Padilla vs.

Dizon (Crim1)
Alexander Padilla, complainant, vs. The Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
113, respondent.
February 23, 1988
Per Curiam
Facts:

Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the

tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai, saying that Lo Chi Fai had
no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the
release to Lo Chi Fai of at least the amount of US$3,000.00
under Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the
Manila International Airport while attempting to
smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange
instruments out of the country.
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the
RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular
No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD
NO. 1883.
Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960
provides that no person shall take out or
transmit or attempt to take out or transmit
foreign exchange in any form out of the
Philippines without an authorization by the
Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident
visitors may take out or send out from the
Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not
exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange

brought in by them. Tourists and non-resident

temporary visitors bringing with them more
than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other
foreign currencies shall declare their foreign
exchange in the form prescribed by the
Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival
in the Philippines.
Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any
person who shall engage in the trading or
purchase and sale of foreign currency in
violation of existing laws or rules and
regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty
of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign
exchange and shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion temporal (minimum of 12 years and
1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of
no less than P50,000.00.
At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a
businessman from Hongkong, that he had come to the
Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the
country with his business associates, and that he and
his business associates declared all the money they
brought in and all declarations were handed to and
kept by him.
Because of the revolution taking place in Manila
during that time, Lo Chi Fai was urged by his
business associates to come to Manila to bring the
money out of the Philippines.
Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a
complaint against Baltazar R. Dizon for acquitting Lo Chi
Fai.
Issue:

Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of

gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding
that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the
accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.

Held:

Yes.

Ratio:

Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency

and foreign currency instruments found in the possession of
Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport and the
amounts of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the
foreign currency declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the
trial, and that these currency declarations were declarations
belonging to other people.
In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No.
960 to justify the release of US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai,
Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and
gross ignorance of law. There is nothing in the Central Bank
Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court
to release the said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.

Estrada
vs.
Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001
Petitioner:
Joseph
Ejercito
Estrada
Respondents: Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and People of the
Philippines
Ponente: J. Bellosillo
FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the

Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress

upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this
Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality
mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea
in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of
which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of
the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder) as amended by R.A. No. 7659 substantially
provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty
million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under
the said Act, assailed its constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code; and as such, a violation of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is
a malum prohibitum.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which
requires proof of criminal intent. Moreover, the legislative
declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense

implies that it is amalum in se. The predicate crimes in the case of

plunder involve acts which are inherently immoral or inherently
wrong, and are committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally by
the offender, alleging his guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of
plunder is a malum in se.
In view of mens rea
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza
that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.
Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion . . . Precisely because
the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must
be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the
amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges
guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
[With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide
even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates
to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn,
the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this
context, no less heinous are the effect and repercussions of crimes
like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug
offenses involving government official, employees or officers, that
their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction
and damage to society. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for
violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the

amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to
say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this
long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People
v. Echegaray 38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The
declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally
valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary
effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the
3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007
elections.

Respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify

petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan,3 he was
convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing
pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited
under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991.

Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from

running for public office because he was convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification from public office.

The COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from

running for the position of member of House of Representatives and
ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.

Upon MR, COMELEC en banc denied the motion saying that

since petitioner lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections,
it thereby rendered the instant MR moot and academic.
Issue: Whether petitioners violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019
involves moral turpitude.

Held:

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done

contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.

The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as

follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or
indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from
having such interest by the Constitution or by law.

Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has
a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The
first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is
when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the
Constitution or by law.

In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner was convicted under the

second mode for having pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit
which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code
of 1991.
o The evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner
Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the
cockpit in question.
o Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit
were transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest
thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan,
they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as
such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal
partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

o Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is,

therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991.

However, conviction under the second mode does not

automatically mean that the same involved moral turpitude. A
determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of
the statute must be considered. Besides,moral turpitude does not
include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant
case.

The Court clarified that not every criminal act, however,

involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime
involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In
resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the
general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude,
while crimes mala prohibita do not.

Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself,

regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not
be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently
immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by
statute fixes the moral turpitude.

Consequently, considering all circumstances, the Court held

that petitioners conviction does not involve moral turpitude.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling

is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the
interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter,
even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the
activity as it sees fit.

In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may

prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may
prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever

reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng

and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In
making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom,
which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse
Teves

vs.

The petitioner filed a petition which the court found to have merit.
ISSUE:

Comelec

Whether or not petitioners violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019

involves moral turpitude.

Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the

3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007
elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a
petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan, he was convicted of violating Section 3(h),
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a
cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine
of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified
from running for public office because he was convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of
perpetual
disqualification
from
public
office.

HELD:
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done
contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.

FACTS:

On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified

petitioner from running for the position of member of House of
Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of
Candidacy. It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14
May 2007 congressional elections for the position of member of the
House of Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental
thereby rendering the instant Motion for Reconsideration moot and
academic.

Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself (mala in se),

regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. In other
words, it must not be merely mala prohibita. Applying such
guidelines, the Court hereby held that although Teves was guilty of
violating Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, it could not be
considered a mala in se offense because: First, petitioner did not use
his official capacity in connection with his interest in the cockpit and
neither did he hide the same by transferring the management to his
wife, in violation of the trust reposed on him by the people; Second,
its illegality does not mean that violation thereof necessarily
involves moral turpitude or makes such possession of interest
inherently immoral; and Last, although it may be argued that having
an interest in a cockpit is detrimental to public morality, the morality
of gambling or the wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable issue