G.R. No.

152643

August 28, 2008

CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON C.

CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch
19, petitioners,
vs.
RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL
D.B. BONJE, respondents.
Facts:
Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Document, particularly a deed of real estate, before the RTC. Respondendts
allegedly committed estafa by making it appear that Concepcion, the owner of
the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to
the document.
Concepcion, while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the
Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised
to stay in Manila for further treatment.7
Respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in Criminal Case
on the ground of prejudicial question. They argued that Civil Case, which was an
action for declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first be resolved. 8 RTC
granted the aforesaid motion. Concepcions motion for reconsideration was
denied.

Aggrieved, respondents assailed the August 25 and November 3 RTC orders in a

special civil action for certiorari before the CA.
CA rendered a Decision favorable to the respondents.
At the outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in the respondents
petition by not impleading the People of the Philippines, an indispensable party.
This notwithstanding, the appellate court resolved the matter on its merit,
declaring that the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case,
is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
The latter provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant
to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcions deposition should
have been taken before the judge or the court where the case is pending, which
is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in
issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of
discretion. 18
CA added that the rationale of the Rules in requiring the taking of deposition
before the same court is the constitutional right of the accused to meet the
witnesses face to face. The appellate court likewise concluded that Rule 23 could
not be applied suppletorily because the situation was adequately addressed by a
specific provision of the rules of criminal procedure.19
ISSUES:

This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action for certiorari before
the CA seeking the nullification of the May 11 and June 5 RTC orders. The case
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60266 and remains pending before the
appellate court to date.10

I. WHETHER OR NOT RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE APPLIES TO THE DEPOSITION OF PETITIONER.
II. WHETHER OR NOT FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE "PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES" IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ARISING FROM A
CRIMINAL CASE A QUO CONSTITUTES A WAIVABLE DEFECT IN
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.20

On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters
deposition.11 He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to
her weak physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.
HELD:
On August 25, 2000, the RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcions
deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City. 12 The respondents
motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on November 3, 2000.
The court ratiocinated that procedural technicalities should be brushed aside
because of the urgency of the situation, since Concepcion was already of
advanced age.13 After several motions for change of venue of the depositiontaking, Concepcions deposition was finally taken on March 9, 2001 at her
residence.14

This Court has repeatedly declared that the failure to implead an

indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a
case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its
own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the
petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the

order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
petitioners/plaintiffs failure to comply.22
Accordingly, the CA cannot be faulted for deciding the case on the merits despite
the procedural defect. Notwithstanding the non-joinder of the People of the
Philippines as party-respondent, it managed, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file its Comment on the petition for certiorari. Thus, the People was
given the opportunity to refute the respondents arguments.
On the more important issue of whether Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies to
the instant case, we rule in the negative.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the
case in the presence of the judge.25 This is especially true in criminal cases in
order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
face to face.26 It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to
propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to support
their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. 27 Lastly, this rule
enables the judge to observe the witnesses demeanor.28
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the
Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may be
resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to
perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal
proceedings, Sections 12,29 1330 and 15,31 Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the
conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.
The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the
coverage of Rule 119 is at once the ground which places her squarely
within the coverage of the same provision. Rule 119 specifically states that
a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or
infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines
with no definite date of returning. Thus, when Concepcion moved that her
deposition be taken, had she not been too sick at that time, her motion
would have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the
trial court, she would have been compelled to appear before the court for
examination during the trial proper.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is
thus required that the conditional examination be made before the court
where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified,
so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the

same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules

mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an examination during
trial, that is, through question and answer.
The appellate court considered the taking of deposition before the Clerk of Court
of Makati City erroneous and contrary to the clear mandate of the Rules that the
same be made before the court where the case is pending. Accordingly, said the
CA, the RTC order was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
We agree with the CA and quote with approval its ratiocination in this wise:
Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section
5, Rule 119 of the previous Rules, and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the
present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be taken before
any "judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good
standing so designated by the judge in the order, or, if the order be
made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to
be designated therein," the examination of a witness for the
prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (December 1, 2000) may be done only "before the court
where the case is pending."32
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a
prosecution witness shall be made before the court where the case is
pending. Contrary to petitioners contention, there is nothing in the rule
which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement applies
only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and
not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the court
may not introduce exceptions or conditions. Neither may it engraft into the
law (or the Rules) qualifications not contemplated. 33 When the words are
clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation. There is only
room for application.34
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the
purpose of taking his deposition should be made before the court, or at
least before the judge, where the case is pending. Such is the clear
mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules. We find no necessity to depart
from, or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made
elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as when he is under
detention. More importantly, this requirement ensures that the judge would
be able to observe the witness deportment to enable him to properly
assess his credibility. This is especially true when the witness testimony is
crucial to the prosecutions case.

While we recognize the prosecutions right to preserve its witness testimony

to prove its case, we cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for
the protection of the accuseds constitutional rights. The giving of
testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a
witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a
strict construction of the rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
and Resolution dated August 25, 2000 and March 12, 2002, respectively, in CAG.R. SP No. 62551, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19243

February 29, 1964

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BUENAVENTURA MARIANO Y TABAQUIN, defendant-appellant.

... The aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the
municipal court, or the Court of First Instance, within the city, may be
invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. ....

CONCEPCION, J.:

and held that the verb "may" used in both provisions "does not in any way imply a
duty on the part of the court to grant the petition." It, likewise, cited, in support of
this conclusion, a passage in our decision in Primicias vs. Ocampo (49 Off. Gaz.,
2230) declaring that the respondent Judge therein had "acted with abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner (therein) his right to the aid of assessors in the
trial ...."

From an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila defendant Buenaventura

Mariano y Tabaquin has taken this appeal, which is before us only question of
law being raised therein.

The view thus taken by his Honor, the trial Judge, is incompatible with the rule
laid down and consistently applied by this Court in several cases. In Berbari vs.
Concepcion (40 Phil. 3220, 322, and 324), this Court said:

Said defendant is charged in said court with having illegally engaged, in the City
of Manila, and without the authority required therefore, in the business of
carrying, conveying or transmitting letters or packages for monetary
consideration in places where the government has provided means for the
carriage of mails. Upon arraignment he pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Thereafter the case was set for hearing, which was postponed several times on
motion of the defendant. Eventually, it was set for trial on June 7, 1961, but, four
(4) days prior thereto, defendant moved for the appointment of assessors. The
lower court denied this motion upon the ground: (1) that the appointment of
assessors is discretionary for the court which, under the circumstances, felt
should be exercised adversely to the accused; and (2) that the motion had
merely a dilatory purpose. Hence this appeal.

Said section 154 in its relation with section 2477 provides a specie of
jury trial for the defendants in criminal and civil cases in the city of
Manila, when a demand therefor is made by the defendant. By the terms
of said section assessors are only appointed when one or both of the
parties shall apply therefor in writing to the judge. The parties may
therefore waive their right to assessors, and if they do not demand the
appointment, they of course waive their right thereto. The necessity or
advisability of having assessors is left to the discretion of the parties.
Either or both may exercise the right to have assessors appointed. But
when the demand is made, for the appointment of assessors in the form
prescribed by the law, has the judge any discretion to deny it? Said
section (154) provides that "upon the filing of such application the judge
shall direct that the assessors be provided."

Subido,
Morabe
and
Associates
for
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General assails defendant's right to appeal from the order
complained of, the same being interlocutory (People vs. Sampoli, 51 Off. Gaz.,
263). The objection is well taken. In view of the interlocutory nature of said order,
the proper remedy against the same would have been for the defendants to
apply for a writ of certiorari and mandamus. Nevertheless, we deem it fit to
dispose of the issue raised by defendant herein in order that if could no longer be
reiterated in the future, should the decision of the trial court on the merits of the
case be unfavorable to him.
Defendant maintains that the lower court had the mandatory duty to appoint
assessors upon the filing of his aforesaid motion. Upon the other hand, in
overruling this contention, the lower court relied upon section 154 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) providing that "either party to an action may apply
for assessors to sit at the trial" and section 49 of the Charter of the City of Manila
(Republic Act No. 409), pursuant to which

It would be difficult to draw a law in which the terms could be made more
mandatory. We are of the opinion that when the Legislature said that the
court shall direct
etc.,
it
did
not
intent
that
the
judge might, could orshould appoint; that the Legislature, considering the
purpose of the law, meant exactly what it said that the judge upon
proper application shall appoint.
xxx

xxx

xxx

... From all the foregoing our conclusions are: 1. That the
provisions of section 154 of Act No. 190 in relation with Section
2477 of Act No. 2711 relating to the appointment of assessors is
mandatory; ....
In Colegio de San Jose vs. Sison (56 Phil. 344, 349) it was held:

... The respondents could not be deprived of a substantial right granted

them by law. According to section 62 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
assessors thus appointed shall after qualifying sit at the hearing and
advise the justice of the peace in the determination of all questions of
facts as well as of law, and in case of their dissent as to the merits of the
action, they are required by law to certify in writing their dissent, giving
the reason therefor, and such dissent shall be taken into account by the
Court of First Instance in case of appeal. All these provisions necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the intervention of the assessors is not an
empty formality which may be disregarded without violating either the
letter or the spirit of the law. It is another security given by the law to the
litigants, and as such, it is a substantial right of which they cannot be
deprived without vitiating all the proceedings. ....
And in Primicias vs. Ocampo (49 Off. Gaz., 2230). the language used was:
... we hold that the provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of
Civil Procedure are still in force and that the same may still be invoked in
the light of the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409. It is
therefore our opinion that the respondent Judge acted with abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner his right to the aid of assessors in the trial
of the two criminal cases now pending in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
It is thus clear that, whereas the party in a criminal case in the City of Manila
may, in his discretion, move or not for the appointment of assessors, once the
motion to this effect has been filed, "the appointment of assessors is mandatory."
This notwithstanding, the order appealed from should not be disturbed, insofar as
it denies defendant's motion for as stated in said order:
On the other hand, the Court feels that the insistence of the defense to
have assessors appointed is merely part of the dilatory tactics employed
by the defense. This case was filed on August 11, 1960. When the case
was called for the arraignment of the defendant, the defense sought and
obtained a postponement on the ground that it had sought the
reinvestigation of the case. Finally, the defendant was arraigned on
September 26, 1960. On November 14, 1960, the date set for trial, the
defendant moved for postponement on the ground that his original
counsel had withdrawn and that he needed time to secure the services
of another counsel. This was granted in an order dated November 18,
1960. The hearing was set for January 4, 1961. On January 3, 1961, the
defense filed a motion for permission to withdraw his original plea of not
guilty to enable him to file a motion to quash. The Court granted the

defense permission to file the said motion which was in fact filed on
January 9, 1961. On the same date, the Court denied the motion to
quash and the case was set for hearing on March 6, 1961. On March 3,
1961, the defense, alleging that they had to file several briefs and
memoranda, moved for the postponement of the hearing. The defense
counsel, however, taking for granted perhaps, that the Court would grant
their motion to postpone, failed to appear on March 6, 1961, whereupon
the Court ordered them to show cause why they should not be held in
contempt. On March 16, 1961, the Court excused counsel for this nonappearance. The trial was set for June 7, 1961. On June 3, 1961, the
defense filed his original motion for the appointment of
assessors.1wph1.t
We are fully in accord with this view. Indeed, defendant has not even tried to
explain why it took him over eight (8) months since his arraignment, on
September 26, 1960, and almost seven (7) months since the case was first set
for trial (on November 14, 1960), to ask for the appointment of assessors. It is
also, noteworthy that the issues of fact, under the information filed against the
defendant, are limited to: (1) whether he had engaged in activities analogous to
the carriage of mail, as alleged in said information; and (2) whether he had the
requisite authority therefor. Obviously, the determination of these issues does not
depend materially, upon the appreciation or credibility of testimonial evidence, for
which the services of assessors may be of substantial assistance in the
administration of justice. This circumstance and the delay in moving for the
appointment of assessors, after several postponements of the hearing upon
defendants request, indicates clearly that his purposes in filing the motion was
purely dialatory. Its denial by the lower court did not amount, therefore, to an
abuse of discretion warranting our intervention for, "the request for the
appointment of assessors should be made at the earliest convenient time so as
not to hinder or delay the trial or to unnecessarily inconvenience the progress of
the work of the court" (Berbari vs. Concepcion, 40 Phil. 320, 323), which would
have been the necessary effect of said motion, had it been granted.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
defendant. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-836

March 30, 1950

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
ANACLETO
MAGDANG,
JOSE
SUMUGAT, defendants-appellees.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
CADUNGON

and

AMPARO

Assistant Solicitor General Carmelino G. Alvendia and Solicitor Florencio

Villamor for appellant.
BENGZON, J.:
In December, 1942, the defendants-appellees were charged with malicious
mischief in the justice of the peace court of Culasi, Antique. The complaint
alleged that they had plowed land planted with mongo thereby damaging the
owner in the sum of fifteen pesos. They asserted the right to cultivate the land.
Found guilty by the justice of the peace, they appealed to the court of first
instance.
There the trial was postponed several times. On March 10, 1944, the case was
called for hearing. The provincial fiscal was absent. Counsel for defendants
moved for dismissal. Whereupon the judge made this order:
The record of this case shows that the information filed by the Acting
Provincial Fiscal is dated October 25, 1943, and that the original
complaint in the court below was filed on December 31, 1942. this case,
therefore, has been pending in court for quite a long period of time, and
the hearing of this case has been postponed a number of times. The
Acting Provincial Fiscal has failed to appear in court this morning without
any reason, but the accused have signified their readiness to have an
immediate trial of the case. Their counsel verbally moved for the
dismissal of the case, for the reason that they have come to the court a
number of times, and that the case should be heard with the least
possible delay. Finding their motion justified, the case is hereby
dismissed, with costs de oficio.
The fiscal filed a notice of appeal on March 20, 1944.
The Solicitor General contends in this Court that the order should be revoked,
because it does not appear that the provincial fiscal had been officially notified of
the actual date of hearing.
The records of the case now before us demonstrate how incomplete and informal
the proceedings wereobviously due to the emergency caused by the war. We

find therein that the fiscal never asserted in writing that he had not been notified.
On the other hand the judge says that said officer "failed to appear in court this
morning without any reason" which fairly implies that the fiscal had been notified,
notice being a fundamental requirement which must be presumed to have been
complied with.
In situation similar to the one asserted here by the prosecution, the fiscal or the
party affected should first make representations in the court below (in a motion
for reconsideration or new trial) as to the alleged non-receipt of notice, so that the
trial judge may have an opportunity to make an official statement on the point or
see to it that the records are completed.
Considering that the question involves a petty offense possibly mixed up with a
civil litigation, we see no justification in letting it clutter court records for a long
time, especially in the absence of a clear case.
The order of dismissal is affirmed. So ordered.

G.R. No. 2792

May 23, 1950

ROMEO
JACA, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL BLANCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, respondent.
Rodrigo
J.
Harder
for
The respondent Judge and Eleuterio J. Gustillo for respondent.

petitioner.

OZAETA, J.:
Romeo Jaca was accused before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo of triple
homicide through reckless imprudence. After arraignment the case was called for
trial at 8:06 in the morning of February 3, 1949, and counsel for the accused
entered his appearance. The accused was present. But as nobody appeared for
the prosecution, the court then and there dismissed the case without prejudice.
Four minutes later counsel for the private prosecution arrived, followed a little
later by the City Fiscal together with the witnesses for the prosecution, and
explained to the court that their tardiness was due to the fact that the chauffeur of
the jeep in which they were riding was detained by a policeman for driving on the
wrong side of the street. Satisfied with the explanation, the respondent judge set
aside the order of dismissal and reset the case for trial on the following morning,
February 4, 1949. On the date counsel for the accused asked for the
postponement of the trial until February 16, and the respondent judge granted
the request. In the meantime, that is to say, on February 5, 1949, counsel for the
accused moved for the reconsideration of the order of the court setting aside its
order of dismissal and reinstating the case, on the ground that the court had
exceeded its jurisdiction in so doing.
That motion having been denied, the accused filed the present petition
for certiorari, contending that by setting aside its order of dismissal and
reinstating the case, the respondent judge placed him in double jeopardy
inasmuch as he had been arraigned and the dismissal of the case was without
his express consent.
The accused petitioner relies upon section 9 of the Rule 113, which reads as
follows:
SEC. 9 Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. When a
defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against
him dismissed, or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded

to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the

dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
We at the dismissal contemplated in the abovequoted section of the rule is
definite or unconditional dismissal which terminates the case, and not a dismissal
without prejudice the present case. In the absence of any statutory provision to
the contrary, we find no reason why the court may not, in the interest of justice,
dismiss a criminal case provisionally, i.e., without prejudice to reinstating it before
the order becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the
same offense. If the accused should deem such conditional or provisional
dismissal to be unjust and prejudicial to him because he has been deprived of his
right to speedy trial, as for instance where the case has dragged on for an
unreasonable long time without his fault, he could and should object to such
dismissal and insist that the case be heard and decided on the merits. Upon such
objection and insistence of the accused, if the prosecution does not present its
evidence and if its failure to do so is unjustified, the court should dismiss the case
for the failure to prosecute. Such dismissal would come under the purview of
Section 9, Rule 113.
In the present case the information was filed on or after October 12, 1948; the
accused, who was at liberty on bail, was arraigned on January 15, 1949, when
the case was first set for trial; but the trial did not take place then because the
respondent judge was in Manila, and although the private prosecutor appeared
with his witnesses, neither the accused nor his attorney appeared. At the request
of the private prosecutor the case was reset for trial on February 3, 1949, when
the fiscal and the private prosecutor with their witnesses appeared four minutes
after the case had been called. Both the accused and his attorney were present
when the respondent judge dictated the order of dismissal without prejudice, but
interposed no objection thereto. Under the circumstances we find no violation of
any constitutional right of the accused by the respondent judge in reconsidering
his previous order of dismissal a few minutes after it was dictated and in
reinstating the case against accused. The accused had been neither previously
convicted nor acquitted, nor had the case against him been definitely dismissed
since the dismissal was without prejudice. Had the respondent judge refused to
vacate the order of dismissal under the circumstances, we think he would have
committed a grave miscarriage of justice.
The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner.

G.R. No. L-12761

June 29, 1959

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
DR. CLARO ROBLES, defendant-appellee.

trial "for the last time, with the warning that when this case is set anew for trial, it
will not entertain any petition for further postponement of the trial".
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro

for
appellant.
Elias C. Desembrana for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Claro Robles with others were charged with a violation of Article 199, paragraphs
(b) and (c), of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act 235,
which charge was amended on March 8, 1950. After the corresponding
preliminary investigation, the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, where a formal investigation was filed by the Fiscal against them
involving in the same charged. Robles with some of his co-accused pleaded not
guilty (Case No. 10711).
The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1950. The hearing was not held on said
date but was transferred to other dates either at the instance of appellee on the
ground of illness, or upon motion of the Fiscal because of the absence of his
important witnesses who were mostly members of the Philippine Constabulary,
until it was finally set on November 15, 1950. On this later date, the Fiscal moved
for provisional dismissal on the ground that in spite of his efforts his witnesses
could not appear to prove the allegations of the information, and as the accused
gave their conformity to it, the case was provisionally dismissed.
On January 10, 1952, the Provincial Fiscal filed a new information against the
same accused which is practically a reproduction of the original charge (Case
No. 11605). After the corresponding preliminary investigation, which was
conducted only after suffering several postponements, the arrest of Robles and
his co-accused was ordered, who in due time put up a bail bond for their
temporary release. They were arraigned on June 16, 1952, and pleaded not
guilty, the court setting the hearing for July 28 and 29, 1952. As some of the
accused have not been apprehended, the Court, upon motion of the defense,
ordered the postponement of the trial until such time as all the other accused
shall have been apprehended. The case was again set for hearing on February
4, 1953, and was reset for February 9 and 10, 1953, but when February 9 came,
the Fiscal could not go to the trial because of the absence of some of his
witnesses, and so he informed the Court that he has no alternative than to ask
for postponement. Because of the alleged reason, the Court again postponed the

When the case was called for hearing on March 19, 1953 the Fiscal again moved
for postponement because of the absence of his witnesses. The motion was
vigorously opposed by counsel for appellee, adverting to the fact that this case
has been postponed many times for the reason that the prosecution could not go
to trial because of the absence of its witnesses with the result that the case had
been pending for more than three (3) years since it was originally instituted, and
considering that the accused have already suffered long enough "from mental
anguish, wounded feelings, social shock and besmirched reputation" and are
entitled under the Constitution to a speedy trial, counsel moved that the case be
definitely dismissed, with costs de oficio. The Court denied the motion for
postponement, but on March 28, 1953, dismissed the case on the ground "that
the prosecution has had ample time and opportunity to prepare for trial and to
prosecute this case, and that it would be unfair and unjust to hold indefinitely the
defendants to the offense charged herein until the prosecution is in a position to
enter trial."
Three years after the dismissal of the second charge, or on February 21, 1956,
the Provincial Fiscal filed another information for the same offense only
against Claro Robles, his other co-accused in the previous cases not having
been included in this third charge. The third information was referred to the
Justice of the Peace of Court of Lucena for preliminary investigation. On June 5,
1956, Robles through counsel, filed a motion to quash on the ground that he had
already been placed in jeopardy. The Provincial fiscal filed his reply contending
that there was no double jeopardy because the dismissal of the first charge was
provisional in character and that of the second charge was granted on motion of
the accused himself. The Justice of the Peace Court denied the motion to quash
and set the case for preliminary investigation on July 28, 1956. Then the accused
filed a supplementary motion to quash, to which the Fiscal filed a reply. To this
reply the defendants put up an answer. After a series of replies and rejoinders to
the pleadings of both parties, the Justice of the Peace Court denied the
supplementary motion to quash for lack of merit, and thereupon conducted the
required preliminary investigation conducted by it in view of a writ of injunction
issued by the Court of First Instance disputing its jurisdiction to act thereon. And
on August 23, 1956, the Court of First Instance issued an order dismissing the
case alleging as ground that the accused can no longer be prosecuted for the
reason that he has already been placed twice in jeopardy. It is against this order
that the Provincial Fiscal interposed the present appeal.
While the order of the trial court subject of the present appeal does not clearly
indicate the reason why appellee would be placed twice in jeopardy if the present
charge be prosecuted to its termination, it may be gathered from the record that
the basis of the finding of double jeopardy is the dismissal of the second charge

which was granted upon motion of appellee invoking his right to a speedy trial
under the Constitution. The Court considered such order of dismissal as an
acquittal on the merits that would bar the filing of another information for the
same offenses.
Because of its importance in the determination of the merits of this case, we will
quote hereunder the order of dismissal issued in Criminal Case No. 11065:
When this case was called for trial on March 19, 1953 at 9:30 a.m., none
of the witnesses for the prosecution, who are all members of the A.F.P.
or P.C., appeared despite due notice upon them through the Office of the
Provincial Commander, P.C., at Camp Wilhelm, Lucena, Quezon, and for
which reason, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Santiago O. Taada, who
appeared for the prosecution, moved for postponement of trial. Counsel
for the defense vigorously opposed further postponement of trial on the
ground that this case has been pending trial for three years, and that in
the meantime the defendants have undergone mental suffering on
account of this criminal action against them, that the trial of this case has
been postponed time and again on petition of the prosecution; and that
this case had already been once provisionally dismissed for failure of the
prosecution to be ready for trial, and for which reason the defense
moved for the dismissal of the case.
In open court, the motion for postponement of hearing was denied, but
the Court reserved its resolution on the motion of the defense to dismiss
the case.
A perusal of the record of this case, discloses that this case was
instituted and originally docketed as Criminal Case No. 10711 of this
Court on May 12, 1950, at the instance of the P.C. at Lucena, Quezon,
but it was ordered provisionally dismissed on November 15, 1950, on
motion of the prosecution; that it was revived only on January 10, 1952,
upon the filing directly with this Court of the present criminal action after
the lapse of more than one year since its provisional dismissal; that
when this case was set and called for trial was again postponed on
petition of the prosecution on the ground that the prosecution was not
dully prepared for trial, and for the further reason that the remaining
thirty-four defendants were still at large, which postponement of trial was
granted by the Court in its order of February 9, 1953, in order to afford
the prosecution another opportunity to be fully prepared for trial, with a
warning, however, that the Court will not entertain any petition for further
postponement of trial.

Counsel for the defense vigorously opposed further postponement of

trial on the ground that this case has been pending for three years, and
that in the meantime the defendants have undergone mental suffering
on account of this criminal action against them; that the trial of this case
has been postponed of time and again on petition of the prosecution;
and that this case had already been once provisionally dismissed for
failure of the prosecution to be ready for trial.
Wherefore, the Court, finding that the prosecution has had ample time
and opportunity to prepare for trial and to prosecute this case, and that it
would be unfair and unjust to hold indefinitely the defendants to the
offense charged herein until the prosecution is in a position to enter trial,
hereby orders the dismissal of this case with respect to the defendants
Claro Robles, Eduardo Ambat, Eladio Vinal, Fortunato Alcairo, Pedro
Umali, Filomeno Jaurigue, Santiago Paras, Maria Quijano, and Anselmo
Somajestad, and the cancellation of the bail filed for their provisional
liberty, with proportional cost de oficio.
It would appear, as trial court has said, that this case was instituted originally on
May 12, 1950, but was provisionally dismissed on November 10, 1950, on motion
of the prosecution; that it was revived on January 10, 1952, upon filing of another
information for the same offense after a lapse of more than 1 year since its
provisional dismissal; that when this case was set and called for trial on February
9, 1953, the trial was again postponed on petition of the prosecution on the
ground that it was not prepared for trial and because some of the co-accused of
appellee were still at large, which postponement was granted in order to afford
the prosecution another opportunity to prepare for trial with the warning that the
court will not entertain any other petition for postponement.
It would likewise appear that the defense vigorously objected to further
postponement on the ground that this case has been pending for three years and
that in the meantime the defendants, including appellee, have undergone mental
anguish because of the pendency of this case, and that the trial had been
postponed time and again on petition of the prosecution, the opposition of
counsel being predicated on the right of the defendant to a speedy trial
guaranteed by the Constitution. And on the basis of these facts and the reasons
advanced by the defendant, the Court dismissed the case with costs de oficio.
In the circumstances, we find no alternative than to hold that the provisional in
character but no one which is tantamount to acquittal that would bar further
prosecution of the accused for the same offense.
When the hearing came, the fiscal asked for postponement alleging that he was
not able to contact his witnesses, which was granted. When the case was again

called for hearing, the Fiscal moved for another postponement alleging that his
witnesses could not be found, and the hearing was again postponed. But when
the third hearing came and the Fiscal asked for another postponement, the
accused vigorously objected to the postponement, invoking his Constitutional
right to a speedy trial. Considering that the case had been postponed twice and
the whereabouts of the witnesses for the prosecution could not be ascertained,
while on the other hand the accused were entitled to a speedy trial, the court
dismissed the case. However, one year and three months thereafter, the
Provincial Fiscal filed another information for murder against the same
defendants, with the only difference that the mayor of the place was included as
co-accused. When the case came up for hearing, the defendants moved to
quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy. The Court entertained
the motion and on appeal this Court rendered a confirmatory decision.
In holding that the dismissal of the previous case under the circumstances then
prevailing was tantamount to an acquittal of the defendants, this Court said:
"Evidently, the order of dismissal in Criminal Case No. 1793 was based on the
right of the appellees to a speedy trial, and the same was only issued because
the records shows that at the time said case was called for hearing for the third
time on April 21, 1954, the Fiscal wanted to secure another postponement, and
for that reason he manifested that he was not ready to go into trial on account of
the absence of the witnesses, especially that of his principal witness Mauro
Hernaez whose appearance was uncertain as his whereabouts were then
unknown. But since the absence of witnesses was the very same reason why the
two postponements had been granted, the herein appellees protested and
objected a third postponement and moved for the dismissal of the case, and the
Court, believing that further postponement would be unreasonable and unfair to
herein appellees who had the right to be tried promptly, dismissed the case in
order to maintain inviolate their constitutional right to a speedy trial."
And making a resume of the case, this court concluded: " . . . when criminal case
No. 1793 was called for hearing for the third time and the fiscal was not ready to
enter into trial due to the absence of his witnesses, the herein appellee had the
right to object to any further postponement and to ask for the dismissal of the
case by reason for their constitutional right to a speedy trial; and if pursuant to
that objection and petition for dismissal amounted to an acquittal of the herein
appellees which can be invoked as they did, in a second prosecution for the
same offenses."
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked our ruling in the case
of People vs. Salico, 44 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 1765-1776, reiterated in People vs.
Romero, 89 Phil., 672; 49 Off. Gaz., (11) 4851, to the effect that dismissal upon
defendant's motion will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense
as said dismissal was not without the express consent of the defendant, which
ruling the prosecution now invokes in support of its appeal; but said ruling is not

now controlling, having been modified or abandoned in subsequent cases

wherein we sustained the theory of double jeopardy despite the fact that the
dismissal was secured upon motion of the accused. 1
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

G.R. No. L-4445

February 28, 1955

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO, POLICARPIO PACULDO, and
JACINTO ADRIATICO,defendants-appellants.
Agripino A. Brillantes, Valera, Eufemio and Bernardez for appellants.
Prospero
C.
Sanidad
and
Claro
M.
Recto
for
defendant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jaime R. de los
Angeles and Martiniano P. Vivo for appellee.

Policarpio Paculdo as clerk of the jury, and Lino Inovermo as counsel for the
accused. Later, Atty. Jovito Barreras voluntarily appeared and served as counsel
for Borjal. Sgt. Esteban Cabanos observed the proceedings for several days
upon instructions of Headquarters, 15th Infantry. The trial lasted 19 days up to
April 10, 1945; the jury found Borjal guilty on all accounts and imposed upon him
instruction from his superiors. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records of the case
to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review. Said records were returned by
Lt. Col. Arnold to Beronilla on April 18, 1945 with the following instructions:
HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
In the Field

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino
Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Abra (Criminal Case No. 70) convicting them of murder for the execution of
Arsenio Borjal in the evening of April 18, 1945, in the town of La Paz , Province of
Abra.
Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of war,
and continued to serve as Mayor during the Japanese occupation, until March
10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an attempt upon his life by
unknown persons. On December 18, 1944, appellant Manuel Beronilla was
appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, regimental
commander of the 15th Infantry, Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit in
the province of Abra. Simultaneously with his appointment as Military Mayor,
Beronilla received copy of a memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold to all Military
Mayors in Northern Luzon, authorizing them "to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to
try persons accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding and abetting (of ) the
enemy" (Exhibit 9). He also received from the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry a
list of all puppet government officials of the province of Abra (which included
Arsenio Borjal, puppet mayor of La Paz), with a memorandum instructing all
Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints
from people of the municipality for collaboration with the enemy (Exhibit 12-a).
Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the liberation of the province
of Abra were in progress, Arsenio Borjal returned to La Paz with his family in
order to escape the bombing of Bangued. Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions,
placed Borjal under custody and asked the residents of La Paz to file complaints
against him. In no time, charges of espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of
authority were filed against Borjal; a 12-man jury was appointed by Beronilla,
composed of Jesus Labuguen as chairman, and Benjamin Adriatico, Andres
Afos, Juanito Casal, Santiago Casal, Benjamin Abella, Servillano Afos, Mariano
Ajel, Felimon Labuguen, Felix Murphy, Pedro Turqueza, and Delfin Labuguen as
members; while Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda were named prosecutors,

16 April 1945

Msg. No. 337

Subject: Arsenio Borjal, Charges Against
To: Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra.
1. Returned herewith are the papers on the case of Arsenio Borjal.
2. This is a matter best handled by your government and whatever
disposition you make of the case is hereby approved.

(Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
Commanding

Received April 18, 1945, 10:35 a.m.

(Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra
(Exhibit 8, 8-a)
and on the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution
of Borjal. Jacinto Adriatico acted as executioner and Antonio Palope as grave
digger. Father Luding of the Roman Catholic Church was asked to administer the
last confession to the prisoner, while Father Filipino Velasco of the Aglipayan

Church performed the last rites over Borjal's remains. Immediately after the
execution, Beronilla reported the matter to Col. Arnold who in reply to Beronilla's
report, sent him the following message:
HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
In the Field

22 April 1945

Msg. No. 398

Subject: Report and information Re Borjal case
To: Military Mayor Beronilla
1. Received your letter dated 18 April 1945, subject, above.
2. My request that you withhold action in this case was only dictated
because of a query from Higher Headquarters regarding same. Actually,
I believe there was no doubt as to the treasonable acts of the accused
Arsenio Borjal and I know that your trial was absolutely impartial and fair.
Consequently, I Can only compliment you for your impartial independent
way of handling the whole case.

(Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
Commanding

Received April 26, 1947 7:00 a.m.

(Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra

alleged conspirator, were indicted in the Court of First Instance of Abra for
murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the execution of Arsenio
Borjal. Soon thereafter, the late President Manuel A. Roxas issued Executive
Proclamation No. 8, granting amnesty to all persons who committed acts
penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the
enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Defendant Jesus
Labuguen, then a master sergeant in the Philippine Army, applied for and was
granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines
(Records, pp. 618-20). The rest of the defendant filed their application for
amnesty with the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, who denied their
application on the ground that the crime had been inspired by purely personal
motives, and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Abra for trial on
the merits.
Upon motion of defense counsel, the case against defendant Jesus Labuguen,
who had been granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, was ordered provisionally dismissed: defendant Juan
Balmaceda was discharged from the information so that he might be utilized as
state witness, although actually he was not called to testify; while the case
against defendants Antonio Palope (the grave digger) and Demetrio Afos( a
boloman) was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.
Trial proceeded against the rest of the defendants; and on July 10, 1950, the
Court below rendered judgment, acquitting the members of the jury and the
grave digger Antonio Palope on the ground that they did not participated in the
killing of Arsenio Borjal; acquitting defendants Jesus Labuguen, Felix Alverne,
Severo Afos, and Lauro Parado upon insufficiency of evidence to establish their
participation in the crime; but convicting defendants Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio
Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico as conspirator and co-principals
of the crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of from 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of Arsenio Borjal jointly and severally in the amount of P4,000
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one fourth of
the costs. In convicting said defendants the Court a quo found that while the
crime committed by them fell within the provisions of the Amnesty Proclamation,
they were not entitled to the benefits thereof because the crime was committed
after the expiration of the time limit fixed by the amnesty proclamation;: i.e., that
the deceased Arsenio Borjal was executed after the liberation of La Paz, Abra.

(Exhibit 21, 21-a)

In view of the sentence meted by the Court below, the accused Beronilla,
Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico appealed to this Court.

Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla as military mayor, Policarpio Paculdo as

Clerk of the jury, Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda as prosecutors, Jesus
Labuguen, Delfin Labuguen, Filemon Labuguen, Servillano Afos, Andres Afos,
Benjamin Adriatico, Juanito Casel, Santiago Casel, Mariano Ajel, Felix Murphy,
Benjamin Abella, and Pedro Turqueza as members of the jury, Jacinto Adriatico
as executioner, Severo Afos as grave digger, and Father Filipino Velasco as an

The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest,
prosecution and trial of the late Arsenio Borjal were done pursuant to express
orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters. (Exhibit 9 and 12-a), instructing all
military mayors under its jurisdiction to gather evidence against puppet officials
and to appoint juries of at least 12 bolomen to try the accused and find them

guilty by two thirds vote. It is to be noted that Arsenio Borjal was specifically
named in the list of civilian officials to be prosecuted (Exhibit 12-b).

before Fiscal Antonio of Abra (Exhibit 4), Balmaceda failed to make any mention
of the reading, or even the receipt, of the message. In the affidavit, he stated:

In truth, the prosecution does not seriously dispute that the trial and sentencing
of Borjal was done in accordance with instructions of superior military authorities,
altho it point to irregularities that were due more to ignorance of legal processes
than personal animosity against Borjal. The state, however, predicates its case
principally on the existence of the radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann,
overall area commander, to Lt. Col. Arnold, specifically calling attention to the
illegality of Borjal's conviction and sentence, and which the prosecution claims
was known to the accused Beronilla. Said message is as follows:

Q. In your capacity as policeman, do you know of any usual occurrence

that transpired in La Paz, Abra? A. Yes, sir.

"Message:
VOLCKMANN
TO
ARNOLD
CLN
UNDERSTAND
THAT
MUNICIPALITIES OF ABRA HAVE ORGANIZED JURY SYSTEM PD
BELIEVE THAT THIS BODY IS ILLEGAL AND CANNOT TRY
PUNISHMENTS THEREOF PD SPECIFIC INSTANCE IS BROUGHT
TO YOUR ATTENTION FRO PROPER AND IMMEDIATE ACTION ON
ONE ARSENIO BORJAL OF LA PAZ WHO HAS BEEN TRIED CMA
CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO BE HANGED PD REPORT
ACTION TAKEN BY YOU ON THIS MATTER PD MSG BEGINS CLN"
(EXH. H)
The crucial question thus becomes whether or not this message, originally sent
to Arnold's quarters in San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, was relayed by the latter to
appellant Beronilla in La Paz, Abra, on the morning of April 18, 1945, together
with the package of records of Borjal's trial that was admittedly returned to and
received by Beronilla on that date, after review thereof by Arnold (Exhibit 8-8-a).
Obviously, if the Volckmann message was known to Beronilla, his ordering the
execution of Borjal on the night of April 18, 1945 can not be justified.
We have carefully examined the evidence on this important issue, and find no
satisfactory proof that Beronilla did actually receive the radiogram Exhibit H or
any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied it. The messenger, or "runner",
Pedro Molina could not state what papers were enclosed in the package he
delivered to Beronilla on that morning in question, nor could Francisco Bayquen
(or Bayken), who claimed to have been present at the delivery of the message,
state the contents thereof.
The only witness who asserted that Beronilla received and read the Volckmann
message, Exhibit H, was Rafael Balmaceda, a relative of Borjal, who claimed to
have been, as Beronilla's bodyguard, present at the receipt of the message and
to have read it over Beronilla's shoulder. This testimony, however, can not be
accorded credence, for the reason that in the affidavit executed by this witness

Q. Will you state what is the event? A. On April 17, 1945, I was
assigned as guard at the Presidencia where Mayor Arsenio Borjal is
confined. On the 18th of April, 1945, six bolomen came to me while I
was on duty as guard, that Mayor Borjal should be tied, on orders of
Mayor Beronilla, Mayor Borjal wanted to know the reason why he would
be tied, as he had not yet learned of the decision of the jury against him.
Mayor Borjal wrote a note to Mayor Beronilla, asking the reason for his
being ordered to be tied. I personally delivered the note of Borjal to
Mayor Beronilla. Mayor Beronilla did not answer the note, but instead
told me that I should tie Mayor Borjal, as tomorrow he would die, as he
cannot escape. I returned to the Presidencia, and Mayor Borjal was tied,
as that was the ordered of Mayor Beronilla.
The plain import of the affidavit is that the witness Rafael Balmaceda was not
with Beronilla when the message arrived, otherwise Beronilla would have given
him his orders direct, as he (Balmaceda) testified later at the trial. Moreover, it is
difficult to believe that having learned of the contents of the Volckmann message,
Balmaceda should not have relayed it to Borjal , or to some member of the
latter's family, considering that they were relatives. In addition to Balmaceda was
contradicted by Bayken, another prosecution witness, as to the hatching of the
alleged conspiracy to kill Borjal. Balmaceda claimed that the accused-appellants
decided to kill Borjal in the early evening of April 18, while Bayken testified that
the agreement was made about ten o'clock in the morning, shortly after the
accused had denied Borjal's petition to be allowed to hear mass.
Upon the other hand, Beronilla's conduct belies his receipt of the Volckmann
message. Had he executed Borjal in violation of superior orders, he would not
have dared to report it to Arnold's headquarters on the very same day, April 18th,
1945, as he did (Exhibit 20), half an hour after the execution. And what is even
more important, if Borjal was executed contrary to instructions, how could Lt.
Colonel Arnold on April 21, 1945, write in reply (Exhibit 21, 21-a) "I can only
compliment you for your impartial but independent way of handling the whole
case" instead of berating Beronilla and ordering his court martial for
disobedience?
Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now be
ascertained, failed to transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla. And this
being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be
rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire against a man who was,
to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.

The state claims that the appellants held grudges against the late Borjal. Even
so, it has been already decided that the concurrence of personal hatred and
collaboration with the enemy as motives for a liquidation does not operate to
exclude the case from the benefits of the Amnesty claimed by appellants, since
then "it may not be held that the manslaughter stemmed from purely personal
motives" (People vs. Barrioquinto,* G. R. Nos. L-2011 and 2267, June 30, 1951).
Actually, the conduct of the appellants does not dispose that these appellants
were impelled by malice (dolo). The arrest and trial of Borjal were made upon
express orders of the higher command; the appellants allowed Borjal to be
defended by counsel, one of them (attorney Jovito Barreras) chosen by Borjal's
sister; the trial lasted nineteen (19) days; it was suspended when doubts arose
about its legality, and it was not resumed until headquarters (then in
Langangilang, Abra) authorized its resumption and sent an observer (Esteban
Cabanos, of the S-5) to the proceedings, and whose suggestions on procedure
were followed; and when the verdict of guilty was rendered and death sentence
imposed, the records were sent to Arnold's headquarters for review, and Borjal
was not punished until the records were returned eight days later with the
statement of Arnold that "whatever disposition you make of the case is hereby
approved" (Exhibit 8), which on its face was an assent to the verdict and the
sentence. The lower Court, after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really
committed treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and civilians to be tortured, and
hidden American officers to be captured by the Japanese) expressly declared
that "the Court is convinced that it was not for political or personal reason that the
accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal" (Decision, p. 9; Record, p. 727).
It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the
accused-appellants acted upon orders, of a superior officers that they, as military
subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without being aware
of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on their part, we can not say that
criminal intent has been established (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507; Peo. vs.
Pacana, 47 Phil., 48; Sent. of the Tribunal Supremo of Spain, 3 July 1886; 7
January 1901; 24 March 1900; 21 Feb. 1921; 25 March 1929). Actus non facit
reum nisi mens si rea.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such
by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence
or indifference to duty or to consequence, as, in law, is equivalent to
criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens reaa crime is not committed if the minds of the person performing the act
complained of be innocent. (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507).
But even assuming that the accused-appellant did commit crime with they are
charged, the Court below should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the
Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 (42 Off. Gaz., 2072)on the ground that the
slaying of Arsenio Borjal took place after actual liberation of the area from enemy
control and occupation. The evidence on record regarding the date of liberation
of La Paz, Abra, is contradictory. The Military Amnesty Commission that decided
the case of one of the original accused Jesus Labuguen, held that La Paz, Abra,

was liberated on July 1, 1945, according to its records; and this finding was
accepted by Judge Letargo when he dismissed the case against said accused on
March 15, 1949. On the other hand, Judge Bocar and Hilario, who subsequently
took cognizance of the case, relied on Department Order No. 25, of the
Department of the Interior, dated August 12, 1948, setting the liberation of the
Province of Abra on April 4, 1945, fifteen days before Borjal was slain. The two
dates are not strictly contradictory; but given the benefit of the Presidential
directive to the Amnesty Commissions (Adm. Order No. 11, of October 2, 1946)
that "any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the (amnesty)
proclamation shall be resolved in favor of the accused" (42 Off. Gaz., 2360), as
was done in People vs. Gajo, Phil., 107 46 Off. Gaz., (No. 12) p. 6093.
For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the
appellants are acquitted, with costs de oficio.

G.R. No. L-2754

August 31, 1949

FIDEL
ABRIOL, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE HOMERES, Provincial Warden of Leyte, respondent-appellee.
Francisco
Astilla
for
appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Isidro C.
Borromeo for appellee.
OZAETA, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte denying
the appellant's petition forhabeas corpus.
In criminal case No. 1472 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte the herein
petitioner Fidel Abriol, together with six other persons, was accused of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. After the prosecution had presented its
evidence and rested its case, counsel for the defense moved to dismiss the case
on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to prove the guilt of the accused.
After hearing the arguments for and against the motion for dismissal, the court
held the proofs sufficient to convict and denied said motion, whereupon counsel
for the defense offered to present evidence for the accused. The provincial fiscal
opposed the presentation of evidence by the defense, contending that the
present procedural practice and laws precluded the defense in criminal cases
from presenting any evidence after it had presented a motion for dismissal with
or without reservation and after said motion had been denied, and citing as
authority the case of United States vs. De la Cruz, 28 Phil., 279. His Honor Judge
S. C. Moscoso sustained the opposition of the provincial fiscal and, without
allowing the accused to present evidence in their defense, convicted all of them
and sentenced the herein petitioner to suffer seven years of imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P2,000.
From that sentence the herein petitioner together with his coaccused appealed to
the Court of Appeals. On June 7, 1948, the Court of Appeals, on its own motion
and without notice to the appellants as required in section 8 of Rule 120 and
in Baradi vs. People, G.R. No. L-2658, dismissed the appeal for failure of the
appellants to file their brief within the extension of time granted them.
The present petition for habeas corpus was thereafter presented by Fidel Abriol
against the provincial warden of Leyte, contending that the sentence entered
against him in said criminal case No. 1472 was null and avoid because it had
been rendered without due process of law. Judge Rodolfo Baltazar, who heard
the petition forhabeas corpus, denied it on the ground that, the judgement of
conviction against the petitioner having become final, "this court is entirely devoid

of jurisdiction over and power to modify or in any war alter said decision." From
that decision of Judge Baltazar the petitioner has appealed to this Court.
1. The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow the accused-petitioner to present
proofs in his defense after the denial of his motion for dismissal was a palpable
error which resulted in denying to the said accused the due process of law
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution, it being provided in
Article II, section 1 (17), of the Constitution that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. There is
on law nor "procedural practice" under which the accused may ever be denied
the right to be heard before being sentenced.
Both the fiscal and Judge Moscoso have misunderstood the ruling of this Court in
the case of the United States vs. De la Cruz, 28 Phil., 279. In that case the
accused-appellant assigned as error the denial by the trial court of the motion for
dismissal presented by the defense after the evidence for the prosecution had
been closed, although the court heard the evidence for the defense before
rendering judgment. In refutation of said assignment of error the Attorney
General cited in the case of United States vs. Abaroa, 3 Phil., 116, wherein the
following principle was laid down: "After the prosecution rests, the court should
not dismiss the case on motion for insufficiency of proof but should require
defendant to present evidence in his own behalf." In that connection the Court
observed that the ruling in the Abaroa case was handed down in December,
1903, and before the decision in the Kepner case, when the Government was
permitted to appeal from dismissals and final judgments in criminal cases. Said
the Court:
. . . It was then held that the practice of dismissing the case immediately
after the evidence for the prosecution had been closed ought not to be
followed, for when the order of dismissal was appealed from and this
higher court sustained the conviction of the accused on that evidence of
the prosecution he would have been convicted without having been
heard in his own defense which would work an injustice; and when to
avoid this difficulty the order of dismissal was overruled and the case
returned for rehearing, another difficulty would be encountered, which is
that of subjecting the accused a second time to another trial without
action on his part and without need, since all the evidence could and
should have been taken at the trial already held, and with the additional
risk of all the inconveniences of delay. In this state of affairs the
Supreme Court of the United States rendered the decision in the case
of Kepner vs. U. S. (195 U. S., 100; 11 Phil., 669), and since then the
situation assumed and disposed of in United States vs. Abaroa cannot
be considered, for the Government cannot now appeal from an order
sustaining the motion to dismiss presented by the defense after the
evidence for the prosecution has been closed, on the ground of
insufficiency thereof.

Even now, after the Keeper case, it is no ground for error that the Court
of First Instance denied the motion for dismissal presented immediately
after the evidence for the prosecution had been closed because the
defense believed it to be insufficient; for the reason that, as in this case,
the court did not hold it to be insufficient it was under no obligation so
to hold it and it could continue the trial and take the evidence for the
defense in order to reach the conclusion induced in its opinion by the
allegations and the evidence, or as it did conclude in this case by
sentencing the defendant on the evidence for the prosecution, which it
held to be sufficient. (28 Phil., 282-283.)
Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal cases if the defendant would
be placed thereby in double jeopardy (sec. 2, Rule 118), the dismissal of the
case for insufficiency of the evidence after the prosecution has rested terminates
the case then and there. But if the motion for dismissal is denied, the court
should proceed to hear the evidence for the defense before entering judgment
regardless of whether or not the defense had reserved its right of present
evidence in the event its motion for dismissal be denied. The reason is that it is
the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense before sentence
is pronounce on him. Of course if the accused as no evidence to present or
expressly waives the right to present it, the court has no alternative but of decide
the case upon the evidence presented by the prosecution alone.
In the case of People vs. Moro Mamacol (46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 1], 3411) the
accused, without reserving the right to present evidence, moved for the dismissal
of the case after the prosecution had rested. The court denied the motion and,
without allowing the accused to present his evidence, sentenced him to suffer life
imprisonment for the crime of murder of which he was accused. On appeal this
Court, although finding that the evidence for the prosecution was sufficient for
conviction, set aside the judgment and ordered the case remanded to the lower
court to allow the accused to present his proofs.
In civil case cases, where either or both of the parties can appeal, the ruling is
different from that in criminal cases. If the defendant moves for dismissal on the
ground of insufficiency of the evidence after the plaintiff had rested and the court
grants the motion, and if n appeal by the plaintiff the judgment is reversed, the
case is terminated then and there; that is to say, it is not remanded to the court of
origin for the purpose of allowing the defendant to produce evidence in his
defense. "The defendant in offering a motion to dismiss in effect elects to stand
on the sufficiency of the plaintiff's case." (Moody, Aronso and Co. vs. Hotel
Bilboa, 50 Phil., 198; Demetriovs. Lopez, 50 Phil., 45; Arroyo vs. Andrea Azur, 43
Off. Gaz., 54.) However, if the court denies the motion to dismiss, it is not
precluded from receiving evidence for the defendant, and the plaintiff cannot by
mandamus compel it to render judgment without hearing the evidence for the
defense. (Cataoco vs. Dinglasan, G. R. No. L-2004, May 24, 1949.)
2. The main question to decide is whether the writ of habeas corpus lies in a
case like the present. The general rule is that the function of a writ of habeas

corpus in permitting the petitioner to challenge by collateral attack the jurisdiction

under which the process or judgment by which he is deprived of his liberty was
issued or rendered cannot be distorted by extending the inquiry to mere errors of
trial courts acting within their jurisdiction. (25 Am. Hur., Habeas corpus, sec. 13,
p. 152.) This principle, however, has been qualified in the sense that it "is not to
be so applied as to destroy constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty."
(Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304 U. S., 458; 82 Law. ed., 1461.)
Appellant relies upon the case of Schields vs. McMicking, 23 Phil., 526. That
case, however, was reversed inMcMicking vs. Schields, 238 Y. S., 99; 59 Law,
ed., 1220; 41 Phil., 971. The petitioner Schields was accused of theft in the
municipal court of Manila on December 1, 1910. There he was duly arraigned,
tried, convicted, and sentenced. He appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Manila on December 21, 1910. On December 23 he received notice that the case
would be heard at ten o'clock a.m. on the 24th. When he was arraigned on the
last-mentioned date he asked for time in which to answer the complaint, which
request was denied by the court, who ordered the clerk to enter on the record
that the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the complaint. Thereupon the petitioner's
attorney also asked for time in which to prepare a defense, which petition was
also denied by the same court. The petitioner's attorney excepted to this ruling
and asked that the exceptions, together with the request of the petitioner which
had been denied, be entered on the record. After the trial, during which the
accused presented witnesses in his, defense, the Court of First Instance found
him guilty and sentenced him to four months and one day of arresto mayor. In
denying the petitioner's request for time in which to prepare his defense, the trial
court said:
At the beginning of the trial the defendant asked for further time to
prepare, and invoked certain sections of General Order No. 58, which, in
our judgment, were not applicable to this case. The prosecution did not
file a new complaint in this court. Defendant was tried on the identical
complaint which was presented in the court below as long as December
1st. To that complaint, as the record shows, he pleaded not guilty, and
having further brought this case here on appeal, the presumption is that
such plea continued, and to allow delays for the reiteration of such a
plea would be an empty formality. The law does not require a vain and
useless thing, and the provisions in question must be construed as
applying to cases where a new complaint is filed in this court. But aside
from this, we think that the time of trial caused no prejudice to the
accused. As we have seen, the complaint was filed on December 1st,
and the accused had more than three weeks to prepare before the trial
in this court. During this period there were evidently one or more
continuances, and finally, it seems, the defendant had to be called into
the municipal court by a bench warrant. Upon bringing the case here it
was incumbent upon him to follow it up and to be ready and waiting its
disposition by this court. Notice of the trial was sent both to him and to
his counsel the day before, and it was not claimed if the case had been
postponed. On the contrary it appears that he called one witness who

did not testify in the court below. After all, the question in the case is
mainly one of law. The principal controversy as to the facts to the
question of the alleged permission to take articles, and this, as we have
seen, would not have excused the defendant, even had it been proved,
though he admits that himself and Frandom are the only witnesses on
that point.
This court granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered the discharge of
the petitioner from confinement on the ground that under section 30 of General
Orders No. 58 the accused, on demand, had the right to at least two days in
which to prepare for trial and that the refusal of the time in which to prepare for
trial was equivalent to the refusal of a legal hearing. On appeal by the respondent
Director of Prisons to the Supreme Court of the United States, the latter reversed
the judgment. Said that court:
We are unable to agree with the conclusion of the Supreme Court that
the judgment pronounced by three Court of First Instance was void and
without effect. Under the circumstances disclosed denial of the request
for the time to answer and to prepare defense was at most matter of
error which did not vitiate the entire proceedings. The cause admitted
to be within the jurisdiction of the court stood for trial on appeal. The
accused had known for weeks the nature of the charge against him. He
had notice of the hearing, was present in person and represented by
counsel, testified in his own behalf, introduced other evidence, and
seems to have received an impartial hearing. There is nothing to show
that he needed further time for any proper purpose, and there is no
allegation that he desired to offer additional evidence or suffered
substantial injury by being forced into trial. But for the sections in respect
of procedure quoted from General Order No. 58, it could not plausibly be
contended that the conviction was without due process of law. The Court
of First Instance placed no purely fanciful or arbitrary construction upon
these sections and certainly they are not so peculiarly inviolable that a
mere misunderstanding of their meaning or harmless departure from
their exact terms would suffice to deprive the proceedings of lawful effect
and enlarge the accused. . . .
It will be noted that in said case the fact that the cause stood for trial on
appeal from the municipal court; that the accused had known for weeks the
nature of the charge against him; that he had notice of the hearing, was present
in person and represented by counsel, testified in his own behalf, introduced
other evidence, and seems to have received an impartial hearing; that there was
nothing to show that he needed further time for any proper purpose; and that
there was no allegation that he desired to offer additional evidence or suffered
substantial injury by being forced into trial weighed heavily against the
pretension of the petitioner that the sentenced entered against him was void for
lack of due process of law.

There is no analogy between the facts of that case and those of the present
case.
A more pertinent and analogous case is that of Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304 U. S.,
458 Law. ed., 1461. Johnson was indicated by the grand jury for feloniously
uttering, passing, and possessing counterfeit Federal Reserve notes. Upon
arraignment, he pleaded not guilty, said that he had no lawyer, and in
response to an inquiry of the court stated that he was ready for trial. He did
not ask for and was not provided with the assistance of counsel. He was tried,
convicted and sentenced to four and one-half years of imprisonment. Although
the Federal District Court believed that the petitioner was deprived, in the trial
court, of his constitutional rights to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense, it denied the petition for habeas corpus, holding that the proceedings
"were not sufficient to make the trial void and justify its annulment trial errors or
irregularities which could only be corrected on appeal." The Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed that judgment; but the Supreme Court on certiorari reversed it.
We quote the pertinent portion of its ratio decidendi:
The purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to Counsel is to
protect an accused from conviction resulting from his own ignorance of
his legal and constitutional rights, and the guaranty would be nullified by
a determination than an accused's ignorant failure to claim his rights
removes the protection of the Constitution. True, habeas corpus cannot
be used as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not
involving the question of jurisdiction occurring during the course of
trial; and the "writ of habeas corpus can nor be used as a writ of error."
These principles, however, must be construed and applied so as to
preserve not destroy constitutional safeguards of human life and
liberty. . . . .
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with
crime to the assistance of Counsel, compliance with this constitutional
mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a Federal Court's
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty. When this right is
properly waived, the assistance of Counsel is no longer a necessary
element of the court's jurisdiction to conviction and sentenced. If the
accused, however, is not represented by Counsel and has not
competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth
Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and
sentence depriving him of his life or liberty. A court's jurisdiction at the
beginning of trial may be lost "in the course of the proceedings" due to
failure to complete the court-as the Sixth Amendment requires--by
providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who
has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or
liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not
complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The
judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void,

and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus. . .

. (82 Law. ed., 1467-1468.)

court to decide the case anew. Pending such new trial, the petitioner may be
admitted to bail.

We have already shown that there is no law or precedent which could be invoked
to place in doubt the right of the accused to be heard or to present evidence in
his defense before being sentenced. On the contrary, the provisions of the
Constitution hereinabove cited expressly and clearly guarantee to him that right.
Such constitutional right is inviolate. No court of justice under our system of
government has the power to deprive him of that right. If the accused does not
waive his right to be heard but on the contrary as in the instant case
invokes that rough, and the court denies it to him, that court no longer has
jurisdiction to proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused without hearing
him in his defense; and the sentence thus pronounced is void and may be
collaterally attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding.

It is so ordered, without costs.

3. There is no doubt that if the petitioner had prosecuted his appeal to a

successful conclusion, the sentence against him would have been set aside and
the case would have been rendered to the trial court to allow him to present his
proofs, as was done in the case of People vs. Mamacol, supra. We make this
observation to show that the petitioner cannot by this habeas corpus proceeding
secure a greater relief that he could have obtained by appeal, and that in any
event he is only entitled to the restoration of the right of which he has been
unlawfully deprived, namely, the right to present evidence in his defense. Under
section 17 of Rule 102, a person who is not set at liberty upon a writ of habeas
corpus shall not be again imprisoned for the same offense unless by the lawful
order or process of a court having jurisdiction of the cause or offense. Although
the sentence against the petitioner is void for the reasons hereinabove stated, he
may be held under the custody of the law by being detained or admitted to bail
until the case against him is finally and lawfully decided. The process against him
in criminal case No. 1472 may sand should be resumed from the stage at which
it was vitiated by the trial court's denial of his constitutional right to be heard. Up
to the point when the prosecution rested, the proceedings were valid and should
be resumed from there.

This is a petition for habeas corpus.

Under the title "Proceedings and Relief" and subtitle "Judgment and Costs" on
the subject of Habeas corpus, American Jurisprudence says: "After the hearing,
the court should dispose of the petitioner in such manner as the justice of the
case may require; he may be discharged, remanded, or admitted to bail . . . Even
though a petitioner is entitled to be relieved of the particular restraint under which
he is held, he may, if there is sufficient cause for his detention, be restrained until
valid proceedings against him may be taken." (Section 152 and 154.)
Wherefore, in view of the nullity of the sentence under which the petitioner has
been committed to imprisonment by the respondent, the judgment appealed from
is reversed and the writ prayed for is granted. The respondent shall discharge the
petitioner unless within fifteen days from the promulgation of this decision the
provincial fiscal of Leyte should move the lower court to reset for trial said
criminal case No. 1472 to allow the petitioner to present his evidence and the trial

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Montemayor and Torres, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
REYES, J., dissenting:

The petitioner was sentenced to prison by the Court of First Instance of Leyte for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. From this sentence he appealed
to the Court of Appeals; but the appeal was there dismissed because of his
failure to file a brief. And as no steps were taken to have the appeal reinstated,
the sentence was in due time declared final. This was on June 22, 1948.
Committed prison to serve his sentence, petitioner, on December 3, 1948, filed
the present petition for habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance, and the
petition having been denied by that court, the case is now before us on appeal.
The petitioner challenges the validity of the sentence of conviction imposed upon
him on the ground that his constitutional right was violated when the lower court,
after denying his motion to dismiss for alleged insufficiency of the prosecution's
proof, refused to allow him to present his own evidence, holding that his right to
do so was waived by his motion for dismissal. It was, of course, error for the trial
court to deny him that right, and the error would undoubtedly have been
corrected had he prosecuted his appeal to its conclusion. But this he did not do,
and the question now is whether notwithstanding what was happened, the
correction may still be made throughhabeas corpus proceedings, whose only
purpose in law is to determine whether or not a person alleged to be illegally
detained is entitled to release. Disregarding the legal purpose of this remedy, the
majority of the Court has granted the writ but has denied liberty to the petitioner,
remanding the case to the court below for further proceedings. Actually, what the
majority has done is to allow the remedy of habeas corpus to perform the
functions of an appeal that is now dead and can no longer be revived. To this I
cannot agree.
No rule is better settled than that habeas corpus is not a corrective remedy. It
cannot be used for correcting errors or irregularities of procedure which are not
jurisdictional. (25 Am. Jur., par. 28.) It dose not take the place of an appeal.
(Abanilla vs. Villas, 56 Phil., 481.) And even if the error sought to be corrected

may have the effect of voiding a judgment, so long as the court that rendered that
judgement had jurisdiction, habeas corpus may not be invoked to correct the
error. The proper remedy is by appeal or certiorari.
Thus, in the case of Domingo vs. Director of Prisons, 44 Off. Gaz., 22011, where
an attempt was made throughhabeas corpus proceedings to invalidate a
judgment of conviction rendered on a plea of guilty when, so it was alleged, no
such plea was properly entered by the accused, this Court, through its Chief
Justice, said:
. . . The trial court had jurisdiction over the offense and of the person of
the accused, and, therefore, it had jurisdiction to try the case and render
judgment therein. The allegation, if true, that the judgment of conviction
was rendered without a plea of guilty properly entered by the accused to
the lesser offense of homicide, is merely a defect of procedure, not of
jurisdiction, though it may have the effect of voiding the judgment. And
this
error
of
procedure
cannot
be
reviewed
in habeas
corpus proceedings wherein the only issue is whether or not the
petitioner is entitled to release. And the petitioner is not entitled to
release even if we have power to set aside the judgment upon the
ground aforementioned, for, in such event, the proper procedure would
be to reopen the criminal case and order the trial court to proceed further
as if no judgment has ever been entered therein, that is, it must arraign
the accused for the lesser offense of homicide after the information is
duly amended, then try the case if the accused pleads not guilty, and the
latter in the meantime should remain in confinement if he is not on bail.
But this correction can be done only in an appeal or in an action
for certiorari wherein the trial court is made respondent and is amenable
to our orders.
In the present case, there is no question that the lower court had jurisdiction to
try the case against the petitioner for illegal possessions of firearms and to
convict him therefore. The court committed a legal error when it convicted
petitioner without allowing him to present his evidence. But the error, though it
made the judgment voidable, was only an error in procedure, which could have
been corrected by appeal. In fact, petitioner took the steps to have the error so
corrected, except that he later abandoned the appeal by not presenting a brief.
And though notified on June 9, 1948, of the dismissal of his appeal, he did
nothing to have the dismissal reconsidered, and his petition for habeas
corpus was not filed until December 3, 1948, that is, about six months later, when
he had already been serving sentence for sometime. As said by this Court in the
case of Domingo vs. Director of Prisons, supra, "this passive attitude is an
indication of conformity with the proceedings and that the petition (for habeas
corpus) is but an afterthought."
The accused in a criminal case has the undoubted right to present evidence on
his behalf. But this right may be waived at any stage of the case, and the waiver
may be express or implied. Petitioner in the present case could have insisted on

the preservation of that right when he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But
since he gave up the appeal and commenced to serve his sentence, the natural
interpretation of his attitude is that he no longer cared to have the error corrected
and go through further trial, thereby impliedly waiving his right to present
evidence if he had any.
The case of Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304 U. S., 458; 82 Law. ed., 1461, relied on in
the majority opinion is hardly applicable to the present case. There the accused
was denied his constitutional right to have the assistance of counsel at the trial
and the Supreme Court of the United States held that the recognition of that right
was a prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction, so that when the right was denied
the judgment of conviction was void as having been rendered without jurisdiction.
It is obvious that the denial of the error which vitiated the entire proceedings of
the trial court and made a new trial inevitable. Annulment of the whole
proceedings taken while the accused had no legal counsel was, therefore,
proper. In the case at bar, as the majority opinion itself rules, the whole
proceedings below did not have to be annulled, so that the case had to be
remanded to the trial court for the reception of defendant's evidence. The
question of jurisdiction is not at all in issue and seems to have been invoked
merely as an excuse to justify recourse to habeas corpus as a merely for
correcting a procedural mistake.
I therefore vote for the dismissal of this petition and the confirmance of the
judgment below.

G.R. No. L-46329-30 April 10, 1979

JAMES JOSEPH, MIGUEL ROMULO, ANTONIO SANTAMARIA, RAMON
IGNACIO MORAN, EUGENIO LOPEZ III, and JAIME CLAPAROLS,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE VILLALUZ, as Judge presiding over the Circuit Criminal
Court, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Metro Manila, HON. EMMANUEL G.
PEA, as Acting District State Prosecutor And the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition, certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
injunction and/or petition for habeas corpus seeking the following relief:
WHEREFORE, petitioners respectfully pray that writs of
prohibition issue commanding respondents to desist from
further prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-VII-1750-51 of
the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Metro Manila of certiorari
annulling the orders of February 7 and 28, 1977 and June 10,
1977 of respondent judge in said criminal cases denying
petitioners' demurrers to the evidence and motion for separate
trial of each accused, and of mandamus commanding
respondents to render a judgment of acquittal of petitioners from
the said criminal charges. Or, at the very least, they respectfully
pray that the lower court be ordered to grant each petitioner
separate trials. In the alternative, they also pray for the issue of
a writ of habeas corpus which extends to the continued restraint
on petitioner's liberty when petitioners are entitled to acquittal
from the criminal charges by force of their constitutional rights.
Immediately, they respectfully apply for the issue ex-parte of a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondents judge and
fiscal to desist from continuing with the trial and proceedings of
the aforesaid criminal cases, followed by such writ of
preliminary injunction to the same tenor and effect, petitioners
offering a bond executed to the parties enjoined in an amount,
to be fixed by the Court, to the effect that petitioners will pay to
such parties all damages which they may sustain by reason of
the injunction if the Court should finally decide that petitioners
were not entitled thereto.

They pray for such other remedy as the Court may deem just
and equitable in the premises.
Manila, June 14, 1977. 1
As prayed for, the respondents were "RESTRAINED from continuing with the trial
of Criminal Case Nos. CCC-VII-1750-51 which are pending before the Circuit
Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District at Pasig, Metro Manila, and from further
proceeding with the case until further orders from this Court." 2
The petitioners, James Joseph, Miguel Romulo, Antonio Santamaria, Ramon
Ignacio Moran, Eugenio Lopez III, and Jaime Claparols Jr., were charged by
Noemi L. Garcia with the crime of multiple rape in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal. The complaint was docketed as Criminal Case No. 20380 but upon
transfer to the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, the same was docketed as
Criminal Case No. CCC-VIII-1750-Rizal. 3
The petitioners Jaime Claparols, Jr. and Ramon Ignacio Moran were also
charged with another offense of multiple rape by the same complainant before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The complaint was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 20381 but upon transfer to the Circuit Criminal Court, the same was
docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1751-Rizal. 4
Upon arraignment, the accused-petitioners entered a plea of not guilty in both
cases. A joint trial on the merits of both cases of all the accused was commenced
and the prosecution presented its evidence.
After the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence in chief, the
petitioner Claparols, Jr. filed a motion to dismiss dated November 19, 1976; the
petitioner Lopez filed a motion to acquit dated November 19, 1976; the
petitioners Romulo, Santamaria and Joseph filed a motion to dismiss dated
November 22, 1976; and the petitioner Moran filed a motion to dismiss dated
November 22, 1976.
The respondent judge, Hon. Onofre Villaluz, then heard the oral arguments of the
movants in amplification of their formal motions to dismiss/acquit and the oral
arguments of the prosecution in support of their opposition thereto.
The respondent judge denied the motions in an order dated February 7, 1977
which reads:
After a thorough perusal of the records and considering the
allegations of the issues raised and arguments adduced in the
Motion to Acquit and/or Dismiss filed by the respective counsels

of the accused, together with the opposition thereto; and

considering further the exhaustive oral argument of the parties
which lasted for almost eight (8) hours, the Motion to Dismiss
and/or Acquit is hereby Denied.
WHEREFORE, let the hearing on the presentation of evidence
for the defense be set on February 9, 1977 at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning.
SO ORDERED.

Romulo home and in which they are not even said to have
participated. 7
This motion was denied by the respondent judge on June 10, 1977. The said
petitioners' verbal motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was denied.
The respondent Judge then reset the joint trial of the two cases for reception of
the evidence for the defense on September 22, 24, 27 and 29, 1977. The trial did
not proceed in view of the restraining order issued by this Court pursuant to its
resolution of June 21, 1977.

Pasig, Metro Manila, February 7, 1977.

The petitioners assail the order of the respondent judge denying their Motions to
Dismiss/Acquit on the following grounds:
(Sgd.) ONOFRE A.
VILLALUZ
Respondent judge had consistently and invariably denied in all
criminal cases heard by him demurrers to the evidence (motions
to dismiss after close of the evidence of the prosecution on the
Judge
ground that it did not amount to proof beyond reasonable doubt)
on the opinion that the Rules of Court in omitting provisions for
The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners of the order denying the Motions
a demurrer to evidence in criminal cases prohibited it. This
to Dismiss/Acquit was likewise denied by the respondent Judge in an order dated
opinion denies petitioners their following rights under the
February 28, 1977 on the ground that "the issues raised and arguments adduced
Constitution, i.e., 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
in the Motion for Reconsideration together with the opposition thereto were the
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved ...' and 'no
same grounds adduced in the Motion to Dismiss and/or Acquit were virtually
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.'
6
covered by the extensive arguments of both parties ..."
Therefore, the continued prosecution of petitioners without a
just resolution of their demurrers to evidence should be prohibit.
Thereafter, the petitioners, Antonio Santamaria, Ramon Ignacio Moran, Eugenio
The denial of constitutional rights is reviewable onhabeas
Lopez III and Jaime Claparols Jr. filed a motion dated June 7, 1977 asking for
corpus proceedings at the very least. 8
separate trial for each accused on the ground that:
... The defenses of the accused are individual and separate
from each other, because
(a) Technically, none of the accused need defend himself
against charges which allegedly occurred before they
respectively arrived at the Romulo house.
(b) At the Romulo home. no evidence in fact was presented that
any of the accused participated in the rape committed by any
one of them.
(c) They should not therefore be prejudiced by any evidence
presented by such of the other accused on those charges
allegedly committed before their respective arrivals at the

The submission that the petitioners were deprived of their constitutional right to
be presumed innocent and the right against self-incrimination by the denial of
their Motions to Dismiss/Acquit by the respondent Judge has no merit. The
respondent Judge made a thorough perusal of the records of the cases and
considered the exhaustive arguments of the parties which lasted for almost eight
(8) hours before resolving the Motions to Dismiss/Acquit. The motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the Motion to Dismiss/Acquit was denied
because said motion contained the same grounds adduced in petitioners'
Motions to Dismiss/Acquit. There is no showing that the respondent Judge
denied the Motions to Dismiss/Acquit allegedly because of his opinion that the
Rules of Court in omitting provisions for a demurrer to evidence in criminal cases
prohibited it.

The petitioners are not precluded from presenting their evidence. In fact, the
continuation of the hearing of both cases was set on September 22, 24, 27 and
29, 1977 for the reception of the evidence for the defense.
It is true that an accused is presumed innocent until his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. However, after the prosecution has adduced evidence, the
constitutional presumption of innocence must yield to what has been so amply
and persuasively demonstrated. 9
The respondent Judge did not disregard any constitutional right of the petitioners.
Said respondent Judge is presumed to have considered the evidence adduced
by the prosecution when he denied the Motion to Dismiss/Acquit of the
petitioners.
The Court cannot decide in this special civil action whether or not the evidence
adduced by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
the petitioners. It is now petitioners' duty to neutralize the evidence of the State in
order to maintain the presumption of their innocence of the crime of which they
are charged.
In the absence of a clear knowing that the respondent Judge has committed a
grave abuse of discretion or acted in excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not
annul an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss a criminal case. Appeal
is the proper remedy of the, petitioners in order to have the findings of fact of the
respondent judge reviewed by a superior court. 10
The petitioners' application for separate trial is meritorious. Section 8, Rule 119,
Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 8. Trial of joint defendants. When two or more
defendants are jointly charged with any offense they shall be
tried jointly unless the court. n its discretion upon motion of the
fiscal or any defendant orders separate trials. In ordering
separate trials, the court y order that one or more defendants be
each separately tried, or may order that several defendants be
jointly tried in another trials, or may order that each defendant
be separately tried.
The foregoing provision does not state when the application or separate trial may
be made. As a matter of law, the granting of a separate trial when two or more
defendant are jointly barged with an offense is discretionary with the trial court. 11
Considering the established circumstances, the cause of the State would not be
jeopardized by the granting of separate trials to the accused. Inasmuch as the

petitioners are said with capital offenses, great care should be taken the
evidence of one should not prejudice the others. It appears they have different
defenses which may be antagonist to each other. in the interest of justice, this
Court a separate trial may be granted even after f the prosecution as finished
presenting its evidence in chief. It is understood, however, that the evidence in
chief of the prosecution shall remain in the record as evidence against al the
petitioners. It is not necessary for the prosecution to adduce all over again its
evidence in chief in each separate trial of the accused. In the separate trial of the
accused, only the accused presenting evidence has to be present.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent judge denying the Motion to
Dismiss/Acquit of the petitioners are hereby affirmed and the petition to prohibit
the continuation of the trial of Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-17-00-Rizal and
Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1751-Rizal and to compel the respondent judge to
acquit the petitioners is denied. The petition for habeas corpus is also denied.
However, the order dated June 10, 1977 denying petitioners' motion for lifting of
consolidation of trial and/or separate trial is set aside and the petition for
separate trial for each accused. is hereby granted. The evidence to be adduced
by each accused-petitioner should not be considered as evidence against the
other accused-petitioners. Only the accused presenting evidence is obliged to
attend the trial. The prosecution does not have adduce all over again its evidence
in chief which shall be considered against all the petitioners, without prejudice to
the right of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence in each separate trial.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, and De Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Castro C.J. and Aquino, J., took no part.
Fernando, J., took no part, one of the counsel Attorney Norberto J. Quisumbing,
being his brother in law.
Barredo, J., reserves his vote.
Melencio-Herrera, J., inhibiting herself for personal reasons.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur in the result. This is a special civil action for prohibition certiorari and
mandamus and/or petition for habeas corpus seeking inter alia the setting aside
of respondent judge's orders denying petitioners' demurrers to the evidence
presented by the prosecution and asking this Court to issue a writ of mandamus
to respondent judge for a directed verdict of acquittal. Hence, the denial or
dismissal of the petition simply means that the Court has found petitioners not to
be entitled to the relief prayed for. (cf. Rule 65, section 8). It does not mean an
affirmance of the correctness of the questioned orders denying petitioners'
demurrer and motion to dismiss the case for insufficiency of the prosecution's
evidence, for to cite one case, that of the accused Lopez, it does appear that
even the complainant admits that he did not participate at all in any alleged act of
rape and he would be entitled to a dismissal of the case upon submittal of the
prosecution's case.
The denial or dismissal of the petition simply means as stated in the main opinion
of Mr. Justice Fernandez that the Court adheres to the settled rule that it will not
overrule in a special civil action the trial court's interlocutory order denying a
motion to dismiss for failure or insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence since
it cannot review in such special civil action the prosecution's evidence and decide
here and now in advance that it has or has not established beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of the petitioners-accused. The orderly procedure prescribed by
the Rules of Court is for the accused to present their evidence after which the
trial court will on the basis of the evidence presented before it by both the
prosecution and the defense render its judgment of conviction or acquittal If the
verdict be one of acquittal the case ends there. If it be a verdict of conviction,
then appeal is the proper remedy and such appeal in order to have a review of
the trial court's findings of fact lies within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals.
I concur in the granting of separate trials for the petitioners-accused, as
alternatively prayed for in the petition, for the reasons stated in the main opinion.
# Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. This is a special civil action for prohibition certiorari and
mandamus and/or petition forhabeas corpus seeking inter alia the setting aside

of respondent judge's orders denying petitioners' demurrers to the evidence

presented by the prosecution and asking this Court to issue a writ of mandamus
to respondent judge for a directed verdict of acquittal. Hence, the denial or
dismissal of the petition simply means that the Court has found petitioners not to
be entitled to the relief prayed for. (cf. Rule 65, section 8). It does not mean an
affirmance of the correctness of the questioned orders denying petitioners'
demurrer and motion to dismiss the case for insufficiency of the prosecution's
evidence, for to cite one case, that of the accused Lopez, it does appear that
even the complainant admits that he did not participate at all in any alleged act of
rape and he would be entitled to a dismissal of the case upon submittal of the
prosecution's case.
The denial or dismissal of the petition simply means as stated in the main opinion
of Mr. Justice Fernandez that the Court adheres to the settled rule that it will not
overrule in a special civil action the trial court's interlocutory order denying a
motion to dismiss for failure or insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence since
it cannot review in such special civil action the prosecution's evidence and decide
here and now in advance that it has or has not established beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of the petitioners-accused. The orderly procedure prescribed by
the Rules of Court is for the accused to present their evidence after which the
trial court will on the basis of the evidence presented before it by both the
prosecution and the defense render its judgment of conviction or acquittal If the
verdict be one of acquittal the case ends there. If it be a verdict of conviction,
then appeal is the proper remedy and such appeal in order to have a review of
the trial court's findings of fact lies within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals.
I concur in the granting of separate trials for the petitioners-accused, as
alternatively prayed for in the petition, for the reasons stated in the main opinion.

G.R. No. L-20146

September 30, 1964

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VIRGILIO OPLADO and VISITACION FERNANDEZ GUYOT, defendantsappellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
In a complaint filed on November 26, 1958, before the Municipal Court of Cebu
City, Virgilio Oplado and Visitacion Fernandez Guyot were charged by the latter's
husband with the crime of adultery allegedly committed during the month of June,
1958 and for some time subsequent thereto.
Thereafter, the same complaint was reproduced in an amended information filed
by an Assistant Fiscal of Cebu City before the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In
view of the failure of the prosecution to arrest Visitacion Fernandez Guyot, the
trial of the case had to be repeatedly postponed, although the prosecution had
always been ready to proceed with the trial with respect to the co-accused Virgilio
Oplado. Finally, when the case was again called for trial on March 5, 1962, and
still Visitacion Fernandez Guyot was at large for as yet she had not been
apprehended, the Court a quo, upon motion of co-accused Virgilio Oplado, over
the objection of the prosecution, ordered the provisional dismissal of the case.
Hence, the City Fiscal took the instant appeal claiming that the provisional
dismissal of the case was contrary to law considering that the prosecution, was
ready, able and willing to proceed with the trial with respect to accused Virgilio
Oplado.
The only issue before us is whether the Court a quo erred in ordering the
provisional dismissal of the case due to the failure of the prosecution to arrest the
accused Visitacion Fernandez Guyot considering that both the prosecution and
the accused Virgilio Oplado were then ready for trial even in the absence of his
co-accused. Stated in another way, the question presented is whether one of the
accused in a prosecution for adultery may be separately tried in the absence of
the other accused where both the prosecution and the other accused are ready
to go to trial. 1awphl.nt
It is now well settled in this jurisdiction that while the husband cannot institute a
prosecution for the crime of adultery without including therein both of the guilty
parties if they are both living, the statute does not require that both must
necessarily be tried together. When the complaint is filed by the offended
husband against both of the guilty parties, the proceedings then pass into the
hands of the prosecuting officer, who may move for dismissal of the complaint as
to the paramour if he is certain that he cannot establish guilty knowledge on the

part of the man f the fact that the woman was married, and such dismissal would
not of itself require the Court to acquit the woman. Nor would the death of the
woman during the pendency of the action defeat the trial and conviction of the
man. (U.S. vs. De la Torre and Gregorio, 25 Phil. 36) Neither would the fact that
the man had left the country and could not be apprehended defeat the trial and
conviction of the woman. And if both are brought before the Court to be tried
jointly and one of them claims a separate trial, which the Court would have to
grant (Sec.33, G. 0. No. 58), the acquittal of one would not necessarily bar the
prosecution and conviction of the other (U.S. vs. Topino and Guzman, 35 Phil.
901, 910).
And in a later case, it was stated that "there are numerous cases, after the
complaint has been properly presented, where one or the other of the alleged
guilty parties in a criminal action for adultery may be tried and sentenced
separate from the co-defendant. For example, where one of the parties died after
the commencement of the action, or where the man was ignorant of the fact that
the woman was a married woman at the time of the commission of the alleged
criminal act." (U.S. vs. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289, 292) And so, the Supreme Court
declared that the lower court in that case did not commit an error in requiring the
paramour to proceed to trial alone in the absence of his co-defendant.
It is then clear that a defendant in an adultery case may be tried alone or
separately from his codefendant if the prosecution and the party available are
ready for it. The only difference between the old rule (Section 33, General Orders
No. 58, as amended) and the present (Section 8, Rule 115, Rules of Court) is
that under the old law, a separate trial can be demanded by a codefendant as of
right and the Court had no authority to deny the petition (U.S. vs. Remigio. 36
Phil. 719), while under the present rule it is discretionary upon the trial Court to
order a separate trial.
In the instant case, the order of the trial Court appealed from discloses that the
adultery case has been pending for more than three years, that is, since
November 26, 1958, when the case was filed, to March 5, 1962, when the case
was called for trial, in view of the failure of the prosecution to apprehend
Visitacion Fernandez Guyot, and that at the hearing of March 5, 1962, the other
accused, Virgilio Oplado, manifested his readiness to enter to trial. Nonetheless,
the trial Court granted the motion of the accused Oplado for the provisional
dismissal of the case on the ground that he is entitled to a speedy trial, even if
the prosecution was likewise able and ready to try the case.
This is not only an error but an abuse of discretion, for the very right of accused
Oplado to a speedy trial demanded that the case against him be heard and
prosecuted to a conclusion without waiting for the arrest of his co-accused, there
being no advantage to be derived from the provisional dismissal of the case

when trial could be held then and there without further delay and in the interest of
said co-acussed.
We have, therefore, no other alternative than to set aside the order of dismissal
and remand this case for further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside. This case is ordered
remanded to the lower Court for further proceedings. No costs.

G.R. No. L-38453-54 March 25, 1975

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE PEDRO C. NAVARRO, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, Branch II, and JAIME CATUDAY, respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition by the State for certiorari to annul the joint decision of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, insofar as it acquits Jaime Catuday of the charge of
light threat. The ground alleged is that the case for light threat was never tried in
the lower court.
On March 6, 1968, respondent Catuday was charged in the Municipal Court of
Makati, Rizal, with the crime of light threat allegedly committed against Henry
Dioquino (Criminal Case No. 12846). Almost a year later, or on February 3, 1969,
and while the light threat case was still pending, he was charged in the same
court, with a different offense, frustrated theft, allegedly committed against the
Commonwealth Foods, Inc. In two separate decisions rendered on September
10, 1969, the Municipal Court convicted him of the two charges. He appealed
both decisions to the Court of First Instance.
In the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the Provincial Fiscal filed two separate
informations, one for light threat (Criminal Case No. 20145) and the other for
frustrated theft (Criminal Case No. 20146). Both cases were assigned to Branch
XI of said Court of First Instance.
The theft case was first set for hearing on December 16, 1969. The threat case
was originally set for hearing on December 22, 1969. On December 16, 1969,
the court ordered continuation of the trial of the theft case for January 14 and 21,
1970 (Annex A, Motion for Reconsideration). On December 22, 1969, the court
rescheduled the hearing of the threat case for January 26, 1970. On January 14,
1970, the court reset for January 21, 1970 the theft case hearing of that day
(Annex C, Motion for Reconsideration). When January 21, 1970 came, the court
rescheduled the theft case hearing for February 11 and 24, 1970 (Annex B,
Motion for Reconsideration). On January 26, 1970, the scheduled threat case
hearing was rescheduled for February 11, 1970. This was the first time the two
cases were scheduled for hearing on the same day, February 11, 1970.
For the theft case, it was for continuation of trial; for the threat case, it was for
start of the trial. On said February 11, 1970, the court in two separate orders,
directed that the threat case be rescheduled for February 24, 1970 (Annex D,
Motion for Reconsideration), and that the trial of the theft case be continued also

on February 24, 1970. (Annex E, Motion for Reconsideration). On February 24,

1970, counsel de oficio for both cases failed to appear. For the first time, the
court issued a single order in the two cases (Annex E, Motion for
Reconsideration), directing arrest of said counsel "and to show cause why she
should not be punished for contempt"; and ordering that "the trial set for today is
hereby re-set for March 25, 1970, at 8:30 in the morning."
On March 25, 1970, trial of the theft case continued. The threat case was not
tried at all at this or any subsequent trial. In the hearings after March 25, 1970, it
was always the theft case which was heard. Sometime in December 1972, upon
retirement of Judge Flores of Branch XI, respondent District Judge Pedro C.
Navarro took over in the two cases. The theft case was then in the rebuttal stage.
On March 20, 1973, rebuttal evidence closed, and upon order of the court, the
parties filed their respective "offer and submission of exhibits", and submitted the
theft case for decision. On July 20, 1973, respondent Judge rendered one
decision, acquitting Catuday of both charges for lack of proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of this decision reads thus: t.
hqw
WHEREFORE, for lack of proof of his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the accused
JAIME CATUDAY not guilty in both cases and he is hereby
acquitted in Criminal Case No. 20145 for Light Threat as well as
in Criminal Case No. 20146 for Frustrated Theft. The bonds for
his provisional liberty in both cases are ordered cancelled.
Notably, the decision also stated that "these (light threat case and frustrated theft
case) were tried jointly."
On September 6, 1973, the private prosecutor, with the conformity of the
provincial fiscal, filed the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of said decision
insofar as Criminal Case No. 20145 for light threat is concerned. On November
10, 1973, respondent judge denied the motion, reiterating that there was joint
hearing of the two criminal cases.
On December 13, 1973, the provincial fiscal filed the prosecution's second
motion for reconsideration, which was, however, denied on February 27, 1974.
On March 25, 1974, the provincial fiscal, together with the private prosecutor,
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, proving that respondent Judge's
decision be annulled for lack of due process insofar as Criminal Case No. 20145
is concerned, and that record of this case be remanded to the court of origin for
trial. On April 17, 1974, the Court (Second Division) issued a resolution to the
effect that "considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the

arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari, the Court Resolved to DISMISS
the petition for lack of merit."
On June 6, 1974, Provincial Fiscal Castillo filed his motion for reconsideration of
said Resolution, which motion was co-signed by the Private Prosecutors praying
that this Court reconsider and set aside said resolution, and that their petition for
certiorari be given due course.
While we fault the petitioner for having presented an unconvincing original
petition which induced this Court to dismiss the same in a minute resolution "for
lack of merit," We now have to commend Rizal Provincial Fiscal Castillo for his
well-prepared and well-documented motion for reconsideration which has
persuaded Us to grant the same, notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of
respondents, in view of the facts and the reasons that now follow, which are also
the facts and the reasons for our granting the petition for certiorari.
Petitioner claims that the threat case was never tried in the lower court so the
charge therein should not have been dismissed on the ground of lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Respondents, on the other hand, claim that there was
joint trial of the threat case and the theft case, and since the prosecution failed to
present evidence respecting the alleged threat, the case was properly dismissed
on the stated ground.
Thus the question of denial of due process to the State hinges on whether or not
there was really a joint trial of both the threat and the theft cases.
We have specific rules on joint trial in criminal cases. There is the rule that "when
two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried,
jointly, unless the court in its discretion upon motion of the fiscal or any defendant
orders separate trial." (Sec. 8, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court). As long as the
condition therein is fulfilled, that is, two or more defendants are jointly charged
with any offense, joint trial is automatic, without need of a court order. The rule is
inapplicable here because there is only one defendant in the two cases.
Then there is the rule that "charges for offenses founded on the same facts, or
which form or are part of a series of offenses of the same or similar character
may, in the discretion of the court, be tried jointly." (Sec. 15, Rule 119, Revised
Rules of Court). In contrast, this second rule clearly requires a court order for a
joint trial, since the court has discretion whether or not to order the same.
Respondents here have not pointed to any court order for joint trial, as indeed
there is none. The order of February 24, 1970 (Annex E, Motion for
Reconsideration), does not qualify as such, even though it is the first court order
which covers the two cases. Insofar as hearings are concerned, all this court

orders says is that "the trial set for today is hereby re-set for March 25, 1970."
Note that the term "trial" is singular, and the court did not specify which trial it
intended to reschedule. All we can infer from this order is that the court intended
to have a common date of hearing for the two cases, as was true of the two
hearings set for February 11, 1970 and the two hearings scheduled for February
24, 1970, obviously a concession to defense counsel who have previously asked
that hearings of the two cases be scheduled on the same day, so she would
come to court on only the same day for the two cases.
Furthermore, joint trial is not called for in the two criminal cases. It is true that the
accused in the two cases is only one person, but there are two different
complainants: Henry Dioquino, in the threat charge, and Commonwealth Foods,
Inc., in the theft case. The threat was supposed to have been made on March 5,
1968; the theft was allegedly committed on January 31, 1969, almost a year
thereafter. Also, the charges are different. They do not even belong to the same
class of crimes. Light threat is a crime against personal liberty and security;
frustrated theft is a crime against property. So, We cannot say the charges are for
offenses founded on the same facts or form or are part of a series of offenses of
the same or similar character. Consequently, the court had no power to try them
jointly.
Going to the matter of the captions in the pleadings, subpoenas, court orders,
transcript of stenographic notes, etc., it has been argued that since most of the
captions include both Criminal Case No. 20145 (light threat) and Criminal Case
No. 20146 (frustrated theft), there was joint trial of the cases, and the court
properly treated the hearing as joint and acted accordingly with respect to the two
cases. It has been held, however, that a mistake in the caption of an indictment in
designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect, for it is the
sufficiency of the averments of the charging part that is the gist of the
accusation. 1 It is almost the universal rule that the caption of a pleading is not
controlling but what is embodied therein. 2 More, the office of a caption is to
declare the purpose of the acts, and if the matter mentioned in the caption is not
contained in the body of the act, it is merely surplusage, and does not affect the
matters set forth in the act itself. 3 Captions are purely formal, and may be
amended.
Despite the captions of some of the portions of the transcript of stenographic
notes, an examination thereof reveals that the light threat case was never tried at
all.
The following portions of the transcript of stenographic notes expose clearly that
what was singularly tried was the theft case:

On Pages 8-13 of the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings taken

on January 27, 1971, the defense counsel asked the accused: t.hqw
ATTY. BELISARIO:
Q. Were you able to bargain with the administration after the union won in
the certification election?.

being immaterial, and he was sustained by the Court. Said the Court: t.
hqw
COURT:
It has nothing to do with this case of theft. That may be good if
you file a civil suit, maybe, but in this crime of theft, that is
immaterial."(underlining Mine)

ATTY. FUNK:
On Page 17 of the transcript, March 10, 1971: t.hqw
A. Immaterial, Your Honor.
ATTY. BELISARIO:
COURT:
Sustained.

Q. Is there a prescribed uniform in the COEI,

Mr. Catuday?

COURT:

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What is the materiality of that question? What is the connection of that

question to this case (of frustrated theft) in which the accused is charged?
What is the connection of that question to the case of theft? (Emphasis
Supplied).

COURT:
Attorney, this has nothing to do with this crime of theft. As to the
good purpose of the accused, that is immaterial. (Emphasis
Supplied)

ATTY. BELISARIO:
Q. What important event happened after the certification election in
connection with the activities that has something to do with your crime of
theft later on? (Page 10).
A. After the certification election wherein our union won, we made some
bargaining with the company. (page 11) .
When counsel was becoming persistent, the Court said:
COURT:
I have already ruled. You may appeal if you want to, when the time comes.
That is why we have the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
On Pages 16-18 of the transcript, March 10, 1971, when accused was asked by
his counsel where he was living or residing on January 31, 1969 when he was
arrested for frustrated theft of coffee items, Atty. Funk again objected to it as

On Page 23 of the transcript, June 17, 1970, where Edward Funk, witness for the
prosecution, under direct examination by Atty. Funk: t.hqw
ATTY. FUNK:
A. I am showing to you a copy of this decision
(in grave coercion cases filed by the coffee
firm against certain of its workers who joined
the 1969 strike against it), will you go over the
same and tell us whether that is the decision in
the cases aforementioned?
ATTY. BELISARIO:
Objection, your Honor, I think the crime of Grave Coercion is
immaterial because we are trying the case of theft....
In connection with this objection of the defense counsel, the respondent Judge
did not make any remark to correct the counsel to the effect that he was

conducting, as he has claimed, a joint trial of the two cases, instead of the theft
case alone.
More, on Page 4 of the transcript, March 28, 1972, the following has been
relevantly cited by the prosecution, where defense counsel was questioning
defense witness Alfredo Osias in connection with the subject incident of
frustrated theft being ascribed to Catuday: t.hqw
FISCAL ALCOBA:
Q. May I interrupt the counsel? May we know if
this witness is a common witness with respect
to the light threat and frustrated theft?
ATTY. GERONIMO: (Defense counsel who
replaced Atty. Belisario)
A. The other case is not being tried as yet.
Evidently, the State had been deprived of due process, which act was an abuse
of discretion on the part of the herein respondent Judge, tantamount to excess or
lack of jurisdiction, rendering the judgment of acquittal of the accused Jaime
Catuday, in Criminal Case No. 20145 for light threat, NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO.
It is quite clear in the record of this case, especially in the transcript of
stenographic notes and in practically all the pleadings filed by the parties, that
there was absolutely no trial or hearing of Criminal Case No. 20145 for light
threat. For instance, in the aforementioned identical pleadings "Offer and
Submission of Exhibits" filed by the parties at the final phase of the hearings, all
the exhibits listed pertain to only one case, Criminal Case No. 20146 for
frustrated theft, which, in truth and in fact, was the only case actually tried to the
finish, the light threat case not even having reached first base as it was never
called to trial nor the first witness therein ever been called to the stand. Same is
true of the defense's "Motion for Cancellation of Hearing" and "Objection to
Evidence," which both relate exclusively to the offense of theft. The State is
entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity
to present its evidence in support of the charge. The Court has always accorded
this right to the prosecution, and where the right had been denied, had promptly
annulled the offending court action. We have heretofore held that a purely
capricious dismissal of an information deprives the State of fair opportunity to
prosecute and convict; it denies the prosecution its day in court. For this reason,
it is a dismissal (in reality an acquittal) without due process, and, therefore, null
and void. Such dismissal is invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite, that is,

due process, and, consequently, will not constitute a proper basis for the claim of
double jeopardy. 4 We have likewise held that a trial court may not arbitrarily deny
a timely and well-founded motion of the prosecution for reconsideration of an
order of dismissal or acquittal and that such arbitrary refusal to reopen the case
will be set aside to give the State its day in court and an opportunity to prove the
offense charged against the accused and to prevent miscarriage of justice,
especially when no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced thereby. 5
The imperative requirement of the due process guarantee or mandate would be
ignored if on the above considerations it is not given controlling force entitling the
State to the remedy being sought.
"Jurisdiction" is the right to hear and determine, not to determine without hearing
[Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 23 L. ed. 914 (23A Words and Phrases, p.
121)]. A judgment is void for lack of due process, which is equivalent to excess or
lack of jurisdiction (Trimica, Inc. v. Polaris Marketing Corp., et al., L-29887,
October 28, 1974.
In the present case, the respondent Judge, in rendering his judgment of acquittal
of private respondent JAIME CATUDAY in Criminal Case No. 20145 for Light
Threat which was never tried in the respondent Judge's court nor in Branch XI of
the CFI of Rizal, acted with abuse of discretion tantamount to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. Indeed, this is so grave and patent to justify the issuance of a writ of
CERTIORARI (Lagman v. Dela Cruz, 40 SCRA 101). And, in fine, this Court has,
in these words, defined "grave abuse of discretion" as: "Such capricious and
arbitrary exercise of judgment, as is equivalent, in the eyes of the law to lack of
jurisdiction." (Palma and Ignacio v. O. & S., Inc., 17 SCRA 98). For such want of
jurisdiction, said JUDGMENT is NULL AND VOID AB INITIO. It is one rendered
by a court which had no power so to do; it is as though there had been no
judgment or process; it is coram non judice (People v. Liscomg, 60 NY 559, 568,
569, Am. Rep. 211; 44 Words and Phrases 592). IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, this Court reconsiders and sets aside its resolution of April 17,
1974 dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari for lack of merit; and We hereby
sustain petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari and declare null and void the
decision of the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, dated July
20, 1973, insofar as it acquitted the private respondent Jaime Catuday, as
accused, in Crim. Case No. 20145 for light threat and orders its reinstatement in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the corresponding trial. No costs.

G.R. No. L-55533 July 31, 1984

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS* (Third Division), JOSE V. PEREZ, AMADEA C.
PEREZ, CIPRIANO LADINES and FLAVIA C. VALDENOR, respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Roncesvalles cannot be said to be the least guilty. He would be a principal by

direct participation, or a co-principal if he acted upon instruction of another as the
prosecution alleges," and that, "the prosecution having presented all its
witnesses, the Court, after going over their testimony, cannot see how
Roncesvalles' testimony, if ever he is discharged, would be corroborated." 2
Reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, the prosecution filed a
petition for certiorari with respondent appellate court praying for the annulment
and setting aside of the trial court's questioned orders. Respondent court
sustained the trial court's ruling in its decision, subject of the petition at bar and
denied reconsideration thereof.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner People of the

Philippines to set aside the decision of the then Court of Appeals, now
Intermediate Appellate Court, 1 which affirmed the order issued by the then City
Court of Lucena, Branch II, denying the prosecution's motion for the exclusion of
Miguel Roncesvalles (co-accused of the private respondents herein named) from
the information in Criminal Case No. 0399 so that he may testify therein as a
state witness.

Hence, the People's petition, which complains that "the respondent court acted
with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in sustaining the
Order dated September 15, 1978 issued by the City Court of Lucena and in
holding that the petitioner failed to show that there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of Miguel Roncesvalles whose discharge is requested. "

The amended information for violation of Section 22 of Republic Act No. 720, as
amended, charged that Miguel Roncesvalles, together with herein private
respondents Jose V. Perez, Amadea Consul Perez, Cipriano Ladines and Flavia
C. Valdenor, "with intent to deceive, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and illegally make
false statements and misrepresentation of material facts in the application for
agricultural loan signed by FLAVIA C. VALDENOR and in the other supporting
papers, calculated to produce semblance of compliance with the legal
requirements, making it appear that accused FLAVIA C. VALDENOR is an
eligible borrower which misrepresentation or false statements of facts were
considered as the credit factors in the approval and the granting of the loan to
accused FLAVIA C. VALDENOR in the amount of P30,000.00, by the Rural Bank
of Lucena, Inc., ..."

Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court prescribes the conditions in order that
one or several accused may be used as witnesses against their co-accused, to
wit: "(a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose
discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
defendant; (c) the testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated
in its material points; (d) said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty;
and (e) said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude."

All the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After the prosecution had
already presented seven witnesses, the state prosecutors filed a motion with the
court, asking that accused Roncesvalles be discharged from the information in
order that he may be used as a state witness against his co-defendants, alleging
that Roncesvalles had not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude; that he did not appear to be the most guilty; that there was
absolute necessity for his testimony; that there was no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed and that his
testimony could be substantially corroborated in its material points. The motion
was set for hearing and after the parties were heard, the trial court, issued the
questioned order denying the motion on the ground that, ". . . Miguel

The Court finds merit in this petition and dispenses with the firing of memoranda
or briefs in the light of the facts and pleadings of record.

While it is true that the court has the exclusive responsibility to see that the
conditions prescribed by the rule exists, 3 this grant of discretion is not a grant of
arbitrary discretion, but rather a sound judicial discretion to be exercised with due
regard to the proper and correct administration of justice. 4
The trial curt manifestly erred in denying the prosecution's motion to discharge
accused Roncesvalles or, the ground that he "cannot be said to be the least
guilty." All that the law requires, in order to discharge an accused and to use him
as a state witness is that the defendant whose exclusion is requested does not
appear to be themost guilty, not necessarily that he is the least guilty. 5 The trial
court's order itself shows that Roncesvalles does not appear to be the most guilty
since it acknowledged that "he would be a principal by direct participation or a coprincipal if he acted upon instruction of another as the prosecution alleges."

The Rules do not disqualify an accused sought to be discharged as witness for

the state merely on the ground that he has committed a falsification himself, or
that he had actually committed the crime charged. The Rules say that it is
necessary that the "said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty from
which the conclusion follows that the guilt of an accused of the crime charged is
no reason why he may not be excluded as witness for the State. As a matter of
fact, the candid admission of an accused, of his participation in a crime, is a
guaranty that if he will testify in court he will testify truthfully; so that even if an
accused actually participated in the offense charged in the information, he may
still be made a witness. Individuals who are candid enough to admit their guilt are
expected to testify truthfully and it is from that circumstance that all the facts
involved shall be expected to be truthfully disclosed by him. 6
The ground underlying the rule is not to let a crime that has been committed go
unpunished; so an accused who is not the most guilty is allowed to testify against
the most guilty in order to achieve the greater purpose of securing the conviction
of the more or most guilty and the greatest number among the accused permitted
to be convicted for the offense they have committed. 7 Experience, under English
and American procedural methods, has shown that without the aid of informers
testifying against their co-participants in crime, many guilty parties would escape,
where the facts which would sustain a conviction are known to the guilty parties
themselves alone. 8
Respondent appellate court itself sustained the People's contention on this score,
simply stating that "respondent Court erred when it ruled that it could not grant
the motion for the discharge of Roncesvalles because it does not appear that he
is the least guilty of the accused. What Section 9, Rule 119 requires as one of the
conditions for the discharge of one of the accused to testify as a witness for the
Government is that said 'defendant does not appear to be the most guilty.' "
But respondent appellate court nevertheless sustained the questioned orders
"since the petition failed to show that there was absolute necessity for the
testimony of Roncesvalles". The trial court had denied discharge on the ground
that "the prosecution having presented all its witnesses, the Court, after going
over their testimony, can not see how Roncesvalles testimony, if ever he is
discharged, would be corroborated." This conjecture of the trial court has no
sound basis, as is readily shown by respondent appellate court's contrary
evaluation that "the most that petitioner could say was that the testimony of
Roncesvalles would be corroborative of the testimony of the witnesses already
presented by the Government as well as the documentary evidence presented
during the hearing, among them, the Rural Bank Examiner and NBI agents."
Sufficient corroborative evidence exists of record.
The Court therefore overrules respondent court's finding that there is no absolute
necessity for the testimony of Roncesvalles. A careful examination of the records

of the case supports the prosecution's stand to discharge Roncesvalles in order

that he may testify for the government. The testimony of Roncesvalles is
absolutely necessary to prove conspiracy among the accused who are charged
of conspiring and confederating with each other in defrauding the Lucena Rural
Bank in the amount of P30,000.00 under the pretext of an agricultural loan
granted to accused Flavia N. Valdenor. Roncesvalles was the Assistant Chief
Inspector of the Lucena Rural Bank and he was the one who signed the
investigation report which contained false information as to the credit standing of
accused Flavia N. Valdenor. Nobody is in a better position to testify and prove the
existence of conspiracy than accused Roncesvalles, because he is an officer of
the bank. There is ample basis for the Solicitor General's submittal that
"considering the foregoing circumstances and inasmuch as the other accused
cannot be compelled to testify, certain facts necessary for the conviction of the
accused would not be revealed unless accused Roncesvalles is allowed to testify
for the State"; "unless accused Roncesvalles is allowed to testify for the
government, there is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense charged, i.e., the role or participation of his coaccused in the preparation and accomplishment of the falsified loan application
and its supporting papers. The testimony of accused Roncesvalles will prove
conspiracy among the perpetrators of the crime charged"; and "unless this
petition is given due course and granted, the accused in Criminal Case No. 0399
may be acquitted and the State irretrievably prejudiced. Because of the Rule on
double jeopardy, the State has no other remedy except the instant petition." 9
It is noteworthy that these assertions appear to be based on solid ground for the
prosecutors presented their motion for discharge of Roncesvalles as a state
witness only after they had presented seven witnesses and could then show the
absolute necessity for his testimony in consonance with what was to be held by
the Court in Flores vs Sandiganbayan that the trial court should act on said
discharge motion when the prosecution has presented all its other evidence and
it could then "fully determine whether the requisites prescribed in Section 9, Rule
119 of the New Rules of Court, are fully complied with." 10
A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute
certainty at the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed
in the course of the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the
commission of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were practicable or
possible, there would be little need for the formality of a trial. In coming to his
conclusion as to the 'necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge
is re. requested'; as to the 'availability or non-availability of other direct or
corroborative evidence'; as to which of the accused is the 'most guilty'; and the
like, the judge must rely in a large part upon the suggestions and information
furnished by the state prosecutors. 11

ACCORDINGLY, respondent appellate court's decision affirming the trial court's

questioned orders denying the discharge of Miguel Roncesvalles as a state
witness is hereby SET ASIDE. As prayed for, the trial court is ORDERED to allow
the discharge of said accused Miguel Roncesvalles from the information before it
in Criminal Case No. 0399 so that he may testify therein as a state witness.
This decision is immediately executory.

G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S.
PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks the
annulment of the resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, promulgated on
December 22, 1993, which denied petitioner's motion for the discharge of
respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be utilized as a state witness, and its
resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of its
preceding disposition. 1
The records show that during the dates material to this case, respondent
Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur.
Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur,
then Governor of the same province, and is at present a Congressman.
Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as counsel for
Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the
present recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes
applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land
Subdivision Survey. His application was approved and, pursuant to a free patent
granted to him, an original certificate of title was issued in his favor for that lot
which is situated in the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action 2 for the cancellation of
respondent Paredes' patent and certificate of title since the land had been
designated and reserved as a school site in the aforementioned subdivision
survey. The trial court rendered judgment 3 nullifying said patent and title after
finding that respondent Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent
misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently, respondent Sansaet served as
counsel of Paredes in that civil case. 4
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the subsequent
complaint of the Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary investigation conducted
thereon, an information for perjury 5 was filed against respondent Paredes in the

Municipal Circuit Trial Court. 6 On November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal was,
however, directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of
the case on the ground inter alia of prescription, hence the proceedings were
terminated. 7 In this criminal case, respondent Paredes was likewise represented
by respondent Sansaet as counsel.
Nonetheless, respondent Sansaet was thereafter haled before the Tanodbayan
for preliminary investigation on the charge that, by using his former position as
Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to
favorably act on his application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. For the third time, respondent Sansaet was
Paredes' counsel of record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution 8 recommending the
criminal prosecution of respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his
aforenamed co-respondent, moved for reconsideration and, because of its legal
significance in this case, we quote some of his allegations in that motion:
. . . respondent had been charged already by the complainants
before the Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur, went to jail on detention in 1984 under the same set of
facts and the same evidence . . . but said case after
arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the court upon
recommendation of the Department of Justice. Copy of
the dismissal
order, certificate
of
arraignmentand
the recommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto
attached for ready reference; thus the filing of this case will be a
case of double jeopardy for respondent herein . . . 9 (Emphasis
supplied.)
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan 10 charging
respondent Paredes with a violation of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. However, a motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted in
respondent court's resolution of August 1, 1991 11 and the case was dismissed on
the ground of prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the
perjury and graft charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the
Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the three respondents herein for
falsification of public documents. 12 He claimed that respondent Honrada, in
conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated and certified as true copies
certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985,
and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of
Paredes on the perjury charge. 13 These falsified documents were annexed to

respondent Paredes' motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for

the filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support his contention that the
same would constitute double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice
of arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan
del Sur in connection with that perjury case; and a certification of Presiding
Judge Ciriaco Ario that said perjury case in his court did not reach the
arraignment stage since action thereon was suspended pending the review of the
case by the Department of Justice. 14
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently
discarded and repudiated the submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit.
In a so-called Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications, 15respondent Sansaet
revealed that Paredes contrived to have the graft case under preliminary
investigation dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it appear
that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court after he had been
arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent Sansaet in
the preliminary investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in
this case in the house of respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own
participation in the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and
inducement of respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his
discharge as a government witness in the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion
therefor was filed by the prosecution pursuant to their agreement.
Withal, in a resolution 16 dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the
filing of falsification charges against all the herein private respondents. The
proposal for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness was
rejected by the Ombudsman on this evaluative legal position:
. . . Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer
of his stature, in the absence of deliberate intent to conspire,
would be unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime. As
counsel for the accused in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet
had control over the case theory and the evidence which the
defense was going to present. Moreover, the testimony or
confession of Atty. Sansaet falls under the mantle of privileged
communication between the lawyer and his client which may be
objected to, if presented in the trial.
The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution 17 and, ostensibly to
forestall any further controversy, he decided to file separate informations for

falsification of public documents against each of the herein respondents. Thus,

three criminal cases, 18 each of which named one of the three private
respondents here as the accused therein, were filed in the graft court. However,
the same were consolidated for joint trial in the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan.
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the
discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It was submitted that all the
requisites therefor, as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were
satisfied insofar as respondent Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was
that, except for the eyewitness testimony of respondent Sansaet, there was no
other direct evidence to prove the confabulated falsification of documents by
respondents Honrada and Paredes.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the
theory of the attorney-client privilege adverted to by the Ombudsman and
invoked by the two other private respondents in their opposition to the
prosecution's motion, resolved to deny the desired discharge on this
ratiocination:
From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to
establish that client and lawyer relationship existed between
Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and
after the period alleged in the information. In view of such
relationship, the facts surrounding the case, and other
confidential matter must have been disclosed by accused
Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his
professional capacity. Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet
on the facts surrounding the offense charged in the information
is privileged. 19
Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied, 20 the
controversy was elevated to this Court by the prosecution in an original action for
the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari against respondent
Sandiganbayan.
The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar actually turns
are therefore (1) whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet,
as proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege; and (2)
whether or not, as a consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to testify as
a particeps criminis.
As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client
relationship which existed between herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet

during the relevant periods, the facts surrounding the case and other confidential
matters must have been disclosed by respondent Paredes, as client, to
respondent Sansaet, as his lawyer. Accordingly, it found "no reason to discuss it
further since Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness against accused
Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latter's consent." 21

included within the confidences which his attorney is bound to respect.

Respondent court appears, however, to believe that in the instant case it is
dealing with a past crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set to testify on alleged
criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already been
committed and consummated.

The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply

in these cases, as the facts thereof and actuations of both respondents therein
constitute an exception to the rule. For a clearer understanding of that evidential
rule, we will first sweep aside some distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.

The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat

inaccurate basis. It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified
to in respondent court are concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed
in the past. But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the
period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was
made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the
past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future . In other
words, if the client seeks his lawyer's advice with respect to a crime that the
former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual
confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken
by the attorney without the client's consent. The same privileged confidentiality,
however, does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit
thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer's advice.

1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication

made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93
for falsification before respondent court, and this may reasonably be expected
since Paredes was the accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed, the
fact that Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the falsified documents
by Paredes and Honrada was as eloquent a communication, if not more, than
verbal statements being made to him by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of
such falsification. It is significant that the evidentiary rule on this point has always
referred to "any communication," without distinction or qualification. 22
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken,
there is no particular mode by which a confidential communication shall be made
by a client to his attorney. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written
communications made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to
information communicated by the client to the attorney by other means. 23
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and
existing relations as counsel and client and, further, in view of the purpose for
which such falsified documents were prepared, no word at all passed between
Paredes and Sansaet on the subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher for
this conclusion is the undisputed fact that said documents were thereafter filed by
Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the motion for reconsideration in the
preliminary investigation of the graft case before the Tanodbayan. 24 Also, the
acts and words of the parties during the period when the documents were being
falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited
Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except under
conditions of secrecy and confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the instance of
Paredes in the criminal act for which the latter stands charged, a distinction must
be made between confidential communications relating to past crimes already
committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily,
it is admitted that the announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not

Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already

committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such,
are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is
to the effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with
the client'scontemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not
covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to
communications between attorney and client. 25 (Emphases supplied.)
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansate as state
witness are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or
accompanying words of Parades at the time he and Honrada, either with the
active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process
of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet
and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications thus made
by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of
falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which
he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having
been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside
the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that
crime of falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon
the authorities. It is well settled that in order that a communication between a
lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in

furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the

privilege from attaching. 26 In fact, it has also been pointed out to the Court that
the "prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be
permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an
attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a
conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under
certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of
justice." 27
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist
that such unlawful communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by
conspirators are nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To
prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was
later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his
conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence
and practice in the noble profession of law.
II
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential inquiry as to
whether respondent Sansaet qualifies, as a particeps criminis, for discharge from
the criminal prosecution in order to testify for the State. Parenthetically,
respondent court, having arrived at a contrary conclusion on the preceding issue,
did not pass upon this second aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution
which are now submitted for our resolution in the petition at bar. We shall,
however, first dispose likewise of some ancillary questions requiring preludial
clarification.
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon the query as
to whether or not respondent Sansaet was qualified to be a state witness need
not prevent this Court from resolving that issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where
the determinative facts and evidence have been submitted to this Court such that
it is in a position to finally resolve the dispute, it will be in the pursuance of the
ends of justice and the expeditious administration thereof to resolve the case on
the merits, instead of remanding it to the trial court. 28
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private respondents here
stand charged in three separate informations. It will be recalled that in its
resolution of February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman recommended the filing of
criminal charges for falsification of public documents against all the respondents
herein. That resolution was affirmed but, reportedly in order to obviate further
controversy, one information was filed against each of the three respondents
here, resulting in three informations for the same acts of falsification.

This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the

deliberations in this case by the following discussion thereof by Mr. Justice
Davide, to wit:
Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaet's
discharge as state witness, he can, nevertheless, be discharged
even if indicted under a separate information. I suppose the
three cases were consolidated for joint trial since they were all
raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2,
Rule XV of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows
consolidation in only one Division of cases arising from the
same incident or series of incidents, or involving common
questions of law and fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and
purposes, Sansaet stood as co-accused and he could be
discharged as state witness. It is of no moment that he was
charged separately from his co-accused. While Section 9 of
Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure uses the
word jointly, which was absent in the old provision, the
consolidated and joint trial has the effect of making the three
accused co-accused or joint defendants, especially considering
that they are charged for the same offense. In criminal law,
persons indicted for the same offense and tried together are
called joint defendants.
As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the same vein,
there having been a consolidation of the three cases, the several actions lost
their separate identities and became a single action in which a single judgment is
rendered, the same as if the different causes of action involved had originally
been joined in a single action. 29
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation "(w)hen two or
more persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense" was too
broad and indefinite; hence the word "joint" was added to indicate the identity of
the charge and the fact that the accused are all together charged therewith
substantially in the same manner in point of commission and time. The word
"joint" means "common to two or more," as "involving the united activity of two or
more," or "done or produced by two or more working together," or "shared by or
affecting two or more. 30 Had it been intended that all the accused should always
be indicted in one and the same information, the Rules could have said so with
facility, but it did not so require in consideration of the circumstances obtaining in
the present case and the problems that may arise from amending the
information. After all, the purpose of the Rule can be achieved by consolidation of
the cases as an alternative mode.

2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of

falsification, and the rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of
all, the same penalty shall be imposed on all members of the conspiracy. Now,
one of the requirements for a state witness is that he "does not appear to be the
most guilty." 31 not that he must be the least guilty 32 as is so often erroneously
framed or submitted. The query would then be whether an accused who was
held guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be a state
witness.
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al. 33 we find this obiter:
It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is
believable that he persuaded the others to rob Paterno, not to
kill him for a promised fee. Although he did not actually commit
any of the stabbings, it was a mistake to discharge Bagispas as
a state witness. All the perpetrators of the offense, including
him, were bound in a conspiracy that made them equally guilty.
However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al., 34 two conspirators charged
with five others in three separate informations for multiple murder were
discharged and used as state witnesses against their confederates. Subsequent
thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 35 one of the co-conspirators
was discharged from the information charging him and two others with the crime
of estafa. The trial court found that he was not the most guilty as, being a poor
and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by his two co-accused to open the
account with the bank and which led to the commission of the crime.
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate court that
Lugtu was just as guilty as his co-accused, and should not be discharged as he
did not appear to be not the most guilty, is untenable. In other words, the Court
took into account the gravity or nature of the acts committed by the accused to
be discharged compared to those of his co-accused, and not merely the fact that
in law the same or equal penalty is imposable on all of them.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicity articulated found
expression in People vs. Ocimar, et al., 36 which we quote in extenso:
Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy the conditions
for the discharge of a co-accused to become a state witness. He argues that no
accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and utilized as a state
witness, for not one of them could satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the
most guilty. Appellant asserts that since accused Bermudez was part of the
conspiracy, he is equally guilty as the others.

We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of

Bermudez. For, despite the presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of
them could positively identify the accused except Bermudez who was one of
those who pulled the highway heist which resulted not only in the loss of cash,
jewelry and other valuables, but even the life of Capt. Caeba, Jr. It was in fact
the testimony of Bermudez that clinched the case for the prosecution. Second,
without his testimony, no other direct evidence was available for the prosecution
to prove the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony could be, as indeed it
was, substantially corroborated in its material points as indicated by the trial court
in its well-reasoned decision. Fourth, he does not appear to be the most guilty.
As the evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party without having
any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway robbery. But even assuming
that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not appear to be the most
guilty. What the law prohibits is that the most guilty will be set free while his coaccused who are less guilty will be sent to jail. And by "most guilty" we mean the
highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the
offense and not necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the
accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may
be considered least guilty if We take into account his degree of participation in
the perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at any time
been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General
that the rule on the discharge of an accused to be utilized as
state witness clearly looks at his actual and individual
participation in the commission of the crime, which may or may
not have been perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused.
Since Bermudez was not individually responsible for the killing
committed on the occasion of the robbery except by reason of
conspiracy, it cannot be said then that Bermudez appears to be
the most guilty. Hence, his discharge to be a witness for the
government is clearly warranted. (Emphasis ours.)
The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators
found guilty of a criminal offense is based on the concurrence of criminal
intent in their minds and translated into concerted physical action
although of varying acts or degrees of depravity. Since the Revised
Penal Code is based on the classical school of thought, it is the identity
of the mens rea which is considered the predominant consideration and,
therefore, warrants the imposition of the same penalty on the
consequential theory that the act of one is thereby the act of all.

Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated

with the procedural rule on the discharge of particeps criminis. This
adjective device is based on other considerations, such as the need for
giving immunity to one of them in order that not all shall escape, and the
judicial experience that the candid admission of an accused regarding
his participation is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully. For those
reasons, the Rules provide for certain qualifying criteria which, again,
are based on judicial experience distilled into a judgmental policy.
III
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other requisites for the
discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness are present and should have
been favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.

This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect, the
prosecution may propose but it is for the trial court, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, to determine the merits of the proposal and make the corresponding
disposition. It must be emphasized, however, that such discretion should have
been exercised, and the disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts and
issues herein discussed, and not merely on the sole issue of the applicability of
the attorney-client privilege.
This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan eventually
assumed, after the retirement of two members of its Second Division 37 and
the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely anticlimactic Manifestation and
Comment 38 dated June 14, 1995, as required by this Court in its resolution on
December 5, 1994, the chairman and new members thereof 39 declared:
4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and
March 7, 1994 upon which the Petition for Certiorari filed by the
prosecution are based, was penned by Associate Justice
Narciso T. Atienza and concurred in by the undersigned and
Associate Justice Augusto M. Amores;

Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual

commission of the falsification charged in the criminal cases pending before
respondent court, and the prosecution is faced with the formidable task of
establishing the guilt of the two other co-respondents who steadfastly deny the
charge and stoutly protest their innocence. There is thus no other direct evidence
available for the prosecution of the case, hence there is absolute necessity for
the testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for that purpose.
Said respondent has indicated his conformity thereto and has, for the purposes
required by the Rules, detailed the substance of his projected testimony in his
Affidavit of Explanation and Rectifications.
His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points by
reputable witnesses, identified in the basic petition with a digest of their
prospective testimonies, as follows: Judge Ciriaco C. Ario, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur; Provincial Prosecutor and Deputized
Ombudsman Prosecutor Claudio A. Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant
who initiated the criminal cases through his letter-complaint; Alberto Juvilan of
the Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur, who participated in
the resolution asking their Provincial Governor to file the appropriate case
against respondent Paredes, and Francisco Macalit, who obtained the
certification of non-arraignment from Judge Ario.
On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that respondent
Sansaet has at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Thus, with the confluence of all the requirements for the discharge of this
respondent, both the Special Prosecutor and the Solicitor General strongly urge
and propose that he be allowed to testify as a state witness.

5) That while the legal issues involved had been already

discussed and passed upon by the Second Division in the
aforesaid Resolution, however, after going over the arguments
submitted by the Solicitor-General and re-assessing Our
position on the matter, We respectfully beg leave of the
Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that We are amenable to
setting aside the questioned Resolutions and to grant the
prosecution's motion to discharge accused Generoso Sansaet
as state witness, upon authority of the Honorable Supreme
Court for the issuance of the proper Resolution to that effect
within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING
ASIDE the impunged resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs sought
in these cases by petitioner be allowed and given due course by respondent
Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-1642-44 January 29, 1949 THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEJANDRO MENDIOLA, FLORENTINO
ZAPANTA and GREGORIO
PERFECTO, J.:
Justina Rizal and Teofilo Ampil, spouse, had been quarreling because of the
latter's amorous relations with other women. During the Japanese occupation
they were invited to live with her brother Dr. Sisenando Rizal in Calamba. There
were times during which he did not sleep there. There were occasion on which
husband and wife were not on speaking terms. Justina went to the extene of
complaining to her brothers and sisters against her husband.

The circumstances of the case, as proved by the evidence, lead us to the

conclusion that each and everyone of appellants took part with Taciano V. Rizal
in conspiracy to kidnap as they did Teofilo Ampil and they are all equally
responsible for his killing which was perpetrated in accordance with the plan of
the kidnapper. Once the kidnapping has been decided, the authors necessarily
had to entertain the killings as one of the means of accomplishing the purpose of
kidnapping.
The three appellants were correctly found by the trial court guilty as authors of
the crime found by the trial court guilty as authors o the crime of murdered. It
sentenced then to death and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Teofilo Ampil
in the sum of P2,000 with subsidiary.

On March 31, 1946, her brother Taciano V. Rizal came from Calamba to Manila
in a weapons carrier, accompanied by appellants Alejandro Mendiola, Florentino
Zapanta and Gregorio Reyes, his townmates. In the evening of the same day,
Taciano borrowed an ambulance car from Arturo Gomez. Later, Taciano alone
went to the house of his sister Justina at 514 Aviles, Manila, and talked with her
for a short time. On the same evening, appellants passed the night together in
the same sala in a house in Paco.

With regard to appellants Gregorio Reyes and Florentino Zapanta, the principal
penalty must be changed toreclusion perpetua, insufficient votes having been
cast to affirm the appealed judgment, and there is even a minority opinion that
they can be held as accomplices.

Early in the morning of the next day, Taciano and the three appellants for the
ambulance of Arturo Gomez and drove it to Teofilo's house in Aviles. Upon
seeing Teofilo they forced him to go with them in the ambulance. After sometime
they were driving through Taft Avenue. At about 7 o'clock in the morning, upon
reaching the intersection of Libertad, Teofilo jumped out of the car through the
backdoor. Alejandro Mendiola shot him. After the shooting Taciano and
appellants scampered away. Teofilo was helped by traffic policeman Leonardo
Roxas, who took him to the Philippine general Hospital, where a few day later he
died to generalized peritonitis and hyphostatic pneumonia, secondary to gunshot
wounds thorough the abdomen, lacerating the omentum and transversing the
colon.

SEC. 9. Discharge of one of several defendants to be witness for the

prosecution. When two or more persons are charged with the commission of a
certain offense, the competent court, at any time before they have entered upon
their defense, may direct any of them to be discharged with the latter's consent
that he may be a witness for the government when in the judgment of the court:

Sometime later appellant Alejandro Mendiola was arrested and some time after
him the other two appellants rested and some time after him the other two
appellants. Taciano V. Rizal continues to be at large.
There cannot be any question as to the participation of the three appellants in the
commission of the crime on question, The three of them have testified about their
joining Taciano from Calamba until all of them boarded the Ambulance car with
Teofilo, up the corner of Taft Avenue and Libertad, where Teofilo was shot. They
disagree, however, as to who fired the fatal shot. Mendiola says it was Taciano
who fired, while the other two appellants say that it was Mendiola. We are
convinced that the latter's version id the correct one, although for the purposes of
this case the effect would be the same whether the shot was fired by Taciano or
by Mendiola.

The case with respect to Alejandro Mendiola calls fro the application of section 9
and 11 of Rule 115 which read as follows:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose
discharge is requested:.
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said defendant;.
(c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d) Said defendant does not appear to be that most guilty.
(e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
SEC. 11. Discharge of defendants operate as acquittal. The order indicated in
the two preceding sections shall amount to an acquittal of the defendant
discharged and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless
the defendant, in the case provided in section 9 fails or refuses to testify against
his co-defendant.

It appears that the original information for murder committed on the person of
Teofilo Ampil was filed on April 27, 1946, against Taciano V. Rizal alone. On
October 30, 1946, an amended information was filed including new defendants,
among them Alejandro Mendiola. On November 6, 1946, assistant city fiscal
Engracio Abasolo filed a motion to discharge defendant Alejandro Mendiola in

order that he may be utilized as witness for the prosecution, which motion was
granted.
On December 26, 1946, another independent information was filed for the same
murder against Gregorio Reyes.
On January 31, 1947, a new information was filed for the same murder against
Taciano V. Rizal, Vicente Llamas and the three appellants, including Alejandro
Mendiola.
On February 7, 1947 counsel moved to quash the new information against
Alejandro Mendiola in the ground that he has previously been acquitted of the
offense charged. The motion was denied and erroneously.
The Prosecution contends that appellant Mendiola is not entitled to the benefits
of section 11 of Rule 115 on the following grounds:
1. Because Mendiola, upon developments subsequent to his discharge on
November 6, 1946, appears to be one of the most guilty, for having fired the fatal
shot, his discharge having been based on the main proposition that by using him
as a witness the prosecution would be enabled to prove it case against the most
guilty accused, and the prosecution no longer wanted to avail, as it never availed,
of his testimony to successfully prosecute the real and most guilty culprits.
2. That the failure to testify mentioned in the proviso of section 11 of Rule 115
comprehends the failure due to the prosecution's omission or refusal to use the
discharged accused as its witness.
3. That the discharge, to operate as an acquittal under section 11 of Rule 115,
must have taken place after the discharged accused shall have been arraigned
and shall have entered his plea and after the trial of the case shall have actually
begun, and Mendiola had not even been arraigned when he was discharged on
November 6, 1946.
The above three proposition announced by the prosecution are not supported
either by law or by reason.
The discharge contemplated in the clear text of section 9 of Rule 115 is the
effected or which can be effected a t any stage of the proceedings, from the filing
of the information to the time the defense starts to offer any evidence. The clause
"any time before they have entered upon their defense," used in the section, is so
clear as not to give rise to any misunderstanding. The words "any time before"
imply an indefinite period of time limited only by the time set by a court's
jurisdiction and the very nature of things, and that limit is set at the moment of the
filing of the information.

Before the discharge is ordered, the prosecution must show and the trial court
must ascertain that the five conditions fixed by section 9 of Rule 115 are
complied with. But one the discharge is ordered, any future development
showing that any or all of the five conditions have not actually been fulfilled, may
not affect the legal consequences of the discharge, as provided by section 11 of
Rule 115. Any writing or unwitting error of the prosecution in asking for the
discharge and of the court in granting the petition no question of jurisdiction being
involved, cannot deprive the discharged accused of the acquittal provided by
section 11 of Rule 115 and of the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy.
The exception in the proviso of section 11 of Rule 115 against the defendant who
"fails to testify against his co-defendant" refers exclusively to a failure attributable
to defendant's will or fault. It is unfair to deprive defendant of an acquittal for a
failure attributable to the prosecution, and it would be an abhorrent legal policy to
place defendant's fate at the mercy of anyone who may handle the prosecution.
The willingness or unwillingness of the discharged defendant is the only test that
should be taken into account to determine whether or not he fails to testify
against this co-defendant and, consequently, whether or not he should be
excluded from the benefits of the acquittal provided by section 11 of Rule 115. In
the present case, it is not disputed that Alejandro Mendiola had always been
willing to testify for the prosecution and upon the same facts bared to the
prosecution for which the latter, among other grounds, decided to move for his
discharge from the information. As a matter of fact, although testifying for himself,
he reiterated substantially in open court what he had testified before the officers
for the prosecution. Under the circumstances and the law, he is protected by the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
Accordingly, the appealed decision is modified and reversed in part, and appellant
Gregorio Reyes and Florencio Zapanta are sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to jointly
and severally indemnify the heirs of Teofilo Ampil in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the
cost, and appellants Alejandro Mendiola is acquitted and shall immediately be released
upon promulgation of this decision.
Separate Opinions, PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I dissent from the decision of the majority in so far as if finds the appellants, Florentino
Zapanta and Gregorio Reyes guilty of murder as principals. There can be no doubt that
Taciano Rizal, still at large, planned to kidnap his brother-in-law, Teofilo Ampil; but I am not
convinced that appellants Zapanta and Reyes conspired with him. Indeed, it is admitted by
the trial court and the Solicitor General that there is no direct evidence of conspiracy. In all
probability, said appellants were as, testified to by them, invited by Taciano Rizal to leave
Calamba Laguna, for a sight-seeing trip to Manila. From the mere fact that Zapanta and
Reyes had been with Taciano Rizal from the time they left Calamba to the moment Teofilo
Ampil was shot by appellant Alejandro Mendiola while jumping out of the car in which he
was asked to ride by Taciano on Aviles Street, we cannot safely deduce that Zapanta and
Reyes had previous knowledge of Taciano's murderous designs. The prosecution has not
imputes to either Zapanta or Reyes any positive act that would tend to make them principal
under article 17 of the Revised Penal Code. Neither may guilty knowledge on the part of

Zapanta and Reyes be inferred from their failure to stop Alejandro Mendiola from shooting
Teofilo Ampil or to report the crime to the authorities, because they could not foresee that.

G.R. No. L-62881 August 30, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and LUCIANO TAN, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In an Amended Information dated 10 February 1977, Ngo Sin, Luciano Tan, and
three others were charged with the crime of Theft of 300 pieces of second-hand
rail valued at P243,750.00, belonging to the Philippine National Railways, before
the then Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch I I I
(Criminal Case No. 719-SP).
On 10 July 1981, after the prosecution had already presented one witness, upon
motion of the prosecution, and after the parties were duly heard, the Trial Court
ordered the discharge from the Information of Ngo Sin to be utilized as a State
witness after satisfying itself that his testimony could be substantially
corroborated in its material points and that the other conditions for discharge as
set forth in Rule 119, Sec. 9 of the Rules of Court were present.
A Motion for Reconsideration filed by Luciano Tan was denied by the Trial Court
in its Order of 11 February, 1982, reasoning inter alia:
... it is pointed out that the prosecuting Fiscal has failed to show the
absolute necessity for the testimony of defendant Ngo Sin. As pointed out
by the prosecuting Fiscal Ngo Sin is the only person who can directly
Identify Luciano Tan as the person who instructed him get the rails in San
Pablo City, who gave him a certain amount of money to be used in the
hiring of trailers and to be given to certain persons in San Pablo City, as the
person who gave to him the necessary papers he presented in San Pablo
City to effect the taking of the rails in question, this as previously stated in
the Motion to Discharge filed by the City Fiscal dated February 20, 1981
particularly pars. 2 and 3 of said motion, and also Annex 'A' of said motion.
As contended by the City Fiscal without the testimony of defendant Ngo Sin
the prosecution cannot prove the participation of the accused Luciano Tan
who appears to be the mastermind in the unlawful taking of the rails from
the PNR Compound at San Pablo city.
Next, it is contended that lacking is the requirement that there is no other
direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed except the testimony of defendant Ngo Sin. As correctly pointed
out by the City Fiscal, except for the testimony of defendant Ngo Sin there
is no other direct evidence available for the prosecution to show the positive
and direct participation of Luciano Tan as narrated in Ngo Sin's affidavit

attached to the Motion to Discharge. Next, it is contended by defendantmovant that the next condition, to wit, that the testimony of defendant Ngo
Sin can be substantially co rroborated in its material point has not been met
in the discharge of the accused Ngo Sin. As pointed out by the City Fiscal,
this is not true. The testimony of Ngo Sin win be corroborated by Leonides
Manalo whose affidavit is submitted as Exh. 'A' motion (at p. 382, rec.)
who saw Luciano Tan deliver to Ngo Sin a certain sum of money and certain
papers. The testimony of Ngo Sin is also corroborated by the way bills or
delivery receipts marked Exhs. 'M' and 'N' made out to the name of Luciano
Tan. As also stated in the City Fiscal's Opposition to the motion for
reconsideration, he has earlier pointed out in the Petition for Discharge,
particularly par. 8 thereof, that defendant Ngo Sin appears to be merely an
instrument in carrying out the asportation, with the bulk of responsibility
resting on the accused Luciano Tan. The City Fiscal in his opposition to the
motion for was, has discussed this at page 3 of the opposition.
Defendant-movant next argument is that the body of the crane was taken
from 'the possession of Ngo Sin (p. 4, Motion for Reconsideration). As
contended by the City Fiscal, while it is true that the physical possession of
the subject rails was taken from the accused Ngo Sin the latter explained
that he was in possession of the rails upon instruction by defendant Luciano
Tan; that the papers were given to him. It is not true as alleged in the motion
for was, that the accused Ngo Sin did not point to defendant Luciano Tan
until he was interrogated by the San Pablo City Police (p. 4, Motion for
Reconsideration). Lt. Octavio Mabilangan of the PNR Security Force
testified (Sess. Sept. 4, 1979) that upon apprehension of Ngo Sin, the latter
protested that he was merely 'utusan lamang koni Luciano Tan and was
simply told to go to San Pablo City; that Ngo Sin told him that the delivery
receipts and other papers were given to him by Luciano Tan.
The defendant-movant has reproduced in whole the testimony of Ngo Sin
before the Fiscal's Office (p. 4-12, Motion). As pointed out by the City
Fiscal, a reading of his entire testimony would readily show that defendantmovant Luciano Tan was his principal who directed the accused Ngo Sin to
go to San Pablo City to get the rails
Next, defendant-movant points out that the information alleges conspiracy
and cites Sec. 27 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. As pointed out
by the City Fiscal, the aforecited provision of the Rules of Court is not
applicable to the testimony of the discharged witness in the person of
defendant Ngo Sin to be given in open Court.
It is next argued that since the rails in question have already been sold to
one Jose Chan, the accused Luciano Tan has nothing more to do with the
papers found in the possession of the accused Ngo Sin (p. 14, Motion for

Reconsideration). As pointed out by the City Fiscal, this matter is immaterial

for the purpose of present motion; it is a matter of defense.

Reconsideration prayed for by petitioner having been denied, they have elevated
the case to us.

On Certiorari, Luciano Tan challenged the validity of the aforesaid Orders before
respondent Appellate Court. In a Decision promulgated on 25 June 1982, said
Court held that "there was no despotic exercise of discretion by His Honor in
issuing the challenged orders" finding as justified his rationalizations abovequoted.

In this petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner People of the Philippines

alleges that respondent Court acted arbitrarily and/or committed grave abuse of
discretion in reversing itself, submitting that:

Upon a Motion for Reconsideration filed by Luciano Tan, respondent Court

reversed its prior Decision and nullified the Trial Court Orders discharging Ngo
Sin to be a State witness, rationalizing:
It appears that accused Ngo Sin can be the most guilty among the five
accused for it was in his possession that the missing rails in question were
found. The contention that this was per instruction of Luciano Tan is a matter
of defense which could be better ventilated at the trial proper, especially so
when in addition to the rails, papers were likewise found in his possession, in
relation to those rails. The money paid for the hiring of trailers to effect the
transfer of the rails to certain persons in San Pablo City was given by Ngo
Sin, who puts up the defense again that the money came from Luciano Tan.
This again being a matter of defense to be better determined during the trial.
The weakness of the challenged Orders is that it jumps at the conclusion that
Luciano Tan 'appears to be the mastermind in the unlawful taking of the rails
from the PNR compound at San Pablo City', which conclusion is quite
premature, prejudges the merit of the case and makes the pending trial even
moot and academic.
Aggravating the situation of the five (5) accused in the case pending before
the respondent court and calling for extreme caution in excluding any
accused is the allegation of the fiscal in the information (Annex A) that in the
commission of the offense accused were equally charged of "conspiring,
cooperating and mutually helping one another," without in any manner
qualifying g the degree of conspiracy of any one among the five (5) accused.
This means that the exclusion of one accused now at this stage can result in
an act beneficial to his own exclusive interest but prejudicial to the liberty of
his four (4) other co-accused and worse of all even to the interest of the
State.
We are not convinced that there is an absolute necessity for the State to
exclude the particular accused in this case to prosecute successfully the
case. The best interest of justice would require the was, of our Decision and
revoke and nullify the questioned Orders.

... For no apparently justifiable nor cogent reason, respondent court

abruptly executed an about and against the facts of record, did, in effect,
rule, that the trial court for all of its observance of the requirements of law
(including due notice, hearing and fun consideration of the evidence), had
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the fiscal's motion to
discharge Ngo Sin to become State witness. This sudden reversal of a wellreasoned decision is obviously despotic capricious, and arbitrary, and totally
unjustifiable.
We resolved to give due course.
It is believed that the record justifies the discharge of Ngo Sin to be utilized as a
State witness considering the absolute necessity of his testimony for the
successful prosecution of the criminal charge if it has to be established that the
accused Luciano Tan had planned and financed the theft. All conditions for
discharge prescribed by Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court have been met.
The Rules do not require absolute certainty in determining those conditions.
Perforce, the Judge has to rely in a large part upon the suggestions and the
considerations presented by the prosecuting officer.
... A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with
absolute certainty at the very outset of the trial as to everything which may
be developed in the course of the trial in regard to the guilty participation of
the accused in the commission of the crime charged in the complaint. If that
were practicable or possible, there would be little need for the formality of a
trial. In coming to his conclusions as to the necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested,' as to the 'availability or nonavailability of other direct or corroborative evidence;' as to which of the
accused is the most guilty one; and the like, the judge must rely in a large
part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the prosecuting
officer. ... 1
It is also settled that the discharge of a co-defendant is a matter that lies within
the sound discretion of the Trial Court. 2 The Court's is the exclusive
responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the Rules exist. 3

We see no compelling reason for respondent Appellate Court to have substituted

its own findings for those of the prosecution and the Trial Judge. We find no
contrary evidence to justify a reversal of the Trial Judge's conclusions, who was
in a position to evaluate the evidence already available, a like opportunity to
assess the same not having been afforded respondent Appellate Court.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Court's Resolution, dated 4 November 1982
reversing its own prior Decision of 25 June 1982, as well as its Resolution of 17
December 1982 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration are hereby SET
ASIDE, and the Orders of the then Court of First Instance of Laguna and San
Pablo City, Branch III, dated 10 July 1981 and 11 February 1982, in Criminal
Case No. 719-SP, are hereby REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court
corresponding to the former Court of First Instance is now directed to proceed
with the trial on the merits accordingly. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-57333-37 September 16, 1986

CECILIA
C.
BARRETTO
and
ROBERT
SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, respondent.
YAP, J.:
Cecilia Barretto, Esperanza Magadia and Robert Soriano were charged in five
separate informations before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of Estafa
Through Falsification of Public Documents. The five cases, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815 and 1816, involved the amounts of P130.00,
P100.00, P90.00, P100.00 and P100.00, respectively, or a total of P520.00.
Except as to the particulars regarding the dates of the commission of the
offenses and the amounts involved, the information uniformly alleged that Cecilia
C. Barretto, Chief of the Project Compassion Office in the Province of Batangas,
and Esperanza Casapao-Magadia and Robert Soriano, both casual employees in
said office, taking advantage of their public positions, and in conspiracy with one
another, committed the crime as follows, to wit:
... the accused Esperanza Casapao-Magadia upon the direction
of accused Cecilia C. Barretto prepared and accomplished the
form of a document captioned as Time Book and Payroll of the
Project Compassion's Office, for the period covering ... ... by
making it appear thereon that one Leticia Austria y Serrano, a
separated casual employee of the said Project Compassion's
Office, rendered actual services and worked for the said period
and the corresponding wages therefor was . . . ... Philippine
Currency, the said accused after preparing the aforesaid Time
Book and Payroll upon order of accused Cecilia C. Barretto,
knowingly wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without authority
from the said Leticia Austria y Serrano, falsified, affixed and
signed the signature of the latter, and accused Cecilia C.
Barretto, as Chief of the Project Compassion's Office, knowing
fully well that the said Time Book and Payroll concerning Leticia
Austria y Serrano, a casual employee separated by her is
falsified, nonetheless signed and affixed her signature thereto,
and thereafter that the two accused, together with her coaccused Robert Soriano y Soriano, who knowing fully well that
the signature above the name of Leticia Austria is falsified and
does not belong to Leticia, acted and signed as a witness to the
authenticity of the said signature, and all the accused in the
pursuit of their criminal design to defraud the national

government conspiring and confederating together, acting in

common accord and mutually helping one another, through
Robert Soriano y Soriano, by virtue of and with the use of said
falsified Time Book and Payroll which was presented by
accused Robert Soriano y Soriano, to the Office of the
Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, the entity then in custody of
the funds, the amounts of . . . ..., Philippine Currency, was
released to the said Robert Soriano y Soriano, purportedly as
wages for the services of the said Leticia Austria y Serrano, as
casual employee of the Project Compassion's Office, when in
truth and in fact she was already separated from said office, and
as such she did not work nor render services for the period
covered by Time Book and Payroll, nor did she sign her name in
said Time Book and Payroll, and thereafter, the said Robert
Soriano y Soriano delivered the said amount to accused Cecilia
C. Barretto who misapplied and converted the aforesaid amount
to her personal use and benefit, thereby prejudicing and
damaging the national government in the amount of . . . ... ,
Philippine Currency, which offense was committed in relation to
their office.
The cases were tried jointly by agreement of the parties. After the presentation of
two witnesses, the complainant and the paymaster, the prosecution asked for
postponement. The prosecution then filed a motion to discharge accused
Esperanza Magadia to be utilized as state witness. This motion was granted by
the respondent court over petitioners' objections. Trial was thereafter resumed,
and the prosecution, after presenting Esperanza Magadia as state witness,
closed its case. The petitioners then took the witness stand, after which the
defense rested its case.
On June 11, 1981, the respondent court promulgated its decision convicting
petitioners of the crime charged in the five informations filed against them,
sentencing Cecilia Barretto to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4)
YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum
and to pay a fine of P3,500.00, for each of the aforementioned five (5) cases, and
to pay the costs; sentencing Robert Soriano to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
ONE (1) YEAR, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as
minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500.00, for each of the
aforementioned five (5) cases, and to pay the costs; and ordering accused
Cecilia Barretto and Robert Soriano, jointly and severally, to pay the Provincial
Government of Batangas the total sum of P520.00, representing the amount of
which the latter was defrauded in these cases.

The decision is now before this Court for review on appeal by certiorari.
In a resolution promulgated on November 20, 1984, we affirmed the judgment of
conviction, but modified the penalty meted out to petitioners to a total "not to
exceed three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties imposed on each of them."
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, to which no objection was
interposed by the Solicitor General. We granted the motion, reconsidered our
resolution of November 20, 1984, and gave due course to the petition.
Upon review of the evidence, we find that in arriving at its judgment convicting
Barretto and Soriano, the respondent court relied on the uncorroborated
testimony of the accused-turned-state witness, Esperanza Magadia. Section 9(c),
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court requires, as one of the essential conditions for the
discharge of an accused in order to be utilized as state witness, that his
testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points. The testimony
of Magadia failed to meet this condition, and yet, the respondent court believed
her and utilized her testimony to convict the petitioners,
We have repeatedly cautioned trial courts in receiving and evaluating the
testimony of a discharged accused to subject such testimony to close scrutiny. In
People vs. Tabayoyong, 1 we held that the testimony of a self- confessed
accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused
cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be considered as proof to a moral
certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime;
thus, it is required that the testimony be substantially corroborated by other
evidence in all its material points.
In the case at bar, the accused-turned-state witness Magadia admitted having
falsified the payroll, but tried to exculpate herself by shifting the responsibility to
her co-accused. She claimed that she merely acted upon the orders of Barretto
who was her superior and whom she could not refuse for fear that she would not
renew her appointment. Magadia's testimony on this point is not corroborated by
any evidence. Not only that, there is evidence in the records of this case showing
that Barretto did not have the appointing power.
Magadia likewise made it appear that Soriano received the salary pertaining to
Austria and delivered the same to Barretto. This statement not only stands
uncorroborated, but is pure speculation on the part of Magadia. It is merely
based on her observation that Austria used to go inside the office of Barretto.
In giving credence to the testimony of Magadia, the respondent court capitalized
on the fact that her testimony at the trial was a mere repetition of her written

declaration before the NBI on February 8, 1979, or long before her discharge to
become a state witness and therefore "was not tailored to earn her discharge, but
given in the interest of truth." What the court failed to note in its decision was that
Magadia gave two statements to the NBI. She gave an earlier statement on
January 30, 1979, in which she admitted having falsified the signatures of Austria
in the payrolls, but did not implicate Barretto. It is apparent that her later
statement was made in an effort to exculpate herself by pointing to her chief,
Cecilia Barretto, as the person responsible for the scheme of falsifying the
payrolls. The trial court obviously failed to consider this.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court are generally accorded great
respect, and will not be disturbed by the appellate court. However, in the case at
bar, we are convinced that the trial court overlooked material facts and
circumstances in the appreciation of the evidence which, properly considered,
would affect the result of the case.
Judging from the acts done by Esperanza Magadia, she appears to be the most
guilty. As such, she has the strongest motive to point to petitioners as the guilty
parties, in exchange for her discharge and eventual acquittal. On the other hand,
it is hard to believe that petitioner Barretto, as head of the Project Compassion
Office, would jeopardize her position for the paltry amounts involved, totalling
only P520.00.
Without the testimony of Magadia, the petitioners would certainly have been
acquitted as there would have been no evidence to link them to the commission
of the offense. The judgment of conviction was based on the sole testimony of
the accused-turned-state witness, Esperanza Magadia. Such testimony, coming
from a polluted source, cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction, without
being corroborated in its material points by other evidence.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court in Criminal Cases Nos. 1812
to 1816 is REVERSED and set aside. Petitioners are hereby ACQUITTED, and
declared without liability of whatever nature arising from the incidents of this
case.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-55939 May 29, 1981

FLORITA SARDINIA-LINCO, Assistant Provincial Fiscal, FRANCISCO Ma.
GUERRERO,
Senior
State
Counsel,
and
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES *, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable GREGORIO G. PINEDA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, GREGORIO BILOG, JR., AMADO MASICAMPO, FELINO CORTEZ,
DOMINADOR MATEO, TITO SANTOS, CONRADO TORRES, RICARDO
MARAMOT and MEDARDO HABAL, respondents.
RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:1wph1.t
Without prejudice to the filing of extended opinions, the Court has issued the
following resolutions:
I. On the cuestion previa of (a) whether the People of the Philippines should first
be ordered impleaded as petitioner (it having been noted that the petition at bar
was filed only by petitioners Linco and Guerrero in their official capacities as
Assistant Provincial Fiscal and Senior State Counsel, respectively, while the real
party in interest is the People); and (b) whether the Solicitor General on behalf of
the People should be required to submit his comment and position on the issues
raised before the case can be finally acted upon and decided, no majority could
be reached with five Justices, namely, Barredo, Aquino, Fernandez, Guerrero
and De Castro, JJ., first, voting against such impleading of the People and
requiring of the Solicitor General's comment and three Justices, namely,
Teehankee, Makasiar, and Herrera, JJ., voting for such impleading and comment
of the People as an indispensable party and Chief Justice Fernando voting for
such impleading without comment. The Court, consequently, voted unanimously
to ORDER that the People of the Philippines be deemed impleaded as petitioner
but to forego any comment on the part of the Solicitor General.
II. On the merits of the petition the Court
(a) Resolved, by unanimous vote, to SET ASIDE respondent judge's questioned
Order of January 12, 1981 (Annex "FF" of the petition) giving the parties "thirty
(30) days from receipt of copy of (his) resolution on the admission of rebuttal
evidence within which to submit their simultaneous memoranda. Thereafter, with
or without such memoranda, this case shall be deemed submitted for decision"
and to ORDER the reopening of the case pending before respondent judge for

further reception of the People's rebuttal evidence, giving the People a period of
thirty (30) days from the date first set for continuation of hearing within which to
do so;
(b) Resolved, by unanimous vote, to SET ASIDE respondent judge's questioned
Order of January 7, 1981 (Annex "EE" of the petition) finding petitioners Linco
and Guerrero, "guilty of contempt of (his) court" and sentencing them "to pay a
fine of P100.00 each with warning that "repetition of the same or similar acts shall
be dealt with more severely;" and
(c) Resolved, for lack of the necessary votes, to DENY the petition to set aside
respondent judge's Orders of December 10, 1980 and January 6, 1981 (Annexes
"W" and "DD" of the petition) denying the motion for his inhibition and
disqualification, with five Justices, namely, Barredo, Aquino, Fernandez, Guerrero
and De Castro,JJ., voting against the petition for disqualification and Chief
Justice Fernando and Teehankee, Makasiar and Herrera, JJ. voting for
respondent judge's disqualification.
Justices Teehankee and Fernandez filed their respective memoranda-opinions
on the issues involved, which were taken into consideration in the Court's
deliberations, as follows:
Justice Teehankee's memo-opinion 1wph1.t
Antecedents: In Administrative Matter No. 4453-CFI, the Court's
majority through its resolution of December 28, 1979 upheld the
order of Executive Judge Gregorio G. Pineda denying the
motion of Augusto Syjuco, Jr. for inhibition from further hearing
the anti-graft case against former Land Registration
Commissioner Gregorio Bilog, Jr., et al., docketed as Criminal
Case No. 27743 of the Court of First Instance, Pasig, Rizal.
Chief Justice Fernando, Justice Melencio-Herrera and I
dissented and voted to grant the Motion for inhibition for the
reasons stated in the Resolution, copy of which is attached
hereto as Annex "A" for ready reference and for a full statement
of the antecedents.
Chief Justice Fernando's vote is herewith reproduced for the
Court's consideration: 'Chief Justice Fernando voted to grant
such motion consistently with the principle he has followed
invariably in a number of opinions penned by him that to avoid
any suspicion as to the absence of that desirable frame of mind
expected of a judge, namely the cold neutrality of an impartial
arbiter, and considering the incidents that show the apparent

lack of mutual goodwill between petitioner Syjuco and

respondent Judge, the latter's apparent willingness to leave the
disposition of the matter to the Court gives more than ample
ground for his inhibition and the reraffling of the case.
On my part, I urged the members of the Court to consider that
under our broken line of doctrinal jurisprudence, elementary due
process which entitles every litigant to the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge demand s the inhibition of the judge. Where
there exist mutual mistrust, suspicion and hostility between the
complainant and the judge, with the complainant charging in
open hearing before this Court that the judge offered him for
sale a land suspected of being covered by a void titleand with
the judge likewise charging the complainant in open
hearing with having hallucinations and having tried to bribe and
corrupt him, and acknowledging complainant's fear that 'the
accused will be acquitted in my court,' the judge should
withdraw from the case. He has passed the buck to us and we
must tell him so.
Likewise, let it be recalled that the record before us shows that
there is a strained relationship between Syjuco and Judge
Pineda and more, mutual hostility, mistrust and prejudice, with
Syjuco expressing open mistrust of the judge who offered him
for sale a land suspected of being covered by wrongfully issued
titles and the judge openly charging Syjuco of having
hallucinations and trying to bribe him, and asserting that Syjuco
"is full of fear and suspicion in his mind" and fears that "the
accused will finally be acquitted in my court . . . Because he
could not corrupt me, that is how he is hallucinating before this
Honorable Tribunal.' This makes it imperative for this Court to
heed Judge Pineda's request for guidance in the dispositive part
of his order (stating that he is "amenable to whatever this
Honorable Supreme Court may decide on the matter") and
accordingly, to declare that it is in the best interests of justice, in
accordance with our settled doctrines and jurisprudence, that
the case below be transferred and re-raffled among the other
branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The land suspected of being covered by a void title therein
referred to and purportedly belonging to respondent judge's
aunt (see transcript of hearing reproduced on pages 15 to 17
hereof) has now definitively and finally held by this Court to be
covered by a fake claim and title in Director of Lands vs. CA, L-

45168, Resolution
of January 27, 1981.

of September

25, 1979 and

Decision

The present case. At any rate, as a consequence of the

attached Resolution, Judge Pineda continued the trial and
hearing of the case. But according to the petition, Judge Pineda
continued to show undue interest and partiality in the trial of the
case, obviously favoring the accused, which prompted the
government prosecutors, Linco and Guerrero, to file on August
25, 1980 before the respondent judge a motion for his
disqualification and/or inhibition of respondent judge.
At the hearing of August 27, 1980, the motion was ordered
stricken off the record on the flimsy ground that it was
mistakenly captioned" Office of the Provincial Fiscal" instead of
"Court of First Instance." The next day, or on August 28, 1980,
petitioners refiled their Motion for Disqualification and/or
Inhibition of respondent judge, this time properly captioned.
Respondent Judge denied the motion for inhibition and
continued with the trial of the case. What precipitated the filing
of this petition is, while the prosecution was still in the process
of presenting rebuttal evidence, respondent judge terminated
the case and verbally ordered petitioner Linco to submit
memorandum on the case within ten (10) days although the
verbal order was modified in respondent judge's written order of
January 12, 1981 by requiring petitioners to submit their formal
offer of rebuttal evidence within ten (10) days and to submit
their memorandum within thirty (30) days. Petitioners allege that
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion by
arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously closing the case without
allowing the State, represented by the herein petitioners, to
finish or complete its rebuttal evidence, a matter which, besides
being contrary to law is an obvious display of bias, hostility, and
partiality. Petitioners pointed out that respondent judge
committed error of law and gravely abused his discretion in
compelling petitioner Guerrero to be placed on the witness
stand and cross-examined in the hearing of their motion for
inhibition and finding them in contempt while denying their
motion to hold counsel for accused Bilog in contempt of court.
They likewise reiterated their previous stand that respondent
judge committed error of law and grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to inhibit himself from trying the criminal case.

1. Petitioners allege that respondent judge committed grave

abuse of discretion in refusing to inhibit himself from trying
Criminal Case No. 27743 against the private respondents.
In view of the antecedents clearly demonstrating the
antagonism between the complainant and respondent judge
(Adm. Matter No. 4453 CFI) or at the very least, on the basis of
the evident lack of faith on the part of the complainant and
prosecution with respect to the ability of the respondent judge to
dispense justice without bias or partiality, the respondent judge
should have voluntarily inhibited himself if only to restore the
confidence of the complainant and prosecution in particular and
the public in general in the soundness of our judicial system and
the integrity and probity of those who sit in the bench.
Again, in view of the verbal clashes between the prosecution and the respondent
judge and the charges of partiality levelled by the prosecution, considering that
'however upright the judge, and however free from the slightest inclination to do
justice, there is peril of his unconscious bias or prejudice' (Del Castillo vs.
Javelona, 6 SCRA 146 cited in Ignacio vs. Villaluz, 90 SCRA 16) engendered by
the expressed antagonism or at the very least, a demonstration of lack of
confidence on the part of both the prosecution and its complaining witness. Thus,
in Pimentel vs. Salanga, 21 SCRA 160, We held that: 1wph1.t
All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good
occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate
guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a
case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge
from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally
prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is
made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one
party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of
circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of
mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should
exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the
courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he
reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the
back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously
tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part
of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of
misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel is not
altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other
men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution
before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit where
that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit

himself where that case could be heard by another judge and

where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others
involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit
may depend to a great extent the all important confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to
voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or
fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be
interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the
law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.
Judges should not only be impartial, but should also appear
impartial. (Fernandez vs. Presbitero, 79 SCRA 61.) While
judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important
that they should act and behave in such a manner that the
parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality
(lbid). It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be
satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part
of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and just
(Mateo Jr. vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18).
It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a
hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal and that
every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge (Gutierrez vs. Santos, 2 SCRA 249,
Villapando vs. Quitain, 75 SCRA 24).
In Castillo vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124, We held that in the event
that a judge may be unable to discern for himself his inability to
meet the test of the cold neutrality required of in this Court has
seen to it that he should disqualify himself.
2. While on its face, the obvious attempt of the respondent
judge to terminate the proceedings with apparent speed and
dispatch should merit our approval and commendation, his
failure to accord the same consideration to other cases pending
before his sala including cases involving detention prisoners,
must necessarily give rise to doubts as to his reasons for
pursuing this particular case with a vigor unknown in his sala.
Where the deportment of a judge leaves much to be desired, he
should be disqualified. (Villapando vs. Quitain, supra.)

3. The refusal of respondent judge to grant the prosecution

ample opportunity to complete its rebuttal evidence.
In the first place, postponements are part and parcel of our
procedural system of dispensing justice, and when substantial
rights are affected and the intention to delay is not, manifest, it
is sound judicial discretion to allow them. (Rexwell Corporation
vs. Canlas, 3 SCRA 875.) In considering motions of
postponement of trials or for new trials, two circumstances
should be taken into account by the court, namely (1) the merits
of the case of the movant, and (2) the reasonableness of the
postponement or new trials (De Cases vs. Peyer 5 SCRA 1165;
Udan vs. Amon 23 SCRA 837).
In the second place, the right to speedy trial is not violated by
granting a continuance on the ground of the absence of material
witnesses (Rexwell Corporation vs. Canlas, supra).
In the third place, there will have been no substantial injury or
prejudice upon the accused by a delay of one or two months
considering that all the accused are out on bail. The interests of
justice and fair play will better be served if greater freedom and
latitude is allowed the parties to present, for the consideration
and appreciation of the court, all their evidence.
In any event, the State is likewise entitled to due process in criminal cases, thus
We held in the case of People vs. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264 and the later case
of Silvestre vs. Military Commission No. 21, S2 SCRA 10, that: 1wph1.t
The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it
must be given the opportunity to present its evidence in support
of the Court has always accorded this right to the prosecution
here the right had been denied, had promptly annulled the
offending court action. We have heretofore held that a purely
capricious dismissal of an information deprives the State of fair
opportunity to prosecute and convict; it denies the prosecution
its day in court. For this reason, it is a dismissal (in reality an
acquittal) without due process, and, therefore, null and void.
Such dismissal is invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite,
that is, due process, and, consequently, will not constitute a
proper basis for the claim of double jeopardy. We have likewise
held that a trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and wellfounded motion of the prosecution for reconsideration of an
order of dismissal or acquittal and that such arbitrary refusal to

reopen the case will be set aside to give the State its day in
court and an opportunity to prove the offense charged against
the accused and to prevent miscarriage of justice, especially
when no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced
thereby.
4. Petitioners contend that respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in compelling Fiscal Guerrero to take the
witness stand and be cross-examined on his motion for
inhibition. Section 2, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides for
the procedure to be followed in objecting to the competency of
the judge in hearing a case, which must be substantially
followed (Joaquin vs. Barreto, 25 Phil. 281). Objection to the
competency of the judge should be filed with him in writing and
the judge shall determine his qualification (Government of
Philippine Islands vs. Heirs of Abelia, 49 Phil. 374) and
thereupon proceed with the trial or to withdraw therefrom, in
accordance with his determination of the question of his
disqualification. The judge is not allowed by the rules to receive
evidence on the motion for inhibition. Though not necessarily
illegal or improper, it is not a usual procedure in the conduct of
trial to place a prosecutor on the witness stand and put pressure
on the prosecution which might be construed as indicative of
personal bias or interest.
5. The hostility of respondent judge against petitioners is
bolstered by the fact that, in his order of January 7, 1981, he
declared petitioners in contempt of court and fined P100.00
each because of alleged false manifestations made before the
court.
It appears that petitioners were ordered by the respondent
judge to submit to the court the names of their rebuttal
witnesses and the nature of their testimony. In their
manifestation of August 18, 1980, they refused on the ground
that they did not want to divulge the names of their witnesses
because of their fear that the witnesses, who are employees of
the Land Registration Commission might be influenced by their
former superiors, the accused. They cited Acting land
Registration Commissioner Federico B. Alfonso, Jr. who
cautioned them to exercise restraint and reminded them that the
accused are capable of intimidating witnesses.
Based on a letter of Acting Commissioner Alfonso, respondent
judge in his January 7, 1981 Order (Annex 'EE') declared

petitioners guilty of contempt of court for allegedly making "false

imputations as found by (his) court, thereby obstructing,
delaying and fomenting distrust "in the administration of justice."
In fact, respondent judge plainly misinterpreted the letter of
Acting Commissioner Alfonso as a complete denial of the
statement attributed to him. Respondent judge lost sight of the
fact that in his typewritten letter, Acting Commissioner Alfonso
added in his own handwriting the statement, "I do not pass
judgment on the capability or lack of capability of accused to
intimidate witnesses" which is not a denial that he did express
the fear to the petitioners. "The act of respondent judge
declaring petitioners-prosecutors guilty of reprehensible and
contemptuous . . . . gross misconduct' on a contentious and
insignificant matter manifests clear partiality and hostility against
the prosecution that require his disqualification, considering the
antecedents as set forth above and in Annex "A" hereof.
The Court's settled and uniform jurisprudence on the litigations
right to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as an essential
part of due process demand such disqualification - until and
unless the Court is to overthrow its long line of decisions which
form part of the law of the land.
The only drawback cited that it is better that the judge who tried
the case, hand down the decision, must yield to the law of the
land. And it is refuted by the numerous cases decided correctly
by judges other than those who tried the same and saw and
heard the witnesses, more so, where as in this case, the main
evidence consists of documentary evidence.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court should set aside the questioned
orders and specifically
1. Order there opening of the case for further reception of the
State's rebuttal evidence, giving them a period of 90 days to do
so, in order to afford them the opportunity to locate missing
witnesses;
2. Set aside the contempt order and lit the fine of P100.00
imposed upon each of petitioners-prosecutors; and

3. Order the inhibition of respondent judge and the re-raffle of

the case among the other branches of the Rizal court of first
instance upon due notice to and in the presence of the parties
and/or their counsels.
Annex "A" of justice Teehankee's memo-opinion1wph1.t

Decembe
Administrative Matter No. 4453-CFI-Re: Order of Executive
Judge Gregorio G. Pineda, CFI, Pasig, Branch XXI. The Court
voted to sustain the order of Executive Judge Gregorio G.
Pineda, denying for lack of merit the motion of Augusto Syjuco,
Jr. for the inhibition of Executive Judge Gregorio G. Pineda from
further hearing Criminal Case No. 27743 entitled "People vs.
Gregorio Bilog, Jr., et al." Chief Justice Fernando and Justices
Teehankee and Melencio-Herrera voted to grant the motion for
inhibition. Justices Felix V. Makasiar and Felix Q. Antonio
reserved their votes. Chief Justice Fernando voted to grant
such motion consistently with the principle he has followed
invariably in a number of opinions penned by him that to avoid
any suspicion as to the absence of that desirable frame of mind
expected of a judge, namely, the cold neutrality of an impartial
arbiter, and considering the incidents that show the apparent
lack of mutual goodwill between petitioner Syjuco and
respondent Judge, the latter's apparent willingness to leave the
disposition of the matter to the Court gives more than ample
ground for his inhibition and the reraffing of the case. Justice
Teehankee, dissenting, voted to (a) direct the implementation
by the Ministry of Justice the President's order of January 12,
1979 to the case below to the sandiganbayan or to secure a
revocation of the same fifteen (15) days from notice hereof; and
(b) in the event that revocation is obtained within the said
fifteen-day period, to that the case below be transferred and reraffled among other branches of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal excluding XXI presided by Judge Pineda and the Circuit
Criminal Court l Rizal) upon due notice to in the presence of the
parties, complainant Syjuco, and/or their respective counsels.
Justice Melencio-Herrera concurred with the above dissent.
Justice Teehankee's separate opinion follows:
I dissent from the majority's resolution upholding Judge
Gregorio C Pineda's Order denying the motion for his inhibition
in the anti- graft case pending in his court, for the following
reasons;

I. The President's January 12, 1979 direct order to the Ministry

of Justice to transfer the case to the Sandiganbayan should be
implemented by said ministry It s pro tanto a withdrawal of the
general instruction that only all cases where there has been no
arrangement be so transferred, and its validity has not been
challenged; and
II. Prescinding from the above, under our unbroken line of
doctrinal jurisprudence, elementary due process which entitles
every litigant to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge
demands the inhibition of the judge. Where there exist mutual
mistrust, suspicion and hostility between the complainant and
the judge, with the complainant charging in open hearing before
this Court that the judge offered him for sale a land suspected
of being covered by a void title and with the judge likewise
charging the complainant in open hearing with having
hallucinations and having tried to bribe and corrupt him, and
acknowledging complainant's fear that "the accused will be
acquitted in my court," the judge should withdraw from the case.
He has passed the buck to us and we must tell him so.
This incident started on August 30, 1978 when three coaccused of former LRC Commissioner Gregorio Bilog, Jr.,
namely, Amado Y. Masicampo, Dominador Mateo and Conrado
Torres, in a pending criminal case for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act 1 before Judge Onofre Villaluz of the
Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal who had already held eight
months of extensive hearings, had filed ex parte on their
own behalf an obviously pre- prepared petition of five (5) short
paragraphs, stating that Judge Villaluz had filed a leave of
absence from August 20, 1978 to September 21, 1978 (the
specific dates were just fined in ink on the blank spaces
provided in the petition, indicating that the accused who
were at-large already had a prepared petition for re- raffle ready
for them to come out of hiding and to file the same upon Judge
Villaluz' going on leave of absence), that they had not yet been
arraigned, that their bail bonds had not been approved due to
Judge Villaluz' absence and they were liable to be arrested any
time and that they invoked their right to speedy trial, and prayed
that the case be referred to the Executive Judge of the CFI of
Rizal for re-raffle.
The petition was included in the September 5, 1978 agenda of
the Court en banc (with a heavy load of 108 items), at which
time there were only sixteen days left yet of Judge Villaluz'

leave of absence. Upon recommendation of the Court's then

executive officer, now deputy court administrator Arturo B.
Buena (who was apparently misled by the misrepresentations
and was unaware that the reason for the movants' nonarraignment was that they had gone into hiding and had evaded
service of the warrants of arrest long issued against them), the
Court en banc in its session of September 5 granted the petition
without following the usual practice of requiring the
prosecution's comment and thus the case was re-raffled and
redocketed as Criminal Case No. 27743 of the Pasig CFI
presided by Executive Judge Gregorio G. Pineda.
Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., as the authorized representative of the
victimized party in the case, complained about the transfer of
the case from the circuit criminal court to the court of first
instance, and the President on January 12, 1979 in a directive
to the Ministry of Justice "ordered the transfer of all cases of
corruption committed by public officials to the Sandiganbayan.
This shall include the case against former Com. Bilog."
Upon request of Deputy Minister of Justice Catalino Macaraig,
Jr. in a letter dated January 30, 1979, the Court set for hearing
and heard on April 3, 1979 Syjuco's complaint. In his letter of
March 20, 1979 filed in compliance with the Court's resolution
of February 6, 1979, Syjuco prayed for the return of the case to
the circuit criminal court for the continuation of trial or in the
alternative for the transfer thereof to the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to the President's order.
Stated briefly and in summary, the following were brought to
light at the hearing of April 3, 1979:
The Ministry of Justice has nothing to do with the transfer of
cases from one branch to another which falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
Syjuco expressed his "full and unqualified belief in the
wisdom and integrity of the Supreme Court" and averred that
through their misrepresentations the three above-named coaccused petitioners succeeded in misleading this Court into
issuing its resolution of September 5, granting the petition for
the transfer of the case from the circuit criminal court to the
court of first instance.

 Syjuco expressed great suspicion as to the re-raffling of the

case and its falling in the sala of Judge Pineda, so much so that
some Justices suggested that his remedy was to file a motion
for the inhibition of Judge Pineda and to state the reasons as he
did in open court why he did not have faith in the court of Judge
Pineda" and "doubted his fairness," although expressing that he
had "enough ground for my fear but not enough for his
disqualification." (T.s.n., pp. 44-47).
In answer to a question of Mr. Justice De Castro, Syjuco
explained his misgivings as to the whitewashing of the case
against Bilog in the Ministry of Justice in this wise: Because of
Mr. Bilog's boast in the past that he is well covered in the
Department of Justice, in the same way that he has likewise
boasted that in matters involving the Supreme Court his wife is
here. I have this statement dated January 23, 1978 from Mr.
Gerardo Pios while admitting that in law, suspicion is not
evidence, although stating that "I say categorically that I can
substantiate to the President my fears and my belief. But I also
likewise admit that I cannot substantiate it before the courts."
(T.s.n., pp. 51, 54).
The mutual suspicion, mistrust and hostility between Syjuco
and Judge Pineda may best be appreciated from the transcript
of the last part of the hearing wherein both of them express
their respective feelings against each other (with Judge Pineda
charging in open court that Syjuco, through his former counsel,
had tried to bribe or corrupt him), as follows:
Justice Barredo [to Mr. Syjuco];
Anyway, when you say that you are confident that you can
substantiate your charges before the President while you
cannot substantiate it before the Court, you mean to say that
you cannot substantiate it before us because you don't have the
facts while the President will agree with you even if you don't
have the facts?
Mr. Syjuco: 1wph1.t
No, Your Honor, because a court of law operates on the
principle that unless a man is proven guilty, he is considered
innocent, I feel that the leadership of this country on the other
hand follows adifferent criterion, that criterion being that when

there is any question at all as to the person's integrity, he would

not otherwise qualify for public office, the standard being that he
should be like Caesar's wife.
One last statement, Your Honor. I do not believe that where
the matter presently rests, i.e., in the sala of Judge Pineda, the
matter would get a fair hearing. Several months ago I received
an offer from Judge Pineda for the sale of a property. This was
before this case started. The basis of that offer was a court
order that was expected to come out shortly for the titling of a
property. If that property would be titled, it would be offered to
me. Again, I wish to categorically point out that this in itself does
not discredit the good Judge, but this is one of the matter
that create these fears in mymind and in my heart.
Justice Teehankee: 1wph1.t
All right the time is getting late. If Judge Pineda wishes to make
a response to that, we will listen to him, to round this up.
Judge Pineda: 1wph1.t
I would just like to point out that what Mr. Syjuco has just stated
is not true. It was through his lawyer, Fiscal Bernabe now, when
they were investigating the first case they filed with the CCC
that I told Fiscal Bernabe that I have an aunt who has a land in
that place. In the event that a final decision will be in her favor, I
think she would offer it to him. That's all. I did not tell him that I
have a land. Now, one reason for the fear of Mr. Syjuco that
the accused will finally be acquitted in my court is thathis
lawyer, my former assistant f in Pasay, approached me while
this case was being tried. Because he could not corrupt me,
that is how he is hallucinating 2 before this Honorable Tribunal.
Justice Teehankee: 1wph1.t
Are you saying that this former lawyer tried to corrupt you?
Judge Pineda: 1wph1.t
It was said in a mild manner. He said that Mr. Syjuco has much
money. But I said, I don't give a damn. This is a case which I
am going to try as I receive the evidence. 'That is the reason
why Mr. Syjuco now is full of far and suspicion in his mind.

Justice Teehankee: 1wph1.t

All right, case submitted. (T.s.n., pp. 54-56, emphasis supplied).

At the April 3, 1979 hearing, it was brought out that the President's order
to transfer the case to the Sandiganbayan has not been implemented as
follows: 1wph1.t

Apparently in compliance with the suggestions made at the hearing,

Syjuco did file in the case below a motion for the inhibition of Judge
Pineda from the case and on June 1, 1979, Judge Pineda forwarded to
this Court a copy f his order of May 30, 1979 declaring the motion for
inhibition to be "utterly groundless and without just and legal justification."
In his said order judge Pineda states that

Justice Teehankee:

Candor compels the admission that at first this Presiding Judge would
have given in to the temptation of inhibiting himself from trying this case if
only to make manifest his disinterestedness. On further reflection, so as
not to frustrate the ends of justice, he ordered a hearing on this motion to
determine whether or not the allegations and the evidence pressed meet
the requirements of the Constitution and statutory commands of
impartiality (Art. IV, Section 19, Constitution of the Philippines; Rule 137,
Rules of Court) and jurisprudence.

No, Your Honor. The trial before Judge Pineda I understand, is

proceeding.

After hearing, this Presiding Judge finds the Petitioner's motion for
inhibition utterly groundless and without just and legal justification such
that to inhibit himself would, in consequence, amount to an abandonment
of a sworn duty to administer speedy, fair and impartial justice. ...
Without, however, denying the motion for his inhibition, Judge Pineda
made the following disposition of the motion in the last paragraph of his
order: (W)hile it is evident that the motion for inhibition is utterly
groundless, this Presiding Judge is, however, amenable to whatever
the Honorable Supreme Court may decide on this matter." (Syjuco's
counsel in his comment on the order surmised correctly that the same
should have been docketed under AM 961-CC [wherein the petition of the
three above-named co-accused Masicampo, et al., for the transfer and reraffle of the case was granted and wherein some Justices had suggested
precisely that Syjuco file the motion for inhibition] but peculiarly enough
the order of Judge Pineda was given another docket number as shown in
the above title hereof.)
I. Before proceeding to deal with the question of Judge Pineda's inhibition,
we should deal with Syjuco's alternative prayer that the criminal case
below be transferred to the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive
jurisdiction over anti-graft cases pursuant to the President's directive of
January 12, 1979.

I just would like to ask Deputy Minister Macaraig whether this case has
been transferred to the Sandiganbayan?
Deputy Minister Macaraig:

Justice Teehankee:
What about the directive of the President?
Deputy Minister Macaraig:
The Sandiganbayan decree itself provides that only cases where there
has been no arraignment can be transferred to the Sandiganbayan. I was
just talking t the Fiscal in charge of this case, and she said that she is
about to close her evidence. So transfer of this case at this time to the
Sandiganbayan might also raise issues of double jeopardy, perhaps.
Chief Justice Castro:
Or propriety, honesty and so on.
Justice Teehankee:
And the said evidence before the CFI cannot be passed over to the
Sandiganbayan The president has made an order to transfer all the
cases involving corruption committed by public officials to the
Sandiganbayan.
Deputy Minister Macaraig:
We have done that in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, where
there had been no arraignment yet, as provided for by PD 1607.
Justice Makasiar:

Did you bring that to the attention of the President?

Deputy Minister Macaraig:
Yes, I told Secretary Clave about that difficulty.
Justice Makasiar:
Do you know if Secretary has brought that to the attention of the
President?
Deputy Minister Macaraig
I don't know, Your Honor.
Justice Makasiar: 1wph1.t
There might be need to amend the decree. (T.s.n. pp. 36-37).
There appears to be no valid reason for not implementing the President's
order to transfer the case to the Sandiganbayan in the sane manner that this
our Court had ordered in its September 5 resolution the transfer of he very
same case from the Circuit Criminal Court t the Court of First Instance. The
Sandiganbayan is composed of a division of at least three judges which try
aid hear the case and requires the affirmative vote of two judges in a division
for the promulgation of a judgment. The accused is favored, rather than
prejudiced or jeopardized b tie transfer of case from a single-judge court (the
Court of First instance) to a collegiate court (the Sandiganbayan).
The President's order to transfer the case to the Sandiganbayan which
under the Court majority ruling in Aquino vs. Comelec, 62 SCRA 275 (1975)
has the force of the law of the land under Art. XVII, section 3 (2) of the 1973
Constitution, is binding on all government ministries, bureaus and offices,
particularly the Ministry of Justice to which it was specifically issued. It is pro
tanto a withdrawal of the general instruction that only all cases where there
has been no arraignment be so transferred. Its validity has not been
challenged and it must, therefore, be implemented by the said Ministry of
Justice, by having the prosecution so move for its transfer (in the same
manner it has done with previous transfers of cases from the civil courts to
the military tribunals). Needles to say, such implementation and transfer
would make the question of Judge Pineda's inhibition moot and academic.

II. Coming to the order of judge Pineda, assuming that the President's order
to transfer the case to the Sardiganbayan is not implemented, the record
before us shows that there is a strained relationship 3 between Syjuco and
Judge Pineda and more, mutual hostility; mistrust and prejudice, with Syjuco
expressing open mistrust of the judge who offered him for sale a land
suspected of being covered by wrongfully issued titles and the judge openly
charging Syjuco of having hallucinations and trying to bribe him, and
asserting that Syjuco "is full of fear and suspicion in his mind and fears that
'the accused will finally be acquitted in my court . . . Because he could not
corrupt me, that is how he is hallucinating before this Honorable Tribunal."
This makes it imperative for this Court to heed Judge Pineda's request for
guidance in the dispositive part of his order (stating that he is "amenable to
whatever this Honorable Supreme Court may decide on the matter") and
accordingly, to declare that it is in the best interests of justice, in accordance
with our settled doctrines and jurisprudence, that the case below be
transferred and re-raffled among the other branches of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (excluding Judge Pineda's branch and the Circuit Criminal
Court of Rizal) upon due notice to and in the presence of the parties,
including complainant Syjuco, and/or their respective counsels.
We have said time and again that all suitors are 'entitled to nothing short of
the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly free, disinterested and impartial
tribunal (Luque vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 175-177).
In Pimentel vs. Salanga, 21 SCRA 160, we said that 'if after reflection, he
(the judge) should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where
his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be
interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137,' and laid down the following appropriate guidelines for
judges to follow in the matter of their inhibition: 1wph1.t
All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to
draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where
their capacity to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to the
fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties, A judge may not be
legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of
record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or
prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonablycapable
of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful selfexamination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's
faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect
on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the
thought that the judge had unmeritoriouslytilted the scales of justice against
him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated because
of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel is

not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He

should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his
mind to act or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is
involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be
heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be
occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or
not to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve tovoluntarily
desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously
impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to
the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the
law who forestalls miscarriage of justice. (Emphasis supplied).
Now Chief Justice Fernando has stressed that 'It is now beyond dispute
that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of
objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being
fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the
decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found
by a judge who does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on' equal
footing. ln the language of Justice Dizon: 'It has been said, in fact, that due
process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.' ... A judge then, to quote from the latest
decision in point, Geotina vs. Gonzales, penned by Justice Castro, should
strive to be at all times 'wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent.Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial
and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just
decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion
as to its fairness and as to his integrity. (Mateo vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18).
In Ignacio vs. Villaluz, L-37527-52, May 5, 1979, the Chief Justice again
reiterated the principle that "It is now beyond dispute that due process
cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of
a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and just." (lbid, 23.) It
is traceable to Gutierrez vs. Santos (112 Phil 184), a 1961 decision, cited in
the petition. As a matter of fact, in Umale five cases were relied upon in
support of the conclusion reached, starting from Del Castillo vs.
Javelona (116 Phil 451 [1962]), likewise invoked by petitioner and referred to
in the Comment, of the Solicitor General. Such a doctrine has been
consistently adhered to (Cf. Umale vs. Villaluz, L-237l0, Sept. 10, 1969, 29
SCRA 688, and other cases cited), the latest case in point beingBautista vs.
Rebueno (L-46117, Feb. 22,1978, 81 SCRA 535)," remarking that 'it is
difficult to understand the reluctance of respondent judge to inhibit himself.'

Accordingly, I vote to (a) direct the implementation by the Ministry of Justice

of the President's order of January 12, 1979 to transfer the case below to the
Sandiganbayan or to secure a revocation on of the same within fifteen
(15)days from notice hereof and(b)in the event that such revocation is
obtained within the said fifteen-day period to direct that the case below be
transferred and re-raffled among the other branches of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal t (excluding branch XXI presided by Judge Pinedas and the
Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal) upon due notice to and in the presence of the
parties including complaint Syjuro and/or their respective counsels.
Justice Fernandez meno-opinion
This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with preliminary
mandatory injunction instituted by Florita Sardinia Linco and Francisco Ma.
Guerrero, in their personal ad official capacities as Assistant Fiscal of Rizal
province and Senior State Counsel of the Ministry of Justice, respectively, in
representation of the state, seeking the following reliefs:
l. Seting aside ODERS of December 10, 1980 and January 6, 1981
(Annexes "W" and "DD") denying the motion to inhibit respondent Judge and
the motion for the reconsideration thereof and to order the respondent Judge
to inhibit himself from proceeding wit Criminal Case No. 27743; ordering the
transfer of this case from he Court of First Instance of Rizal to the Court of
origin, the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal; ordering the reopening of the case
o accommodate presentation and completion of prosecution's evidence;
2. Setting aside the ORDER of December 9, 1980 (Annex "V") denying
petitioners' motion to withdraw or set aside the proceedings wherein
petitioner GUERRERO was improperly placed at the witness stand and to
order the respondent judge to strike out said proceeding from the records;
3. To set aside the ORDER, January 7, 1981 declaring petitioners in
contempt of count and sentencing them to pa a fine of P100 each; and to
order Atty. EXEQUIEL CONSULTA in contempt of court (Annex "EE");
4. Further praying for such other relief as they may he entitled in law and
equity.
The petitioners contend that Judge Pineda committed the following errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO INHIBIT HIMSELF PROM

TRYING CRIMINAL
RESPONDENTS.

CASE

NO.

27743

AGAINST

THE

PRIVATE

II
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED ERROR OF LAW AND
GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN COMPELLING PETITIONER
GUERRERO TO BE CROSS-EXAMINED IN THE HEARING OF THE
SUBJECT MOTION FOR INHIBITION.
III
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING MOTION TO HOLD
ATTY. EXEQUIEL CONSULTA IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND
DECLARING PETITIONERS IN CONTEMPT OF COURT.
IV
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED ERROR OF LAW AND
GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONERS'
URGENT MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT OF TRIAL ON JANUARY 12,
1981; FOR ORDERING TERMINATED PROSECUTION'S REBUTTAL
EVIDENCE; FOR GIVING PROSECUTION 10 DAYS WITHIN WHICH TO
SUBMIT FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE AND FOR UNCONCIONABLY
DECLARING THE CASE SUBMITTED FOR DECISION THEREAFTER.
l. Respondent Judge did not commit any error of law nor grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to inhibit himself from trying Criminal Case No. 27743,
there being no valid grounds to warrant disqualification. Specific instances
cited by the petitioners to prove that respondent Judge committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction are not only unsupported
by the records but are contrary to what appears therein. The issue of "raffle"
which was not raised in the lower court and, therefore, cannot be an issue in
this Petition, has already been decided by this Court in its resolution of
December 18, 1979 in AM No. 4453- CFI which sustained the Order of
respondent Judge denying the motion of Augusto Syjuco, Jr. to disqualify
said judge on the ground, inter alia,that the raffle was irregular.
2. Respondent Judge did not commit any error nor grave abuse of discretion
in allowing the cross-examination of petitioner Guerrero at the hearing of
subject motion for inhibition. It appears that said motion for disqualification
was set for hearing at the instance of the petitioners (pp. 4-5 of said Motion
for Disqualification); in the hearing of said motion on September 19, 1980,
petitioner Guerrero presented evidence in narrative form and at the next

hearing on October 1, 1980, submitted himself to cross- examination by the

defense counsel without objection through 102 pages of the transcript of
stenographic notes. (Annex "P", pet.). It was only at the next hearing of
October 6, 1980, for the continuation of said cross-examination that he
objected; but there' is nothing in the record that respondent judge threatened
him with contempt. The petitioner Guerrero not only made manifestations as
a prosecutor but actually testified as a witness. (Annex "P", petition). Hence,
his cross-examination by defense counsels for the oppositors was necessary
and proper.
3. Respondent Judge did not err in declaring petitioners in contempt of court
and in denying the motion to hold Atty. Exequiel Consulta in contempt of
court. Two motions for contempt were filed against the petitioners: (a) one
was filed by Atty. Consulta, counsel for accused Bilog for having falsely
represented in court that 'Acting Commissioner of Land Registration
Federico B. Alfonso, Jr. had expressed the belief that the accused Gregorio
Bilog, Jr. is capable of intimidating witnesses. Acting Commissioner Alfonso
both in open court and in his letter dated August 22, 1980 categorically
denied the imputations attributed to him; (b) the other motion was filed by
accused Felino Cortez on the ground that they filed a Motion for
Disqualification dated August 28, 1980, of the respondent judge, alleging
imputations of partiality and bias on the part of the respondent judge, which
the court in the Order dated January 17, 1981 (Annex 'EE', petition) found to
be false. The petitioners filed a motion for contempt against Atty. Consulta
for alleged distortion of the meaning of their allegation in their Manifestation
of August 18, 1980, which does not refer to Gregorio Bilog, Jr. alone but to
the 'accused' and to Bilog's well entrenched friends at the Land Registration
Commission, as capable of intimidating witnesses. (Motion to Hold Atty.
Consulta in Contempt of Court; Annex N petition). Respondent judge
rendered the Order dated January 7, 1981 (Annex "EE", Id.), finding
petitioners guilty of contempt of court, sentencing each of them to pay a fine
of P100.00 with a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with severely. The motion to hold Atty. Consulta in contempt was
denied for lack of merit. Accordingly to respondent judge, it is immaterial
whether the imputation refers to Bilog alone or to all the accused (including
Bilog), the issue being the falsity of the prosecutors' claim that Acting LRC
Commissioner made such imputation.
4. Respondent Judge did not err in denying petitioners' urgent motion for
postponement of trial on January 12, 1981; for ordering terminated
prosecution's rebuttal evidence for giving prosecution 10 days within which
to submit formal offer of evidence and for declaring the case submitted for
decision. On January 12, 1981, at the scheduled hearing, petitioner Linco
again asked for postponement on the ground that the last witness she was
going to present could not be located because lie bad resigned from the

LRC and on the further ground that they intended to appeal certain orders of
the respondent Judge. Counsel for Bilog vigorously objected to the motion
for postponement and asked that since the prosecution had no witness the
rebuttal evidence be deemed terminated and the case submitted for
decision, which was granted, Undoubtedly trial courts have the power to
regulate the conduct of trials and direct their course; and may thus limit the
number of witnesses when in its opinion further testimony on the point would
be merely cumulative.
Finally if, as petitioner Linco manifested in open court, that witness Ernesto
del Rosario who had already testified for the prosecution, was their last
witness (TSN of Jan. 12, 1981 attached as Annex '16', Answer of Bilog), the
Order terminating their rebuttal evidence could not have prejudiced the
prejudiced the prosecution's case, since the defense did not ask for the
striking out of the testimony of that witness for his failure to appear for
additional cross-examination.
Hence, I vote to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
ACCORDINGLY, as first above stated, the Court has ordered and rendered
judgment (1) that the People of the Philippines be deemed impleaded as
petitioner; (2) that respondent judge Order of January 12, 1961 (Annex "FF" of
the petition) the case submitted for decision upon the filing of memoranda be set
aside and that the pending criminal case against private respondents be
reopened for further reception of the People's rebuttal evidence, for which
purpose the People are given a period of thirty (30) days counted from the date
first set for the purpose; and (3) that respondent judge's Order of January 7,
1981 (Annex "EE" of the petition) sentencing petitioners Linco and Guerrero to a
fine of P100.00 each for contempt of court be set aside. For lack of necessary
votes, as first above stated, the petition to set aside respondent judge's Orders of
December 10, 1980 and January 6, 1981 (Annexes "W" and "DD" of the petition)
denying the motion for his inhibition and disqualification is denied.

G.R. No. L-43790 December 9, 1976

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE CITY COURT OF SILAY, ERNESTO DE LA PAZ, PACIFICO SENECIO,
JR. y SEBUSA, ROMEO MILLAN y DELEJERO and WILFREDO JOCHICO y
MAGALONA, respondents.
MUOZ PALMA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review jointly filed by the City Fiscal of Silay City, Marcelino
M. Paviera, and the Law Offices of Hilado, Hagad & Hilado, the latter as private
prosecutors, praying that an order of the City Court of Silay dated December 19,
1975, issued by Judge Reynaldo M. Alon, dismissing Criminal Case No. 7124-C
entitled "People vs. Ernesto de la Paz, et al." be set aside and that respondent
court be directed to continue with the trial of the aforementioned case. *
In compliance with Our Resolution of July 21, J976, the Office of the Solicitor
General filed its comment on October 13, 1974, joining the Petitioner's prayer
that the order of respondent court of December 19, 1975, be reversed and the
case remanded for further proceedings.
The record shows that private respondent herein, Ernesto de la Paz, Pacifico
Senecio, Jr. y Sebusa Romeo Millan y Delejero and Wilfredo Jochico y
Magalona, were charged with "falsification by private individuals and use of
falsified document" under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, alleged
to have been committed as follows.

That sometime on January 4, 1974, at Hawaiian-Philippine

Company, Silay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused Ernesto de la Paz, overseer
of Hda. Malisbog belonging to Deogracias de la Paz, and the
other three accused, scalers of Hawaiian-Philippine Company,
with intent of gain and to cause damage by conniving,
cooperating and mutually helping one another did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously alter or falsify the sugar
cane weight report card or "tarjeta", a private document showing
the weight of sugarcane belonging to Deogracias de la Paz,
particularly those loaded in cane cars Nos. 1686, 1743 and
1022 by increasing the total actual weight of 22.005 tons to
27.160 tons for said three cane cars, thereby causing damage
to the central and other cane planters of about 8.68 piculs of
sugar valued in the total amount of P618.19, to the damage and
prejudice of Hawaiian Central and other sugarcane planters
adhered thereto in the aforestated amount of P618.19.
IN VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 2, ART. 172, R.P.C. (p. 14,
rollo) Evidence was presented by the prosecution showing that:
On January 4, 1974, accused Pacifico Senecio, Jr. Romeo
Millan and Wilfredo Jochico who were then scalers on duty that
day at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars
Nos. 1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar canes belonging to
Deogracias de la Paz. The weight of the sugar canes were
reflected on the weight report cards (H.P. Co. Lab. Form No. 1)
or "tarjetas" showing that for car No. 1743 8.920 tons (Exhibit
"B-1"), for Car No. 1686 8.970 tons (Exhibit "C-1") for car No.
1022 8.875 tons or a total weight of 26.765 tons. However,
they did not submit said "tarjetas" to the laboratory section,
instead, they substituted "tarjetas" showing a heavier weight for
car No. 1743 10.515 tons (Exhibit "B"), car No. 1686
10.525 tons (Exhibit "C") and car No. 1022 10.880 tons
(Exhibit "D") with a total of 27.160 tons or an additional of 5.155
tons. These were the "tarjetas" submitted to the laboratory
section. Exhibits "B-1", "C-1" and "D-1" were taken later by the
prosecution witness PC Sgt. Rogelio Sevilla from the wife of
Pacifico Senecio, Jr. (pp. 15-16, rollo, Order of December 19,
1975).
After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, private
respondents moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the
evidence presented was not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Acting on this motion, respondent court issued its order of December 19,

1975, dismissing the case with costs de oficio principally on the ground that the
acts committed by the accused as narrated above do not constitute the crime of
falsification as charged. Reasoning out his order, Judge Alon said:
To be convicted under paragraph 2, Article 172, an accused
should have committed one of the eight acts of falsification
enumerated under Article 171, R.P.C. Is the act of substituting
the "tarjetas" with higher cane weight for the ones with lower
cane weight fall under one of the acts enumerated. After going
over the acts of falsification one by one and trying to correlate
the act of the accused with each of them, the Court finds that
the said act could not possibly be placed under any of
them. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the inclusion of one is
the exclusion of the other. Following this maxim, we cannot just
include the act of substitution as among those acts enumerated
under Article 171. And, under the rule of statutory construction,
penal laws should be liberally construed in favor of the accused.
This Court, therefore, is of the opinion that the accused have
not committed the act of falsification with which they are
charmed. Obviously, it follows that there could be no use of
falsified document since there is no falsified document.
The imputed acts of the accused in making the substitution, if
true, is repugnant to the human sense of right and wrong. But,
however reprehensible the act may be, it is not punishable
unless there is a showing that there is a law which defines and
penalizes it as a crime. Unless there be a particular provision in
the Penal Code or Special Law that punishes the act, even if it
be socially or morally wrong, no criminal liability is incurred by
its commission. (U.S. vs. Taylor, 28 Phil. 599)
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore, the motion is hereby granted and the case
dismissed with costs de oficio ... (pp. 17-18, rollo)
In their comment on this Petition, private respondents claim that there was no
error committed by respondent court in dismissing the case against them for
insufficiency of evidence and that for this Court to grant the present petition
would place said respondents in double jeopardy.
On the other hand, the People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not
tenable inasmuch as the case was dismissed upon motion of the accused, and
the dismissal having been made with their consent, they waived their defense of

double jeopardy, citing various cases in support thereof. (pp. 58-59, rollo,
Comment of the Solicitor General)
We disagree with the position taken by the Acting Solicitor General Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr. that the plea of double jeopardy is not available in the instant
situation.
It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion of the
accused; however, this was amotion filed after the prosecution had rested its
case, calling for an appreciation of the evidence adduced and its sufficiency to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case
on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.
Thus, in People vs. Acosta, L-23657, October 29, 1968, this Court dismissed an
appeal taken by the Peopleagainst an order of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte dismissing a criminal case upon motion of the accused after the
presentation of evidence by the prosecution as such appeal if allowed would
place the accused in double jeopardy. There the accused was charged
with estafa by obtaining from Pedro Miguel a ring valued at P16,500.00 and
issuing a check for $5,000.00 in Payment thereof which turned out later to be
counterfeit to the damage and prejudice of said Pedro Miguel in the
aforementioned amount of P16,500.00. After the presentation of the evidence of
the prosecution, the accused moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
evidence showed that the ring belonged to somebody else, Banang Jaramillo,
and not to Pedro Miguel as alleged in the information and that the element of
damage was absent. This motion was opposed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal
but notwithstanding said opposition, the trial court dismissed the case on the
ground that Pedro Miguel was a mere agent of the true owner of the ring and
therefore not the real offended party. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal appealed to
this Court, but the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the
ground that it would place the accused in double jeopardy, and the Court agreed
with the Solicitor General, stating that it cannot be seriously questioned that the
trial court had grievously erred in his conclusion and application of the law, and in
dismissing outright the case; however, the error cannot now be remedied by an
appeal because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. (per Eugenio
Angeles, J., 25 SCRA 823,826)
In the earlier case of Catilo vs. Hon. Abaya, May 14, 1954, petitioner Catilo was
charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Batangas presided by
respondent Judge. Petitioner was arraigned and after the prosecution had rested
its case petitioner moved for the dismissal of the charge for insufficiency of
evidence. This motion was granted by the Judge and his order was promulgated
in open court to the accused. Later in the day, Judge Abaya set aside his order of
dismissal motu proprio and scheduled the case for continuation of the trial on
specific dates. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the defense counsel but

because respondent Judge failed to take action, the accused filed an original
action for certiorari with this Court. In granting relief to petitioner Catilo, the Court,
through Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor, held:
From whatever angle we may view the order of dismissal Annex
"A", the only conclusion possible is that it amounted to an
acquittal. Whether said acquittal was due to some
"misrepresentation of facts" as stated in the order of
reconsideration, which alleged misrepresentation is vigorously
denied by the defendant-petitioner, or to a misapprehension of
the law or of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the fact
is that it was a valid order or judgment of acquittal, and
thereafter the respondent Judge himself advised the accused in
open court that he was a free man and could not again be
prosecuted for the same offense.

The cases cited by the Acting Solicitor General are not applicable to the situation
now before Us because the facts are different. In Co Te Hue vs. Judge
Encarnacion , 94 Phil. 258, the case was dismissed provisionally with the
express consent of the accused. The same occurred in People vs. Togle, 105
Phil. 126 there was a provisional dismissal upon express request of the counsel
for the accused, In Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299, it was the accused who
asked for the dismissal of the case because the private prosecutor was not in
court to present the prosecution's evidence and the Municipal Court of the City of
Iloilo dismissed the case without prejudice to the refiling of the charge against the
accused. 1 In People vs. Romero, 89 Phil. 672, the dismissal was made at the
instance of the accused because the prosecution was also not ready with its
evidence. The case of People vs. Belosillo, 9 SCRA 836, is not applicable either,
because the order of dismissal of the Information was made before arraignment,
hence, the accused was not yet placed in jeopardy of punishment for the offense
charged.

The inherent powers of a court to modify its order or decision,

under section 5, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court claimed for the
respondent to set aside his order of dismissal, does not extend
to an order of dismissal which amounts to a judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case; and the power of a court to modify a
judgment or set it aside before it has become final or an appeal
has been perfected, under section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court, refers to a judgment of conviction and does not and
cannot include a judgment of acquittal.

In the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the charge
against them was one on the merits of the case which is to be distinguished from
other dismissals at the instance of the accused. All the elements of double
jeopardy are here present, to wit: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged, (2) a court of competent
jurisdiction, and (3) an unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the
prosecution had rested its case, amounting to the acquittal of the accused. The
dismissal being one on the merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea
of double jeopardy cannot be invoked.

In conclusion, we hold that to continue the criminal case against

the petitioner after he had already been acquitted would be
putting him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. ... (94 Phil. 1017)

It is clear to Us that the dismissal of the criminal case against the private
respondents was erroneous.
As correctly stated in the Comment of the Acting Solicitor General, the accused
were not charged with substitution of genuine "tarjetas" with false ones. The
basis for the accusation was that the accused entered false statements as to the
weight of the sugar cane loaded in certain cane cars in "tarjetas" which were
submitted to the laboratory section of the company. The act of making a false
entry in the "tarjetas" is undoubtedly an act of falsification of a private document,
the accused having made untruthful statements in a narration of facts which they
were under obligation to accomplish as part of their duties- Ernesto de la Paz, as
overseer of Hda. Malisbog, and the other accused as scalers of the offended
party, the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, thereby causing damage to the latter.
However erroneous the order of respondent Court is, and although a miscarriage
of justice resulted from said order, to paraphrase Justice Alex Reyes in People
vs. Nieto, 103 Phil, 1133, such error cannot now be righted because of the timely
plea of double jeopardy.

In Nieto, the background of the case is as follows: On September 21, 1956, an

Information for homicide was filed with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
against Gloria Nieto who, upon arraignment pleaded guilty to the charge but
-notwithstanding that plea, the trial judge acquitted her on the Page 254 ground
that although the accused was a minor "over 9 and under 15 years old" the
Information failed to allege that she acted with discernment. Thereafter the
prosecution filed another Information for the same offense stating therein that the
accused Gloria Nieto was "a child between 9 and 15 years" and alleging in
express terms that she acted with discernment. The defense filed a motion to
quash this second Information on grounds of double jeopardy, and the trial court
already presided by another Judge, Hon. Felix V. Makasiar, now Justice of this
Court, granted the motion. The prosecution appealed to this Court from said
order. In its Decision, the Court dismissed the appeal and sustained the order of
then Judge Makasiar, deploring that as a result of a mistaken view taken by the
trial judge who acquitted the accused Gloria Nieto despite her plea of guilty there
was a miscarriage of justice which cannot be righted and which leaves the Court
no choice bat to affirm the dismissal of the second Information for reasons of
double jeopardy. 2
We cannot but express Our strong disapproval of the precipitate action taken by
Judge Alon in dismissing the criminal case against the private respondents at
that stage of the trial. A thorough and searching study of the law, the allegations
in the Information, and the evidence adduced plus a more circumspect and
reflective exercise of judgment, would have prevented a failure of justice in the
instant case. We exhort Judge Alon to take into serious consideration what We
have stated so as to avoid another miscarriage of justice.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We are constrained to DISMISS this Petition of
the People. Without pronouncement as to costs. Let copy of this Decision be
entered in the personal file of Judge Reynaldo Alon.
So Ordered.

G.R. No. L-19190

November 29, 1922

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE
vs.
VENANCIO CONCEPCION, defendant-appellant.
Recaredo
Ma.
Calvo
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

for

appellant.

MALCOLM, J.:
By telegrams and a letter of confirmation to the manager of the Aparri branch of
the Philippine National Bank, Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine
National Bank, between April 10, 1919, and May 7, 1919, authorized an
extension of credit in favor of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." in the amount of
P300,000. This special authorization was essential in view of the memorandum
order of President Concepcion dated May 17, 1918, limiting the discretional
power of the local manager at Aparri, Cagayan, to grant loans and discount
negotiable documents to P5,000, which, in certain cases, could be increased to
P10,000. Pursuant to this authorization, credit aggregating P300,000, was
granted the firm of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C.," the only security required
consisting of six demand notes. The notes, together with the interest, were taken
up and paid by July 17, 1919.
"Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was a copartnership capitalized at P100,000.
Anacleto Concepcion contributed P5,000; Clara Vda. de Concepcion, P5,000;
Miguel S. Concepcion, P20,000; Clemente Puno, P20,000; and Rosario San
Agustin, "casada con Gral. Venancio Concepcion," P50,000. Member Miguel S.
Concepcion was the administrator of the company.
On the facts recounted, Venancio Concepcion, as President of the Philippine
National Bank and as member of the board of directors of this bank, was charged
in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan with a violation of section 35 of Act No.
2747. He was found guilty by the Honorable Enrique V. Filamor, Judge of First
Instance, and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and six months, to
pay a fine of P3,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the
costs.
Section 35 of Act No. 2747, effective on February 20, 1918, just mentioned, to
which reference must hereafter repeatedly be made, reads as follows: "The
National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members
of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks." Section

49 of the same Act provides: "Any person who shall violate any of the provisions
of this Act shall be punished by a fine not to exceed ten thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment not to exceed five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
These two sections were in effect in 1919 when the alleged unlawful acts took
place, but were repealed by Act No. 2938, approved on January 30, 1921.
Counsel for the defense assign ten errors as having been committed by the trial
court. These errors they have argued adroitly and exhaustively in their printed
brief, and again in oral argument. Attorney-General Villa-Real, in an exceptionally
accurate and comprehensive brief, answers the proposition of appellant one by
one.
The question presented are reduced to their simplest elements in the opinion
which follows:
I. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine
National Bank, a "loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747?
Counsel argue that the documents of record do not prove that authority to make
a loan was given, but only show the concession of a credit. In this statement of
fact, counsel is correct, for the exhibits in question speak of a "credito" (credit)
and not of a " prestamo" (loan).
The "credit" of an individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the
confidence or trust reposed by a lender that he will pay what he may promise.
(Donnell vs. Jones [1848], 13 Ala., 490; Bouvier's Law Dictionary.) A "loan"
means the delivery by one party and the receipt by the other party of a given sum
of money, upon an agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum loaned, with
or without interest. (Payne vs. Gardiner [1864], 29 N. Y., 146, 167.) The
concession of a "credit" necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up to the limit
of the amount fixed in the "credit,"
II. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C.," by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine
National Bank, a "loan" or a "discount"?
Counsel argue that while section 35 of Act No. 2747 prohibits the granting of a
"loan," it does not prohibit what is commonly known as a "discount."
In a letter dated August 7, 1916, H. Parker Willis, then President of the National
Bank, inquired of the Insular Auditor whether section 37 of Act No. 2612 was
intended to apply to discounts as well as to loans. The ruling of the Acting Insular
Auditor, dated August 11, 1916, was to the effect that said section referred to

loans alone, and placed no restriction upon discount transactions. It becomes

material, therefore, to discover the distinction between a "loan" and a "discount,"
and to ascertain if the instant transaction comes under the first or the latter
denomination.

Various provisions of the Civil serve to establish the familiar relationship called a
conjugal partnership. (Articles 1315, 1393, 1401, 1407, 1408, and 1412 can be
specially noted.) A loan, therefore, to a partnership of which the wife of a director
of a bank is a member, is an indirect loan to such director.

Discounts are favored by bankers because of their liquid nature, growing, as they
do, out of an actual, live, transaction. But in its last analysis, to discount a paper
is only a mode of loaning money, with, however, these distinctions: (1) In a
discount, interest is deducted in advance, while in a loan, interest is taken at the
expiration of a credit; (2) a discount is always on double-name paper; a loan is
generally on single-name paper.

That it was the intention of the Legislature to prohibit exactly such an occurrence
is shown by the acknowledged fact that in this instance the defendant was
tempted to mingle his personal and family affairs with his official duties, and to
permit the loan P300,000 to a partnership of no established reputation and
without asking for collateral security.

Conceding, without deciding, that, as ruled by the Insular Auditor, the law covers
loans and not discounts, yet the conclusion is inevitable that the demand notes
signed by the firm "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." were not discount paper but
were mere evidences of indebtedness, because (1) interest was not deducted
from the face of the notes, but was paid when the notes fell due; and (2) they
were single-name and not double-name paper.
The facts of the instant case having relation to this phase of the argument are not
essentially different from the facts in the Binalbagan Estate case. Just as there it
was declared that the operations constituted a loan and not a discount, so should
we here lay down the same ruling.
III. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership, "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine
National Bank, an "indirect loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No.
2747?
Counsel argue that a loan to the partnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was
not an "indirect loan." In this connection, it should be recalled that the wife of the
defendant held one-half of the capital of this partnership.
In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain
and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of
the Legislature is plainly to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a director
of the bank. The prohibition against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar
maxim that no man may serve two masters that where personal interest
clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost always suffers. If, therefore, it is
shown that the husband is financially interested in the success or failure of his
wife's business venture, a loan to partnership of which the wife of a director is a
member, falls within the prohibition.

In the case of Lester and Wife vs. Howard Bank ([1870], 33 Md., 558; 3 Am.
Rep., 211), the Supreme Court of Maryland said:
What then was the purpose of the law when it declared that no director
or officer should borrow of the bank, and "if any director," etc., "shall be
convicted," etc., "of directly or indirectly violating this section he shall be
punished by fine and imprisonment?" We say to protect the
stockholders, depositors and creditors of the bank, against the
temptation to which the directors and officers might be exposed, and the
power which as such they must necessarily possess in the control and
management of the bank, and the legislature unwilling to rely upon the
implied understanding that in assuming this relation they would not
acquire any interest hostile or adverse to the most exact and faithful
discharge of duty, declared in express terms that they should not borrow,
etc., of the bank.
In the case of People vs. Knapp ([1912], 206 N. Y., 373), relied upon in the
Binalbagan Estate decision, it was said:
We are of opinion the statute forbade the loan to his copartnership firm
as well as to himself directly. The loan was made indirectly to him
through his firm.
IV. Could Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, be
convicted of a violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747 in relation with section 49 of
the same Act, when these portions of Act No. 2747 were repealed by Act No.
2938, prior to the finding of the information and the rendition of the judgment?
As noted along toward the beginning of this opinion, section 49 of Act No. 2747,
in relation to section 35 of the same Act, provides a punishment for any person
who shall violate any of the provisions of the Act. It is contended, however, by the
appellant, that the repeal of these sections of Act No. 2747 by Act No. 2938 has
served to take away the basis for criminal prosecution.

This same question has been previously submitted and has received an answer
adverse to such contention in the cases of United Stated vs. Cuna ([1908], 12
Phil., 241); People vs. Concepcion ([1922], 43 Phil., 653); and Ong Chang Wing
and Kwong Fok vs. United States ([1910], 218 U. S., 272; 40 Phil., 1046). In
other words, it has been the holding, and it must again be the holding, that where
an Act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense, such repeals a former Act
which penalized the same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of
thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentenced
offenders charged with violations of the old law.
V. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine
National Bank, in violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747, penalized by this law?
Counsel argue that since the prohibition contained in section 35 of Act No. 2747
is on the bank, and since section 49 of said Act provides a punishment not on the
bank when it violates any provisions of the law, but on a personviolating any
provisions of the same, and imposing imprisonment as a part of the penalty, the
prohibition contained in said section 35 is without penal sanction.lawph!l.net
The answer is that when the corporation itself is forbidden to do an act, the
prohibition extends to the board of directors, and to each director separately and
individually. (People vs. Concepcion, supra.)
VI. Does the alleged good faith of Venancio Concepcion, President of the
Philippine National Bank, in extending the credit of P300,000 to the copartnership
"Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." constitute a legal defense?
Counsel argue that if defendant committed the acts of which he was convicted, it
was because he was misled by rulings coming from the Insular Auditor. It is
furthermore stated that since the loans made to the copartnership "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C." have been paid, no loss has been suffered by the
Philippine National Bank.
Neither argument, even if conceded to be true, is conclusive. Under the statute
which the defendant has violated, criminal intent is not necessarily material. The
doing of the inhibited act, inhibited on account of public policy and public interest,
constitutes the crime. And, in this instance, as previously demonstrated, the acts
of the President of the Philippine National Bank do not fall within the purview of
the rulings of the Insular Auditor, even conceding that such rulings have
controlling effect.
Morse, in his work, Banks and Banking, section 125, says:

It is fraud for directors to secure by means of their trust, and advantage

not common to the other stockholders. The law will not allow private
profit from a trust, and will not listen to any proof of honest intent.
JUDGMENT
On a review of the evidence of record, with reference to the decision of the trial
court, and the errors assigned by the appellant, and with reference to previous
decisions of this court on the same subject, we are irresistibly led to the
conclusion that no reversible error was committed in the trial of this case, and
that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the
crime charged in the information. The penalty imposed by the trial judge falls
within the limits of the punitive provisions of the law.
Judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.

G.R. No. 196685

December 14, 2011

GOODLAND
COMPANY,
vs.
ABRAHAM CO and CHRISTINE CHAN, Respondents.

INC., Petitioner,

CARPIO, J.:
The Facts
Petitioner-appellant Goodland Company, Inc. ("Goodland"), a corporation duly
organized and existing in accordance with Philippine laws, is the registered
owner "Makati property".
Goodland and Smartnet Philippines, Inc. ("Smartnet"), likewise a duly organized
and registered corporation, are part of the Guy Group of Companies, owned and
controlled by the family of Mr. Gilbert Guy.
Sometime in 2000, Goodland allowed the use of its Makati property, by way of
accommodation, as security to the loan facility of Smartnet with Asia United Bank
(AUB). Mr. Guy, Goodlands Vice President, was allegedly made to sign a Real
Estate Mortgage (REM) document in blank. Upon signing the REM, Mr. Guy
delivered the same to AUB together with the original owners copy of the TCT
covering the the Makati property.
Mr. Rafael Galvez, the Executive Officer of Goodland, who had custody of the
title to the Makati property, handed over the original of the said title to Mr. Guy,
after being reassured that it would be turned over to AUB along with a blank
REM, and that it would serve as mere comfort document and could be filled up
only if and when AUB gets the conformity of both Smartnet and Goodland.
About two (2) years thereafter, Goodland found out that the REM signed in blank
by Mr. Guy has been allegedly filled up or completed and annotated at the back
of the title of the Makati property. Goodland thus wrote a letter to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) requesting for an investigation of the fraud
committed by private respondents. The NBI, thru a Letter-Report dated February
10, 2003, recommended the filing of criminal charges of falsification against
private respondents Abraham Co and Christine Chan, and Atty. Joel Pelicano,
the notary public who notarized the questioned REM.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, the Makati Prosecutors Office filed
an Information for Falsification of Public Document defined and penalized under
Article 172 in relation to Article 171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code against private
respondents Co and Chan and Atty. Pelicano. The Information states:

That on or about the 29th day of February 2000, in the City of Makati, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
Abraham Co and Christine Chan who are private individuals and Joel T. Pelicano,
a Notary Public, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and
aiding with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify Real Estate Mortgage, a public document, causing it to appear, as it did
appear, that Mr. Gilbert Guy, Vice President of Goodland Company, Inc.,
participated in the preparation and execution of said Real Estate Mortgage
whereby complainant corporation mortgaged to Asia United Bank a real property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11645 and by then and there causing
aforesaid Real Estate Mortgage to be notarized by accused Atty. Joel Pelicano,
who in fact notarized said document on August 3, 2000 under Document No.
217, Page No. 44, Book No. XVII, Series of 2000 of his Notarial Register, thus
making it appear, that Gilbert Guy has acknowledged the said Real Estate
[Mortgage] before him, when in truth and in fact Gilbert Guy did not appear nor
acknowledge said document before Notary Public Joel T. Pelicano and thereafter
herein accused caused the aforesaid Real Estate [Mortgage] document to be
registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of Makati City on March 8,
2001."
The case was raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 332313. The prosecution presented the
testimonies of (1) Rafael Galvez, Executive Officer of Goodland, (2) Leo Alberto
Pulido, Systems Manager of Smartnet, (3) NBI Special Agent James Calleja, (4)
Atty. Joel Pelicano, and (5) Atty. Alvin Agustin Tan Ignacio, Corporate Secretary
of Goodland.
After the prosecution formally offered its evidence and rested its case, herein
private respondents filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to
Evidence with attached Demurrer to Evidence claiming that the prosecution failed
to substantiate its claim that they are guilty of the crime charged. Private
respondents alleged that the prosecution failed to establish the second and third
elements of the crime as the prosecution was unable to provide any proof that
private respondents caused it to appear in a document that Mr. Gilbert Guy
participated in an act and that the prosecution failed to establish that Mr. Gilbert
Guy did not participate in said act. Thus, private respondents alleged that the
prosecutions evidence itself showed that Mr. Gilbert Guy signed the REM,
delivered the original transfer certificates of title to AUB and that Mr. Guy was
duly authorized by Goodlands Board of Directors to execute the REM. They
likewise claimed that the prosecution failed to prove that the REM was submitted
as a comfort document as the testimonies of the witnesses (referring to Galvez,
Pulido, Calleja, Pelicano and Ignacio) proving this matter were hearsay and
lacked probative value. Also, the prosecution failed to present direct evidence
showing the involvement of private respondents in the alleged falsification of
document.

The prosecution opposed the Demurrer to Evidence contending that it was able
to prove [that] Mr. Guy did not participate in the execution of the REM because
Goodland did not consent to the use of its Makati property to secure a loan and it
has no outstanding credit for any peso loan. The loan of Smartnet was not
secured by any collateral. The REM shows signs of falsification: Mr. Guy signed
the REM in blank in the presence of Atty. Ignacio and before the adoption of the
board resolution authorizing the use of the subject property to secure Smartnets
credit; the REM filed in Pasig City is different from the one filed in the Makati
Register of Deeds; and the CTCs appearing in the REM (particularly of Mr.
Gilbert Guy) were issued in 2001 when the REM was executed on 2000. Atty.
Pelicano also denies having affixed his signature in the notarization. 7

amounted to falsification in the execution of the questioned Real Estate

Mortgage.

The Metropolitan Trial Courts Ruling

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Demurrer to Evidence of the accused

is hereby granted. The case is dismissed for failure of the prosecution to present
sufficient and competent evidence to rebut the presumption of innocence of the
accused.

MeTC granted the Demurrer to Evidence of respondents. The MeTC enumerated

the elements for the crime of Falsification of Public Document by making it
appear that a party participated in an act or proceeding when he/she did not:
1. That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee
who did not take advantage of his official position;
2. That the offender caused it to appear that a person or persons have
participated in any act or proceeding;
3. That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the act or
proceeding;
4. The falsification was committed in a public or official document. 9
The MeTC found that although Goodland established the first and fourth
elements, it failed to prove the second and third elements of the crime. Goodland
was unable to present competent evidence that the Real Estate Mortgage was
indeed falsified. Hence, Goodland erred in relying on the presumption that the
person in possession of the falsified document is deemed the falsifier. Assuming
that the Real Estate Mortgage is indeed falsified, Goodland presented no
competent evidence to show that the Real Estate Mortgage was transmitted to
any of the respondents. Guys affidavit stated that he delivered the Real Estate
Mortgage to Chan; however, the affidavit is merely hearsay as Guy never
testified, and the affidavit referred to properties in Laguna which are not the
subject of the present case.
The MeTC declared that the record shows that other than the fact that Co and
Chan are President and Vice President of Asia United Bank, no other evidence
was presented by Goodland to show that Co and Chan performed acts which

The MeTC found insufficient the testimonies of Mr. Pulido, Mr. Galvez, NBI Agent
Calleja and Atty. Ignacio to prove that Guy merely signed the Real Estate
Mortgage as a comfort document. None of the witnesses have any personal
knowledge of the circumstances of the discussions between Guy and Asia United
Bank. Guys non-presentation as a witness raised the disputable presumption
that his testimony would have been adverse to Goodland.
The dispositive portion of the MeTCs Order states thus:

SO ORDERED.10
Goodland moved to reconsider the MeTCs 16 October 2008 Order. Goodland
stated that the MeTC made an error in concluding that Guy participated in the
execution of the Real Estate Mortgage, as well as in disregarding evidence of the
spuriousness of the Real Estate Mortgage.
The MeTC issued another Order 11 on 13 January 2009, and resolved the Motion
for Inhibition and the Motion for Reconsideration of the 16 October 2008 Order.
The MeTC denied the Motion for Inhibition because Goodland failed to show
evidence to prove bias or partiality on the part of Judge Ronald B. Moreno. The
MeTC likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the following grounds:
first, the dismissal of a criminal case due to a granted demurrer to evidence
amounts to an acquittal of the accused; second, no motion for reconsideration is
allowed to a granted demurrer to evidence; and third, the arguments raised by
Goodland in its Motion for Reconsideration have been thoroughly passed upon
by the MeTC in its 16 October 2008 Order.
Goodland filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure assailing
the MeTCs decision.
Co and Chan opposed13 the Petition and stated that it is highly improper for the
RTC to re-examine the evidence on record and substitute its findings of fact to
those of the MeTC. They stated that there is no basis for the filing of the Petition.
The Regional Trial Courts Ruling

On 2 September 2009, the RTC issued a Resolution 14 denying the Petition. The
RTC found that Judge Moreno did not gravely abuse his discretion. Errors raised
by Goodland can be categorized as errors in judgment which cannot be
corrected by a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The issues involved affect
the wisdom of a decision; hence, they are beyond the province of a special civil
action for certiorari.
Goodland filed an appeal before the CA and assigned one error to the RTCs
resolution: The RTC gravely erred in ruling that the grounds for appellants
petition for certiorari assailing Judge Ronald B. Morenos Order dismissing
Criminal Case No. 332313 in blind disregard of material prosecution evidence
pertained to mere errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction correctible by
certiorari.15 Co and Chan claimed that Goodland can no longer file an appeal of
RTCs 2 September 2009 Resolution as the appeal violates their right against
double jeopardy. Moreover, the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited solely
to the correction of defects of jurisdiction and does not include the review of facts
and evidence.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
CA affirmed the RTCs resolution, declaring that the Goodlands appeal is bereft
of merit.
There being no grave abuse of discretion committed, the decision of the MeTC
granting the demurrer to evidence may not be disturbed. There is nothing
whimsical or capricious in the exercise of public respondents judgment and the
granting of the demurrer was not done in an arbitrary and despotic manner,
impelled by passion or personal hostility. Assuming that there are errors
committed by the public respondent, this may only be error of judgment
committed in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction. However, this is not the
same as "grave abuse of discretion." For as long as the court acted within its
jurisdiction, an error of judgment that it may commit in the exercise thereof is not
correctible through the special civil action of certiorari.16
The Issue
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 332313 against respondents on demurrer to
evidence in complete disregard of material prosecution evidence which clearly
establishes respondents criminal liability for falsification of public documents. 17
HELD:

No. Goodland is aware that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review under Rule 45. However, Goodland insists that the present petition is
meritorious and that it may raise questions of fact and law because there is grave
abuse of discretion and the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Insisting that the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion, the prayers in the
Petitions in both the RTC and CA asked for the reversal of the respondents
acquittal.
An order granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case
on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution
of the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy.18
It is settled that a judgment of acquittal cannot be recalled or withdrawn by
another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case, nor can it be
modified except to eliminate something which is civil or administrative in
nature. One exception to the rule is when the prosecution is denied due process
of law.21 Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accuseds demurrer to
evidence. If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting Goodlands prayer
is not tantamount to putting Co and Chan in double jeopardy.
However, the present case is replete with evidence to prove that the CA was
correct in denying Goodlands certiorari on appeal. We emphasize that the
Orders of the MeTC were affirmed by the RTC, and affirmed yet again by the CA.
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the CAs affirmation of the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 332313.
We have explained "grave abuse of discretion" to mean thus: An act of a court or
tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when
the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
personal hostility.23
The CA made its decision after its careful examination of the records of the case.
The CA found that Guy signed the subject Real Estate Mortgage and was
authorized by the Board of Directors to do so, and none of Goodlands witnesses
have personal knowledge of the circumstances of the discussions between Guy
and Asia United Bank. Goodland, however, failed to prove that (1) the subject

Real Estate Mortgage was in blank at the time it was submitted to Asia United
Bank; (2) respondents filled-in the blanks in the Real Estate Mortgage; and (3)
Guy did not appear before the notary public. It was with reason, therefore, that
the CA declared that the evidence for Goodland failed miserably in meeting the
quantum of proof required in criminal cases to overturn the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Grave abuse of discretion may not be attributed to a
court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of evidence.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112769.

SO ORDERED.