LAGUA V.

CUSI
G.R. No. L-44649
April 15, 1988
Ponente: Guiterrez, Jr.

FACTS: This is a mandamus case filed against respondents for closing a logging road without authority.
The private respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the petitioners arose out of the
legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast Development Enterprises rights as a timber licensee, more
particularly in the use of its logging roads, therefore, the resolution of this question is properly and legally
within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705. The
lower court affirmed the respondents defense, stating that the petitioners must first seek recourse with
the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the legality of the closure of the logging roads, before
seeking redress with the regular courts for damages.

ISSUE: W/N the regular courts can take cognizance of the damages case without first seeking the
determination of the Bureau regarding the legality of the closure. YES.

RATIO: P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in the
Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal
and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained.
Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal
closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the
part of the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately
be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest
Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the payment
of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Forest Development.

THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs. RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL

G.R. No. L-32266
February 27, 1989
Facts: The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality
of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was
opposed by several persons, including the. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First
Instance. of Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then

came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forest land in
nature and not subject to private appropriation
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land
is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is the legal
nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forest land and therefore not
disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue is legal, not
factual.
Issue: Whether or not the subject land is alienable
Held: No. the classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Mangrove swamps or manglares
should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in Section 1820
of the Administrative Code of 1917. It follows from all this that the land undercontention being admittedly a
part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by
the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the
subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in
support of his application for registration. To be so, ithad first to be released as forest land and reclassified
as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of
the Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of
Lands, to prove that the land is registerable. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious.
The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. It is the Director of Forestry who has the
authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a
basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership.
Republic vs Naguiat
G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006

FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in Panan,
Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having
acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in
possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer
no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or
equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in
question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the
lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.
ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public
domain?
HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land
in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or
possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest

lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely descriptive
of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

FACTORAN V. CA
G.R. No. 93540
December 13, 1999
Ponente: De Leon, Jr.

FACTS: On August 9, 1988, 2 police officers of the Marikina intercepted a six-wheeler truck, carrying
narra lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, private
respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation
Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon City.
There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered the
discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber. Due to the failure of respondents to show the
required documents, petitioner Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources issued
an order for the confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck. Private respondents neither
asked for reconsideration of nor appealed, the said order to the Office of the President. Consequently,
these items were then forfeited in favor of the government. They were subsequently advertised to be sold
at public auction on March 20, 1989.
Respondents then filed for preliminary injunction and replevin, to which the trial court acceded. Petitioner
then refused to obey the writ of seizure and filed a counterbond, to which the court denied because of
lack of service to the respondents. Court of appeals affirmed the lower courts decision.

ISSUE: WON respondents can validly be restored possession of their trucks and lumber based on the writ
of replevin. NO.

RATIO: Firstly, herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of petitioner Secretary to the
Office of the President as provided for in Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity
and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been
resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their
alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. However, petitioners waived this ground for

failure to raise such in their motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, in order for replevin to prosper, the wrongful
detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactorily
established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued. In the case
at bar, the subject narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were confiscated by petitioner Secretary pursuant
to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277.
Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. When a thing
is in official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ, replevin
will not lie to recover it. Otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the function of
law had been performed as to the process under which the property was taken. Lastly, Sec. 80 of P. D.
No. 705 which requires delivery of the seized forest products within 6 hours from the time of the seizure to
the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to criminal
prosecutions provided for in Sec. 68, and not to administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.

PAAT V. CA
G.R. No. 111107
January 10, 1997
FACTS: On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to
Bulacan from Cagayan, was seized by DENR personnel in Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not
produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito
Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan,
issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days within which to submit an
explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the
required explanation. Later, the Regional Executive Director of DENR sustained petitioner Layugans
action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential
Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Respondents then appealed.
Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by the private respondents
against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director, which thereafter issued a writ ordering the return of the
truck to private respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to
dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, which the CA
affirmed upon petitioners appeal.
ISSUES:
1

W/N an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of
an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the DENR pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705. NO.

W/N the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government. YES.

RATIO: Firstly, the Court held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. The
premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. In the case at bar, there is no
question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him
following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the
order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, private respondents clearly
recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the
resolution of their case.
Secondly, as to the power of the DENR to confiscate, SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the
Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this
Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the
offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the
matter.
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the
Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations.
Lastly, as to the contention that since they are not liable for qualified theft, then they should not
have necessarily have committed a crime under Sec. 68. This is unmeritorious. With the introduction of
Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting,
removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now
from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be
imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the
language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as
defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and inserted the words
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code .