CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE

RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND

SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.

Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

Garayblas v. Ong, gr no. 174507-30, august 3, 2011

Lawyer who fails to attend pre-trial conference may be sanctioned.
Section 3, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides as follows:
Sec. 3. Non-appearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - If
the counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not
appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer
an acceptable excuse for his lack of cooperation, the
court may impose proper sanctions or penalties.
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, the court may sanction or
penalize counsel for the accused if the following concur: (1) counsel
does not appear at the pre-trial conferenceAND (2) counsel does not
offer an acceptable excuse.

The Court expounded on the role of lawyers in pre-trials, to wit:

Pre-trial is meant to simplify, if not fully dispose of, the case at its early
stage. x x x .
x x x during pre-trial, attorneys must make a full disclosure of their
positions as to what the real issues of the trial would be. They should
not be allowed to embarrass or inconvenience the court or injure the
opposing litigant by their careless preparation for a case; or by their
failure to raise relevant issues at the outset of a trial x x x[15]
This being so, it is not quite prudent to send in a new lawyer, who has not
had ample time to fully familiarize himself or herself with the facts and
issues involved in the case, to attend a pre-trial conference. Sending to the
pre-trial conference a new lawyer who is not very knowledgeable about the
case would most probably lead to such careless preparation which the
Court abhors.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or

menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not

supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.

FLORIDO VS. FLORIDO

A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but
respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of
the legal profession.[9] The lawyers arguments whether written or oral
should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should
be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to
another.

TOLEDO V. BURGOS, GR NO. 75466, DECEMBER 19, 1988

The attorney's duty of prime importance is to observe and maintain
the respect due the courts of justice and judicial officers (Rule 138,
Sec. 20(b); Rheem of the Phil. vs. Ferrer, 60 SCRA 234). His
arguments, written or oral, should be gracious to both the court and
opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly
addressed by one gentleman to another (National Surety Co. v. Jarvis,
278 US 610 (1928).

ROXAS V. ZUZUARREGUI, JR., GR NO. 152072 & 152104, JULY 12,

2007, 527 SCRA 446
The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is
not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right.
Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised
as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair
the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor
and confidence therein.[25] Free expression must not be used as a
vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean, ridicule,
degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.[26]

It is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona

fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It
is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

It is the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration
of justice and in the Supreme Court as the last bulwark of justice and

democracy.[31] Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the

judicial institution. Without such guarantee, the institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.

In re: ALMACEN
If the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands,
and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of
the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in
duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he
owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not
to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty
would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

PRESS FREEDOM AND RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH

HABAWEL, ET AL.
V. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, FIRST
DIVISION, GR NO. 174759, SEPTEMBER 7, 2011
It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of the
courts and their judges provided the criticism is made in respectful terms
and through legitimate channels. In that regard, we have long adhered to
the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of In re:
Almacen:[25]
xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the
actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact
that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is
articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the
criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the courts
actuation are thrown open to public consumption.
xxx
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of
the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.xxx
xxx
The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not
the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety.

In re: Sotto
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good
faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court
and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well
taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in
reversing or modifying its decision. Had the respondent in the present case
limited himself to as statement that our decision is wrong or that our
construction of the intention of the law is not correct, because it is different
from what he, as proponent of the original bill which became a law had
intended, his criticism might in that case be tolerated, for it could not in any
way influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the court.
It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the
press must be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty
of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true
sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the
free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the
independence of the judiciary. As Judge Holmes very appropriately said U.
S vsSullens (1929), 36 Fed. (2nd), 230, 238, 239: &The administration of
justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are
equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and
the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to
uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former
receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate
publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to
avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to
dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably
tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the
administration of justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise its
undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to
proceed with the disposition if its business in an orderly manner free from
outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will
be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as a
individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its
existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. . . .&

In re: ALMACEN
Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily
punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts
and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring

them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal

contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the
first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of
newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to
administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second
kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate
the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into
disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is
no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision
which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication.
In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as
what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity.
Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is
destroyed.

ROXAS V. ZUZUARREGUI, JR., GR NO. 152072 & 152104, JULY 12,

2007, 527 SCRA 446
The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is
not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right.
Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised
as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair
the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor
and confidence therein.[25] Free expression must not be used as a
vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean, ridicule,
degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.[26]

It is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona

fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It
is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

Zaldivar vs. Tanodbayan, 166 scra 316

Excerpt of the article in Philippine Daily Globe:
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the
Supreme Court order stopping him from investigating
graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can
aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an prevent
the progress of a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is
that it appears that while rich and influential persons
get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is

difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition

to be given due course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe
in an exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the
people's apprehension over the justice system in this
country, especially because the people have been
thinking that only the small fly can get it while big
fishes go scot-free."
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely
exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the
related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair criticism in
the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free
speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What
respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression
and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection
and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within
the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within
the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor
an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the
other; both are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the
press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which
that freedom may, if necessary be vindicated. And one of the potent
means for assuring judges their independence is a free press. 50

Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the
following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This
constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has
heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel
Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this
chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its
completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the
citizens should not be confused with liberty ill its true sense. As
important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free

exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the

independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be
had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court
adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted
by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential
proceedings to the embarassment of the parties and the courts. 51
(Emphasis supplied)

Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of
the Court effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on the
part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable participants in the
task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held,
persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may
have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and
an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of
fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the embodiment
and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic.
The responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court' and "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice 53 is
heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize
the rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have
lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of criticism is not unlimited.
Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are
worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be
bonafide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A
wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is
essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the
assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with
superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 22 scra 132, 135

[What is penalized is not the criticism of the court but the nature and
manner of criticism.]

The clear and present danger doctrine invoked by respondent's

counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves all problems and

dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy

of claims to free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a
defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of
impending apocalypse. The clear and present danger& doctrine has
been an accepted method for marking out the appropriate limits of
freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not,
however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by
courts. In Logunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 3 this Court, speaking through
Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera said:
...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred
position in the &hierarchy of civil liberties& (Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA
191 [1963]. It is not, however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
&From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would
appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may
be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The
realities of life in a complex society preclude however, a literal
interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be
too much to insist that all times and under all circumstances it should
remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values
that press for recognition.&
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is
such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on
freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of
the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the balancingof-interests test (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights,
1970 ed., p. 79). The principle &requires a court to take conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a
given situation or type of situation (Separate Opinion of the late Chief
Justice Castro in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899).
(Emphasis Supplied) 4
Under either the clear and present danger test or the balancing-ofinterest test, we believe that the statements here made by respondent
Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under
such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech.
This conclusion was implicit in the per curiam Resolution of October 7,
1988. It is important to point out that the &substantive evil& which the
Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant
case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar
disruptions of public order. 5 What is here at stake is the authority of the
Supreme Court to confront and prevent a &substantive evil& consisting not
only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but
also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial
system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional
conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts. The
&substantive evil& here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a

threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and

more far reaching in its implications for society.

POBRE VS. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures,
Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts attention to the following excerpts of
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I
am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I
feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature.
I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and
his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position
[of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in
another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part
of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the
other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court.
Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary
actions be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago,
through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She,
however, explained that those statements were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech
she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its
committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out
in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future
remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she
believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC], which, after
sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated
position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only
incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She
felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that nonsitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the
position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the
provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides:
A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the
Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose is to

enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his

public trust with firmness and success for it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that
he should be protected from resentment of every one, however,
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.
[1]
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in
upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of
free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the
legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of government,
investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country
and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the
legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions
in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an
unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement
uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege.[3] The disciplinary authority of the assembly[4] and the
voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such
abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.[5]
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal
of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken.
Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a
disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however,
that this could not be the last word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language
Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its
effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator
has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional
conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were
intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was
quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and
calling the Court a Supreme Court of idiots.
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.[6] We draw her
attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have taken
to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity
of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom,
they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the
courts should be allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In

this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,
use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct
by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her
achievements speak for themselves. She was a former Regional Trial
Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional
and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an
elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a
member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is dutybound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to
maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are
keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of
social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private
practice.[7] Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive
individual, the impact her statements would make on the peoples faith
in the integrity of the courts.
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her
statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not
being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore,
her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary
functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be
used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of
the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and
disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an
individual privilege accorded the individual members of the
Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a
privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that
represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger
without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly
traceable to what she considered as an unjust act the JBC had taken
in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice.
But while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its
individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as
the JBCs ex-officio chairperson,[8] have no official duty to nominate
candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court
is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and
indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of
critical and defamatory words against all of them.

At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of

Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the
Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises specific
authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the
end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except
within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest
may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.[9]
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,[10] we
reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v.
Ferrer[11] that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the
judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in
Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces
that [i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.
That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon
lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor.
And more. The attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that
should be with all good fidelity x x x to the courts.
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral
Reservation Board v. Cloribel[12] that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Faith
in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to
the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a
lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty
to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and

regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of

justice.[13]
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the
exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that
profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of
justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may
not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed
while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.[14]
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their
private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of
probity or good demeanor,[15] a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for
continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or
misconduct, the reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited
in connection with the performance of lawyers professional duties,
but also covers any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual
practice of their professionwould show them to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest
in them.[16]
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in
courts and trust in the rule of law, has consistently exercised its
disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or
personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of
justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse,
malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in
the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty.
Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in
Tacordan v. Ang[17] who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court
in a most insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary
sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have
constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court
and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case,
however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of
remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this
kind of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators
offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to
denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to reinstill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice,
especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary
non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to
protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable
them, as the peoples representatives, to perform the functions of their
office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or
other forums outside the congressional hall.[18] It is intended to
protect members of Congress against government pressure and

intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of

Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on
Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from
using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper language
against another Senator or against any public institution.[19] But as
to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President
had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to
the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as
the Rules dictates under such circumstance.[20] The lady senator
clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that
her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on
her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his
complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken
solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We
cannot overstress that the senators use of intemperate language to
demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation
of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.[21]
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove
that she in fact made the statements in question. Suffice it to say in
this regard that, although she has not categorically denied making
such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of
her privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the
Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against
Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI,
Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.
ANG VS. CASTRO
The Rules of Court cannot be any clearer. The use of disrespectful or
contemptuous language against a particular judge in pleadings
presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct,
contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of
or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of
justice. Stated differently, if the pleading containing derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court or
judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt
because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence
of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of
justice.

Maglucot-aw vs. Maglucot

Finally, this Court takes notice of the language utilized by counsel for
petitioners in their petition for review on certiorari. Thrice in the petition,
counsel for petitioners made reference to the researcher of the CA. First,

he alluded to the lack of scrutiny of the records and lack of study of the law
"by the researcher."[60] Second, he cited the researcher of the CA as
having "sweepingly stated without reference to the record"[61]that "[w]e
have scanned the records on hand and found no evidence of any partition."
Finally, counsel for petitioners assailed the CA decision, stating that "this
will only show that there was no proper study of the case by the
researcher."[62]
Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm of the justice
system and as an institution apart from the persons that comprise it.
Decisions are rendered by the courts and not the persons or
personnel that may participate therein by virtue of their office. It is
highly improper and unethical for counsel for petitioners to berate the
researcher in his appeal. Counsel for petitioner should be reminded of
the elementary rules of the legal profession regarding respect for the
courts by the use of proper language in its pleadings and admonished
for his improper references to the researcher of the CA in his petition.
A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing
language or behavior before the courts.[63]

Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the

proper authorities only.

DE VERA VS. PELAYO

Before a civil or criminal action against a judge for a violation of Art. 204
and 205 (knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order) can be
entertained, there must first be "a final and authoritative judicial declaration"
that the decision or order in question is indeed "unjust." The
pronouncement may result from either:[20]
(a).....an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the
validity of the judgment; or
(b).....an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge
precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment or order.
Likewise, the determination of whether a judge has maliciously delayed the
disposition of the case is also an exclusive judicial function.[21]
"To repeat, no other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution
or investigation service of any other branch, not any functionary thereof,
has competence to review a judicial order or decision -- whether final and
executory or not -- and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a
criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or
order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone (underscoring
ours)."[22]
This having been said, we find that the Ombudsman acted in accordance
with law and jurisprudence when he referred the cases against Judge
Pelayo to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.

ANDAMO VS. LARIDA

This administrative charge seeks to cast doubt on the integrity of
respondent judge, the judicial personnel and the court which they
represent, in flagrant abdication of the bounden responsibility of a lawyer to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice. As an officer of
the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to impede or pervert,
the administration of justice.[38] Lawyers must always keep in perspective
the thought that since lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound
servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose,
but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly
subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics."[39]
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument
or agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity
and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust
in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to
preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the
continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the
people."[40]
A lawyer who files an unfounded complaint must be sanctioned
because, as an officer of the court, he does not discharge his duty by
filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.
Such filing of baseless complaints is contemptuous of the courts.[41]

CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND

CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

PRIETO VS. CORPUZ

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the
proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by
filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.
A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like
the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends the speedy,
efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and
the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only
help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid unethical or
improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization,
charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.[2] Canon 12[3] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very
explicit that lawyers must exert every effort and consider it their duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

LIM VS. MONTANO

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense
of truth and the administration of justice. The filing of multiple
petitions constitutes abuse of the Courts processes and improper
conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court.
Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious
petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and
executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of
his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and
to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are
consistent with truth and honor.
Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the
courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to
delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes
such lawyers duty.

Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has
adequately prepared himself on the law and the facts of his case, the
evidence he will adduce and the order of its proferrence. He should
also be ready with the original documents for comparison with the
copies.

Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the
same cause.

FORUM SHOPPING
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another.18 Thus, the following requisites should concur:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

EFFECT OF FORUM SHOPPING UPON ACTION FILED

Forum shopping may result to dismissal, upon motion, of the second

suit on the ground that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause or that the cause of action is barred
by a prior judgment.

EFFECT OF WILLFUL AND DELIBERATE FORUM SHOPPING

1. It is a ground for summary dismissal with prejudice
2. Shall constitute direct contempt
3. cause for administrative sanctions

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENT TO SUBMIT

CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
1 Shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading
2 Shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, upon motion and hearing.

EFFECT OF SUBMISSION OF FALSE CERTIFICATION OR FAILURE TO

COMPLY WITH UNDERTAKING
I. Shall constitute indirect contempt of court
II. Without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions

LIGON VS. CA
As regards the final issue, we hold that INC did not engage in forumshopping. There is forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse
decision in one forum or, it may be added, in anticipation thereof, a
party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means
other than appeal or certiorari,[31] raising identical causes of action,
subject matter, and issues.[32] Forum-shopping exists when two or
more actions involve the same transactions, essential facts, and
circumstances; and raise identical causes of action, subject matter,
and issues.[33] Yet another indication is when the elements of litis
pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other case. The test is whether in the
two or more pending cases there is an identity of (a) parties, (b) rights
or causes of action, and (c) reliefs sought.[34]
INC instituted Civil Case No. Q-90-6937 to compel IDP to comply with
its undertaking to clear of squatters the lots the latter sold to the

former. On the other hand, in Civil Case No. Q-91-10494 INC sought to
annul the mortgages and enjoin LIGON from foreclosing them.The
two cases involved different transactions and sought different
reliefs. Moreover, INC won in Civil Case No. Q-90-6937; hence, it
cannot be said that the later Civil Case No. Q-91-10494 was filed as a
result of an adverse decision in one forum. On the other hand, CAG.R. SP No. 40258 was a special civil action for certiorari, which was
instituted, and correctly so, in reaction to an adverse partial decision
in Civil Case No. Q-91-10494.

LIM VS. MONTANO

The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously
or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It
exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase
the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in
determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the
parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the
same reliefs.17 Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in another.18 Thus, the following requisites
should concur:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
x x x19
The fact that the parties in the first and second cases are not identical
will not prevent the application of the principle of res judicata. Mere
substantial identity of parties, or a community of interests between a
party in the first case and a party in the subsequent case, even if the
latter was not impleaded in the first case, is sufficient.20Moreover, a
party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle
that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated
between the same parties or their privies.21 This was what
respondent resorted to in order to give some semblance of merit to
the complaint for annulment of title. He should have realized that the
ruling of the Court in Tuazon v. Court of Appeals22 effectively
determined with finality the rights and obligations of the parties under
the questioned deed of sale.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense
of truth and the administration of justice. The filing of multiple
petitions constitutes abuse of the Courts processes and improper
conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court.
Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious
petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and
executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of
his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and
to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are
consistent with truth and honor. 24
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in
violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also
violated Rule 12.0225 and Rule 12.0426 of the Code, as well as a
lawyers mandate "to delay no man for money or malice."27
Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the
courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to
delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes
such lawyers duty. Indeed, the Court has time and again warned not
to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs the court
dockets.28

SPS. AGUILAR VS. THE MANILA BANKING (LAWYERS PENCHANT

FOR FILING NUMEROUS MOTIONS FOR INHIBITION)
Through the motions for inhibition of the presiding judges and the
assignment of the case to different branches of the same court,
petitioners sought to obtain from one branch a ruling more favorable
than the ruling of another branch. They deliberately sought a friendly
branch of the same court to grant them the relief that they wanted,
despite the finality of the resolution of one branch on the matter. This
is a permutation of forum shopping. It trifles with the courts, abuses
their processes, degrades the administration of justice, and congests
court dockets.68
Be it remembered that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the
rules against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent
tribunals of two separate, and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous
party-litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals,
may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable
result is reached. This would make a complete mockery of the judicial
system.69

QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN SILVERIO-BUFFE

As we observed earlier,[34] Atty. Buffe had no qualms about the
simultaneous use of various fora in expressing her misgivings about
the perceived unfairness of Section 7 of R.A. 6713. She formally
lodged a query with the Office of the Court Administrator, and soon
after filed her successive petitions for declaratory relief. Effectively,
she exposed these fora to the possibility of embarrassment and
confusion through their possibly differing views on the issue she
posed. Although this is not strictly the forum-shopping that the Rules
of Court prohibit, what she has done is something that we cannot
help but consider with disfavor because of the potential damage and
embarrassment to the Judiciary that it could have spawned. This is a
point against Atty. Buffe that cancels out the leniency we might have
exercised because of the OCATs observation about her ignorance of
and misgivings on the extent of the prohibition after separation from
the service.

Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to

file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

ACHACOSO VS. CA
The Court censures the practice of counsels who secure repeated
extensions of time to file their pleadings and thereafter simply let the
period lapse without submitting the pleading or even an explanation
or manifestation of their failure to do so. The Court herein reprimands
petitioner's counsel for such misconduct with the warning that a
repetition thereof will be dealt with more severely.

MATTUS VS. VILLASECA

The records of the present case show that Atty. Villaseca had been
grossly remiss in handling Criminal Case No. 10309-02. To recall, Atty.
Villaseca requested for time to file demurrer to evidence after the
prosecution had rested its case. In its order 10 of July 1, 2004, the
RTC gave him 20 days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic
notes within which to file a demurrer to evidence. Atty. Villaseca,
however, did not file a demurrer to evidence, without offering any
explanation why he failed to do so. As a result, the RTC issued an
order 11 stating that Atty. Villaseca "is deemed to have waived his
right to file the said pleading."
To our mind, Atty. Villasecas failure to submit a demurrer to evidence
to explain such omission constitutes inexcusable negligence; it
showed his lack of devotion and zeal in preserving his clients cause.
We point out that nine months had lapsed from the time the RTC

granted Atty. Villaseca 20 days to file the demurrer to the time it ruled
that he was deemed to have waived his right to file this pleading.
Clearly, Atty. Villasecas actuations violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs,
let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so."

FIL-GARCIA VS. HERNANDEZ

Respondents act of filing three (3) successive motions for extension
of time to file the petition on the careless assumption that each
motion will be granted by the Court, and without taking care of
informing himself of the Courts action thereon, constitutes
inexcusable negligence.
While pressure of work or some other unavoidable reasons may
constrain a lawyer to file a motion for extension of time to file
pleadings, he should not presume that his motion for extension of
time will be granted. Well-settled is the rule that motions for extension
of time to file a pleading are not granted as a matter of course but lie
in the sound discretion of the court. It is thus incumbent on any
movant for extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as
soon as possible of the Court's action on his motion, by timely inquiry
from the Clerk of Court. Should he neglect to do so, he runs the risk
of time running out on him, for which he will have nobody but himself
to blame.[33]

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.

SAMBAJON VS. SUING

As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause.
Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the
administration of justice constitutes misconduct.23 While the
Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein
are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action
being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of
its officers or an examination into his character.24
In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr.25 the respondent lawyer was found guilty
of gross misconduct for his attempts to delay and obstruct the
investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless, this Court
found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was
enough to give him "the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the
virtuous path of the legal profession."

Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a
break or recess in the trial, while the witness is still under
examination.

Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to

misrepresent himself or to impersonate another.

Rule 12.07 - A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness

nor needlessly inconvenience him.

Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client,

except:
(a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody
of an instrument, and the like; or
(b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential
to the ends of justice, in which event he must, during his testimony,
entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.

PNB VS. UY TENG PIAO

With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to
observe that although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a
witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer
that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary,
and that they should withdraw from the active management of the
case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19 of the Code of Legal
Ethics reads as follows:
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal
matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the
like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except
when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying
in court in behalf of his client.

SANTIAGO VS. RAFANAN

Lawyer as Witness for Client
Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor
Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered

by respondents clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: A

lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client.

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
a)
on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or
custody of an instrument and the like;
b)
on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is
essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must, during his
testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.

Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a

witness,[31] except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged
communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.[32]
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the
task of dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as
advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In
contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and
defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and
impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The
question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who
testify for their clients.
Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for
the client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect
the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as
disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if
their sympathies are against the lawyers client, they will have an
opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he
fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes
doubted and is looked upon as partial and untruthful.[33]
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at
the same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain
from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should
they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.[34]

CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS

CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO
INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE
COURT.

Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality

to, nor seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges.

Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.
Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another
branch or agency of the government in the normal course of judicial
proceedings.

CHAPTER IV. THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT

CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE
NEEDY.

Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on

account of the latter's race, sex. creed or status of life, or because of his
own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.
Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient
cause, an appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus curiae, or a
request from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters for
rendition of free legal aid.
Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an
indigent client if:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently;
(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective
client or between a present client and the prospective client.
Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his
professional fees shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his
relations with paying clients.