization funds. It is the socalled legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin.
action in implementing a law or requiring legislative
approval must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions
allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through
the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only
the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a
specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of
CAFGUs use of special fund for the compensation of
the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior
approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD
No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an
appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend
existing laws. VETO VALID.
SECTION 27.
1. EVERY BILL PASSED BY THE CONGRESS SHALL,
BEFORE IT BECOMES A LAW, BE PRESENTED TO THE
PRESIDENT. IF HE APPROVES THE SAME HE SHALL SIGN
IT; OTHERWISE, HE SHALL VETO IT AND RETURN THE
SAME WITH HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE HOUSE WHERE IT
ORIGINATED, WHICH SHALL ENTER THE OBJECTIONS AT
LARGE IN ITS JOURNAL AND PROCEED TO RECONSIDER
IT. IF, AFTER SUCH RECONSIDERATION, TWO-THIRDS OF
ALL THE MEMBERS OF SUCH HOUSE SHALL AGREE TO
PASS THE BILL, IT SHALL BE SENT, TOGETHER WITH
THE OBJECTIONS, TO THE OTHER HOUSE BY WHICH IT
SHALL LIKEWISE BE RECONSIDERED, AND IF APPROVED
BY TWO-THIRDS OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THAT
HOUSE, IT SHALL BECOME A LAW. IN ALL SUCH CASES,
THE VOTES OF EACH HOUSE SHALL BE DETERMINED BY
YEAS OR NAYS, AND THE NAMES OF THE MEMBERS
VOTING FOR OR AGAINST SHALL BE ENTERED IN ITS
JOURNAL. THE PRESIDENT SHALL COMMUNICATE HIS
VETO OF ANY BILL TO THE HOUSE WHERE IT
ORIGINATED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF
RECEIPT THEREOF, OTHERWISE, IT SHALL BECOME A
LAW AS IF HE HAD SIGNED IT.
2. THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO VETO
ANY
PARTICULAR
ITEM
OR
ITEMS
IN
AN
APPROPRIATION, REVENUE, OR TARIFF BILL, BUT THE
VETO SHALL NOT AFFECT THE ITEM OR ITEMS TO
WHICH HE DOES NOT OBJECT.
GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, JR. (191 SCRA 452)
FACTS:
Petition for prohibition/mandamus attacking
constitutionality of presidential veto of section 55.

the

Section 55 of the General Appropriations Bill FY 1989

Sec. 55. Prohibition against the restoration or increase
of recommended appropriations disapproved and/or
reduced by congress: no item of appropriation
recommended by the president in the budget
submitted to congress pursuant to article VII, section
22 of the constitution which has been disapproved or
reduced in this act shall be restored or increased by
the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes
by augmentation. An item of appropriation for any
purpose recommended by the presided in the
budgetshall be deemed to have been disapproved by
congress if no corresponding appropriation for the
specific purpose is provided in this act.
Dec 16, 1988; congress passed general appropriations
bill for FY 1989. Dec 29, 1988; president signed the bill
into law but vetoed 7 special provisions and section 55
which is a general provision. The reason of the
president in vetoing such section is because it violates
Article 6, Section 25 (5) of the constitution.
Furthermore, section 55 not only nullify the
constitutional and statutory authority of the president,
but also the senate president, speaker of the house,
chief justice, and the heads of the constitutional
commissions to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings
in
other
items
of
their
respective
appropriations. Feb 2, 1989; congress mentioned in a
resolution that the veto by the president of section 55
is unconstitutional which means section 55 will be in
effect.
April
11,
1989;
petition
for
prohibition/mandamus was filed. A similar provision
was vetoed by the president. It appears in the general
appropriations act of 1990. Instead of section 55, such
provision was located in section 16 of the said bill. It
must be noted that the 1989 appropriations act, the
use of savings appears in section 12, separate and
apart from section 55; whereas in the 1990
appropriations act, the use of savings and the vetoes
provision have been comingled in section 16 only, with
the vetoed provision made to appear as a condition or
restriction.
The petitioners cause is anchored on the following:
The presidents veto power does not Cover provisions,
that she exceeded her authority when she vetoed sec
55 (FY 89) and sec 16 (FY 90) because they are
provisions
When the president objects to a provision, she cannot
item-veto but instead veto the entire bill
The item-veto power does not carry with it the power
to strike out conditions or restrictions
The power of augmentation in article 6, section 25 (5)
of the constitution has to be provided for by law, which
means the congress has also the power to determine
restrictions
The veto power of the president can be found in article
6, section 27, of the constitution.

which are all provisions, is unconstitutional and without

effect.
DECISION:
Petition dismissed. The questioned presidential veto is
constitutional.
RATIO:
The argument that the president may not veto a
provision without vetoing the entire bill disregards the
basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a
bill may be the subject of a separate veto. The same
argument also overlooks the constitutional mandate
that such provision is only limited in its operation to
some particular appropriation which it relates as stated
in article 6 section 25 (2) of the constitution.
The constitution is a limitation upon the power of the
legislative, and in this respect it is a grant of power in
the executive. The legislative has the affirmative power
to enact laws; the chief executive has the negative
power by the constitutional exercise of which he may
defeat the will of the legislature. It follows that the
chief executive must find his authority in the
constitution. Thus, such act of the president is
constitutional and does not hamper with the legislative
function.
Settled is the rule that the executive is not allowed to
veto a condition or restriction of an appropriation while
allowing the appropriation itself to stand. For this rule
to apply, conditions or restrictions should be such in
the real sense of the term, not some matter which are
more properly dealt with in a separate legislation.
Restrictions or conditions in an appropriations bill must
exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary
sense in the schedule of expenditures.
With this, section 55 (FY 89) and section 16 (FY 90) are
held to be inappropriate conditions. They are general
law measures more appropriate for separate
legislation. They do not show the necessary connection
with a schedule of expenditures. Considering that
section 55 (FY 89) and section 16 (FY 90) are not really
conditions, they can be vetoed by the president.
If the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto
powers by the executive were unconstitutional, the
remedy laid down by the constitution is crystal clear. A
presidential veto may be overridden by the votes of
two-thirds of members of congress as stated in article
6, section 27 (1) of the constitution.
Group 7
BENGZON VS. DRILON
208, SCRA 133

ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto by the president of section 55
of the 1989 appropriations bill and subsequently of its
counterpart section 16 of the 1990 appropriations bill,

Facts:

In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e.

Whether or not the veto of the President on that

Republic Act No. 1797) that were repealed during the

portion

time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old

constitutional

of

the

General

Appropriations

bill

is

laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired

judges, justices, and members of the constitutional

Rulings:

commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these

laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among
government

officials.

However,

President

Corazon

Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the

ground that the law should not give preferential
treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed
a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to
readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797
was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said
PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were
subject of the case of Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, the
repealing law never existed due to non publication and
in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme
Court then readjusted their pensions.

General

Appropriations

Bill

(GAB) for

1992,

Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of

retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in
the following manner: Congress made an item entitled:
General

Fund

Adjustment;

accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to

Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The
president has no power to set aside and override the
decision of the Supreme Court neither does the
president have the power to enact or amend statutes
promulgated by her predecessors much less to the
repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is
unconstitutional since the power of the president to
disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill
does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and
to approve the remaining portion of said item. It
appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed

Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in

the

No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the

included

therein

are

allotments to unavoidable obligations in different

branches of the government; among such obligations is
the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the

some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot

be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in
its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an
entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case,
the president did not veto the entire line item of the
general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the
portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices
but did not veto the other items covering obligations to
the other departments of the government.

judiciary. However, President Aquino again vetoed the

said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired
justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that
that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when
she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired

INS VS CHADHA

judges and justices to question the constitutionality of

the veto made by the President. The President was

462 U.S. 919 (1983)

represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin

Drilon.
Issue:

FACTS

An immigration law passed by Congress holds that the

attorney general can suspend the deportation of an
illegal immigrant if the immigrant would sustain
severe hardship as a result. Additionally, if either the
Senate or House of Representatives voted by majority
to veto the attorney generals decision regarding
deportation. Chadha was a student who had remained
in the US with an expired Visa. The attorney general
held that he should remain in the US due to hardship.
The House of Representatives vetoed the decision to
grant amnesty, thereby sustaining the deportation
order. Chadha brought this litigation after the
legislative veto.
ISSUE

Miller filed with the Court of First Instance of

Baguio a petition praying for judgment prohibiting
Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo from proceeding
with the case, for the reason that said Hearing Officer
had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject
matter of the complaint. He question the validity of
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, prepared and submitted
by the Government Survey and Reorganization
Commission under the authority of Republic Act No.
997, as amended by R.A 1241, insofar as it confers
jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department
of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of
laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay.

Whether a single house can vote to override an

executive decision such that it violates the principle of
separation of powers.

ISSUE:

HELD
Yes, Act invalidated. The court recognize the argument
of efficiency regarding a single house vote.
Efficiency is achieved by this measure because the
attorney general may frequently override deportation
and calling both houses of the legislature to vote for
each instance would be time consuming and
burdensome. However, the constitution is very clear
that legislative decisions are to be bicameral. There
are reasons relating to fair representation of states that
maintain this justification as paramount, particularly
when weighed against arguments of efficiency. The
act of overriding an executive veto is inherently
legislative and therefore requires bicameral, legislative
support.

Whether or not Reorganization Plan No. 20-A

confers judicial power to the Regional Offices over
cases other than these falling under the Workmens
Compensation on Law, invalid and of no effect?

HELD:
YES. The functions referred to in R.A 1241
which could thus be created, obviously refer merely to
Administrative, not judicial functions. For the
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission
was created to carry out the reorganization of the
Executive Branch of the National Government which
plainly did not include the creation of courts. If a
statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be
clear in its terms when clothing administrative bodies
with quasi-judicial function, then certainly such
conferment cannot be implied from a mere grant of
power to a body such as the Government Survey and
Reorganization Commission to create functions in
connection with the reorganization of the Executive
Branch of the Government.

Bowsher v. Synar
Miller vs Mardo
2 SCRA 898

FACTS:
Manuel Gonzales filed with Regional Office No.3
of the Department of Labor, in Manila, a complaint
against Bill Miller, owner and manager of Miller Motors,
claiming to be a driver of Miller from December 1, 1956
to October 31, 1957, on which latter date he was
allegedly arbitrarily dismissed without being paid
separation pay.

United States Supreme Court

478 U.S. 714 (1986)

Facts:
In 1985, Congress passed the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act with the goal of
reducing the federal budget deficit. A minimum
acceptable amount was calculated for the budget
deficit. If the actual deficit exceeded this amount,
Congress authorized the Comptroller General to
recommend mandatory budget cuts that would then be
executed by the President of the United States.

However, Congress retained ultimate removal power

over the Comptroller General and could remove this
official from office for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance. Synar, a Congressman, challenged the
constitutionality of the Act in federal district court
against Bowsher , the Comptroller General, on the
ground that the Act violated the separation of powers
doctrine.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Comptroller General is controlled
by Congress?
2. Whether or not the Comptroller General had been
assigned in executive powers in the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985?
Held:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States zeroed
in on the specific language of the Budget and
Accounting Act. Because so many of the provisions of
the Act placed the Comptroller General firmly under
Congressional control, specifically removal authority,
the Court concluded that the General may not be
entrusted with executive powers.
2. Yes. The Court, again paying attention to the specific
provisions of the act, found that the office was the very
essence of execution of the law. Under the law, the
Comptroller
General
must
exercise
judgment
concerning facts that affect the application of the Act.
He must also interpret the provisions of the Act to
determine precisely what budgetary calculations are
required. The Court concluded that Congress in effect
has retained control over the execution of the Act and
has intruded into the executive function. Justice
Whites dissent focused on what he saw as the Courts
attaching dispositive significance to what should be
regarded as a triviality. Justice Blackmuns dissent
argued that the original statute should have been
found unconstitutional. Justice Stevens, joined by
Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment, focusing
on Article I of the Constitution.

applied for since that is already the function of the

executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president
of some provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house
of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead,
Senators Wigberto Taada and Alberto Romulo sought
the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus
against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al.
Taada et al contest the constitutionality of: (1) the
veto on four special provisions added to items in the
GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by
the President in the implementation of certain
appropriations for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the
National Housing Authority (NHA).
Issues:
Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid
Rulings:
In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress
acted within its power and that the CDF is
constitutional. In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed
the other petitions and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and
compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The
president particularly vetoed the debt reduction
scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the
scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation
and may be more properly addressed by revising the
debt policy. He, however did not delete the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et
al averred that the president cannot validly veto that
provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The
veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed
provision is considered inappropriate; in fact the Sc
found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect
repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation
as a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs

THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS

ENRIQUEZ
235 SCRA 506

Facts:
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to
question the veto authority of the president involving
the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the
constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine
Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the
countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that
Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot
specify the items as to which those funds would be

The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges

(SUCs), the President vetoed special provisions which
authorize the use of income and the creation, operation
and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise
vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were
already funds allotted for the same in the National
expenditure Program. Taada et al claimed this as
unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for
it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided
double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30%
(contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it
may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The
funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some
existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special

Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision

which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the
appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other
hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended
70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The
1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of
special provisions, conditions to items in an
expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately
from the items to which they relate so long as they are
appropriate in the budgetary sense. The veto herein
is then not valid.

Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for

purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the
said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional
mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations,
and if allowed, shall effectively alter the original intent
of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military
equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP.
The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an
administrative action in implementing a law or
requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be
incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.
Therefore, being inappropriate provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP
pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and
separation benefits should be covered by direct
appropriations specifically approved for the purpose
pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to
use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in
Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC
retained the veto per reasons provided by the
president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs
including the payment of separation benefits. The
President declared in his Veto Message that the
implementation of this Special Provision to the item on
the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential
approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by
the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it
would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.

compensation standardization. Taada et al claim that

the conditions imposed by the President violated the
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme
court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC
sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions
questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by
Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message
merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that
additional or indirect compensation can only be given
pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements
are mere reminders that the disbursements of
appropriations must be made in accordance with law.
Such statements may, at worse, be treated as
superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The
Congressmen, being representatives of their local
districts know more about the problems in their
constituents areas than the national government or the
president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge,
the Congressmen are in a better position to
recommend as to where funds should be allocated.

TAADA v. TUVERA
[136 SCRA 27 (1985)]
Facts:
The petitioner seek a writ of mandamus to
force the respondent public offi cial to pursue
mandatorily a publication in the Offi cial Gazette of
various Special Laws and other Orders to inform
every individual or people bound in such laws
pursuant to Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution. In view thereon, the respondents
would have this case dismissed on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring this
petition.
Petitioners argue that since the subject of
the petition concerns a public right and its object
is to oblige public duty, they need not show any
specific interest.

Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court,

etc
In his veto message: The said condition is consistent
with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under
Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states
that no elective or appointive public officer or
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation unless specifically authorized by law. I
am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said
offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully
adhere
to
the
well-established
principle
on

Respondents more contend that publication

in the Offi cial Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws, where the
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates.

Issue:

Whether or Not publication in the Offi cial

Gazatte

is

an

essential

requirement

for

the

This is a case raised in the instant Petition

for

Prohibition

with

Petition

for

Preliminary

effectivity of the various Special Laws and Orders,

Injunction and application for Ex Parte Temporary

where

Restraining Order.

laws

themselves

provide

for

their

own

effectivity dates.
On
Held:

1985,

the

Central

Bank

of

the

Philippines filed with Branch 39 of the Regional

Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the
Yes. It is the matter of the peoples right to

be informed on public concern and to have access

to

offi cial

records,

and

other

documents

and

papers pertaining to offi cial acts, transactions, or

decisions, shall be afforded and affects the citizens
subject to such limitation as may be provided by

Liquidation
Thereafter,
Employees

of

the

the

Philippine

Veterans

Philippine

Union-N.U.B.E.,

Veterans
herein

Bank.
Bank

petitioner,

represented by petitioner Perfecto V. Fernandez,

filed claims for accrued and unpaid employee
wages and benefits with said court.

law under 6 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.

The petitioners moved to disqualify the
The laws may be valid and enforceable,
must be published in the Offi cial Gazette and or

respondent judge from hearing the above case on

grounds of bias and hostility towards petitioners.

otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a

Special Law or Order, states its date of eff ectivity

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted

does not preclude their publication in the Offi cial

R.A.

Gazette,

Philippine Veterans Bank. It was published in the

as

they

constitute

vital

role

in

the

legislative acts.

7169

providing

for

the

rehabilitation

of

Offi cial Gazette in February 24, 1992. Thereafter,

petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their

The publication of presidential issuances

of public nature or of general applicability is a

residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement

upon reopening the bank.

requirement of due process, mandatorily. Before a

person may be bound by law, he must first be
offi cially informed of its contents to the public.

Despite

the

legislative

mandate

for

rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, respondent

judge continued with the liquidation proceedings of

The SC judgment, the respondents ordered

to publish in Offi cial Gazette all unpublished Laws
and Orders of general application, and unless so
published shall have no binding force and its
effectivity.

the

Moreover,

petitioners

learned

that

respondents were set to order the payment and

release

of

employee

benefits

upon

motion

of

another lawyer, while petitioners claims have

been frozen to their prejudice.

The Publication in the Offi cial Gazette is

enforceability of a statute.

bank.

Petitioners argue that with the passage of

the

R.A.

7169,

the

liquidation

court

became functus offi cio, and no longer had the

authority to carry on with liquidation proceedings.
Philippine Veterans Bank Employee Union
versus Judge Vega
[G.R. No. 105364, June 28, 2001]

FACTS:

In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a

certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen
despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and
reopening,

Judge

Vega

liquidation

proceedings

continued
of

the

bank

with

the

alleging

further that the RA 7169 turn into effective only on

March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in

the Offi cial Gazette on February 24, 1992 as

required by law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A. 7169 became the
application of said Special Law be effective on
January 2, 1992.
RULING:
Yes. The RA 7169 clearly provided that it
should take eff ect upon its approval. The head of
state signed it on January 2, 1992. Hence, the said
law became effective its application on said date.
Its succeeding publication was not necessary for
its effectivity but for compliance. The nature of the
said Special Laws is internal and not have general
application, as a result, it took effect on the date
provided for, and for this reason was rightfully
invoked by the petitioners.
The Supreme Court upheld that while as a
rule

laws

completion

take effect
of

their

after

15 days

publication

in

following

the

Offi cial

Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in

the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to
provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause
unless otherwise provided.
The SC judgment, the instant petition is
hereby

given

due

course

and

granted.

The

Respondent Judge is hereby permanently enjoined

from further proceeding with other case filed.

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer

that the President has abused power by issuing E.O.
464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public
Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other
Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null
and
void
for
being
unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of
the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,

conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation

which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and
offices including those employed in Government
Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National
Police
(PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department for them
to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on
the railway project, others on the issues of massive
election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping,
and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate
Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of
consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,
Section 3 which requires all the public officials
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public
officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is
broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact
that certain information must, as a matter of necessity,
be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest.
The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from
the obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree
as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that
obligation
in
a
particular
case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from
the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must
so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it
must
be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the
executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to
do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the
mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.

Group 8
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. HON. SENATOR RICHARD J.
GORDON, et al.
G.R. No. 174340 October, 17, 2006
FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon
requested
PCGG
Chairman
Sabio
and
his
Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on

Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and

Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment, and at the same time invoked Section
4(b) of EO No. 1: No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of
legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or
staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding.
RULING:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution
grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and
the House of Representatives, but also to any of their
respective committees.
Clearly, there is a direct
conferral of investigatory power to the committees and
it means that the mechanism which the Houses can
take in order to effectively perform its investigative
functions are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has
gained more solid existence and expansive construal.
The Courts high regard to such power is rendered
more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically
ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to
cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the
Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and
that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the
power to legislate.
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section
4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21.
Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff
from the Congress power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any
provision granting such exemption.
The Congress
power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything
that concerns the administration of existing laws as
well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even
extends to government agencies created by Congress
and officers whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to
this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it
is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates
or establishes methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect
violates the Constitution or its basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by
the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the
constitutional provisions on the Congress power of
inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public
accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full
disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access to
public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a

limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the
absence of any constitutional basis.

Arnault vs. Nazareno

G.R. No. L-3820; July 18, 1950
FACTS
The Senate investigated the purchase by the
government of two parcels of land, known as
Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing
question that the Senate sought to resolve was the
apparent irregularity of the governments payment to
one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the
total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in
the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00,
which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before.
The Senate sought to determine who were responsible
for and who benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest
Burt in the subject transactions, was one of the
witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In
the course of the investigation, the petitioner
repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person
to whom he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which
he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds
pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate
and was committed to the custody of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers
the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas
corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the
validity of his detention.
ISSUE
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the
petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name
of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?
2.
Did the Senate have the authority to commit
petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session?
3.
May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right
against self-incrimination?
RULING
1.
Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the
petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name
of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935]
Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting the conditions

which the legislation is intended to effect or change;

and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information which is not infrequently
true recourse must be had to others who do possess
it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate
or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential
to obtain what is needed.
We find that the question for the refusal to answer
which the petitioner was held in contempt by the
Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact,
this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution
No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the
petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among
other things, to determine the parties responsible for
the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is
obvious that the name of the person to whom the
witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is
pertinent to that determination it is in fact the very
thing sought to be determined. The contention is not
that the question is impertinent to the subject of the
inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any
proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it
is not necessary for the legislative body to show that
every question propounded to a witness is material to
any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is
that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is
within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and
the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to
that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced
by the committee by imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit
petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the
legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of
every session and not to the end of the last session
terminating the existence of that body. The very reason
for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is
to enable the legislative body to perform its
constitutional
function
without
impediment
or
obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in
practice are performed during recess by duly
constituted committees charged with the duty of
performing investigations or conducting hearing
relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such
committees the power of inquiry with process to
enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for
which that the power is recognized in the legislative
body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is
legislative function. It is but logical to say that the
power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to
be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was
adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and
which does not cease exist upon the periodical
dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no limit as to
time to the Senates power to punish for contempt in
cases where that power may constitutionally be
exerted as in the present case.

3.
NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his
right against self-incrimination.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction
was legal, and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latters
verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to
sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person
might incriminate him. There is no conflict of
authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged
is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is not
enough for the witness to say that the answer will
incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his
liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear
reasonable and real to the court, from all the
circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as
from his general conception of the relations of the
witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the
province of the court to determine whether a direct
answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact
that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that
he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to
claim the protection of the constitutional provision
against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same
time liable to prosecution and punishment for such
violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by
reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against
an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third
person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all
the facts and circumstances of the case whether the
witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is
not relieved from answering merely on his own
declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but
rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.

Arnault vs. Balagtas

G.R. No. L-6749; 97 Phil. 358; July 30, 1955
FACTS:
This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean
Arnault against the Director of Prisons, Balagtas.
Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by
the Senate finding Arnault in contempt for refusing to
disclose the name of a person with whom he
transacted business in relation to a government
purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates.
The circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are
described
in
the
companion
case Arnaultvs.
Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's
power to hold a person in contempt for defying or
refusing to comply with an order in a legislative inquiry.
Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted
with one Jess D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista
and Tambobong deal. Upon further inquiry, the Senate,
obviously not satisfied with Arnault's explanations,
adopted Resolution No. 114. The title of the resolution
states:

RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL

COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND
TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE
DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L.
ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND
DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT
MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL
HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.
WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation
of the said Jean L. Arnault has not materially changed
since he was committed to prison for contempt of the
Senate, and since the Supreme Court of the
Philippines, in a judgment long since become final,
upheld the power and authority of the Senate to hold
the said Jean L. Arnault in custody, detention, and
confinement, said power and authority having been
held to be coercive rather than punitive, and fully
justified until the said Jean L. Arnault should have given
the information which he had withheld and continues
contumaciously to withhold;
WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful
statements made by the said Jean L. Arnault on the
occasions above referred to constitute a continuing
contempt of the Senate, and an added affront to its
dignity and authority, such that, were they to be
condoned or overlooked, the power and authority of
the Senate to conduct investigations would become
futile and ineffectual because they could be defied by
any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice;
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Petitioner
Arnault and ordered his release.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner may be released from his
Senate-imposed incarceration.
1. Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the
findings of the Senate.
2. Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in
contempt or incarcerate him as a punitive rather than
as a coercive measure.

HELD:
YES. The Senate may continue to keep Petitioner
incarcerated.
1. NO. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right
to review the findings of the Senate. In the above
quoted resolution, the Senate in stating that petitioner
has failed and refused, and continues to fail and
refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the
amount of P440,000 and that the situation of
petitioner has not materially charged since he was
committed to prison, clearly shows that the
Senate believes that Arnault was still trying to deceive
them. The CFI on the other hand arrogated unto itself
to review such finding and held that Arnault
satisfactorily answered the questions of the Senate in

its investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong

deal.
There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of
action that the lower court followed. It assumed that
courts have the right to review the findings of
legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of
legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their
discretion in what is known as the legislative process.
The Judicial department has no right or power or
authority to do this, in the same manner that the
legislative department may not invade the judicial
realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the
application and interpretation of the law, in what is
known as the judicial process, because that would be in
direct conflict with the fundamental principle of
separation
of
powers
established
by
the
Constitution. The
only
instances
when
judicial
intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has
been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when
there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative
discretion.
2. YES. The legislature may hold a person in contempt
or incarcerate him as a punitive measure.
Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that
the confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to
coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention
is evident that the continuation of the imprisonment
ordered is in fact partly punitive. This may be inferred
from the confining made in the resolution that
petitioner's acts were arrogant and contumacious and
constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and
authority.
The legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses. This power is founded upon reason and
policy. Said power must be considered implied or
incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or
necessary to effectuate said power. How could a
legislative body obtain the knowledge and information
on which to base intended legislation if it cannot
require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge
and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of
its power and authority? The legislative department
should not be constrained to look to the courts
whenever for every act of refusal, every act of
defiance, every act of contumacy with which it is faced.
The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with
the defiant and contumacious witness should be
supreme
and
is
not
subject
to
judicial
interference, except when there is a manifest and
absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of
arbitrary power coming within the reach of
constitutional limitations.
The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is,
reversed, and the petition for the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court
allowing the petitioner to give bail is declared null and
void and the petitioner is hereby ordered to be
recommitted to the custody of the respondent. With
cost against the petitioner-appellee.

BENGZON VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

EN BANC
G.R. No. 89914; November 20, 1991
FACTS:
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin
Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices, schemes and
stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a
speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over
personal privilege before the Senate on the alleged
"takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First
Manila Management of Companies or FMMC by Ricardo
Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into the
possible violation of the law in the case with regard to
RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC]) started its
investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo
Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it
and testify on what they know regarding the sale of 36
corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa
and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their rights to
due process, and that their testimony may unduly
prejudice the defendants and petitioners in case before
the Sandiganbayan. SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea
to be excused from testifying and the SBRC continued
its investigation of the matter. The petitioners filed for
prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive
relief, claiming that the SBRC in requiring their
attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose. The Supreme Court
intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by
one of the defendants of the civil case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the
case.
2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid
legislative purpose.
3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is
beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners'
right to due process.
RULING:
1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the
Constitution provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the
government. The Court has provided that the allocation
of constitutional boundaries is a task which the
judiciary must perform under the Constitution.
Moreover, as held in a recent case, the political
question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to
judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has
been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,

although said provision by no means does away with

the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has
jurisdiction over the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the scope and extent of the
power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct
inquiries into private affairs in purported aid of
legislation.
2. No. The power to conduct formal inquiries or
investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the
implementation or re-examination of any law or in
connection with any proposed legislation or the
formulation of future legislation. They may also extend
to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in
Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by
respondent Committee is not really "in aid of
legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within
the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives
of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated
Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the
province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
3. No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry
on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39)
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez
to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to
Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator
Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither
Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are
connected with the government but are private
citizens.
4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional
restriction does not call for the banning or prohibition
of investigations where a violation of a basis rights is
claimed. It only requires that in the course of the
proceedings, the right of persons should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket
prohibition against a witness testifying at all, simply
because he is already facing charges before the
Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Constitution allows
him to interpose objections whenever an incriminating
question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his
court defenses, but not to refuse to take the witness
stand completely.
PIMENTEL vs. Joint Committee of Congress to
Canvass the Votes Cast for President and VicePresident in the May 10, 2004 Elections
G.R. No. 163783. June 22, 2004
FACTS
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. sought a petition for
prohibition to declare null and void the existence of the

Joint Committee of Congress to determine the

authenticity and the due extension of the certificates of
canvass and preliminary canvass the votes cast for
Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates in the May
10, 2004 elections.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Joint Committee performing
election canvass even after the termination of the
session of Congress is constitutional.

HELD:
Yes, because even if the legislative functions of the
Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the
final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11,
2004, its non-legislative functions are not affected.
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its
non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim
the duly elected President and Vice President, its
existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well
as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the
preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the
certificates of canvass cannot be considered an expired
mandate.
In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of
Congress convened by express directive of Section 4,
Article VII to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the
newly elected President and VP has not, and cannot,
adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its
constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board
of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered
functus officio. Its membership may change, but it
retains its authority as a board until it has
accomplished its purposes.
Brillantes vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 163193; June 15, 2004
FACTS:
Congress enacted Republic Act 8436 which authorized
the Commission on Elections to use the automated
election system (AES) for the national and local
elections. Aside from the process of voting, counting
and canvassing of results, RA 8436 also mandated the
poll body to acquire automated counting machines
(ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials;
and to adopt new electoral forms and printing
materials.
In 2002, COMELEC adopted in its Resolution 02-0170, a
modernization program for the 2004 elections. This
program consisted of three phases to wit:
(1) PHASE I Computerized system of registration and
voters validation or the so-called "biometrics" system
of registration;
(2) PHASE II Computerized voting and counting of
votes; and

(3) PHASE III Electronic transmission of results. It

resolved to conduct biddings for the three phases.
Since there were problems encountered as to the
enforcement of phases I and II, only phase III remained
imposable. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6712 which
also adopts the policy that the election results of each
city and municipality shall be transmitted electronically
in advance to the COMELEC in Manila.
However, petitioners in this case questioned the
Constitutionality of the quick-count as being preemptive of the authority vested in Congress to canvass
the votes for the President and Vice-President under
Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELECs conduct of an
unofficial tabulation of presidential election results
based on a copy of the election returns was
constitutional
HELD:
NO, since there is no constitutional or statutory basis
for COMELEC to undertake an unofficial tabulation of
results whether manual or automated process.
Based on Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, the
sole and excessive authority to officially canvass the
votes for the elections of the President and the Vice
President rests upon the Congress. Subsequently,
Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep.
Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act
No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the dulyaccredited citizens arm to conduct the unofficial
counting of votes for the national or local elections.
Since the COMELEC is prohibited from conducting an
official canvass of the votes cast for the President and
VP, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from
making an unofficial canvass of said votes.

Pimentel v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005
FACTS:
1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to
compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed
copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court to the Senate of the Philippinesfor its
concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987
Constitution.
2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal
Court which will have jurisdiction over the most serious
crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the
Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs

in UN. The provisions of the Statute however require

that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval
of the signatory state.
3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty,
under both domestic and international law, is a
function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the
Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to
the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have
the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy
of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the
Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the
signature of the President.

form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22,

2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent
to the House in plenary in accordance with the said
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four
months and three weeks since the filing on June 2,
2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a
day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was
filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied
by
a
"Resolution
of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least onethird (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.

HELD:

ISSUES:

NO.

1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment

complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
with the House of Representatives falls within the oneyear bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question
has resulted in a political crisis.

1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ

and authorized in the external relations and he is also
the country's sole representative with foreign nations,
He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's
foreign affairs.

HELD:
2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole
authority to negotiate with other states and enter into
treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution
with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the
Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).
3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a
check on the executive in the field of foreign relations,
to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and
growth.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261; November 10, 2003.
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives
adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative
Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2,
2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for
"culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was
endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was
referred to the House Committee. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that
the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by

the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official
within a one-year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the
first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment
proceedings
against
the
same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty
which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this
creature called the political question doctrine. Chief
Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that
Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with
"truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those
which "are not truly political questions." Truly political
questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason
for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to
be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.

Nixon Vs. United States of America

113 S. CT. 733; January 13, 1933

Bai Sandra Sema vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 177597; July 16, 2008

FACTS:

FACTS:

In this case, Chief Judge for the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Mississippi Walter
Nixon was convicted of committing perjury before a
grand jury but refused to resign from office even after
he had been incarcerated. Nixon was subsequently
impeached by the US House of Representatives, and
the matter was referred to the Senate for a vote on
Nixon's removal. The Senate appointed a committee to
hear the evidence against Nixon and later reported to
the body as a whole. The Senate then heard the report
of the committee and voted to remove Nixon from
office. Nixon contended that this did not meet the
constitutional requirement of Article I for the case to be
"tried by the Senate."

On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly,

exercising its power to create provinces under Sec.19,
Art.VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy
Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the province of
Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district of Maguindanao.

ISSUE:

In an answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC

issued Resolution No. 07-0407 maintaining the status
quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in
the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.

Whether the Senate had properly tried an

impeachment was a political question and could not be
resolved in the Courts?
RULING:
The majority opinion (the court's decision was
unanimous, but four separate opinions were published)
held that the courts may not review the impeachment
and trial of a federal officer because the Constitution
reserves that function to a coordinate political branch.
Article I. Sec. 3 of the Constitution gave the Senate the
"sole power to try all impeachments." Because of the
word "sole" it is clear that the judicial branch was not
to be included. Furthermore, because the word "try"
was originally understood to include factfinding
committees, there was a textually demonstrable
commitment to give broad discretion to the Senate in
impeachments.
Furthermore, the Framers believed that representatives
of the people should try impeachments, and the Court
was too small to justly try impeachments. Also, the
judicial branch is "checked" by impeachments so
judicial involvement in impeachments might violate the
doctrine of separation of powers.
The Court further ruled that involving the judiciary
would prevent finality without clear remedy and bias
post-impeachment criminal or civil prosecutions, which
the Constitution explicitly allows.
Justices White, Blackmun and Souter concurred but
voiced concern that the Court was foreclosing the area
for review. While they found that the Senate did all that
was constitutionally required, they were concerned that
the Court should have the power to review cases in
which the Senate removed an impeached officer
summarily without a hearing, or through some
arbitrary process, such as "a coin toss."
An important feature of this case is how it diverges
from Powell v. McCormack. In Powell, a grant of
discretionary power to Congress was deemed to be
justiciable because it required a mere "interpretation"
of the Constitution.

The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans

creation in a plebiscite held on October 29, 2006.
On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting
the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in
view of the conversion of the First District of
Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act
201.

However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007

elections, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative
district is composed only of Cotabato City because of
the enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May 10, 2007,
the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending
Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative
district in question as Shariff Kabunsan Province with
Cotabato City.
Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of
Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City prayed for the
nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion
from the canvassing of votes cast in Cotabato for that
office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is
entitled to one representative in Congress under Sec.
5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to
the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is
constitutional.
2. Whether a province created under Sec. 19, Art.VI of
RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House
of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such province.
HELD:
1.Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL,
insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces and cities,for being contrary
to Sec. 5 of Art.VI and Sec.20 of Art. X of the
Constitution, as well as Sec.3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution.

The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of

the Constitution:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code (LGC)
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any LGU must comply with 3
conditions: First, the creation of an LGU must follow the
criteria fixed in the LGC. Second, such creation must
not conflict with any provision of the Constitution.
Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express
grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to
delegate to regional/legislative bodies the power to
create LGUs.However, under its plenary powers,
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create LGUs subject to reasonable standards
and provided no conflict arises with any provisions of
the Constitution. In fact, the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities
and barangays is constitutional, provided the criteria
established in the LGC and the plebiscite requirement
in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution is complied.
However, the creation of provinces is another matter.
Under the LGC, only x x x an Act of Congress can
create provinces, cities, or municipalities.
According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of the Constitution:
Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or
each province, shall have at least 1 representative in
the House of Representatives.
Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides,
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any
city whose population may hereafter increase to more
than 250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least 1 Member.
Thus, only Congress can create provinces and cities
because the creation of provinces and cities
necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts,
a power only Congress can exercise under Sec. 5,
Art.VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution.
2.Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only
by an act of Congress. Under the Constitution, the
power to increase the allowable membership in the
House of Representatives, and to apportion legislative
districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the
power to increase the allowable membership in the
House of Representatives. Sec. 5 (4) empowers
Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power
to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes
the power to create legislative districts out of existing
ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law
the Congress itself enacts, not through a law enacted

by regional/local legislative bodies. The power of

redistricting xxx is traditionally regarded as part of the
power (of Congress) to make laws, and is thus vested
exclusively in (it) [Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415
(1995)].
An inferior legislative body cannot change the
membership of the superior legislative body which
created it. Congress is a national legislature, and any
changes in its membership through the creation of
legislative districts must be embodied in national law.
The power to create or reapportion legislative districts
cannot be delegated by Congress but must be
exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional
Assembly recognizes this.
The ARMM cannot create a province without a
legislative district because the Constitution mandates
that every province shall have a legislative district.
But this can never be legally possible because the
creation of legislative districts is vested solely in
Congress.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a
law creating a national office because Sec. 20, Art.X of
the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative
powers of regional assemblies are limited only within
its territorial jurisdiction. (Nothing in Sec. 20, Art.X of
the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions to
create/apportion legislative districts for Congress.)
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions
cannot prevail over the Constitution. Since the ARMM
Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact
laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a
legislative district whose representative is elected in
national elections.
At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not
cities and provinces.
Thus, MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional
Assembly, creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan,
is void.
Group 9
ALDABA VS. COMELEC
Jan. 25, 2010
Facts:
This is an original action for Prohibition to declare
unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591),
creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos,
Bulacan, for violating the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a
city.
On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending
Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a separate
legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos
City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1
May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute
that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated
certification issued by a Regional Director of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) that the projected
population of the Municipality of Malolos will be

254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth

rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.
Issue:
RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to
merit representation in Congress as provided under
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution.
Held:
We grant the petition and declare RA 9591
unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
Ruling:
YES. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to
have a legislative district, the city must have a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of
Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the
population of the City of Malolos will be 254,030 by
the year 2010. The Certification states that the
population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is
175,291. The Certification further states that it was
issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo
of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed
creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district
of the Province of Bulacan.
First, certifications on demographic projections can be
issued only if such projections are declared official by
the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB).
Second,
certifications
based
on
demographic
projections can be issued only by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third,
intercensal population projections must be as of the
middle of every year.
Moreover, the Certification states that the total
population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is
175,291. The Certification also states that the
population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year
between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of
3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in
2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.
Any population projection forming the basis for the
creation of a legislative district must be based on an
official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited
Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population
projection would be unreliable or speculative.
G.R. No. 180050 : May 12, 2010
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, ET AL., Petitioners, v.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET
AL.,Respondent
FACTS:
The arguments of the movants are similar. The grounds
for reconsideration of Governor Villaroman can be
subsumed under the grounds for reconsideration of the
OSG,
which
are
as
follows:
I.
The Province of Dinagat Islands was created in
accordance with the provisions of the 1987
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Article 9 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations is
merely interpretative of Section 461 of the Local
Government Code.

II.
The power to create a local government unit is vested
with the Legislature. The acts of the Legislature and
Executive in enacting into law RA 9355 should be
respected as petitioners failed to overcome the
presumption of validity or constitutionality.
III.
Recent and prevailing jurisprudence considers the
operative fact doctrine as a reason for upholding the
validity and constitutionality of laws involving the
creation of a new local government unit as in the
instant
case.
As regards the first ground, the movants reiterate the
same arguments in their respective Comments that
aside from the undisputed compliance with the income
requirement, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355, creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands, has also complied with the
population
and
land
area
requirements.
The arguments are unmeritorious and have already
been passed upon by the Court in its Decision, ruling
that R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional, since it failed to
comply with either the territorial or population
requirement contained in Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991.
When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new
province on December 3, 2006, it had an official
population of only 106,951based on the2000 Census of
Population conducted by the National Statistics Office
(NSO), which population is short of the statutory
requirement
of
250,000
inhabitants.
Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del
Norte conducted a special census of population in
Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population
count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the
NSO as required by the Local Government Code.
Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the
population count of 371,000, the population of the
original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte)
would not be reduced to less than the minimum
requirement prescribed by law at the time of the
creation
of
the
new
province.
Less than a year after the proclamation of the new
province, the NSO conducted the2007Census of
Population. The NSO certified that as of August 1,
2007,Dinagat Islands had a total population of
only120,813,which was still below the minimum
requirement
of
250,000
inhabitants.
Based on the foregoing, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply
with the population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants
as
certified
by
the
NSO.
Moreover, the land area of the province failed to
comply with the statutory requirement of2,000 square
kilometers. R.A. No. 9355 specifically states that the
Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate
land area of802.12 square kilometers. This was not
disputed by the respondent Governor of the Province of
Dinagat Islands in her Comment. She and the other
respondents instead asserted that the province, which
is composed of more than one island, is exempted from
the land area requirement based on the provision in
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 (IRR), specifically paragraph
2 of Article 9which states that [t]he land area

requirement shall not apply where the proposed

province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The
certificate of compliance issued by the Lands
Management Bureau was also based on the exemption
under
paragraph 2,
Article
9 of
the
IRR.
However, the Court held that paragraph 2 of Article 9
of the IRRis null and void, because the exemption is not
found in Section 461 of the Local Government Code.
There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between
the basic law and the rules and regulations
implementing the said law, the basic law prevails,
because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond
the terms and provisions of the basic law.
The movants now argue that the correct interpretation
of Section 461 of the Local Government Code is the
one stated in the Dissenting Opinion of Associate
Justice
Antonio
Eduardo
B.
Nachura.
In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Nachura agrees that
R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with the population
requirement. However, he contends that the Province
of Dinagat Islands did not fail to comply with the
territorial requirement because it is composed ofa
group of islands; hence, it is exempt from compliance
not only with the territorial contiguity requirement, but
also with the 2,000-square-kilometer land area criterion
in Section 461 of the Local Government Code.
He argues that the whole paragraph on contiguity and
land area in paragraph (a) (i) above is the one being
referred to in the exemption from the territorial
requirement in paragraph (b). Thus, he contends that if
the province to be created is composed of islands, like
the one in this case, then, its territory need not be
contiguous and need not have an area of at least 2,000
square kilometers. He asserts that this is because as
the law is worded, contiguity and land area are not two
distinct and separate requirements, but they qualify
each other. An exemption from one of the two
component requirements in paragraph (a) (i) allegedly
necessitates an exemption from the other component
requirement, because the non-attendance of one
results in the absence of a reason for the other
component requirement to effect a qualification.
ISSUE: Whether the correct interpretation of Section
461 of the Local Government Code is the one stated in
the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo
B.
Nachura.
HELD: The Court is not persuaded.
POLITICAL LAW: general powers and attributes of local
government
units
Section 7, Chapter 2 (entitled General Powers and
Attributes of Local Government Units) of the Local
Government Code provides:
SEC. 7.Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the
creation of a local government unit or its conversion
from one level to another level shall be based on
verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity
to provide services, to wit:
(a)Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable
standards, to provide for all essential government
facilities
and
services
and
special
functions

commensurate with the size of its population, as

expected of the local government unit concerned;
(b)Population. It shall be determined as the total
number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction
of the local government unit concerned; and
(c)Land area. It must be contiguous, unless it
comprises two (2) or more islands, or is separated by a
local government unit independent of the others;
properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic
services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be
attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the
National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Perez, J.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative
district for the province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative
districts of the province. The said law originated from
House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
additional legislative district for the province. Hence,
the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac,
Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined
with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and
Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced
by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional
standards that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a
legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will
end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only
176,383.
ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative
district
in
a
province.
HELD:
NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the constitution states that: Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.
There is a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For
a province is entitled to at least a representative, there
is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile,
a city must first meet a population minimum of
250,000
in
order
to
be
similarly
entitled.
It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the
constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population
only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not
so
for
a
province.

Umali vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City
passed a Resolution requesting the President to declare
the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component
city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly
urbanized city (HUC). Respondent COMELEC, acting on
the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution
which states that only those registered residents of
Cabanatuan City should participate in the said
plebiscite. In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali,
Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for
Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed
conversion in question will necessarily and directly
affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main
argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be
interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used
in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to
refer to the qualified voters of the units directly
affected by the conversion and not just those in the
component city proposed to be upgraded.
Issue:
Whether the qualified registered voters of the entire
province of Nueva Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan
City can participate in the plebiscite called for the
conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city
into an HUC.
Held:
Voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija would
participate in the plebiscite. According to Section 10,
Article X. No province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
In cutting the umbilical cord between Cabanatuan City
and the province of Nueva Ecija, the city will be
separated from the territorial jurisdiction of the
province. The provincial government will no longer be
responsible for delivering basic services for the city
residents benefit. Ordinances and resolutions passed
by the provincial council will no longer cover the city.
In view of these changes in the economic and political
rights of the province of Nueva Ecija and its residents,
the entire province certainly stands to be directly
affected by the conversion of Cabanatuan City into an
HUC. Following the doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the
qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija should then
be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for
that purpose.

Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela

Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered voters, filed
a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET
against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner
Abayon, alleging that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a
party-list seat in the House of Representatives since it
did
not
represent
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented
sectors.
Petitioner Abayon countered that the COMELEC had
already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a
national
multi-sectoral
party-list
organization
representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor,
and elderly and that she belonged to the women
sector.
Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent
HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo
warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others
with him collaterally attacked the registration of
Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that
fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order,
dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but
upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of
petitioner Abayon. The latter moved for reconsideration
but the HRET denied the same on prompting Abayon to
file the present petition for special civil action of
certiorari.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the
first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a
seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the
House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo
Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr.,
Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez
are members of some other party-list groups.
Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the
others with him filed with respondent HRET a petition
for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee,
petitioner Palparan, alleging that Palparan was
ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as
party-list nominee because he did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors that
Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist
rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca
and the others said that Palparan committed gross
human rights violations against marginalized and
underrepresented
sectors
and
organizations.

FACTS:

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no

jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the
party-list Bantay, that was elected to and assumed
membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan
claimed that he was just Bantays nominee.
Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as
first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such
question must be brought, he said, before that partylist
group,
not
before
the
HRET.

In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the

first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization
that won a seat in the House of Representatives during
the
2007
elections.

Respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the

petition against Bantay for the reason that the issue of
the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group
fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to

DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON,Petitioner, v. THE

HONORABLE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN,
JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C.
DOROGA, Respondents.
G.R.
No.
189466,
February
11,
2010

the

Party-List

System

Act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over
the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay
party-list organizations, respectively, who took the
seats at the House of Representatives that such
organizations
won
in
the
2007
elections.
HELD:
HRET has jurisdiction over the controversy POLITICAL
LAW
jurisdiction
of
the
HRET.
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA
7941 v. Commission on Elections, a party-list
representative is in every sense "an elected member of
the House of Representatives." Although the vote cast
in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote,
in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of
Representatives. Both the Constitution and the PartyList System Act set the qualifications and grounds for
disqualification
of
party-list
nominees.
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged
the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan
claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors that they ought to
represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a
nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or
organization
which
he
seeks
to
represent."
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this
particular qualification of a nominee the need for him
or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of
his party-list organization in the context of the facts
that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans
relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and
the marginalized and underrepresented interests that
they
presumably
embody.
Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act
does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe,
when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon,
that it has the power to do so as an incident of its
authority to approve the registration of party-list
organizations. But the Court needs not resolve this
question since it is not raised here and has not been
argued
by
the
parties.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to, among other things,
the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list
nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives
no
less
than
the
district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear
and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the
cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been
proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends, and

the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. Hence, respondent

HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against
Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld
its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT) vs COMELEC
586 SCRA 210, January 2, 2012
FACTS:
1. The Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula
being used in the proclamation. BANAT averred that 2%
threshold is invalid since Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void
because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a
congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the
votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by
the Constitution.
2. It questioned whether or not 20% rule is mere ceiling
or mandatory.
3. It questioned whether political party is allowed in the
party-list election.
ISSUES:
WON the 80-20 is the rule being observed in the lower
house.
WON 20% is the mandatory or mere ceiling for partylist representative
WON 2% is the threshold to qualify for a valid seat
WON political parties are allowed to participate
WON the 3 seat rule is valid
HELD:
The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for
every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there
shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative.
Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there
shall not be more than 250 members of the lower
house. Using the 80-20 rule,200 of that will be from
legislative districts and 50 from the party-list
representative.
The 20% allocation is a mere ceiling, meaning the
number of representatives shall not exceed 20% of the
total number of members of the lower house.
There is no constitutional basis to allow that only partylists which garnered less than 2% are qualified for seat.
It is therefore clear that the 2% threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec.
5 (2), Art. VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the lower house.
By vote of 8-7 in the Supreme Court, political parties
are not allowed to participate in the election for partylist system.
The 3 seat limit rule is valid as this will ensure that no
party shall dominate the partly-list system.
COCOFED vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207026 August 6, 2013
Facts: This is a case of COMELEC cancelling COCOFEDs
registration
and
accreditation
as
a
party-list
Organization, on the grounds that it failed to submit

the required five nominees, thus denying its intent to

participate in the May 2013 elections.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC should recognize
COCOFED as a legitimate party-list representing a
marginalized sector in our society.
HELD: Petition was dismissed for lack of merit
-- COCOFED party-list name was included in the ballot
but it garnered less than required number of votes
hence case is now moot and academic
Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC
694 SCRA 477
Facts: This is a case about ATONG PAGLAUM and 51
other parties disqualified by the COMELEC on May 2013
party-list elections for various reasons but mainly for
not being qualified a representatives for the
marginalized or under represented sectors.
A case was then filed against COMELEC for grave
abuse of discretion.
Issue: whether or not the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the
guidelines. However the Supreme Court remanded the
cases back to COMELEC as the Supreme Court now
provides for new guidelines.

The Court ruled in the negative and upheld prior

Resolutions of the Comelec without prejudice for filing
anew by the MAGDALO.
The Court finds that it is within the bounds of lawful
power of the Comelec to regulate the registration of
political parties under Article IX of the Constitution and
echoed in the provisions of BP 881 and RA 7941. The
same powers bestowed upon Comelec also provides for
the restriction on the registration and certification of
political parties of those belonging to religious
denominations and those who seek to achieve their
goals through violence of unlawful means. That said,
the Court emphasized that accreditation as a political
party is not a right but a privilege given to parties who
have qualified and met the requirements set forth by
the law.
On the matter of abuse of discretion in the judicial
notice of the Oakwood incident, the Court ruled that
the said incident was of public knowledge and
cognizance thereof do not require the introduction and
reception of evidence. On the matter of finding that the
MAGDALO uses violence or unlawful means to achieve
its goals, the same Oakwood incident was taken as a
manifestation that the means (deliberate display of
military power, display of ammunitions, threatening
public security, etc) employed by the MAGDALO to
pursue its goals are of violent predilection.
LAYUG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 192984, February 28, 2012

Group 10
Group 10 Milana, et.al

FACTS:

Topic: Party-list System

On 2010, Rolando Layug filed a petition to disqualify

the BuhayHayaanYumabong (BUHAY) Party-List from
participating in the 2010 National Elections and to
disqualify Bro. Mike Velarde as one of its nominees.
Layugs contention was that BUHAY is a mere extension
of El Shaddai, a religious sect, and is disqualifiable
under RA 7941 (par. 1, sec. 6) and the Constitution
(Art. VI, par. 2, sec. 5) as well; further contended was
that Velarde does not have the qualifications to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sector as it was alleged that he was not only rich but
he is also the spiritual leader of El Shaddai, thus in
violation of the qualifications set by the Comelec for
party-list nominees (Comelec Resolution No. 8807,
Section 6). On their defense, BUHAY responded that it
is a political party possessing all qualifications of a
party-list as it represents the elderly, women, youth,
handicapped, and professionals and that Velarde, its
fifth nominee, represents the elderly.

MAGDALO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012
FACTS:
Last 2009, MagdalosaPagbabago (MAGDALO) filed a
Petition for Registration with the Comelec for
registration and accreditation as a party-list for
participation in the then upcoming 2010 National
Elections. After review and deliberation, Comelec
issued a Resolution that denied the Petition for
Registration of MAGDALO on the grounds that its
Chairman and most of the members were, as a matter
of common knowledge, implicated in the Oakwood
Siege sometime back, thus giving rise to the notion
that the group seeks to achieve its goals through
violent or unlawful means. Upon denial of their
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration, MAGDALO filed
for a Petition for Certiorari seeking reversal of original
Comelec decision and for the latter to issue a
Certificate of Registration for the party.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed a grave abuse in
discretion when it denied the Petition of Registration of
Magdalo
RULING:

The Comelec later ruled and issued a Resolution

denying Layugs petition for lack of substantial
evidence with copies furnished to the parties. However,
Layugs given and maintained address was inexistent
as proven with thenumerous failed serves. Without any
motion for reconsideration from Layug within the
reglementary period, Resolution was deemed final and
executory. Consequently, said Resolution would be
made basis for the proclamation of BUHAY as a winning
party-list entitled to 2 seats in the House of
Representatives however, being the 5 th nominee,

Velarde was not able to secure representation for

himself in the Congress.
After learning of the cases development in the
newspapers, Layug then moved for reconsideration
before the Comelec En Banc claiming denial of due
process of the latter to serve him a copy of the
Resolution which was, however, denied for being filed
beyond the time prescribed. Feeling aggrieved, Layug
filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court
to:
Enjoin the implementation of the Resolution of the
Comelec which denied his petition for disqualification
of BUHAY and its nominee, Velarde.
Nullify the proclamation of BUHAY as a winning partylist; and
Compel theComelec En Banc to rule on Layugs Motion
for Reconsideration
ISSUES:
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this
petition for certiorari
Whether petitioner Layug was denied due process
Whether the Comelecshould be compelled to resolve
Layugs Motion for Reconsideration
RULING:

The Court finds that Layugs Motion for Reconsideration

for the Comelec Resolution cannot be acted upon
because said Resolution had already attained finality
and that same Motion had already been denied since it
was filed beyond the prescriptive period. Further,
petitioner made mockery of the rules of procedure by
filing aforementioned Motion without the mandatory
notice of hearing and that substitution of counsel was
carried out without observance of procedure for valid
substitution, thus the Court finds appellants
petitionunworthy of serious consideration and that the
Comelec had, all the while, exercised discretion within
the bounds of the law.
AMORES v. HRET
G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010

FACTS:
This a petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores
(petitioner) challenges the Decision of May 14,
2009 and Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(public respondent), which respectively dismissed

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction on the case at bar.

petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto questioning

The Courts jurisdiction has been raised in relation to

the fact that since BUHAY has already been proclaimed
and its nominees having assumed office, then the case
should be under the sole jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) under Article
VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution. However, the Court
assails that since Velarde did not secure a seat for
himself and thus not a member of the Congress, the
HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of his
qualifications. Further, the reviews on qualifications for
party-list groups are under the jurisdiction of the
Comelec under RA 7941 and under Article IX of the
Constitution and the Comelecs Rules of Procedure, the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review decisions and
resolutions of the former.

the

The Court ruled on the negative.

age limit of 30 which was the limit imposed by RA

The Court finds that Comelec did not commit an abuse

of discretion in issuing its Resolution that led to the
denial of petition of Layug and the subsequent
proclamation of BUHAY as a winning party-list in the
2010 National Elections. On the other hand, the Court
finds that Layug with his deliberate provision of an
inexistent address and failure to rectify despite his
knowledge thereof is an evident mockery of procedure
with the intention of delaying the finality of decision to
his convenience. Thus, the Court finds that appellants
plea for due process is aimed to delay proceedings and
the Comelec did not commit any error in discretion in
issuing the Resolution as it is a jurisdictional act that
cannot be made to depend on the convenience of one
party.

7941 otherwise known as the Party-List System

The Court ruled that petition for mandamus is without

merit.

legality

of

the

assumption

of

offi ce

of

Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent)

as representative of the party-list organization
Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the
House of Representatives, and denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioner raised
the issues, herein:
Villanueva is representing a youth sector under
CIBAC Party List was 31 at the time of fi ling of
nomination and acceptance, he was beyond the

Act.
Villanueva's change of affi liation from CIBACs
Youth Sector to Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFW) and families sector not aff ected six months
prior to elections.
The Public Respondent answers:

RA 7941 requirement for "age" for youth sector

Sandiganbayan

representative

preventive suspension against him in relation to a

only

applicable

to

fi rst

three

criminal

elections after the party list act.

case

issued
on

an

order

September

of

2005.

90-day

The

said

suspension order was subsequently lifted by the

There was no resultant change in affi liation.

Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the

functions of his offi ce.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conditions and qualifi cations

Asilo then fi led his certifi cate of candidacy for the

for

same position in 2007. His disqualifi cation was

youth

sector

representatives

apply

to

sought by herein petitioners on the ground that

respondent Villanueva.

he had been elected and had served for three

Whether or not private respondent, Villauneva

consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term

ineligible to hold offi ce as a member of House of

Constitutional limit.

the Representative representing CIBAC Party List.

HELD:

ISSUE:
Whether

Villanueva's arguments are invalid. The law is

or

interrupts

not

the

the

suspensive

three-term

condition

limitation

rule

of

COMELEC.

clear. If representative of youth sector, should be

between 25 to 30.

RULING:

Villanueva is ineligible to also represent OFW.

No. The ordered preventive suspension of public

Sectoral representation should be changed six

offi cials does not interrupt their term for reasons

of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution

months prior to elections.

SC

resolved

the

petition

and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).

by

declaring

the

respondent Villanueva as ineligible to hold offi ce

as representative of CIBAC for being overage to
represent youth. The youth sector must represent

The candidacy of Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a

fourth term in the 2007 elections was in fl outing
of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the
Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not

by 25 30 years of age, while the change of

interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed

affi liation

on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B.

must be

made

six

months

before

elections.

Aldovino,

The Decision dated May 14, 2009 and Resolution

Danilo

B.

Faller,

and

Ferdinand

N.

Talabong seeking Asilos disqualifi cation.

No. 09-130 dated August 6, 2009 of the House of

Herein quotes, the Preventive suspension, by its

Representatives Electoral Tribunal are hereby SET

nature, does not involve an eff ective interruption

ASIDE.

of service within a term and should therefore not

be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,

Topic: Synchronized terms of office

held

the

Court.

It

noted

that

preventive

suspension can pose as a threat more potent

ALDOVINO v. COMELEC

than

G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009

the

voluntary

renunciation

that

the

Constitution itself disallows to evade the threeterm limit as it is easier to undertake and merely

FACTS:

requires

The councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo of Lucena City was

charge

elected to the said offi ce for three consecutive

preventive

terms,

obligatorily.

following:

1998-2001,

2001-2004,

and

2004-2007. During his third term of offi ce, the

an
that

easily
can

be

fabricated
dismissed

suspension

has

administrative
soon
been

after

forced

NAVAL v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014
CASE:
A provincial board member cannot be elected and
serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms.
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari to assail the
(a) COMELEC Second Divisions Resolution granting the
petition filed by Julia, seeking to cancel the CoC as
member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan of Camarines
Sur of Naval, who is allegedly violating the three-term
limit imposed upon elective local officials; and (b)
COMELEC En Bancs Resolution denying Navals Motion
for Reconsideration to the Resolution issued by the
COMELEC Second Division.
FACTS:
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been
elected and had served as a member of the
Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines
Sur.
On October 12, 2009, the President approved R.A. No.
9716, which reapportioned the legislative districts in
Camarines Sur. Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken
from the old Second District to form the present Third
District. The present Second District is composed of the
two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with
five towns from the old First District.

Topic: Fair Election Act R.A. 9006

ASISTIO v. AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 191124, April 27, 2010
FACTS:
Private respondent Echiverri filed a Petition for
Exclusion of Voter from the permanent list of voters of
Caloocan City before the MeTC presided by Judge
Malabaguio. He alleged that Asistio is not a resident of
Caloocan City and was no longer residing in the
address stated in his CoC for Mayor in the 2010
Elections. Malabaguio rendered a decision directing the
Election Registration Board to remove the name of
Asistio from the list of permanent voters of Caloocan
City. Echiverri then filed with the COMELEC a Petition
for Disqualification on the grounds that Asistio is not a
resident of Caloocan City and that he had been
previously convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Asistio filed his Notice of Appeal and paid the
required appeal fees through postal money orders on
Feb. 10, 2010. Echiverri filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal, arguing that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the appeal on the ground of failure to file the
required appeal fees. Judge Aguirre granted the motion
for failing to pay the docket fees essential for the RTC
to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. Hence, this
petition.

In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among

the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He
served until 2013. In the 2013 elections, Naval ran
anew and was re-elected as a Member of the
Sanggunian, Third District.

ISSUE:

Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate

from the Third District in the 2013 elections. He filed
before the COMELEC a verified petition to deny due
course or to cancel the CoC of Naval. Julia posited that
Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines
Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the
Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been
elected from. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian
member for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible
three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and
the LGC, which must be strictly construed.

HELD:

ISSUE:
WoNNavals election to the same position as a
Sanggunian member violated the three term limit rule.
HELD:
Yes. With 26 in favor and 17 against, the Constitutional
Commission approved that there is no immediate reelection after three successive terms. For the body
believed that the imposition of term limits would be
tantamount to squandering the experience of seasoned
public servants and a curtailment of the power of the
citizens to elect whoever they want to remain in the
office.
Further, the petition is denied. The resolutions of the
COMELEC are affirmed.

WoNAsistio should be excluded from the permanent list

of voters of Caloocan City for failure to comply with the
residency required by law.

No. The Supreme Court ruled that from the provisions

of Section 117 of BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and
Section 9 of RA 8189, the residency requirement of
voter is at least 1 year residence in the Philippines and
at least 6 months in the place where the person
proposes or intends to vote. Residence as used in the
law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage is
doctrinally settled to mean domicile. Domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when
absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return.
To successfully effect a transfer of domicile one must
demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of
domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the
place of residence; (3) acts which correspond with that
purpose. Asistio has always been a resident of
Caloocan City since birth and his family is also known
to be among the prominent political families in
Caloocan. He even served as a 2 nd district
representative in Caloocan and sought also election as
City Mayor in 2007. Taking these circumstances into
consideration, it cannot be denied that Asistio has
qualified and continues to qualify as a voter of
Caloocan City.
MITRA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010
Facts:

Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second

District of Palawan when his COC for the position of
Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled. This
district then included, among other territories, the
Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He
was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto
Princesa City, and represented the legislative district
for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of
2010.
On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second
term as Representative), Puerto Princesa City was
reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus
ceased to be a component city of the Province of
Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new
status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City
residents from voting for candidates for elective
provincial officials.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for
the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer
of his Voters Registration Record from Precinct No.
03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to
SitioMaligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan,
Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for
the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of
Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and
Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition
to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC.
Issue:
Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of
Palawan.
Held:
YES. Mitra is qualified to run for the position as
Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that
Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met the
residency
requirement
as
mandated
by
the
Constitution.
The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of
Palawan in the May 10, 2010 elections was upheld in a
vote

of

present a

11-3. The

respondents were

convincing

case

sufficient

not
to

able

to

overcome

Mitras evidence of effective transfer to and residence

in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this
point in his COC. Likewise, the "COMELEC could not
present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that
Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence
was a misrepresentation."
TALAGA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 196804, 660 SCRA 256, October 9, 2012
In focus are the disqualification of a substitute who was
proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election and the
ascertainment of who should assume the office
following the substitutes disqualification.
FACTS:
Ramon Talaga and Philip Castillo filed their certificates
of candidacy (COC) for the position of Mayor of Lucena
City for the 2010 elections. Castillo filed with the
COMELEC a petition to cancel the COC of Talaga on the
ground that he has already served as mayor of Lucena

for three consecutive terms (2001, 2004, 2007) without

interruption.
Talaga countered by saying that the
Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from
office during his second and third terms, which he
claims to have amounted to an interruption.
Thereafter, Talaga withdrew his candidacy. On May 4,
2010, Barbara Ruby filed her own COC to substitute
Talaga. Talagas name remained printed on the ballots
and votes in his favor were counted for Barbara Ruby,
who won against Castillo. But it was only on May 13,
2010 when the Comelec gave due course to Rubys
COC to include her in the official list of candidates.
Ruby was proclaimed newly elected mayor.
ISSUES:
The core issue involves the validity of the substitution
by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor
of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband. Ancillary
to the core issue is the determination of who among
the contending parties should assume the contested
elective position.
RULING:
1. Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise
to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution
of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate
who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly
substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is
not considered a candidate in much the same way as
any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a
candidate. All told, a disqualified candidate may only
be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy
in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate
did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of
candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all.
2. A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of
Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be
filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in
Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the
Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor.

If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the

governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor.
No local elected official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms in the same position in order to
avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial juris as a
result of a prolonged stay in the office. Therefore, the
case was dismissed.
ALDOVINO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009
Facts:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to
the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007.
In September 2005,
during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan
issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension
against him in relation to a criminal case. The said

suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court,

and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of
his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by
herein petitioners on the ground that he had been
elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in
violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.
Issue:
WON the suspensive condition interrupts the threeterm limitation rule of COMELEC?
RULING:
NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does
not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term
limit rule under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code (RA 7160).
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo
for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in
contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec.
8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not
interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on
him, the Supreme Court granted the petition of Simon
B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong
seeking Asilos disqualification.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve
an effective interruption of service within a term and
should therefore not be a reason to avoid the threeterm limitation, held the Court.
It noted that
preventive suspension can pose as a threat more
potent than the voluntary renunciation that the
Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term
limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an
easily fabricated administrative charge that can be
dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been
imposed.

5. Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in

his COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa
City for two years and eight months prior to the
scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.
6. In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010, the
COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of
private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified
from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City, and
canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not being
a resident of Lipa City and for his failure to meet the
statutory one-year residency requirement under the
law.
7. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26
January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during the
pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections
were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly
elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest
number of votes cast for the said position. He
accordingly filed a Manifestation 42 with the COMELEC
en banc to reflect this fact.
8. In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010, the
COMELEC en
banc denied
the
Motion
for
Reconsideration of petitioner.
9. Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition
(Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent
Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and
for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case) under
Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the annulment of the 26 January 2010 and 17
August 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC.
Issues:
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove
compliance with the one-year residency requirement
for local elective officials.
Ruling:

SABILI vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012
Facts:
1. COMELEC denied Sabilis Certificate of Candidacy for
mayor of Lipa due to failure to comply with the one
year residency requirement.
2. When petitioner filed his COC 1 for mayor of Lipa
City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he
hadbeen a resident of the city for two (2) years and
eight (8) months.
3. However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed
his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family
were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay
(Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
4. Respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent)
filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate
for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification.

1. As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily

review the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of
evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been
established,
including
when
the
COMELECs
appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so
grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of
jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled
by its bounden constitutional duty to intervene and
correct the COMELECs error.
2. As a concept, grave abuse of discretion defies
exact definition; generally, it refers to capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction; the abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty.
3. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be
grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or
irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is
sufficient to taint a decision-makers action with grave
abuse of discretion.

4. Closely related with the limited focus of the present

petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the
COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be
final and non-reviewable.
5. In light of our limited authority to review findings of
fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the
COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence.
Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally
involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
6. In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELECs
action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence
oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of
being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only
obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene.
When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting
errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error
of judgment to one of jurisdiction.
7. Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the
COMELECs use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in
deciding the issue of whether petitioner made a
material
misrepresentation
of
his
residency
qualification in his Certificate of Candidacy as to order
its cancellation.
8. Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
petitioner had not sufficiently shown that he had
resided in Lipa City for at least one year prior to the
May 2010 elections, we examine the evidence adduced
by the parties and the COMELECs appreciation thereof.
9. Basically, the allegations of the Petitioner Sabili are
tantamount to allege that the COMELEC, in denying his
COC committed grave abuse of discretion. The court
here defined what grave abuse of discretion is; and by
that chose and ruled to review the acts of COMELEC
under its jurisdiction.
10. Eventually he was able to prove that he was a
resident of Lipa and the SC granted his petition.