IS THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SEPARATE FROM

THE SUPREME COURT?

In an irritated and annoyed tone, the Supreme Court dismissed an
unlabelled petition filed by election lawyer Atty. Romulo Macalintal
assailing the legality of the organization and operation of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as a tribunal separate from the
Supreme Court. According to Atty. Macalintal, the operation of the
PET as a distinct body with separate budget allocation, own seal, a
set of staff and confidential employees violates Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution which provides that the Supreme Court, sitting en
banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose. Atty. Macalintal argues that
the PET, under the circumstances it is being operated, is an illegal
and unauthorized progeny of the role of the Supreme Court, en banc,
as the sole election judge relative the presidential and vicepresidential contests.
The pertinent parts of the decision are quoted as follows:
xxx Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several
cases before this Court involving constitutional and election law
issues, including, among others, the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003), cannot claim ignorance of: (1) the invocation of
our jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and (2)
the unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably, the overarching
framework affirmed in Tecson v. Commission on Elections is that the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and
vice-presidential election protests while concurrently acting as an
independent Electoral Tribunal.
Despite the foregoing, petitioner is adamant on his contention that the
provision, as worded, does not authorize the constitution of the PET.
And although he concedes that the Supreme Court may promulgate
its rules for this purpose, petitioner is insistent that the constitution of
the PET is unconstitutional. However, petitioner avers that it allows
the Court to appoint additional personnel for the purpose,
notwithstanding the silence of the constitutional provision.
Petitioners pastiche arguments are all hurled at the Court, hopeful
that at least one might possibly stick. But these arguments fail to
elucidate on the scope of the rules the Supreme Court is allowed to
promulgate. Apparently, petitioners concept of this adjunct of judicial
power is very restrictive. Fortunately, thanks in no part to petitioners
opinion, we are guided by well-settled principles of constitutional
construction.xxx
xxx Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of our power
to judge presidential and vice-presidential election contests, as well

as the rule-making power adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as

restrictive as petitioner would interpret it. In fact, former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who proposed the insertion of the phrase,
intended the Supreme Court to exercise exclusive authority to
promulgate its rules of procedure for that purpose. To this, Justice
Regalado forthwith assented and then emphasized that the sole
power ought to be without intervention by the legislative department.
Evidently, even the legislature cannot limit the judicial power to
resolve presidential and vice-presidential election contests and our
rule-making power connected thereto.
To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the
establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory
before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of the PET in
our country cannot be denied.xxx
xxx It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET,
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it
performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case of
Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated
that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for
a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he
Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at
that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded
definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2
of the present Constitution.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to
the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latters exercise of judicial
power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vicepresidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise
thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary
judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the
Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but,
nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme
Court.xxx
xxx We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an
agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again,
the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an
institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland
proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity."
The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the
Constitution and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional
Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to this
Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioners,
should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial
power. (ATTY. MACALINTAL vs. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010)