TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC vs.

THE BOARD OF
TRANSPORTATION (1982)

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation

composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to
operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to
vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum
Circular No. 77-42 Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis, that no car
beyond 6 years shall be operated as taxi.
Pursuant to the BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT)
issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional
Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the NCR, to implement the
phasing out of the taxis.

On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 807553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration
and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of
earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are
roadworthy and fit for operation.

Issues:
1. WON BOT and BLT promulgated the questioned Memorandum Circular in
accordance with the manner
required by PD 101. NO
2. Does it violate constitutional rights of the Petitioner. NO
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements,
or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility
motor vehicles.
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow
in the exercise of its powers: Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. In the exercise of the powers
granted in the preceding section, the Board shall proceed promptly along the method of
legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the
cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary,
particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other government office or agency that
may be able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any
policy, plan or program in the implementation of this Decree.
The Board may also call conferences, require the submission of position papers or other
documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the
implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry.

PET claim that they were denied due process because they were not asked to submit
position papers or to attend conferences regarding the assailed circ.
SC held that the PD provides a wide leeway as to how the board will choose to gather data
in formulating its policy. NOT ALL OPTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO BE DONE FOR POLICY TO BE
VALID the board has the choice of which avenue to pursue in collecting data.
It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position
papers from operators or persons who may be affected being only one of the options open to
the board.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the circulars is neither violative of
procedural due process.
A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles uniformly, fairly and justly.
The span of 6 years supplies that reasonable standard. By the time taxis have fully
depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also
generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public.
The questioned circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity to declare a law
constitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and
undeniable.

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOC. vs. MICHAEL DEFENSOR ET AL Gr. No. 163980, August 3,
2006
Facts :
A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, authorized the
creation and development of what is now known as the National Government Center
(NGC).On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826,
reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440
hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. On August 11, 1987, then
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the440 hectares of
the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the
disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. In view
of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137
from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 248 on September7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the
excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively become
beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing program. On May 14, 2003, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC. It
is represented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own
personal capacity and on behalf of the association. The instant petition for prohibition under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from
enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise
known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003."

Issue :Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function and should be declared null and void
for being arbitrary, capricious and whimsical.
Held: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasijudicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the
power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency
concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed
act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued
pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No.
9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee
is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it
seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasilegislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the
regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the
Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its
validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.