G.R. No. L-953, 79 Phil.

283, September 18, 1947

EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS, querellante-apelado,
vs.
PEDRO MARCAIDA, acusado-apelante.
Facts:
Pedro Marcaido was allegedly helping Japanese occupants in arresting Filipinos thought to be guerillas.
Charged in the People's Court with the crime of treason on four courts, appellant was found guilty only on count
No. 3 and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay a fine of
P1, 000 and the costs.
Without evidence presented by the defense, respondent appeals for the decision of lower court finding him guilty
of treason. He contends that he should not be tried by the court on account that his nationality and citizenship
are undetermined, citing previous cases under the doctrine of stare decisis where a limitation on the application
of jus soli for citizenship was established.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of four witnesses, however, having major discrepancies.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of treason and stare decisis must be applied
Held:
No, the accused is not guilty of treason, therefore, the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to the extent of
perpetuating an error. The doctrine stands to be corrected once it was found out that a previous judgment was
erroneous.
From the foregoing, it appears that, although three witnesses testified as to the arrest of Epimaco Zurbano
effected by appellant to be later brought to the Japanese garrison, for all legal purposes, it is the same as if no
witness had testified at all. The reciprocal contradictions between the testimonies of the witnesses have the
effect of engaging the three witnesses for the prosecution in a veritable three-cornered fight. A striking
characteristic of it is the fact that the first witness is the sister of Epimaco Zurbano, the arrested person, and the
second witness is a brother-in-law of both, the first witness and the arrested person, and both have mutually
contradicted each other on the following essential facts to their credibility as witnesses:
(a) As to the presence of about eighty persons at the scene;
(b) As to whether Mariano or Marianito Catan was, as stated by Illuminada Zurbano, "my companion;"
(c) As to the presence of Illuminada Zurbano at theplace of the arrest;
(d) As to whether appellant was wearing camisa china or polo shirt;
(e) As to whether appellant had his revolver at his left or right hip;
(f) As to whether said weapon was exposed and visible or not;

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(g) As to whether Alejandro Enguanso was accompanying appellant or was not in the place at the time of the
arrest.
To increase the prosecution's predicament, comes Luisa de Mondragon, a third witness in discord, by further
belying the first two witnesses when she testified that appellant was accompanied by Pablo Cortes and Benito
Villaruz, but not by Lamberto San Juan, the one, who, according to the first two witnesses, was accompanying
him.
As a general rule, the testimony of one witness is enough, if truthful or reasonably credible, to prove the truth of
a controverted fact in court. The special nature of the crime of treason requires that the accused be afforded a
special protection not required in other cases, so as to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The law requires that, at
least, two witnesses must testify as to overt acts of treason, if the same should be accepted by the tribunals as
legal basis to condemn a person as a traitor.
These two witnesses must equally be truthful and credible. It is not enough that the testimony of one of them can
be relied upon on the existence of the overt act in controversy, while the other cannot. The requirement of the
law is not complied with because even without the two-witness rule in treason cases, there is no legal basis to
convict appellant upon the testimony of any one of the three witnesses, as each one is belied by the other two.
Each of them is unreliable under the maxim "falsus in unus, falsus in omnibus."
WHEREFORE, the appellant is acquitted.

G.R. Nos. 141773-76, January 22, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSENDO LAYOSO @ SENDONG, accused-appellant.
Facts:
Rosendo Layoso Sendong was convicted of four counts of rape under four (4) separate Informations filed
before the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Branch 57. The victim, Marlene Nitoya was raped three times
by Layoso when she was only 14 years old; the fourth rape occurred a few days after she turned 15 years old.
On October 22, 1998 at 8:00 in the evening, Marlene went out to buy kerosene at her Aunt Florys store, about
15 meters from her house. While she was on her way, accused-appellant suddenly pulled her left arm, kissed
her face and threatened to kill her if she shouted. He smelled of alcohol. He dragged Marlene to the bamboo
grove at the back of the store. There, he forced Marlene to lie down on the ground. When she refused, he kicked
her. He then removed her panties, mounted himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her private parts.
Marlene was not able to shout for help out of fear that accused-appellant might kill her. Marlenes ordeal was
repeated on November 18, 1998 at the same time and place.

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On December 14, 1998, Marlene was washing her face at the pump well near her grandmothers house when
accused-appellant embraced her from behind, covered her mouth, repeatedly kissed her and threatened to kill
her if she shouted. He forced her to lie flat on the basement of the pump well, lay on top of her, raised her skirt,
removed her panties and inserted his penis into her vagina.
The fourth rape incident happened on February 23, 1999 between 7:30 to 8:30 in the evening. Marlene was
again about to buy kerosene at the store of her Aunt Flory when, all of a sudden, accused-appellant grabbed her
from behind, covered her mouth with his right hand and brought her to a secluded place fronting the store. He
forced her to lie down, removed her panties and threatened to kill her with a bamboo stick if she told anybody
what he was about to do. He kissed her on the lips and neck then inserted his penis into her vagina. After he
finished having carnal knowledge of Marlene, he again threatened to kill her if she told anyone about it.
Marlene went home and washed her genitals. That night, she had difficulty sleeping because she felt pain in her
private parts. When her parents arrived at 10:00 in the evening, she told her mother that she was raped by
accused-appellant four times. They went to the PNP of Basista, Pangasinan to report the matter and then to the
San Carlos General Hospital where she was physically examined.
With her parents corroborating testimonies and the result of the internal examination of the hymen done by Dr.
Ma. Salome Romero, the prosecution won against the defense. On November 9, 1999, the trial court found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined in and penalized by Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, and hereby ordered to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to indemnify Marlene Nitoya the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay her exemplary damages of P25,000.00 and
to pay the cost in each of the four cases.
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant raises some errors. Accused-appellant claims that the trial court
failed to appreciate in his favor the testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses on cross-examination. The said
testimonies, especially that of private complainant Marlene Nitoya, are fraught with inconsistencies which
demonstrate the improbability of the four incidents of rape or, at least, created doubts as to their commission. He
asserts that these inconsistencies relate to vital points, i.e., the time of their commission, number of times rape
was committed, the locus criminis, the time of reporting the incidents of rape and the testimony of the
complainant Marlene Nitoya herself. In sum, the arguments of accused-appellant boil down to the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the honorable judge erred in not considering the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on
cross-examination.
2. Whether or not the honorable judge erred in disregarding the inconsistencies in the prosecutions testimonies.
3. Whether or not the honorable judge erred in not considering the incredibility of the complainants testimonies.
4. Whether or not the great discrepancy in the time and details negates or discredits the commission of the crime
of rape.
5. Whether or not complainant lacked adequate resistance.

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6. Whether or not the trial court erred in awarding exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in all four
counts of rape.
Held:
1. No. The trial courts assessment is accorded great weight when the credibility of witnesses is in issue,
because the court has the unique opportunity to hear the testimony of witnesses and observe their deportment
and manner of testifying.
2. No. The alleged inconsistencies of prosecution witnesses Juanito Nitoya, Teodora Nitoya, and Victoriano
Nitoya are more apparent than real. Their testimonies do not in any way detract from the fact that Marlene was
raped by accused-appellant. What is important is that the prosecution witnesses were consistent in relating the
significant and indispensable components of the principal occurrence of rape.
3. No. The commission of the four acts of rape was established by the testimony of Marlene Nitoya herself.
Rape, by its very nature, is committed with the least possibility of being seen by the public. More often than not,
this crime is committed in the presence of only the victim and her defiler. Thus, we have not hesitated before and
will not be disinclined now to uphold the conviction of an accused on the basis of the lone testimony of a private
complainant. In the case at bar, Marlene was steadfast and unwavering in her testimony that she was raped on
four separate occasions by accused-appellant. She could not have been mistaken in her identification of the
accused-appellant as the latter lives within her neighborhood. In the face of his positive identification by Marlene,
accused-appellants self-serving denial and alibi cannot prevail. Moreover, her testimony is corroborated by the
findings of the medical examination which indicated that she was in a non-virgin state, physically confirming that
Marlene was indeed raped by accused-appellant. Furthermore, the testimonies of victims who are young and of
tender age deserve full credence and should not be so easily dismissed as a mere fabrication especially where
they have absolutely no motive to testify against the accused.
4. No. Even if accused-appellant assails as incredible Marlenes testimony that the sex act on October 22, 1998
last only two minutes while that on December 14, 1998 lasted one and one half (1 ) hours, these discrepancies
do not negate or discredit, at the very least, the absence of intrusion of the penis of accused-appellant into the
labia of the pudendum of Marlene. Settled is the rule that in rape cases, what is material is that there is
penetration of the female organ no matter how slight. In a long line of decisions, we have ruled that the only
essential point is to prove at least the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum.
5. No. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and
she submits herself against her will to the rapists lust out of fear for her life and personal safety. It was held in
People v. Las Pias, Jr., citing People v. Dreu, that it is not necessary that the victim should have resisted unto
death or sustained physical injuries in the hands of the rapist. It is enough if the intercourse takes place against
her will or if she yields because of genuine apprehension of harm to her if she did not do so. In the case at bar,
accused-appellant threatened Marlene with bodily harm prior to and after the commission of each rape. The
record shows that accused-appellant was a 24-year old man "at the peak of his masculine vigor" while Marlene,
a thin, 14-year old schoolgirl who, in accused-appellants own words "kept herself mostly at home." The
contrasting physiques of the two parties further stress the futility of any physical resistance that Marlene might
have wanted to put up.
6. Yes, the trial court erred in awarding exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in all four counts of
rape. The joint decision of the trial court failed to state the rationale and legal basis for its award in favor of the
rape-victim. Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides that "in criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of

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the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances."
Furthermore, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of moral damages in the amount of P50, 000.00
should be imposed against accused-appellant for each count of rape, in addition to the civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, Branch 57, in Criminal Cases Nos. SCC-3030 to 3043, finding accused-appellant Rosendo Layoso
@ Sendong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua in each case, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is ordered to pay the
complainant, Marlene B. Nitoya,, in each case, the amount of P50, 000.00 as moral damages in addition to the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of factual and
legal basis.

G.R. No. 88724, 184 SCRA 114-115, April 3, 1990

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito," defendant-appellant.

Facts:
The accused poke a balisong to college freshman Cristina Abayan as soon as she got into her boarding house
early morning after arriving from a party. She knew him as a frequent visitor of another boarder. She was
dragged inside the house up the stairs while his left arm wrapped around her neck, and his right hand poking the
Batangas knife to her neck.
Upon entering her room, he pushed her in and got her head hit on the wall. He immediately undressed while still
holding the knife with one hand, and ordered her to do the same. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and
then mounted her. He asked her to hold his penis and insert it in her vagina, while still poking the knife to her.
She followed, but the appellant could not fully penetrate her in such a position. Next, he laid down on his back
and commanded her to mount him, but he cannot fully penetrate her.

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When Oritas hands were both flat on the floor, complainant escaped naked. She ran from room to room as
appellant pursued her, and finally jumped out through a window. She went to the municipal building nearby and
knocked on the back door for there was no answer. When the door opened, the policemen inside the building
saw her crying and naked. She was given a jacket for covering by the first policeman who saw her. The
policemen dashed to her boarding house but failed to apprehend the accused. She was brought to a hospital for
physical examination and it revealed that she is still a virgin, with abrasions on the left breast, left and right
knees, and multiple pinpoint marks on her back, among others.
The Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar convicted the accused of frustrated rape.
On appeal is the decision that Ceilito Orita commited frustrated rape. The accused contends that there is no
crime of frustrated rape. He was not able to fully penetrate in her. The trial court erred in disregarding the
substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses. The accused also questions the failure of the
prosecution to present other witnesses to corroborate the allegations in the complaint. The trial court erred in
declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed by the accused. The accused used the Article 266 of
the RPC to show that he is not guilty of frustrated rape, and Article 6 to stress the difference of consummated,
frustrated, and attempted felonies. Since theres no crime of frustrated rape, he should be released.
Issue:
Whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape?
Held:
No, the frustrated stage does not apply to the crime of rape. From the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of
the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed
the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. [Art. 266 and Art. 6] It is the
general rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female
organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen
or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC is hereby MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito Orita is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to
indemnify the victim in the amount of P30, 000.00.

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G.R. No. 12656, 37 Phil. 116, November 8, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DEOGRACIAS PANES, defendant-appellant.

Facts:
B. F. Hodges is a pawnbroker in Iloilo. On August 23, 1915, Hodges delivered to the accused, Deogracias
Panes, jewelry of a total value of P130, with a receipt complied with. It is to be emphasized that in accordance
with the receipt for the jewelry, the authenticity of which is not questioned, the accused received the jewelry to
sell on commission or to return on demand to Hodges. Further, we should emphasize that notwithstanding the
plain meaning of this document, Panes repeatedly failed to return the jewelry on demand, and apparently
construing the document for his own purposes, after the passage of a long interval of time, sold the jewelry to
another on credit. Thus, a case was filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
On the day before the trial in the lower court, the accused returned the same wristlet he had received from
Hodges and presented a note signed by Juan de Leon in payment of the rest of the jewelry that the defendant
did not return.
The Attorney-General recommends acquittal.
The trial court declared the accused guilty of the crime of estafa, and sentenced him to two months and one day
of arresto mayor, and to pay the costs. Hence, an appeal was made by the accused.
Issue:
1. Whether or not there was a conversion of the property by the defendant to his own use.
2. Whether or not failure to comply with numerous demands for the return of the property indicates unlawful
conversion.
3. Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring that the facts constitute the crime of estafa.

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Held:
1. Yes. It would seem that, soon after the first demand for the return of the jewelry was made and no attention
was paid to the same, the accused must be held to have converted the property to his own use, and
consequently was liable before the law. To appropriate to one's own use includes not only conversion to one's
personal advantage but every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right.
2. Yes. Numerous demands for the return of the property are just as efficacious in indicating unlawful conversion
as the passing of a year. In the case of The United States vs. Morales and Morco, the words "which was over
one year from the date of the delivery of the property" and "or to give any account thereof, refers to the demand.
In the case at bar, the receipt can stand as a safeguard since it contains the conditions that the jewelry should be
returned upon demand. Although one year did not elapse from the date of the delivery of the property to the date
of the trial, it cannot be conceived that it is to be understood that merely the lapse of a long period of time
changes the penal aspect of the case.
3. No, the lower court was apparently correct in labeling the crime of estafa. The intent to convert the property to
the use of the taker or to that of some other person is a necessary element in the crime of estafa as defined in
article 535, subdivision 5, Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, accused is declared guilty of the crime of estafa, and that the judgment of the lower court should
be affirmed. We accordingly make the statement contained in the last sentence the order of this court, with the
costs of this instance against the appellant.
The fact that, on threat of criminal prosecution, Panes actually did make restitution to Hodges and the latter
proclaimed himself satisfied, only affects the penal aspect of the case as to the right of the offended party to
indemnification.

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G.R. No. 118971, 314 SCRA 460, September 15, 1999

RODOLFO R. VASQUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA BRANCH 40, and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. Sometime in April 1986, he and some
37 families from the area went to see then National Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza
regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo.
After their meeting with Atienza and other NHA officials, petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed
by newspaper reporters at the NHA compound concerning their complaint.
The next day, April 22, 1986, a news article appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa, regarding his
revelation about the involvement of Jaime Olmeda in a number of illegal activities such as attempted murder,
gambling and theft of fighting cocks.
Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner alleging that the latter's
statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation. After conducting preliminary investigation, the
city prosecutor filed an information in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, accusing RODOLFO R.
VASQUEZ of the crime of libel.
Upon being arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon the case was tried. The prosecution
presented Barangay Chairman Olmedo and his neighbor, Florentina Calayag, as witnesses. On the other hand,
the defense presented Ciriaco Cabuhat, Nicasio Agustin, Estrelita Felix, Fernando Rodriguez all residents of
the Tondo Foreshore Area and petitioner as its witnesses.
On May 28, 1992, the trail court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of libel and sentencing him to pay a
fine of P1,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not Rodolfo Vasquez is guilty of the crime of libel because of his defamatory words which were
inserted in the news article.
Held:
No. Under Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statements is made against a public official with
respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the accused
will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove that the imputation was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends.

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In this case, contrary to the findings of the trial court, on which the Court of Appeals relied, petitioner was able to
prove the truth of his charges against the barangay official. Whether the charges were dismissed or not, it is not
the true commission of the crime charged that should be tested but the truth of the presence of these charges
which are filed. In accordance with Art. 361, if the defamatory matter either constitutes a crime or concerns the
performance of official duties, and the accused proves the truth of his charge, he should be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.

G.R. No. 193234

October 19, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROBERTO MARTIN Y CASTANO, Accused-Appellant.

Facts:

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On 13 November 2006, an Information was filed against Roberto Martin y Castano alias Inpet (Martin) for selling
drugs which is a violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
With the photocopy of the Pre-Operation Report or Coordination Sheet for the buy-bust and the photocopy of the
marked money presented in Court, the accused was found GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, he is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, 000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. The defense of frame up is viewed with disfavor
because it is easily concocted and commonly used as a standard line of defense in most prosecution of
dangerous drugs cases.
The CA denied Martins appeal and affirmed the RTC decision. Martin elevated the matter for review by Supreme
Court, alleging that the CA's Decision was contrary to facts, law, and jurisprudence. He contended that various
irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust operation and the processing of the evidence in the present case
have left the case against the accused too weak to overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. First is
the absence of the actual evidences which are the original copy of the Pre-Operation Report or Coordination
Sheet. Second is that the official marked money used in the buy-bust operation was likewise not presented.
Third, the police officer did not comply with the procedure for seizure of evidence laid out in RA 1655. Fourth, the
prosecution failed to establish the "chain of custody of the seized item. Fifth, the presumption that the police
officers are performing their duty should not have defeated the presumption of innocence of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not non-compliance with the set procedures in RA 9165 is a ground for acquittal of the accused
Ruling:
Yes. While non-compliance with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to
the prosecution's case, lapses in procedure "must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable
grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.
Otherwise, the procedure set out in the law will be mere lip service. It is essential that the first two contentions of
the accused which are the presentation of the actual evidences must be satisfied.
First, the Pre-Operation Report/Coordination Sheet, which is intended to show the coordination between the
PDEA and the police. Its importance lies in the fact that RA No. 9165 mandates close coordination between the
PNP/NBI and the PDEA on all drug-related matters, including investigations on violations of RA No. 9165. In the
case at bar, the original copy was not presented in court and the records contain only a photocopy thereof.
Second, the absence of the actual marked money used in the buy-bust operation raises doubts regarding the
regularity of the buy-bust operation.
Third, the police officer did not comply with the procedure for seizure of evidence laid out in Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 and its corresponding Implementing Rules without giving any reasonable excuse for the lapse because
these have not yet been "properly implemented" at the time. In truth, however, the implementing guidelines for
R.A. No. 9165 took effect on November 27, 2002 while the arrest took place about four years later, or on 6
November 2006.
Fourth, the prosecution failed to establish the "chain of custody" of the seized item. The person who they turned
over the sachet, marked money, and the one who photocopied the evidences are not presented to testify as to
the marking of the sachet, the whereabouts of the marked money and the completion of the chain of custody of
the evidence from SPO1 Mora to the Crime Laboratory. Graham v. State recognized the risk of tampering, loss
and mistake. In that case, a substance later analyzed as heroin was excluded from the prosecution evidence
since it was previously handled by two police officers prior to examination who did not testify in court. It ruled that

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unless the state can show by records or testimony the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between
the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its
composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.
Fifth, even if it is the general rule that law officers are presumed to be performing their duties, this is a mere
procedural presumption which cannot overturn the constitutionally recognized presumption of innocence of the
accused where lapses in the buy bust operation are shown.
IN VIEW THEREOF, the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE and accused-appellant Roberto Martin y Castano is
ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. His release from detention is hereby ordered forthwith, unless he
is detained for some other lawful cause.

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