Cogn Ther Res (2012) 36:219227

DOI 10.1007/s10608-010-9334-y

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Negative Cognitive Style and Past History of Major Depressive

Episodes in University Students
John R. Z. Abela Darren Stolow Man Zhang
Chad M. McWhinnie

Published online: 10 October 2010

Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Abstract The current study examined whether questionnaire- and interview-based assessments of negative cognitive style (Abramson et al. in Psychol Rev 96:358372,
1989) were each associated with a past history of major
depressive episodes (MDE) in currently non-disordered
university students. In addition, we examined whether negative cognitive style as assessed by either questionnaire or
interview was associated with a past history of MDE above
and beyond the association between negative core beliefs
(Beck in Depression: clinical, experimental, and theoretical
aspects. Harper & Row, New York, 1967; Treatment of
depression: old controversies and new approaches. Raven
Press, New York, 1983; Young in Cognitive therapy for
personality disorders: A schema-focused approach, 3rd edn.
Professional Resource Exchange, Sarasota, 1990; Young
et al. in Schema therapy: a practitioners guide. Guilford
Press, New York, 2003) and such a history. Sixty university
students completed self-report measures assessing current
depressive symptoms and negative cognitive style as well as
semi-structured clinical interviews assessing current and
past history of MDEs, negative cognitive style, and negative
core beliefs. In line with hypotheses, negative cognitive style
as assessed by both questionnaire and interview were each
significantly associated with a past history of MDE after
controlling for current depressive symptoms. At the same
time, of the two approaches to assessing negative cognitive

J. R. Z. Abela
D. Stolow (&)

Department of Psychology, Rutgers University, Tillett Hall,
Livingston Campus, 53 Avenue E, Piscataway,
NJ 08854-8040, USA
e-mail: dstolow@eden.rutgers.edu
M. Zhang
C. M. McWhinnie
McGill University, Montreal, Canada

style, only the interview-based approach exhibited a unique

effect. Negative cognitive style as assessed by interview, but
not by questionnaire, remained significantly associated with
past depression after controlling for the association between
negative core beliefs and such a history.
Keywords Depression
Hopelessness theory

Negative cognitive style
Retrospective design

Introduction
The hopelessness theory (HT) posits that a negative cognitive style confers vulnerability to the development of
depression (Abramson et al. 1989). A negative cognitive
style is operationalized as the tendencies: (1) to attribute
negative events to stable and global causes; (2) to catastrophize the consequences of negative events; and (3) to
view the self as flawed and/or deficient following negative
events. According to the theory, individuals who possess a
negative cognitive style are more likely than other individuals to make depressogenic inferences following negative events. Such inferences, in turn, increase the likelihood
that hopelessness develops. Once hopelessness develops,
depression is posited to be inevitable given that the theory
views hopelessness as a sufficient cause of depression.
The majority of research examining the HT has used
short-term, diathesis-stress designs to examine whether a
negative cognitive style interacts with the occurrence of
negative events to predict increases in depressive symptoms. The majority of such studies have obtained partial
(Abela and Seligman 2000; Abela 2002; Metalksy et al.
1993) to full support (Metalsky et al. 1987; Metalsky and
Joiner 1992; Alloy et al. 1997) for this hypothesis.
Researchers have also tested the HT by utilizing

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retrospective designs in which it is hypothesized that

cognitively vulnerable individuals are more likely than
other individuals to exhibit a past history of clinically
significant depressive episodes. In support of this hypothesis, Alloy et al. (1992) reported that attributionally vulnerable university students were more likely than other
students to have experienced a past MDE.
The majority of studies testing the HT (Abramson et al.
1989) assess negative cognitive style using questionnaires
in which respondents are asked to generate (or endorse)
inferences and attributions made in response to a series of
hypothetical negative events. Respondents are asked to
vividly imagine that each event happened to them and then
write down (or select) what they believe to be the cause of
each event, as well as generate (or endorse) inferences
about each events consequences and self-implications.
The assumption in using hypothetical negative events to
assess negative cognitive style is that inferences made
about hypothetical events are representative of inferences
made about naturally occurring stressors. Furthermore, it is
assumed that because the hypothetical events presented in
the questionnaire provide no contextual information,
respondents must rely on their personal interpretations of
the events when generating their inferences. This personalization of the hypothetical events, in turn, should
increase the likelihood that the inferences generated are
representative of those that the respondent would generate
in response to the occurrence of actual stressors in their
lives. Only a limited number of studies, however,
have explicitly examined this assumption by looking at
the association between a negative attributional style as
assessed by questionnaire and the causal attributions generated by individuals following the experience of lived
stressors (e.g., Metalsky et al. 1987; Follette and Jacobson
1987). Metalsky et al. (1987) compared students attributional style as assessed by questionnaire with the causal
attributions they made for their performance on a midterm
examination. Results indicated a significant correlation
between attributional style as assessed by questionnaire
and causal attributions made following a negative exam
outcome. Similarly, Follette and Jacobson (1987) assessed
causal attributions using a questionnaire and the attributions made by students about the outcome of an exam.
Results indicated that the two attributional measures were
significantly correlated suggesting that attributional style as
measured by the questionnaire reflected the types of attributions made by students for negative exam outcomes.
Thus, the few studies that have compared individuals
attributional style as assessed by questionnaire with attributions generated in response to lived stressors suggest that
the two correspond.
An alternative approach to the assessment of negative
cognitive style is the Content Analysis of Verbatim

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Cogn Ther Res (2012) 36:219227

Explanations (CAVE; Peterson et al. 1992) method. In the

initial step of the CAVE method, self-generated passages
are obtained from individuals either through open-ended
probing (Peterson et al. 1985) or through spoken or written
samples (Satterfield 1998). An assumption of the CAVE
method is that individuals spontaneously discuss the events
in their lives in terms of valence (negative and positive).
Furthermore, it is assumed that individuals spontaneously
attribute causes to significant events in their lives, as well
as discuss the implications of these events in terms of their
consequences and implications on the self. Ideally, such
passages also provide statements about multiple events
from various domains so that negative cognitive style may
be assessed across a broad range of situations. The next
step in the procedure involves trained extractors culling
event-inference units from the transcribed passages
(Peterson et al. 1992). Each event described, coupled with
an inference about its cause, consequences, or implications
on the self, constitutes an event-inference unit. Events may
be real or hypothetical, derived from the participants past,
present, or future. However, only those events which are
perceived by extractors as having clear and direct implications for the individual her/himself are used. Eventinference units are then rated on a 7-point scale with higher
scores for each type of inference reflecting more negative
inferences. Inter-rater reliability coefficients for previous
studies using the CAVE method to assess attributional style
show good reliability for composite scores with an alpha
value of .80 (Shulman et al. 1989), as well as acceptable
reliability for each measured dimension with alphas of .93,
.63, and .73 for internality, stability and globality, respectively (Shulman et al. 1989). The CAVE technique has also
demonstrated validity in its ability to predict depressed
mood and depressive symptoms. For example, Peterson
et al. (1985) found that CAVE-derived negative attributions of college students correlated significantly with their
level of depressive symptoms. One advantage of the CAVE
method over questionnaire-based methods of assessing
negative cognitive style is that CAVE-ing makes it possible
to conduct research in situations where filling out questionnaires is impossible or impractical. In addition, the
CAVE method enables retrospective or historical research
on time periods when questionnaires assessing negative
cognitive style did not exist (e.g., Peterson et al. 1988).
The current study utilized a retrospective design in order
to examine whether a negative cognitive style as assessed
by questionnaire and/or the CAVE method were each
associated with a past history of MDEs. The logic of this
retrospective design is based on two assumptions. First,
individuals who exhibit a negative cognitive style at present presumably developed such a style in the past and thus
have been at an elevated risk for depression since that time.
In support of this assumption, research examining the latent

Cogn Ther Res (2012) 36:219227

organization of a negative cognitive style indicates that it

manifests trait-like rather than state-like stability (Hankin
et al. 2005) and that this trait-like stability emerges by early
adolescence (Hankin and Abela 2005). Second, given that a
past history of depression is the best-known predictor of
future depression (e.g., Belsher and Costello 1988), cognitive vulnerabilities associated with past depressive episodes should predict future episodes. There is, however,
one interpretational ambiguity inherent to this retrospective
design: we cannot rule out the possibility that a negative
cognitive style is merely a consequence or scar of a past
depressive episode rather than its cause. Such a possibility,
however, is not necessarily inconsistent with the HT
because of the likely early developmental origins of a
negative cognitive style (Hankin and Abela 2005) and the
extensive body of research prospectively supporting the
claims of the theory.
The primary goal of the current study was to examine
whether currently non-disordered (i.e., not experiencing a
current MDE) individuals possessing a negative cognitive
style would be more likely than currently non-disordered
individuals without such a style to have experienced a past
MDE. More specifically, we examined whether a negative
cognitive style as assessed by questionnaire and/or the
CAVE method would be associated with a past history of
MDEs after controlling for current depressive symptoms.
The procedure involved an initial screen for past history of
MDEs followed by assessments of negative cognitive style
using the Cognitive Style Questionnaire (CSQ; Haeffel
et al. 2008) and CAVE method, and current depressive
symptoms. In line with the vulnerability hypothesis of the
HT (Abramson et al. 1989), we hypothesized that a more
negative cognitive style as assessed by both the CSQ and
CAVE method would be associated with a greater likelihood of exhibiting a past history of MDEs after controlling
for current depressive symptoms. In addition, we examined
whether these two approaches to assessing negative cognitive style exhibited unique effects.
The second objective of the current study was to
examine the empirical overlap and/or distinctiveness
between the cognitive vulnerability factors posited by the
HT and Becks (Beck 1967, 1983) cognitive theory. More
specifically, we examined whether questionnaire- and
interview-based assessments of negative cognitive style
would each continue to be associated with a past history of
MDEs after controlling for the association between negative core beliefs and such a history. For the current study,
we drew upon Young and colleagues (Young 1990; Young
et al. 2003) recent elaboration of Becks (1967, 1983)
cognitive theory in defining cognitive vulnerability as a
function of the presence of negative core beliefs in two
schema domains: (1) disconnection and rejection, and (2)
over vigilance and inhibition. We focused on these two

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schema domains to the exclusion of others posited by

Young et al. (2003) as past research examining the association between negative core beliefs and past history of
MDEs has shown that negative core beliefs specifically
related to these two schema domains are most strongly
associated with past depression (Abela et al. 2009).1

Method
Participants
Participants were recruited in two phases. In the first phase,
participants were recruited through an upper-level psychology course and received course credit for their voluntary participation in the study. In the second phase,
recruitment posters were distributed around Montreal-area
universities. In order to provide a more powerful examination of our hypotheses, we oversampled individuals with
a history of depression by specifically targeting our
recruitment posters towards such individuals. Respondents
from the second phase of recruitment were compensated
$20 for their participation. Respondents from both phases
of recruitment were administered a screen to assess the
presence of past histories of major depression. The final
sample consisted of 60 students (49 women and 11 men).
Of this sample, 19 participants met criteria for a past MDE
and 1 participant met criteria for a current episode. As the
current study focused on past history of MDE in currently
non-disordered individuals, the participant meeting criteria
for a current MDE was removed from all analyses. Of the
participants, 81.7% were Caucasian, 6.7% were Asian,
1.7% were Hispanic, and 9.7% identified themselves as of
another ethnicity. The mean age of the participants was
21 years and 10 months. Participants from the two
recruitment phases did not differ on any demographic
variables, including, gender (v2 (1) = 1.39, ns), age
(t (57) = 1.11, ns), ethnicity (v2 (1) = .29, ns), and mother
tongue (v2 (1) = 1.57, ns). Participants with a past history
of MDEs recruited from the psychology course and those
recruited through posters did not differ on any study
variables.

Using the same sample as that used in the current study, Abela et al.
(2009) examined the association between negative core beliefs and a
past history of MDEs. Results indicated that the presence of negative
core beliefs in the schema domains of disconnection and rejection,
and overvigilance and inhibition, were each uniquely associated with
such a history. In order to provide a stringent test of our hypotheses
and to expand upon past research, we controlled for the association
between negative core beliefs and past history of MDEs in our
examination of the vulnerability construct posited by the HT. This
approach allowed us to examine whether each vulnerability factor
uniquely contributed to past depression.

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Procedure
Participants first completed consent and demographics
forms. Interviewers then administered (1) the Life Story
Interview (LSI; McAdams 1997) and (2) the Structured
Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV, Axis I disorders
(SCID-I; First et al. 1995). The LSI was completed prior to
the SCID-I to prevent recall of past depressive episodes
from impacting recall in the LSI among participants with a
history of MDEs. After completing these interviews, participants completed measures assessing current depressive
symptoms (Beck Depression Inventory (BDI); Beck et al.
1961), and cognitive vulnerability (Cognitive Style Questionnaire (CSQ); Haeffel et al. 2008).
Measures
The Life Story Interview (LSI; McAdams 1997). The LSI is
a semi-structured clinical interview that explores the way
in which individuals narrate their life stories in order to
understand how people make sense of their own lives. The
LSI requires that participants play the role of storyteller
and construct the story of their past, present, and what they
envision as their future. The interview is divided into three
sections: (1) Life chapters, (2) Critical events (i.e., peak
experience, nadir experience, turning point, important
childhood event, important adolescent event, and one other
important event), and (3) Alternative futures for the life
story, one positive and one negative.
During the life chapters section of the LSI, participants
break down their lives by chapters and provide a summary
of the content of each chapter. The material obtained in this
section was not coded as it was used only to provide
informants with practice recalling and gathering information on critical events. Following the discussion of life
chapters, participants were asked to describe six critical life
events in detail (i.e., what happened, where they were, who
was involved, what they did, and what they were thinking
and feeling at the time). Participants were also asked to
convey the impact that each event had on their life at the
time and what the event implied about them as a person. If
participants did not spontaneously produce information
addressing each of these questions, interviewers used specific probes (e.g., What does this experience say about
who you are or who you were?) to elicit such information.
Interviewers were 12 senior undergraduate student
research assistants who received intensive training and
supervision by a licensed clinical psychologist in the
administration of the LSI. The training program consisted
of 40 h of didactic instruction, role-playing, and extensive
practice conducting live interviews. In addition, interviewers received supervision and extensive individual
feedback on their performance.

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The current study applied the Content Analysis of

Verbatim Explanations (CAVE) technique to verbatim
transcriptions of the critical events section of participants
life story interviews in order to assess negative cognitive
style. First, the contents of the critical events section of the
life story interviews were analyzed by an event-inference
unit extractor who selected events and inferences from the
transcripts according to the following criteria: (1) a specific
event was described that had a discernible beginning and
ending; (2) the event involved the self and was experienced
as being undesirable; (3) the event was unambiguously
negative; (4) an inference about the cause(s), and/or consequence(s), and/or the self was identifiable. Second, each
extracted event along with its corresponding inference(s)
was transcribed onto a separate card. If an extracted event
had multiple corresponding inferences (e.g., a single event
had corresponding inferences about both its cause and
consequences or a single event had more than one inference about the self), multiple cards for the event, each
containing one inference, were created. Last, a team of
three research assistants, blind to participants identity,
independently rated each carded event-inference unit on a
17 scale according to the following criteria for inferences
about causes, consequences and the self, respectively.
Inferences about the causes of the negative event were
rated on two subscales, globality and stability, with a
higher composite score on both subscales (i.e., the average
degree of globality and stability on the 1-7 scale) reflecting
more global and stable causal inferences. Inferences about
consequences were rated such that higher scores indicated
qualitatively more negative descriptions of the consequence of the negative event. Inferences about the self
were rated such that higher scores indicated qualitatively
more negative self-statements associated with the occurrence of the negative event. For the current study, a CAVEderived composite score for negative cognitive style
(CAVE-NCS) was calculated in the following manner.
First, for each participant, a separate mean score for each
dimension of negative cognitive style (i.e., causes, consequences, and self) was calculated by summing the individual scores assigned to each event-inference unit and
then dividing that sum by the number of units extracted.
This method allowed us to control for variability across
participants in terms of the number of inferences generated
along each of the dimensions. Next, participants mean
scores were standardized within each of the three dimensions. Last, a final composite score for negative cognitive
style was obtained by averaging the three standardized
scores. Because the material provided by informants in the
alternative futures section of the interview referred to
events which had not actually taken place, only the scored
event-inference units obtained from material provided
during the critical events section of the interview were

Cogn Ther Res (2012) 36:219227

used in analyses. Analyses examining inter-rater reliability

indicated that the three raters achieved, on average, 97%
agreement on scores for each dimension of negative cognitive style. Discrepancies were resolved through consensus meetings and best estimate procedures.
Two additional research assistants independently read
and coded verbatim transcriptions of the critical events
section of the LSI for the presence or absence of 18 core
beliefs postulated by Young et al. (2003). Consistent with
findings obtained by Abela et al. (2009), for the current study,
only the scores assigned to verbalizations identified as containing core beliefs pertaining to the schema domains of (1)
disconnection and rejection and (2) overvigilance and inhibition were used in analyses. According to Young et al.
(2003), the disconnection and rejection schema domain is
composed of the core beliefs of (1) abandonment/instability,
(2) mistrust/abuse, (3) emotional deprivation, (4) defectiveness/shame, and (5) social deprivation. The overvigilance and inhibition schema domain is composed of the core
beliefs of (1) negativity/pessimism, (2) emotional inhibition,
(3) unrelenting standards/hypercriticalness, and (4) punitiveness. Coders were provided with definitions for each core
belief as described by Young et al. (2003). For each of the six
critical events described in the LSI, verbalizations consistent
with the definitions of each core belief listed above were
scored a 1. Given that there were six critical events described,
scores for each of the core beliefs could range from 0 (i.e., not
present in any of the six events described) to 6 (present in
each of the six events described). For each participant, a
summary score indicating the participants overall level of
core beliefs within each of the two schema domains was then
created by summing the scores for each core belief contained
within each of the two schema domains. Analyses examining
inter-rater reliability indicated that coders achieved 98.8 and
96.5% agreement for the presence or absence of core beliefs
within the domains of disconnection and rejection, and
overvigilance and inhibition, respectively.
The Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV (SCIDI; First et al. 1995). The SCID-I is a semi-structured clinical
interview designed to arrive at current and lifetime DSM-IV
diagnoses. The current study employed the affective disorders module and psychotic screen to allow for the diagnosis
of all DSM-IV mood disorders. Diagnostic interviewers
completed an intensive training program for administering
the SCID-1 and for assigning DSM-IV diagnoses. In addition to supervision sessions for the interviewers, the principal investigator (PI) reviewed interviewers notes to
confirm the presence or absence of a diagnosis. To resolve
questions regarding the accuracy of symptom ratings or
diagnoses, the PI reviewed audiotapes of interviews and met
with individual interviewers. Although there were discrepancies between the PI and the diagnosticians with respect to
individual symptoms, there were no discrepancies in terms

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of diagnoses assigned. The SCID-I has been shown to yield

reliable diagnoses of depressive disorders (Zanarini et al.
2000) and is frequently used in clinical studies of depression.
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al. 1961).
The BDI is a 21-item self-report measure that assesses
levels of depressive symptoms by rating each of the items
on a scale of 03. Scores on the BDI range from 0 to 63 with
higher scores reflecting greater depressive symptomatology. The BDI is a reliable and well-validated measure of
depressive symptoms (Beck et al. 1988). Across numerous
studies, the BDI has exhibited high internal consistency,
good testretest reliability, and high correlations with other
measures of depression (Beck et al. 1988). The BDI was
used in the current study to control for current depressive
symptoms. In the current study, we obtained an alpha of .89
on the BDI, indicating strong internal consistency. For the
current sample, participants scores on the BDI ranged from
0 to 32, with a mean of 7.2 (SD = 6.9).
The Cognitive Style Questionnaire (CSQ; Haeffel et al.
2008). The CSQ assesses cognitive vulnerability factors in
the hopelessness theory of depression based on 12 hypothetical negative events. Participants are asked to rate the
degree to which the cause of the negative event is stable
and global on a scale from 1 to 7. Similarly, participants
then rate the probability that the negative event would lead
to the occurrence of subsequent negative events by
answering the following question on a scale from 1 to 7,
with higher scores reflecting a higher probability of negative consequences: To what degree does the [negative
event] mean that other negative things will happen?).
Finally, participants similarly rate on a scale from 1 to 7 the
extent to which the negative event implies that they are
flawed (i.e., To what degree does the [negative event]
mean that you are flawed in some way?). In the current
study, a CSQ-derived composite score for negative cognitive style (CSQ-NCS) was obtained in the following
manner. First, for each participant, a separate mean score
for each dimension of negative cognitive style (i.e., causes,
consequences, and self) was calculated by summing participants scores on each dimension and then dividing that
sum by the number of items. Next, participants mean
scores on each dimension were standardized within each of
the three dimensions. Last, a final composite score for
negative cognitive style for each participant was obtained
by averaging the three standardized scores.

Results
Descriptive Data
Means and standard deviations for all variables are presented in Table 1. Although the remitted-depressed (i.e.,

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Cogn Ther Res (2012) 36:219227

Table 1 Means (standard deviations) for all study variables

Variable

Never-depressed

Remitted-depressed

Significance

BDI

6.8 (7.5)

8.2 (5.8)

t (59) = .75, ns

CSQ-NCS

11.2 (3.8)

15.3 (5.7)

t (59) = 3.31, P \ .01

CAVE-NCS

-.4 (.6)

5 (.6)

t (45) = 4.58, P \ .01

DISC-REJ

2.3 (2.6)

4.5 (3.5)

t (58) = 2.69, P \ .01

OVER-INH

1.7 (2.3)

2.7 (2.9)

t (57) = 2.14, P \ .01

Age

22.2 (3.3)

21.2 (1.67)

t (57) = 1.36, ns

Gender (female)

75.6%

95.5%

v2 (1) = 4.07, P \ .05

Ethnicity (Caucasian)

80.5%

77.3%

v2 (1) = .03, ns

Language (English)

70.7%

72.7%

v2 (1) = .38, ns

BDI Beck Depression Inventory; CSQ-NCS Cognitive style questionnaire-Negative cognitive style; CAVE Content Analysis of Verbatim
Explanations-Negative cognitive style; DISC-REJ Disconnection-Rejection; OVER-INH Overvigilance-Inhibition

Table 2 Intercorrelations between all study variables

1
BDI
CSQ-NCS
CAVE-NCS

.24

.37*

DISC-REJ

.21

.32*

.34*

OVER-INH

.33*

.24

.35*

Age

-.05

Gender

.03

-.18

-.09

.17

.72*

.35*

.00

-.12

.26

.24

.25

-.02

BDI Beck Depression Inventory; CSQ-NCS Cognitive style questionnaire-Negative cognitive style; CAVE-NCS Content analysis of verbatim
explanations-Negative cognitive style; DISC-REJ Disconnection-Rejection; OVER-INH Overvigilance-Inhibition
*P \ .05

those with a past MDE) and the never-depressed (i.e., those

without a past MDE) groups did not significantly differ in
terms of level of depressive symptoms, the remitteddepressed group reported more negative cognitive styles as
assessed by both CAVE and CSQ. In terms of demographic
variables, the two groups did not differ in terms of age,
ethnicity, or mother tongue. The remitted depressed group
contained a greater proportion of women and therefore
gender was controlled for in all analyses. Intercorrelations
between all study variables are reported in Table 2. 78.3%
of participants made inferences about the causes, consequences and/or self implications of negative events during
the LSI. The never-depressed and remitted-depressed
groups did not significantly differ in terms of the tendency
to make such inferences (v2 (1) = .13, ns).
Overview of Statistical Analyses: Logistic Regression
Analyses
The current study used logistic regression in order to test
the hypothesis that a more negative cognitive style would
be associated with a greater likelihood of having

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experienced a past MDE among currently non-disordered

individuals. The dependent variable in all analyses was
whether the participant had experienced a past MDE (i.e., a
coded variable whereby HISTORY-MDE = 1 if the participant reported a past MDE and HISTORY-MDE = 0 if
the participant did not). First, in order to control for the
impact of current depressive symptoms on the recall of past
negative events and past depressive episodes, current levels
of depressive symptoms (i.e., BDI scores) were entered
into the first step of the regression equation. In addition, in
order to control for possible sex differences, gender was
entered into the first step. Next, the scores obtained from
the relevant measure (i.e., questionnaire (CSQ-NCS) or
interview (CAVE-NCS)) of negative cognitive style were
entered in the second step. This step-wise approach
allowed us to examine whether a more negative cognitive
style was associated with a past history of a MDE after
controlling for current depressive symptoms. Preliminary
analyses were conducted examining whether any of the
reported associations varied as a function of gender. The
results of such analyses indicated that gender neither
exerted a main effect nor interacted with any of the

Cogn Ther Res (2012) 36:219227

variables examined to predict the occurrence of a past

MDE. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, results are
presented for the entire sample.
Negative Cognitive Style and Past Major Depressive
Episodes: CSQ Scores
In line with our hypotheses, CSQ-NCS was significantly
associated with a past history of MDEs after controlling for
BDI (OR = 1.21, Wald = 5.42, P \ .05). A more negative
cognitive style as assessed by questionnaire was associated
with an increased likelihood of having experienced a past
depressive episode.
Negative Cognitive Style and Past MDEs: CAVE
Scores
In line with our hypotheses, CAVE-NCS was significantly
associated with a past history of MDEs after controlling for
BDI (OR = 6.88, Wald = 7.87, P \ .01). A more negative
cognitive style as assessed by interview was associated
with an increased likelihood of having experienced a past
depressive episode.
Unique Effects of CSQ and CAVE
In order to examine the unique effects of a negative cognitive style as assessed by questionnaire and interview, a
separate logistic regression analysis was conducted with
both indices of cognitive vulnerability simultaneously
entered into the second step. Again, current depressive
symptoms were controlled for in the first step. In regards to
unique effects, CAVE-NCS continued to be significantly
associated with a past history of MDEs after controlling for
CSQ-NCS (OR = 4.84, Wald = 4.93, P \ .05). At the
same time, however, CSQ-NCS was no longer significantly
associated with an increased likelihood of such a history
after controlling for CAVE-NCS (OR = 1.14, Wald =
1.981, ns). Thus, of the two approaches to assessing negative cognitive style, only the interview-based approach
exhibited a unique effect.
Negative Core Beliefs, Negative Cognitive Style,
and Past Major Depressive Episodes
Two separate logistic regression analyses were conducted
in order to examine whether negative cognitive style as
assessed by questionnaire or interview was associated with
a past history of MDEs above and beyond the association
between negative core beliefs and such a history. First,
current levels of depressive symptoms were entered into
the first step. Second, separate scores were entered from
measures of negative core beliefs in each of the two

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schema domains, disconnection-rejection (DISC-REJ) and

overvigilance-inhibition (OVER-INH) in the second step.
Last, the score from the relevant measure of negative
cognitive style was entered in the third step.
In regards to negative cognitive style as assessed by
questionnaire, CSQ-NCS was no longer significantly
associated with a past history of MDEs after controlling for
the associations between DISC-REJ and OVER-INH and
past MDE (OR = 1.13, Wald = 1.45, ns). At the same
time, however, CAVE-NCS remained significantly associated with a past history of MDEs after controlling for the
association between DISC-REJ and OVER-INH and such a
history (OR = 6.27, Wald = 6.25, P \ .05). Thus, of the
two approaches to assessing negative cognitive style, only
the interview-based approach, and not the questionnairebased approach, made a unique contribution to past
depression above and beyond the effects of negative core
beliefs.

Discussion
Results from the current study provide support for the
vulnerability hypothesis of the hopelessness theory
(Abramson et al. 1989) of depression. When examining the
hypothesized cognitive vulnerability factor using both
questionnaire- and interview-based approaches, we found
full support for the theory. Specifically, negative cognitive
style as assessed by both the CSQ and CAVE method were
each associated with a past history of an MDE in currently
non-disordered individuals after controlling for current
depressive symptoms. These findings provide support for
the validity of both the CSQ and CAVE method in terms of
their association with past depression. Importantly, our
results add to research linking negative cognitive style to
clinically significant levels of depression (Alloy et al.
1992).
When examining the unique effects of questionnaireand interview-based assessments of negative cognitive
style, only the interview-based approach exhibited a unique
effect. Such a finding suggests that the CAVE method may
be tapping into information about individuals inferential
tendencies that is not provided by the questionnaire. In
terms of the questionnaire, the hypothetical events present
the respondent with no contextual information and thus are
somewhat ambiguous. Given this ambiguity, respondents
are likely to project their own meanings into the events and
form inferences on the basis of their subjective interpretations. At the same time, however, external situational
cues, which likely inform the inferences that individuals
generate during lived experiences, are absent in the questionnaire format. Alternatively, interview-based assessments of negative cognitive style may be more likely to

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capture an individuals idiosyncratic inferential tendencies

as they exist in nature. In other words, by sharing first-person
accounts of their lives, our participants may have provided
us with qualitatively distinct and more personally-relevant
information during the interview than they did through the
questionnaire. Given the current findings, future research
examining the HT is likely to benefit from testing the theory
using each method of assessing the posited vulnerability
factor in order to compare patterns of findings.
When examining whether negative cognitive style as
assessed by CSQ and/or the CAVE method is associated
with a past history of MDEs above and beyond negative
core beliefs, we found that negative cognitive style as
assessed by the CSQ did not exhibit a unique effect in
terms of an association with such a history. Such a finding
suggests considerable overlap between questionnaireassessed negative cognitive style and negative core beliefs.
At the same time, results indicated that CAVE-assessed
negative cognitive style remained significantly associated
with past depression after controlling for the association
between negative core beliefs and such a history. Furthermore, it should be noted that negative core beliefs were
not associated with past depression above and beyond
CAVE-assessed negative cognitive style. Thus, it would
appear that interview-based assessments of negative cognitive style yield unique information not provided by
assessments of negative core beliefs.
Several limitations of the current study should be noted.
First, the current sample was predominantly female and
thus it is unclear whether results are specific to females or
whether they extend to males as well. In addition, although
the current study did not find gender moderating effects,
this may be due to the small size of our sample and/or the
small number of males. Thus, although gender did not
serve as a significant moderator of any of the reported
associations, this may have been due to a lack of statistical
power to detect such differences. Second, although the
results of the current study indicated that negative cognitive style was associated with a past history of MDEs in
currently non-disordered individuals, longitudinal research
is needed demonstrating that negative cognitive style predicts the onset of future depressive episodes. Such prospective research would benefit from being conducted with
individuals without a prior history of depressive episodes in
order to provide more compelling evidence that the types
of inferences made in the context of the LSI and CSQ
represent enduring cognitive vulnerability that predates the
onset of depression rather than the types of inferences that
have been found to accompany residual depression (for
review see Just et al. 2001). In addition, such research
would benefit from examining the mechanisms that both
mediate (e.g., actual inferences) and moderate (e.g., negative life events) the association between negative

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Cogn Ther Res (2012) 36:219227

cognitive style and the onset of depressive episodes. Third,

it is possible that memory bias may have impacted on
participants recall of past events as discussed in the LSI.
Further, it is possible that individual difference variables
impacted on the content of the stories told, as well as on the
inferences made in regards to such stories. The most likely
such variable is current depressive symptoms as such
symptoms have been found to impact upon recall (Bower
and Forgas 2001). Importantly, however, we controlled for
current depressive symptoms in order to limit such a bias.
At the same time, it is possible that other third variables
that we did not control for may have led to memory bias.
Finally, the majority of our sample consisted of university
students, limiting our ability to generalize our results to
clinical and community populations.
In sum, the results of the present study provide support
for the vulnerability hypothesis of the HT (Abramson et al.
1989) of depression. Results further provide support for the
validity of both questionnaire and interview-based assessments of negative cognitive style in terms of their association with a past history of clinically significant depressive
episodes. Future research examining these hypotheses
using a prospective design, larger and more diverse samples, and measures assessing stressors is likely to provide a
deeper understanding of the cognitive processes and
mechanisms underlying depression.

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