NCC Art. 7.

Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their

violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)
1987 Phil. Constitution, ARTICLE XVIII
Transitory Provisions
Xxx
SECTION 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances
not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed, or revoked.
FC Art. 254. If any provision of this Code is held invalid, all the other
provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid.
THIRD DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION G.R. No. 154598
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS Present:
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for PANGANIBAN,J., Chairman,
and in behalf of the minor SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,*
child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER CORONA and
DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON CARPIO MORALES, JJ.
Petitioner,
- versus ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 16, 2004
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5,
2002 resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP
No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The dispositive portion [2] read:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the
grounds that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient in substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on
August 28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations
Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom
they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain
housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a guest relations officer in
a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever
petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her
friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she
continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the
family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She
told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta.
Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court
in Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation
that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain
the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find
them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued
a certification[3] that respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular
phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija,
Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for
habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of
habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground
that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369
(The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas
Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether

or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was

re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of
this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule
102 of the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It
provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation
to the latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902
insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in
custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did,
because there is no other meaning of the word exclusive than to constitute
the Family Court as the sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other
than the Family Court also possesses the same competence, then the
jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent and such an
interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition
for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily
evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by just moving
out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has
territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by
law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it
cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this
Court or any court for that matter to determine. The enactment of a law on
jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is a
perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought form the courts
but only from the legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of
minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over such petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule
on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the
issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas
corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court,[4] Court of Appeals, or with any

of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in

the Philippines.[5]
The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is
nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving the custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and
BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can
issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word exclusive
apparently cannot be construed any other way.
We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous
situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in
obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the
whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they
cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in
their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred
from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner
in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of
recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they
passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor
General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to
protect the rights and promote the welfare of children. The creation of the
Family Court is geared towards addressing three major issues regarding
childrens welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during the
deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts
exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further
clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and
specialization in view of the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to
guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains
protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child.
We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for
habeas corpus involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain
and transient will not result in one of the situations that the legislature
seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex
parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of
the childs privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the
appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by
the legislature: the childs welfare and well being will be prejudiced.

This is not the first time that this Court construed the word exclusive
as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the
Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,[6] the heirs of
miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the
regular courts even if, under the Workmens Compensation Act, the
Workmens Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over
such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it
supports petitioners submission that the word exclusive in the Family
Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic foreclosure of the
jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In
the same manner that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective,
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar
is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus
enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in
cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot
be determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ
enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of
the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any
member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or
any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made
returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of
First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the
merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge
thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself,
enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioners exclusive jurisdiction did not foreclose
resort to the regular courts for damages, this Court, in the
sameFloresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving effect to
the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the wellestablished rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter,
of the law:
Idolatrous reverence for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of
the law insures mans survival and ennobles him. In the words of
Shakespeare, the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the
Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is

not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to

the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation
aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used
in more than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in
mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal
interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or
contradiction.[7] In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word
exclusive will result in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect the
rights and promote the welfare of children [8] under the Constitution and the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must
prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in
construing the provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals
are not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof
must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The
rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est
optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought
into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known
the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes.
Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all
efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws
on the subject.[9]
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of
habeas corpus relating to the custody of
minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092
and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas
corpus in cases involvingthe custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA
8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors
is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the
adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ
of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule
provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ
of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family
Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable
to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and
decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas
corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over
the country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court
of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by the
Solicitor General:[10]
That the serving officer will have to search for the child all over the country
does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since
such a task is nomore different from or difficult than the duty of the peace
officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise
enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas
corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is
hereby REINSTATED andREMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth
Division.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

On leave.
Penned by Associate Justice Hilarion A. Aquino and concurred in by
Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Regalado E. Maambong.
[2]
CA Decision, p. 3.
[3]
Rollo, p. 49.
[1]

[4]

Article VIII. Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus.
xxx xxx xxx.
[5]
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition for a writ
of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family
Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Courts belong.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals
or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforecebale
anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be returnable to a Family Court
or any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where
the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
[6]
136 SCRA 141 [1985].
[7]
Agpalo Statutory Constitution, 1986, p. 98.
[8]
SEC. 2. State and National Policies.- The State shall protect the rights
and promote the welfare of children in keeping with the mandate of the
Constitution and the precepts of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child. xxx
[9]
Republic vs. Marcopper Mining, 335 SCRA 386 [2000].
[10]
Ibid. at 120.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA,

in his personal capacity, and in
representation of MAGUINDANAO
FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS
IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN,
JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON
T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI,
MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH ALSAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE
ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH

G.R. No. 196271

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,

SAUPI,
Petitioners,

- versus -

DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

represented by its President
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF Promulgated:
REPRESENTATIVES, thru
SPEAKER FELICIANO
October 18, 2011
BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, thru its Chairman,
SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,
PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of
the President Executive Secretary,
FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary
of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN,
Treasurer of the Philippines,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO,
G.R. No. 196305
Petitioner,

- versus -

SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his

capacity as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections,
FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his
capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and
Management, PACQUITO OCHOA,
JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
in his capacity as Senate
President, and FELICIANO
BELMONTE, in his capacity as
Speaker of the House of
Representatives,
Respondents.

x----------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 197221
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,
Petitioner,

- versus -

PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his

capacity as the Executive
Secretary, and the COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 197280
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU
CASAN CONDING CANA, and
PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO
PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN
(PDP-LABAN),
Petitioners,

- versus -

THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, through its
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES,
JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, JR., in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, and
HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his
capacity as Treasurer of the
Philippines,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------- G.R. No. 197282
x
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL,

Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 197392
LUIS BAROK BIRAOGO,
Petitioner,

- versus -

THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 197454
JACINTO V. PARAS,
Petitioner,
- versus -

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM,
PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Respondents-Intervenor.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
BRION, J.:

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act
Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections
and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections
from the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every
three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and
local elections. The law as well granted the President the power to appoint
officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the
Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices
until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
and assumed office.
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153
already spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and
Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this
Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common
and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to

enact an organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into
effect the granted autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the
executive department and legislative assembly, both of which
shall be elective and representative of the constituent political
units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts
with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent
with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided
that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734
entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required
by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting
provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No.
6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the
ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its
ratification.
RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose
Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended) was the next legislative act
passed. This law provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure
first defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular elections for
the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.

Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 9140 [1] on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first regular elections originally
scheduled under RA No. 9054, toNovember 26, 2001. It likewise set the
plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.
The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same
date.
RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the
ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday of August 2005, and on the
same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054,
RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should
have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for
these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various
regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the
regular national and local elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House
Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the ARMM elections
scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of
Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191)
Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version,
Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13)
Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of
Representative concurred with the Senate amendments, and on June 30,
2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a
petition filed with this Court G.R. No. 196271[3] - assailing the
constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the
validity of RA No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the constitutional
plebiscite requirement. Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No.
196305 filed another petition[4] also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.

With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC

stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well
to the filing of the following petitions against its constitutionality:
a)

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman

as a member of the House of Representatives against Paquito
Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197221;

b)

Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo

Macalintal as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R.
No. 197282;

c)

Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary

Injunction[7] filed by Louis Barok Biraogo against the COMELEC and
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No.
197392; and

d)

Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed by Jacinto Paras as a

member of the House of Representatives against Executive
Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R.
No. 197454.

Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as

registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino
Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional
elections scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition
and Mandamus[9] against the COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No. 197280, to
assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum
Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their
own Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and Commentin-Intervention dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the
motion. In the same Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of all
the petitions relating to the constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756,
RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.

Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16,

2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their respective
memoranda within twenty (20) days.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent
elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should
these cases not be decided by the end of their term on September 30,
2011.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153
assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with
the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under
Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is
unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement
of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the
alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as
the failure to adhere to the elective and representative character of the
executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners
challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials
elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office.
Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the
President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of
Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
The Issues

From the parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and
argued by the parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:
I.

Whether the 1987 Constitution

synchronization of elections

mandates

the

II.

Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section

26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a

supermajority vote and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular
elections constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article
XVIII of RA No. 9054?
B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for
amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate
Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable
laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the
creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2,
Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV.

Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy

granted to the ARMM

V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:

A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
VI.

Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional

and legal.
We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.

OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.

I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate

The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the
Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this position, cites
Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under
this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be
determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with
the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the
election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the
Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve
obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year
and the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and
Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President
under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of
May, 1992.
We agree with this position.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this
objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of
the Constitution,[10] which show the extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. [11]
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all
elective officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of

the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to

synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to
once every three years. [12] This intention finds full support in the discussions
during the Constitutional Commission deliberations. [13]
These

Constitutional

Commission

exchanges,

read

with

the

provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as

patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized
national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and
for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of
the national and local elections as a constitutional mandate. In Osmea v.
Commission on Elections,[14]we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987
Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of
the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President
and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the
same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the abovementioned Sections that the term of synchronization is used
synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this
is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the
same day or occasion. This common termination date will
synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas,
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p.
605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII)
will have to be synchronized with the election for President and
Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from
the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional
Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election
based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used
should be understood in the sense that they have in common use and
given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed,

in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. [15] As this
Court explained in People v. Derilo,[16] [a]s the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyers document, its language should be understood in the sense that it
may have in common. Its words should be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed.
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that
primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community
or minor political subdivision.[17] Regional elections in the ARMM for the
positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives
obviously fall within this classification, since they pertain to the elected
officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are
considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article
X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous regions are
established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article
wholly devoted to Local Government. That an autonomous region is
considered a form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article
X of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided.

Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated

by the Constitution does not include the regional elections of the ARMM
unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our
discussions below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the
various issues posed in this case and must be recalled time and again for
its complete resolution.

II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA
No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of

the Constitution[18]which provides that before bills passed by either the

House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass through three
readings on separate days. The exception is when the President certifies to
the necessity of the bills immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[19] explained the effect
of the Presidents certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill
on separate days. The phrase "except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art.
VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill
can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on
separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved.
xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the
requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing
and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the
weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the
certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with
the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was
passed on second and third readings in the House of
Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill
had been certified by the President as urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections.[20] Following our Tolentino ruling, the
Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from
having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the
immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public calamity or
emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling
in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII,
Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying

the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under

Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic
rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of
presidential certification of bills, which involves doing
away with procedural requirements designed to insure that
bills are duly considered by members of Congress,
certainly should elicit a different standard of
review. [Emphasis supplied.]

The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their

legislative discretion gave full recognition to the Presidents certification and
promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can
justify our intrusion under our power of judicial review.[21]
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or
justification for this course of action. Hence, while the judicial department
and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President's
certification by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent
exercise of our powers and respect due our co-equal branches of
government in matters committed to them by the Constitution, caution a
stay of the judicial hand.[22]
In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose
that underlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of every
bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties
interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the
purpose with respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the
legislators of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that
a measure is in progress through the enactment process. [23]
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that
both advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient
opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify
RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No.
9054

The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been
challenged because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII
of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution,
this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress
of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the
Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate
voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act
shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the
vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be
held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90)
days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
We find no merit in this contention.
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA
No. 9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only
provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the
date of the regular elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to
fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by
enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these
subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered
amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any
provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or
supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular
elections.
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of
the date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion finds
support in ARMMs recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled
the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only did not fix
the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of
the first ARMM elections,[24] leaving the date to be fixed in another
legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, [25] RA No. 8176,[26] RA
No. 8746,[27] RA No. 8753,[28] and RA No. 9012[29] were all enacted by
Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not

change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not
amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to submit
them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on
March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the
second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No.
9140[30] to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No.
9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the Second
Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional
elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified
in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress
passed RA No. 9333,[31] which further reset the date of the ARMM regional
elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress
to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as
separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted
consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring
compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and
Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA
No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact
amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required
under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 [32] has to be struck down for
giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by
requiring more than what the Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of
each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. In other words, as
long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the
Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct
business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally
sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of

no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively
amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than
what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to
restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the
laws it had passed. The Courts pronouncement in City of Davao v.
GSIS[33] on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the
unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic
principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the
actions of future legislative body, considering that both
assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do
the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of
the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature
which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of
its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all
subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its
territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the
old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal
constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself
or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so
restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts
passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be
exercised at the same session at which the original act was
passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it
becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future
legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in
advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.[34] (Emphasis
ours.)

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a

limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills
and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the
future legislators room for action and flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the
plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted

supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied
in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority
requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required
under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of
absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is
required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining
which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in the
autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that amendments to the
Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite requirement in order to
become effective,[35] questions on the extent of the matters requiring
ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general terms
of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite
were to be required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the
majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for
the purpose. With these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement
to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those
aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must
provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite. These
amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic
structure of the regional government; (b) the regions judicial system, i.e.,
the special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction; and,
(c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded
to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
[36]

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the
matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for
in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes
and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date of
elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic
Act that would require compliance with these requirements.

IV. The synchronization issue

As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local
elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress must provide for and
this synchronization must include the ARMM elections. On this point, an
existing law in fact already exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the
current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already provides for the
synchronization of local elections with the national and congressional
elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local
governments
(with
the
exception
ofbarangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not
constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is already
reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local
elections by express constitutional recognition. [37]
To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile
the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held
in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the
national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open
to Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options are: (1) to allow
the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity,
pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in
the synchronized elections assume office; [38](2) to hold special elections in
the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in
the synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President
to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those
elected in the synchronized elections assume office.
As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in
choosing to grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose the
correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.
V.

The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153

A.

Basic Underlying Premises

To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material

premises must be fully understood. The first is the extent of the powers of
Congress to legislate; thesecond is the constitutional mandate for the
synchronization of elections; and the third is on the concept of autonomy as
recognized and established under the 1987 Constitution.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive.[39] The legislative body possesses plenary power for all
purposes of civil government.[40]Any power, deemed to be legislative by
usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the
Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. [41] Except as limited by the
Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all
subjects and extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.
[42]

The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express

or implied. The express limitations are generally provided in some
provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and
in the provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional provisions
(such as the initiative and referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and
32, and the autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their own express
limitations. The implied limitations are found in the evident purpose which
was in view and the circumstances and historical events which led to the
enactment of the particular provision as a part of organic law.[43]

The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to

21 of Article X of the Constitution constitute express limitations on
legislative power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its
parameters, thus limiting what is otherwise the unlimited power of
Congress to legislate on the governance of the autonomous region.

Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the

limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure of government i.e., that
the government must have an executive department and a legislative
assembly, both of which must be elective and representative of the

constituent political units; national government, too, must not encroach on

the legislative powers granted under Section 20, Article X. Conversely and
as expressly reflected in Section 17, Article X, all powers and functions not
granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be
vested in the National Government.
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as
a standard that Congress must observe in dealing with legislation touching
on the affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave
no doubt on what the Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or selfgovernment, in particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social,
economic and administrative matters. But equally clear under these
provisions are the permeating principles of national sovereignty and the
territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed in the above-quoted
Section 17 and in Section 15.[44] In other words, the Constitution and the
supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium
et imperio[45] in the relationship between the national and the regional
governments.
In

relation

with

synchronization,

both

autonomy

and

the

synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and

established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the
other. If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their
coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while
regional autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a narrower regional
effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.
These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and
limitations of Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To succinctly
describe the legal situation that faced Congress then, its decision to
synchronize the regional elections with the national, congressional and all
other
local
elections
(save
for barangay and sangguniang
kabataanelections) left it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM
with governance in the intervening period between the expiration of the
term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office twentyone (21) months away of those who will win in the synchronized elections
on May 13, 2013.

The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this
period, consistent with the terms of the Constitution and its established
supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of
autonomy. Interim measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in
the Philippine legal landscape. The Constitutions Transitory Provisions
themselves collectively provide measures for transition from the old
constitution to the new[46] and for the introduction of new concepts. [47] As
previously mentioned, the adjustment of elective terms and of elections
towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the Transitory
Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far enough or deeply
enough, particularly into the problems that synchronizing regional
autonomous elections would entail; thus, the present problem is with us
today.
The creation of local government units also represents instances
when interim measures are required. In the creation of Quezon del
Sur[48] and Dinagat Islands,[49] the creating statutes authorized the President
to appoint an interim governor, vice-governor and members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan although these positions are essentially
elective in character; the appointive officials were to serve until a new set of
provincial officials shall have been elected and qualified. [50] A similar
authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a local government from
a sub-province to a province.[51]
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity;
out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in
order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do
violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under
these limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to
congressional discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve
as the guideposts and markers in our discussion of the options available to
Congress to address the problems brought about by the synchronization of
the ARMM elections, properly understood as interim measures that
Congress had to provide. The proper understanding of the options as
interim measures assume prime materiality as it is under these terms
that the passage of RA No. 10153 should be measured, i.e., given the

constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot legally be

faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate the
Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the
concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily
brought with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in
executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term
as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they
cannot extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v.
COMELEC:[52]
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term
of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has
in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when
the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall
begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office
beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify
within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as
follows:
It has been broadly stated that the legislature
cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill
an office the term of which is limited by the
Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent
beyond the period as limited by the
Constitution. [Emphasis ours.]

Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as

the supreme law of the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself
made a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined
or mandated should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by
amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A
necessary corollary is that none of the three branches of government can
deviate from the constitutional mandate except only as the Constitution
itself may allow.[53] If at all, Congress may only pass legislation filing in
details to fully operationalize the constitutional command or to implement it
by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the other hand, may
only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and called for.
[54]

In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly
and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with
respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an
interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials
should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be
extended by holdover by Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term
mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term
and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension
of the elective term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do
indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would
effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be
legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
[55]
Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the
occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of
appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President. [56] Hence, holdover
whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress
could not have undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the
question of holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur of
approval by, this Court. The present case though differs significantly from
past cases with contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC,
[57]
Adap v. Comelec,[58] and Montesclaros v. Comelec,[59]where the Court

ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over
capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for
in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to local
elective officials the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly whose terms fall within the
three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Because
of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension
beyond the term for which they were originally elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there
had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No.
9054) in the past,[60] we have to remember that the rule of holdover can
only apply as an available option where no express or implied
legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such
contrary intent is evident.[61]
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had
the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No.
9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy
decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the
exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, [62] except
where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for
this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections
pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in
nature, as evident from, and exemplified by, the following provisions of the
Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the
regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House

of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.

[Emphasis ours]
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the
President and Vice-President, states:
xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the
regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held
on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]

while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local
government code which shall provide for xxx the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials[.]
[Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be
held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President,
Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by
another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom
Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain
or fill in the details in the execution of that power.[63]
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing
the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13,
2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential,
congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has
made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom thatit
shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary
can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of
the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without
thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be
sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null
and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave
abuse of discretion.[64] But our power rests on very narrow ground and

is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to

supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress
itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus,
contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot compel
COMELEC to call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of
the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call for, and to set
the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. [65] Statutorily, COMELEC
has no power to call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to
a specific statutory grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of
BP 881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to another date.
However, this power is limited to, and can only be exercised within, the
specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. We quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any
serious
cause
such
as violence, terrorism, loss
or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force
majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that
the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should
become impossible in any political subdivision, the
Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any
interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all
interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard,
shall postpone the election therein to a date which should
be reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not
later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held
on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the
failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified
petition by any interested party and after due notice and
hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not held,

suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later

than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
[Emphasis ours]

A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to

address instances where elections have already been scheduled to take
place but have to be postponedbecause of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c)
loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure,
and (e) other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free,
orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the term analogous
causes will be restricted to those unforeseen or unexpected events that
prevent the holding of the scheduled elections. These analogous causes
are further defined by the phrase of such nature that the holding of a free,
orderly and honest election should become impossible.
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where
elections have already been scheduled but do not take place because of
(a) force majeure, (b)violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held
on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law
for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation
and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP
881, Section 6 addresses instances where the elections do not occur or
had
to
be
suspended
because
of unexpectedand unforeseen circumstances.
In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections
is by law i.e., by congressional policy and is pursuant to the
constitutional mandate of synchronizationof national and local
elections. By no stretch of the imagination can these reasons be given the
same character as the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section
6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that obstruct the holding
of elections. Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under
the guise of interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor intended
by the lawmakers.[66] Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP 881 can

apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no legal basis to
compel the COMELEC to hold special elections.
D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective
officials

Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel

the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise exists to
rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the
ARMM officials elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed
office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of
elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of
office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case
of barangay officials,[67] is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress
itself may be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution
shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes, [68] and
extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President [69] in order to
synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The
settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by
mere statute.[70] More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this
Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the
ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three
years[71] as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot
be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting
an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution
itself commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two
years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while
synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an
express provision of the Constitution.
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those
officials to be elected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on their term
(where the term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold
office as of right and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another, while the tenure represents the term during

which the incumbent actually holds the office). [72] As with the fixing of the
elective term, neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to
shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would commit an
unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if they do so.
E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim
measure RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to
govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only measure that Congress can
make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant
constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature,
and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should
be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly
stated in order to be recognized.[73] The appointing power is embodied in
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
[emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the
President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other
public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may
by law vest in the President alone.[74]
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA
No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can
appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the
assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority
to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the
Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be
elective and representative of the constituent political units. This
requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the
assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional
problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No.
10153 were to bemistakenly read as a law that changes the elective
and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153,
however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the
ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What
RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for the
Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is far
different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term
ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.

As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority

and plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not
amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for
synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must
in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in
the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms.
[75]
Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an
interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.
Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure
is an unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given the legal situation
that the synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete
terms and based on the above considerations, given the plain
unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability
of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term
of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the Presidents power to
appoint for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as
allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an
unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other
situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond the
adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a government that
is not democratic and republican. For then, the peoples right to choose the
leaders to govern them may be said to besystemically withdrawn to the
point of fostering an undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would
frontally breach the elective and representative governance requirement of
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited
circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed
and, more importantly, the terms of governance both under Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 will not systemically be
touched nor affected at all. To repeat what has previously been said, RA
No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with full effect in
accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary
measures that synchronization of elections requires.

Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily

disrupt the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the
communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of
necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures
have been adopted and used in the creation of local government
units[76] and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of provinces.
[77]
These measures, too, are used in light of the wider national demand for
the synchronization of elections (considered vis--vis the regional interests
involved). The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different
from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the State,
where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim
measure taken in light of the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need
not necessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement
is really a function of the appointment process; only the elective aspect
shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No.
10153 significantly seeks to address concerns arising from the
appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law,
concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of
Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in
its proper context is a law that is not violative of the Constitution
(specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well
under the circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns
Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral
arguments that upholding the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a
dangerous precedent of giving the President the power to cancel elections
anywhere in the country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with
OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board
cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress, not for the President, to
address. It is a power that falls within the powers of Congress in the

exercise of its legislative powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is

limited in what it can legislatively undertake with respect to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was
for a very specific and limited purpose the synchronization of elections. It
was a temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections.
Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation
are likewise clear and specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any
other cause for the cancellation of elections. Any other localized
cancellation of elections and call for special elections can occur only in
accordance with the power already delegated by Congress to the
COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to
act in a holdover capacity upon the expiration of their terms, and this Court
cannot compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now
has to deal with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be
forgotten that a period of 21 months or close to 2 years intervenes from the
time that the incumbent ARMM elective officials terms expired and the time
the new ARMM elective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons
of our Mindanao history past and current teach us, many developments,
some of them critical and adverse, can transpire in the countrys Muslim
areas in this span of time in the way they transpired in the past. [78] Thus, it
would be reckless to assume that the presence of an acting ARMM
Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully functioning Regional
Legislative Assembly can be done away with even temporarily. To our mind,
the appointment of OICs under the present circumstances is an absolute
necessity.
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs
to undertake the functions of the elective members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our
earlier pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:[79]
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588
and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is
empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public
offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both

laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive

positions. However, in the absence of any contrary
provision in the Local Government Code and in the best
interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the
procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be
similarly applied in the present case. The respondents
contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing
power. This argument has no merit. As between the President
who has supervision over local governments as provided by law
and the members of the board who are junior to the vicegovernor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President,
until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no
approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of
their right of representation and governance in their own local
government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules
through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or
absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that
extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a
consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the
people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is
missing.[80](Emphasis ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice
Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21
months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in
the delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper management of
the affairs of the regional government, and in responding to critical
developments that may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the
President in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment
power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally
mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede the autonomy that the
Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would
presume that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional
mandates synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary
to choose one over the other.

We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic

principle in constitutional construction ut magis valeat quam pereat: that the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, [81] and one mandate should not
be given importance over the other except where the primacy of one over
the other is clear.[82] We refer to the Courts declaration inAng-Angco v.
Castillo, et al.,[83] thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be construed in
isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be
interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions
should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may
give to all of them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]
Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as
regional autonomy. They are interests that this Court should reconcile and
give effect to, in the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides
the measure to transit to synchronized regional elections with the least
disturbance on the interests that must be respected.Particularly, regional
autonomy will be respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not
in any way alter, change or modify its governing features, except in a very
temporary manner and only as necessitated by the attendant
circumstances.
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be
synchronized with the national and local elections in order to maintain the
autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the
rough and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves
us far from convinced of its merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions
are granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never
equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus
continues to operate within the larger framework of the State and is still
subject to the national policies set by the national government, save only
for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional
autonomous determination. As reflected during the constitutional
deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete
separation from the central government, but rather an efficient
working relationship between the autonomous region and the

central government. We see this as an effective partnership, not

a separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really
thought of as complete independence.
Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of selfgovernment within the larger political framework of the
nation.[84] [Emphasis supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the abovequoted Section 17, Article X of the Constitution, and by the express
reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall
be within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to
remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary in light of the
enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers decided to
reinstate the provision in order to make it clear, once and for all, that these
are the limits of the powers of the autonomous government. Those not
enumerated are actually to be exercised by the national government[.]
[85]
Of note is the Courts pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon.
Aguirre[86] which we quote:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the
national government has not completely relinquished all its
powers over local governments, including autonomous regions.
Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to
political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make
governance more directly responsive and effective at the local
levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at
the smaller political units are expected to propel social and
economic growth and development. But to enable the
country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies
effected locally must be integrated and coordinated
towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for
the entire country still lies in the President and
Congress. [Emphasis ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be
invoked to defeat national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization
of elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is

subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used
to exempt the region from having to act in accordance with a national policy
mandated by no less than the Constitution.

Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional
mandate the synchronization of national and local elections when it
enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which
Congress undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. [87] As judges, we
can only interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts about its
wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.[88]
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress
should address what is essentially a legislative problem. It is not within the
Courts power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty
of usurping the exclusive prerogative of Congress. [89] The petitioners, in
asking this Court to compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its
lack of authority to do so, are essentially asking us to venture into the realm
of judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the most basic principles
of a republican and democratic government the separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress
acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Grave
abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of the law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[90]
We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within
its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due
constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the
necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress,
therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a
refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord merit to the
petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.

On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can

only reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed valid.
[91]
Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its
acts, and the party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task
of rebutting this presumption. [92] Any reasonable doubt about the validity of
the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. [93] As this Court
declared in Garcia v. Executive Secretary:[94]
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions and to presume that the acts of the political
departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain.
This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming
respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is
that as the joint act of Congress and the President of
the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and
determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally enacted.[95] [Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and confirm its
validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated
petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit,
and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the
temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September 13,
2011. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

[1]

Entitled An act fixing the date of the plebiscite for the approval of the
amendments to Republic Act No. 6734 and setting the date of the regular
elections for elective officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao on the last Monday of November 2001, amending for the

purpose Republic Act No. 9054, entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand
the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending
for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended, and for other
purposes.
[2]
Entitled An Act amending fixing the Date or Regular elections for Elective
Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9054, entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for
the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended
[3]
Filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, in his personal capacity, and
in representation of Maguindanao Federation of Autonomous Irrigators
Association, Inc., Hadji Muhmina Usman, John Anthony L. Lim, Jamilon T.
Odin, Asrin Timbol Jaiyari, Mujib M. Kalang, Alih Al-Saidi J. Sapi-e, Kessar
Damsie Abdil, and Bassam Aluh Saupi.
[4]
Petition for Prohibition with Very Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order dated April
11, 2011 was filed against Sixto Brillantes, as Chairperson of COMELEC, to
challenge the effectivity of RA No. 9333 for not having been submitted to a
plebiscite. Since RA No. 9333 is inoperative, any other law seeking to
amend it is also null and void.
[5]
With Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writs of Preliminary Prohibitive and Mandatory Injunction dated June 30,
2011.
[6]
With Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo
Order and Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction dated July 1, 2011.
[7]
With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order dated July
12, 2011.
[8]
With Injunction and Preliminary Injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order dated July 11, 2011.
[9]
With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and the Issuance of Writs of
Preliminary Injunction, Both Prohibitory and Mandatory dated July 1, 2011.
[10]
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under
this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the
President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of
the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or
municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives,
and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve
until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the
highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve
for three years.

xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President
elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. [emphasis
ours]
[11]
To illustrate, while Section 8, Article X of the Constitution fixes the term
of office of elective local officials at three years, under the above-quoted
provisions, the terms of the incumbent local officials who were elected in
January 1988, which should have expired on February 2, 1991, were fixed
to expire at noon of June 30, 1992. In the same vein, the terms of the
incumbent President and Vice President who were elected in February
1986 were extended to noon of June 30, 1992. On the other hand, in order
to synchronize the elections of the Senators, who have six-year terms, the
twelve Senators who obtained the lowest votes during the 1992 elections
were made to serve only half the time of their terms.
[12]
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary (1996 ed.), p. 1199, citing Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 429-4.
[13]
MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a
section which we will temporarily indicate as Section 14. It reads: THE
SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
THE LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL
SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF JUNE 1992.
This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that
Commissioner Davide be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is
recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only state
that in view of the action taken by the Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am
formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: THE SENATORS,
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL
OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL
SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992.
I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on Transitory
Provisions giving a term to the incumbent President and Vice-President until
1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided by the Commission for
Members of the Lower House and for local officials is three years, if there
will be an election in 1987, the next election for said officers will be in 1990,
and it would be very close to 1992. We could never attain, subsequently,
any synchronization of election which is once every three years.
So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization
in 1992, and consequently, we should not have a local election or an
election for Members of the Lower House in 1990 for them to be able to

complete their term of three years each. And if we also stagger the Senate,
upon the first election it will result in an election in 1993 for the Senate
alone, and there will be an election for 12 Senators in 1990. But for the
remaining 12 who will be elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their
election will be in 1993. So, consequently we will have elections in 1990, in
1992 and in 1993. The later election will be limited to only 12 Senators and
of course to local officials and the Members of the Lower House. But,
definitely, thereafter we can never have an election once every three years,
therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we adopted
the term of six years for the President and another six years for the
Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and
12 for three years insofar as the first Senators are concerned. And so my
proposal is the only way to effect the first synchronized election
which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the Members
of the Lower House and a bonus of two years to the local elective
officials.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say?
MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is
recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of
elections, I was the one who proposed that in order to synchronize the
elections every three years, which the body approved the first national and
local officials to be elected in 1987 shall continue in office for five years, the
same thing the Honorable Davide is now proposing. That means they will all
serve until 1992, assuming that the term of the President will be for six
years and continue beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will again have
national, local and presidential elections. This time, in 1992, the President
shall have a term until 1998 and the first twelve Senators will serve
until 1998, while the next 12 shall serve until 1995, and then the local
officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall
have an election every three years.
So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if we
have to synchronize our elections every three years which was already
approved by the body.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of
the incumbent President and Vice-President in 1992.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the
election of the Senators and local officials with the election of the
President?
MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here is
on the assumption that the provision of the Transitory Provisions on the
term of the incumbent President and Vice-President would really end in
1992.

MR. GUINGONA. Yes.

MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992 for
all, from the President up to the municipal officials. [emphasis ours] (V
Record of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 429-431; October 3,
1986)
[14]
G.R. Nos. 100318, 100308, 100417 and 100420, July 30, 1991, 199
SCRA 750, 758.
[15]
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064,
February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413; Ordillo v. Commission on Elections, 192
SCRA 100 (1990).
[16]
271 SCRA 633, 668 (1997); Occena v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 52265, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 755.
[17]
Websters Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, p.1327 (1993).
[18]
Section 26(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless
it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof
in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon
shall
be
taken
immediately
thereafter,
and
theyeas and nays entered in the Journal.
[19]
G. R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA 630.
[20]
A copy of the letter that the President wrote to Honorable Feliciano
Belmonte, Jr. as Speaker of the House of Representatives dated March 4,
2011 is reproduced below:
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
of the Philippines
Malacaang
14 March 2011
HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.
Speaker
House of Representatives
Quezon City
Dear Speaker Belmonte:
Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the 1987
Constitution, I hereby certify to the necessity of the immediate enactment of
House Bill No. 4146, entitled:
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE
ELECTIONS AND THE TERM OF OFFICE OF THE ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO
(ARMM) WITH THOSE OF THE NATIONAL AND OTHER LOCAL
OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9333,
ENTITLED AN ACT FIXING THE DATE FOR REGULAR ELECTIONS FOR
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN
MUSLIM MINDANAO, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

to address the urgent need to protect and strengthen ARMMs autonomy by

synchronizing its elections with the regular elections of national and other
local officials, to ensure that the on-going peace talks in the region will not
be hindered, and to provide a mechanism to institutionalize electoral
reforms in the interim, all for the development, peace and security of the
region.
Best wishes.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
cc: HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE
Senate President
Philippine Senate
Pasay City
Taken
from: http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/congrec/15th/1st/15C_1RS64b-031611.pdf. Last accessed on September 26, 2011.
[21]
See Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, February
15, 2011.
[22]
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995.
[23]
Tolentino, id., citing 1 J. G. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory
Construction 10.04, p. 282 (1972).
[24]
Section 7, Article XIX of RA No. 6734 states: The first regular elections
of the Regional Governor, Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional
Assembly under this Organic Act shall be held not earlier than sixty (60)
days or later than ninety (90) days after the ratification of this Act. The
Commission on Elections shall promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary for the conduct of said election.
[25]
Entitled An Act Providing for the Date of Regular Elections for Regional
Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and
for other purposes, which fixed the date of the ARMM elections on
the second Monday after the Muslim month of Ramadhan.
[26]
Entitled An Act Changing the Date of Elections for the Elective Officials
of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the
Purpose Section One of Republic Act Numbered Seventy-Six Hundred and
Forty-Seven Entitled An Act Providing for the Date of the Regular Elections
for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao and for other purposes, which changed the date of the ARMM
elections to the second Monday of March, 1993 and every three (3) years
thereafter.
[27]
Entitled An Act Providing for the Date of the Regular Elections of
Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) Further Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 7647 entitled
An Act Providing for the Date of Regular Elections for Regional Governor,

Regional Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative

Assembly for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and for other
purposes, As Amended, and for other purposes, which moved the regional
elections to the second Monday of September and every three (3) years
thereafter.
[28]
Entitled An Act Resetting the Regular Elections for the Elective Officials
of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Provided for Under
Republic Act No. 8746 and for other purposes, which reset the regional
elections, scheduled onSeptember 13, 1999, to the second Monday of
September 2000.
[29]
Entitled An Act Resetting the Regular Elections for Elective Officials of
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to the Second Monday of
September 2001, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 8953,
which reset the May 2001 elections in ARMM to September 2001.
[30]
Entitled An Act Fixing the Date of the Plebiscite for the Approval of the
Amendments to Republic Act No. 6734 and setting the date of the regular
elections for elective officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao on the Last Monday of November 2001, Amending for the
Purpose Republic Act No. 9054, Entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand
the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending
for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734,Entitled An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended, and For Other
Purposes.
[31]
Entitled An Act Fixing the Date of Regular Elections for Elective Officials
of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Pursuant to Republic Act
no. 9054, Entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose
Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended, which rescheduled
the ARMM regional elections scheduled for the last Monday of November
2004 to the second Monday of August 2005.
[32]
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic
Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon
a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives
and of the Senate voting separately.
[33]
G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 280.
[34]
Id. at 295-297, citing Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil. 36 (1915); LEWIS
SOUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Vol. 1, Section 244,
pp. 456-457.
[35]
This has been established by the following exchange during the
Constitutional Commission debates:
FR. BERNAS. So, the questions I have raised so far with respect to this
organic act are: What segment of the population will participate in the
plebiscite? In what capacity would the legislature be acting when it passes
this? Will it be a constituent assembly or merely a legislative body? What is
the nature, therefore, of this organic act in relation to ordinary statutes and
the Constitution? Finally, if we are going to amend this organic act, what
process will be followed?

MR. NOLLEDO. May I answer that, please, in the light of what is now
appearing in our report.
First, only the people who are residing in the units composing the region
should be allowed to participate in the plebiscite. Second, the organic act
has the character of a charter passed by Congress, not as a constituent
assembly, but as an ordinary legislature and, therefore, the organic act will
still be subject to amendments in the ordinary legislative process as now
constituted, unless the Gentleman has another purpose.
FR. BERNAS. But with plebiscite again. [Emphasis ours.];
III Record of the Constitutional Commission, pp.182-183; August 11, 1986.
[36]
Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions
of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous
regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of
the general welfare of the people of the region.
[37]
See discussions at pp. 14-15.
[38]
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. (1) Terms of
Office. The terms of office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be for a period of
three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September
next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same
date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of the
autonomous region shall continue in effect until their successors are
elected and qualified. [emphasis ours]
[39]
Fernando, The Philippine Constitution, pp. 175-176 (1974).
[40]
Id. at 177; citing the concurring opinion of Justice Jose P. Laurel
in Schneckenburger v. Moran, 63 Phil. 249, 266 (1936).
[41]
Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 212 (1946).
[42]
Ople v. Torres, et al., 354 Phil. 948 (1998); see concurring opinion of
Justice Jose P. Laurel in Schneckenburger v. Moran, supra note 40, at 266.
[43]
State ex rel. Green v. Collison, 39 Del 245, cited in DefensorSantiago, Constitutional Law, Vol. 1 (2000 ed.)
[44]
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities and
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
[45]
An empire within an empire.

[46]

Bernas, Joaquin, Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government

Notes and Cases Part I, 2005 ed., p. 1249.
[47]
Such as the addition of sectoral representatives in the House of
Representatives (paragraph 2, Section 5, of Article VI of the Constitution),
and the validation of the power of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government to issue sequestration, freeze orders, and the provisional
takeover orders of ill-gotten business enterprises, embodied in Section 26
of the Transitory Provisions.
[48]
RA No. 9495 which created the Province of Quezon del Sur Province
was rejected by the voters of Quezon Province in the plebiscite of
November 13, 2008.
[49]
RA No. 9355.
[50]
Section 50, RA No. 9355 and Section 52 of RA No. 9495.
[51]
Section 462, RA No. 7160.
[52]
Supra note 14.
[53]
In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections [146 Phil. 798 (1970)] the Court
held that, "The three departments of government in the discharge of the
functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield
obedience to [the Constitutions] commands.
Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed. 146 Phil. 798 (1970).
[54]
In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration [No. L-21064,
February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413, 423], the Court, speaking through former
Chief Justice Enrique, stated: As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever
be present in the peoples consciousness, its language as much as possible
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that
the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are cases
where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
[55]
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, G.R.
No. 166471, March 22, 2011.
[56]
Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, citing Bernas,
Joaquin, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (1996 ed.) 768.
[57]
481 Phil. 661 (2004).
[58]
G.R. No. 161984, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 403.
[59]
G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2011.
[60]
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. (1) Terms of
Office. The terms of office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly shall be for a
period of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of
September next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of
the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective officials
of the autonomous region shall continue in effect until their
successors are elected and qualified.
[61]
Guekeko v. Santos, 76 Phil. 237 (1946).
[62]
Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. 187883, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 356.

[63]

Ututalum v. Commission on Elections, No. L-25349, December 3, 1965,

15 SCRA 465.
[64]
See CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1.
[65]
See CONSTITUTION, Article IX (C), Section 2(1).
[66]
Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
159268, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 654, 663, citing Lapid v. CA, G.R.
No. 142261, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 738, quoting Morales v. Subido,
G.R. No. 29658, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 150.
[67]
CONSTITUTION, Article X, Section 8.
[68]
Article XVIII, Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this Constitution
shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining
the highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining
twelve for three years.
[69]
Article XVIII, Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President
and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes
of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
[70]
Cruz, Carlo. The Law of Public Officers, 2007 edition, p. 285, citing
Mechem, Section 387.
[71]
Ponencia, p. 21.
[72]
See Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12, 21-22 (1946); Alba, etc. v.
Evangelista, etc., et al., 100 Phil. 683, 694 (1957); Aparri v. Court of
Appeals, No. L-30057, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 231.
[73]
Hon. Luis Mario M. General, Commissioner, National Police
Commission v. Hon. Alejandro S. Urro, et al., G.R. No. 191560, March 29,
2011, citing Sarmiento III v. Mison, No. L-79974, December 17, 1987, 156
SCRA 549.
[74]
Sarmiento III v. Mison, supra.
[75]
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. De Jesus v.
Commission on Audit, 451 Phil. 812 (2003).
[76]
Supra notes 47 and 48.
[77]
Supra note 50.
[78]
The after-effects of the Maguindanao massacre where the Ampatuans
stand charged, the insurrection by the MILF and its various factions, and
the on-going peace negotiations, among others, are immediately past and
present events that the nation has to vigilant about.
[79]
274 Phil. 523 (1991).
[80]
Id. at 532.
[81]
Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618,
November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783.
[82]
As noted under footnote 37.
[83]
118 Phil. 1468 (1963).
[84]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, August 11, 1986, p.
179.

[85]

Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, p. 560.

391 Phil. 84, 102 (2000).
[87]
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
[88]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, 343 Phil. 411, 427
(1997) citing Pangilinan v. Maglaya, 225 SCRA 511 (1993).
[89]
Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 and 162605,
December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468, 581.
[90]
Ligeralde v. Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA
315.
[91]
Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et al., 210 Phil.
187, 207 (1983); Peralta v. Commission on Elections, Nos. L-47771, L47803, L-47816, L-47767, L-47791 and L-47827, March 11, 1978, 82
SCRA 30; Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City
Mayor of Manila, No. L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849.
[92]
See Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290 (2001); Heirs of Juancho
Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et al., supra; Peralta v. Commission
on Elections, supra.
[93]
Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et
al., supra; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra.
[94]
G.R. No. 100883, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 516.
[95]
Id. at 523.
[86]