Case Digest for Caltex vs Palomar 18 SCRA 247

FACTS:
In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the
ground work for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up
patronage for its oil products. The contest was entitled Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest, which calls for participants to estimate
the actual number of liters as hooded gas pump at each Caltex
station will dispense during a specific period.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as
amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the
transmission of communications, representations were made by
Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in
advance for mailing. This was formalized in a letter sent by Caltex
to the Post master General, dated October 31, 1960, in which
Caltex, thru its counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and
endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate
the The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law.
Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General
denied Caltexs request stating that the contest scheme falls
within the purview of the Anti-lottery Provision and ultimately,
declined Clatexs request for clearance.
Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being
no consideration involved in part of the contestant, the contest
was not commendable as a lottery. However, the Postmaster
General maintained his view that the contest involves
consideration, or even it does not involve any consideration it still
falls as Gift Enterprise, which was equally banned by the Postal
Law.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief?
Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee is
within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal
Law?
HELD:
I.
By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of
Court which deals with the applicability to invoke declaratory
relief which states: Declaratory relief is available to person

whose rights are affected by a statute, to determine any question

of construction or validity arising under the statute and for a
declaration of rights thereunder.
In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the
matter, laid down certain conditions:
1. There must be a justiciable controversy.
2. The controversy must be between persons whose interests
are adverse.
3. The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy.
4. The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
With the appellees bent to hold the contest and the appellants
threat to issue a fraud order if carried out, the contenders are
confronted by an ominous shadow of imminent and inevitable
litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a
declaration. And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the
time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the
appellees desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears
of others which admittedly does not confer a cause of action.
Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy
when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim
of right which is actually contested.
Construction

Is the art or process of discovering and expounding the

meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
application to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case
is not explicitly provided for in the law.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we
have herein just reached is not without precedent. In Liberty
Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a
corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by
the county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had
the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion
were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal
prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to
maintain a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor
to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan.
II.
Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?

Lottery

Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by

chance
e.g. policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs
as well as various forms of gambling.
Three Essential Elements:
1. Consideration
2. Prize
3. Chance
No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is
not a lottery but it appears to be more of a gratuitous distribution
since nowhere in the rules is any requirements that any fee be
paid, any merchandise be bought, any services be rendered, or
any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate.
Since, a prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station,
request for the entry form which is available on demand and
accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner.
Because of this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible
consideration which would brand it as a lottery.
Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of
property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or
indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but it does
condemn as criminal scheme in which a valuable consideration of
some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a
prize.
Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the sponsor
in the way of increased patronage be considered as a
consideration and thus violates the Postal Law?
No, the required element of consideration does not consist
of the benefit derived by the sponsors of the contest. The true test
lies on whether or not the participant pays a valuable
consideration for the chance of winning and not whether or not
those conducting the enterprise receiver something of value for
the distribution of the prize.
Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?
Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined
explicitly, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers
and standard authorities that the term is common applied to a

sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market
value but by way of inducement to purchase the product, the
purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.
And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established
in the case at bar since there is not sale of anything to which the
chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The
contest is open to all qualified contestant irrespective of whether
or not they buy the appellees products.
The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent
jurisprudence is that every case must be resolved upon the
particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision. It is
only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded
no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of
the word associated therewith.
In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive
provision of the Postal Law, gift enterprise and similar schemes
therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they
involve the element of consideration. Finding non in the contest, it
was ruled out that the appellee may not be denied the use of the
mails for the purpose thereof.

times; 2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not

able to file their claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin
Jr., and Teresita Buchholz opposed Lutes reopening on the
following grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-year
period provided in RA 931; 2) the petition to reopen the case was
not published; and 3) as lessees of the land, they have standing on
the issue.
Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed
outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931, which was
ENACTED on June 20, 1953
Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral
proceedings
Ratio: The title of RA 931 was An Act to Authorize the Filing in
Proper Court under Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims of Title
to Parcels of Land that have been Declared Public Land, by Virtue
of Judicial Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years Next
Preceding the Approval of this Act. Section 1 of the Act reads as
..in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file
such claims, have been, or about to be declared land of the public
domain by virtue of judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the
40 years next preceding the approval of this act. If the title is to
be followed, November 13, 1922 is the date which should be
followed, hence, would allow the reopening of the case. If Section
1 is to be followed, the date of the institution of reopening of the
case which was April 12, 1912, the petition would be invalid.
StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and
what may inadequately be omitted in the text may be supplied or
remedied by its title.

CITY OF BAGUIO V. MARCOS G.R. NO. L-26100. FEBRUARY

28, 1969
Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio
INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral proceedings. In
November 13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land
involved was the Baguio Townsite which was declared public land.
In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case
on the following grounds: 1) he and his predecessors have been in
continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, v. SSANGYONG

CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 170633; October 17, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling
stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the responded, an
international trading company with head office in Seoul, South
Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The
two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and
facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Respondent would send the
pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product
order to petitioner; if the latter conforms thereto, its
representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it
back to the respondent, again by fax.
Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of
contract against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City. In its complaint, respondent alleged that defendants
breached their contract when they refused to open the letter of
credit in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT
of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2POSTS0401-2.
After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to
Evidence alleging that respondent failed to present the original
copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was
based. Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma
invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove the
perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in
evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792,
because the law merely admits as the best evidence the original
fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a
reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the
original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is
admissible in evidence since it is an electronic document and,
therefore, the best evidence under the law and the Rules.
Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these fax
transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS04012) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the
respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the
original fax transmittals.

Issue:
Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile
transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as such?
Held:
Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an
original document under the Best Evidence Rule, as long as it is a
printout or output readable by sight or other means, showing to
reflect the data accurately. Thus, to be admissible in evidence as
an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional
equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule,
the writing must foremost be an electronic data message or an
electronic document.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792
defines the Electronic Data Message refers to information
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar
means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI),
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.
The phrase but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI),
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy in the IRRs definition
of electronic data message is copied from the Model Law on
Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), from which majority of
the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken. While Congress
deleted this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the
drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the
said phrase is significant and pivotal.
Moreover, when Congress formulated the term electronic data
message, it intended the same meaning as the term electronic
record in the Canada law. This construction of the term
electronic data message, which excludes telexes or faxes, except
computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic
Commerce Laws focus on paperless communications and the
functional equivalent approach that it espouses. Facsimile
transmissions are not, in this sense, paperless, but verily are
paper-based.
[I]n an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original
paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a
phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. [I]n a virtual or
paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to
speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same,
in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the

laws definition of electronic data message, which, as aforesaid,

is interchangeable with electronic document, could not have
included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paperbased copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received.
These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different
legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in
communications and computer technology when it drafted the law,
it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and
telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer
development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax
machine transmission), when it defined the term electronic data
message.
[T]he terms electronic data message and electronic document,
as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not
include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is
not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best
Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

before the Workmens Compensation Commission. They also filed

a separate civil case against Philex for damages.
Philex sought the dismissal of the civil case as it insisted that
Floresca et al have already claimed benefits under the Workmens
Compensation Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philex is correct.
HELD: Yes. Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one.
If they filed for benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped
from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts.
Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would
also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA.
HOWEVER, the Supreme Court ruled that Floresca et al are
excused from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had
they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a
remedy. But, if in case theyll win in the lower court whatever
award may be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA
should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go
strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may
be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law
sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures mans
survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the
law killeth but its spirit giveth life.
Justice Gutierrez dissenting

PERFECTO FLORESCA VS PHILEX MINING CORPORATION

Statutory Construction Determining the Purpose of the Law
Perfecto Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of
Philex Mining Corporation who, while working at its copper mines
underground operations in Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died
as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
mine. Theircomplaint alleges that Philex, in violation of
government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately
failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the
lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to
claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act

No civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the

WCA. If employers are already liable to pay benefits under the
WCA they should not be compelled to bear the cost of damage
suits or get insurance for that purpose. The exclusion provided by
the WCA can only be properly removed by the legislature NOT the
SC.
When is it construction and when is it judicial legislation?
To declare what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to
declare what the law is or has been, is judicial. However, the court
do and must legislate to fill in the gaps in the law. The Court
decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of the existing law
and jurisprudence. (Floresca v. Philex Mining; Republic v. CA and
Molina)
Does CFI (RTC) have jurisdiction over the complaint?

Pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code which provides that: No

judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. It argues that the
application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is
part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law
since the Courts application or interpretation merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law
purports to carry into effect. Yet, the Court argues that the Court
can legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil Code.
However, even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain
instances, the court do and must legislate to fill in the gaps in
the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings,
is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which
the law may apply.

PAFLU VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR

FACTS:The Registration of Labor Organization (Registrar)
rendered a decision cancelling the SSSEAs Registration
Certificate No. 1-IP169 for failure to submit the following:
1. Failure to furnish the Bureau of Labor Relations with copies of
the reports on the finances of that union duly verified by affidavits
which its treasurer or treasurers rendered to said union and its
members covering the periods from September 24, 1960 to
September 23, 1961 and September 24, 1961 to September 23,
1962, inclusive, within sixty days of the 2 respective latter dates,
which are the end of its fiscal year; and
2. Failure to submit to this office the names, postal addresses and
non-subversive affidavits of the officers of that union within sixty
days of their election in October (1st Sunday), 1961 and 1963, in
conformity with Article IV (1) of its constitution and by-laws.
On the following day, Manuel Villagracia, Assistant Secretary of
the SSSEA filed with the Office of the Registrar, a letter enclosing
documents that supposed to comply with the abovementioned
requirements, but the Registrar found out that the following are
still not complied with:
1. Non-subversive affidavits of Messrs. Teodoro Sison, Alfonso
Atienza, Rodolfo Zalameda, Raymundo Sabino and Napoleon
Pefianco who were elected along with others on January 30, 1962.

2. Names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of all the

officers who were supposedly elected on October (1st Sunday), of
its constitution and by-laws.
Alfredo Fajardo, president of the SSSEA moved for a
reconsideration of said decision and prayed for time, up to
November 15, within which to submit the requisite papers and
data. An opposition thereto having been filed by one Paulino
Escueta, a member of the SSSEA, upon the ground that the latter
had never submitted any financial statement to its members, said
motion was heard on November 27, 1963. Subsequently, or on
December 4, 1963, the Registrar issued an order declaring that
the SSSEA had failed to submit the abovementioned
requirements and granting the SSSEA 15 days from notice to
comply with said requirements, as well as meanwhile holding in
abeyance the resolution of its motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the effect of Section 23 of Republic Act No.
875 (Any labor organization, association or union of workers duly
organized for the material, intellectual and moral well being of its
members shall acquire legal personality and be entitled to all the
rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations within thirty days of filing with the office of the
Secretary of Labor notice of its due organization and existence
and the following documents, together with the amount of five
pesos as registration fee, except as provided in paragraph d of
this section:) unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and
association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.
RULING:
There is no incompatibility between Republic Act
No. 875 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Upon the
other hand, the cancellation of the SSSEAs registration certificate
would not entail a dissolution of said association or its suspension.
The existence of the SSSEA would not be affected by said
cancellation, although its juridical personality and its statutory
rights and privileges as distinguished from those conferred by
the Constitution would be suspended thereby.
To be registered, pursuant to Section 23(b) of Republic Act No.
875, a labor organization, association or union of workers must
file with the Department of Labor the following documents:
(1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization
together with a list of all officers of the association, their
addresses and the address of the principal office of the
organization;

(2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the said organization,

association or union to the effect that they are not members of the
Communist Party and that they are not members of any
organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by
force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method; and
(3) If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or
more years, a copy of its last annual financial report.
Moreover, paragraph (d) of said-Section ordains that:
The registration and permit of a legitimate labor organization
shall be cancelled by the Department of Labor, if the Department
has reason to believe that the labor organization no longer meets
one or more of the requirements of paragraph (b) above; or fails to
file with the Department Labor either its financial report within
the sixty days of the end of its fiscal year or the names of its new
officers along with their non-subversive affidavits as outlined in
paragraph (b) above within sixty days of their election; however,
the Department of Labor shall not order the cancellation of the
registration and permit without due notice and hearing, as
provided under paragraph (c) above and the affected labor
organization shall have the same right of appeal to the courts as
previously provided.
What is the rule on executive construction?
1. PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations
The court still and should respect the contemporaneous
construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose
duty is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is clearly
erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby.

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC vs.

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION

Commissioner of Customs vs. Hypermix Feeds

Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to
make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the delegated
authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is
reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper
procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as
to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by
its delegation of administrative judgment, has committed those
questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial
judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not
into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule.
As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an
interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule;
(ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii)
give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the
interpretative rule.

Facts:
On October 15,1958, the Social Security Commission issued
Circular No. 22 requiring all Employers in computing premiums to
include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime
pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration.
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling
Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security
Commission in effect protesting against the circular as
contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957
expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of
the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium
contributions. Counsel further questioned the validity of the
circular for lack of autho
rity on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it
without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in
the Official Gazette. Overruling the objections, the Social Security
Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation
that needed the approval of the President and publication in the
Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative
interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or
opinion as to how the law should be construed. Petitioner comes to
Court on appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as
contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering
the Social Security Commission.
Held:
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an
administrative rule or regulation and an administrative
interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an
administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates
rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and
effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules
and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure
or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law,
partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may
be enforced by a penal sanction provided therein. The details and
the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the

administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this

sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product
of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions
that have the effect of law. Therefore, Circular No. 22 purports
merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the
light of the amendment of the law, they should include in
determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon
which the social security contributions should be based, and that
such circular did not require presidential approval and publication
in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. The Resolution appealed
from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
compensation to include all renumerations, except bonuses,
allowances & overtime pay
Definition was amended: deleted exceptions
Legislative Intent: the amendment shows legislative intent that
bonuses & overtime pay now included in employees
renumeration.
Principle: by virtue of express substantial change in phraseology,
whatever prior judicial or executive construction should give way
to mandate of new law.

authorizing and legalizing the collection of income tax on the

salaries of judicial officers.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional
HELD
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in
the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duly of the courts to
declare the act unconstitutional. Section 13, RA No. 590 is a clear
example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the
phrase found in section 9, Art. VIII of the Constitution which
refers to the salaries of judicial officers. This act interpreting the
Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion
of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary. The Legislature may not legally provide therein that a
statue be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thus the unconstitutionality of Section
13 of RA No. 590.

ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION

FACTS:

FACTS
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance in Manila declaring section 13 of RA No. 590
unconstitutional and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as
Collector of Internal Revenue to refund to Justice Pastor Endencia
and to Justice Fernando Jugo the income tax collected on their
salary. When the SC held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers
exempt from salary tax because the collection thereof was a
decrease or diminution of their salaries which is prohibited by the
Constitution, the Congress thereafter promulgated RA No. 590,

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and

the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor
were candidates voted for the position of members of the National
Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the
provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as memberelect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his
oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8,
which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec.
8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of
Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that
Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National
Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec.

9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6)

stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9.

system of checks and balances and subject to the specific

limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument.

Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive

jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the
Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the

judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commision and the subject matter of the controversy
upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
(2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by
resolution of the National Assembly
RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of
government. It obtains not through a single provision but by
actual division in our Constitution that each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
restrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government.

Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases

and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution,
but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases
and controversies must respect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of government.

In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only

constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral and constituent units thereof.

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy

involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral
Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may
not be interfered with, when and while acting wihtin the limits of
its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not
subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is
not a separate department of the government, and even if it were,
conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
departmental powers and agencies of the government are
necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and
appropriate cases.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking

perfection and perfectability, but as much as it was within the
power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide,
that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty
however limited, has established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly."

On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission

The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy
certain errors of which the framers of our Constitution were
cognizant. The purpose was to transfer in its totality all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested
with the necessary authority in the performance and exercise of
the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government,
it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of
its authority, an independent organ.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is
an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the
legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.

authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole

judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election
protests.
HELD:
The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise
of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of
the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against he
election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the
resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any
manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the
Electoral Commission might prescribe.

IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex

necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time
within which protests instructed to its cognizance should be filed.
Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18,

Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief
of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP
in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The
President declared that the services of the Marines in the anticrime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a
reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall
have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for

the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last
day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the
National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935,
confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly,
the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear
that said body had actually been organized.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the
necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the
PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character
of the PNP

While there might have been good reason for the legislative
practice of confirmation of the election of members of the
legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was
still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature
cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18,
Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such

proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the

writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of
the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents
action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the
calling out power in a different category from the power to declare
martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would
have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers
highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and
broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the
armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present
petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification
for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of
the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized
in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of
the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces
are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does
not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real
authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian
institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the
Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP,
there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of.
Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols
does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

IBP VS ZAMORA
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII
of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive,
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a
temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the

deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law

enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy
over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court
can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an
actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of
the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this
case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of
joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary
equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued
that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does
not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither
does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the
task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of
the Constitution.

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC.

V. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
FACTS:
Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging
the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human
Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions
are the Anti-Terrorism Councilcomposed of, at the time of the
filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as
Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson,
and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense
Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales,
Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and
Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions,
except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and
Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should prosper
HELD: No. Petitions Dismissed
REMEDIAL LAW- certiorari does not lie against respondents
who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1.
Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum
of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of
their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
POLITICAL LAW- Requisites of power of judicial review

In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited

by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis
mota of the case.

under the law.

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites,
which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last
two superfluous. Locus standi or legal standing requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material

requisites: (1) the matter must be oneof common and general
knowledge; (2) it must bewell and authoritatively settledand not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is
limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional

question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injuryas a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking

of judicial notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to
substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription
under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its
effectivity,belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat
emanating from the so-called tagging.

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being

suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially the
military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the
"transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens
and taxpayers.

The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in

G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed "link"
to the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the
implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in
direct injury to their organization and members.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890 allege that they have been

subjected to "close security surveillance by state security forces,"
their members followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with
dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with
military build." They likewise claim that they have been branded
as "enemies of the State. Even conceding such gratuitous
allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly
points out that petitioners have yet to show any connection
between the purported"surveillance" and the implementation of
RA 9372.

The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary

Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the
Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of
the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. Such statement
notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an
application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic
terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. From July
2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted
their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an
actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.

REMEDIAL LAW- Requisites of Judicial Notice

REMEDIAL LAW- A taxpayer suit is proper only when there

is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of
Congress,whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and
personal interest in the proceeding.

Petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court

to take judicial notice of respondent's alleged action of tagging
them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples
Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount
to the effects of proscription without following the procedure

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any
appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of
the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and

personal interest in the implementation of the law. It bears to

stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the
assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence
of a direct and personal interest is key.
POLITICAL LAW- judicial power operates only when there is
an actual case or controversy.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion.
Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and
supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way
approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these
allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion,
which is not its function. Without any justiciable controversy, the
petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the
petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it
of a public official aremerely theorized, lie beyond judicial review
for lack of ripeness.
POLITICAL LAW- A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed
only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of
constitutional litigation are rightly excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly
broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in
that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies
with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
A statute or act suffers from the defect ofvaguenesswhen it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It
is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.The
overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected

freedoms.
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth
doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute
prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even
though some of it is protected.
Distinguished from anas-applied challenge which considers only
extant facts affectingreallitigants, afacial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects,
not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also
on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or activities.
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring
opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines,as grounds
for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant
cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a
criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as
applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the
definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent
an actual or imminent charge against them.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law
penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of
"unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must necessarily
be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the
free speech clause.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there
must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the
operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of
the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to
an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element,
any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected
conduct into a protected speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely
inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element
of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some
mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to
launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the
amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful
transaction.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual

charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a
limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism"
is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that
judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a
statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the
courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in
Congress.

of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also

claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.

Petitions Dismissed

Issue:

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS

Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the
presidency via the non-violent people power revolution and was
forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to
return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a
time when the stability of government is threatened from various
directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of
Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats &
following supervening events:

failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a
chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove
that they can stir trouble from afar
Honasans failed coup
Communist insurgency movements
secessionist movements in Mindanao
devastated economy because of
accumulated foreign debt
plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order

the respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent
the implementation of President Aquinos decision to bar Marcos
from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquinos
power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the
claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right

to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection
of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to
travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution,
may only be impaired by a court order.

1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by

the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.
Decision: No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive
powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, the executive power shall be vested in the President
of the Philippines. However, it does not define what is meant by
executive power although in the same article it touches on
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the
power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons (art VII secfs. 14-23).
Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list
is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary
powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to
protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect
the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest.
(Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according
to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything
which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153),
inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman,
American President) and that the president has to maintain peace
during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of
the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Theyre

flexible depending on the circumstances. The request of the
Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one.
It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to
those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit
in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such
request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it
must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is
whether or not there exist factual basis for the President to
conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of
the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual
bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened
before her decision are factual. The President must take
preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country &
protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
Fernan, Concurring
The presidents power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the
imperatives of events and not on abstract theories of law. We are
undergoing a critical time and the current problem can only be
answerable by the President.
Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear &
present danger. Thus, its the executives responsibility &
obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety from
arising.
We cant sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political &
economic gains to give in to Marcos wish to die in the country.
Compassion must give way to the other state interests.
PENAFRANCIA SUGAR MILLS V. SUGAR REGULATORY
ADMINISTRATION

MENDOZA v. FAMILARA
FACTS:
This petition questions the constitutionality of Section 2[1] of
Republic Act No. 9164 (entitled "An Act Providing for
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections,
amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991"). As other barangay officials had
done in previous cases, petitioner Constancio F. Mendoza
(Mendoza) likewise questions the retroactive application of the
three-consecutive term limit imposed on barangay elective
officials beginning from the 1994 barangay elections.
Mendoza was a candidate for Barangay Captain of Barangay
Balatasan, Oriental Mindoro in the 29 October 2007 Barangay
Elections. As required by law, Mendoza filed a certificate of
candidacy. Prior thereto, Mendoza had been elected as Barangay
Captain of Barangay Balatasan for three (3) consecutive terms.
On 26 October 2007, respondent Senen C. Familara (Familara)
filed a Petition to Disqualify Mendoza averring that Mendoza,
under Section 2 of RA No. 9164, is ineligible to run again for
Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan, having been elected and
having served, in the same position for three (3) consecutive terms
immediately prior to the 2007 Barangay Elections.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not Section 2 [1] of RA No. 9164 is constitutional
II. Whether or not Section 2 [1] of RA No. 9164 may be applied
retroactively
HELD:

In COMELEC v. Cruz settles, the Court ruled that the

constitutionality of the three-consecutive term limit rule no
retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has
been there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No.
6679) after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued
under the Local Government Code and can still be found in the
current law. We find this obvious from a reading of the historical
development of the law.
The first law that provided a term limitation for barangay officials
was RA No. 6653 (1988); it imposed a two-consecutive term limit.
After only six months, Congress, under RA No. 6679 (1988),
changed the two-term limit by providing for a three-consecutive
term limit. This consistent imposition of the term limit gives no
hint of any equivocation in the congressional intent to provide a
term limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 - the LGC - followed,
bringing with it the issue of whether it provided, as originally
worded, for a three-term limit for barangay officials. We differ with
the RTC analysis of this issue.
Section 43 is a provision under Title II of the LGC on Elective
Officials. Title II is divided into several chapters dealing with a
wide range of subject matters, all relating to local elective
officials, as follows: a. Qualifications and Election (Chapter I); b.
Vacancies and Succession (Chapter II); c. Disciplinary Actions
(Chapter IV) and d. Recall (Chapter V). Title II likewise contains a
chapter on Local Legislation (Chapter III).
These Title II provisions are intended to apply to all local elective
officials, unless the contrary is clearly provided. A contrary
application is provided with respect to the length of the term of
office under Section 43(a); while it applies to all local elective
officials, it does not apply to barangay officials whose length of
term is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this
clear case of an exception to a general rule, the three-term limit
under Section 43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies to
all local elective officials who must perforce include barangay
officials.
An alternative perspective is to view [Section] 43(a), (b) and (c)
separately from one another as independently standing and selfcontained provisions, except to the extent that they expressly
relate to one another. Thus, [Section] 43(a) relates to the term of
local elective officials, except barangay officials whose term of
office is separately provided under Sec. 43(c). [Section] 43(b), by
its express terms, relates to all local elective officials without any
exception. Thus, the term limitation applies to all local elective
officials without any exclusion or qualification.

All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the challenged

proviso has been there all along and does not simply retroact the
application of the three-term limit to the barangay elections of
1994. Congress merely integrated the past statutory changes into
a seamless whole by coming up with the challenged proviso.
With this conclusion, the respondents constitutional challenge to
the proviso based on retroactivity must fail.

KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO

FACTS:
[T]his suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the
ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease
nullified in the first case [decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan,
Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the
Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp.
(PGMC)]. Petitioners maintain (1) that the Equipment Lease
Agreement (ELA) is a different lease contract with none of the
vestiges of a joint venture which were found in the Contract of
Lease nullified in the prior case; (2) that the ELA did not have to
be submitted to a public bidding because it fell within the
exception provided in E.O. No. 301, 1 (e); (3) that the power to
determine whether the ELA is advantageous to the government is
vested in the Board of Directors of the PCSO; (4) that for lack of
funds the PCSO cannot purchase its own on-line lottery equipment
and has had to enter into a lease contract; (5) that what
petitioners are actually seeking in this suit is to further their
moral crusade and political agenda, using the Court as their
forum.
Issue:
whether the petitioner has the requisite personality to
question the validity of the contract in this case
Held:
Yes. Kilosbayans status as a peoples organization
give it the requisite personality to question the validity of
the contract in this case. The Constitution provides that the
State shall respect the role of independent peoples
organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect,

within the democratic framework, their legitimate and

collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and
lawful means, that their right to effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political, and economic
decision-making shall not be abridged.
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that
only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the
case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction
of the Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions,
is limited by the case and controversy requirement of Art.
VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the
judicial function. It is what differentiates decision-making in
the courts from decision-making in the political departments
of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any
party.
It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in the
past accorded standing to taxpayers and concerned citizens
in cases involving paramount public interest. Taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens and legislators have indeed been
allowed to sue but then only (1) in cases involving
constitutional issues and (2) under certain conditions.
Petitioners do not meet these requirements on standing.
Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a
claim of illegal disbursement of public funds. or where a tax
measure is assailed as unconstitutional. Voters are allowed to
question the validity of election laws because of their
obvious interest in the validity of such laws. Concerned
citizens can bring suits if the constitutional question they
raise is of transcendental importance which must be settled
early. Legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity
of any official action which they claim infringes their
prerogatives qua legislators.

or that public money is being deflected to any improper

purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent
from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. Besides, the institution of a
taxpayers suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial review.
The Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a
taxpayers suit should be entertained.
Petitioners suit does not fall under any of these categories
of taxpayers suits.
Thus, petitioners right to sue as taxpayers cannot be
sustained. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit
because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for
the petitioners, who are members of Congress, their right to
sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not
complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.

DAVID V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these

various litigants have. Petitioners assert an interest as
taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement
for bringing taxpayers suits as set forth in Dumlao
v.Comelec, to wit:

Facts:

While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the

expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do
said petitioners allege that their tax money is being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protections against abuses of legislative power or that there
is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the

Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me
by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states
that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may
call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th

Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued
PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby

command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law
and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing
PP 1017.
Respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive
issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of
the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and
present danger.
Issue:
whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and
academic
Held:
The power of judicial review may be exercised only when the
following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual
case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of
constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised
at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of
the case itself.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is
definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interest; a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief. The Solicitor General refutes the
existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the
present petitions were rendered moot and academic by
President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021.
Such contention lacks merit.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a

declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.

Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it
on ground of mootness.
The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did
not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the
eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers,
according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it.
Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify
these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be
resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that an
unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no
duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation,
inoperative.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that
can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts
will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify the
Supreme Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the instant
petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the
issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving as they
do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly
and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules.
It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar,
and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the
extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And
lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition.
Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.
Issue:
whether petitioners have legal standing
Held:
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed
by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2,

Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It

provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to
the relief sought.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and
taxpayer standing in public actions. However, to prevent just
about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official
policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the
activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service the
Supreme Court laid down the more stringent direct injury test.
For a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine
the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that
he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is
not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all
members of the public. However, being a mere procedural
technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the
Court in the exercise of its discretion in cases of transcendental
importance and far-reaching implications.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the
cases decided by the Supreme Court. Taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to
sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the
validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the
issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be
settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of

whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion. This ruling is mainly a
result of the Courts reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987
Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the
political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power,
the courts are authorized not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The
latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial
power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government. It speaks of judicial prerogative
not only in terms of power but also of duty.
As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of
power, Lansang v. Garcia adopted the test that judicial inquiry can
go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the Presidents
decision is correct, but that the President did not act arbitrarily.
Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court further ruled that it
is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents
decision is totally bereft of factual basis and that if he fails, by way
of proof, to support his assertion, then the Supreme Court cannot
undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.

Held:

Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of the

calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual
basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment
and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports
forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the
Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines,
and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There
was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing
to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the
Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP
1017 calling for military aid.

Yes. In IBP v. Zamora, while the Court considered the Presidents

calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his

BPI V. SHEMBERG BIOTECH CORP

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may review the factual bases
of the Presidents exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power

processing of embarking and disembarking from aircrafts of

passengers, as well as their baggage and cargoes, forms part of
the BOC functions. BOC employees who serve beyond the regular
office hours are entitled to overtime pay for the services they
render. The SC also noted that the BOC created a committee to
re-evaluate the proposed increase in the rate of overtime pay and
for two years, several meetings were conducted with the agencies
concerned to discuss the proposal. BAR and the Airline Operators
Council participated in these meetings and discussions. Hence,
BAR cannot claim that it was denied due process in the imposition
of the increase of the overtime rate. Sergio I. Carbonilla, et al. vs.
Borad of Airlines, et al., G.R. No. 193247/G.R. No. 194276.
September 14, 2011.

CARBONILLA V. BOARD OF AIRLINE REPRESENTATIVES

Constitutionality; Tariff and Customs Code. In this case, the issue
was the validity of Customs Administrative Order No. 7-92 and
Section 3506 of the Tariff and Customs Code (on the assignment of
customs employees to overtime work). Section 3506 provides:
Customs employees may be assigned by a Collector to do
overtime work at rates fixed by the Commissioner of Customs
when the service rendered is to be paid by the importers, shippers
or other persons served. The rates to be fixed shall not be less
than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private
enterprise. The Supreme Court disagreed with the CA in
excluding airline companies, aircraft owners, and operators from
the coverage of Section 3506 of the TCCP. The term other
persons served refers to all other persons served by the BOC
employees. Airline companies, aircraft owners, and operators are
among other persons served by the BOC employees. The

as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in place of Roces. On the

same date, PGMA appointed Eduardo U. Escueta (Escueta) as
acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as
NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman.
Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro(Urro) in place of the
petitioner, Constancia P.de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and
Escuetaas permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners. In a letter
dated March 19, 2010, DILG Head Executive Assistant/Chief-ofStaff Pascual V. Veron Cruz, Jr. issued separate congratulatory
letters to the respondents, for being appointed as NAPOLCOM
Commissioners. The petitioner then filed the present quo warranto
petition questioning the validity of the respondents appointments
mainly on the ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition
against midnight appointments. On July 30, 2010, Pres. Benigno S.
Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) "Recalling,
Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous
Administration in Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight
Appointments."
The petitioner argues that the appointment issued to him was
really a "regular" appointment, and as such, he cannot be removed
from office except for cause. Since the appointment paper of
respondent Urro, while bearing a date prior to the effectivity of
the constitutional ban on appointments,was officially released
(perthe congratulatory letter dated March 19, 2010 issued to
Urro) when the appointment ban was already in effect, then the
petitioners appointment, though temporary in nature, should
remain effective as no new and valid appointment was effectively
made. The petitioner assails the validity of the appointments of
respondents De Guzman and Escueta on the same grounds.
Both parties dwelt lengthily on the issue of constitutionality of the
respondents appointments in light of E.O. No. 2.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
GENERAL V. URRO, ET AL.

POLITICAL LAW: Judicial power; kinds of appointments.

FACTS:

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court

can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial

When Roces, a former NAPOLCOM Commissioner, died in

September 2007, PGMA appointed the petitioner on July 21, 2008

interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional

question; (3)recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of
the case. Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action.
In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents
appointments is not the lis mota of the case. From the submitted
pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether the
petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this
present petition: a quo warranto against respondent Urro.
The Court already held that for a petition for quo warranto to be
successful, the suing private individual must show a clear right to
the contested office. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting
appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have
a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of
an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent
revocability at any time by the appointing authority.
Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes
the power to make temporary (acting) appointments,unless he is
otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law,
or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the
office involved. Here, nothing in the enumeration of functions of
the members of the NAPOLCOM that would be subverted or
defeated by the President's appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM
Commissioner pending the selection and qualification of a
permanent appointee. Viewed as an institution, a survey of
pertinent laws and executive issuances will show that the
NAPOLCOM has always remained as an office under or within the
Executive Department.Clearly, there is nothing repugnant
between the petitioners acting appointment, on one hand, and the
nature of the functions of the NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of
the NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the other.
Estoppel also clearly militates against the petitioner. From the
time he was appointed until apprised of the appointment of Urro,
the petitioner discharged the functions of his office without
expressing any misgivings on his appointment. He cannot later on
be heard to say that the appointment was really a permanent one
so that he could not be removed except for cause.
DENIED

PERALTA V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

FACTS
Pursuant to Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) which
conferred upon the Commissioner of Civil Service to prescribe,
amend and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into
effect the provisions of this Civil Service Law, the Commission
interpreted provisions of Republic Act No. 2625 amending the
Revised Administrative Code and adopted a policy that when an
employee who was on leave of absence without pay on a day
before or on a day time immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday
or Holiday, he is also considered on leave of absence without pay
on such Saturday, Sunday or Holiday. Petitioner Peralta, affected
by the said policy, questioned the said administrative
interpretation.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Civil Service Commissions interpretative
construction is:
(1) valid and constitutional.
(2) binding upon the courts.
RULING
(1) NO. The construction by the respondent Commission of R.A.
2625 is not in accordance with the legislative intent. R.A. 2625
specifically provides that government employees are entitled to
leaves of absence with full pay exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays
and Holidays. The law speaks of the granting of a right and the
law does not provide for a distinction between those who have
accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted their
leave credits in order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit

nec nos distinguere debemus.The fact remains that government

employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits,
are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and
Holidays and thus they can not be declared absent on such nonworking days. They cannot be or are not considered absent on
non-working days; they cannot and should not be deprived of their
salary corresponding to said non-working days just because they
were absent without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after
said non-working days. A different rule would constitute a
deprivation of property without due process.
(2) NO. Administrative construction, is not necessarily binding
upon the courts. Action of an administrative agency may be
disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an
error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the
spirit of a legislative enactment. When an administrative or
executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of
policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the
administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is
the courts that finally determine what the law means.
The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act
is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as
inoperative as though it had never been passed.

Philippines, if necessary, to handle this problem with justice and

equity to all affected government employees.

LOPEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS

But, as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State

Bank:
. . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to
the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such
determination is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate; and particular conduct, private and official.
To allow all the affected government employees, similarly situated
as petitioner herein, to claim their deducted salaries resulting
from the past enforcement of the herein invalidated CSC policy,
would cause quite a heavy financial burden on the national and
local governments considering the length of time that such policy
has been effective. Also, administrative and practical
considerations must be taken into account if this ruling will have a
strict restrospective application. The Court, in this connection,
calls upon the respondent Commission and the Congress of the

TATAD VS SECRETARY OF ENERGY

Facts:
In December 9, 1992, the Department of Energy was created
(through the enactment of R.A. No. 7638) to control energyrelated government activities. In March 1996, R.A. No. 8180
(Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996) was enacted
in pursuance to the deregulation of the power and energy thrust
under R.A. 7638. Under the R.A. No. 8180, any person or entity
was allowed to import and market crude oil and petroleum

products, and to lease or own and operate refineries and other

downstream oil facilities.
Petitioner Francisco Tatad questions the constitutionality of
Section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 since the imposition of tarrif violates
the equal protection clause and bars the entry of others in the oil
industry business. Also, the inclusion of tarrif violates Section 26
(1) of Article VI of the constitution requiring every law to have
only one subject which shall be expressed in its title.
In a separate petition (G.R. 127867), petitioners Edcel Lagman,
Joker Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human
Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition and
Sanlakas argued that R.A. No. 8180, specifically Section 15 is
unconstitutional because it: (1) gives undue delegation of
legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy by
not providing a determinate or determinable standard to guide the
Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry; (2) Executive Order
No. 392, an order declaring the implementation of the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry, is arbitrary and
unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion
of the Oil Price Stabilization Plan- a condition not found in R.A.
No. 8180; and (3) Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392
allow the formation of a de facto cartel among Petron, Caltex and
Shell in violation of constitutional prohibition against monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.
Respondents, on the other hand, declares the petitions not
justiciable (cannot be settled by the court) and that the petitioners
have no locus standi since they did not sustain direct injury as a
result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180.
Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. no. 8180 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not E. O. no. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable.
3. Whether or not Section 5 of R.A. no. 8180 violates Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
4. Whether or not Section 15 of R.A. no. 8180 constitutes undue
delegation of legislative power.
Held:

1. No, R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional. It violated Section 19,

Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition. The
deregulation act only benefits Petron, Shell and Caltex, the three
major league players in the oil industry.
2. Yes, Executive Order No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable
and therefore considered void. The depletion of OFSP is not one of
the factors enumerated in R.A. No. 8180 to be considered in
declaring full deregulation of the oil industry. Therefore, the
executive department, in its declaration of E.O. No. 392, failed to
follow faithfully the standards set in R.A. No. 8180, making it void.
3. No, section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 does not violate Section 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution. A law having a single general
subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions
as long as they are not inconsistent with the foreign subject.
Section 5 providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject
of the deregulation of the downstream industry which is R.A. No
8180, therefore it does not violate the one title-one subject rule.
4. No, Section 15 did not violate the constitutional prohibition on
undue delegation of legislative power. The tests to determine the
validity of delegation of legislative power are the completeness
test and the sufficiency test. The completeness test demands that
the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions such that
when it reaches the delegate, all it must do is enforce it. The
sufficiency test demand an adequate guideline or limitation in the
law to delineate the delegates authority. Section 15 provides for
the time to start the full deregulation, which answers the
completeness test. It also laid down standard guide for the
judgement of the President- he is to time it as far as practicable
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world
market are declining and when the exchange rate of peso to dollar
is stable- which answers the sufficiency test.
Decision:
The petitions were granted. R.A. No. 8180 was declared
unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.