Zulueta v CA

Mendoza, J.:
FACTS:
- Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta is married to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin.
- That petitioner accused her husband of infidelity.
- That on March 26, 1982, petitioner went to the clinic of private respondent, who is a doctor of medicine,
without the consent of the latter. That on the same date mentioned, petitioner opened the drawers and
cabinet of her husband and took 157 documents and papers consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours.
- The documents found by petitioner were seized for use as evidence in a case for legal separation filed
by Zulueta.
- Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
petitioner.
- The RTC, decided in favor of private respondent, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of
properties described and ordering petitioner to return the properties to Dr. Martin and pay him nominal
and moral damages and attorneys fees, and cost of the suit.
- Furthermore, petitioner and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision made by the Regional Trial Court. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence.
HELD:
NO.
- The Supreme Court held that the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
- The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Constitution) is no less applicable simply because it is the wife
(who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the provision in the constitution is if
there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise as provide by
law. (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Constitution) Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Sec.3, Par.2, Art.III,1987 Constitution)
- A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual
and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law ensures absolute freedom of
communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for
or against the other without consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. (Sec.22,
Rule130, Rules of Court). Neither maybe examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. (Sec.24, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
PT&T v NLRC
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman
specifically as Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21,
1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She
was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave
on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary
employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of
the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had
contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the
marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder
about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was
dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down
decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman,
who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent
that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in
violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the
services of an employee.
HELD:
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that
company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according
to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful
discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women
workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de
Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that
married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely
because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As
stated in the labor code:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require
as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code
on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in
connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public
policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is
inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy
followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an
inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such
policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also
imperatively required.
SILVERIO v REPUBLIC
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
- Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. Hes a biological male who feels trapped in a male
body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure was successful he
(she) now has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for the change of his first name (from
Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila
RTC. He wanted to make these changes, among others, so that he can marry his American fianc.
The RTC granted Silverios petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on equity; that Silverios
misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him;
that there was no opposition to his petition (even the OSG did not make any basis for opposition at this point);
that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fianc
and the realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate may be changed on the ground of
gender re-assignment.
HELD:
NO.
The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support in existing legislation. ART. 412. No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE
CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR
CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL
ORDER) was passed. This law provides that it should be the local civil registrar that has jurisdiction in petitions
for the change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio insofar as his first name
is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still
because the ground upon which it is based(gender re-assignment) is not one of those provided for by the law.
Under the law, a change of name may only be grounded on the following:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner
and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender re-assignment
as the basis.

Issue on the change of sex

This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a petition for the local civil
registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to support it. And not with the civil registry because there
is no clerical error involved. Silverio was born a male hence it was just but right that the entry written in his birth
certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not
attended by error, is immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the changes sought by Silverio will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a
man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in
case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if Silverios petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment
the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying
down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
REPUBLIC v CAGANDAHAN
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
- Jennifer Cagandahan has organs of both male and female because she is suffering from a rare and
permanent medical condition known as Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH).
- Jennifer is genetically female but has phenotypic features of a male individual.
- In 2003, she filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate to change her name from
Jennifer to Jeff and her gender to male.
- The RTC granted her petition. However, the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to the SC arguing
that the petition is fatally defective because it violates Rule 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court since the
petition did not implead the local civil registrar.1

1 The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court because respondents petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in
the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be had. Unless all
possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too
short of the requirements of the rules. The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar

ISSUE:
WON the change of name and sex may be allowed.
HELD:
YES.
- The Court ruled that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised
in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow. In the instant case, if we determine
respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender.
But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to
be other than female, then a change in the subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
- The Court, in deciding the case, considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. It noted that
Cagandahan thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen), there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. It
stressed that she has let nature take its course in her development to reveal more fully his male
characteristics.
- In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so
innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as
having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither
will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one
who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness
and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along
the path of his sexual development and maturation.
- The SC agrees that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of
the petition to the local civil registrar. Rule 1 of the Rules of Court states that courts shall construe the
Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it.
REPUBLIC v ALBIOS
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married, as evidenced by a Certificate of
Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and
wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their
essential marital obligations.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that the parties married each other for
convenience only. Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship and that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00. However,
she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the latter never processed her petition for citizenship

and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.

The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage is void ab initio on the ground that it lacks consent
HELD:
NO. MARRIAGE IS VALID.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A freely given consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately entered into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of
their act.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious
and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that
they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by
way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real
intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not
be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It
is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever,
hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties
have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an undeniable
intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that
only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention
to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent
was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal
and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life
together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same
Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by
law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the

essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.