G.R. No.

168913

TING vs. HEIRS OF DIEGO LIR

March 14, 2007
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-983, then
Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted
the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of title
to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787.
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29, 1977. Judge
Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10, 1982 directing the Land
Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration and the
certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot. The application was
docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.1
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska,
Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle
L. Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to petitioners
application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer2 calling attention to the
December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and executory
on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioners application
on the ground of res judicata.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion
of respondents, dismissed petitioners application on the ground of res judicata.
31vvphi1.nt
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole issue of whether
the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had become final and
executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of registration has been issued by the Land
Registration Authority (LRA);4 it was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct" decision
belatedly surfaced as basis of respondents motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N;5 and as
no action for revival of the said decision was filed by respondents after the lapse of the
ten-year prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the dormant judgment pass[d] into
extinction."6

After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to
forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the
Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding
certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis
supplied)
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without
opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as
the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res
judicata against the whole world.9 It becomes final when no appeal within the
reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.10
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration courts approval in
LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienzas application for registration of
the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including petitioner.
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No. N-983 had
become "extinct," petitioner advances that the LRA has not issued the decree of
registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey Assistance Section,
Land Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Region 7, Cebu City having claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral
Extension is erroneous and all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must first
be approved by the Land Management Services of
the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in court; and that the
spouses Lirio did not comply with the said requirement for they instead submitted to the
court a mere special work order.11
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of Engineer
Belleza and that it reported such claim to the land registration court for appropriate action
or reconsideration of the decision which was its duty.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the
decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of
the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the
data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are
in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is
their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court
and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings."12 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis of res judicata.7
As for petitioners claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:
The petition fails.
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree
provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. The
judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of
thirty days8 to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal
may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment

or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After
the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment
may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations[,]
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents
and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the prescriptive
period, the same does not lie.

Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.13 enunciates the raison detre why Section 6, Rule 39 does not
apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION
RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR
TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment,
except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case
has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except
by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the
provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years
by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings,
such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his
failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules
makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the
purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the
ownership has been proved and confirmed
by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary,
except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place
the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

After trial on the merits, the RTC, on September 29, 1995, rendered its Decision[6]
declaring the September 27, 1989 holographic will as having revoked the November 18,
1985 will, allowing the former, and appointing respondent as administrator of Moisess
estate.[7]
On appeal, the CA, in the assailed June 17, 2005 Decision,[8] modified the decision of
the trial court and ruled that the September 27, 1989 holographic will had only revoked
the November 18, 1985 will insofar as the testamentary disposition of Moisess real
property was concerned.[9]
With the denial of her motion for reconsideration in the further assailed August 17, 2005
Resolution,[10] petitioner elevated the case before us via the instant petition.[11]
The Court notes that the trial court focused all of its attention on the merits of the case
without first determining whether it could have validly exercised jurisdiction to hear and
decide Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P. On appeal, the appellate court also overlooked the issue
on the jurisdictional competence of the trial court over the said case. This Court, after a
meticulous review of the records, finds that the RTC of Pasay City had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter in Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P.
The jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at
the time of the institution of the action unless such statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof.[12] Jurisdiction is moreover determined by the allegations or
averments in the complaint or petition.[13]
In this case, at the time the petition for the allowance of Moisess holographic will was
instituted, the then Sections 19 and 33[14] of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129[15] were
in force, thus
SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the
estate exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00);

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.

xxxx
FRIANELA vs. BANAYAD
G.R. No. 169700 July 30, 2009
NACHURA, J.:
Following the death of her uncle, the testator Moises F. Banayad, petitioner, who was
named as devisee in the will, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City,
on June 3, 1991, Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P[3] for the allowance of the November 18, 1985
holographic will of the decedent. Petitioner alleged that Moises died without issue and left
to her the following properties, namely: (1) a parcel of land situated in Pasay City and
described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9741; (2) images of Oracion del Huerto and
Pieta including the crown; and (3) all personal belongings.[4]
Respondent, a cousin of the petitioner, filed his opposition and counter-petitioned for the
allowance of two other holographic wills of the decedent, one dated September 27, 1989
and another dated September 28, 1989.[5]

SECTION 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and
intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the demand
does not exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of interest and costs but inclusive of
damages of whatever kind, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided,
That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality
of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of action arose
out of the same or different transactions; and
xxxx

The applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction on the RTC or the MTCs over probate
proceedings depending on the gross value of the estate,[16] which value must be alleged
in the complaint or petition to be filed. Significantly, in this case, the original petition
docketed before the trial court contains only the following averments:
xxxx
1. That Petitioner is of legal age, married, Filipino and residing at 2237 P. Burgos St.,
Pasay City who is named devisee in the Last Will and Testament of MOISES BANAYAD,
deceased who died in Pasay City General Hospital on March 27, 1991 xerox copy of his
death certificate is herewith attached as Annex A to form integral part hereof;
2. That the said Last Will and Testament is herewith (sic) attached as Annex B and made
an integral part of this Petition, the original thereof will be presented to this Honorable
Court at the time of probate;
3. That the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines and residing at 2237 P. Burgos
St., Pasay City at the time of his death;
4. That the properties left by the decedent consist of real and personal properties
particularly described herein below, which decedent all bequeathed to petitioner;
A. A parcel of land described under TCT No. 9741 xerox copy of which is herewith (sic)
attached as Annex C.
B. Imahen ng Oracion del Huerto at Pieta, kasama and korona.
C. All personal belongings.
5. That the testator at the time of the execution of the said Will was of sound and
disposing mind.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that:
a. Upon proper notice and hearing, the above mentioned Will be admitted to probate;
b. That letters testamentary or administration be issued to herein petitioner without bond;
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs just and equitable in (sic) the premises.
x x x x[17]

Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moisess estate. Thus,
from a reading of the original petition filed, it cannot be determined which court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings.[18] The RTC therefore
committed gross error when it had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that
the initiatory pleading filed before it did not call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The
RTC should have, at the outset, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Be it noted
that the dismissal on the said ground may be ordered motu proprio by the courts.[19]
Further, the CA, on appeal, should have dismissed the case on the same ground. Settled
is the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any of the parties or may be
reckoned by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost
by waiver or by estoppel.[20]
Despite the pendency of this case for around 18 years, the exception laid down in Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy[21] and clarified recently in Figueroa v. People[22] cannot be applied.
First, because, as a general rule, the principle of estoppel by laches cannot lie against

the government.[23] No injustice to the parties or to any third person will be wrought by
the ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instituted probate proceedings.
Second and most important, because in Tijam, the delayed invocation of lack of
jurisdiction has been made during the execution stage of a final and executory ruling of a
court. In Figueroa, the Court has emphasized that estoppel by laches only supervenes in
exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu in Tijam. It is well to note the following
factual setting of Tijam:
On July 19, 1948 barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as
the Judiciary Act of 1948 the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced
Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00,
with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole
obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was
issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved
upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co.,
Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month.
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after
making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they
interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter,
the Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been
returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against
the Surety's bond (Rec. on Appeal pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written
opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2)
Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the
judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion
for execution against its counter-bond but also the following affirmative relief: "to relieve
the herein bonding company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question" (Id. p. 54)
The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been
made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary
demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs
filed a second motion for execution against the counter-bond. On the date set for the
hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel, granted the latter a
period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such answer,
the Court granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was
issued without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the
Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of
Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for
reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its record on appeal was then printed as required by the
Rules, and in due time it filed its brief raising therein no other question but the ones
covered by the following assignment of errors:
I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its order dated November 2, 1957, by
holding the incident as submitted for resolution, without a summary hearing and
compliance with the other mandatory requirements provided for in Section 17, Rule 59 of
the Rules of Court.

II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the issuance of execution against
the herein bonding company-appellant.
III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the motion to quash the writ of
execution filed by the herein bonding company- appellant as well as its subsequent
motion for reconsideration, and/or in not quashing or setting aside the writ of execution.
Not one of the assignment of errors it is obvious raises the question of lack of jurisdiction,
neither directly nor indirectly.
Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11,
1962, decided the case affirming the orders appealed from.
On January 8, 1963 five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a
motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The
Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year.
Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging
substantially that appellees' action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July
19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date
Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already
become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the
demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of
First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon these
premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to
dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court of Appeals required the
appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May
20 of the same year, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to
Us.
x x x x[24]

Clearly, then, in Tijam, the issue of lack of jurisdiction has only been raised during the
execution stage, specifically when the matter of the trial courts denial of the suretys
motion to quash the writ of execution has been brought to the appellate court for review.
Here, the trial courts assumption of unauthorized jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings has been discovered by the Court during the appeal stage of the main case,
not during the execution stage of a final and executory decision. Thus, the exceptional
rule laid down in Tijam cannot apply.
Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including
the decision rendered, are null and void.[25] With the above disquisition, the Court finds it
unnecessary to discuss and resolve the other issues raised in the petition.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 150206

GABATAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

March 13, 2009
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the
Decision[1] dated April 28, 2000, and Resolution[2] dated September 12, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 52273. The challenged Decision affirmed the
decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, dated

October 20, 1995 in Civil Case No. 89-092, an action for Recovery of Property and
Ownership and Possession, thereat commenced by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana
against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado.
Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot
3095 C-5 and situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was
declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC,
respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same
from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero (Hermogena). Respondent
further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his
wife, Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, Lot
3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilos wife, Rita
Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena
demanded for the return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogenas death, respondent
also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender
the subject property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners
Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite
respondents demands for them to vacate the same.
In their answer, petitioners denied that respondents mother Hermogena was the
daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is
the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in
1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters,
namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings
and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual,
physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the
concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the
improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent.
Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the
subject land; the former is merely the husband of Teofilos daughter while the latter is just
a caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by respondent
against Teofilos wife, Rita Vda. de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as Civil
Case No. 5840 but the case was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally,
petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states no cause of action or, if there
was any, the same has long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches.
On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo were
individually named, to wit: Lolita Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan,
Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis, Riorita Gabatan Tumal and Freira
Gabatan.
On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging that the
disputed land was already covered by OCT No. P-3316 in the name of the heirs of Juan
Gabatan represented by petitioner Riorita Gabatan (Teofilos daughter).
On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, declaring the plaintiff the owner of Lot No. 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan,
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City; and ordering the defendants represented by Riorita
Gabatan Tumala to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-3316 in favor of
plaintiff Lourdes Evero Pacana, free of any encumbrance; ordering the defendants to pay

P10,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as Attorneys fees; and P2,000.00 for
litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse was docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 52273.
On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming that of the
RTC. Dispositively, the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision of the lower court dated
October 20, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Discounting petitioners argument that respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan, the CA
declared that respondents claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently
established during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long line of jurisprudence that findings of
fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight and are not disturbed except for cogent
reasons, such as when the findings of fact are not supported by evidence.
The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale[5] executed by Macaria
Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein
Hermogena was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan:
x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and presently
residing at Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the deceased, JUAN
GABATAN; x x x.
To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration
which was signed by Teofilo and the latters nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a
tangible proof that they acknowledged Hermogenas status as the daughter of Juan
Gabatan. Applying Section 38, Rule 130[6] of the Rules of Court on the declaration
against interest, the CA ruled that petitioners could not deny that even their very own
father, Teofilo formally recognized Hermogenas right to heirship from Juan Gabatan
which ultimately passed on to respondent.
As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that petitioners possession of the disputed
property could not ripen into acquisitive prescription because their predecessor-ininterest, Teofilo, never held the property in the concept of an owner.
Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse principally
contending that the CA committed the following reversible errors:
FIRST ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that Juan Gabatan died single and
without issue;
SECOND ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee (respondent)
as the sole and surviving heir of Juan Gabatan, the only child of a certain Hermogena
Clareto GABATAN;
THIRD ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring that a certain Hermogena Clareto
GABATAN is the child and sole heir of Juan Gabatan;

FOURTH ERROR: The lower court erred in failing to appreciate by preponderance of

evidence in favor of the defendants-appellants (petitioners) claim that they and the heirs
of Justa and Macaria both surnamed Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs of Juan
Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject matter hereof;
FIFTH ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that the cause of action of plaintiffappellee (respondent) if any, has been barred by laches and/or prescription.[7]
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon certain preliminary
matters.
In general, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Questions of fact cannot be the subject of this particular
mode of appeal, for this Court is not a trier of facts.[8] It is not our function to examine
and evaluate the probative value of the evidence presented before the concerned
tribunal upon which its impugned decision or resolution is based.[9]
However, there are established exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of the findings
of fact by the lower courts, such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when
the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[10]
Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to
waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. Thus,
the Court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned
as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal
but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to
avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on
appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the
issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e)
matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f)
matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question
properly assigned, is dependent. [11]
In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed to resolve the merits
of the case.
The respondents main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership
and possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject property, Lot 3095 C-5, was

owned by the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his lifetime.[12] Before us are two
contending parties, both insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the
action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that
the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that
such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are
seeking the establishment of a status or right.[13]
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,[14] this Court ruled that the declaration of
heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action.
This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals[15] where the Court held:

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to
still subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a determination of
petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners (Vide
Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 [1989]; Intestate Estate of Mercado v.
Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 [1955]), the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed
by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more
practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the
status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that
the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and
already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding.
Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment
thereon.
We GRANT the petition.

xxx where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action
in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased
to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal
properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case
declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the
properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that
the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that such declarations (that
Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it
being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in
which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of
the project of partition.

After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and
questionable the basis of the RTC in conferring upon respondent the status of sole heir
of Juan Gabatan.

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,[16] the Court reiterated
its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in
the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang,[17] this Court held that the
status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedents estate could not
be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
property.

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall
be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[18] where

the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title
to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, to wit:
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the
case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to
establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the
estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous
in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and
had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction
over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property,

pinned her claim entirely on her alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was
incumbent upon her to present preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.
Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in
the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.

ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, two conflicting birth certificates[19] of respondent were presented at the RTC.
Respondent, during her direct testimony, presented and identified a purported certified
true copy of her typewritten birth certificate which indicated that her mothers maiden
name was Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a
certified true copy of respondents handwritten birth certificate which differed from the
copy presented by respondent. Among the differences was respondents mothers full
maiden name which was indicated as Hermogena Calarito in the handwritten birth
certificate.
In resolving this particular issue, the trial court ruled in this wise:
The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each other by presenting two conflicting
Certificate (sic) of Live Birth of plaintiff herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are Exhibit

A for the plaintiff and Exhibit 1 for the defendants. Which of this (sic) is genuine, and
which is falsified. These (sic) issue is crucial and requires serious scrutiny. The Court is
of the observation that Exhibit A for the plaintiff which is a certified true copy is in due
form and bears the as is and where is rule. It has the impression of the original
certificate. The forms (sic) is an old one used in the 1950s. Her mothers maiden name
appearing thereof is Hermogina (sic) Clarito Gabatan. While Exhibit 1, the entries found
thereof (sic) is handwritten which is very unusual and of dubious source. The form used
is of latest vintage. The entry on the space for mothers maiden name is Hermogena
Calarito. There seems to be an apparent attempt to thwart plaintiffs mother filiation with
the omission of the surname Gabatan. Considering these circumstances alone the Court
is inclined to believe that Exhibit A for the plaintiff is far more genuine and authentic
certificate of live birth.[20]
Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, we simply cannot agree with
the above-quoted findings of the trial court. To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court
noted, was an original typewritten document, not a mere photocopy or facsimile. It uses a
form of 1950s vintage[21] but this Court is unable to concur in the trial courts finding that
Exhibit 1[22] was of a later vintage than Exhibit A which was one of the trial courts bases
for doubting the authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the contrary, the printed notation on the
upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1 states Municipal Form No. 102 (Revised, January
1945) which makes it an older form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial courts finding regarding
which form was of more recent vintage was manifestly contradicted by the evidence on
record. No actual signature appears on Exhibit A except that of a certain Maximo P.
Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Cagayan de
Oro City, who purportedly certified on July 6, 1977 that Exhibit A was a true copy of
respondents birth certificate. The names of the attendant at birth (Petra Sambaan) and
the local civil registrar (J.L. Rivera) in 1950 were typewritten with the notation (Sgd.) also
merely typewritten beside their names. The words A certified true copy: July 6, 1977
above the signature of Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be inscribed by the
same typewriter as the very entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A and the
information stated therein were prepared and entered only in 1977. Significantly, Maximo
P. Noriga was never presented as a witness to identify Exhibit A. Said document and the
signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein were identified by respondent herself whose selfserving testimony cannot be deemed sufficient authentication of her birth certificate.
We cannot subscribe to the trial courts view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were
handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies
of the handwritten birth certificate of respondent (petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly
authenticated by two competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms. Vidal), Assistant
Registration Officer of the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and
Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta.
Mesa, Manila. Both witnesses testified that: (a) as part of their official duties they have
custody of birth records in their respective offices,[23] and (b) the certified true copy of
respondents handwritten birth certificate is a faithful reproduction of the original birth
certificate registered in their respective offices.[24] Ms. Vidal, during her testimony, even
brought the original of the handwritten birth certificate before the trial court and
respondents counsel confirmed that the certified true copy (which was eventually marked
as Exhibit 1) was a faithful reproduction of the original.[25] Ms. Vidal likewise
categorically testified that no other copy of respondents birth certificate exists in their
records except the handwritten birth certificate.[26] Ms. Cacho, in turn, testified that the
original of respondents handwritten birth certificate found in the records of the NSO
Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was photocopied) was the one officially transmitted to their
office by the Local Civil Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro.[27] Both Ms. Vidal and Ms.
Cacho testified and brought their respective offices copies of respondents birth certificate

in compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial court and there is no showing that they
were motivated by ill will or bias in giving their testimonies. Thus, between respondents
Exhibit A and petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter documents deserve to be given
greater probative weight.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate presented by
respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on its face is insufficient to prove
respondents filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had
been credible and authentic, would have proven was that respondents mother was a
certain Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. It does not prove that same Hermogena Clarito
Gabatan is the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA held that the conflicting
certificates of live birth of respondent submitted by the parties only proved the filiation of
respondent to Hermogena.[28]
It was absolutely crucial to respondents cause of action that she convincingly proves the
filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the relationship of
respondents mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such
familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic
document or a final judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have
presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent
allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mothers
relationship to Juan Gabatan.
However, respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth certificate, which would have been
the best evidence of Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as
evidence at the RTC. Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final
judgment categorically evidencing Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac
Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that they personally knew Hermogena
(respondents mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married
to Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana. However,
none of these witnesses had personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to
Laureana or the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet
born or were very young when Juan supposedly married Laureana or when Hermogena
was born and they all admitted that none of them were present at Juan and Laureanas
wedding or Hermogenas birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what they had
been told by, or heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word,
hearsay.
Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondents witnesses
testimonies. The records would show that they cannot be said to be credible and
impartial witnesses. Frisco Lawan testified that he was the son of Laureana by a man
other than Juan Gabatan and was admittedly not at all related to Juan Gabatan.[29] His
testimony regarding the relationships within the Gabatan family is hardly reliable. As for
Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who are children of Justa Gabatan
Nagac,[30] this Court is wary of according probative weight to their testimonies since
respondent admitted during her cross-examination that her (respondents) husband is the
son of Felicisima Nagac Pacana.[31] In other words, although these witnesses are
indeed blood relatives of petitioners, they are also the mother and the aunt of
respondents husband. They cannot be said to be entirely disinterested in the outcome of
the case.

Aside from the testimonies of respondents witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied
heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale[32] (Exhibit H) presented by
respondent and which appeared to be signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings
of Juan Gabatan. In this document involving the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5,
Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan Gabatan was indicated as one of the
vendors. The RTC deemed the statement therein as an affirmation or recognition by
Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners predecessor in interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the
heir of Juan Gabatan.[33] The CA considered the same statement as a declaration
against interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.[34]
However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the
signatures therein, as competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by
petitioners counsel for being a mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated.[35]
After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court
cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.[36] Although the
best evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are instances where the presentation
of secondary evidence would be allowed, such as when the original is lost or the original
is a public record, the basis for the presentation of secondary evidence must still be
established. Thus, in Department of Education Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario,[37] we
held that a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence
before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof
of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac
Pacana (who identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that
she gave no testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or
whether it was recorded in any public office.
There is an ostensible attempt to pass off Exhibit H as an admissible public document.
For this, respondent relied on the stamped notation on the photocopy of the deed that it
is a certified true xerox copy and said notation was signed by a certain Honesto P. Velez,
Sr., Assessment Officer, who seems to be an officer in the local assessors office.
Regarding the authentication of public documents, the Rules of Court[38] provide that the
record of public documents, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy.[39] The attestation of the certifying officer must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be.[40]
To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented by respondent that an original of
Exhibit H was registered or exists in the records of the local assessors office.
Furthermore, the stamped certification of Honesto P. Velez is insufficient authentication
of Exhibit H since Velezs certification did not state that Exhibit H was a true copy from
the original. Even worse, Velez was not presented as a witness to attest that Exhibit H
was a true copy from the original. Indeed, it is highly doubtful that Velez could have made
such an attestation since the assessors office is not the official repository of original
notarized deeds of sale and could not have been the legal custodian contemplated in the
rules.
It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original of the Deed of Absolute
Sale in his notarial register and to forward the same to the proper court. It is the notary

public or the proper court that has custody of his notarial register that could have
produced the original or a certified true copy thereof. Instead, the Deed of Absolute Sale
was identified by Felicisima Nagac Pacana who, despite appearing to be a signatory
thereto, is not a disinterested witness and as can be gleaned from her testimony, she
had no personal knowledge of the preparation of the alleged certified true copy of the
Deed of Absolute Sale. She did not even know who secured a copy of Exhibit H from the
assessors office.[41] To be sure, the roundabout and defective manner of authentication
of Exhibit H renders it inadmissible for the purpose it was offered, i.e. as proof that
Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or admitted the status of Hermogena Gabatan as heir of
Juan Gabatan.
Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the
same admissible, it still nonetheless would have only provided proof that a certain
Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H does not show the filiation
of respondent to either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As discussed above, the
only document that respondent produced to demonstrate her filiation to Hermogena
Gabatan (respondents Exhibit A) was successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence
presented by petitioners.
As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against respondent. According
to respondents own testimony,[42] Juan Gabatan died sometime in 1933 and thus, the
cause of action of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to recover the decedents property from third
parties or to quiet title to their inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or her
mother Hermogena, if they were truly the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their
rights as such. It is only in 1978 that respondent filed her first complaint to recover the
subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840, against Rita Gabatan, the widow of
Teofilo Gabatan.[43] However, that case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to
prosecute.[44] Again, respondent waited until 1989 to refile her cause of action, i.e. the
present case.[45] She claimed that she waited until the death of Rita Gabatan to refile
her case out of respect because Rita was then already old.[46]
We cannot accept respondents flimsy reason. It is precisely because Rita Gabatan and
her contemporaries (who might have personal knowledge of the matters litigated in this
case) were advancing in age and might soon expire that respondent should have exerted
every effort to preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate her claim. As we held in
Republic of the Philippines v. Agunoy: Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura
subveniunt, the law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights[O]ne may not
sleep on a right while expecting to preserve it in its pristine purity.[47]
All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing,
credible and independently verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan
Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under litigation. Aggravating the weakness of
her evidence were the circumstances that (a) she did not come to court with clean hands
for she presented a tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of
live birth and (b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action. If
the Court cannot now affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON vs. RICAFORTE

G.R. No. 198680
July 8, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a complaint for
Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against
respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso),
docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno
Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot
Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso
executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the
aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under
TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdalenos
collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by:
(a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a
certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed
that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a
cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there
is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdalenos lawful
heirs.10
The RTC Ruling
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the
subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that
while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous
special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration,12 this did not mean that
they could already be considered as the decedents compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary,
Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdalenos son and hence, his
compulsory heir through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of:
(a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate
of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on
August 31, 2011 due to the counsels failure to state the date on which his Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246,15 sought
direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the
RTCs dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a
cause of action was proper.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the
allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient
cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff
would be entitled to the relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient

basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed,
regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.19
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein,
alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and
that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latters favor be cancelled. While the
foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs
sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedents lawful
heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in
an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In
the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents,
held that the determination of who are the decedents lawful heirs must be made in the
proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and/or possession, as in this case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of property.1wphi1 This must take precedence
over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently
ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section
3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship
must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This
doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its
ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the
proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the
status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not
be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the
parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already
presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had
been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist.
Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine
the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No.
T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same
fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper
appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence,
since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of
ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether
proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudiosos
heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the
proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be
devoid of any legal effect.

UY KIAO ENG vs. LEE,

January 15, 2010

Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court, in the assailed August 23,
2006 Amended Decision,[10] granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the
writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorneys fees. It ruled this
time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her
possession the holographic will.
Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The
appellate court denied this motion in the further assailed February 23, 2007
Resolution.[11]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 176831

before the trial court, failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that his mother had in
her custody the original copy of the will.[9]

NACHURA, J.:

Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic
will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon
Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. 01100939, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel
petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could
be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to settle and
liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance,
but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.[3]
In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the complaint and
posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause
of action, and for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the filing thereof.
Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she
knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given
to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent was able to introduce,
as an exhibit, a copy of the will in Civil Case No. 224-V-00 before the RTC of Valenzuela
City. Petitioner further contended that respondent should have first exerted earnest
efforts to amicably settle the controversy with her before he filed the suit.[4]
The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondents
evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her
custody the original holographic will. Importantly, she asserted that the pieces of
documentary evidence presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and
irrelevant to the issue involved in the petitionthey did not prove or disprove that she
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to issue the writ of
mandamus.[5]
The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence.[6] In its February 4, 2005 Order,[7]
however, it granted the same on petitioners motion for reconsideration. Respondents
motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied on September 20, 2005.[8]
Hence, the petition was dismissed.
Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. On April 26, 2006, the CA
initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of mandamus would issue
only in instances when no other remedy would be available and sufficient to afford
redress. Under Rule 76, in an action for the settlement of the estate of his deceased
father, respondent could ask for the presentation or production and for the approval or
probate of the holographic will. The CA further ruled that respondent, in the proceedings

Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in
the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial
evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.[12]
The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ.
The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the
rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the wrongful acts of the respondent.[13]

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the

name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or
to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
directed or from operation of law.[14] This definition recognizes the public character of
the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of
enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest.[15] The writ is a
proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated
by the Constitution.[16] As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.[17]
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which
is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to
which he is not entitled by law.[18] Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a
mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is
meritorious.[19] As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following
grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a

duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person
has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which he is entitled.[20] On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a
writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it
must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.[21]
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to
enforce contractual obligations.[22] Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely
private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the
nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.[23] The writ is not appropriate to
enforce a private right against an individual.[24] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the
execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues
only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a
prerogative writ.[25] To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the
redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.[26]

SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.A person who neglects any of
the duties required in the two last preceding sections without excuse satisfactory to the
court shall be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.
SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.A person having custody of a will after
the death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same,
when ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and
there kept until he delivers the will.[30]

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to
state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants
the demurrer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should
be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the
remedy of mandamus being invoked.[27] In other words, mandamus can be issued only
in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to
afford relief.[28] Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its
nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles.[29] Indeed, the
grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation
involved herethe production of the original holographic willis in the nature of a public or a
private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee
because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the
production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not
prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the
same is in his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.Any executor, devisee, or legatee
named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time, after the
death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of
the original holographic will. Thus
SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.The person who has custody of a will shall, within
twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court
having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.A person named as executor
in a will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, or within
twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such
knowledge after the death of the testator, present such will to the court having
jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any other manner, and shall, within
such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the trust or his refusal to
accept it.

REPUBLIC vs. MARCOS

G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855
August 4, 2009

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the March 13, 1997 Decision[2] and August 27, 1997
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 43450.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City Branch 156, acting as
a probate court, in Special Proceeding No. 10279, issued an Order[4] granting letters
testamentary in solidum to respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad
Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E.
Marcos.
The dispositive portion of the January 11, 1996 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the Last Will and Testament of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos to have
been duly executed in accordance with law, the same is hereby ALLOWED AND
ADMITTED TO PROBATE.
Upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued
in solidum to Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos AND Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos II,
named executors therein.
Pending the filing of said bond and their oath, Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby authorized to continue her functions as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos.
Let NOTICE be given to all known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other
persons having an interest in the estate for them to lay their claim against the Estate or
forever hold their peace.
SO ORDERED.[5]

On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration[6] in so far as the January 11, 1996 RTC Order granted letters
testamentary to respondents. On the other hand, respondent Imelda Marcos filed her

own motion for reconsideration on the ground that the will is lost and that petitioner has
not proven its existence and validity.
On February 5, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance stating that he
already filed a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 as directed by the January 11, 1996
RTC Order and that he took his oath as named executor of the will on January 30, 1996.
On March 13, 1996, the RTC issued Letters of Administration[7] to BIR Commissioner
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato in accordance with an earlier Order dated September 9, 1994,
appointing her as Special Administratrix of the Marcos Estate.
On April 1, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Motion to Revoke the Letters of
Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato.
On April 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order[8] denying the motion for partial
reconsideration filed by petitioner as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent Imelda Marcos, the penultimate portion of which reads:
Under the Rules, a decedents testamentary privilege must be accorded utmost respect.
Guided by this legal precept, therefore, in resolving the two (2) motions at hand, the
Court is constrained to DENY both.
Examining the arguments poised by the movants, the Court observed that these are but
a mere rehash of issues already raised and passed upon by the Court.
One has to review the previous orders issued by the Court in this case, e.g., the orders
dated September 9, 1994, November 25, 1994, as well as October 3, 1995, to see that
even as far back then, the Court has considered the matter of competency of the
oppositors and of Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato as having been settled.
It cannot be overstressed that the assailed January 11, 1996 Orders of the Court was
arrived at only after extensive consideration of every legal facet available on the question
of validity of the Will.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration filed separately by
petitioner Republic and oppositor Imelda R. Marcos are both DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[9]
On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under
Ruled 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the aforementioned RTC Orders granting
letters testamentary to respondents.
On February 5, 1997, the First Division of this Court issued a Resolution referring the
petition to the CA, to wit:
xxxx
The special civil action for certiorari as well as all the other pleadings filed herein are
REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits or
any other action as it may deem appropriate, the latter having jurisdiction concurrent with
this Court over the Case, and this Court having been cited to no special and important
reason for it to take cognizance of said case in the first instance.[10] (Emphasis and
Underscoring Supplied)

On March 13, 1997, the CA issued a Decision,[11] dismissing the referred petition for
having taken the wrong mode of appeal, the pertinent portions of which reads:
Consequently, for having taken the wrong mode of appeal, the present petition should be
dismissed in accordance with the same Supreme Court Circular 2-90 which expressly
provides that:
4. Erroneous Appeals An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition for review is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] which was, however denied by the CA
in a Resolution[14] dated August 27, 1997.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following assignment of errors, to wit:
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
In the meantime, on October 9, 2002, the RTC, acting on the pending unresolved
motions before it, issued an Order[16] which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby appoints as joint special administrators of the estate of
the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, the nominee of the Republic of the Philippines (the
Undersecretary of the Department of Justice whom the Secretary of Justice will
designate for this purpose) and Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Mr. Ferdinand R.
Marcos II, to serve as such until an executor is finally appointed.
SO ORDERED.
The petition is without merit.
When the assailed Orders granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents were
issued by the RTC, petitioner sought to question them by filing a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90,[17] which was then in effect, reads:
2. Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court. Except in criminal cases
where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, judgments of
regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the clear intendment of the provision of the
Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari
which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis and Underscoring
Supplied)
The pertinent portions of Section 17[18] of the Judiciary Act of 1948 read:
The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in

(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or
executive order or regulation is in question;
(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto;
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue;
(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided,
however, That if, in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases
mentioned in the three next preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and
the final judgment or decision of the latter may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified
or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari; and
(5) Final awards, judgments, decision or orders of the Commission on Elections, Court of
Tax Appeals, Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission, and the
Workmens Compensation Commission.
A reading of Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, clearly shows that the subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of
granting letters testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any ground which can be
the subject of a direct appeal to this Court. The CA was thus correct in declaring that the
issues raised by petitioner do not fall within the purview of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948 such that the Supreme Court should take cognizance of the instant case.[19]
Moreover, the Courts pronouncement in Suarez v. Judge Villarama[20] is instructive:
Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, in effect at the time of the antecedents, provides that an
appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or
inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. This rule is now incorporated in Section 5, Rule
56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moreover, the filing of the case directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the
Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained
in the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial
tradition. Thus, a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision involving both
questions of fact and law must first be brought before the Court of Appeals.[21]
Also, in Southern Negros Development Bank v. Court of Appeals,[22] this Court ruled:
It is incumbent upon private respondent qua appellants to utilize the correct mode of
appeal of the decisions of trial courts to the appellate courts. In the mistaken choice of
their remedy, they can blame no one but themselves (Jocson v. Baguio, 179 SCRA 550
[1989]; Yucuanseh Drug Co. v. National Labor Union, 101 Phil. 409 [1957]).
xxxx
Pursuant to Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, which provides that "[a]n appeal taken to
either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate
mode shall be dismissed," the only course of action of the Court to which an erroneous
appeal is made is to dismiss the same. There is no longer any justification for allowing
transfers of erroneous appeals from one court to another (Quesada v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 93869, November 12, 1990, First Division, Minute Resolution).[23]
Based on the foregoing, petitioner cannot deny that the determination of whether or not
respondents should be disqualified to act as executors is a question of fact. Hence, the
proper remedy was to appeal to the CA, not to this Court.
Petitioner is adamant, however, that notwithstanding the improper remedy, the CA
should not have dismissed therein petition. Petitioner argues in the wise:

However, as can be seen in the Resolution of February 5, 1997, (Annex H) this

Honorable Court deemed it more proper to transmit the first Petition for Review to
respondent appellate court for the reason that:
This Court having been cited to no special and important reason for it to take cognizance
of said case in the first instance. x x x
It would appear then that even though this Honorable Court apparently considers the
Republics petition as deserving to be given due course, it deemed it in the best interest
of the parties concerned if the Court of Appeals would first take cognizance of said case,
thereby preserving its stance as a court of last resort.
Additionally, this Honorable Court itself plainly stated that the case under review is:
.REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits.
The latter having jurisdiction concurrent with this Court over the case[24]
Petitioners arguments are misplaced. To stress, the February 5, 1997 Resolution reads:
The special civil action for certiorari as well as all the other pleadings filed herein are
REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits or
any other action as it may deem appropriate, the latter having jurisdiction concurrent with
this Court over the Case, and this Court having been cited to no special and important
reason for it to take cognizance of said case in the first instance.[25]

Based thereon, this Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that said resolution gave the
CA discretion and latitude to decide the petition as it may deem proper. The resolution is
clear that the petition was referred to the CA for consideration and adjudication on the
merits or any other action as it may deem appropriate. Thus, no error can be attributed to
the CA when the action it deemed appropriate was to dismiss the petition for having
availed of an improper remedy. More importantly, the action of the CA was sanctioned
under Section 4 of Supreme Court Circular 2-90 which provides that an appeal taken to
either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate
mode shall be dismissed.
Moreover, petitioner mistakenly relies in Oriental Media, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[26] in
which this Court made the following pronouncements:
In the case at bar, there was no urgency or need for Oriental to resort to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari for when it learned of the case and the judgment
against it on July 25, 1986, due to its receipt of a copy of the decision by default; no
execution had as yet been ordered by the trial court. As aforementioned, Oriental had still
the time and the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration, as was actually done.
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration in the first case, or at the latest upon the
denial of its petition for relief from judgment, Oriental should have appealed. Oriental
should have followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court for
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the
protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to
purpose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has
often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if
it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true;
the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give
effect to both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy
resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive rights is
equally guaranteed by due process whatever the source of such rights, be it the
Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.[27]

In the case at bar, as found by this Court in its February 5, 1997 Resolution, therein
petition offered no important or special reason for the Court to take cognizance of it at the
first instance. Petitioner offered no plausible reason why it went straight to this Court
when an adequate and proper remedy was still available. The CA was thus correct that
the remedy that petitioner should have availed of was to file an appeal under Rule 109 of
the Rules of Court which states:
Section 1. Orders of judgments from which appeals taken. An interested person may
appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First
Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a)

allows or disallows a will;

Because of the preceding discussion, herein petition must necessarily fail. However,
even if this Court were to set aside petitioners procedural lapses, a careful review of the
records of the case reveal that herein petition is without merit.
At the crux of the controversy is a determination of whether or not respondents are
incompetent to serve as executors of the will of Ferdinand Marcos.
Ozeata v. Pecson[28] is instructive:
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary
concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural
that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted
to carry out his wishes in the disposal of the estate. The curtailment of this right may be
considered as a curtailment of the right to dispose. And as the rights granted by will take
effect from the time of death (Article 777, Civil Code of the Philippines), the management
of his estate by the administrator of his choice should be made as soon as practicable,
when no reasonable objection to his assumption of the trust can be interposed any
longer. It has been held that when a will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of
the court to issue letters testamentary to the person named as executor upon his
application (23 C.J. 1023).
xxxx
The case of In re Erlanger's Estate, 242 N.Y.S. 249, also reiterates the same principle.
The courts have always respected the right to which a testator enjoys to determine who
is most suitable to settle his testamentary affairs, and his solemn selection should not
lightly be disregarded. After the admission of a will to probate, the courts will not name a
better executor for the testator nor disqualify, by a judicial veto, the widow or friend or
other person selected in the will, except upon strict proof of the statutory grounds of
incompetency. Matter of Leland's Will, 219 N.Y. 387, 393, 114 N.E. 854. x x x[29]
Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent to serve as
executors, to wit:
Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. No person is
competent to serve as executor or administrator who:
xxxx

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of trust by reason of
drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of
conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. (Emphasis Supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioner anchored its opposition to the grant of letters testamentary
to respondents, specifically on the following grounds: (1) want of integrity, and (2)
conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. Petitioner contends that respondents
have been convicted of a number of cases[30] and, hence, should be characterized as
one without integrity, or at the least, with questionable integrity.[31]
The RTC, however, in its January 11, 1996 Order, made the following findings:
However, except for petitioner Republics allegation of want of integrity on the part of
Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Romualdez Marco II, named
executors in the last will and testament, so as to render them incompetent to serve as
executors, the Court sees at this time, no evidence on record, oral or documentary, to
substantiate and support the said allegation. (Emphasis Supplied)
Based on the foregoing, this Court stresses that an appellate court is disinclined to
interfere with the action taken by the probate court in the matter of removal of an
executor or administrator unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown.[32]
The Rules of Court gives the lower court the duty and discretion to determine whether in
its opinion an individual is unfit to serve as an executor. The sufficiency of any ground for
removal should thus be determined by the said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first
place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to
or in disregard of the rules of orders of the court.[33]
Hence, in order to reverse the findings of the RTC, this Court must evaluate the evidence
presented or alleged by petitioner in support of its petition for disqualification. However,
after a painstaking review of the records and evidence on hand, this Court finds that the
RTC committed no error or gross abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner failed to
substantiate its allegation.
Petitioner conveniently omits to state that the two cases against respondent Imelda
Marcos have already been reversed by this Court. Her conviction in Criminal Case No.
17453 was reversed by this Court in Dans, Jr. v. People.[34] Likewise, her conviction in
Criminal Case No. 17450 was reversed by this Court in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan.[35]
Hence, the so-called convictions against respondent Imelda Marcos cannot serve as a
ground for her disqualification to serve as an executor.
On the other hand, the eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos II involve
four charges for violation of Section 45 (failure to file income tax returns) and four
charges for violation of Section 50 (non-payment of deficiency taxes) of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (NIRC).
It is a matter of record, that in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569,[36] the CA acquitted respondent
Ferdinand Marcos II of all the four charges for violation of Section 50 and sustained his
conviction for all the four charges for violation of Section 45. It, however, bears to stress,
that the CA only ordered respondent Marcos II to pay a fine for his failure to file his
income tax return. Moreover, and as admitted by petitioner,[37] said decision is still
pending appeal.
Therefore, since respondent Ferdinand Marcos II has appealed his conviction relating to
four violations of Section 45 of the NIRC, the same should not serve as a basis to
disqualify him to be appointed as an executor of the will of his father. More importantly,
even assuming arguendo that his conviction is later on affirmed, the same is still

insufficient to disqualify him as the failure to file an income tax return is not a crime
involving moral turpitude.

segregates the situations into three different classes, namely, "falsity," "fraud" and
"omission."[42] (Emphasis Supplied)

In Villaber v. Commision on Elections,[38] this Court held:

As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted the definition in
Black's Law Dictionary as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals."
In In re Vinzon, the term "moral turpitude" is considered as encompassing "everything
which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."
xxxx
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections that "not every criminal
act involves moral turpitude," and that ''as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for
the Supreme Court to determine."[39]

Applying the foregoing considerations to the case at bar, the filing of a fraudulent return
with intent to evade tax is a crime involving moral turpitude as it entails willfulness and
fraudulent intent on the part of the individual. The same, however, cannot be said for
failure to file a return where the mere omission already constitutes a violation. Thus, this
Court holds that even if the conviction of respondent Marcos II is affirmed, the same not
being a crime involving moral turpitude cannot serve as a ground for his disqualification.
Anent the third error raised by petitioner, the same has no merit.
Petitioner contends that respondents denied the existence of the will, and are, therefore,
estopped from claiming to be the rightful executors thereof. Petitioner further claims that
said actions clearly show that respondents lack the competence and integrity to serve as
officers of the court.

Moreover, In De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces:[40]

Indeed, it is well-settled that "embezzlement, forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes
which denote moral turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an
element are looked on as involving moral turpitude" (58 C.J.S., 1206).
The failure to file an income tax return is not a crime involving moral turpitude as the
mere omission is already a violation regardless of the fraudulent intent or willfulness of
the individual. This conclusion is supported by the provisions of the NIRC as well as
previous Court decisions which show that with regard to the filing of an income tax return,
the NIRC considers three distinct violations: (1) a false return, (2) a fraudulent return with
intent to evade tax, and (3) failure to file a return.
The same is illustrated in Section 51(b) of the NIRC which reads:
(b) Assessment and payment of deficiency tax xxx
In case a person fails to make and file a return or list at the time prescribed by law, or
makes willfully or otherwise, false or fraudulent return or list x x x. (Emphasis Supplied)

This Court does not agree with the posture taken by petitioner, and instead, accepts the
explanation given by respondents, to wit:
Respondents opposed the petition for probate not because they are disclaiming the
existence of the will, but because of certain legal grounds, to wit: (a) petitioner does not
have the requisite interest to institute it; (b) the original copy of the will was not attached
to the petition for probate as required by the rules; and (c) the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue is not qualified to be appointed as administrator of the
estate.[43]

Based on the foregoing, considering the nature of their opposition, respondents cannot
be held guilty of estoppel as they merely acted within their rights when they put in issue
legal grounds in opposing the probate proceedings. More importantly, even if said
grounds were later on overruled by the RTC, said court was still of opinion that
respondents were fit to serve as executors notwithstanding their earlier opposition.
Again, in the absence of palpable error or gross abuse of discretion, this Court will not
interfere with the RTCs discretion.
As for the remaining errors assigned by petitioner, the same are bereft of merit.

Likewise, in Aznar v. Court of Tax Appeals,[41] this Court observed:

To our minds we can dispense with these controversial arguments on facts, although we
do not deny that the findings of facts by the Court of Tax Appeals, supported as they are
by very substantial evidence, carry great weight, by resorting to a proper interpretation of
Section 332 of the NIRC. We believe that the proper and reasonable interpretation of
said provision should be that in the three different cases of (1) false return, (2) fraudulent
return with intent to evade tax, (3) failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a
proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at
any time within ten years after the discovery of the (1) falsity, (2) fraud, and (3) omission.
Our stand that the law should be interpreted to mean a separation of the three different
situations of false return, fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, and failure to file a
return is strengthened immeasurably by the last portion of the provision which

Petitioner contends that respondents have strongly objected to the transfer to the
Philippines of the Marcos assets deposited in the Swiss Banks[44] and thus the same
should serve as a ground for their disqualification to act as executors. This Court does
not agree. In the first place, the same are mere allegations which, without proof, deserve
scant consideration. Time and again, this Court has stressed that this Court is a court of
law and not a court of public opinion. Moreover, petitioner had already raised the same
argument in its motion for partial reconsideration before the RTC. Said court, however,
still did not find the same as a sufficient ground to disqualify respondents. Again, in the
absence of palpable error or gross abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with
the RTCs discretion.
Lastly, petitioner argues that the assailed RTC Orders were based solely on their own
evidence and that respondents offered no evidence to show that they were qualified to
serve as executors.[45] It is basic that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
and a mere allegation is not evidence.[46] Consequently, it was the burden of petitioner
(not respondents) to substantiate the grounds upon which it claims that respondents

should be disqualified to serve as executors, and having failed in doing so, its petition
must necessarily fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the March 13, 1997 Decision and August 27, 1997
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43450 are hereby AFFIRMED.
The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156, acting as a probate court in Special
Proceeding No. 10279, is hereby ORDERED to issue letters testamentary, in solidum, to
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos II.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183053

October 10, 2012

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,

vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the
spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings,
Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation
of Isabels parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabels parents, along with her
paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for
parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her
among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and void and of no effect the
marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco on the finding that:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans memorial
Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the
patient was already out of the hospital, he continued to be under observation and
treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration
classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955;
that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under
expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked
progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.

PEREZ, J.:
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched imbroglio over the
estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We issued a Decision in the dispute
as in Inter Caetera.1 We now find a need to replace the decision.
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
(respondent Isabel) of our Decision2 in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010, directing
the issuance of joint letters of administration to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III
(Emilio III) and respondent. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the
estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M.
Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to
be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding
Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise
directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all
other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the
estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.3
We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990.
Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five
grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and
two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federicos and
Cristinas only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9,
1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration
of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes after (sic)
existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental
condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason.
The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist
handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong
indication of schizophernia (sic).4
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and Isabel filed a
complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the
same special lower court. The Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRCQC) granted their prayer for one hour a month of visitation rights which was subsequently
reduced to thirty minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabels
testimony in court that her grandparents visits caused her and her siblings stress and
anxiety.5
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristinas death, Federico adopted
his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.

On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristinas
estate docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the
petition, pointing out that: (1) as the surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be
appointed administrator of the decedents estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of
conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded preference in the
administration thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in the petition
was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son, Emilio III and Nenita;
(5) even before the death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal
properties, and thus, is better situated to protect the integrity of the decedents estate; (6)
the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7)
Isabels allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabels petition for letters of administration on the
ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an
illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabels parents marriage being declared
null and void. However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that
Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void
marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate children of
Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the
decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedents
estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico.
Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his
grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better
equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent,
Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision
appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the Oppositionin-Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby appointed
administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter
upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P 200,000.00,
conditioned as follows:

(4) To perform all orders of the Court.

Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be issued in his
favor.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC,
revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as
administratrix of the subject estate:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9,
2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said court to
Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel CojuangcoSuntay is hereby appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P 200,000.00) Pesos.7
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of
the appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristinas
estate, giving weight to his interest in Federicos estate. In ruling for co-administration
between Emilio III and
Isabel, we considered that:
1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her
husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent,
Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the
subsistence of their marriage;
3. Cristinas properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled with
those of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership
remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the
distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and
not simply in representation of his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals Decision in favor
of her sole administratorship based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina,
whose estate she seeks to administer.

(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on
the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other time when
required by the court, and

Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on
the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and
that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III
had demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not
deserve to become a co-administrator thereof.

Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore,
not an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the
decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify his appointment as administrator thereof;
(3) Emilio IIIs actuations since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9
November 2001 emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of
preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no basis for joint
administration as there are no "opposing parties or factions to be represented."
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between Emilio III and
Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedents estate. We did not
choose. Considering merely his demonstrable interest in the subject estate, we ruled that
Emilio III should likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina,
as a co-administrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and
therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid
down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in
the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the
appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out
the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an
administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence. 8
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a
decedent is the prospective administrators interest in the estate. 9 This is the same
consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of
preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the
rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical
administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly.10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of
preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedents estate must
demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any
other candidate.

To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the

administration of a decedents estate presupposes the surviving spouses interest in the
conjugal partnership or community property forming part of the decedents
estate.11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is a compulsory heir of a decedent 12 which evinces
as much, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate of a decedent, aside from
her share in the conjugal partnership or absolute community property.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator of a decedents estate, that the appointment of co-administrators has been
allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court which specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the
surviving spouse and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2
of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say that "x x x when an executor or administrator
dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the
trust alone, x x x."
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one
administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein. 13 We recognized
that the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent or the determination of
a persons suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the
sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment.14
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and
American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to
have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests
represented;15 (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is
large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle;16 (4) to have all
interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best
interests of the estate;17 and when a person entitled to the administration of an estate
desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office. 18
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment of special coadministrators during the pendency of the appeal for the probate of the decedents will.
Pending the probate thereof, we recognized Matias special interest in the decedents
estate as universal heir and executrix designated in the instrument who should not be
excluded in the administration thereof. Thus, we held that justice and equity demands
that the two (2) factions among the non-compulsory heirs of the decedent, consisting of
an instituted heir (Matias) and intestate heirs (respondents thereat), should be
represented in the management of the decedents estate. 19
Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that "inasmuch as
petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory
heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to
the probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests." 20
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v. Ventura 21 where
we allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the
decedent as co-administrators. However, we drew a distinction between the heirs
categorized as next of kin, the nearest of kin in the category being preferred, thus:

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana
Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel
Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the
statute of distribution to the decedents property (citations omitted). It is generally said
that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in
the choice of administrator. Among members of a class the strongest ground for
preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the
nearest of kin is to be preferred." (citations omitted)
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late
Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are
entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria
and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of
Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the
surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana
Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to
represent both interests.22 (Emphasis supplied)
In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we maintained that the order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In
that case, we affirmed the legitimate childs appointment as special administrator, and
eventually as regular administrator, of the decedents estate as against the surviving
spouse who the lower court found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia24 as good law,
we pointed out that unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in
adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running theme of heirs squabbling
over the estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set aside the probate courts
refusal to appoint as special co-administrator Diaz, even if he had a demonstrable
interest in the estate of the decedent and represented one of the factions of heirs,
because the evidence weighed by the probate court pointed to Diazs being remiss in his
previous duty as co-administrator of the estatein the early part of his administration.
Surveying the previously discussed cases of Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we
clarified, thus:
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, Corona v. Court of
Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their
claim, these cases do not establish an absolute right demandable from the probate court
to appoint special co-administrators who would represent the respective interests of
squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the probate
court to designate not just one but also two or more special co-administrators for a single
estate. Now whether the probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are
fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound discretion.
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon factual
circumstances other than the incompatible interests of the heirs which are glaringly
absent from the instant case. In Matias this Court ordered the appointment of a special
co-administrator because of the applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix
designated in the will, which we considered to be a "special interest" deserving protection
during the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since the lower court in Matias had
already deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator, we found grave

abuse of discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive
status in the selection of another special administrator.
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special
Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion
given her by the testatrix in her will," for this Court to compel her appointment as special
co-administrator. It is also manifest from the decision in Corona that the presence of
conflicting interests among the heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the
designation of a second special administrator as this fact was taken into account only to
disregard or, in the words of Corona, to "overshadow" the objections to the appointment
on grounds of "impracticality and lack of kinship."
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the decedent as
special co-administrator because it was "our considered opinion that inasmuch as
petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory
heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to
the probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests." The special status of a
surviving spouse in the special administration of an estate was also emphasized in Fule
v. Court of Appeals where we held that the widow would have more interest than any
other next of kin in the proper administration of the entire estate since she possesses not
only the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent but
also a share in the conjugal partnership for which the good or bad administration of the
estate may affect not just the fruits but more critically the naked ownership thereof. And
in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals we recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse
applying as regular administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when we counseled
the probate court that "there must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the
widow from the administration."
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit
was based upon the independent proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the
appointee that were not necessarily related to the demand for representation being
repeatedly urged by respondents.26(Emphasis supplied)
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory character of the
rule on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration:
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the
issuance of letters of administration, it categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the
next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an
administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously
set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason
therefor.27
Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we expounded on the legal
contemplation of a "next of kin," thus:
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate
of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent.
When the law speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under
the statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that
he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving,
therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or

an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the
issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this
consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and passed upon
the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles. 29
Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size of, and benefits
to, the estate should respondent therein be appointed as co-administrator. We
emphasized that where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing
one to settle, the appointment of co-administrators may be sanctioned by law.
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in
the estate and glossed over the order of preference set forth in the Rules. We gave
weight to Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in Cristinas estate and without a closer
scrutiny of the attendant facts and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We
are led to a review of such position by the foregoing survey of cases.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled
does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does
squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the
order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned
with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. 31 Given
Isabels unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedents legitimate
grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as coadministrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely
to the sound discretion of the Court32 and depends on the facts and the attendant
circumstances of the case.33
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this case even
as we reiterate Isabels and her siblings apparent greater interest in the estate of
Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped
out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of
one over the other.

Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in
the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that
Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent
Isabel points out that after Emilio IIIs appointment as administrator of the subject estate
in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted
to the damage and prejudice thereof as evidenced by the following:
1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete
inventory, omitted in the partial inventories34 he filed therewith properties of the
estate35 including several parcels of land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares
of stock, motor vehicles, and other personal properties, contrary to Section
1,36paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federicos settlement
of the decedents estate which adjudicated to himself a number of properties
properly belonging to said estate (whether wholly or partially), and which
contained a declaration that the decedent did not leave any descendants or
heirs, except for Federico, entitled to succeed to her estate. 37
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to respond to the
following imputations of Isabel that:
1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002;
2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of the decedent;
3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to different individuals
or persons; several properties to Federico Suntay himself; and
4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of falsified
documents;38
Emilio III refutes Isabels imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming and
performing the functions of administrator of Cristinas estate:

1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the

one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time their paternal
grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as adverse interest of
some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately interested in
the estate;

1. From the time of the RTCs Order appointing Emilio III as administrator,
Isabel, in her pleadings before the RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio IIIs
assumption of that office, arguing that "the decision of the RTC dated 9
November 2001 is not among the judgments authorized by the Rules of Court
which may be immediately implemented or executed;"

2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working
harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the decedents
estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and

2. The delay in Emilio IIIs filing of an inventory was due to Isabels vociferous
objections to Emilio IIIs attempts to act as administrator while the RTC decision
was under appeal to the Court of Appeals;

3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristinas
estate, has not looked after the estates welfare and has acted to the damage
and prejudice thereof.

3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the nature

thereof, and one of the first steps in the lengthy process of settlement of a
decedents estate, such that it cannot constitute a complete and total listing of
the decedents properties; and

4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where Isabel, as

private complainant, has been unwilling to appear and testify, leading the Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to
warn the prosecutor of a possible motu propio dismissal of the cases.
While we can subscribe to Emilio IIIs counsels explanation for the blamed delay in the
filing of an inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof, partial as opposed to
complete, in the course of the settlement of a decedents estate, we do not find any
clarification on Isabels accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in
the inventory, which properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be
knowledgeable about.
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator
rooted in his failure to "make and return x x x a true and complete inventory" which
became proven fact when he actually filed partial inventories before the probate court
and by his inaction on two occasions of Federicos exclusion of Cristinas other
compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an oath to
faithfully discharge the duties of settling the decedents estate with the end in view of
distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of
Emilio IIIs omission and inaction become even more significant and speak volume of his
unsuitability as administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately
interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted
litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep
aversion for each other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay,
improbable, for the two to work as co-administrators of their grandmothers estate. The
allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico
and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged from their grandparents further
drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, it
appears detrimental to the decedents estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III)
who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those, such as herein
respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate.

6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons
interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or
encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and
7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for
an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all
obligations are either satisfied or provided for.44
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy found in Section 2,
Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. If an executor or
administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or to
perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or
absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an
executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone
to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be
granted to any suitable person.
Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint: we uphold
that the question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article
992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is
better qualified to administer the estate of the decedent.
Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making
a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the
estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the
properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good law:

Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a preliminary order
to facilitate the settlement of a decedents estate, we here point out that Emilio III is not
without remedies to protect his interests in the estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court
of Appeals,39 we mapped out as among the allowable participation of "any interested
persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" in either testate or intestate
proceedings:

The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence
sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been
judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of
the estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition:

xxxx
4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the
deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of
any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or interest therein;"

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a controversy

before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination
and allowance of the Administrators account "to persons interested;"

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum

to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time
as the court directs.45

of the Court and the motion shall be acted upon by him or her with the participation of the
other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs.

Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental Comment46 of Emilio

III questioning the Special Second Division which issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution.
Emilio III asseverates that "the operation of the Special Second Division in Baguio is
unconstitutional and void" as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its
Decision on 16 June 2010 on the petition filed by him:

If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be acted upon by the ponente on record
with the participation of the other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs at
the time said pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis
supplied)

7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio, acting separately
from the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila? There will then be two Second
Divisions of the Supreme Court: one acting with the Supreme Court in Manila, and
another Special Second Division acting independently of the Second Division of the
Supreme Court in Manila.47

As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change in venue for the
Supreme Court's summer session held last April.48

For Emilio IIIs counsels edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio is not a
different division created by the Supreme Court.
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16 June 2010,
penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a different composition, with
the advent of Justice Nachuras retirement on 13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides:
Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or signed
resolutions and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special
Division. Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed
resolution and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be
acted upon by the ponente and the other Members of the Division who participated in the
rendition of the decision or signed resolution.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our Decision

in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of Administration over the
estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to settle the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

OCAMPO vs. OCAMPO

G.R. No. 187879
July 5, 2010
NACHURA, J.:

If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has
inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification,
he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a new ponente who shall be chosen among
the new Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or
signed resolution and who concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court who
participated and concurred in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution remains,
he or she shall be designated as the new ponente.

Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo (Vince), Melinda Carla E.

Ocampo (Melinda), and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.) are the surviving wife
and the children of Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), who died on January 23, 2004.
Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato M. Ocampo (Renato) and Erlinda M.
Ocampo (Erlinda) are the legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and
Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate on December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996,
respectively. Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in Bian, Laguna.
Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts.

If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision or signed
resolution has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited
himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she
shall be replaced through raffle by a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the
other Divisions until a new Justice is appointed as replacement for the retired Justice.
Upon the appointment of a new Justice, he or she shall replace the designated Justice as
replacement Member of the Special Division.

On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a
petition for intestate proceedings, entitled In Re: Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of
Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo M. Ocampo, in the
RTC, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. B-3089.[5] The petition
alleged that, upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and their brother
Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and administered the estate of their parents.
Under such circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share consisting of one-third
(1/3) of the total income generated from the properties of the estate. However, when
Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and management of the properties
to the exclusion of petitioners. The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of
Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for the appointment
of an administrator to apportion, divide, and award the two estates among the lawful
heirs of the decedents.

Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle from among the
other Members of the Court to constitute a Special Division of five (5) Members.
If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the Decision or signed
Resolution are no longer Members of the Court, the case shall be raffled to any Member

Respondents filed their Opposition and Counter-Petition dated October 7, 2004,[6]

contending that the petition was defective as it sought the judicial settlement of two
estates in a single proceeding. They argued that the settlement of the estate of Leonardo
was premature, the same being dependent only upon the determination of his hereditary
rights in the settlement of his parents estate. In their counter-petition, respondents
prayed that they be appointed as special joint administrators of the estate of Vicente and
Maxima.
In an Order dated March 4, 2005,[7] the RTC denied respondents opposition to the
settlement proceedings but admitted their counter-petition. The trial court also clarified
that the judicial settlement referred only to the properties of Vicente and Maxima.

Through a Motion for Appointment of Joint Special Administrators dated October 11,
2005,[8] respondents reiterated their prayer for appointment as special joint
administrators of the estate, and to serve as such without posting a bond.
In their Comment dated November 3, 2005,[9] petitioners argued that, since April 2002,
they had been deprived of their fair share of the income of the estate, and that the
appointment of respondents as special joint administrators would further cause injustice
to them. Thus, they prayed that, in order to avoid further delay, letters of administration to
serve as joint administrators of the subject estate be issued to respondents and Dalisay.
In another Motion for Appointment of a Special Administrator dated December 5,
2005,[10] petitioners nominated the Bian Rural Bank to serve as special administrator
pending resolution of the motion for the issuance of the letters of administration.
In its June 15, 2006 Order,[11] the RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint
administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses, and required them to post a bond
of P200,000.00 each.[12]
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated August 1, 2006[13] of the Order,
insisting that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to be appointed as administrator of the
estate, considering that she even failed to take care of her husband Leonardo when he
was paralyzed in 1997. They also contended that petitioners prayer for Dalisays
appointment as special administrator was already deemed abandoned upon their
nomination of the Bian Rural Bank to act as special administrator of the estate.
In their Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration,[14] respondents asserted their
priority in right to be appointed as administrators being the next of kin of Vicente and
Maxima, whereas Dalisay was a mere daughter-in-law of the decedents and not even a
legal heir by right of representation from her late husband Leonardo.
Pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed a Motion to
Submit Inventory and Accounting dated November 20, 2006,[15] praying that the RTC
issue an order directing respondents to submit a true inventory of the estate of the
decedent spouses and to render an accounting thereof from the time they took over the
collection of the income of the estate.
Respondents filed their Comment and Manifestation dated January 15, 2007,[16]
claiming that they could not yet be compelled to submit an inventory and render an
accounting of the income and assets of the estate inasmuch as there was still a pending
motion for reconsideration of the June 15, 2006 Order appointing Dalisay as co-special
administratrix with Renato.

In its Order dated February 16, 2007, the RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay as cospecial administratrix, substituting her with Erlinda. The RTC took into consideration the
fact that respondents were the nearest of kin of Vicente and Maxima. Petitioners did not
contest this Order and even manifested in open court their desire for the speedy
settlement of the estate.
On April 23, 2007, or two (2) months after respondents appointment as joint special
administrators, petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to Render Account of the
Estate,[17] reiterating their stance that respondents, as joint special administrators,
should be directed to submit a true inventory of the income and assets of the estate.
Respondents then filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond[18] on May
22, 2007, praying that they be allowed to enter their duties as special administrators
without the need to file an administrators bond due to their difficulty in raising the
necessary amount. They alleged that, since petitioners manifested in open court that
they no longer object to the appointment of respondents as special co-administrators, it
would be to the best interest of all the heirs that the estate be spared from incurring
unnecessary expenses in paying for the bond premiums. They also assured the RTC that
they would faithfully exercise their duties as special administrators under pain of
contempt should they violate any undertaking in the performance of the trust of their
office.
In an Order dated June 29, 2007,[19] the RTC directed the parties to submit their
respective comments or oppositions to the pending incidents, i.e., petitioners Motion for
Inventory and to Render Account, and respondents Motion for Exemption to File
Administrators Bond.
Respondents filed their Comment and/or Opposition,[20] stating that they have already
filed a comment on petitioners Motion for Inventory and to Render Account. They
asserted that the RTC should, in the meantime, hold in abeyance the resolution of this
Motion, pending the resolution of their Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond.
On October 15, 2007, or eight (8) months after the February 16, 2007 Order appointing
respondents as special joint administrators, petitioners filed a Motion to Terminate or
Revoke the Special Administration and to Proceed to Judicial Partition or Appointment of
Regular Administrator.[21] Petitioners contended that the special administration was not
necessary as the estate is neither vast nor complex, the properties of the estate being
identified and undisputed, and not involved in any litigation necessitating the
representation of special administrators. Petitioners, likewise, contended that
respondents had been resorting to the mode of special administration merely to delay
and prolong their deprivation of what was due them. Petitioners cited an alleged
fraudulent sale by respondents of a real property for P2,700,000.00, which the latter
represented to petitioners to have been sold only for P1,500,000.00, and respondents
alleged misrepresentation that petitioners owed the estate for the advances to cover the
hospital expenses of Leonardo, but, in fact, were not yet paid.
Respondents filed their Opposition and Comment[22] on March 10, 2008, to which, in
turn, petitioners filed their Reply to Opposition/Comment[23] on March 17, 2008.
In its Order dated March 13, 2008,[24] the RTC granted petitioners Motion, revoking and
terminating the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators, on
account of their failure to comply with its Order, particularly the posting of the required
bond, and to enter their duties and responsibilities as special administrators, i.e., the
submission of an inventory of the properties and of an income statement of the estate.

The RTC also appointed Melinda as regular administratrix, subject to the posting of a
bond in the amount of P200,000.00, and directed her to submit an inventory of the
properties and an income statement of the subject estate. The RTC likewise found that
judicial partition may proceed after Melinda had assumed her duties and responsibilities
as regular administratrix.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari[25] under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court before the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in (a)
declaring them to have failed to enter the office of special administration despite lapse of
reasonable time, when in truth they had not entered the office because they were waiting
for the resolution of their motion for exemption from bond; (b) appointing Melinda as
regular administratrix, a mere granddaughter of Vicente and Maxima, instead of them
who, being the surviving children of the deceased spouses, were the next of kin; and (c)
declaring them to have been unsuitable for the trust, despite lack of hearing and
evidence against them.
Petitioners filed their Comment to the Petition and Opposition to Application for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction,[26] reiterating their
arguments in their Motion for the revocation of respondents appointment as joint special
administrators. Respondents filed their Reply.[27]
On December 16, 2008, the CA rendered its assailed Decision granting the petition
based on the finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents
appointment as joint special administrators without first ruling on their motion for
exemption from bond, and for appointing Melinda as regular administratrix without
conducting a formal hearing to determine her competency to assume as such. According
to the CA, the posting of the bond is a prerequisite before respondents could enter their
duties and responsibilities as joint special administrators, particularly their submission of
an inventory of the properties of the estate and an income statement thereon.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision.[28] The CA, however,
denied it. Hence, this petition, ascribing to the CA errors of law and grave abuse of
discretion for annulling and setting aside the RTC Order dated March 13, 2008.
Our Ruling
The pertinent provisions relative to the special administration of the decedents estate
under the Rules of Court provide
Sec. 1. Appointment of special administrator. When there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession
and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are
decided and executors or administrators appointed.[29]
Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. Such special administrator shall take
possession and charge of goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and
preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that
purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such
perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not
be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.[30]
Sec. 1. Bond to be given before issuance of letters; Amount; Conditions. Before an
executor or administrator enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary

or of administration issue, he shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs,
conditioned as follows:
(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and complete
inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall
come to his possession or knowledge or to the possession of any other person for him;
(b) To administer according to these rules, and, if an executor, according to the will of the
testator, all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate which shall at any time come to his
possession or to the possession of any other person for him, and from the proceeds to
pay and discharge all debts, legacies, and charges on the same, or such dividends
thereon as shall be decreed by the court;
(c) To render a true and just account of his administration to the court within one (1) year,
and at any other time when required by the court;
(d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.[31]
Sec. 4. Bond of special administrator. A special administrator before entering upon the
duties of his trust shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned that he
will make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of
the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge, and that he will truly account
for such as are received by him when required by the court, and will deliver the same to
the person appointed executor or administrator, or to such other person as may be
authorized to receive them.[32]

Inasmuch as there was a disagreement as to who should be appointed as administrator

of the estate of Vicente and Maxima, the RTC, acting as a probate court, deemed it wise
to appoint joint special administrators pending the determination of the person or persons
to whom letters of administration may be issued. The RTC was justified in doing so
considering that such disagreement caused undue delay in the issuance of letters of
administration, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. Initially, the RTC,
on June 15, 2006, appointed Renato and Dalisay as joint special administrators,
imposing upon each of them the obligation to post an administrators bond of
P200,000.00. However, taking into account the arguments of respondents that Dalisay
was incompetent and unfit to assume the office of a special administratrix and that
Dalisay, in effect, waived her appointment when petitioners nominated Bian Rural Bank
as special administrator, the RTC, on February 16, 2007, revoked Dalisays appointment
and substituted her with Erlinda.
A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and
control, expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its
smooth administration and speedy settlement.[33] When appointed, he or she is not
regarded as an agent or representative of the parties suggesting the appointment.[34]
The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the
estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the
benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.[35]
While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased
parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory
requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of
special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of
regular administrators.[36] The probate court may appoint or remove special
administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its

discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or
unfitness[37] and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule
78,[38] as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long
as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity,
justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted.[39] The
appointment or removal
of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[40]

Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it
compels the administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in,
and discharge the obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to
safeguard the properties of the decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be
considered as part of the necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not being
included among the acts constituting the care, management, and settlement of the
estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the
office of administration.[41]

Granting the certiorari petition, the CA found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
revoking respondents appointment as joint special administrators, and for failing to first
resolve the pending Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond, ratiocinating that
the posting of the administrators bond is a pre-requisite to respondents entering into the
duties and responsibilities of their designated office. This Court disagrees.

Hence, the RTC revoked respondents designation as joint special administrators,

especially considering that respondents never denied that they have been in possession,
charge, and actual administration of the estate of Vicente and Maxima since 2002 up to
the present, despite the assumption of Melinda as regular administratrix. In fact,
respondents also admitted that, allegedly out of good faith and sincerity to observe
transparency, they had submitted a Statement of Cash Distribution[42] for the period
covering April 2002 to June 2006,[43] where they indicated that Renato had received
P4,241,676.00, Erlinda P4,164,526.96, and petitioners P2,486,656.60, and that the
estate had advanced P2,700,000.00 for the hospital and funeral expenses of
Leonardo.[44] The latter cash advance was questioned by petitioners in their motion for
revocation of special administration on account of the demand letter[45] dated June 20,
2007 of Asian Hospital and Medical Center addressed to Dalisay, stating that there still
remained unpaid hospital bills in the amount of P2,087,380.49 since January 2004.
Undeniably, respondents had already been distributing the incomes or fruits generated
from the properties of the decedents estate, yet they still failed to post their respective
administrators bonds despite collection of the advances from their supposed shares. This
state of affairs continued even after a considerable lapse of time from the appointment of
Renato as a special administrator of the estate on June 15, 2006 and from February 16,
2007 when the RTC substituted Erlinda, for Dalisay, as special administratrix.

It is worthy of mention that, as early as October 11, 2005, in their Motion for Appointment
as Joint Special Administrators, respondents already prayed for their exemption to post
bond should they be assigned as joint special administrators. However, the RTC
effectively denied this prayer when it issued its June 15, 2006 Order, designating Renato
and Dalisay as special administrators and enjoining them to post bond in the amount of
P200,000.00 each. This denial was, in effect, reiterated when the RTC rendered its
February 16, 2007 Order substituting Dalisay with Erlinda as special administratrix.
Undeterred by the RTCs resolve to require them to post their respective administrators
bonds, respondents filed anew a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond on
May 22, 2007, positing that it would be to the best interest of the estate of their deceased
parents and all the heirs to spare the estate from incurring the unnecessary expense of
paying for their bond premiums since they could not raise the money themselves. To
note, this Motion was filed only after petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to
Render Account of the Estate on April 23, 2007. Respondents then argued that they
could not enter into their duties and responsibilities as special administrators in light of
the pendency of their motion for exemption. In other words, they could not yet submit an
inventory and render an account of the income of the estate since they had not yet
posted their bonds.
Consequently, the RTC revoked respondents appointment as special administrators for
failing to post their administrators bond and to submit an inventory and accounting as
required of them, tantamount to failing to comply with its lawful orders. Inarguably, this
was, again, a denial of respondents plea to assume their office sans a bond. The RTC
rightly did so.
Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties and
obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay the debts; (2)
to perform all judicial orders; (3) to account within one (1) year and at any other time
when required by the probate court; and (4) to make an inventory within three (3)
months. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is conditioned on the
faithful execution of the administration of the decedents estate requiring the special
administrator to (1) make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights,
credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly
account for such as received by him when required by the court; and (3) deliver the same
to the person appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other person as
may be authorized to receive them.

What is more, respondents insincerity in administering the estate was betrayed by the
Deed of Conditional Sale dated January 12, 2004[46] discovered by petitioners. This
Deed was executed between respondents, as the only heirs of Maxima, as vendors, thus
excluding the representing heirs of Leonardo, and Spouses Marcus Jose B. Brillantes
and Amelita Catalan-Brillantes, incumbent lessors, as vendees, over a real property
situated in Bian, Laguna, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-332305 of the
Registry of Deeds of Laguna, for a total purchase price of P2,700,000.00. The Deed
stipulated for a payment of P1,500,000.00 upon the signing of the contract, and the
balance of P1,200,000.00 to be paid within one (1) month from the receipt of title of the
vendees. The contract also stated that the previous contract of lease between the
vendors and the vendees shall no longer be effective; hence, the vendees were no
longer obligated to pay the monthly rentals on the property. And yet there is a purported
Deed of Absolute Sale[47] over the same realty between respondents, and including
Leonardo as represented by Dalisay, as vendors, and the same spouses, as vendees,
for a purchase price of only P1,500,000.00. Notably, this Deed of Absolute Sale already
had the signatures of respondents and vendee-spouses. Petitioners claimed that
respondents were coaxing Dalisay into signing the same, while respondents said that
Dalisay already got a share from this transaction in the amount of P500,000.00. It may
also be observed that the time of the execution of this Deed of Absolute Sale, although
not notarized as the Deed of Conditional Sale, might not have been distant from the
execution of the latter Deed, considering the similar Community Tax Certificate Numbers
of the parties appearing in both contracts.
Given these circumstances, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC when it revoked the appointment of respondents as joint special administrators,

the removal being grounded on reason, equity, justice, and legal principle. Indeed, even
if special administrators had already been appointed, once the probate court finds the
appointees no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the
appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.[48]
On the other hand, the Court finds the RTCs designation of Melinda as regular
administratrix improper and abusive of its discretion.
In the determination of the person to be appointed as regular administrator, the following
provisions of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, state
Sec. 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. No person is
competent to serve as executor or administrator who:
(a)

Is a minor;

(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of
drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of
conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
xxxx
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in
the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.

Further, on the matter of contest for the issuance of letters of administration, the following
provisions of Rule 79 are pertinent
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to
the petitioner:
(a)

The jurisdictional facts;

(b)
The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent;

(c)
(d)

The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
Sec. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for letters of
administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place
for hearing the petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and
creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons believed to have an interest in the
estate, in the manner provided in Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration. Any interested person may, by filing a
written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of the incompetency of the person
for whom letters are prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestants own right to the
administration, and may pray that letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or
persons named in the opposition.
Sec. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the hearing of the petition, it must first be
shown that notice has been given as herein-above required, and thereafter the court
shall hear the proofs of the parties in support of their respective allegations, and if
satisfied that the decedent left no will, or that there is no competent and willing executor,
it shall order the issuance of letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto.

Admittedly, there was no petition for letters of administration with respect to Melinda, as
the prayer for her appointment as co-administrator was embodied in the motion for the
termination of the special administration. Although there was a hearing set for the motion
on November 5, 2007, the same was canceled and reset to February 8, 2008 due to the
absence of the parties counsels. The February 8, 2008 hearing was again deferred to
March 10, 2008 on account of the ongoing renovation of the Hall of Justice. Despite the
resetting, petitioners filed a Manifestation/Motion dated February 29, 2008,[49] reiterating
their prayer for partition or for the appointment of Melinda as regular administrator and for
the revocation of the special administration. It may be mentioned that, despite the filing
by respondents of their Opposition and Comment to the motion to revoke the special
administration, the prayer for the appointment of Melinda as regular administratrix of the
estate was not specifically traversed in the said pleading. Thus, the capacity,
competency, and legality of Melindas appointment as such was not properly objected to
by respondents despite being the next of kin to the decedent spouses, and was not
threshed out by the RTC acting as a probate court in accordance with the above
mentioned Rules.
However, having in mind the objective of facilitating the settlement of the estate of
Vicente and Maxima, with a view to putting an end to the squabbles of the heirs, we take
into account the fact that Melinda, pursuant to the RTC Order dated March 13, 2008,
already posted the required bond of P200,000.00 on March 26, 2008, by virtue of which,
Letters of Administration were issued to her the following day, and that she filed an
Inventory of the Properties of the Estate dated April 15, 2008.[50] These acts clearly
manifested her intention to serve willingly as administratrix of the decedents estate, but
her appointment should be converted into one of special administration, pending the
proceedings for regular administration. Furthermore, since it appears that the only unpaid
obligation is the hospital bill due from Leonardos estate, which is not subject of this case,
judicial partition may then proceed with dispatch.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

It is elementary that courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant x x x only
when the latter voluntarily appeared or submitted to the court or by coercive process
issued by the court to him, x x x. In this case, it is undisputed that when [petitioner]
Boston filed the complaint on December 24, 1997, defendant Manuel S. Toledo was
already dead, x x x. Such being the case, the court a quo could not have acquired
jurisdiction over the person of defendant Manuel S. Toledo.

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 173946 June 19, 2013
PEREZ, J.:
On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita
Toledo.6 Herein respondent filed an Answer dated 19 March 1998 but on 7 May 1998,
she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer7 in which she alleged, among
others, that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead.8
The death certificate9 of Manuel states "13 July 1995" as the date of death. As a result,
petitioner filed a motion, dated 5 August 1999, to require respondent to disclose the heirs
of Manuel.10 In compliance with the verbal order of the court during the 11 October 1999
hearing of the case, respondent submitted the required names and addresses of the
heirs.11 Petitioner then filed a Motion for Substitution,12 dated 18 January 2000, praying
that Manuel be substituted by his children as party-defendants. It appears that this
motion was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 9 October 2000.13

Pre-trial thereafter ensued and on 18 July 2001, the trial court issued its pre-trial order
containing, among others, the dates of hearing of the case.14
The trial of the case then proceeded. Herein petitioner, as plaintiff, presented its
evidence and its exhibits were thereafter admitted.
On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent was cancelled upon
agreement of the parties. On 24 September 2004, counsel for herein respondent was
given a period of fifteen days within which to file a demurrer to evidence.15 However, on
7 October 2004, respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the
following as grounds: (1) that the complaint failed to implead an indispensable party or a
real party in interest; hence, the case must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action; (2) that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court; (3) that the trial court erred
in ordering the substitution of the deceased Manuel by his heirs; and (4) that the court
must also dismiss the case against Lolita Toledo in accordance with Section 6, Rule 86
of the Rules of Court.16

x x x the court a quos denial of [respondents] motion to dismiss was based on its finding
that [respondents] attack on the jurisdiction of the court was already barred by laches as
[respondent] failed to raise the said ground in its [sic] amended answer and during the
pre-trial, despite her active participation in the proceedings.
However, x x x it is well-settled that issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceeding, even for the first time on appeal. By timely raising the issue on
jurisdiction in her motion to dismiss x x x [respondent] is not estopped [from] raising the
question on jurisdiction. Moreover, when issue on jurisdiction was raised by [respondent],
the court a quo had not yet decided the case, hence, there is no basis for the court a quo
to
invoke
estoppel
to
justify
its
denial
of
the
motion
for
reconsideration;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It should be stressed that when the complaint was filed, defendant Manuel S. Toledo was
already dead. The complaint should have impleaded the estate of Manuel S. Toledo as
defendant, not only the wife, considering that the estate of Manuel S. Toledo is an
indispensable party, which stands to be benefited or be injured in the outcome of the
case. x x x
xxxx
[Respondents] motion to dismiss the complaint should have been granted by public
respondent judge as the same was in order. Considering that the obligation of Manuel S.
Toledo is solidary with another debtor, x x x, the claim x x x should be filed against the
estate of Manuel S. Toledo, in conformity with the provision of Section 6, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, x x x.20
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
The Issues

The trial court, in an Order dated 8 November 2004, denied the motion to dismiss for
having been filed out of time, citing Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court which
states that: "[W]ithin the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made x x x."17 Respondents motion for
reconsideration of the order of denial was likewise denied on the ground that
"defendants attack on the jurisdiction of this Court is now barred by estoppel by laches"
since respondent failed to raise the issue despite several chances to do so.18
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that
the trial court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in denying her motion to
dismiss despite discovery, during the trial of the case, of evidence that would constitute a
ground for dismissal of the case.19
The Court of Appeals granted
grounds:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

the

petition

based

on

the

following

Petitioner claims that

that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

the

Court

Respondent
is
already
estopped
jurisdiction;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

of
from

Appeals

erred

questioning

in

not

holding

the

trial

courts

Petitioner never failed to implead an indispensable party as the estate of Manuel is not
an indispensable party;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is a mere misjoinder of party not warranting
the dismissal of the case before the lower court; and

Since the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party, it is not necessary that
petitioner file its claim against the estate of Manuel.
In essence, what is at issue here is the correctness of the trial courts orders denying
respondents motion to dismiss.
The Ruling of the Court

As can be gleaned from the records, with the admission of plaintiffs exhibits, reception of
defendants evidence was set on March 31, and April 23, 2004 x x x . On motion of the
defendant[s], the hearing on March 31, 2004 was cancelled.
On April 14, 2004, defendants sought the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and
duces tecum to one Gina M. Madulid, to appear and testify for the defendants on April
23, 2004. Reception of defendants evidence was again deferred to May 26, June 2 and
June 30, 2004, x x x.

We find merit in the petition.

Motion to dismiss filed out of time
To begin with, the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari in favor of
respondent. Well settled is the rule that the special civil action for certiorari is not the
proper remedy to assail the denial by the trial court of a motion to dismiss. The order of
the trial court denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory, as it neither terminates
nor finally disposes of a case and still leaves something to be done by the court before a
case is finally decided on the merits.21 Therefore, "the proper remedy in such a case is
to appeal after a decision has been rendered."22
As the Supreme Court held in Indiana Aerospace University v. Comm. on Higher
Education:23
A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is
resorted only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court within
its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts acts which courts or judges
have no power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous
findings and conclusions made by the courts. (Emphasis supplied)
Even assuming that certiorari is the proper remedy, the trial court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying respondents motion to dismiss. It, in fact, acted correctly
when it issued the questioned orders as respondents motion to dismiss was filed SIX
YEARS AND FIVE MONTHS AFTER SHE FILED HER AMENDED ANSWER. This
circumstance alone already warranted the outright dismissal of the motion for having
been filed in clear contravention of the express mandate of Section 1, Rule 16, of the
Revised Rules of Court. Under this provision, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the
time for but before the filing of an answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim.24
More importantly, respondents motion to dismiss was filed after petitioner has completed
the presentation of its evidence in the trial court,25 giving credence to petitioners and the
trial courts conclusion that the filing of the motion to dismiss was a mere ploy on the part
of respondent to delay the prompt resolution of the case against her.
Also worth mentioning is the fact that respondents motion to dismiss under consideration
herein is not the first motion to dismiss she filed in the trial court. It appears that she had
filed an earlier motion to dismiss26 on the sole ground of the unenforceability of
petitioners claim under the Statute of Frauds, which motion was denied by the trial court.
More telling is the following narration of the trial court in its Order denying respondents
motion for reconsideration of the denial of her motion to dismiss:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

On May 13, 2004, defendants sought again the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
and ad testificandum to the said Gina Madulid. On May 26, 2004, reception of
defendants [sic] evidence was cancelled upon the agreement of the parties. On July 28,
2004, in the absence of defendants witness, hearing was reset to September 24 and
October 8, 2004 x x x.
On September 24, 2004, counsel for defendants was given a period of fifteen (15) days
to file a demurrer to evidence. On October 7, 2004, defendants filed instead a Motion to
Dismiss x x x.27nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
Respondents act of filing multiple motions, such as the first and earlier motion to dismiss
and then the motion to dismiss at issue here, as well as several motions for
postponement, lends credibility to the position taken by petitioner, which is shared by the
trial court, that respondent is deliberately impeding the early disposition of this case. The
filing of the second motion to dismiss was, therefore, "not only improper but also
dilatory."28 Thus, the trial court, "far from deviating or straying off course from
established jurisprudence on [the] matter, x x x had in fact faithfully observed the law and
legal precedents in this case."29 The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred not only in
entertaining respondents petition for certiorari, it likewise erred in ruling that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied respondents motion to
dismiss.
On whether or not respondent is estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court
At the outset, it must be here stated that, as the succeeding discussions will
demonstrate, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel should not be an issue in this case.
A protracted discourse on jurisdiction is, nevertheless, demanded by the fact that
jurisdiction has been raised as an issue from the lower court, to the Court of Appeals
and, finally, before this Court. For the sake of clarity, and in order to finally settle the
controversy and fully dispose of all the issues in this case, it was deemed imperative to
resolve the issue of jurisdiction.
1. Aspects of Jurisdiction
Petitioner calls attention to the fact that respondents motion to dismiss questioning the
trial courts jurisdiction was filed more than six years after her amended answer was filed.
According to petitioner, respondent had several opportunities, at various stages of the
proceedings, to assail the trial courts jurisdiction but never did so for six straight years.
Citing the doctrine laid down in the case of Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al.30
petitioner claimed that respondents failure to raise the question of jurisdiction at an
earlier stage bars her from later questioning it, especially since she actively participated
in the proceedings conducted by the trial court.

Petitioners argument is misplaced, in that, it failed to consider that the concept of

jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2)
jurisdiction over the parties; (3) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (4) in cases
involving property, jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the
litigation.31
The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of
estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, in Tijam, the case relied
upon by petitioner, the issue involved was the authority of the then Court of First Instance
to hear a case for the collection of a sum of money in the amount of P1,908.00 which
amount was, at that time, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal courts.
In subsequent cases citing the ruling of the Court in Tijam, what was likewise at issue
was the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter of the case. Accordingly, in
Spouses Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,32 the issue for consideration was the authority of
the regional trial court to hear and decide an action for reformation of contract and
damages involving a subdivision lot, it being argued therein that jurisdiction is vested in
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree). In Lee v. Presiding Judge, MTC, Legaspi
City,33 petitioners argued that the respondent municipal trial court had no jurisdiction
over the complaint for ejectment because the issue of ownership was raised in the
pleadings. Finally, in People v. Casuga,34 accused-appellant claimed that the crime of
grave slander, of which she was charged, falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of
municipal courts or city courts and the then courts of first instance, and that the judgment
of the court of first instance, to which she had appealed the municipal court's conviction,
should be deemed null and void for want of jurisdiction as her appeal should have been
filed with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
In all of these cases, the Supreme Court barred the attack on the jurisdiction of the
respective courts concerned over the subject matter of the case based on estoppel by
laches, declaring that parties cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent
posture by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted their cause
voluntarily.35
Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court
was that courts jurisdiction over the person of defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of
estoppel by laches finds no application in this case. Instead, the principles relating to
jurisdiction over the person of the parties are pertinent herein.
The Rules of Court provide:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
RULE 9
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
RULE 15
MOTIONS

Sec. 8. Omnibus motion. Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion

attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then
available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
Based on the foregoing provisions, the "objection on jurisdictional grounds which is not
waived even if not alleged in a motion to dismiss or the answer is lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. x x x Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can always be raised
anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since jurisdictional issues cannot be waived x x
x subject, however, to the principle of estoppel by laches."36
Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of
those defenses which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense
must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a
waiver of the defense.37 If the objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the
defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above-quoted Section 1
of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.38
The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred when it made a sweeping pronouncement in its
questioned decision, stating that "issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding, even for the first time on appeal" and that, therefore, respondent timely
raised the issue in her motion to dismiss and is, consequently, not estopped from raising
the question of jurisdiction. As the question of jurisdiction involved here is that over the
person of the defendant Manuel, the same is deemed waived if not raised in the answer
or a motion to dismiss. In any case, respondent cannot claim the defense since "lack of
jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can
only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence."39
Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid service of
summons; trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo
In the first place, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was never acquired by the trial
court. A defendant is informed of a case against him when he receives summons.
"Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him.
Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person."40
In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel
since there was no valid service of summons upon him, precisely because he was
already dead even before the complaint against him and his wife was filed in the trial
court. The issues presented in this case are similar to those in the case of Sarsaba v.
Vda. de Te.41
In Sarsaba, the NLRC rendered a decision declaring that Patricio Sereno was illegally
dismissed from employment and ordering the payment of his monetary claims. To satisfy
the claim, a truck in the possession of Serenos employer was levied upon by a sheriff of
the NLRC, accompanied by Sereno and his lawyer, Rogelio Sarsaba, the petitioner in
that case. A complaint for recovery of motor vehicle and damages, with prayer for the
delivery of the truck pendente lite was eventually filed against Sarsaba, Sereno, the
NLRC sheriff and the NLRC by the registered owner of the truck. After his motion to
dismiss was denied by the trial court, petitioner Sarsaba filed his answer. Later on,
however, he filed an omnibus motion to dismiss citing, as one of the grounds, lack of
jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants, in view of the fact that Sereno was
already dead when the complaint for recovery of possession was filed.

Although the factual milieu of the present case is not exactly similar to that of Sarsaba,
one of the issues submitted for resolution in both cases is similar: whether or not a case,
where one of the named defendants was already dead at the time of its filing, should be
dismissed so that the claim may be pursued instead in the proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased defendant. The petitioner in the Sarsaba Case claimed, as
did respondent herein, that since one of the defendants died before summons was
served on him, the trial court should have dismissed the complaint against all the
defendants and the claim should be filed against the estate of the deceased defendant.
The petitioner in Sarsaba, therefore, prayed that the complaint be dismissed, not only
against Sereno, but as to all the defendants, considering that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Sereno.42 This is exactly the same prayer made by
respondent herein in her motion to dismiss.
The Court, in the Sarsaba Case, resolved the issue in this wise:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
x x x We cannot countenance petitioners argument that the complaint against the other
defendants should have been dismissed, considering that the RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Sereno. The courts failure to acquire jurisdiction over
ones person is a defense which is personal to the person claiming it. Obviously, it is now
impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view of his death. Neither can petitioner
invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of having the case
dismissed against all of the defendants. Failure to serve summons on Serenos person
will not be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint against the other defendants,
considering that they have been served with copies of the summons and complaints and
have long submitted their respective responsive pleadings. In fact, the other defendants
in the complaint were given the chance to raise all possible defenses and objections
personal to them in their respective motions to dismiss and their subsequent answers.43
(Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal by the trial court of the complaint
against Sereno only.
Based on the foregoing pronouncements, there is no basis for dismissing the complaint
against respondent herein. Thus, as already emphasized above, the trial court correctly
denied her motion to dismiss.
On whether or not the estate of Manuel
Toledo is an indispensable party
Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties-in-interest without whom
no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants.
An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject
matter of a case that a final adjudication cannot be made in his or her absence, without
injuring or affecting that interest. He or she is a party who has not only an interest in the
subject matter of the controversy, but "an interest of such nature that a final decree
cannot be made without affecting [that] interest or leaving the controversy in such a
condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good
conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose
absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court

which is effective, complete or equitable." Further, an indispensable party is one who

must be included in an action before it may properly proceed.44
On the other hand, a "person is not an indispensable party if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it
will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete
justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would
merely permit complete relief between him or her and those already parties to the action,
or if he or she has no interest in the subject matter of the action." It is not a sufficient
reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party simply because his or her
presence will avoid multiple litigations.45
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the estate of
Manuel is not an indispensable party to the collection case, for the simple reason that the
obligation of Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is solidary.
The contract between petitioner, on the one hand and respondent and respondents
husband, on the other, states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/We jointly and severally46 (in solemn) promise to pay
BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. x x x the sum of PESOS: [ONE MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED (P1,400,000.00)] x x x.47
The provisions and stipulations of the contract were then followed by the respective
signatures of respondent as "MAKER" and her husband as "CO-MAKER."48 Thus,
pursuant to Article 1216 of the Civil Code, petitioner may collect the entire amount of the
obligation from respondent only. The aforementioned provision states: "The creditor may
proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.
The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may
subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully
collected."
In other words, the collection case can proceed and the demands of petitioner can be
satisfied by respondent only, even without impleading the estate of Manuel.
Consequently, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to petitioners complaint
for sum of money.
However, the Court of Appeals, agreeing with the contention of respondent, held that the
claim of petitioner should have been filed against the estate of Manuel in accordance
with Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The aforementioned provisions
provide:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. All
claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the
notice; otherwise, they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the
claimants. x x x.
SEC. 6. Solidary obligation of decedent. Where the obligation of the decedent is solidary
with another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were the only
debtor, without prejudice to the right of the estate to recover contribution from the other
debtor. x x x.

The Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the above-quoted provisions.

In construing Section 6, Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court, the precursor of Section 6,
Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which latter provision has been retained in the
present Rules of Court without any revisions, the Supreme Court, in the case of Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Villarama, et. al.,49 held:50
Construing Section 698 of the Code of Civil Procedure from whence [Section 6, Rule 87]
was taken, this Court held that where two persons are bound in solidum for the same
debt and one of them dies, the whole indebtedness can be proved against the estate of
the latter, the decedents liability being absolute and primary; x x x. It is evident from the
foregoing that Section 6 of Rule 87 provides the procedure should the creditor desire to
go against the deceased debtor, but there is certainly nothing in the said provision
making compliance with such procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary action
against the surviving solidary debtors, should the creditor choose to demand payment
from the latter, could be entertained to the extent that failure to observe the same would
deprive the court jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action against the surviving
debtors. Upon the other hand, the Civil Code expressly allows the creditor to proceed
against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. There is,
therefore, nothing improper in the creditors filing of an action against the surviving
solidary debtors alone, instead of instituting a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased debtor wherein his claim could be filed.
The foregoing ruling was reiterated and expounded in the later case of Philippine
National
Bank
v.
Asuncion51
where
the
Supreme
Court
pronounced:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that
nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary
debtors. Said provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a
creditor chooses to pursue his claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor.
The rule has been set forth that a creditor (in a solidary obligation) has the option
whether to file or not to file a claim against the estate of the solidary debtor. x x x
xxxx
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this
matter. Said provision gives the creditor the right to "proceed against anyone of the
solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously." The choice is undoubtedly left to
the solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of the
death of one of the solidary debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he so chooses, proceed
against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of
the deceased debtors. It is not mandatory for him to have the case dismissed as against
the surviving debtors and file its claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor,
x x x. For to require the creditor to proceed against the estate, making it a condition
precedent for any collection action against the surviving debtors to prosper, would
deprive him of his substantive rights provided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As correctly argued by petitioner, if Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court
were applied literally, Article 1216 of the New Civil Code would, in effect, be repealed
since under the Rules of Court, petitioner has no choice but to proceed against the estate
of [the deceased debtor] only. Obviously, this provision diminishes the [creditors] right

under the New Civil Code to proceed against any one, some or all of the solidary
debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by principle, which is too well settled to
require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule.
Otherwise stated, Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot be made to
prevail over Article 1216 of the New Civil Code, the former being merely procedural,
while the latter, substantive.
Based on the foregoing, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party and the case
can proceed as against respondent only. That petitioner opted to collect from respondent
and not from the estate of Manuel is evidenced by its opposition to respondents motion
to dismiss asserting that the case, as against her, should be dismissed so that petitioner
can proceed against the estate of Manuel.
On whether or not the inclusion of Manuel as
party defendant is a misjoinder of party
Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that "[n]either misjoinder nor non-joinder
of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order
of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and
on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and
proceeded with separately."
Based on the last sentence of the afore-quoted provision of law, a misjoined party must
have the capacity to sue or be sued in the event that the claim by or against the
misjoined party is pursued in a separate case. In this case, therefore, the inclusion of
Manuel in the complaint cannot be considered a misjoinder, as in fact, the action would
have proceeded against him had he been alive at the time the collection case was filed
by petitioner. This being the case, the remedy provided by Section 11 of Rule 3 does not
obtain here. The name of Manuel as party-defendant cannot simply be dropped from the
case. Instead, the procedure taken by the Court in Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te,52 whose
facts, as mentioned earlier, resemble those of this case, should be followed herein.
There, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court when it resolved the issue of
jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Sereno in this wise:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
As correctly pointed by defendants, the Honorable Court has not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Patricio Sereno since there was indeed no valid service of summons
insofar as Patricio Sereno is concerned. Patricio Sereno died before the summons,
together with a copy of the complaint and its annexes, could be served upon him.
However, the failure to effect service of summons unto Patricio Sereno, one of the
defendants herein, does not render the action DISMISSIBLE, considering that the three
(3) other defendants, x x x, were validly served with summons and the case with respect
to the answering defendants may still proceed independently. Be it recalled that the three
(3) answering defendants have previously filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which
was denied by the Court.
Hence, only the case against Patricio Sereno will be DISMISSED and the same may be
filed as a claim against the estate of Patricio Sereno, but the case with respect to the
three (3) other accused [sic] will proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)53
As a result, the case, as against Manuel, must be dismissed.
In addition, the dismissal of the case against Manuel is further warranted by Section 1 of
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which states that: [o]nly natural or juridical persons, or

entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action." Applying this provision of law,
the Court, in the case of Ventura v. Militante,54 held:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. x x x. In order to maintain an action in a
court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he, she or it must
be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial
person, and no suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in the name of such a person.
The rule is no different as regards party defendants. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff, when
he institutes a judicial proceeding, to name the proper party defendant to his cause of
action. In a suit or proceeding in personam of an adversary character, the court can
acquire no jurisdiction for the purpose of trial or judgment until a party defendant who
actually or legally exists and is legally capable of being sued, is brought before it. It has
even been held that the question of the legal personality of a party defendant is a
question of substance going to the jurisdiction of the court and not one of procedure.
The original complaint of petitioner named the "estate of Carlos Ngo as represented by
surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia Ventura" as the defendant. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
same on the ground that the defendant as named in the complaint had no legal
personality. We agree.
x x x. Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the
same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be named a
party defendant in a court action. (Emphases supplied.)
Indeed, where the defendant is neither a natural nor a juridical person or an entity
authorized by law, the complaint may be dismissed on the ground that the pleading
asserting the claim states no cause of action or for failure to state a cause of action
pursuant to Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because a complaint cannot
possibly state a cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a civil action.55

G.R. No. 151876

GO vs. DIMAGIBA
June 21, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The pertinent facts are not disputed. Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to
Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for
encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason account
closed.[6] Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22[7]
under separate Complaints filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Baguio
City.[8] After a joint trial, the MTCC (Branch 4) rendered a Decision on July 16, 1999,
convicting the accused in the 13 cases. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, this Court finds the evidence of the
prosecution to have established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of the
offenses charged and imposes upon the accused the penalty of 3 months imprisonment
for each count (13 counts) and to indemnify the offended party the amount of One Million
Two Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Pesos (P1,295,000.00) with legal interest per
annum commencing from 1996 after the checks were dishonored by reason ACCOUNT
CLOSED on December 13, 1995, to pay attorneys fees of P15,000.00 and to pay the
costs.[9]
The appeal of Dimagiba was raffled to Branch 4 of the RTC in Baguio City.[10] On May
23, 2000, the RTC denied the appeal and sustained his conviction.[11] There being no
further appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the RTC issued on February 1, 2001, a
Certificate of Finality of the Decision.[12]
Thus, on February 14, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba
for the service of his sentence as a result of his conviction. The trial court also issued a
Writ of Execution to enforce his civil liability.[13]

Since the proper course of action against the wrongful inclusion of Manuel as partydefendant is the dismissal of the case as against him, thus did the trial court err when it
ordered the substitution of Manuel by his heirs. Substitution is proper only where the
party to be substituted died during the pendency of the case, as expressly provided for
by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC Order.
He prayed for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final Decision,
arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been
imposed on him.[14] The arguments raised in that Motion were reiterated in a Motion for
the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution filed on February 28, 2001.[15]

Death of party;duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court
within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or representatives. x x x

In an Order dated August 22, 2001, the MTCC denied the Motion for Reconsideration
and directed the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against Dimagiba.[16] On September
28, 2001, he was arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator x x x.

On October 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition[17] for a writ of
habeas corpus. The case was raffled to Branch 5, which scheduled the hearing for
October 10, 2001. Copies of the Order were served on respondents counsels and the
city warden.[18]

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and
be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, since Manuel was already dead at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court
never acquired jurisdiction over his person and, in effect, there was no party to be
substituted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order directing the
immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of
P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. However, the civil aspect of the July 16, 1999 MTCC
Decision was not touched upon.[19] A subsequent Order, explaining in greater detail the
basis of the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, was issued on October 11, 2001.[20]

In justifying its modification of the MTCC Decision, the RTC invoked Vaca v. Court of
Appeals[21] and Supreme Court Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000,[22] which
allegedly required the imposition of a fine only instead of imprisonment also for BP 22
violations, if the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent. The RTC held that
this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba.[23] It further noted that (1)
he was a first-time offender and an employer of at least 200 workers who would be
displaced as a result of his imprisonment; and (2) the civil liability had already been
satisfied through the levy of his properties.[24]
On October 22, 2001, Petitioner Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Orders
dated October 10 and 11, 2001.[25] That Motion was denied on January 18, 2002.[26]
Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court on pure questions of law.[27]

The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which
individuals are deprived of liberty.[30] It was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief
for those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause
and thus deliver them from unlawful custody.[31] It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended
to test the circumstances under which a person is detained.[32]
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or
by virtue of a valid judgment.[33] However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be
allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following
exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the
sentence as to such excess.[34]

The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration:
1. [The RTC] Judge was utterly devoid of jurisdiction in amending a final and conclusive
decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, dated July 16, 1999, in nullifying the
Sentence Mittimus, dated September 28, 2001, issued by x x x [the] Municipal Trial
Court, Branch 4, Baguio City, and in ordering the release of [Dimagiba] from confinement
in jail for the service of his sentence under the said final and conclusive judgment;
2. Assuming only for the sake of argument that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, the
Petition for Habeas Corpus is utterly devoid of merit as [Dimagiba was] not entitled to the
beneficent policy enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in
the Supreme Court Circular No. 12-2000; x x x
3. Granting for the sake of argument that [Dimagiba was] entitled to the beneficent policy
enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the Supreme
Court Circular No. 12-2000, the minimum fine that should be imposed on [Dimagiba] is
one million and two hundred ninety five thousand pesos (P1,295,000.00) up to double
the said amount or (P2,590,000), not just the measly amount of P100,000; and
4. [The RTC] judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in hearing and deciding [Dimagibas] Petition for Habeas Corpus without
notice and without affording procedural due process to the People of the Philippines
through the Office of [the] City Prosecutor of Baguio City or the Office of the Solicitor
General.[28]

In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on the ruling in
Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not
imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22. Respondent sought the retroactive effect of
those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being
excessive. From his allegations, the Petition appeared sufficient in form to support the
issuance of the writ.
However, it appears that respondent has previously sought the modification of his
sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration[35] of the MTCCs Execution Order and in a
Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution.[36] Both were denied by the
MTCC on the ground that it had no power or authority to amend a judgment issued by
the RTC.
In his Petition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same arguments that he had
invoked in the said Motions. We believe that his resort to this extraordinary remedy was a
procedural infirmity. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order
denying his Motions, in which he should have prayed that the execution of the judgment
be stayed. But he effectively misused the action he had chosen, obviously with the intent
of finding a favorable court. His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an
attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and executory. Such an action
deplorably amounted to forum shopping. Respondent should have resorted to the proper,
available remedy instead of instituting a different action in another forum.
The Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to support the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus.

In the main, the case revolves around the question of whether the Petition for habeas
corpus was validly granted. Hence, the Court will discuss the four issues as they
intertwine with this main question.[29]

Preference in the
Application of Penalties
for Violation of BP 22

The Courts Ruling

The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not
less than 30 days, but not more than one year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double
the amount of the check, a fine that shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (3) both such
fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.[37]

The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue:
Propriety of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus

SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001,[38] established a rule of

preference in imposing the above penalties.[39] When the circumstances of the case
clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the
imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty.[40] The

determination of the circumstances that warrant the imposition of a fine rests upon the
trial judge only.[41] Should the judge deem that imprisonment is appropriate, such
penalty may be imposed.[42]

First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the
date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.

SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment. The
competence to amend the law belongs to the legislature, not to this Court.[43]

Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin.

Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the
penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the
legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts
to take into account not only the purpose of the law but also the circumstances of the
accused -- whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence -- and such other circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court
believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed.[51]

Inapplicability of
SC-AC No. 12-2000
Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent policy enunciated in
SC-AC No. 12-2000, because he is not a first time offender.[44] This circumstance is,
however, not the sole factor in determining whether he deserves the preferred penalty of
fine alone. The penalty to be imposed depends on the peculiar circumstances of each
case.[45] It is the trial courts discretion to impose any penalty within the confines of the
law. SC-AC No. 13-2001 explains thus:
x x x. Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the
application of the penal provisions of BP 22 such that where the circumstances of both
the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without
taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more
appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances
warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. x x x.
It is, therefore, understood that:
xxxxxxxxx
2. The Judges concerned, may in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition
of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the
social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;
The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus relied mainly on the alleged
retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000, which supposedly favored BP 22 offenders.[46] On
this point, Dimagiba contended that his imprisonment was violative of his right to equal
protection of the laws, since only a fine would be imposed on others similarly
situated.[47]
The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied retroactively if favorable
to the accused. This principle, embodied in the Revised Penal Code,[48] has been
expanded in certain instances to cover special laws.[49]
The issue of retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000 was settled in De Joya v. Jail Warden of
Batangas City,[50] which we quote:
Petitioner's reliance of our ruling in Ordoez v. Vinarao that a convicted person is entitled
to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v.
Simon, is misplaced. Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 132001 should benefit her has no basis.

Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline
for the trial courts. Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider the
factual circumstances of each case prior to imposing the appropriate penalty. In other
words, the Administrative Circular does not confer any new right in favor of the accused,
much less those convicted by final judgment.
The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court rendering the
decision against the accused.[52] That decision is subject only to appeal on grounds of
errors of fact or law, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Another trial court may not encroach upon this authority. Indeed, SC-AC No.
12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all factual circumstances of each case. Such a
review can no longer be done if the judgment has become final and executory.
In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant
circumstances from which respondents conviction and sentence were based. The
penalty imposed was well within the confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was
sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City. Eventually, the Decision attained finality.
Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the
guise of granting a writ of habeas corpus.
The doctrine of equal protection of laws[53] does not apply for the same reasons as
those on retroactivity. Foremost of these reasons is that the Circular is not a law that
deletes the penalty of imprisonment. As explained earlier, it is merely a rule of preference
as to which penalty should be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a case. At
any rate, this matter deserves scant consideration, because respondent failed to raise
any substantial argument to support his contention.[54]
Modification of Final
Judgment Not Warranted
The Court is not unmindful of So v. Court of Appeals,[55] in which the final judgment of
conviction for violation of BP 22 was modified by the deletion of the sentence of
imprisonment and the imposition of a fine. That case proceeded from an Urgent
Manifestation of an Extraordinary Supervening Event,[56] not from an unmeritorious
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as in the present case. The Court exercised in that
case its authority to suspend or to modify the execution of a final judgment when
warranted or made imperative by the higher interest of justice or by supervening
events.[57] The supervening event in that case was the petitioners urgent need for
coronary rehabilitation for at least one year under the direct supervision of a coronary
care therapist; imprisonment would have been equivalent to a death sentence.[58]

The peculiar circumstances of So do not obtain in the present case. Respondents

supposed unhealthy physical condition due to a triple by-pass operation, and aggravated
by hypertension, cited by the RTC in its October 10, 2001 Order,[59] is totally bereft of
substantial proof. The Court notes that respondent did not make any such allegation in
his Petition for habeas corpus. Neither did he mention his physical state in his
Memorandum and Comment submitted to this Court.
Respondent seeks the retroactive application of SC-AC No. 12-2000 in his favor on the
basis alone of the alleged settlement of his civil liability.[60] Citing Griffith v. Court of
Appeals,[61] he theorizes that answering for a criminal offense is no longer justified after
the settlement of the debt.
Respondent, however, misreads Griffith. The Court held in that case that convicting the
accused who, two years prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases, had already paid his debt
(from which the checks originated) was contrary to the basic principles of fairness and
justice.[62] Obviously, that situation is not attendant here.
The civil liability in the present case was satisfied through the levy and sale of the
properties of respondent only after the criminal case had been terminated with his
conviction.[63] Apparently, he had sufficient properties that could have been used to
settle his liabilities prior to his conviction. Indeed, such an early settlement would have
been an indication that he was in good faith, a circumstance that could have been
favorably considered in determining his appropriate penalty.
At any rate, civil liability differs from criminal liability.[64] What is punished in the latter is
not the failure to pay the obligation, but the issuance of checks that subsequently
bounced or were dishonored for insufficiency or lack of funds.[65] The Court reiterates
the reasons why the issuance of worthless checks is criminalized:
The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on public interest. The
effects of the increase of worthless checks transcend the private interest of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large.
The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation
multiplied a thousand-fold can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense
against public order.[66]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders NULLIFIED.

A second libel case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 was likewise filed
against Adonis by Jeanette L. Leuterio, pending before the RTC of Davao City, Branch
14.6
On December 11, 2007, the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP) issued an order for the
Discharge on Parole of seven (7) inmates in various jails in the country, which included
Adonis. The said document was received by the City Parole and Probation Office of
Davao on May 2, 2008.7
Meanwhile, on January 25, 2008, this Court issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008,
the subject of which is the "Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the
Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases."
In view of these developments, Adonis, on April 18, 2008 filed with the RTC Branch 17 a
Motion to Reopen Case (With Leave of Court),8 praying for his immediate release from
detention and for the modification of his sentence to payment of fine pursuant to the said
Circular.
On May 26, 2008, in Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 before the RTC Branch 14, Adonis
moved for his provisional release from detention. The motion was granted by Presiding
Judge George Omelio in open court and he was allowed to post bail in the amount of
P5,000.9 Subsequently on even date and after Adonis filed a cash bond and an
undertaking,10 the trial court issued an Order directing the Chief of Davao Penal Colony
"to release the accused Alexis Adonis unless he is being held for some other crimes or
offenses."11 On the same date, the said order was served to the respondent,12 but the
release of Adonis was not effected.
On May 30, 2008, Adonis filed the instant petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus alleging that his liberty was restrained by the respondent for no valid reason.13
The respondent consequently filed his Comment.14 Adonis then filed on October 27,
2008 an Urgent Motion to Resolve15 and on November 7, 2008 a Manifestation and
Motion,16 reiterating all his previous prayers.
On February 11, 2009, the Court received the letter from the respondent, informing the
Court that Adonis had been released from confinement on December 23, 2008 after
accepting the conditions set forth in his parole and with the advise to report to the City
Parole and Probation Officer of Davao.17
The Courts Ruling
The petition is without merit.

ADONIS vs. TESORO

G.R. No. 182855
June 5, 2013

REYES, J.:

In Criminal Case No. 48679-2001, Adonis was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City (RTC), Branch 17 for Libel, filed against him by then Representative
Prospero Nograles. He was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of five (5) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor maximum, as minimum penalty, to four (4) years, six
(6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium, as maximum penalty.4 He
began serving his sentence at the Davao Prisons and Penal Farm on February 20,
2007.5

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful
restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for
the lone purpose of obtaining relief for those illegally confined or imprisoned without
sufficient legal basis. It is not issued when the person is in custody because of a judicial
process or a valid judgment.18
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides when a writ must not be
allowed or discharge authorized, to wit:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17, in Criminal
Case No. 48679-2001.1wphi1 Since his detention was by virtue of a final judgment, he
is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his sentence when the BPP
granted him parole, along with six (6) others, on December 11, 2007.19 While it is true
that a convict may be released from prison on parole when he had served the minimum
period of his sentence; the pendency of another criminal case, however, is a ground for
the disqualification of such convict from being released on parole.20 Notably, at the time
he was granted the parole, the second libel case was pending before the RTC Branch
14.21 In fact, even when the instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was
still pending. The issuance of the writ under such circumstance was, therefore,
proscribed. There was basis for the respondent to deny his immediate release at that
time.
Further, Adonis seeks the retroactive application of Administrative Circular No. 08-2008,
citing Fermin v. People,22 where the Court preferred the imposition of the fine rather
than imprisonment under the circumstances of the case. Administrative Circular No. 082008, was issued on January 25, 2008 and provides the "guidelines in the observance of
a rule of preference in the imposition of penalties in libel cases." The pertinent portions
read as follows:
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing rule of
preference set by the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for the
crime of libel bearing in mind the following principles:
1. This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty
for the crime libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition
of a fame alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the
social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no
legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provision on subsidiary
imprisonment.23 (Emphasis ours)
A clear reading of the Administration Circular No. 08-2008 and considering the attendant
circumstances of the case, the benefits of the administrative circular can not be given
retroactive effect in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001. It is too late in the day for Adonis to
raise such argument considering that Criminal Case No. 48679-2001 has already
become final and executory; and he had, in fact, already commenced serving his
sentence. Eventually, he was released from confinement on December 23, 2008 after
accepting the conditions of the parole granted to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

AMPATUAN vs. MACARAIG
G.R. No. 182497
June 29, 2010
PEREZ, J.:
Petitioner alleged in her petition that her husband PO1 Ampatuan was assigned at Sultan
Kudarat Municipal Police Station. On 14 April 2008, he was asked by his Chief of Police
to report to the Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan, Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali
(Supt. Ali). The latter brought PO1 Ampatuan to Superintendent Piang Adam, Provincial
Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was
directed to stay at the Police Provincial Office of Maguindanao without being informed of
the cause of his restraint. The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to
the General Santos City Airport and was made to board a Philippine Airlines plane bound
for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was turned over
to policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police Director Geary
Barias and General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted where it was
announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Officials. He was then detained at the Police Jail in United Nations
Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato
Gonzaga of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty.
Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law Department of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008,
PO1 Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional Headquarters Support Group in Camp
Bagong Diwa, Taguig City.[3]
Petitioner continues that on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva
ordered the release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan.[4] The Order was
approved by the City Prosecutor of Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co,
Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan.
This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the RTC of
Manila, Branch 37.[5]
Private respondents had another version of the antecedent facts. They narrated that at
around 7:08 oclock in the evening of 10 November 2007, a sixty-four-year-old man, later
identified as Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was
killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation
conducted by the Manila Police District (MPD) Homicide Section yielded the identity of
the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded
to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were
conducted by the Manila Prosecutors Office.
On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinto, rendered his
Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge
PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1
Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.
On even date, a charge sheet for Grave Misconduct was executed against PO1
Ampatuan, the accusatory portion of which reads:
CHARGE SHEET
THE UNDERSIGNED NOMINAL COMPLAINANT hereby charges above-named
respondent of the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct (murder) pursuant to

Section 52 of R.A. 8551[6] in relation to NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular 93-024,

committed as follows:
That on or about 7:08 in the evening of November 10, 2007, in M.H. Del Pilar and Pedro
Gil St., Ermita, Manila, above-named respondent while being an active member of the
PNP and within the jurisdiction of this office, armed with a cal .45 pistol, with intent to kill,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, shot Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Jr.,
COMELEC official on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal gunshot wounds which directly cause (sic) his death.

Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila Citys Prosecution Office,
petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008. The petition was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 and was raffled to Branch 37.
On 24 April 2008, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, respondent
Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding
therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said
respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1
Ampatuan.[12]

Acts contrary to the existing PNP Laws rules and Regulations.[7]

On 25 April 2008, the RTC resolved the Petition in its Order which reads:

Also, through a Memorandum dated 18 April 2008, Police Director General Avelino I.
Razon, Jr. directed the Regional Director of the National Capital Regional Police Office
(NCRPO) to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody, thus:

Essentially, counsels for petitioner insists that PO1 Basser Ampatuan is being illegally
detained by the respondents despite the order of release of Chief Inquest Prosecutor
Nelson Salva dated April 21, 2008. They further claim that as of April 23, 2008, no
administrative case was filed against PO1 Ampatuan.

1.
Reference: Memo from that Office dated April 15, 2008 re Arrest of
PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee
Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers.
2.
This pertains to the power of the Chief, PNP embodied in Section 52
of RA 8551, to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a
grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint,
grave in nature, against such police personnel.
3.
In this connection, you are hereby directed to place PO1 Busser
Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both
COMELEC Legal Officers, under your restrictive custody.
4.

For strict compliance.[8]

On 19 April 2008, through a Memorandum Request dated 18 April 2008, respondent

Police Director Geary L. Barias requested for the creation of the Summary Hearing Board
to hear the case of PO1 Ampatuan.[9]
On 20 April 2008, Special Order No. 921 was issued by Police Director Edgardo E. Acua,
placing PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO,
effective 19 April 2008. Said Special Order No. 921, reads:

Respondents, while admitting that to date no criminal case was filed against PO1
Ampatuan, assert that the latter is under restrictive custody since he is facing an
administrative case for grave misconduct. They submitted to this Court the Pre-charge
Evaluation Report and Charge Sheet. Further, in support of their position, respondents
cited the case of SPO2 Manalo, et al. v. Hon. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920 claiming that
habeas corpus will not lie for a PNP personnel under restrictive custody. They claim that
this is authorized under Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551 authorizing the Chief of PNP to
place the PNP personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of administrative
case for grave misconduct.
Petitioner countered that the administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan was antedated to make it appear that there was such a case filed before April 23, 2008.
The function of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of ones detention, meaning, if
there is sufficient cause for deprivation or confinement and if there is none to discharge
him at once. For habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of
illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom which must be actual and effective, not
nominal or moral.
Granting arguendo that the administrative case was ante-dated, the Court cannot simply
ignore the filing of an administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. It cannot be
denied that the PNP has its own administrative disciplinary mechanism and as clearly
pointed out by the respondents, the Chief PNP is authorized to place PO1 Ampatuan
under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551.

Restrictive Custody
PO1 Basser B. Ampatuan 128677, is placed under restrictive custody of the Regional
Director, NCRPO effective April 19, 2008. (Reference: Memorandum from CPNP dated
18 April 2008).
BY COMMAND OF POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL RAZON:[10]

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case
against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released
from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds.[11]

The filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the
PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer.
Lastly, anent the contention of the petitioner that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan
has rendered the administrative case moot and academic, the same could not be
accepted by this Court. It must be stressed that the resignation has not been acted (sic)
by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed
while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby
DISMISSED.[13]

Distressed, petitioner is now before this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court to question the validity of the RTC Order dated 25 April 2008. The
issues are:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.[15]
Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be followed in the
issuance of the writ. The Rule provides:
RULE 102
HABEAS CORPUS
SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise expressly provided by
law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of
Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before
the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof
for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First
Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself,
enforceable only within his judicial district.
xxxx
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.

The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or
lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a
person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas
corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no
longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.[16]
Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined
or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the
custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.[17]

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual
seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under
some form of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process,
the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.[18] Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of
the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.[19]
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a
particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal
restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ
of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which
will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.[20]
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into
whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be
refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists.
If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted
and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be
refused.[21]
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its
issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima
facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is
being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If
the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose
behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.[22]
Petitioner contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was placed under the custody of
respondents on 20 April 2008, there was yet no administrative case filed against him.
When the release order of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva was served upon
respondents on 21 April 2008, there was still no administrative case filed against PO1
Ampatuan. She also argues that the arrest on 14 April 2008 of PO1 Ampatuan in Shariff
Kabunsuan was illegal because there was no warrant of arrest issued by any judicial
authority against him.
On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment[23] filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, argue that the trial court correctly denied the subject petition. Respondents
maintain that while the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila had recommended that
PO1 Ampatuan be released from custody, said recommendation was made only insofar
as the criminal action for murder that was filed with the prosecution office is concerned
and is without prejudice to other legal grounds for which he may be held under custody.
In the instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges for Grave
Misconduct. They cited the case of Manalo v. Calderon,[24] where this Court held that a
petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being
detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and monitoring of
movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not
a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.[25]

The Solicitor General is correct.

In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act
No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990),
as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police
Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police
force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of
the said law enumerates the disciplinary actions, including restrictive custody that may be
imposed by duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter
of internal discipline. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 8551 reads:

the preventive suspension shall not be more than ninety (90) days except if the delay in
the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petitions of the respondent:
Provided, finally, That such preventive suspension may be sooner lifted by the court in
the exigency of the service upon recommendation of the Chief, PNP. Such case shall be
subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.)
Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court,
we have to dismiss the petition.
In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the
issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition
fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and
enshrined in the Constitution.

Sec. 52 x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
xxxx
4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary punishment of
dismissal from the service; suspension or forfeiture of salary; or any combination thereof
for a period not exceeding one hundred eighty (180) days. Provided, further, That the
Chief of the PNP shall have the authority to place police personnel under restrictive
custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him or even
after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel.
[Emphasis ours].
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a
valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody
and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by
their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.[26]
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas
corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the
remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP
authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for.[27]
Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuans restrictive custody is the administrative case filed
against him, his remedy is within such administrative process.
We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody since 19 April
2008. To date, the administrative case against him should have already been resolved
and the issue of his restrictive custody should have been rendered moot and academic,
in accordance with Section 55 of Republic Act No. 8551, which provides:
SEC. 55. Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave
felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the
court shall immediately suspend the accused from office for a period not exceeding
ninety (90) days from arraignment: Provided, however, That if it can be shown by
evidence that the accused is harassing the complainant and/or witnesses, the court may
order the preventive suspension of the accused PNP member even if the charge is
punishable by a penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1) day: Provided, further, That

G.R. No. 166682

BAGTAS vs. SANTOS

November 27, 2009

CARPIO, J.:

Antonio and Rosita S. Gallardo (Spouses Gallardo) are the parents of Maricel S.
Gallardo (Maricel). Two weeks after graduating from high school in April 2000, Maricel
ran away to live with her boyfriend. Maricel became pregnant and gave birth to Maryl Joy
S. Gallardo (Maryl Joy). Maricels boyfriend left her.
In February 2002, Maricel returned to her parents. On the same day, Maricel ran away
again and lived with Noel B. Bagtas (Bagtas) and Lydia B. Sioson (Sioson) at Ma.
Corazon, Unirock, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City. Maricel went to Negros Occidental
and left Maryl Joy in the custody of Bagtas and Sioson. In a letter[5] dated 5 February
2001, Maricel relinquished her rights over Maryl Joy to Bagtas and his wife. She stated:
Ako po si Maricel S. Gallardo 18 taong gulang ay kusang ipinagkaloob ang aking anak sa
pagkadalaga sa mag-asawang Noel B. Bagtas at Neneth A. Bagtas sa kadahilanan pong
itinakwil ako ng sarili kong mga magulang at hindi ko po kayang buhayin at dahil po sa
tinakbuhan ako ng aking boyfriend kaya wala na pong ibang paraan para ako
makabangon o makapagsimula ng panibagong buhay kaya para mabigyan ng
magandang buhay ang aking anak inisip ko po na ito na ang pinaka madaling paraan
para po sa pagbabago ng aking buhay.
Kaya mula sa araw na ito ay wala na akong karapatan sa aking anak. Sila ang tatayo
bilang magulang ng aking anak.

In April 2002, the Spouses Gallardo tried to obtain the custody of Maryl Joy from Bagtas
and Sioson. Bagtas and Sioson refused. Unable to settle the matter, the Spouses
Gallardo filed with the RTC a petition[6] for habeas corpus.
In its Order[7] dated 10 July 2002, the RTC issued a writ of habeas[8] corpus directing
the deputy sheriff to produce Maryl Joy before it and to summon Bagtas and Sioson to
explain why they were withholding the custody of Maryl Joy.
The Spouses Gallardo, Bagtas and Sioson entered into a compromise agreement. In its
Order[9] dated 13 September 2002, the RTC stated:

In todays hearing, both parties appeared with their respective counsels and have agreed
on the following:
1.
that the child should be placed in custody of the petitioners on Friday, Saturday and
Sunday;
2. that the child should be returned to the respondents by the petitioners on Sunday at
8:00 oclock in the evening subject to visitorial rights of the petitioners anytime of the day;
and
3.
that the child can be brought by the respondents to Valenzuela but should be
returned to the petitioners on Friday morning.
The above agreement shall take effect today and parties are ordered to comply strictly
with the said agreement under pain of contempt in case of violation thereof.

5.
Thus, the Honorable Court very clearly issued a conflicting Order because It has
cited the [Spouses Gallardo] in contempt of court for violating the previous September
13, 2002 Order that the child should be returned to the respondents in the evening of
September 29, 2002 (Sunday), and yet the Honorable Court has dismissed the petition
for being moot and academic. This is in effect giving premium to the act of the petitioners
of not turning over the child to respondents on September 29, 2002. Likewise, this is
tantamount to rewarding them for not producing the child in court in violation of the
aforesaid September 13, 2002 Order;
6.
Moreover, the Honorable Court has issued an unreasonable Order by stating that
the dismissal of the instant case is without prejudice to the filing of the proper action for
custody of the minor by the petitioners. Why would the petitioners still file the proper
action for custody if they now have the custody of the minor?
PRAYER

On 29 September 2002, Bagtas and Sioson learned that Rosita S. Gallardo brought
Maryl Joy to Samar. In their motion[10] dated 30 September 2002, Bagtas and Sioson
prayed that the Spouses Gallardo be directed to produce Maryl Joy before the RTC, that
they be directed to explain why they violated the RTCs 13 September 2002 Order, and
that they be cited in contempt. In their motion[11] to dismiss dated 11 October 2002,
Bagtas and Sioson prayed that the Spouses Gallardos action be dismissed pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court. Section 3 states that If, for no justifiable cause,
the plaintiff fails x x x to comply with x x x any order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion. Bagtas and
Sioson claimed that the Spouses Gallardo failed to comply with the RTCs 13 September
2002 Order.
In its Order[12] dated 15 October 2002, the RTC cited the Spouses Gallardo in contempt,
fined them P500, and ordered them to produce Maryl Joy before the trial court.
The RTCs Ruling
In its Order[13] dated 9 December 2002, the RTC dismissed the action for having
become moot. The RTC stated:
In this petition, the prayer of the petitioners is to produce the person of Meryl [sic] Joy S.
Gallardo before this court to be turned over to herein petitioners who are the maternal
[grandparents] of said minor.
Since the person subject of the petition has already produced [sic] to this court and has
been turned over to the petitioners, the issue on the petition for habeas corpus is now
moot and academic without prejudice to the filing of the proper action to determine as to
the rightful custody over the minor child.
In view thereof, x x x the Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted but without prejudice on the
petitioners to file proper action for custody of the minor. (Emphasis supplied)
In their motion[14] for reconsideration dated 27 December 2002, Bagtas and Sioson
alleged that the ground for the dismissal of the action was erroneous. The action should
have been dismissed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court. They prayed
that Maryl Joy be returned to them to preserve the status quo ante. Bagtas and Sioson
stated:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the December 9,

2002 Order of the Honorable Court be partially reconsidered so that the dismissal of the
case will not be based on the ground of being moot and academic but based on failure to
comply with the September 13, 2002 pursuant [sic] to Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure and that petitioners be consequently directed to return the
person subject of the petition to the respondents to preserve the status quo ante.
In its Order[15] dated 21 April 2003, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. The
RTC held that the sole purpose of the petition for habeas corpus was the production of
Maryl Joy and that the Spouses Gallardo exercised substitute parental authority over
Maryl Joy. The RTC stated that:
The allegations in the Petition show that the sole purpose for the filing of the Petition is to
cause the production before the Court of the person of minor Meryl [sic] Joy S. Gallardo,
not a determination of the legality or illegality of respondents custody of the child,
petitioners being aware of the fact that the child was left by their (petitioners) daughter to
[sic] the custody of the respondents, as stated in par. no. 10 of the Petition.
The instant Petition is therefore, essentially not a petition for Habeas Corpus as
contemplated in Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court which is resorted to in all cases of
illegal confinement by which any person is deprived of his liberty (Cruz vs. CA, 322
SCRA 518), but is resorted to also where the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto as contemplated in Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court. In
order that the special remedy of Habeas Corpus maybe [sic] invoked, it is necessary that
there should be an actual and effective restraint or deprivation of liberty. A nominal or
moral restraint is not sufficient (Gonzales vs. Viola, et al., 61 Phil 824).
Since therefore, the purpose of the instant Petition has already been served, as the child
has been produced and delivered to the petitioners, the instant Petition logically has
become moot and academic. Petitioners are, under the law (Art. 214, Family Code),
authorized to exercise substitute parental authority over the child in case of death,
absence or unsuitability of the parents, the entitlement to the legal custody of the child
being necessarily included therein to make possible and/or enable the petitioners to
discharge their duties as substitute parents.
There is no inconsistency between the Order dated December 9, 2002 sought to be
reconsidered, and the Order dated October 15, 2002, as the latter was issued pursuant

to an incident, an interlocutory matter, that is, the failure of the petitioners to comply with
the agreement reached between the parties in open court on September 13, 2002. The
said Order dated October 15, 2002 is not a resolution of the case in the main, as it did
not terminate the case. The Order dated December 9, 2002, on the other hand,
terminated the case, and considering that the dismissal of the case was unqualified, the
same amounted to an adjudication on the merits pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the
Revised Rules of Court Procedure, therefore, the agreement earlier entered by and
between the herein parties is deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
Bagtas filed with the Court of Appeals a petition[16] for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Bagtas alleged that (1) the RTC erred when it ruled that the sole purpose
of the 1 August 2002 petition was the production of Maryl Joy before the trial court, (2)
the RTC erred when it ruled that the petition was essentially not a petition for Habeas
Corpus as contemplated in Rule 102, (3) the RTC erred when it ruled that there must be
actual and effective deprivation of liberty, (4) the RTC erred when it ruled that the action
had become moot, (5) the RTC erred when it ruled that the Spouses Gallardo had
substitute parental authority over Maryl Joy, and (6) the RTC erred when it ruled that
there was no inconsistency between the 15 October and 9 December 2002 Orders.

The Issues
In his petition dated 1 February 2005, Bagtas raised as issues that:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
The Courts Ruling
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the RTCs 9 December 2002 and 21 April
2003 Orders. In its Orders, the RTC ruled that, since the sole purpose of the petition for
habeas corpus was the production of Maryl Joy before the trial court, the action became
moot when Maryl Joy was produced. The Court disagrees.
Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court states that the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the persons
entitled thereto. In cases involving minors, the purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is
not limited to the production of the child before the court. The main purpose of the
petition for habeas corpus is to determine who has the rightful custody over the child. In
Tijing v. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court held that:

The Court of Appeals Ruling

In its Decision dated 11 June 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
affirmed the 9 December 2002 and 23 April 2003 Orders of the RTC. The Court of
Appeals held that:
In the second part of [Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court], x x x habeas corpus
may be resorted to in cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto. Accordingly, the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to
enable herein private respondents to regain the custody of their minor grand daughter
Maryl Joy who was admittedly left by her natural mother in the care of petitioner and
Lydia Sioson.
Significantly, in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal or involuntary
restraint is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ of habeas corpus as
a remedy; rather, the writ is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of
custody of a child. By dismissing the petition a quo, the trial court in effect upheld private
respondents right of custody over the minor involved as against that of petitioner.
While it cannot be gainsaid that private respondents obtained initial custody of the minor
in violation of a valid court order, we nonetheless sustain the judgment a quo dismissing
the petition and validating such rightful custody over Maryl Joy. This is because private
respondents are the grandparents of Maryl Joy, hence, lawfully authorized to exercise
substitute parental authority over her in the absence of her parents. What is more, in
awarding custody to private respondents, the best welfare of the child was taken into
consideration inasmuch as, per report of the Court Social Worker, the implementation of
the parties agreement would cause more psychological damage and traumatic
experience to Maryl Joy. To our mind, therefore, the violation of a court order pales in
significance when considered alongside the best interest of the minor whose welfare
requires that she be in the custody of her grandparents rather than petitioners. x x x
Under the factual and legal milieux of the case, there is no question that as grandparents
of the minor, Maryl Joy, private respondents have a far superior right of custody over her
than petitioner.[17]

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person
is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable
parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors,
the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for
the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of
determining the right of custody over a child. (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC erred when it hastily dismissed the action for having become moot after Maryl
Joy was produced before the trial court. It should have conducted a trial to determine
who had the rightful custody over Maryl Joy. In dismissing the action, the RTC, in effect,
granted the petition for habeas corpus and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the
Spouses Gallardo without sufficient basis. In Laxamana v. Laxamana,[19] the Court held
that:
Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo should have conducted a trial
notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to submit the case for resolution on the
basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric report of Dr. Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped
from questioning the absence of a trial considering that said psychiatric report, which was
the courts primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the
decision. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of
children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve
the family and the youth. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 214 of the Civil Code states that in case of absence or unsuitability of the parents,
substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. Article 216
states that in default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the surviving
grandparent shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child. Accordingly, in its
21 April 2003 Order, the RTC held that:
Petitioners are, under the law (Art. 214, Family Code), authorized to exercise substitute
parental authority over the child in case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents,
the entitlement to the legal custody of the child being necessarily included therein to

make possible and/or enable the petitioners to discharge their duties as substitute
parents.[20]

TAPUZ vs. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. 182484
June 17, 2008

BRION, J.:

In its 11 June 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals held that:

While it cannot be gainsaid that private respondents obtained initial custody of the minor
in violation of a valid court order, we nonetheless sustain the judgment a quo dismissing
the petition and validating such rightful custody over Maryl Joy. This is because private
respondents are the grandparents of Maryl Joy, hence, lawfully authorized to exercise
substitute parental authority over her in the absence of her parents.[21]
In determining who has the rightful custody over a child, the childs welfare is the most
important consideration. The court is not bound by any legal right of a person over the
child. In Sombong v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court held that:
The controversy does not involve the question of personal freedom, because an infant is
presumed to be in the custody of someone until he attains majority age. In passing on
the writ in a child custody case, the court deals with a matter of an equitable nature. Not
bound by any mere legal right of parent or guardian, the court gives his or her claim to
the custody of the child due weight as a claim founded on human nature and considered
generally equitable and just. Therefore, these cases are decided, not on the legal right of
the petitioner to be relieved from unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in the case of
adults, but on the courts view of the best interests of those whose welfare requires that
they be in custody of one person or another. Hence, the court is not bound to deliver a
child into the custody of any claimant or of any person, but should, in the consideration of
the facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at the time appears to require. In short,
the childs welfare is the supreme consideration.
Considering that the childs welfare is an all-important factor in custody cases, the Child
and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care
and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration. In the same vein, the Family Code authorizes the courts to, if the welfare
of the child so demands, deprive the parents concerned of parental authority over the
child or adopt such measures as may be proper under the circumstances. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Sombong,[23] the Court laid down three requisites in petitions for habeas corpus
involving minors: (1) the petitioner has a right of custody over the minor, (2) the
respondent is withholding the rightful custody over the minor, and (3) the best interest of
the minor demands that he or she be in the custody of the petitioner. In the present case,
these requisites are not clearly established because the RTC hastily dismissed the action
and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo without conducting any
trial.
The proceedings before the RTC leave so much to be desired. While a remand of the
case would mean further delay, Maryl Joys best interest demands that proper
proceedings be conducted to determine the fitness of the Spouses Gallardo to take care
of her.
WHEREFORE, the Court REMANDS the case to the Regional Trial Court, Judicial
Region 4, Branch 72, Antipolo City, for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine
the fitness of the Spouses Antonio and Rosita S. Gallardo to have custody of Maryl Joy
Gallardo.

The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the
private respondents), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay,
Aklan (the MCTC) a complaint[3] dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and damages with
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion,
Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian
Timbas (the petitioners) and other John Does numbering about 120. The private
respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners under TCT
No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag,
Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the disputed land); (2) they were the disputed lands prior
possessors when the petitioners armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and
together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force
and intimidation, without the private respondents permission and against the objections
of the private respondents security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer[4] dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of
the complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors
of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and
(3) the private respondents certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They
asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision[5] in the
private respondents favor. It found prior possession the key issue in forcible entry cases in the private respondents favor, thus:
The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended
Commissioners Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the records and the
evidence the parties have submitted. It is shown in the Amended Commissioners Report
and Sketch that the land in question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire
perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said
perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing findings of
the Commissioner in his report and sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that
after they acquired the land in question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex
A, Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the construction of the
perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in
actual physical possession of the whole lot in question since 1993 when it was
interrupted by the defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of
Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question with view of inhabiting the same
and building structures therein prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them
before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn
Sacapao. As a result of their confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex D,
Complaint p. 20) wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in
question and agreed not to build any structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January 4,
2005 when the plaintiff posted security guards, however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M.
of April 19, 2006, the defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to
contain firearms with other John Does numbering about 120 persons by force and
intimidation forcibly entered the premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo

structure (Annex E, Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question which incident was
promptly reported to the proper authorities as shown by plaintiffs Certification (Annex F,
Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the
plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no settlement was reached as shown in their
Certificate to File Action (Annex G, Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action.

issuance conditioned on the private respondents posting of a bond. The writ[7]

authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision was actually issued by
respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the respondent Judge) on 12 March 2007 after
the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved
to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a
motion for demolition.

Defendants (sic) contend in their answer that prior to January 4, 2005, they were already
occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of
ownership by open continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic).
(Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).

The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17 May
2007[8].

The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed by a

perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by the
Commissioner in his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that
the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical possession of the land in question from 1993
up to April 19, 2006 when they were ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of
force. Applying by analogy the ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of
Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of plaintiffs
from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants claims to an older possession must be rejected
as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in
two different personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in
question on April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon as shown in their
Certification (Annex D, Defendants Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).
The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to the
commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in question that they built structures on the
land in question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioners Amended Report, pp.
246 to 247), after there (sic) entry thereto on even date.
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendants
witnesses, Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo
Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- 144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated that on or
about April 19, 2006, a group of armed men entered the property of our said neighbors
and built plastic roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors
away from their homes but they refused to leave and resisted the intruding armed men.
From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened
on April 18, 2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006 when the defendants overpowered by
their numbers the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy.
Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their pictures
attached as annexes to their position paper were not noted and reflected in the amended
report and sketch submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that
these structures are built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in question,
accordingly, they are irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered as evidence
of their actual possession of the land in question prior to April 19, 2006[6].
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC, Branch 6
of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin (Judge Marin).
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents motion for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the

Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition.[9] The respondent Judge
nevertheless issued via a Special Order[10] a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen
(15) days after the Sheriffs written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their
house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a
Petition for Review[11] (under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of the
Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in
Civil Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for
Demolition on 19 March 2008.[12]
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29
April 2008. The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas
data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of
amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual
positions diametrically opposed to the MCTCs findings and legal reasons. Most
importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed land
and of intrusion into this land by the private respondents. The material factual allegations
of the petition bases as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo read:
29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns
intruded into the property of the defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not in
uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m.
two houses of the defendants were burned to ashes.
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by
defendants to protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed men trained their
shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was identified
as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an,
Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [...]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one of
the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at
minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion.
Their act is a blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence against women and
children, which is aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons.

[]
34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners
continue because the private respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men
and they are influential with the police authorities owing to their financial and political
clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by
defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into the property in dispute by
the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses who are persons not related to the defendants
are therefore disinterested witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida
Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of
Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts
through hired men in their bid to unjustly evict the defendants.[13]
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for
forcible entry that the private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,[14] they maintain
that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or possession of real property
or an interest therein, with the assessed value of the property involved exceeding
P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the
petitioners reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC decision was appealed equally
has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could not have validly issued the
assailed orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective,
both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the
other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the
petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not
lost on us that the petitioners have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the CA
petition) for the review of the same RTC orders now assailed in the present petition,
although the petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present petition the exact
status of their pending CA petition. The CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of
Appeals on 2 August 2007, which indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very
least, the latest of the interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at
the latest. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more
than eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the present petition is
separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at
least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days[15] from
receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed
motion for reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the petitioners counsel stated in his attached Certificate of
Compliance with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court[16] (Certificate of Compliance) that
in the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR
DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the
same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC. To guard against any insidious
argument that the present petition is timely filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel
it best to declare now that the counting of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65
cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date cited by the petitioners counsel. The Notice to
Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists independently from the RTC orders

assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA petition. It is merely a notice, made
in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement
medium that has no life of its own separately from the assailed order on which it is
based. It cannot therefore be the appropriate subject of an independent petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot
likewise be the material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to
Vacate is not even directly assailed in this petition, as the petitions Prayer patently
shows.[17]
Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been
guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least,
of forum shopping.
By the petitioners own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals
(docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed in
this petition, but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly because the CA did not act
on the petition up to this date and for the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA would be
a waste of time and would render the case moot and academic since the CA refused to
resolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of
demolition despite the defect of LACK OF JURISDICTION.[18]
Interestingly, the petitioners counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition at the same time represented in his Certificate of Compliance[19] that:
xxx
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic);
(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that the
ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is
not capable of being the subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the resolution of
the CA is attached hereto; (underscoring supplied)
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date the
same had not been resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).
xxx
The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate
court level is replete with significance regarding the petitioners intentions. We discern -from the petitioners act of misrepresenting in the body of their petition that the CA did not
act on the petition up to this date while stating the real Court of Appeals action in the
Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide the real state of the remedies the
petitioners sought below in order to mislead us into action on the RTC orders without
frontally considering the action that the Court of Appeals had already undertaken.
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present
petition, the same relief that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 02859. The petitioners act of seeking against the same parties the nullification of the
same RTC orders before the appellate court and before us at the same time, although
made through different mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes willful and
deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal
of the petition under the combined application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs
of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the

Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of
Appeals and possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping violation
where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory orders, with
the recourses existing side by side at the same time.
To restate the prevailing rules, forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against
whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek
a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.
Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the
administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the
rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct
contempt.[20]
Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective
as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in violation of Sections
4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their postal
identification cards with the Notary Public.
In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the
supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction
over the private respondents complaint, which specifically alleged a cause for forcible
entry and not as petitioners may have misread or misappreciated a case involving title to
or possession of realty or an interest therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction
over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts have
had jurisdiction over these cases called accion interdictal even before the R.A. 7691
amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of
possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the property
involved; the law established no distinctions based on the assessed value of the property
forced into or unlawfully detained. Separately from accion interdictal are accion
publiciana for the recovery of the right of possession as a plenary action, and accion
reivindicacion for the recovery of ownership.[21] Apparently, these latter actions are the
ones the petitioners refer to when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19,
par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, in which jurisdiction may either be with the first-level courts or the regional trial
courts, depending on the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the
complaint at the MCTC was patently for forcible entry, that court committed no
jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present petition.

concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or

security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the
prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall
issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty
that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the Pwrit must
be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat,
act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be
described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and
conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the
threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.[22]
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of
the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the
circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty
and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual
allegations heretofore quoted,[23] that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the
petition. These allegations are supported by the following documents:
(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel
Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the
petitioners, id., petitioners prior possession, private respondents intrusion and the illegal
acts committed by the private respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of
guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minors descendants of Antonio Tapuz;

In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for
violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for
substantive deficiencies.

(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating

Nemias affidavit;

The Writ of Amparo

(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding
the incident of petitioners intrusion into the disputed land;

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to
the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary

(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the
altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards of the private respondents,
including the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one of the security guards;

(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house
owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally
burned by a fire.
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the
overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of
physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues
relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that
the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other
hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the
presence of armed men bare to the waist and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons.
Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights
to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them the statements of Nemia
Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The
Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what
had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the
burning of two residential houses was accidental.
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the
forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners factual claims. These findings are
significantly complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-blown judicial
process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending parties positions,
evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a
dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was
brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal
that is still pending; still much later brought to the appellate court without conclusive
results; and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the issuance
of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending
RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie
existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather
than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the
violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the
disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged
perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary
criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of
amparo.
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action
may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently of
the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal
process. Such effect, though unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the orderly
administration of justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not
intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the
indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners present recourse via the remedy of
the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners
sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an improper

remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners misrepresentations pointed out
above; from their obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the
extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are
far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary
course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper
remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary though
they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo,
particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari
process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes the situation obtaining
in the present case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for
rules on the institution of separate actions,[24] for the effect of earlier-filed criminal
actions,[25] and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with
a subsequently filed criminal and civil action.[26] These rules were adopted to promote
an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo
when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the
possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in
separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear
prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security the personal concern that the
writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or
threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of
the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari,
applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed
criminal case.
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material
allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to
life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the
person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:
1. [ ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP
may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of

violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the
petitioners with copy of the same;
[]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine National
Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the
petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an investigation
was conducted by the PNP.
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a
minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete
allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to
life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated,
any need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has
already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the
writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not
also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing
more than the fishing expedition that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on
habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In
these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data
is fully in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition
OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and attachments.
G. R. No. 182161

REYES vs. GONZALEZ

December 3, 2009
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November
30, 2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty (50) others,
were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same
day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y.
Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to
ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for
trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.
On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure
Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the
Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of
petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national
security and public safety.
On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for
the crime of Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel of
Prosecutors filed an Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045 before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause and Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance asserting that the
DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific participation in the crime
charged; and that under the Constitution, the determination of probable cause must be
made personally by a judge.

On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion
against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. The trial court ratiocinated
that the evidence submitted by the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors failed to show
that petitioner and the other accused-civilians conspired and confederated with the
accused-soldiers in taking arms against the government; that petitioner and other
accused-civilians were arrested because they ignored the call of the police despite the
deadline given to them to come out from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and submit
themselves to the police authorities; that mere presence at the scene of the crime and
expressing ones sentiments on electoral and political reforms did not make them
conspirators absent concrete evidence that the accused-civilians knew beforehand the
intent of the accused-soldiers to commit rebellion; and that the cooperation which the law
penalizes must be one that is knowingly and intentionally rendered.
On December 18, 2007, petitioners counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote the DOJ
Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 07-3126.
On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to petitioners letter stating that the DOJ could
not act on petitioners request until Atty. Chavezs right to represent petitioner is settled in
view of the fact that a certain Atty. J. V. Bautista representing himself as counsel of
petitioner had also written a letter to the DOJ.
On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal
of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists; that on December 19,
2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the NAIA as his name is included in the Hold
Departure List; that had it not been for the timely intervention of petitioners counsel,
petitioner would not have been able to take his scheduled flight to Hong Kong; that on
December 26, 2007, petitioner was able to fly back to the Philippines from Hong Kong
but every time petitioner would present himself at the NAIA for his flights abroad, he
stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers because of the continued
inclusion of his name in the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of Justice has not
acted on his request for the lifting of HDO No. 45. Petitioner further maintained that
immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is exigent as the
continued restraint on petitioners right to travel is illegal.
On January 24, 2008, respondents represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed the Return of the Writ raising the following affirmative defenses: 1) that the
Secretary of Justice is authorized to issue Hold Departure Orders under the DOJ
Circulars No. 17, Series of 1998[2] and No. 18 Series of 2007[3] pursuant to his mandate
under the Administrative Code of 1987 as ahead of the principal law agency of the
government; 2) that HDO No. 45 dated December 1, 2007 was issued by the Sec.
Gonzales in the course of the preliminary investigation of the case against herein
petitioner upon the request of the DILG; 3) that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature in
view of public respondents pending Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2008
filed by the respondents of the Order dated December 13, 2007 of the RTC dismissing
Criminal Case No. 07-3126 for Rebellion for lack of probable cause; 4) that petitioner
failed to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a motion to lift HDO No. 45 before the
DOJ; and 5) that the constitutionality of Circulars No. 17 and 18 can not be attacked
collaterally in an amparo proceeding.
During the hearing on January 25, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. at the Paras Hall of the Court of
Appeals, counsels for both parties appeared. Petitioners counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez
manifested that petitioner is currently in Hong Kong; that every time petitioner would

leave and return to the country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and
interrogate him for several minutes because of the existing HDO; that the power of the
DOJ Secretary to issue HDO has no legal basis; and that petitioner did not file a motion
to lift the HDO before the RTC nor the DOJ because to do so would be tantamount to
recognizing the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO.
For respondents part, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) maintained that the
Secretary of the DOJs power to issue HDO springs from its mandate under the
Administrative Code to investigate and prosecute offenders as the principal law agency
of the government; that in its ten-year existence, the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No.
17 has not been challenged except now; and that on January 3, 2008, the DOJ Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors had filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
Dismissal of the trial court.
On February 1, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation attaching thereto a copy of the
Order dated January 31, 2008 of the trial court denying respondent DOJs Motion for
Reconsideration for utter lack of merit. The trial court also observed that the said Motion
should be dismissed outright for being filed out of time. [4]
The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated
petitioners constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no
power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal
basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.
On February 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and
denying the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[5] thereon was also denied in the assailed
Resolution[6] dated March 25, 2008.

The petition must fail.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,[11] made a
categorical pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these
two instances of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof,
thus:
x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to
these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without
due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other
hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the
refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.[12]
In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[13] the Court laid down the basic principle regarding the rule on
the writ of amparo as follows:

Hence, the present petition which is based on the following grounds:

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole gamut
of liberties protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues that [liberty] includes the right
to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude and includes
the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways. Part of the right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is the right of a person to travel.
In their Comment,[8] both respondents Secretary Gonzalez and Commissioner Libanan
argue that: 1) HDO No. 45 was validly issued by the Secretary of Justice in accordance
with Department of Justice Circular No. 17, Series of 1998,[9] and Circular No. 18, Series
of 2007,[10] which were issued pursuant to said Secretarys mandate under the
Administrative Code of 1987, as head of the principal law agency of the government, to
investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders, and provide immigration
regulatory services; and; 2) the issue of the constitutionality of the DOJ Secretarys
authority to issue hold departure orders under DOJ Circulars Nos. 17 and 18 is not within
the ambit of a writ of amparo.
The case hinges on the issue as to whether or not petitioners right to liberty has been
violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would
entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to
the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the
prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall
issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty
that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be
supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat,
act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be
described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and
conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the
threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.[14]
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of
the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the
circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty
and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. (Emphasis supplied)
Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection
of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel.
The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of
the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to
security.
In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,[15] the Court explained the
concept of right to life in this wise:
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be
alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security
of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: The life to which each
person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that
the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person
and property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades the whole history of man.
It touches every aspect of mans existence. In a broad sense, the right to security of
person emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his
body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to
enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also
of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature,
temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.[16]
The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon.
Laguio, Jr.,[17] in this manner:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot
be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common
welfare. x x x

Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.[18] thoroughly expounded on the

import of the right to security, thus:
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the
exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has
been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. (emphasis supplied)
Some scholars postulate that freedom from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but
essentially an individual international human right. It is the right to security of person as
the word security itself means freedom from fear. Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
xxx
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any
threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of
mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same
stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The
degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of
their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the
amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to security is actually the freedom
from threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of
Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in
the earlier part of the provision.
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity
or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general
rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical
injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment,
physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury
increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or
security of a person.
xxx
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of
the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the
right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this
third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human
rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty
and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to
these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to

victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. x x x (emphasis supplied) [19]
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another.[20] As we have
stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,[21] xxx a persons right to travel is subject to the
usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In
such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for
humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts sound discretion. [22]
Here, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of
the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish
that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a
serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily
available legal recourse or remedy.
In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I XIII, Inc. et al.,[23] this Court ruled
that:
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for
the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life,
liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give
priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time
and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the provision of
Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads:
Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been
commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall
be available by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under
the writ of amparo.
Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTCMakati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however,
did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJs HDO, as his co-accused did in the
same criminal case. Petitioner argues that it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that
issued the said HDO, and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the lifting of the
HDO but also to question before this Court the constitutionality of the power of the DOJ
Secretary to issue an HDO.[24] We quote with approval the CAs ruling on this matter:
The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the Supreme Court of its
pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul[25] that once a complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the
sound discretion of the court. Despite the denial of respondents MR of the dismissal of
the case against petitioner, the trial court has not lost control over Criminal Case No. 073126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its residual power, the court a quo
retains the authority to entertain incidents in the instant case to the exclusion of even this
Court. The relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO was and is available by
motion in the criminal case. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of amparo, supra).[26]
Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to
separately and directly intervene through the writ of amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz v.
Del Rosario,[27] thus:

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the
possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in
separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear
wr
threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of
the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari,
applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed
criminal case.
Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his
apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO.[28] Petitioners
apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat
to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an
actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the
constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and
Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18,
Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and
Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other Purposes).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 204528

DE LIMA vs. GATDULA

February 19, 2013

LEONEN, J.:

Submitted for our resolution is a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin "the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in
Manila from implementing its Decision x x x in Civil Case No. 12-127405 granting
respondent's application for the issuance of inspection and production orders x x x."1
This is raised through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 from the
"Decision" rendered by the Regional Trial Court dated 20 March 2012.
From the records, it appears that on 27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B.
Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.2 This case was docketed as In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Amparo of Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula, SP No. 12-127405. It was raffled to the sala of
Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. on the same day.
The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima,
Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National
Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to
cease and desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by
filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the
alleged ambush incident."3
Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons
and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer.4 He also set the case for hearing on 1
March 2012. The hearing was held allegedly for determining whether a temporary
protection order may be issued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al.
manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases.5
In an Order dated 2 March 2012,6 Judge Pampilo insisted that "[s]ince no writ has been
issued, return is not the required pleading but answer".7 The judge noted that the Rules

of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases.8 He opined that the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer.9

respondents to appear before a court of law to show whether the grounds for more
permanent protection and interim reliefs are necessary.

Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March 2012.10
Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda within five (5) working days after that hearing. Since the period to file an
Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the judge also decided that the memorandum of De
Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their Answer.11

The respondents are required to file a Return23 after the issuance of the writ through the
clerk of court. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the petition.24 Unlike an
Answer, the Return has other purposes aside from identifying the issues in the case.
Respondents are also required to detail the actions they had taken to determine the fate
or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary
protection, production and inspection orders. The production and inspection orders were
in relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-going investigation of the
attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. It is not clear from the records
how these pieces of evidence may be related to the alleged threat to the life, liberty or
security of the respondent Gatdula.

If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to state the
actions they had taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and
preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the
petition; (iii) identify witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death or
disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner, location, and time of death or
disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death
or disappearance; and (vi) bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.25
Clearly these matters are important to the judge so that s/he can calibrate the means and
methods that will be required to further the protections, if any, that will be due to the
petitioner.

In an Order dated 8 October 2012, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration dated
23 March 2012 filed by De Lima, et al.
Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the RTC "Decision"
dated 20 March 2012 through a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary
Injunction) via Rule 45, as enunciated in Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
(A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC, 25 September 2007), viz:
SEC. 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. x x
x (Emphasis supplied).
It is the Courts view that the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo
is not the judgment or final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a Petition for
Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time.
The RTC and the Parties must understand the nature of the remedy of Amparo to put its
procedures in the proper context.
The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard
the right of the people to life, liberty12 and security13 as enshrined in the 1987
Constitution.14 The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the
Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights.15 It aims to address concerns such as, among others,
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.16
Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was devised
to afford swift but decisive relief.17 It is initiated through a petition18 to be filed in a
Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court.19
The judge or justice then makes an "immediate" evaluation20 of the facts as alleged in
the petition and the affidavits submitted "with the attendant circumstances detailed".21
After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of Amparo22 or immediately
dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not
show that the petitioner's right to life, liberty or security is under threat or the acts
complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in
motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner. The court compels the

There will be a summary hearing26 only after the Return is filed to determine the merits
of the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the
hearing will be done ex parte.27 After the hearing, the court will render the judgment
within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision.28
If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege
of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate.29 The judgment should
contain measures which the judge views as essential for the continued protection of the
petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed enough so that the
judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this
judgment that could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45.30 After the
measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases,
this is when the threats to the petitioners life, liberty and security cease to exist as
evaluated by the court that renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also be
terminated through consolidation should a subsequent case be filed either criminal or
civil.31 Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy of Amparo
allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional rights.
The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be the
judgment or final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. This is clear from the tenor of the dispositive portion of the "Decision", to wit:
The Branch Clerk of Court of Court [sic] is hereby DIRECTED to issue the Writ of
Amparo.
Likewise, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to effect the service of the Writ
of Amparo in an expeditious manner upon all concerned, and for this purpose may call
upon the assistance of any military or civilian agency of the government.
This "Decision" pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The "Decision" is thus an
interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production and
inspection orders were given together with the decision. The temporary protection,

production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court
upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered.32
The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the RTC.
First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves
as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The
requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy
remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to
be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted
on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.
Judge Pampilos basis for requiring an Answer was mentioned in his Order dated 2
March 2012:
Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with the said rule.
Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure shall apply.
Section 5. Answer Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall
file his Answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. x x x
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the respondents are required to file their Answer
ten (days) from receipt of this Order.33
The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the Court has
devised for the following circumstances:
SECTION 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases:
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x.
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiffs
claim does not exceed x x x.
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged
is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both, x x x.
xxxx

It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to
MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to
proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary
procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It
is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact.34 It is
not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure is seriously misplaced.
The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the
issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not
have been properly joined.
Worse, is the trial courts third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a
responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al.
The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a
hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the
other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading
usually required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the
other since these submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit.
More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.35
The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. In the body of its
decision, the RTC stated:
"Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs prayed for
by the petitioner." (Emphasis supplied).
This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the phraseology is
similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
"SEC. 18. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the
time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may
be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis
supplied).
The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called
the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and
its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary hearing,
the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not
totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.1wphi1 It
is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the
petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very
real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or
ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo."

The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that petitioners used
in elevating the matter to this Court.
It is the responsibility of counsels for the parties to raise issues using the proper
procedure at the right time. Procedural rules are meant to assist the parties and courts
efficiently deal with the substantive issues pertaining to a case. When it is the judge
himself who disregards the rules of procedure, delay and confusion result.
The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order
denominated as "Decision" dated 20 March 2012. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other
hand, is prohibited.36 Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave
injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo were promulgated.
In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in order to
promote a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.37
The rules can be suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property, (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the
case, (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored
by the suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.38
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities committed
by the trial court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the
Constitution, the Court RESOLVES to:
(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge Silvino T.
Pampilo, Jr. after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo;
(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of
this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the
petition and its attached affidavits.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this Resolution on
Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for his
proper guidance together with a WARNING that further deviation or improvisation from
the procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC shall be meted with severe consequences.

G.R. No. 184467

NAVIA vs. PARDICO

June 19, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation
and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be
shown by the required quantum of proof that their disappearance was carried out by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, [the government] or a political
organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge [the same or] give information on the
fate or whereabouts of [said missing] persons.[3]
This petition for review on certiorari[4] filed in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12SC[5] challenges the July 24, 2008 Decision[6] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
20, Malolos City which granted the Petition for Writ of Amparo[7] filed by herein
respondent against the petitioners.
Factual Antecedents

On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies
Corporation[8] (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita) located at 7A
Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The arrival of
the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben),
who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw
two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked
Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw
Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian
Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps
in the subdivision.[9]
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of
Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.[10] The supervisor of the security
guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia), also arrived thereat.
As to what transpired next, the parties respective versions diverge.
Version of the Petitioners
Petitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office because they received a
report from a certain Mrs. Emphasis, a resident of Grand Royale Subdivision, that she
saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp from a post in said subdivision.[11] The reported
unauthorized taking of the lamp was relayed thru radio to petitioners Ruben Dio (Dio) and
Andrew Buising (Buising), who both work as security guards at the Asian Land security
department. Following their departments standard operating procedure, Dio and Buising
entered the report in their logbook and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Emphasis. It was
there where Dio and Buising were able to confirm who the suspects were. They thus
repaired to the house of Lolita where Bong and Ben were staying to invite the two
suspects to their office. Bong and Ben voluntarily went with them.
At the security office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben. The suspects admitted
that they took the lamp but clarified that they were only transferring it to a post nearer to
the house of Lolita.[12] Soon, Navia arrived and Buising informed him that the
complainant was not keen in participating in the investigation. Since there was no
complainant, Navia ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong then signed a statement
to the effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury to him.[13]
His mother Lolita also signed the logbook below an entry which states that she will never
again harbor or entertain Ben in her house. Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the security
office.
Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him about those who might be involved
in the reported loss of electric wires and lamps within the subdivision. After a brief
discussion though, Navia allowed Ben to leave. Ben also affixed his signature on the
logbook to affirm the statements entered by the guards that he was released unharmed
and without any injury.[14]
Upon Navias instructions, Dio and Buising went back to the house of Lolita to make her
sign the logbook as witness that they indeed released Ben from their custody. Lolita
asked Buising to read aloud that entry in the logbook where she was being asked to sign,
to which Buising obliged. Not contented, Lolita put on her reading glasses and read the
entry in the logbook herself before affixing her signature therein. After which, the guards
left.
Subsequently, petitioners received an invitation[15] from the Malolos City Police Station
requesting them to appear thereat on April 17, 2008 relative to the complaint of Virginia

Pardico (Virginia) about her missing husband Ben. In compliance with the invitation, all
three petitioners appeared at the Malolos City Police Station. However, since Virginia
was not present despite having received the same invitation, the meeting was reset to
April 22, 2008.[16]
On April 22, 2008, Virginia attended the investigation. Petitioners informed her that they
released Ben and that they have no information as to his present whereabouts.[17] They
assured Virginia though that they will cooperate and help in the investigation of her
missing husband.[18]

Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition
for Writ of Amparo[28] before the RTC of Malolos City. Finding the petition sufficient in
form and substance, the amparo court issued an Order[29] dated June 26, 2008
directing, among others, the issuance of a writ of amparo and the production of the body
of Ben before it on June 30, 2008. Thus:
WHEREFORE, conformably with Section 6 of the Supreme Court Resolution [in] A.M.
No. 07-[9]-12-SC, also known as The Rule On The Writ Of Amparo, let a writ of amparo
be issued, as follows:

Version of the Respondent

According to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They were unlawfully
arrested, shoved into the Asian Land vehicle and brought to the security office for
investigation. Upon seeing Ben at the security office, Navia lividly grumbled Ikaw na
naman?[19] and slapped him while he was still seated. Ben begged for mercy, but his
pleas were met with a flurry of punches coming from Navia hitting him on different parts
of his body.[20] Navia then took hold of his gun, looked at Bong, and said, Wala kang
nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben.[21]
Bong admitted that he and Ben attempted to take the lamp. He explained that the area
where their house is located is very dark and his father had long been asking the
administrator of Grand Royale Subdivision to install a lamp to illumine their area. But
since nothing happened, he took it upon himself to take a lamp from one of the posts in
the subdivision and transfer it to a post near their house. However, the lamp Bong got
was no longer working. Thus, he reinstalled it on the post from which he took it and no
longer pursued his plan. [22]
Later on, Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the guards logbook where she
undertook not to allow Ben to stay in her house anymore.[23] Thereafter, Navia again
asked Lolita to sign the logbook. Upon Lolitas inquiry as to why she had to sign again,
Navia explained that they needed proof that they released her son Bong unharmed but
that Ben had to stay as the latters case will be forwarded to the barangay. Since she has
poor eyesight, Lolita obligingly signed the logbook without reading it and then left with
Bong.[24] At that juncture, Ben grabbed Bong and pleaded not to be left alone. However,
since they were afraid of Navia, Lolita and Bong left the security office at once leaving
Ben behind.[25]
Moments after Lolita and Bong reached their house, Buising arrived and asked Lolita to
sign the logbook again. Lolita asked Buising why she had to sign again when she already
twice signed the logbook at the headquarters. Buising assured her that what she was
about to sign only pertains to Bongs release. Since it was dark and she has poor
eyesight, Lolita took Buisings word and signed the logbook without, again, reading what
was written in it. [26]
The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her husband
Ben, but only to be told that petitioners had already released him together with Bong the
night before. She then looked for Ben, asked around, and went to the barangay. Since
she could not still find her husband, Virginia reported the matter to the police.
In the course of the investigation on Bens disappearance, it dawned upon Lolita that
petitioners took advantage of her poor eyesight and naivete. They made her sign the
logbook as a witness that they already released Ben when in truth and in fact she never
witnessed his actual release. The last time she saw Ben was when she left him in
petitioners custody at the security office.[27]

(1)
ORDERING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising of the
Asian Land Security Agency to produce before the Court the body of aggrieved party
Benhur Pardico, on Monday, June 30, 2008, at 10:30 a.m.;
(2)
ORDERING the holding of a summary hearing of the petition on the
aforementioned date and time, and DIRECTING the [petitioners] to personally appear
thereat;
(3)
COMMANDING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising to
file, within a non-extendible period of seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ, a
verified written return with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain
the following:
a) The lawful defenses to show that the [petitioners] did not violate or threaten with
violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or
omission;
b)
The steps or actions taken by the [petitioners] to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat,
act or omission; and
c)
All relevant information in the possession of the [petitioners] pertaining to the
threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party.
(4)
GRANTING, motu proprio, a Temporary Protection Order prohibiting the
[petitioners], or any persons acting for and in their behalf, under pain of contempt, from
threatening, harassing or inflicting any harm to [respondent], his immediate family and
any [member] of his household.
The Branch Sheriff is directed to immediately serve personally on the [petitioners], at
their address indicated in the petition, copies of the writ as well as this order, together
with copies of the petition and its annexes.[30]

A Writ of Amparo[31] was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners on June 27,
2008.[32] On June 30, 2008, petitioners filed their Compliance[33] praying for the denial
of the petition for lack of merit.
A summary hearing was thereafter conducted. Petitioners presented the testimony of
Buising, while Virginia submitted the sworn statements[34] of Lolita and Enrique which
the two affirmed on the witness stand.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 24, 2008, the trial court issued the challenged Decision[35] granting the petition.
It disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the privilege of the writ of amparo, and deems it
proper and appropriate, as follows:
(a)
To hereby direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to immediately
conduct a deep and thorough investigation of the [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio
and Andrew Buising in connection with the circumstances surrounding the
disappearance of [Benhur] Pardico, utilizing in the process, as part of the investigation,
the documents forming part of the records of this case;
(b)
To hereby direct the NBI to extend to the family of [Benhur] Pardico and the
witnesses who testified in this case protection as it may deem necessary to secure their
safety and security; and
(c)
To hereby direct the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to investigate
the circumstances concerning the legality of the arrest of [Benhur] Pardico by the
[petitioners] in this case, utilizing in the process, as part of said investigation, the
pertinent documents and admissions forming part of the record of this case, and take
whatever course/s of action as may be warranted.

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the
rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to
provide an expeditious and effective relief to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. [40]
Here, Bens right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties do not dispute
his identity as the same person summoned and questioned at petitioners security office
on the night of March 31, 2008. Such uncontroverted fact ipso facto established Bens
inherent and constitutionally enshrined right to life, liberty and security. Article 6[41] of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[42] recognizes every human beings
inherent right to life, while Article 9[43] thereof ordains that everyone has the right to
liberty and security. The right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and
security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law.
This overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and security without due
process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.[44]
The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Bens disappearance as alleged in
Virginias petition and proved during the summary proceedings conducted before the
court a quo, falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and relevant laws.
It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:

Furnish immediately copies of this decision to the NBI, through the Office of Director
Nestor Mantaring, and to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.
SO ORDERED.[36]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[37] which was denied by the trial court in
an Order[38] dated August 29, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues for our consideration:
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the
writ of amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the
violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security
are clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to
establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state with some
degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners constituting a
violation of or a threat to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be
deduced from the evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had
a hand in his alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which
bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on
March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the trial court erred in
issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for Bens disappearance.

SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(Emphasis ours.)

While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs coverage, said Rules does not, however,
define extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. This omission was intentional as
the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court which drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
chose to allow it to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through substantive laws
as may be promulgated by Congress.[45] Then, the budding jurisprudence on amparo
blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis[46] when this Court defined enforced disappearances.
The Court in that case applied the generally accepted principles of international law and
adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances definition of enforced disappearances, as the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons
or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the
fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law.[47]

Our Ruling

Not long thereafter, another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC came
about after Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 9851[48] on December 11, 2009.
Section 3(g) thereof defines enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows:

Virginias Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and must perforce be dismissed,
but not for the reasons adverted to by the petitioners.

(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or

abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or

a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom

or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of
removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo[49] where Justice Arturo D. Brion wrote in his
Separate Opinion that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to the
rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as well of what an
enforced or involuntary disappearance is.[50] Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs reference
to enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary
disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of RA No. 9851. Meaning, in
probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in
relation to RA No. 9851.
From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the
following elements that constitute it:
(a)

that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b)
that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization;
(c)
that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge
or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo
petition; and,
(d)
that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time.

As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation
and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be
shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an
amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable
element of government participation.
In the present case, we do not doubt Bongs testimony that Navia had a menacing
attitude towards Ben and that he slapped and inflicted fistic blows upon him. Given the
circumstances and the pugnacious character of Navia at that time, his threatening
statement, Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben, cannot be
taken lightly. It unambiguously showed his predisposition at that time. In addition, there is
nothing on record which would support petitioners assertion that they released Ben on
the night of March 31, 2008 unscathed from their wrath. Lolita sufficiently explained how
she was prodded into affixing her signatures in the logbook without reading the entries
therein. And so far, the information petitioners volunteered are sketchy at best, like the
alleged complaint of Mrs. Emphasis who was never identified or presented in court and
whose complaint was never reduced in writing.

But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not

enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with
the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This
indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The petition does
not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend
to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In
fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginias
amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable persons.[51] Thus, in the
absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Bens
disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his
case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible
or
accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie
against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held
accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still,
government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here,
petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam,
Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for
the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some
covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the
ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be
attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation
differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing
person.
WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Malolos City, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Writ of Amparo filed by
Virginia Pardico is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 193636

GAMBOA vs. CHAN

July 24, 2012

SERENO, J.:

At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was
the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior
Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent
Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the Provincial
Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police
Provincial Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative
Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged
Existence of Private Armies in the Country."7 The body, which was later on referred to as
the Zearosa Commission,8 was formed to investigate the existence of private army
groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010
elections and dismantling them permanently in the future.9 Upon the conclusion of its
investigation, the Zearosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the
President a confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent
Commission Against Private Armies Report to the President" (the Report).10
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNPIlocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides,11 and classified

her as someone who keeps a PAG.12 Purportedly without the benefit of data verification,
PNPIlocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zearosa
Commission,13 thereby causing her inclusion in the Reports enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she pointed out the following items reflected
therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of PAGs in
the Philippines.15
(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task Group
(STG) for each private armed group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their activities."16
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP and
captioned as "Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010," which classifies
PAGs in the country according to region, indicates their identity, and lists the prominent
personalities with whom these groups are associated.17 The first entry in the table
names a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to herein petitioner Gamboa.18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in Malacaang on
March 24, 2010 at which time, the Commission was also asked to comment on the PNP
report that out of one hundred seventeen (117) partisan armed groups validated, twentyfour (24) had been dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members apprehended and more
than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.
Commissioner Herman Basbao qualified that said statistics were based on PNP data
but that the more significant fact from his report is that the PNP has been vigilant in
monitoring the activities of these armed groups and this vigilance is largely due to the
existence of the Commission which has continued communicating with the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP personnel in the field to constantly provide data on the
activities of the PAGs. Commissioner Basbao stressed that the Commissions efforts
have preempted the formation of the PAGs because now everyone is aware that there is
a body monitoring the PAGs movement through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant
General Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified that the PAGs are being destabilized so that
their ability to threaten and sow fear during the election has been considerably
weakened.19
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective of the
situation in the field, the PNP complied with the Commissions recommendation that they
revise their validation system to include those PAGs previously listed as dormant. In the
most recent briefing provided by the PNP on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven
(107) existing PAGs. Of these groups, the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have been
reorganized.20
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of
the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21
Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media.22 Thus,
she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified
information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zearosa
Commission.23 As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the
enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made

her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to
harassment and police surveillance operations.24
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas
data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her
Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from
the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP
officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to
refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents
from making baseless reports.26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which
issued the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition meritorious on its
face.27 Thus, the trial court (a) instructed respondents to submit all information and
reports forwarded to and used by the Zearosa Commission as basis to include her in
the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed respondents, and any person acting on
their behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding to the Zearosa Commission, or to any
other government entity, information that they may have gathered against her without the
approval of the court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written return of the writ
together with supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the summary hearing of the case
on 23 July 2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds of
their mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa.29 The
information stored in their database supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which
she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for murder and frustrated murder docketed
as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a Complaint for murder, frustrated
murder and direct assault upon a person in authority, as well as indirect assault and
multiple attempted murder, docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with
the following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in
which the right to privacy was violated or threatened with violation and how it affected the
right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and recourses she took to
secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the files, registers or databases,
the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data
or information.31 They also contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being
limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the proper
remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.32
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the Petition.33
The trial court categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a violation of her right to
privacy, to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs, Gamboas right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The violation
understandably affects her life, liberty and security enormously. The untold misery that
comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be insurmountable. As she essentially
alleged in her petition, she fears for her security that at any time of the day the unlimited
powers of respondents may likely be exercised to further malign and destroy her
reputation and to transgress her right to life.

By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed that
there was certainly intrusion into Gamboas activities. It cannot be denied that information
was gathered as basis therefor. After all, under Administrative Order No. 275, the
Zearosa Commission was tasked to investigate the existence of private armies in the
country, with all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I
of the Administrative Code of 1987.

In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas
data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to privacy; second,
explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary remedy that seeks to protect the right
to informational privacy; and finally, contextualize the right to privacy vis--vis the state
interest involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy

xxx

xxx

xxx

By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she
accused respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and provided
information that made the Zearosa Commission to include her in the list. Obviously, it
was this gathering and forwarding of information supposedly by respondents that
petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the
ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject
information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded this database to the
Zearosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification.35 The trial court also ruled
that even before respondents assumed their official positions, information on her may
have already been acquired.36 Finally, it held that the Zearosa Commission, as the
body tasked to gather information on PAGs and authorized to disclose information on
her, should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to the
Petition.37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010,38 raising
the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zearosa Commission be impleaded as either a
necessary or indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient proof to link
respondents as the informant to [sic] the Zearosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zearosa Commission to
[sic] the PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an
agency.39

The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a
constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved
goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the
periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the
constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas:
"Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful
governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of
freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." As a matter of
fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his
personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands
respect. xxx.
xxx

Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the
mandate to dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in accordance with due
process, such that the gathering and forwarding of unverified information on her must be
considered unlawful.41 She also reiterates that she was able to present sufficient
evidence showing that the subject information originated from respondents.42

xxx

x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for five
members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of
association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers in any house in
time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The
Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of
privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." After referring to various
American Supreme Court decisions, Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear
witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."
xxx

On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa failed to
present substantial evidence to show that her right to privacy in life, liberty or security
was violated, and (b) the trial court correctly dismissed the Petition on the ground that
she had failed to present sufficient proof showing that respondents were the source of
the report naming her as one who maintains a PAG.40

xxx

xxx

xxx

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition

independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions
between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a
system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control.
Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity
of the individual has become increasingly important as modern society has developed.

All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization

operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between
a democratic and a totalitarian society."44 (Emphases supplied)

Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on
privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.

In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the right to
privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:

Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government
to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn. x x x.46 (Emphases supplied)

Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized
and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in
section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:

Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from
intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on
Banks,47 this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights,
viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health as may be provided by law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code
provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts
by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public
officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the
rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other
private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets
by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling.
Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the

With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated,
suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the
legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to
thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right
of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over
the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the
right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.
Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no
infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure
information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies
involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in
foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling
enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the
courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a
fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or
overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy.49 It seeks
to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ
to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand,
and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and jurisprudence.
Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European tradition of data

protection,51 this Court can be guided by cases on the protection of personal data
decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander
v. Sweden,52 in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free from
interference in their private affairs with the right of the state to protect its national
security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked as a
temporary replacement museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent to
a restricted military security zone.53 He was refused employment when the requisite
personnel control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in the
secret police register, which was kept in accordance with the Personnel Control
Ordinance and to which he was prevented access.54 He claimed, among others, that this
procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the European Convention of Human
Rights55 on the right to privacy, as nothing in his personal or political background would
warrant his classification in the register as a security risk.56

xxx

xxx

xxx

66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not
communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the
interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security", as it is the very absence of such communication which, at least partly, ensures
the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see, mutatis mutandis, the abovementioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, 58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of the
Ordinance of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary
Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of communication to the person
concerned, as contained in section 13 of the Ordinance, should be effectively applied in
so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the control (see paragraph 31 above).

The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating to the
private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute the
same, amounted to an interference in his right to respect for private life.57 However, the
ECHR held that the interference was justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel
control system had a legitimate aim, which was the protection of national security,58 and
(b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication as to the
scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording and release of
information by the authorities.59 The following statements of the ECHR must be
emphasized:

67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the safeguards
contained in the Swedish personnel control system meet the requirements of paragraph
2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation available to it,
the respondent State was entitled to consider that in the present case the interests of
national security prevailed over the individual interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59
above). The interference to which Mr. Leander was subjected cannot therefore be said to
have been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)

58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social
need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter
alia, the Gillow judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, 55).

Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the
right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the
determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary
remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion
upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.

59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin of
appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate aim
pursued but also on the particular nature of the interference involved. In the instant case,
the interest of the respondent State in protecting its national security must be balanced
against the seriousness of the interference with the applicants right to respect for his
private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national security,
for the Contracting States to have laws granting the competent domestic authorities
power, firstly, to collect and store in registers not accessible to the public information on
persons and, secondly, to use this information when assessing the suitability of
candidates for employment in posts of importance for national security.

The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis--vis the interest of the state
to dismantle private armies.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed
groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also provides for the
establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is
controlled and administered by a national police commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275
articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the
ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.

Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leanders legitimate

interests through the consequences it had on his possibilities of access to certain
sensitive posts within the public service. On the other hand, the right of access to public
service is not as such enshrined in the Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment
of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, 34-35), and, apart from those
consequences, the interference did not constitute an obstacle to his leading a private life
of his own choosing.

To enable the Zearosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the
powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer
oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and use compulsory
processes to produce documents, books, and records.62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized
the Zearosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law
enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance of its functions.63

In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available to the
respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the present case, and in
particular in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national
security, was a wide one.

Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b) maintain peace
and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and
prevent crimes.64

Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and
functions accorded to the Zearosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected
information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and
counteracted their activities.65 One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in
the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the
trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zearosa
Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life,
liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with
the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these
notorious groups. Moreover, the Zearosa Commission was explicitly authorized to
deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus had the
power to request assistance from the latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP released
information to the Zearosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and
without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a
violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial
component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.1wphi1 Additionally, Gamboa
herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update
information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the
situation on the field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the
information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make any
further determination as to the propriety of sharing information during specific stages of
intelligence gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the discretion of investigative
bodies in the accomplishment of their functions, resulting in an undue encroachment on
their competence.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing
law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these
investigating entities that information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality.
Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities empowered to
receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to privacy is the freedom
from "unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities."67
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its
confidential nature.1wphi1 That it was leaked to third parties and the media was
regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to
establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event,
there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation,
making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and
improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence
that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters
susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard,
respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in

relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy
the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far
outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the
collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful
mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in
Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag
City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is
AFFIRMED.
REPUBLIC vs. COSETENG-MAGPAYO
G.R. No. 189476
February 2, 2011
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo
(respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim
Coseteng who, as respondents certificate of live birth[1] shows, contracted marriage on
March 26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July
22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name
to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No.
Q-0863058, was entitled IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN
EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON
MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG.
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics
Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique does not appear in [its] National Indices of
Marriage.[2] Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to
college[3] showing that he carried the surname Coseteng, and the birth certificate of his
child where Coseteng appears as his surname.[4] In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections,
respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon Citys 3rd District using the
name JULIAN M.L. COSETENG.[5]
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC,[6] respondent amended his petition by
alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule
103 of the Rules of Court.[7]
The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the
newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13,
2008, and November 14-20, 2008.[8] And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered
by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte.[9]

By Decision of January 8, 2009,[10] the trial court granted respondents petition and
directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to:
1. Delete the entry March 26, 1972 in Item 24 for DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF
PARTIES [in herein respondents Certificate of live Birth];

2. Correct the entry MAGPAYO in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to
COSETENG;
3. Delete the entry COSETENG in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr. in the space for FATHER of the
[respondent] (emphasis and underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original)

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009,[11] hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the
present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law.

The petition is impressed with merit.

A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid
and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when
one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs
of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.[17] Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of,
or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.

The Republic assails the decision in this wise:

I.
. . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEINVOLVES THE CHANGE
OF [RESPONDENTS] CIVIL STATUS FROM LEGITIMATE TO ILLEGITIMATE AND,
THEREFORE, SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH APPROPRIATE ADVERSARIAL
PROCEEDINGS
II.
THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT DIRECTED
THE DELETION OF THE NAME OF RESPONDENTS FATHER FROM HIS BIRTH
CERTIFICATE.[12] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines.[18]
In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she
had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her
legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had
been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully
entitled to use her mothers surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was
justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent
denies his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect his legal status
in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103
then would not suffice to grant respondents supplication.

The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of
respondents parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status
from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person must be
effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.[13]
The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondents parents date of marriage
and the name of respondents father from the entries in respondents birth certificate,[14]
the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, such order not being in accord with respondents
prayer reading:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the Honorable
Court issue an order allowing the change of name of petitioner from JULIAN EDWARD
EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO to JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM
COSETENG, and that the Honorable Court order the Local Civil Registrar and all other
relevant government agencies to reflect the said change of name in their records.
Petitioner prays for other reliefs deemed proper under the premises.[15] (underscoring
supplied)
Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial in nature.
He cites the serving of copies of the petition and its annexes upon the Civil Registrar of
Makati, the Civil Registrar General, and the OSG; the posting of copies of the notice of
hearing in at least four public places at least ten days before the hearing; the delegation
to the OSG by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear on behalf of the Republic;
the publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three
consecutive weeks; and the fact that no oppositors appeared on the scheduled
hearing.[16]

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic[19] categorically holds that changes which may affect the civil
status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations
which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . .
Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,
Rule 108 applies. It reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof
to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to
be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status should be filed in
the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected that of Makati in

the present case, and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby should be made parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his
birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of
the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati
nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.

Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote[20] in support of his claim that his
change of name was effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
Republic v. Belmonte,[21] illuminates, however:
The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108
concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and
distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of
expediency. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of
Court allowing the change of ones name or the correction of entries in the civil registry
only upon meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitalization and underscoring supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two
statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule
108. For, as reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil
registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case.
Republic v. Labrador[22] mandates that a petition for a substantial correction or change
of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all
other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. It
cannot be gainsaid that change of status of a child in relation to his parents is a
substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry.
Labayo-Rowe[23] highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties in a
petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations. In that case, the therein
petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe (Emperatriz) filed a petition for the correction of
entries in the birth certificates of her children, Vicente Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat, in
the Civil Registry of San Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz alleged that her name
appearing in the birth certificates is Beatriz, which is her nickname, but her full name is
Emperatriz; and her civil status appearing in the birth certificate of her daughter Victoria
as married on 1953 Bulan are erroneous because she was not married to Vicente Miclat
who was the one who furnished the data in said birth certificate.
The trial court found merit in Emperatrizs petition and accordingly directed the local civil
registrar to change her name appearing in her childrens birth certificates from Beatriz to
Emperatriz; and to correct her civil status in Victorias birth certificate from married to
single and the date and place of marriage to no marriage.
On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the order of the trial
court involved a question of law, the Court nullified the trial courts order directing the
change of Emperatriz civil status and the filiation of her child Victoria in light of the
following observations:

x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties
should have been made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the
child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their
hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be
affected by the change should be notified or represented. The truth is best ascertained
under an adversary system of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if
her status would be changed from legitimate to illegitimate. Moreover, she would be
exposed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate
filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was
published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the
State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other
provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its
rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs
that such rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. If Rule 108 were
to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are
visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and
controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned,
said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to
increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412
of the Civil Code.[24] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof
to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to
be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly mandates two
sets of notices to different potential oppositors. The first notice is that given to the
persons named in the petition and the second (which is through publication) is that given
to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated
under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also abovequoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of potential oppositors) within
which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).
This is the overriding principle laid down in Barco v. Court of Appeals.[25] In that case,
Nadina Maravilla (Nadina) filed a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of
her daughter June from June Salvacion Maravilla to June Salvacion Gustilo, Armando
Gustilo being, according to Nadina, her daughters real father. Gustilo in fact filed before
the trial court a CONSTANCIA wherein he acknowledged June as his daughter. The trial
court granted the petition.

After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for annulment of the Order of the trial court granting the change of Junes family name to
Gustilo.
Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of her minor daughter Mary Joy Ann Gustilo,
filed before the appellate court a motion for intervention, alleging that Mary Joy had a
legal interest in the annulment of the trial courts Order as Mary Joy was, by Barcos claim,
also fathered by Gustilo.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint-in-intervention.
On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she should have been impleaded in Nadinas
petition for correction of entries of the birth certificate of Mary Joy. But since a petitioner,
like Nadina, is not expected to exhaustively identify all the affected parties, the
subsequent publication of the notice cured the omission of Barco as a party to the case.
Thus the Court explained:
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her
interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June
was the daughter of Armando would affect her wards share in the estate of her father. It
cannot be established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joys existence at the time she filed
the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner
under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the
granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all
the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. x x x x.

indispensable party. In so ruling, the Court noted that the affected parties were already
notified of the proceedings in the case since the petitioner-siblings Khos were the ones
who initiated the petition respecting their prayer for correction of their citizenship, and
Carlito respecting the actual date of his marriage to his wife; and, with respect to the
Khos petition for change of their civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, their mother
Epifania herself took the witness stand declaring that she was not married to their father.
What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule
108 to implead the civil registrar and the parties who would naturally and legally be
affected by the grant of a petition for correction or cancellation of entries. Nonimpleading, however, as party-respondent of one who is inadvertently left out or is not
established to be known by the petitioner to be affected by the grant of the petition or
actually participates in the proceeding is notified through publication.
IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, GRANTED. The
January 8, 2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in SP
Proc. No. Q-0863058 is NULLIFIED.

G.R. No. 198010

REPUBLIC vs. UY
August 12, 2013

PERALTA, J.:

xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the
subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even
parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were
inadvertently left out. x x x x.[26] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho,[27] Carlito Kho (Carlito) and his siblings named the civil
registrar as the sole respondent in the petition they filed for the correction of entries in
their respective birth certificates in the civil registry of Butuan City, and correction of
entries in the birth certificates of Carlitos minor children. Carlito and his siblings
requested the correction in their birth certificates of the citizenship of their mother
Epifania to Filipino, instead of Chinese, and the deletion of the word married opposite the
phrase Date of marriage of parents because their parents Juan and Epifania were
not married. And Carlito requested the correction in the birth certificates of their children
of his and his wifes date of marriage to reflect the actual date of their marriage as
appearing in their marriage certificate. In the course of the hearing of the petition, Carlito
also sought the correction of the name of his wife from Maribel to Marivel.
The Khos mother Epifania took the witness stand where she declared that she was not
married to Juan who died before the filing of the Khos petition.
The trial court granted the petition.
On the issue of whether the failure to implead Marivel and the Khos parents rendered the
trial of the petition short of the required adversary proceedings and the trial courts
judgment void, this Court held that when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108
are followed, the publication of the notice of hearing cures the failure to implead an

On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of
Live Birth.5 Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She
alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton
and Sotera Lugsanay6 Her Certificate of Live Birth7 shows that her full name is "Anita
Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S.
Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school records, Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate,8 and passport9 bear the name
"Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering that
her parents were never married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother.10 She
also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the
surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.11
Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and
citizenship which was supposedly granted.12 However, the National Statistics Office
(NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.
On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order13 finding the petition to be sufficient in form
and substance and setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province
of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense
of respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and the City Prosecutors Office for their information and guidance.14
Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied with the publication requirement.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. THE

CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GINGOOG CITY, or any person acting in his behalf is
directed and ordered to effect the correction or change of the entries in the Certificate of
Live Birth of petitioners name and citizenship so that the entries would be:
a)
As to petitioners name :
First Name
: NORMA
Middle Name
: SY
Last Name
: LUGSANAY
b)
As to petitioners nationality/citizenship :
: FILIPINO
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC concluded that respondents petition would neither prejudice the government
nor any third party. It also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer
to one and the same person, especially since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City
has effected the correction. Considering that respondent has continuously used and has
been known since childhood as "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the RTC
granted the petition to avoid confusion.16
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that
respondents failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the
publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation
for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil
Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutors Office.17 As to whether the petition is a
collateral attack on respondents filiation, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, considering
that her parents were not legally married and that her siblings birth certificates uniformly
state that their surname is Lugsanay and their citizenship is Filipino.18 Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 27, 2011.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for failure to
implead indispensable parties.
Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceeding is brought may
make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for
the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same
in his record.19
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate,
particularly those pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the
correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for since childhood,
including her legal documents such as passport and school and professional records.
She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the
surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese."
The changes, however, are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on respondents
filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her
father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her
status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to
Filipino, the same affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes
are substantial.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia20 that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding.21 The pronouncement of the Court in that case is illuminating:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of
clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or
citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief
cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right
in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate
remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved
by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Blacks Law Dictionary defines
"adversary proceeding" as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application,
one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and
afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding.22

In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Courts conclusion in Republic v.
Kho,23 Alba v. Court of Appeals,24 and Barco v. Court of Appeals,25 that the failure to
implead indispensable parties was cured by the publication of the notice of hearing
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In Republic v. Kho,26
petitioner therein appealed the RTC decision granting the petition for correction of entries
despite respondents failure to implead the minors mother as an indispensable party.
The Court, however, did not strictly apply the provisions of Rule 108, because it opined
that it was highly improbable that the mother was unaware of the proceedings to correct
the entries in her childrens birth certificates especially since the notices, orders and
decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence she shared with them.27
In Alba v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court found nothing wrong with the trial courts
decision granting the petition for correction of entries filed by respondent although the
proceedings was not actually known by petitioner. In that case, petitioners mother and
guardian was impleaded in the petition for correction of entries, and notices were sent to
her address appearing in the subject birth certificate. However, the notice was returned
unserved, because apparently she no longer lived there. Thus, when she allegedly
learned of the granting of the petition, she sought the annulment of judgment which the
Court denied. Considering that the petition for correction of entries is a proceeding in
rem, the Court held that acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner is,
therefore, not required and the absence of personal service was cured by the trial courts
compliance with Rule 108 which requires notice by publication.29
In Barco v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court addressed the question of whether the court
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and all other indispensable parties to the petition for
correction of entries despite the failure to implead them in said case. While recognizing
that petitioner was indeed an indispensable party, the failure to implead her was cured by
compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108 which requires notice by publication. In so ruling,
the Court pointed out that the petitioner in a petition for correction cannot be presumed to
be aware of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition.
It emphasized that the petitioner therein exerted earnest effort to comply with the
provisions of Rule 108. Thus, the publication of the notice of hearing was considered to
have cured the failure to implead indispensable parties.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as
respondent in the petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and
allowed the correction sought by respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto by the
CA.
We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in this case.
Aside from Kho, Alba and Barco, the Court has addressed the same in Republic v.
Coseteng-Magpayo,31 Ceruila v. Delantar,32 and Labayo-Rowe v. Republic.33
In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,34 claiming that his parents were never legally
married, respondent therein filed a petition to change his name from "Julian Edward
Emerson Coseteng Magpayo," the name appearing in his birth certificate to "Julian
Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng." The notice setting the petition for hearing was
published and there being no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an order of general
default and eventually granted respondents petition deleting the entry on the date and
place of marriage of parties; correcting his surname from "Magpayo" to "Coseteng";
deleting the entry "Coseteng" for middle name; and deleting the entry "Fulvio Miranda
Magpayo, Jr." in the space for his father. The Republic of the Philippines, through the

OSG, assailed the RTC decision on the grounds that the corrections made on
respondents birth certificate had the effect of changing the civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate and must only be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. The
Court nullified the RTC decision for respondents failure to comply strictly with the
procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Aside from the wrong remedy
availed of by respondent as he filed a petition for Change of Name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, assuming that he filed a petition under Rule 108 which is the appropriate
remedy, the petition still failed because of improper venue and failure to implead the Civil
Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as respondents in the case.
In Ceruila v. Delantar,35 the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and annulment
of the birth certificate of respondent on the ground that the same was made as an
instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and, therefore, invalid and spurious, and it
falsified all material entries therein. The RTC issued an order setting the case for hearing
with a directive that the same be published and that any person who is interested in the
petition may interpose his comment or opposition on or before the scheduled hearing.
Summons was likewise sent to the Civil Register of Manila. After which, the trial court
granted the petition and nullified respondents birth certificate. Few months after,
respondent filed a petition for the annulment of judgment claiming that she and her
guardian were not notified of the petition and the trial courts decision, hence, the latter
was issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process. The Court
annulled the trial courts decision for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 108,
especially the non-impleading of respondent herself whose birth certificate was
nullified.1wphi1
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,36 petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries in
the birth certificates of her children, specifically to change her name from Beatriz V.
Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her civil status from "married" to "single,"
and the date and place of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to "No marriage." The Court
modified the trial courts decision by nullifying the portion thereof which directs the
change of petitioners civil status as well as the filiation of her child, because it was the
OSG only that was made respondent and the proceedings taken was summary in nature
which is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought.
Respondents birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese
citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition,
however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus,
respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also
her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the
changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation
and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the
proceedings taken.37 A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one
given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are
not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties.38 Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts
with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford
the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.39
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the
affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing,

earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested
parties.40 Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves
initiated the corrections proceedings;41 when there is no actual or presumptive
awareness of the existence of the interested parties;42 or when a party is inadvertently
left out.43
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction
of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including
those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is mandated.44 If the
entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary
proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected
by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set
open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.45
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated July 27, 20011 in CAG.R. CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE. Consequently, the June 28, 2004 Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No. 230-2004 granting the
Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma
S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.
REPUBLIC vs. OLAYBAR
G.R. No. 189538
February 10, 2014

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the

petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to
cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner
and respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of
respondent, the court found basis in granting the latters prayer to straighten her record
and rectify the terrible mistake.10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the
grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors
in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged
marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration couched in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Republic of the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor
General, the petitioners counsel, and all concerned government agencies.

PERALTA, J.:
SO ORDERED.12

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No

Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of
five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a
certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said
marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear
before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage
certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the
Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent
impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as
parties to the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have
appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time
the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a
medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the
supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the
marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels
Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who
owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to
obtain a passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga,
an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was
indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was
definitely not respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature
appearing in the marriage contract was forged.8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that
respondents identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a
Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles
35 and 36 of the Family Code.13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and
Order based on the following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE
ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF
THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or
corrected, because the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided
by the person who appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in
fact, the latters personal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in

the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage
null and void ab initio.16 Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is actually a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the
decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are
raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts, which does not call for the examination of the probative value
of the evidence of the parties.18 Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the
cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may
be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may
make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for
the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same
in his record.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification
affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and
the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v.
Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts
established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate
adversarial proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the
trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish
the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed
with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special
proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a
summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the
inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to
file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to
effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that
her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the
purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or
if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that
when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was
married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife
portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local
Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as partiesrespondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule
108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the
petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the
proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a
document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence.
With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the
signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondents
signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards.23 The court
thus made a categorical conclusion that respondents signature in the marriage certificate
was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed
in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz
Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office24 that:

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards
are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support
pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the
corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve
his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage.1wphi1 Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence
that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence.
The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of
marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108
cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to
contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence
of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not
the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of
the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise
stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the
wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there
was no marriage to speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in
SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil
registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United
States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27,
2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction
surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner)
had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He
then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to
"Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal
Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive
weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 174689
October 22, 2007

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant
portions read:
CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming
from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices
said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit
open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan
named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend
of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law
recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with
regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and
sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment],
petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the
physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own
doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody
or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would
bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the
realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present
petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG]
has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the
Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of
[p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and
petitioners gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the
change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law
allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex
reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republics
petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No.
02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is
allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court and RA 9048.10

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First

Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of
first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of
Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of
name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change
of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or

The petition lacks merit.

(3) The change will avoid confusion.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name
and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he
became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of
name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular,
Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment.
He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal
capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first
name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry
and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he
must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this
case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of
using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners
first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been
filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an
improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided
under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly,
it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all.

For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so
far as the change of his first name was concerned.

provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex
reassignment.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of
Sex Reassignment

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while
to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no
error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. No correction is necessary.

The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and
the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so
far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes
and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of

clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the
like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or
changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.
(emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12)
recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such
as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events
(such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal
separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions,
naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of
filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal
consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person.
Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not
among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status
include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have
rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation,
adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.28
(emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a
persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed
by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of
the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register.
Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the
local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a)
date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion
of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of

parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required
in the regulations to be issued.

Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be granted.

xxx

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However,
it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to
apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually
done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the
infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and
"female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and
even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage,
there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the
sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or
"the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or
bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for
fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not
include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the
statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains
unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable
through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to
be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of
entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his
petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to

determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this
case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for
correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds
may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed.
If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may
be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no
authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a
law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal
branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court
recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into
the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life
is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public
policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the
Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles
of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or
prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public
policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but
petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However,
marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal
capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the
changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second,
there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the
Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal
Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the

SILVERIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 178933
September 16, 2009
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz
Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate
proceeding for the settlement of her estate. The case was docketed as SP. PROC. NO.
M-2629 entitled In Re: Estate of the Late Beatriz D. Silverio, Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. v.
Ricardo S. Silverio Jr., et al. pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 57 (RTC).
On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a
petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On
November 22, 2004, Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for the
removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate and for the appointment
of a new administrator.
On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr.
as the new administrator.

On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders.
On February 4, 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting
Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate
of the Late Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable Court.[3]
Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order[4] affirming its Order dated
January 3, 2005 and denying private respondents motion for reconsideration. In the
Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the
order, immediately exercise his duties as administrator of the subject estate. The
Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia,
Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.
Nelia Silverio-Dee received a copy of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 on June 8,
2005.
On June 16, 2005, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 15,
2005[5] of the Omnibus Order. This was later denied by the RTC in an Order dated
December 12, 2005, which was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005.

within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court applying the fresh rule
period enunciated by this Court in Neypes v. Court of Appeals[15] as reiterated in
Sumaway v. Union Bank.[16]
Afterwards, on July 6, 2007, the CA issued the assailed decision granting the petition of
private respondent. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED and GIVEN
DUE COURSE. Accordingly, the Order, dated April 2, 2007, the writ of execution, dated
April 17, 2007, and the Notice to Vacate, dated April 19, 2007, are ANNULLED AND SET
ASIDE. Further, the court a quo is hereby directed to give due course to the appeal of
Nelia S. Silverio-Dee.
SO ORDERED.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues
-A-

Notably, the RTC in its Order dated December 12, 2005[6] also recalled its previous
order granting Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with letters of administration over the intestate estate
of Beatriz Silverio and reinstating Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as the administrator.
From the Order dated December 12, 2005, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated October 31, 2006. In the
same order, the RTC also allowed the sale of various properties of the intestate estate of
the late Beatriz Silverio to partially settle estate taxes, penalties, interests and other
charges due thereon. Among the properties authorized to be sold was the one located at
No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.[7]
Meanwhile, on January 6, 2006, Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal dated
January 5, 2006[8] from the Order dated December 12, 2005 while the Record on Appeal
dated January 20, 2006[9] was filed on January 23, 2006.
Thereafter, on October 23, 2006, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal
and for Issuance of a Writ of Execution[10] against the appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee on
the ground that the Record on Appeal was filed ten (10) days beyond the reglementary
period pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order[11] denying the appeal on the ground
that it was not perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of
execution for the enforcement of the Order dated May 31, 2005 against private
respondent to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park,
Makati City. The writ of execution was later issued on April 17, 2007[12] and a Notice to
Vacate[13] was issued on April 19, 2007 ordering private respondent to leave the
premises of the subject property within ten (10) days.
Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With
Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) dated May 2, 2007[14] with the CA.
On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the
issuance of a TRO. In issuing the TRO, the CA ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed

The Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 (Annex G of Annex C) and the Order dated
December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec.
1 of Rule 41;

-BThe respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, in deliberately failing to decide that the
basis of the occupancy of Nelia S. Silverio-Dee are fraudulent documents, without any
authority from the Intestate Court;
-CThe respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing precipitately the temporary
restraining order (TRO) in its Resolution dated May 4, 2007 (Annex A-1);
-DThe respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in annulling the Order dated April 2, 2007,
the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007, and the Notice to Vacate dated April 19, 2007
because the respondent Silverio-Dees occupancy of the Intestate property located at No.
3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City (Annex N of Annex C) will prevent the sale
authorized by the Order dated October 31, 2006 to secure funds for the payment of taxes
due which are now high and rapidly increasing payment of which must not be
enjoined.[17]

The Courts Ruling

No appeal may be taken from:

This petition is meritorious.

(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

The May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC Is

an Interlocutory Order, Not Subject to an Appeal

xxxx

To recapitulate, the relevant facts to the instant issue are as follows:

On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to
vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati
City. She received a copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of
Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Order. This motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December 12,
2005. This Order was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005. On
January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record
on Appeal on January 23, 2006.
Thus, in denying due course to the Notice/Record on Appeal, the RTC, in its Order dated
April 2, 2007, ruled:
Verily, the appeal taken by the movant Nelia Silverio-Dee from the Order of this Court
dated December 12, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration is misplaced as no
appeal may be taken from the order denying the motion for reconsideration (see Section
1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in relation to Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the
Rules of Court). Furthermore, assuming that what said movant had appealed is the final
Order dated May 31, 2005, still, the appeal cannot be given due course as the Record on
Appeal had been filed beyond the thirty-day period to appeal (see Section 3 Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court)
WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by Nelia Silverio is hereby DENIED due course.
Let a writ of execution issue to enforce the Order dated May 31, 2005 against Nelia
Silverio-Dee requiring her to vacate the premises at No. 3 Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati
City.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, the denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia
Silverio-Dees appeal was against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is
disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia SilverioDees Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal
provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

Petitioner argues that because private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order
dated December 12, 2005 which denied her motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus
Order dated May 31, 2005, her appeal is of an order denying a motion for
reconsideration. Thus, petitioner alleges that private respondent employed the wrong
remedy in filing a notice of appeal and should have filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead.
The CA, however, ruled that the filing of the Notice of Appeal in this case was proper
saying that the appeal pertained to the earlier Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005. The
CA, citing Apuyan v. Haldeman,[18] argued that an order denying a motion for
reconsideration may be appealed as such order is the final order which disposes of the
case. In that case, we stated:

In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., We held, thus:

[T]his Court finds that the proscription against appealing from an order denying a motion
for reconsideration refers to an interlocutory order, and not to a final order or judgment.
That that was the intention of the above-quoted rules is gathered from Pagtakhan v. CIR,
39 SCRA 455 (1971), cited in above-quoted portion of the decision in Republic, in which
this Court held that an order denying a motion to dismiss an action is interlocutory,
hence, not appealable.
The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an interlocutory
order is to prevent undue delay, useless appeals and undue inconvenience to the
appealing party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when
they can be contested in a single appeal. The appropriate remedy is thus for the party to
wait for the final judgment or order and assign such interlocutory order as an error of the
court on appeal.
The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is not
an interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an end to the particular matter
resolved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the
trial court to do other than to execute the order.

Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 41
APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal.An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable.

Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an

order of dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself.
The reference by petitioner, in his notice of appeal, to the March 12, 1999 Order denying
his Omnibus MotionMotion for Reconsideration should thus be deemed to refer to the
January 17, 1999 Order which declared him non-suited and accordingly dismissed his
complaint.

If the proscription against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration is

applied to any order, then there would have been no need to specifically mention in both
above-quoted sections of the Rules final orders or judgments as subject to appeal. In
other words, from the entire provisions of Rule 39 and 41, there can be no mistaking that
what is proscribed is to appeal from a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order. (Emphasis supplied.)

To our mind, the court a quos ruling clearly constitutes a final determination of the rights
of the petitioner as the appealing party. As such, the Omnibus Order, dated May 31,
2002 (the predecessor of the Order dated December 12, 2002) is a final order; hence,
the same may be appealed, for the said matter is clearly declared by the rules as
appealable and the proscription does not apply.[19] (Emphasis supplied.)
An interlocutory order, as opposed to a final order, was defined in Tan v. Republic:[20]

Thus, the question posed is whether the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 is an
interlocutory order.
On this aspect, the CA ruled that the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 was a final
order, to wit:
We note that the Order, dated December 12, 2005, is an offshoot of the Omnibus Order,
dated May 31, 2005. In the Omnibus Order, the court a quo ruled that the petitioner, as
an heir of the late Beatriz S. Silverio, had no right to use and occupy the property in
question despite authority given to her by Ricardo Silverio, Sr. when it said, thus:
x x x In the first place, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee cannot occupy the property in Intsia, Forbes
Park, admittedly belonging to the conjugal estate and subject to their proceedings without
authority of the Court. Based on the pretenses of Nelia Silverio-Dee in her memorandum,
it is clear that she would use and maintain the premises in the concept of a distributee.
Under her perception, Section 1 Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court is violated. x x x
xxxx
For the property at Intsia, Forbes Park cannot be occupied or appropriated by, nor
distributed to Nelia S. Silverio-Dee, since no distribution shall be allowed until the
payment of the obligations mentioned in the aforestated Rule is made. In fact, the said
property may still be sold to pay the taxes and/or other obligations owned by the estate,
which will be difficult to do if she is allowed to stay in the property.
Moreover, the alleged authority given by SILVERIO, SR. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to
occupy the property dated May 4, 2004, assuming it is not even antedated as alleged by
SILVERIO, JR., is null and void since the possession of estate property can only be
given to a purported heir by virtue of an Order from this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule 90, supra;
and Sec. 2 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court). In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall
have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal
estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration (See Sec. 3 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court). With this in
mind, it is without an iota of doubt that the possession by Nelia S. Silverio-Dee of the
property in question has absolutely no legal basis considering that her occupancy cannot
pay the debts and expenses of administration, not to mention the fact that it will also
disturb the right of the new Administrator to possess and manage the property for the
purpose of settling the estates legitimate obligations.
In the belated Memorandum of Nelia Silverio-Dee, she enclosed a statement of the
expenses she incurred pertaining to the house renovation covering the period from May
26, 2004 to February 28, 2005 in the total amount of Php12,434,749.55, which supports
this Courts conclusion that she is already the final distributee of the property. Repairs of
such magnitude require notice, hearing of the parties and approval of the Court under the
Rules. Without following this process, the acts of Nelia Silverio-Dee are absolutely
without legal sanction.

A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one
which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for
the appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is
only when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.[21]
In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on
the ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3
Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final
determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the
estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in mind that until the estate is partitioned,
each heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the estate, such that no heir may
lay claim on a particular property. In Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, we succinctly ruled:
Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole
estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Each co-owner of property which is
held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the
same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners.
The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective share of each
cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants,
joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the
same.
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the
estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise
rights of ownership over such inchoate right. Thus, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.[22] (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context that the subject property
is part of an estate and subject to intestate proceedings before the courts. It is, thus,
relevant to note that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, the administrator may only

deliver properties of the estate to the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule
90, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the properties of the estate shall only be distributed after
the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other expenses against the estate, except
when authorized by the Court.
Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties
included therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the
administrator may take possession of any property that is part of the estate without the
prior authority of the Court.
In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly
secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She,
therefore, never had any real interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia
Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be
considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal.
Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of
Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case
should have been dismissed.[23]
The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the
reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper
remedy in the instant case. This means that private respondent has now lost her remedy
of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.
Therefore, there is no longer any need to consider the other issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the May 4, 2007 Resolution and July 6, 2007 Decision of the CA in CAG.R. SP No. 98764 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Thus, the Decision dated April 2,
2007 of the RTC denying due course to the appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee; the Writ of
Execution dated April 17, 2007; and the Notice to Vacate dated April 19, 2007 are hereby
REINSTATED.