WILLS AND SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS

Uson vs Del Rosario (1953)

Facts:
Faustino Nebreda died, leaving five parcels of land
situatied in Labrador, Pangasinan. He had no other heir except
for his widow Maria Uson. But according to Maria Uson,
Faustinons common-law wife, Maria Del Rosario took illegal
possession of the aforesaid lands, depriving her possession
thereof. Thus, Maria Uson filed an action to recover the lands
against Maria Del Rosario and her illegitimate children.
Among the contentions of Maria Del Rosario were the
following:
1.

2.

That Maria Uson and Faustino executed a public

document whereby they agreed to separate as
husband and wife and, inconsideration of their
separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by
way of alimony and in return she renounced her right
to inherit any other property that may be left by her
husband upon his death; and
That although it is true that Maria Usons children
were illegitimate not entitled to successional rights
under the Old Civil Code which was the law in force
when Faustino died in 1945, the New Civil Code took
effect and happened to so grant such rights to
illegitimate children. Thus, the provisions of the New
Civil Code should be given retroactive effect.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the document executed by Maria Uson and
Faustino was valid.
2. Whether or not the provisions of the New Civil Code
regarding rights of illegitimate children should be given
retroactive effect.
Ruling:
1. No. Future inheritance cannot be the subject of contract nor
can it be renounced.
2. Art. 2253 provides indeed that rights which are declared for
the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the
even which gave rise to them may have occurred under the
former legislation, but this is so only when the new wrights do
not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin.

In 1952, Hilaria and and Virgilio mortgated the subject

land in favor of Jose Deleste. And eventually, the sold it to
Deleste in consideration of the sum of P16,000.
Then, Esperanza and Caridad filed intestate proceedings
concerning the estate of their father, Gregorio. Included in the
list of property was the subject land. When Edilberto Noel took
over as regular adminstrator of the estate, he was not able to
take possession of the land in question because it was in the
possession of Jose Deleste and som heirs of Hilaria.
Later on in 1963, Noel was ordered by the court to file an
action to recover the subject land from Deleste. Noel alleged
that the sale between Hilaria and Virgilio was attended by
fraud. The issue relevant to the Wills and Succession which
would resolve the case was whether or not Hilaria had
authority to dispose half of the property pertaining to her
husband.
The trial court ruled that Hilaria acted as administratrix
over the estate of Gregorio; that she sold the 34.7-hectare
land in order to pay the debts of the conjugal partnership; and
that out of the purchase price of P16,000, P4,000 was in
payment to Deleste who was actually a doctor who attended to
Gregorio.
Noel appealed to the Court of Appeals, which held that the
transaction between Hilaria and Virgilio was indeed a sale
absent fruad, mistake or misrepresentation. Thus, the
prescription period of 10 years had not yet elapsed when the
action to recover was filed in 1963. Moreover, the CA held that
in the absence of proof of adverse possession by Hilaria, she
should be considered as holding the property pursuant to her
usufructuary rights over the same under the provisions of the
Spanish Civil Code, the law in force at the time of the death of
Gregorio. The CA ultimately held that Noel and Hilaria could
not validly sell the subect land because it was conjugal
property, and Hilaria could sell only her one-half share thereof.
As new administrator of the estate, Pinito Mercado
appealed to the Supreme Court. A petition for certiorari to
declare the sale to probate respondent as an equitable
mortgate was filed by Atty. Bonifacio Legaspi, who claimed
that he represented the heirs of Hilaria while Pinito Mercado
represented the heirs of Gregorio.
Issue: Whether or not Hilaria and Virgilio could dispose of the
entire property sold to Deleste.

Noel vs CA and Deleste (1995)

Ruling:

Facts:

No. Gregorio died in 1945 long before the effectivity

of the New Civil Code. And under Article 2263 thereof, rights
to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will,
before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the
Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the rules of
Court. Thus, succession to the estate of Gregorio was
governed primarily by the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code
of 1889. Under Article 953 thereof, a spouse like Hilaria, who is
survived by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters
of the decedent, as is obtaining in this case, was entitled to
receive in usufruct the part of the inheritance pertaining to
said heirs. Hilaria, however, had full ownership, not merely
usufruct, over the undivided half of the estate

The subject of the dispute is a 34.7-hectare land in Iligan

City owned by spouses Gregorio Nanaman and Hilaria
Tabuclin. Gregorio had a child named Virgilio by another
woman. The spouses treated Virgilio as their own,
nevertheless. When Greogio died in 1945, Hilaria administered
the property with the help of Virgilio and enjoyed the
procedure of the land to the exclusion of Juan Nanaman, the
brother of Gregorio, and Esperanza and Caridad Nanaman
(Gregorios daughters by still another woman). Virgilio
eventually declared the property in his name for taxation
purposes.

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On the other hand, Virgilio was not an heir of

Gregorio under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889. Although he
was treated as a child by the Nanaman spouses, illegitimate
children who were not natural were disqualified to inherit
under the said Code (Cid v. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 [1968]).
Article 998 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which gave an
illegitimate child certain hereditary rights, could not benefit
Virgilio because the right of ownership of the collateral heirs of
Gregorio had become vested upon his death (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 2253; Uson v. Del Rosario, 92 Phil. 530
[1953]). Therefore, Virgilio had no right at all to transfer
ownership over which he did not own.
Estate of KH Hemady vs Luzon Surety Co (1956)
Facts:
Luzon Surety Co. filed a claim against the estate of the
deceased KH Hemady based on 20 different indemnity
agreements or counterbonds each subscribed by a distinct
principal and the the late Hemady in all of them, in
consideration of Luzon Suretys having guaranreed the various
principals in favor of different creditors.
Upon motion of the administratrix of Hemadys estate, the
trial court dismissed Luzon Suretys claims, holding that the
liability arising from the indemnity agreement was
intransmissible, because integrity is one requirement for a
person to qualify as a guarantor, and that integrity is
something purely personal and is not transmissible. Hence,
according to the lower court, upon the death of Hemady, his
integrity was not transmitted to his estate or successors.
Issue: Whether or not the liability arising from the indemnity
agreement was transmissible or not.
Ruling: Transmissible. Under the Civil Code, Contracts take
effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs,
except in the case where the rights and obligations arising
from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law.
While in our successional system the responsibility of
the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the
value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle
remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights
of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and
776 of the New Civil Code (and Articles 659 and 661 of the
preceding one) expressly so provide, thereby confirming Article
1311 already quoted.
The general rule is that a partys contractual rights
and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The
exceptions are: (1) intransmissible by nature, (2) stipulation,
and (3) provison of law.
Under the law (Article 1311), a person who enters
into a contract is deemed to have contracted for himself and
his heirs and assigns, it is unnecessary for him to expressly
stipulate to that effect; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhence, his
failure to do so is no sign that he intended his bargain to
terminate upon his death. Similarly, that the Luzon Surety Co.,
did not require bondsman Hemady to execute a mortgage
indicates nothing more than the companys faith and
confidence in the financial stability of the surety, but not that
his obligation was strictly personal.

There is also no merit to the contention that the

liability of Hemady is intransmissible. The lower court sought
to infer such a limitation from Art. 2056, to the effect that one
who is obliged to furnish a guarantor must present a person
who possesses integrity, capacity to bind himself, and
sufficient property to answer for the obligation which he
guarantees. It will be noted, however, that the law requires
these qualities to be present only at the time of the perfection
of the contract of guaranty. It is self-evident that once the
contract has become perfected and binding, the supervening
incapacity of the guarantor would not operate to exonerate
him of the eventual liability he has contracted; and if that be
true of his capacity to bind himself, it should also be true of his
integrity, which is a quality mentioned in the article alongside
the capacity.
Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantors liability is not
extinguished by his death, and that in such event, the Luzon
Surety Co., had the right to file against the estate a contingent
claim for reimbursement. It becomes unnecessary now to
discuss the estates liability for premiums and stamp taxes,
because irrespective of the solution to this question, the Luzon
Suretys claim did state a cause of action, and its dismissal was
erroneous.
Litonjua vs. Montilla (1952)
Facts:
In the Court of Instance of Negros Occidental, Pedro
Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the
payment of P4,000. A writ of execution was issued, but no
property of Claudio Montilla was found which could be levied
upon.
On June 12, 1950 Pedro L. Litonjua filed in special
Proceeding No 32 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Intestate Estate of Agustin Montilla, Sr., deceased,
a motion praying that the interest, property and participation
of Claudio Montilla, one of the heirs of Agustin Montilla, Sr., in
the latter's intestate estate be sold and out of the proceed the
judgment debt of Claudio Montilla in favor of Pedro L. Litonjua
be paid. This motion was opposed by Claudio Montilla and by
Agustin Montilla, Jr., administrator of the intestate estate.
The CFI of Negros Occidental denied the motion from
which Pedro Litonjua appealed.
Issue: Whether or not Claudios interest in the intestate estate
of Austin Montilla Sr. can be sold and the proceeds of which be
applied to the debt of Cluadio Montilla in favor of Claudio
Montilla.
Ruling: No. The creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is
entitled to collect his claim out of the property which pertains
by inheritance to said heirs, only after the debts of the testate
or intestate succession have been paid and when the net
assets that are divisible among the heirs are known, because
the debts of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs
can inherit. It was therein also held that a person who is not a
creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to
intervene either in the proceedings brought in connection with
the estate or in the settlement of the succession.
An execution cannot legally be levied upon the property of an
intestate succession to pay the debts of the widow and heirs of

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the deceased, until the credits held against the latter at the
time of his death shall have been paid can the remaining
property that pertains to the said debtors heirs can be
attached.
Ledesma vs Mclachlin (1938)
Facts:
Lorenzo Quitco and Socorro Ledesma were a married
couple, having a daughter named Ana Quitco Ledesma. But
eventually, their marriage ended. Meanwhile, Lorenzo
executed a document acknowledging Ana as his natural
daughter and he issued a promissory note of P1,500 in favor of
Socorro. Lorenzo was remarried to Conchita McLachlin, with
whome he had four children.

obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving

any property, while it is true that under the provisions of
articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a children presents his
father or mother who died before him in the properties of his
grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does
not make the said child answerable for the obligations
contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may
be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received
with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only
answer with the properties received from their predecessor.
The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in
representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound
to pay the indebtedness of their said father from whom they
did not inherit anything

Lorenzo eventually died. And later, Lorenzos father,

Eusebio, also died, leaving real and personal properties upon
his death.

DKC Holdings Corp. vs CA (2000)

Administration proceedings of the properties of Eusebio

were instituted in which a committee on claims and appraisal
was appointed. Meanwhile, Socorro filed before the said
committee the promissory note for payment. The court issued
an order of declaration of heirs in the intestate of the deceased
Eusebio, but Ana was not included among the declared heirs.
Thus, Socorro asked the court to reconsidered but to no avail.
Hence, Socorro filed an action to recover on the promissory
note against Conchita and her children with Lorenzo. The
lower court ruled in favor of Socorro.

DKC Holdings entered into a contract of lease with option

to buy with Encarnacion Bartolome over a 14,021 square
meter land in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. DKC regularly paid the
monthly rental of P3,000 to Encarnacio until her death.
Thereafter, DKC coursed its payment to Encarnacions son and
sole heir, Victor. However, Victor refused to accept these
payments and altogether refused to deal with DKC. Hence,
DKC filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
against Victor and the Register of Deeds who refused to
register and annotate the contract with Encarnacion on Victors
title over the property. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of
Victor.

Issue: Whether or not Socorros action to recover would

prosper.
Held: No. In the first place, the action to recover on the
promissory note had already prescribed.
According to the promissory note Exhibit C, executed by
the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, on January 21, 1922, the last
installment of P1,500 should be paid two years from the date
of the execution of said promissory note, that is, on January
21, 1924. The complaint in the present case was filed on June
26, 1934, that is, more than ten years after he expiration of
the said period. The fact that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma
filed her claim, on August 26, 1933, with the committee on
claims and appraisal appointed in the intestate of Eusebio
Quitco, does not suspend the running of the prescriptive
period of the judicial action for the recovery of said debt,
because the claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the
promissory note should no have been presented in the
intestate of Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased not being the
one who executed the same, but in the intestate of Lorenzo M.
Quitco, which should have been instituted by the said Socorro
Ledesma as provided in section 642 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, authorizing a creditor to institute said case through
the appointment of an administrator for the purpose of
collecting his credit. More than ten years having thus elapsed
from the expiration of the period for the payment of said debt
of P1,500, the action for its recovery has prescribed under
section 43, No. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
As to the second assignment of alleged error, consisting in
that the trial court erred in holding that the properties
inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather
by representation are subject to the payment of debts and

Facts:

Issue: Whether or not Victor is bound by the contract entered

into between DKC and Encarnacion.
Ruling: Yes. The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are
bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-ininterest except when the rights and obligations arising
therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2)
stipulation or (3) provision of law. In the case at bar, there is
neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the
rights and obligations under the contract intransmissible. More
importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein
are, by their nature, transmissible.
It has also been held that a good measure for determining
whether a contract terminates upon the death of one of the
parties is whether it is of such a character that it may be
performed by the promissors personal representative.
Contracts to perform personal acts which cannot be as well
performed by others are discharged by the death of the
promissor. Conversely, where the service or act is of such a
character that it may as well be performed by another, or
where the contract, by its terms, shows that performance by
others was contemplated, death does not terminate the
contract or excuse nonperformance.
In the case at bar, there is no personal act required from
the late Encarnacion Bartolome. Rather, the obligation of
Encarnacion in the contract to deliver possession of the subject
property to petitioner upon the exercise by the latter of its
option to lease the same may very well be performed by her
heir Victor. It is futile for Victor to insist that he is not a party
to the contract because of the clear provision of Article 1311 of

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the Civil Code. Indeed, being an heir of Encarnacion, there is

privity of interest between him and his deceased mother. He
only succeeds to what rights his mother had and what is valid
and binding against her is also valid and binding as against
him.
In the case at bar, the subject matter of the contract is
likewise a lease, which is a property right. The death of a party
does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves
a property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder
pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly,
nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when
the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of
the contract.[16] Under both Article 1311 of the Civil Code and
jurisprudence, therefore, Victor is bound by the subject
Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.
Coronel vs CA (1996)
Facts:
The Coronel family executed a document titled Receipt of
Down Payment in favor of Ramona Patricia Alcaraz, the subject
of which was a house and lot owned by the deceased
Constancio Coronel. They agreed that Ramona will make a
downpayment of P50,000 upon execution of the document,
and that the Coronels will cause the transfer in their names of
the title of the property registed in the name of their decease
father upon receipt of the downpayment. And once the title is
in their name, the Coronels will execute a deed of absolute
sale in favor of Ramona and the latter will pay the whole
balance of P1,190,000.
But once the title was transferred to their names, the
Coronels instead sold the subject property to Catalina
Mabanag. Thus, Ramona filed a complaint for specific
performance against the Coronels.
The RTC and CA sided with Ramona, ordering the
Coronels to execute in favor of Ramona a deed of absolute
sale covering the subject land.
The Coronels main contention was that there was no
contract of sale, but only a contract to sell, and that there
could had been no perfected contract on Jan. 19, 1985 (the
date of execution of the document titled Receipt of Down
Payment), because they were then not yet the absolute
owners of the inherited property.
Issue: Whether or not there was a perfected sale.
Held: Yes. The contract in question cannot be a contract to
sell, because there was no express reservation of title until full
payment of the entire purchase price. The truth is that the
parties had agreed to a conditional contract of sale, the
consummation of which is subject only to the successful
transfer of the certificate of title from the name of Constancio
Coronel to the heirs.
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and
daughters of the decedent Constancio P. Coronel are
compulsory heirs who were called to succession by operation
of law. Thus, at the point their father drew his last breath,
petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar as the subject
property is concerned, such that any rights or obligations
pertaining thereto became binding and enforceable upon them.

It is expressly provided that rights to the succession are

transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article
777, Civil Code; Cuison vs. Villanueva, 90 Phil. 850 [1952]).
Be it also noted that petitioners claim that succession may
not be declared unless the creditors have been paid is
rendered moot by the fact that they were able to effect the
transfer of the title to the property from the decedents name
to their names on February 6, 1985. Aside from this,
petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed lack of
capacity to enter into an agreement at that time and they
cannot be allowed to now take a posture contrary to that
which they took when they entered into the agreement with
private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz.
Conti vs. CA (1998)
Facts:
Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio
land ing Lucena City. Lourdes died
persons claimed to be collateral
Lourdes Sampayo and filed an
damages before the RTC.

Conti co-owned a 539-sqm

intestate. Later on, several
relatives of the deceased
action for partition and

However, Spouses Conti refused the partition on the

ground that the alleged heirs of Lourdes failed to produce any
document to prove that they were the rightful heirs of
Lourdes.
The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of the alleged heirs of
Lourdes Sampayo, holding that they were abloe to prove that
they were the collateral heirs of Lourdes, and thus ordered the
partition of the lot.
Spouses Conti still pursued the case, arguing that a
complaint for partition to claim a supposed share of the
deceased co-owner cannot prosper without prior settlement of
the latters estate and compliance with all legal requirements,
especially publication, and that the alleged heirs were not able
to prove by competent evidence their relationship with the
deceased.
Issue: Whether or not a prior settlement of the estate is
essential before the heirs can comence any action originally
pertaining to the deceased.
Ruling: No. Title to the property owned by a person who dies
intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is,
under the present law, subject to the claims of administration
and the propety may be taken from the heirs for the purpsoe
of paying debts and expenses, BUT this does not prevent an
immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the
intestate, from himself to his heirs.
Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction
with Arts. 777 and 494[32] of the Civil Code, from the death of
Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which
is the right to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the
co-ownership, were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so
demanding partition private respondents merely exercised the
right originally pertaining to the decedent, their predecessorin-interest.
Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication
would have been correct had the action been for the partition
of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with

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extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the

summary settlement of estates of small value.[33] But what
private respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation of
Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited from her through
intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition
between co-owners.
Nufable vs Nufable (1999)
Facts:
Edras Nufable owned an untitled parcel of land located at
Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, consisting of 948 square
meters, more or less. He died on August 9, 1965 and was
survived by his children, namely: Angel Custodio, Generosa,
Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable.
The heirs then filed a petition for probate, then the CFI
issued an order admitting to probate the last will and
testament executed by the late Edras. But unknown to the
other heirs of Edras, Angel Nufable and his wife mortgaged the
entire property located at Manjuyod to the Development Bank
of the Philippines. The property was eventually foreclosed by
the DBP. Upon the death of Angel, his son, Nelson Nufable
(petitioner herein), purchased the property from DBP.
Thereafter, the other heirs of Edras filed with the lower
court a complaint to annul the fraudulent transactions of
Nelson.
The lower court ruled in favor of Nelson, but the CA
reversed, holding that the trial court failed to take into
consideration the probated will of the late Esdras Nufable
bequeathing the subject property to all his four children
Petitioner presented the issue of whether or not the Last
Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable and its subsequent
probate are pertinent and material to the question of the right
of ownership of petitioner Nelson Nufable who purchased the
land in question from, and as acquired property of, the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP, for short). They
contend that the probate of the Last Will and Testament of
Esdras Nufable did not determine the ownership of the land in
question as against third parties.
Issue: Whether or not Angel had the capacity to mortgage the
whole subject land.
Ruling: No. At the onset, it should be stated that as a general
rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to passing
upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated,
the due execution thereof, the testators testamentary capacity
and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. Said court at this stage of the proceedings
is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of
the provision of the will. The question of the intrinsic validity of
a will normally comes only after the court has declared that the
will has been duly authenticated.
The records show that upon petition for probate filed by
the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable, an Order dated March 30,
1966 was issued by then Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental, Branch II, admitting to probate the last will and
testament executed by the decedent. Thereafter, on June 6,
1966, the same court approved the Settlement of Estate
submitted by the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable wherein they

agreed (T)hat the parcel land situated in Poblacion Manjuyod,

Negros Oriental remains undivided for community ownership
but respecting conditions imposed therein (sic) in the will. In
paragraph 3 thereof, they stated that they have no objection
as to the manner of disposition of their share made by the
testator, the expenses of the proceeding and that they have
already taken possession of their respective shares in
accordance with the will. Verily, it was the heirs of the late
Esdras Nufable who agreed among themselves on the
disposition of their shares. The probate court simply approved
the agreement among the heirs which approval was necessary
for the validity of any disposition of the decedents estate.
It should likewise be noted that the late Esdras Nufable
died on August 9, 1965. When the entire property located at
Manjuyod was mortgaged on March 15, 1966 by his son Angel
Custodio with DBP, the other heirs of Esdras - namely:
Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo - had already acquired
successional rights over the said property. This is so because
of the principle contained in Article 777 of the Civil Code to the
effect that the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent.Accordingly, for the
purpose of transmission of rights, it does not matter whether
the Last Will and Testament of the late Esdras Nufable was
admitted on March 30, 1966 or thereafter or that the
Settlement of Estate was approved on June 6, 1966 or months
later. It is to be noted that the probated will of the late Esdras
Nufable specifically referred to the subject property in stating
that the land situated in the Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros
Oriental, should not be divided because this must remain in
common for them, but it is necessary to allow anyone of them
brothers and sisters to construct a house therein.[10] It was
therefor the will of the decedent that the subject property
should remain undivided, although the restriction should not
exceed twenty (20) years pursuant to Article 870[11] of the
Civil Code
Thus, Angel Nufable had no right to morgaged the subject
land, based on the principle of one cannot give what one does
not have.
Lorenzo vs Posadas (1937)
Facts:
Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, Zamboanga, leaving a will
and considerable amount of real and personal properties. On
June 14, 1922, proceedings for the probate of his will and the
settlement and distribution of his estate were begun in the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to
probate. Said will provides, among other things, as follows:
4. I direct that any money left by me be given to my
nephew Matthew Hanley.
5. I direct that all real estate owned by me at the time of
my death be not sold or otherwise disposed of for a period
of ten (10) years after my death, and that the same be
handled and managed by the executors, and proceeds
thereof to be given to my nephew, Matthew Hanley, at
Castlemore, Ballaghaderine, County of Rosecommon,
Ireland, and that he be directed that the same be used
only for the education of my brother's children and their
descendants.

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6. I direct that ten (10) years after my death my property

be given to the above mentioned Matthew Hanley to be
disposed of in the way he thinks most advantageous.
xxx
xxx
xxx
8. I state at this time I have one brother living, named
Malachi Hanley, and that my nephew, Matthew Hanley, is
a son of my said brother, Malachi Hanley.
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga considered it
proper for the best interests of their estate to appoint a trustee
to administer the real properties which, under the will, were to
pass to Matthew Hanley ten years after the two executors
named in the will, was, on March 8, 1924, appointed trustee.
Moore took his oath of office and gave bond on March 10,
1924. He acted as trustee until February 29, 1932, when he
resigned and the plaintiff herein was appointed in his stead.
On October 4, 1932, the plaintiff Pablo Lorenzo, in his
capacity as trustee of the estate of Thomas Hanley, deceased,
brought this action in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
against the defendant, Juan Posadas, Jr., then the Collector of
Internal Revenue, for the refund of the amount of P2,052.74,
paid by the plaintiff as inheritance tax on the estate of the
deceased, and for the collection of interest thereon at the rate
of 6 per cent per annum, computed from September 15, 1932,
the date when the aforesaid tax was [paid under protest. The
defendant set up a counterclaim for P1,191.27 alleged to be
interest due on the tax in question and which was not included
in the original assessment. From the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga dismissing both the plaintiff's
complaint and the defendant's counterclaim, both parties
appealed to this court.
The following are the principal questions to be decided by this
court in this appeal: (a) When does the inheritance tax accrue
and when must it be satisfied? (b) Should the inheritance tax
be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the
time of the testator's death, or on its value ten years later? (c)
In determining the net value of the estate subject to tax, is it
proper to deduct the compensation due to trustees? (d) What
law governs the case at bar? Should the provisions of Act No.
3606 favorable to the tax-payer be given retroactive effect? (e)
Has there been delinquency in the payment of the inheritance
tax? If so, should the additional interest claimed by the
defendant in his appeal be paid by the estate?
Issue: Whether or not the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent?
Ruling:
(a) The accrual of the inheritance tax is distinct from the
obligation to pay the same. Section 1536 as amended, of the
Administrative Code, imposes the tax upon "every transmission
by virtue of inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa, or
advance in anticipation of inheritance, devise, or bequest." The
tax therefore is upon transmission or the transfer or devolution
of property of a decedent, made effective by his death. It is in
reality an excise or privilege tax imposed on the right to
succeed to, receive, or take property by or under a will or the
intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift to become operative at or
after death. According to article 657 of the Civil Code, "the
rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the
moment of his death." "In other words", said Arellano, C. J., ".
. . the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the

deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the

moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the
ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the
same before his death."
Plaintiff, however, asserts that while article 657 of the Civil
Code is applicable to testate as well as intestate succession, it
operates only in so far as forced heirs are concerned. But the
language of article 657 of the Civil Code is broad and makes
no distinction between different classes of heirs. That article
does not speak of forced heirs; it does not even use the word
"heir". It speaks of the rights of succession and the
transmission thereof from the moment of death. The provision
of section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding the
authentication and probate of a will as a necessary condition to
effect transmission of property does not affect the general rule
laid down in article 657 of the Civil Code. The authentication of
a will implies its due execution but once probated and allowed
the transmission is effective as of the death of the testator in
accordance with article 657 of the Civil Code. Whatever may
be the time when actual transmission of the inheritance takes
place, succession takes place in any event at the moment of
the decedent's death. The time when the heirs legally succeed
to the inheritance may differ from the time when the heirs
actually receive such inheritance.
Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the
inheritance tax accrued as of the date.
(b) The plaintiff contends that the estate of Thomas
Hanley, in so far as the real properties are concerned, did not
and could not legally pass to the instituted heir, Matthew
Hanley, until after the expiration of ten years from the death of
the testator on May 27, 1922 and, that the inheritance tax
should be based on the value of the estate in 1932, or ten
years after the testator's death. The plaintiff introduced
evidence tending to show that in 1932 the real properties in
question had a reasonable value of only P5,787. This amount
added to the value of the personal property left by the
deceased, which the plaintiff admits is P1,465, would generate
an inheritance tax which, excluding deductions, interest and
surcharge, would amount only to about P169.52.
If death is the generating source from which the power of
the estate to impose inheritance taxes takes its being and if,
upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and
the right of the estate to tax vests instantly, the tax should be
measured by the value of the estate as it stood at the time of
the decedent's death, regardless of any subsequent
contingency value of any subsequent increase or decrease in
value. The right of the state to an inheritance tax accrues at
the moment of death, and hence is ordinarily measured as to
any beneficiary by the value at that time of such property as
passes to him. Subsequent appreciation or depreciation is
immaterial.
Castaneda vs Alemany
Facts:
It appears in this case that the will of Doa Juana Moreno
was duly signed by herself in the presence of three witnesses,

Page | 6

who signed it as witnesses in the presence of the testratrix

(Moreno) and of each other.
Defendant-Appellant Jose Alemany constested the validity
of the will of Doa Juana Moreno upon the ground that
although the attestation clause in the will states that the
testator signed the will in the presence of three witnesses who
also each signed in each presence, the will was not actually
written
by
the
testatrix
(Source:
https://www.scribd.com/doc/269275504/Castaneda-vAlemany). It was purportedly typewritten not by Doa Juana
herself but by his lawyer.
Issue: WON the testator/testratix must himself/herself write
the will for it to be valid?
Ruling: No. There is nothing in the language of section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure which supports the claim of the
appellants (Alemany) that the will must be written by the
testator himself or by someone else in his presence and under
his express direction.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires: (1)
that the will be in writing and (2) either that the testator sign it
himself or, if he does not sign it, that it be signed by some one
in his presence and by his express direction.
Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a
matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the
will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testratrix
is of no consequence.
Alemany, in the probate proceedings, also raised the
question of whether the testratrix Doa Juana had the power
to appoint by will a guardian for the property of her children by
her first husband, or whether the person so appointed was or
was not a suitable person to discharge such trust. The Court
said, to establish conclusively as against everyone, and once
for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities
required by law and that the testator was in a condition to
make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the
new code for the probate of a will. The judgment in such
proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In
them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any
provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example,
that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. It could not
in this case make any decision upon the question whether the
testratrix had the power to appoint by will a guardian for the
property of her children by her first husband, or whether the
person so appointed was or was not a suitable person to
discharge such trust. All such questions must be decided in
some other proceeding.
In Re Will of Jose Riosa (1918)
Facts:
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will in the
month of January 190 in which he disposed of an estate valued
at more than P35,000.
The will was duly executed in accordance with the law
then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. However, it was not executed in accordance with
Act. No. 2645, amendatory of Sec. 618, prescribing certain
additional formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in

force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in
writing, signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed by
three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
each other; but was not signed by the testator and the
witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor did
the attestation state these facts. The new law, therefore, went
into effect after the making of the will and before the death of
the testator, without the testator having left a will that
conforms to the new requirements.
Under Sec. 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, No will,
except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to
pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the
same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by
the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of each other. The attestation shall state
the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be
signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and
subscribed it in his presence and in the presence of each
other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not
render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact
signed and attested as in this section provided.
Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure so as to make said section read as follows: No

will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid

to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the
same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by
the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
each other. The testator or the person requested by him to
write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall
also sign, as aforesaid, each, and every page thereof, on the
left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation
shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which
the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
Issue: Whether or not Jose Riosas will is valid.
Ruling: Yes. In arriving at a decision, the Supreme Court cited
three prevailing rules in relation to the problem.
First Rule The rule laid down by the courts in many
jurisdictions is that the statutes in force at the testator's death
are controlling, and that a will not executed in conformity with
such statutes is invalid, although its execution was sufficient at
the time it was made. The reasons assigned for applying the
later statute are the following: "As until the death of the
testator the paper executed by him, expressing his wishes, is
not a will, but a mere inchoate act which may or may not be a
will, the law in force at the testator's death applies and
controls the proof of the will."

Page | 7

Second Rule The rule prevailing in many other

jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must
be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution
and that statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective
effect.
Third Rule Statutes relating to the execution of wills,
when they increase the necessary formalities, should be
construed so as not to impair the validity of a will already
made and, when they lessen the formalities required, should
be construed so as to aid wills defectively executed according
to the law in force at the time of their making.
The Court adhered to the second rule, saying that the
plausible reasoning of the authorities which back the first
proposition is, we think, fallacious. The act of bequeathing or
devising is something more than inchoate or ambulatory. In
reality, it becomes a completed act when the will is executed
and attested according to the law, although it does not take
effect on the property until a future time.
It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as
this court has said, that "all statutes are to be construed as
having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and
intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect
is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be
resolved against the restrospective effect."
The strongest argument against our accepting the first
two rules comes out of section 634 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which, in negative terms, provides that a will shall
be disallowed in either of five cases, the first being "if not
executed and attested as in this Act provided." Act No. 2645
has, of course, become part and parcel of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The will in question is admittedly not executed and
attested as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure as
amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to observe that the
general principle in the law of wills inserts itself even within
the provisions of said section 634. Our statute announces a
positive rule for the transference of property which must be
complied with as completed act at the time of the execution,
so far as the act of the testator is concerned, as to all
testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act No.
2645, but is not effective as to testaments made antecedent to
that date.
Enriquez vs Abadia (1954)
Facts:
Fr. Sancho Abadia, the parish priest of Talisay, Cebu,
executed a document purporting to be his last will and
testament. He died in Jan. 14, 1943. One of his legatees,
Andres Enriquez, filed a petition for its probate in the CFI of
Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate
of the deceased if he left no will, filed an opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the
other two being dead, testified without contradiction that in his
presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father
Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the
testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he
left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios
or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered

the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at
the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence
of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last
will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on
the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in
the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any
evidence.
Apparently, the will that Fr. Abadia executed was a
holographic will. But at the time it was executed, holographic
wills were still not permitted by law, but by the time of the
hearing, the New Civil Code already took effect, and it allows
holographic wills. The trial court took the liberal view and
admitted to probate the will.
Issue: Whether or not the will should be probated.
Ruling: No. What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh.
"A"? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil Code which
not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions
were invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by the
lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code
expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form
depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it
is made." The above provision is but an expression or
statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the
validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the
time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is
presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided
by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One
reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates
upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the
testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and
among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the
will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then
becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by
this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a
wholesome doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the
testator should be the ruling and controlling factor and that all
adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in
order to carry out said intention, and that when statutes
passed after the execution of the will and after the death of
the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the
execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied
so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law
in force at the time of execution. However, we should not
forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he
leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it
becomes a vested right, protected under the due process
clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the
statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills
which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning,
when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe
and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution
then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as
having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by
intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to
execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and
thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by
intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature
can not validate void wills.

Page | 8

Miciano vs Brimo (1927)

Facts:
The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased
Joseph Brimo filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of
the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however,
approved it. The appellant's opposition is based on the fact
that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of
Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the
laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void
as being in violation or Article 10 of the Civil Code.
Brimo, was excluded by the court as a legatee based on
the deceaseds will, which says: Second. I like desire to state

that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship

having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free
choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having
resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine
Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that
I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my
property and everything in connection with this, my will, be
made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in
the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect
this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons
who fail to comply with this request.
Issue: Whether or not the clause in question valid.
Held: No. The institution of legatees in this will is conditional,
and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect
the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance
with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines. If this condition as it is expressed were
legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has
not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being
contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the
following: Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or

good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not

prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even
should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly
ignores the testator's national law when, according to article
10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the
testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Bellis vs Bellis (1967)
Facts:
Amos Bellis, a US citizen, was born in texas. By his first
wife, Mary Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following

order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E.

Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have
been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving
children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.
Amos eventually died while residing in Texas. His will was
admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila.
Pursuant to the 12th clause of Amoss will, the executor
divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the
benefit of the testators seven legitimate children by his first
and second marriage.
Amoss illegitimate children opposed the project partiion
on the ground that they were deprived of the legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore compulsory heirs of the
deceased. The lower court ruled against the illegitimate
children, applying Art. 16(2) of the Civil Code, which provides
that intestate and testamentary scuucessions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to thte intrinsic validity shall be
regulated by the national law of the deceased.
But the illegitimates argued that Art. 17 of the Civil Code
serves as an exception to the second paragraph of Art. 16. Art.
17 provides: Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
Issue: Whether or not Texan law should prevail.
Ruling: Yes. Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding
the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when
they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the
new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change
the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16
in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the
second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which
must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new
provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to
succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general
ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent
executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the
other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he
intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing
a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision

Page | 9

in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be

distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now
Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis,
was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the
laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the
will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Bugnao vs Ubag (1909)
Facts:
Deceased Domingo Ubag left a last will and testament in
which his widow, Catalina Bugnao, was the sole beneficiary.
The probate was contested by Domingos siblings who would
be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate
were denied.
The siblings mainly attacked Domingos capacity to make
a will, claiming that their brother was already of unsound mind
when he made the will. But it was revealed that a rift existed
between the siblings and Domingo, because the latter were
Aglipayanos. They never visited him when he was sick and
dying, despite living near each other.
The lower court admitted to provate Domingos will.
Hence, the siblings appealed.
Issue: Whether or not Domingo had testamentary capacity
when he made the will.
Ruling: Yes. Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that
the alleged will leaves all the property of the testator to his
widow, and wholly fails to make any provision for his brothers
or sisters, indicates a lack of testamentary capacity and undue
influence; and because of the inherent improbability that a
man would make so unnatural and unreasonable a will, they
contend that this fact indirectly corroborates their contention
that the deceased never did in fact execute the will. But when
it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death had
no heirs in the ascending or descending line; that a bitter
family quarrel had long separated him from his brothers and
sisters, who declined to have any relations with the testator
because he and his wife were adherents of the Aglipayano
Church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his
brothers or sisters, although some of them lived in the vicinity,
were present at the time of his death or attended his funeral;
we think the fact that the deceased desired to leave and did
leave all of his property to his widow and made no provision
for his brothers and sisters, who themselves were grown men
and women, by no means tends to disclose either an unsound
mind or the presence of undue influence on the part of his
wife, or in any wise corroborates contestants' allegation that
the will never was executed.
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and
memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary
capacity, and that degree of mental aberration generally
known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of
mental capacity or incapacity, and while on one hand it has

been held that "mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility

from the disease of body, or from age, will not render a person
incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble minded person
may make a valid will, provided he has understanding memory
sufficient to enable him to know what he is about, and how or
to whom he is disposing of his property" (Lodge vs.Lodge, 2
Houst. (Del.), 418); that, "To constitute a sound and disposing
mind, it is not necessary that the mind should be unbroken or
unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise" (Sloan vs.
Maxwell, 3 N. J. Eq., 563); that "it has not been understood
that a testator must possess these qualities (of sound and
disposing mind and memory) in the highest degree. . . . Few
indeed would be the wills confirmed, if this is correct. Pain,
sickness, debility of body, from age or infirmity, would,
according to its violence or duration, in a greater or less
degree, break in upon, weaken, or derange the mind, but the
derangement must be such as deprives him of the rational
faculties common to man" (Den. vs. Vancleve, 5 N. J. L.,680);
and, that "Sound mind does not mean a perfectly balanced
mind. The question of soundness is one of degree" (Boughton
vs. Knight, L. R.,3 P. & D., 64; 42 L. J. P., 25); on the other
hand, it has been held that "testamentary incapacity does not
necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of
an unsound mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from
extreme old age from disease, or great bodily infirmities or
suffering, or from all these combined, may render the testator
incapable of making a valid will, providing such weakness
really disqualifies her from knowing or appreciating the nature,
effects, or consequences of the act she is engaged in" (Manatt
vs. Scott, 106 Iowa, 203; 68 Am. St. Rep., 293, 302).
But for the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for
us to attempt to lay down a definition of testamentary capacity
which will cover all possible cases which may present
themselves, because, as will be seen from what has already
been said, the testator was, at the time of making the
instrument under consideration, endowed with all the elements
of mental capacity set out in the following definition of
testamentary capacity which has been frequently announced in
courts of last resort in England and the United States; and
while is some cases testamentary capacity has been held to
exist in the absence of proof of some of these elements, there
can be no question that, in the absence of proof of very
exceptional circumstances, proof of the existence of all these
elements in sufficient to establish the existence of
testamentary capacity.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the
nature of the transaction which the testator is engaged at the
time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the
person who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon
the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the
instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his
bounty.
Bagtas vs Paguio (1912)
Facts:
Pioquinto Paguio executed a last will and testament before
he died. The will was propunded by his widow, Julia Bagtas.
Paguios son and grandchildren by a former marriage opposed
the probate on the grounds that the will was not executed
according to the formalities and requirements required of wills,

Page | 10

and that the testator (Paguio) was not in the full of enjoyment
and use of his mental faculties and was without mental
capacity necessary to execute a valid will.
Fourteen or fifteen years prior his death, Paguio suffered
from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years
prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost
the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles
his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He
retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able to
write fairly well. Through the medium of signs he was able to
indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his
family.
The oppositors presented two doctors who testified that
Paguio was suffering from a mental condition. The lower court
ruled in favor of Bagtas. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid.
Held: Yes. In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is in
favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the burden is
upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack of
testamentary capacity.
The law does not require that a person shall continue in
the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental
powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal
standard, few indeed would be the number of wills that could
meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both
medical and legal, are universal in statement that the question
of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are many
gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the
lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated
as insanity and idiocy.
The right to dispose of property by testamentary
disposition is as sacred as any other right which a person may
exercise and this right should not be nullified unless mental
incapacity is established in a positive and conclusive manner.
Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect
soundness of mind is not essential to testamentary capacity. A
testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental weaknesses,
disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable in law of
executing a valid will.
Neyra vs Neyra (1946)
Facts:
Severo Nayra died intestate leaving certain properties
which have been divided extrajudicially between his children
by his first marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad
Neyra, who had serious misunderstandings concerning the said
properties which led to court litigations.
On September 14, 1939, Defendant Encarnacion Neyra
executed a will disposing of her properties in favor of the
"Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" and her other
relatives, named Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman and Maria
Jacobo Vda. de Blanco. However, the said bounty was declined
by the authorities of the said organization.
On October 25, 1939, Petitioner Trinidad Neyra filed a
complaint against her sister, defendant Encarnacion Neyra, in
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, for the
recovery of one-half of the property and also, the rents

collected on the said property by the defendant Encarnacion

Neyra.
The trial court ruled that the plaintiff is entitled to one-half
of the property but ordered the same to pay to the defendant
the sum of P727.77, plus interests, by virtue the latters
counterclaims (for money spent during the illness of their
father and for money loaned to plaintiff).
Plaintiff Trinidad Neyra appealed the said decision to the
Court of Appeals for Manila attacking the execution and validity
of said agreement.
In the meantime, Encarnacion had become seriously ill,
suffering from Addisons disease. As advised by Father Garcia,
Encarnacion reconciled with Trinidad on November 1, 1942.
They agreed to have the case dismissed, on the condition that
the property involved therein should be given exclusively to
Trinidad Neyra, that the latter should waive her share in the
rents of said property collected by Encarnacion, and the
Trinidad had no more indebtedness to Encarnacion.
Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise as
well as the new will and testament, naming Trinidad Neyra and
Eustaquio Mendoza as beneficiaries therein, pursuant to
Encarnacion's express instructions, and the two documents
were prepared, in duplicate, and were ready for signature. In
the afternoon of November 3, 1942 Atty. Panis read the
document of compromise and last will and testament to
Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence
of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio
Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he asked her
if their terms were in accordance with her wishes, or if she
wanted any change made in said documents; that Encarnacion
Neyra did not suggest any change, and asked for the pad and
the two documents, and, with the help of a son of Trinidad,
placed her thumbmark at the foot of each one of the two
documents, in duplicate, on her bed in the sala, in the
presence of attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio
R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis.
On November 4, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra unexpectedly
died, allegedly from heart attack as a consequence of
Addisons disease.
On November 10, 1942, said appeal was dismissed,
pursuant to the agreement or compromise entered into by the
parties dated November 3, 1942 and filed on November 4,
1942.
In view of the decision of the Court of Appeals, Atty. Lucio
Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra filed a
petition asking for the reconsideration of said decision,
claiming that the alleged compromise or agreement, dated
November 3, 1942, could not have been understood by
Encarnacion Neyra, as she was already then at the threshold of
death, and that as a matter of fact she died the following day;
and that if it had been signed at all by said Encarnacion Neyra,
her thumbmark appearing on said document must have been
affixed thereto by Trinidad Neyra's attorney, against
Encarnacion's will.
ISSUE: Did Encarnacion Neyra possess the necessary
testamentary and mental capacity at the time of making the
agreement and will, thus making it valid?

Page | 11

HELD: YES. Where it appears that a few hours and also a few
days after the execution of the will, the testator intelligently
and intelligibly conversed with other persons, although lying
down and unable to move or stand up unassisted, but could
still effect the sale of property belonging to him, these
circumstances show that the testator was in a perfectly sound
mental condition at the time of the execution of the will.
(Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her crossexamination, frankly admitted that, in the morning and also at
about 6 o'clock in he afternoon of November 3, 1942,
Encarnacion Neyra talked to her that they understood each
other clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of
sound mind, at the time of signing and execution of the
agreement and will in question.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the
mental faculties of persons suffering from Addison's disease,
like the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to
the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they
necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And
that like patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or
diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties until the
moments of their death.
Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors, who
testified for the opponents to the probate of a will, to the
effect that it tended to destroy mental capacity, was held not
to effect the full possession of mental faculties deemed
necessary
and
sufficient
for
its
execution.
(Caguioa vs.Calderon, 20 Phil., 400.) The testatrix was held to
have been compos mentis, in spite of the physician's testimony
to the contrary, to the effect that she was very weak, being in
the third or last stage of tuberculosis. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca
Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) The testimony of the
attending physician that the deceased was suffering from
diabetes and had been in a comatose condition for several
days, prior to his death, was held not sufficient to establish
testamentary incapacity, in view of the positive statement of
several credible witnesses that he was conscious and able to
understand what was said to him and to communicate his
desires. (Samson vs.Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil., 573.)
Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition,
neither old age, nor ill health, nor the fact that somebody had
to guide his hand in order that he might sign, is sufficient to
invalidate his will (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil.,
485.)
Baltazar vs Laxa (2012)
Facts:
Paciencia Regala was a 78-year-old spinster when she
made her last will and testament in which she gave all her
properties to Lorenzo Laxa and his family. Regala treated
Lorenzo as his own, having raised him since he was a child.
Eventually, Paciencia died. Lorenzo then filed a petition with
the RTC of Pampanga for the probate of the will. Dra. Limpin
testified that she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the
execution of the last will and testament of Paciencia which was
executed in her fathers (Judge Limpin) home office in her
presence and of two others, Francisco and Faustino.

Thereafter, Antonio Baltazar opposed the petition,

claiming that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a will
at the time of its execution. Baltazar presented as his witness
Rosie, whose mother was a first cousin of Paciencia. Rosie
claimed that Paciencia was already forgetful around the time of
the execution of the will and thus could not have had
possessed full enjoyment of her mental faculties.
The trial court gave cradence to Rosies testimony and
denied Lorenzos petition. On appeal, the CA reversed, holding
that the state of being forgetful (magulyan) does not make a
person mentally unsound so as to render a person unfit for
executing a will.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid.
Ruling: Yes. The state of being forgetful does not make a
person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute
a will.
#20 Acop vs Piraso (1929)
Facts:
The Court of First Instance (CFI) of Benguet denied the
probate of the will of the deceased Piraso on the ground that
the will was written in English, a language unfamiliar to the
deceased. The court ruled that the will should have been
written in the Ilocano dialect.
Hence, the proponents of the will appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the will was valid.
Held: No. Under the law, no will, except as provided in the
preceding section shall be valid unless it be written in the
language or dialect known by the testator.
#21 Jaboneta vs Gustilo (1906)
Facts:
The probate of the will of Macario Jaboneta was denied by
the lower court on the ground that Julio Javellana, one of the
witnesses, did not attach his signature thereto in the presence
of Isabelo Jena, another witness, as required by law. The other
witness was Aniceto Jalbuena.
Based on the records, it appeared that Isabelo saw the
pen in Julios hand resting on the paper, but he did not see
Julio actually signing because he was in a hurry to leave.
Issue: Whether or not the will was valid.
Held: Yes. Sabi ng SC, masyadong OA ang oppositor. It is
sufficient if the witnesses are together for the purpose of
witnessing the execution of the will, and in a position to
actually see the testator write, if they choose to do so and
there are many cases which lay down the rule that the true
test of vision is not whether the testator actually saw the
witness sign, but whether he might have seen him sign,
considering his mental and physical condition and position at
the time of the subscription.
#22 Avera vs Garcia (1921)
Facts:

Page | 12

Eutiqui Avera filed a petition for probate of the will of

Esteban Garcia. The will was contested [by Marino Garcia and
Juan Rodriguez] on the sole ground that the signature of the
testator and of the three attesting witnesses were written on
the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left.
The lower court admitted the probate of the will. Hence,
the oppositors appealed, and adding as assignment of error
the fact that only a single attesting witness testified instead of
three despite opposition.
Issue: Whether or not the will was valid.
Held: Yes. With regard to the issue concering the fact that
there was only one attesting witness who testified, the Court
said that it may be attributed to the fact that proponent, in
good faith, did not expect that there would be oppositors as
the latter appeared during hearing already. And besides, such
issue was not raised by the oppositors at the first instance.
It is true that the statute says that the testator and the
witnesses shall sign their names on the left margin of each and
every page; and it is undeniable that the general doctrine is to
the effect that all statutory requirements as to the execution of
wills must be fully complied with. The provision to the effect
that the signatures of the testator and witnesses shall be
written on the left margin of each pagerather than on the
right marginis too trivial that it would be absurd to suppose
that congress could have attached any decisive importance to
them. It can make no possible difference whether the names
appear on the left or right margin as long as they are on one
or the other.
#23 Icasiano vs Icasiano (1964)
Facts:
A petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte
was filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) by Celso
Icasiano. Natividad and Enrique Icasiano, the other children of
Villacorte, opposed the probate. They alleged that the will was
not executed in accordance with the formalities required by
law. There were actually two wills involved hereone original
and one duplicate. The defect consisted in the fact that one of
the attesting witnesses, Jose Natividad, failed to sign page
three of the original but was able to sign the same page of the
duplicate. According to Natividad, he may have lifted two
pages instead of one when he signed page three. The
oppositors also alleged that granting that the documents were
genuine, they were executed through mistake and with undue
influence as may be inferred from the fact that the proponents
stand to profit more from the properties. The court admitted
the probate of the will. Hence, the oppositors appealed before
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the will was valid.
Held: Yes.
The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his
signature to one page of a testament due to the simultaneous
lifting of two pages in the course of signing is not per se
sufficient to justify denial of probate. The law should not be so
strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on
account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose
conduct she had no controll, where the purpose of the law to

guarante the identity of the testament and its component

pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate
deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full
observance of the statutory requirements. And granting that
the original will is void, which is not the case, then it follows
that the duplicate is the only will and is probatable.
With regard to the argument that undue influence was
exerted, the same cannot be inferred based solely on the fact
that the proponents stand to benefit more. Diversity of
apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament;
otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate.
#22 Cagro vs Cagro (1953)
Facts:
The case is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a
decision of the CFI of Samar which admitted to probate a will
allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Pambujan,
Samar on Feb. 14, 1949. The appellants/oppositors (Pelagio
Cagro and friends) argued that the will is defective because
the attestation was not signed by the instrumental witnesses
at the bottom although the page containing the same was
signed by the witnesses on the left hand margin. The
proponent (Jesusa Cagro) claimed that the signatures of the
three witnesses on the left hand margin conform substantially
to the law and should be deemed as signatures to the
attestation clause.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid.
Held: No. Will is not valid. The attestation clause is a
memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will.
It is required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses and
it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned
attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the
witnesses since the omission of their signatures at the bottom
negatives their participation. Moreover, the signatures affixed
on the let hand margin is not substantial conformance to the
law. The said signatures were merely in conformance with the
requirement that the will must be signed on the left-hand
margin of all its pages. If the attestation clause is unsigned by
the 3 witnesses at the bottom, it would be easier to add
clauses to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence
of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.
#23 Nera vs Rimando (1911)
Facts:
The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to
the due execution of the instrument propounded as a will [of
the deceased Pedro Rimano] in the court below, is whether
one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small
room where it was executed at the time when the testator and
the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures; or
whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet
away, in a large room connecting with the smaller room by a
doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it
impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and
the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their
signatures to the instrument. The trial court admitted the
probate of the will.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid.

Page | 13

Held: Yes. it is especially to be noted that the position of the

parties with relation to each other at the moment of the
subscription of each signature, must be such that they may
see each other sign if they choose to do so. This, of course,
does not mean that the testator and the subscribing witnesses
may be held to have executed the instrument in the presence
of each other if it appears that they would not have been able
to see each other sign at that moment, without changing their
relative positions or existing conditions. The evidence in the
case relied upon by the trial judge discloses that "at the
moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he
was actually and physically present and in such position with
relation to Jaboneta that he could see everything that took
place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction and
without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so." And
the decision merely laid down the doctrine that the question
whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an
alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other
does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were
actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription
by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions
and their position with relation to each other were such that by
merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have
seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine further would
open the door to the possibility of all manner of fraud,
substitution, and the like, and would defeat the purpose for
which this particular condition is prescribed in the code as one
of the requisites in the execution of a will.

consists of seven pages, when in fact it consists of eight

pages. Quoting Justice JBL Reyes, the Court said: But the
total number t~{pages, and whether all persons required to
sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially
appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against
perjwy in the probate proceedings.
#25 Caneda vs CA (1993)
Facts:
Mateo Caballero filed a petition for the probate of his own
will, but he died. One of the legatees (Benoni Cabrera) named
in Mateos will was appoointed as administrator. Thereafter,
nephews and nieces of Mateo (petitioners herein) instituted a
second petition concerning the intestate estate of Mateo. The
two petitions were consolidated, and the petitioners opposed
the probate of the will. They argued that the will was
defective, because its attestation clause failed to specifically
state the fact that the attesting witnesses and the testator
signed the will and all its pages in their presence and that
they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.The
RTC and the CA both held that the will, particularly the
attestation clause, substantially complied with Art. 805 of the
Civil Code. Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid.
Held: No. The questioned attestation clause states: We, the

A petition for the probate of the will of Enrique Lopez was

filed by one of his children (Richard) before the RTC of Manila.
Marybeth, a daughter of Enrique, opposed the petition,
contending that the will did not conform to the formalities
required by law. Enriques will failed to state in the attestation
clause the number of pages used upon which the will is written
as required by Art. 805 of the Civil Code.

undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal

addresses appear on the Opposite of our respective names, we
do hereby certify that the Testament was read by him and the
testator, MATEO CABALLERO; has published unto us the
foregoing Will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the
Acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in the
letters on the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and
Testament and he has the same and every page thereof, on
the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand
margin, in the presence of the said testator and in the
presence of each and all of us.

The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to

comply with Art. 805. It held that while Article 809 of the same
Code requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid
down in Article 805 thereof, the rule only applies if the number
of pages is reflected somewhere else in the will with no
evidence aliunde or extrinsic evidence required. Hence, Richard
appealed to the CA which affirmed the lower courts ruling. It
noted that while the acknowledgment of the will made mention
of seven pages, the will had actually 8 pages including the
acknowledgment portion. Richard, thus, went to the Supreme
Court.

It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness

should both attest and subscribe to the will in the presence of
the testator and of one another. "Attestation" and
"subscription" differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of
senses, while subscription is the act of the hand. The former is
mental, the latter mechanical, and to attest a will is to know
that it was published as such, and to certify the facts required
to constitute an actual and legal publication; but to subscribe a
paper published as a will is only to write on the same paper
the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of
identification.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid.

What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the

attestation clause herein assailed is the fact that while it
recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages
in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as
well the number of pages that were used, the same does not
expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses
subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other.

#24 In re Lopez (2012)

Facts:

Held: No. The law is clear that the attestation must state the
number of pages used upon which the will is written. The
purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and
prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts inasmuch
as the will in question cannot be deemed to have substantially
complied with the requirements of law, especially with regard
to the error in the acknowledgment portion which says the will

Quoting Justice JBL Reyes, the Court urged caution in the

application of the substantial compliance rule of Art. 809 in this

Page | 14

wise: The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects

that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself:
whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether
the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the
subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All
theses are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or
even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can
be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and
whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of
each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause,
being the only check against perjury in the probate
proceedings.
We stress once more that under Article 809, the defects
and imperfections must only be with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or
imperfections would not render a will invalid should it be
proved that the will was really executed and attested in
compliance with Article 805. In this regard, however, the
manner of proving the due execution and attestation has been
held to be limited to merely an examination of the will itself
without resorting to evidence aliunde, whether oral or written.
The foregoing considerations do not apply where the
attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting
witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other. In such a
situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the
attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element
required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the
attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect
complained of in the present case since there is no plausible
way by which we can read into the questioned attestation
clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the attesting
witness did actually bear witness to the signing by the testator
of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental
witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another. Furthermore, the
rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be revoked
or relied on by respondents since it presupposes that the
defects in the attestation clause can be cured or supplied by
the text of the will or a consideration of matters apparent
therefrom which would provide the data not expressed in the
attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be gleaned
or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted
textual requirements were actually complied within the
execution of the will. In other words, defects must be
remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself.
#26 Cruz vs Villasor (1973)
Facts:
Agapita Cruz protested the probate of the will of her
deceased husband, Valente Cruz on the ground that the will
did not conform to the formalities required by law. Specifically,
she contended that there were three instrumental witnesses
during the execution of the will, but one of the three witnesses
was also at the same time the Notary Public before whom the
will was acknowledged. The trial court, nevertheless, allowed
the probate of the will. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not one of the instrumental witnesses can

also be at the same time the notary public who would
acknowledge the will.
Held: No. The notary public before whom the will was
acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental
witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having
signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow; to own
as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or
preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third
witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow
assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself.
This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality
into two so that one will appear before the other to
acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To
permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer
absurdity. Furthermore, the function of a notary public is,
among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangement. That function would defeated if the notary public
were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. For them he
would be interested sustaining the validity of the will as it
directly involves him and the validity of his own act. It would
place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be
thwarted
#27 Garcia vs Lacuesta (1951)
Facts:
The probate of the will of Antero Mercado was protested
upon on the ground that it was defective. Its attestation clause
is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado
caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testators name
under his express direction, as required by law. The proponent
argued, however, that there is no need for such because the
cross (x) written by the testator after his name is a sufficient
signature and the signature of Atty. Florentno Javier is a
surplusage. His theory is that the cross is as much a signature
as a thumbmark which was held to be sufficient, based on
jurisprudence. The Court of Appeals disallowed the will.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid.
Held: No. It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on
the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one
of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature
reflection, we are not prepared to liken the mere sign of the
cross to a thumbmark, and the reason is obvious. The cross
cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
What has been said makes it unnecessary for us to determine
there is a sufficient recital in the attestation clause as to the
signing of the will by the testator in the presence of the
witnesses, and by the latter in the presence of the testator and
of each other.
#28 Alvarado vs Gaviola (1993)
Facts:
Brigido Alvarado executed a codicil amending a previously
executed notarial will. In the will, Brigido disinherited his
illegitimate son (Cesar Alvarado). The testator did not read the
final draft of the will himself. Instead, it was his lawyer who
read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, three

Page | 15

instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four

followed the reading with their own respective copies.
A petition for the probate of the will was filled. Cesar
opposed the probate on the ground that the will did not
comply with the formalities required by law. According to him,
Brigido was already blind by reason of his disease called
glaucoma during the execution of the will, and that the
double-reading requirement by Art. 808 was not complied
with. The CA upheld the validity of the will, saying that Brigido
was not blind at the time of the execution of the will and the
codicil. And granting that he was blind, there was substantial
compliance.
Issue: Whether or not the will was valid.
Held: Yes. At the onset, the Supreme Court disagreed with the
CA, and was of the opinion that Brigido was already blind for
purposes of Art. 808 during the execution of the will and the
codicil. Based on a medical certificate, although the testator
could visualize fingers at three feet, he could no longer read
either printed or handwritten matters.
Nevertheless, the Court held that there was substantial
compliance with Art. 808. This Court has held in a number of
occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the
purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that
the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended
to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but
are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy
the testamentary privilege.
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's
will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three
instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and
subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked,
that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only
then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is
no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the
contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made
known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary,
with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution
was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and
authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted
testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already
acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his
expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty.
Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose
of securing his conformity to the draft. Also, it was not only
Atty Rino who read the will but actually all those present.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution
of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid the substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty
their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on the subject
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not
lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So
when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any
other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and
frustrative of the testator's will, must be disregarded.
Substantial compliance suffices where the purpose has been
served.

#31 De Jesus vs De Jesus (1985)

Facts:
SIMEON Roxas was appointed administrator of the estate
of his deceased sister Bibian de Jesus. He found a notebook
belonging to Bibiana which contained a holographic will dated
Feb/61. Thus, Simeon filed a petition for probate with the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. Meanwhile, Luz
Henson, another compulsory heir, opposed the probate,
contending that it was not properly dated as required by the
Civil Code. The CFI initially allowed the probate of the
holographic will but reversed itself. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the date Feb/61 appearing on the
holographic will is a valid compliance with Art. 810 of the Civil
Code.
Held: Yes. As a general rule, the date in a holographic will
must be complete. But when, such as in the case at bar, there
is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and
pressure the authenticity of the will is established and the only
issue is whether or not the date Feb/61 appearing on the
holographic will is a valid compliance with the Civil Code, the
probate of the holographic will should be allowed under the
principle of substantial compliance.
#32 Labrador vs CA (1990)
Facts:
SAGRADO Labrador, Enrica Labrador and Cristobal
Labrador filed a petition for the probate of the alleged
holographic will of Melecio Labrador. In the will, Melecio left a
parcel of land to his heirs (which includes petitioners and
private respondents herein).
Jesus and Gaudencia Labrador opposed the petition on
the ground that on Sept. 30, 1971 prior to Melecios death, the
latter sold to them the land contained in the will for P6,000
which they, in turn, sold to another for only P5,000.
Sagrado then filed a complaint to annul the purported sale
of the land, claiming he had already acquired by devise from
their father Melecio Labrador under a holographic will executed
on March 17, 1968. He claimed that the sale in favor of Jesus
and Gaudencia was fictitious.
The trial court allowed the probate of the will but the
Court of Appeals disallowed it on the ground that the will was
undated. The date, March 17, 1968, can be found on the
second page of the will in the first paragraph of the body text.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the will is dated.
Held: Yes. The law does not specify a particular location
where the date should be placed in the will. The only
requirements are the date be in the will itself and executed in
the hand of the testator. Melecios holographic will complied
with the aforesaid requirements.
As to Jesus and Gaudencios contention that March 17,
1968 refers merely to the partition of the land, the Court held
that the intent to show March 17, 1968 as the date of the
execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding

Page | 16

words of the paragraph: and this decision and or instruction

of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made
this writing is no other than Melecio Labrador. The act of
partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the
testators instruction or decision to be followed reveal that
Melecio was aware of the nature of the estate of the property.
#33 Codoy vs Calugay (1999)
Facts:
EVANGELINE CALUGAY, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia
Patigas (respondents herein), devisees and legatees of the
holographic will of Matilde de Ramonal, filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental for probate of the
holographic will of the deceased. The probate was opposed by
Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal (petitioners
herein), alleging that the holographic will was a forgery.
In the trial, respondents presented six witnesses, after
which petitioners filed a demurrer to evidence, which was
granted by the RTC. It should be noted that not all the
witnesses testified explicitly that they were familiar with the
handwriting of the testator. On appeal, the Court of Appeals,
citing the case of Azaola vs Singson, reversed the order of the
RTC. The appellate court held that the rule (Art. 811) requiring
the production of three witnesses is merely permissive owing
to the fact that ther may be no available witness acquainted
with the testators hand.
Issue: Whether or not the holographic will is valid.
Held: No. The object of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substition of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. But, on the other hand,
one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of
the law to restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a
wil. However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false
document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is
why the law requires three witnesses to declare that the will
was in the handwriting of the deceased if a holographic will is
contested. This is a mandatory and not merely directory.
It should be noted that the will was with one of
respondents who had kept it as early as five years before
death of the testator. And a visual examination of
holographic will conviced the Court that the strokes
different when compared with other documents written by
testator. The signature of the testator in some of
disposition is not readable.

the
the
the
are
the
the

#34 Ajero vs CA (1994)

Facts:
ANNIE Sand executed a holographic will in which she named
as devises petitioners and respondents. Petitioners filed a
petition for the probate of the holographic will of Annie, but it
was opoposed by the respondents, claiming that it contained
alterations and corrections which were not duly authenticated
by the testator. The trial court admitted the will for probate.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, saying that the
holographic will fails to meet the requirements of Articles 813
and 814, thereby invalidating the will. The appeallate court
alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either

unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found

that the earasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon
had not been authenticated.
Issue: Whether or not failure to comply with Articles 813 and
814 invalidates a will.
Held: No. A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code
shows that its requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its
probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the
dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be
effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole
testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be
admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814. In such case, the erasure or
correction would not be considered.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of
authentication of changes and signing and dating of
dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814)
separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions
for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). This fact is
significant, considering that the there was no such separation
in the old Civil Code.
#35 Kalaw vs Relova (1984)
Facts:
GREGORIO Kalaw (private respondent herein) filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Batangas for the
probate of the holographic will of his sister Natividad Kalaw. He
claimed that he was Natividads sole heir.
The probate was opposed by Rosa Kalaw (petitioner
herein) who was another sister of Natividad. The will, as first
written and before it was corrected, named Rosa as the sole
heir of Natividad. But the alterations, corrections, and
insertions were not authenticated as reqruired by Art. 814.
Hence, Rosa contended that the holographic will, as first
written, should be given effect and probated so that she could
be the sole heir thereunder. The trial court denied the probate.
Rosa then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the holographic as it is first written
should be given effect.
Held: No. Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections,
and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will
litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not
thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects
the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in
dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered
by substituting the original heir with another, but which
alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by
the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the
entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that
nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid.
To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is
to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But
that change of mind can neither be given effect because she
failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by
affixing her full signature.

Page | 17

#36 Phil Trust Co vs Bohanan (1960)

Facts:
C.O. Bohanan, who was a citizen of Nebraska, executed a
will on April 23, 1944 in Manila. The will appointed Philippine
Trust Co to be the executor of the will, and filed a petition for
probate of the same. The probate of the will was admitted.
The deceaseds properties were disposed of in accordance with
his will. And is to be noted that from the total estate of
P211,639.33, the testator gave his two children a legacy of
only P6,000 each and none to his wife, Magdalena Bohanan.
Hence, Magdalena and the children appealed, arguing that the
trial court erred when it recognized the Reno devorce secured
by the testator from Magdalaena. The trial court refuted such
claim, citing that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased
was a citizen, allows him to dispose of all of his properties
without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his
wife. Also, they argued that the testators children, Edward and
Mary Lydia, was not given their proper shares in the estate
which, in accordance with the laws of the forum, should be 2/3
of the estate left by the testator.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of the testator to give his
children 2/3 of the estate left by him at the time of his death,
in accordance with the laws of the forum, valid.
Held: Yes. The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case
because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that
successional rights to personal property are to be earned by
the national law of the person whose succession is in question.
But foreign law must be introduced as evidence. An official
record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy tested by the officer having the legal custody of he
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody (Sec. 41, Rule 123) The Court said that Nevada
laws were introduced in evidence.
#37 Aznar vs Garcia (1963)
Facts:
EDWARD S. Christensen, though born in New York,
migrated to California where he resided and consequently was
considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to
1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the
entire period of his residence in this country, he had always
considered himself as a citizen of California.
In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his
only heir but left a legacy of some money (P3,600) in favor of
Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the
Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural
daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2)
of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is
returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is
ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be
increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children
under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter
Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew
Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts

must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under

California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently
a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in
absolute dominion. The trial court ruled in favor of Maria
Helen.
Issue: Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply
Held: Philippine law should apply. The Supreme Court
deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen
Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in
California on the matter. 1. The conflict rule which should
apply to Californians outside the California, and 2. The internal
Law which should apply to California domiciles in califronia.
The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the
California Civil code States that if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed by
the law of the domicile.
Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of
his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be followed.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is
remanded to the lower court with instructions that partition be
made as that of the Philippine law provides.
#37 Aznar vs Garcia (1963)
Facts:
DR. JOSE Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan,
who became American citizens and residents of New York,
each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on
presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known
which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be
presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire
family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael,
who was named trustee in Joses will, filed for separate
probate proceedings of the wills.
Later, Evelyns mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for
reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was
not an heir according to New York law. He contended that
since the wills were executed in New York, New York law
should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he
and his brothers and sisters were Joses heirs and as such
entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud
failed to give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her
daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance
with New York law. But before she could present evidence to
prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already issued
an order, disallowing the wills.
Issue: Whether or not reprobate of the wills should be
allowed.
Held:
Extrinsic

Validity

of

Wills

of

Non-Resident

Aliens

The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were

American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon
compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:

Page | 18

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in

the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the
law of the place in which he resides, or according to
the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with
those which this Code prescribes.
Thus,
proof
that
both
wills conform with
the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine
laws is imperative.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the
Philippines
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills
which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as
follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with
the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the
foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been
admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the
foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a
foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran
Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429;
Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil.
610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the
petitioner
submitted
all
the
needed
evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon
which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled
by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.
On Lack of Notice to Joses Heirs
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching
on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered
herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because
she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan,
she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only
impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose
order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party
(Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate
of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an
original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court,
Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will
probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original
will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time.
Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76,
which require publication and notice by mail or personally to
the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the
petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary
to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and
place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of
the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be
addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees,
and devisees of the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE.
Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within

which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the

wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers
and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and
copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
39. Gonzales vs CA (1979)
Facts:
Private respondent Lutgarda Santiago
Court of First Instance (CFI), Rizal
alleged to have been executed by the
and designating petitioner Rizalina
beneficiary and executrix.

filed a petition with the

for the probate a will
deceased Isabel Gabriel
Gonzales as principal

Gonzales, however, opposed the probate. Her main point

of contention was that the proponent failed to submit proof
that the three instrumental witnesses were credible
witnesses. According to her, unless the qualifications of the
witness are first established, his testimony may not be
favorably considered. She also claimed that credible (found
in Art. 805) is not synonymous with competent (found in Art.
820)
The trial court rejected the probate of the will, and the
Court of Appeals reversed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Civil Code requires proof of
credibility of the instrumental witnesses.
Held: No. In the strict sense, the competency of a person to
be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the
statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his
credibility depends on the appreciation of his testimony and
arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said
witness is telling the truth. "Competency as a witness is one
thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible
that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may
allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter
because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether
to believe or not to believe his testimony."
In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses
in Order to be competent must be shown to have the
qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of
the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony
to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence,
it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record
that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or
that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy
and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the
contrary is established otherwise.
In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be
competent and their testimonies must be credible before the
court allows the probate of the will they have attested. We,
therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was fatal for
respondent not to have introduced prior and independent
proof of the fact that the witnesses were "credible witnesses
that is, that they have a good standing in the community and
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
40. Unson vs Abella (1922) Gonzales vs CA (1979)

Page | 19

Facts:
Dona Josefa Zalamea executed a last will and testament in
which she appointed Pedro Unson as executor of the will.
Thus, Unson filed a petition for the probate of the wil before
the CFI. Some relatives (Antonio Abella et al) of the testator
opposed the will. During trial, one of the instrumental
witnesses, Pedro de Jesus, was not presented, and the
oppositors took exception to this. The proponent contended
that he had to omit the testimony of Pedro de Jesus because
he was openly hostile to the proponent.
The trial court admitted the wil for probate. Hence, this
appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the omission of Pedro de Jesuss
testimony invalidates the will.
Held: No. As announced in Cabang vs. Delfinado, supra, the
general rule is that, where opposition is made to the probate
of a will, the attesting witnesses must be produced. But there
are exceptions to this rule, for instance, when a witness is
dead, or cannot be served with process of the court, or his
reputation for truth has been questioned or he appears hostile
to the cause of the proponent. In such cases, the will may be
admitted to probate without the testimony of said witness, if,
upon the other proofs adduced in the case, the court is
satisfied that the will has been duly executed. Wherefore, we
find that the non-production of the attesting witness, Pedro de
Jesus, as accounted for by the attorney for the proponent at
the trial, does not render void the decree of the court a quo,
allowing the probate.
Side Issue:
The appellants impeach the credibility of Eugenio Zalamea, for having made a
sworn declaration before the justice of the peace of Santa Cruz, Laguna, before
the trial of this case, to the effect that he was really one of the witnesses to the
will in question, which fact was corroborated by himself at the trial. The
appellants take Zalamea's testimony in connection with the dismissal of a
criminal case against a nephew of his, in whose success he was interested, and
infer from this fact the partiality of his testimony. We deem this allegation of
little importance to impeach the credibility of the witness Zalamea, especially
because his testimony is corroborated by the other attesting witness. Gonzalo
Abaya, and by attorney Luis Abaya, who had prepared the testament at the
instance of the testatrix. The foregoing is sufficient for us to conclude that the
first assignment of error made by the appellants is groundless.

41. Maloto vs CA (1988)

Facts:
Adriana Maloto died leaving as heir her niece and nephew, the
petitioners (Aldina and Constancio) and respondents (Panfilo
and Maloto). As they thought that Adriana left no will, they
filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunts
estate. The trial court approved an extrajudicial settlement
among the four. But three years later, a document purporting
to be the last will and testament of Adriana was discovered by
an associate of Adrianas late counsel. The will bequeathed
more properties to petitioners than it did respondents.
Naturally, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and
annulment of the intestate proceedings. The trial court denied
their motion, and when the case reached the Supreme Court,

the latter dismissed the case and adviced that a separate

proceeding for the probate of the alleged will was proper.
When petitioners petitioned for the probate of the alleged
will, the trial court held that the will was already revoked by
the testatrix on account that the alleged will was supposedly
burned by Adrianas househelp. CA affirmed, holding that
despite the inconclusiveness of the matter on whether the will
was burned, still the presence of animus revocandi in the
destruction of the will had, nevertheless, ben sufficiently
proven. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the will was revoked.
Held: No. The Court said that the CA contradicted itself in its
ruling. Citing Art. 830 of the Civil Code, the Court said: It is
clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning
in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation,
unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the
part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical
destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be
performed by another person but under the express direction
and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without
saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to
revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that
requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only
one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a
last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be
accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing,
obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or
by another person in his presence and under his express
direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with
these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned
by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily
established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana
Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been
done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the
burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe
and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones
present at the place where the stove (presumably in the
kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will
were burned.
The respondent appellate court in assessing the evidence
presented by the private respondents as oppositors in the trial
court, concluded that the testimony of the two witnesses who
testified in favor of the will's revocation appear "inconclusive."
We share the same view. Nowhere in the records before us
does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de
Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably
positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will.
Guadalupe, we think, believed that the papers she destroyed
was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her
so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the
burned document was the will because Guadalupe told him so,
thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay. At this
juncture, we reiterate that "(it) is an important matter of public
interest that a purported win is not denied legalization on
dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of

Page | 20

testamentary succession will be shaken to its very foundations

...."
42. Molo vs Molo (1951)
Facts:
Mariano Molo, who died in 1941, left two wills: one
executed on Aug. 17, 1918 and the other on June 20, 1939.
The 1939 will contained a revocatory clause, revoking the 1918
will. Marianos wife, Juana filed a petition for the probate of
the 1939 will, which was granted. But due to the opposition of
Marianos nieces and nephew, the case was reopened and
eventually the probate of the will was denied, because the one
and only testamentary disposition thereof was a dispocicion
captatoria (any disposition made upon the condition that the
heir shall make some provision in his will in favor of the
testator or any other person).
So, later on, Juan filed another petition for the probate of
Marianos will, this time the one executed in 1918. The nieces
and nephew again opposed, claiming that despite the
disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocatory clause is still
valid. To support their cause, they claimed that Mariano
deliberately destroyed the 1918 will.
The trial court admitted the probate of the 1918 will.
Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will should be considered
revoked by virtue of the revocatory clause of 1939 will despite
of the latters disallowance.
Held: No. A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a
previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it
was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills,
cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will,
inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void. Such was the ruling
in the case of Samson vs Naval. It is based on the premise that
where the second will is invalid on account of not being
executed in accordance with the provisions of the statute, or
where the testator who has not sufficient mental capacity to
make a will or the will is procured through undue influence, or
the such, in other words, where the second will is really no
will, it does not revoke the first will or affect it in any manner
(Mort vs Baker University).
The oppositors also failed to prove that the testator
deliberately destroyed the 1918 will. But even if, for the sake
of argument, the testator really did destroy the 1918 will, it
would still not have the effect of revoking the same based on
the principle of Dependent Relative Revocation. The doctrine
is as follows: The rule is established that where the act of
destruction is connected with the making of another will so as
fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant the
revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of a new
disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be
conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new
disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be
made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and
the original will remains in full force.

43. Evangelista vs CA (1997)

Facts:
Carmen Caiza, a 94-year old spinster and a retired
Pharmacy professor of UP was declared incompetent by the
trial court in a guardianship proceeding in which Amparo
Evangelista was appointed a legal guardian of her estate.
Some time in the past, Caiza allowed Pedro and Leonora
Estrada and their children to temporarily reside in her house
for free. But Evanglista deemed it proper to take back the
house for the use of Caiza, as well as to raise funds for the
medical expenses of Caiza whose health was already ailing due
to her cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia.
The Estrada spouses, however, refused to leave, claiming
that the house was bequeathed to them by virtue of a
document purporting to be a holographic will allegedly
executed by Caiza.
Caiza, through Evangelista, filed an action for unlawful
detainer against the spouses. The MeTC ruled in favor of
Caiza, but the RTC and the CA both ruled in favor of the
Estrada spouses, holding that the proper action should be
accion publiciana and not an ejectment suit, because they
have not been in the subject premises as mere tenants but as
a sort of adopted family. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the house was bequeathed to the
spouses.
Held: No. At the onset, the Court ruled that Caiza had a cause
of action for unlawful detainer. And with regard to the alleged
will, the Court said: A will is essentially ambulatory; at any
time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or
revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law
being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.). An owner's intention to confer
title in the future to persons possessing property by his
tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back
possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient.
And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's
resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate
income from the house on account of the physical infirmities
afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
44. Dorortheo vs CA (1999)
Facts:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro
Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without
her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Petitioner
Lourdes Dorotheo filed a petition for the provate of Alejandros
will. Private respondents then filed a motion to declare the will
intrinsically void, which the trial court granted on Jan. 30,
1986. The trial court declared in that order that petitioner is
not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three
legitimate children (petitioners herein). Lourdes appealed to

Page | 21

the CA, which dismissed the appeal. The dismissal became

final and executory on Feb. 3, 1989.
A writ of executrion was issued by the trial court to
implement the CA order. However, Lourdes refused to
surrender to private respondents the TCTs covering the
properties of the late Alejandro. Thus, private respondents
filed a motion for cancellation of the titles and for the issuance
of new titles in their names. An Order was issued on November
29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and
executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order
directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground
that the order was merely interlocutory, hence not final in
character (According to petitioner, an order merely declaring
who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled
cant be the basis of execution). The court added that the
dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the
distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private
respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which
nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and
February 1, 1991.
Petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the
case filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals
was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in
issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to
have no jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to
hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court
of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986
Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will
that was earlier admitted to probate.
Issue: Whether or not a will that was admitted to probate but
declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and
executory still be given effect.
Held: No. It has been consistently held that if no appeal is
taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial court,
the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order
allowing the will became final and the question determined by
the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in
the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of
due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator
acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be
brought into question, all juridical questions in connection
therewith being for once and forever closed. Such final order
makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its
extrinsic validity and due execution.
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals
generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated, particularly on three aspects: (1) whether the will
submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament; (2)
compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of
wills; (3) the testamentary capacity of the testator; and the
due execution of the last will and testament.
The intrinsic validity is
regarding the same may still
been authenticated. Thus, it
an extrinsically valid last

another
be raised
does not
will and

matter and questions

even after the will has
necessarily follow that
testament is always

intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the

testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the
lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to
the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions
thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the
courts had already determined in a final and executory
decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination
having attained that character of finality is binding on this
Court which will no longer be disturbed.
45. Nepomucento vs CA (1985)
Facts:
Martin Jugo died in 1974, leaving a last will and testament
which appointed petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole
executor of his estate. Martin was married to private
respondent Rufina Gomez since 1923, but their marriage
soured, and in 1952, Martin clandestinely married Sofia in
Victoria, Tarlac.
Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will, but
private respondents opposed on the ground that Sofia, being a
mistress, was wanting in integrity.
The trial court denied probate on the ground that the
testator admitted in his will to cohabiting with the petitioner.
Hence, the wills admission to probate will be an idle exercise
because on the face of the will it is intrinsically invalid. On
appeal, the CA declared the will to bevalid except that the
devise in favor of Sofia was held to be void pursuant to Art.
739 of the Civil Code. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with
jurisdiction when it passed upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision in favor of Sofia.
Held: Yes. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the
court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof.
The testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with
the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the
only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any
inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of
the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.
The exception to the abovementioned rule is that when on
the face of the will it appears to be intrinsically void, because
in such case, the probate of the will would become an idle
cerymony.
Applying such principles in this case, it was very evident
that the devise in favor of Sofia was void for violating Art. 739
in relation to Art. 1028. Hence, it was proper for the CA to rule
on the intrinsic validity upon the subject testamentary
provision.
46. Nuguid vs Nuguid (1966)
Facts:
Rosario Nuguid died single without descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. Suriving her were her parents and six
brother and sisters. Later on, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed
a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly
executed by Nosario 11 years before she died. The will
instituted Remedios as universal heir of the deceased.
Rosarios parents opposed the will, contending that they were

Page | 22

illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is

void.

Issue: Whether or not the lack of support of the one or more

of the attesting witnesses is fatal to the probate of the will.

The trial court held that the will is a complete nullity.

Hence, this appeal.

Held: No. These circumstances and other incidents revealed in

the proof leave no room for doubt in our mind that Syyap and
Vergel de Dios have entered into a conspiracy between
themselves, and in concert with the opponents, to defeat the
will of Gregorio Tolentino although they are well aware that
said will was in all respects properly executed; and the trial
court, in our opinion, committed no error in admitting the will
to probate.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court was correct in ruling on

the intrinsic validity of the will, despite the principle which
provides that the probate courts area of inquiry is limited to
the extrinsic validity of the will.
Held: Yes. We pause to reflect. If the case were to be
remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On
the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught
that appears in the record, in the record, in the event of
probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that
the case will come up once again before us on the same issue
of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste of
time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the
practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we
might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a
justiciable controversy crying for solution.
Side Issue:
The issue with regard to preterition: Remedios contended that theres no
preterition here but only ineffective disinheritance. But the Supreme Court did
not agree. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate,
but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, and her
holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names
altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective
disinheritance. Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein,
or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir
and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or
bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate
succession ensues.

47. Tolentino vs Francisco (1932) How To Get Away With

Murder
Facts:
Gregorio Tolentino was a rich widower. He has no children.
And by his generous nature, he allowed his wifes kin to live
with him at his home. At one point, he contemplated leaving
his properties to them. But grave disagreements strained such
relations. Thus, he desired to make a new will in which the
bulk of his estate, worth around P150,000, should be given to
Adelaida Tolentino de Concepcion as his universal heir. For the
purpose of making a new will, Greg consulted with his lawyer,
Eduardo Repide. Greg executed the will in a in Vicente
Legardas office. The attesting witnesses were Jose Syyap,
Agustin Vergel de Dios, and Vicente Legarda. A few days after
the execution of the will, Greg was found dead in his bed,
having perished by the hands of an assassin.
Thereafter, Adelaida Tolentino filed a petition for the
probate of the will of Greg. It was opposed by the cousins and
relatives of Greg. The peculiarity of this case is that upon the
trial of this proceeding, two of the attesting witnesses, Jose
Syyap and Vergel de Dios, repudiated their participation in the
execution of the will.
The Court admitted the will for probate. Hence, this
appeal.

When a will is contested it is the duty of the proponent to

call all of the attesting witnesses, if available but the validity of
the will in no wise depends upon the united support of the will
by all of those witnesses. A will may be admitted to probate
notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the subscribing
witnesses do not unite with the other, or others, in proving all
the facts upon which the validity of the will rests. (Fernandez
vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil., 380.) It is sufficient if the court is
satisfied from all the proof that the will was executed and
attested in the manner required by law. In this case we feel
well assured that the contested will was properly executed and
the order admitting to it probate was entirely proper.
(Note: Ang labo ng case. Parang short story. But I guess the
contention of the oppositors had something to do with the fact
that the two attesting witnesses denied participation in the
execution of the will.)
48. Mercado vs Santos (1938)
Facts:
Petitioner Antilano Mercado filed a petition for the probate of
the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa. It was not opposed,
hence, the will was admitted to probate. Three years later, five
intervenors moved ex parte to reopen the proceedings,
alleging lack of jurisdiction. The order was denied. This issue
reached the Supreme Court, the order of denial was affirmed
in the end. Sixteen months after the probate of the will, one of
the intervenors, Rosario Basa de Leon, filed a complaint for
falsification against petitioner. He was arrested for a total of
four times in a span of three years as the case was repeatedly
dismissed and revived. Eventually, the case was tried on the
merits, and the petitioner interposed a demurrer on the ground
that the will alleged to have been forged had already been
probated. This was overruled. The CA also ruled against
petitioner. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the probate of Ines Basas will
constitutes as a bar to petitioners criminal prosecution for
falsification of the same will.
Held: Yes. At the onset, the Supreme Court discussed the
nature of probate proceedings as being in rem. This means
that through the publication of the petition for the probate of
the will, the court acquires jurisdiction over all such persons as
are interested in said will; and any judgment that may be
rendered after said proceeding is binding against the whole
world.
The Court also cited SEC. 625 of the then Code of Civil
Procedure: Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to
Execution. No will shall pass either the real or personal
estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First

Page | 23

Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the

allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate
shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Applying the above principles to this case, Antilano cannot
be prosecuted for the crime of falsification of the will of Ines
Basa for the reason that the court has already admitted the
will for probate.
49. Pecson vs Coronel (1923)
Facts:
Dolores Coronel died, leaving a last will and testament in
which she bequeathed her properties to Lorenzo Pecson, the
husband of her niece, Angela Coronel. Thus, Lorenzo filed a
petition for probate of the will, and the collateral relatives of
Dolores opposed, contending that it is not natural for Dolores
to completely exclude her blood relatives from her vast estate,
considering that ties of family relationship in the Philippines are
very strong.
Issue: Whether or not blood is thicker than water in all
instances.
Held: No. The Court considered the fact that Dolores was
suspected some of her nephews as having been accomplices in
a robbery of which she had been a victime.
Also, the liberty to dispose of one's estate by will when
there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the civil Code
in force in the Philippines since 1889. It is so provided in the
first paragraph of article in the following terms: Any person
who was no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his property
or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to acquire it.
As to preference given to Lorenzo Pecson, it is not purely
arbitrary, nor a caprice or a whim of the moment. The proof
adduced by this appelle, although contradicted, shows by a
preponderance of evidence that besides the services which the
opponents admit had been rendered by him to Dolores Coronel
since the year 1914, he had also rendered services prior to
that time and was the administrator and manager of the affairs
of said Dolores in the last years of her life.
50. Acain vs IAC (1987)
Facts:
Petitioner Constantino Acain filed a petition for the
probate of the will of the deceased Nemesio Acain. The will
instituted Constantino and his siblings as universal heirs.
Actually, the univesal heir was originally Nemesios brother,
Segunda. But Segunda predeceased Nemesio, hence, the
properties went to Segundas children, Constantino et al.
Opposing the probate was Virginia Fenrandez, the legally
adopted daughter of Nemesio, and the latters widow, Rosa
Diongson. They filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
preterition. The trial court denied the motion. So the filed a
petition for certiorary and prohibition, which was granted by
IAC. Hence, this petition by Constantino.
Issue: Whether or not Virginia was preterited.
Held: Yes. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's
will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they
are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are

neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.

Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code
may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the
testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise,
even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no
preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she
is not in the direct line. But the same thing cannot be said of
the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal
adoption by the testator has not been questioned by
petitioner. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted
person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir
of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted
and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted
child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime.
Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the
legally adopted child.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his
brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator
results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of
such institution of universal heirs-without any other
testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration
that nothing at all was written.
Side Issue(s):
Petitioners argued that private respondents availment of
certiorari was wrong as it should have just appealed. But the
Court disagreed, saying that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it admitted a will for probate when it
was a patent nullity.
51. Neri vs Atukin (1941)
Facts:
This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all
his property by universal title to the children by his second
marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the
children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The
omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the
testator with the belief that he had already given each of the
children portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he had
abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which
registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land,
and an aggregate amount of money which the respondents
were indebted to their father.
The trial court found, contrary to what the testator had
declared in his will, that all his children by the first and second
marriages intestate heirs of the deceased without prejudice to
one-half of the improvements introduced in the properties
during the existence of the last conjugal partnership, which
should belong to Ignacia Akutin. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's decision with the modification that the will was
"valid with respect to the two-thirds part which the testator
could freely dispose of. "This judgment of the Court of Appeals
is now sought to be reviewed in this petition for certiorari.
Issue: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the
omission of heirs? Is there disinheritance in this case?

Page | 24

Held: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and

declared a total intestacy on the ground that testator left all his
property by universal title to the children by his second
marriage, without expressly disinheriting the children by his
first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had given
them already more shares in his property than those given to
the children by his second marriage. Disinheritance made
without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul the
institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the
disinherited person. This is but a case of preterition which
annuls the institution of heirs.
52. Viado Non vs CA (2000)
Facts:
The subject property of this suit was a house and lot located in
La Loma, Quezon City owned by the spouses Julian and
Virginia Viado. They eventually died. Surviving them were their
childrenNilo, Leah, Rebecca and Delia. Nilo and Leah both
died. Surving Nilo was his wife Alicia and their two children
Cherri and Fe.
Petitioners in this case were Rebecca (and his husband)
and Delia, while the private respondents were Alicia, Cherri
and Fe. Petitioners and respondents had shared a common
residence but tension between them arose as Rebecca had
asked that the property be divided between the two families to
make room for the growing children. Respondents later on
claimed absolute ownership, and demanded petitioners to
vacate the area occupied. Thereafter, petitioners filed an
action for partition before the Quezon City RTC. Respondents
contended that the late Julian Viado executed a deed of
donation covering his one-half conjugal share of the subject
property in favor of Nilo; and that the other members of the
family had waived in favor of Nilo the rest of the portion of the
subject property through an extrajudicial settlement. Both
instruments were executed on 26 August 1983 and registered
on 07 January 1988 by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 42682 was cancelled and new Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 373646 was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado.
Petitioners attacked the validity of the instruments; and one of
her contentions was that the exclusion of her retardate sister,
Delia, in the extrajudicial settlement resulted in her peterition
that warrants its annulment.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondents, adjudging
Alicia and her children as the true owners of the subject
property. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not there is preterition and would it warant
a collateral attack on the Torrens title covering the subject
property.
Held: Yes and no. The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado,
alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial
settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of
preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad
faith, does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by
the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil
Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by
bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the
preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining
to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted properly in

ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to

make the proper valuation of the Isarog property and
ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.
53. De Perez vs Garchitorena (1930)
Facts:
Carmen De Perez has P21,428.50 deposited in her name with
the association known as La Urbana. It represented the
liquidated credit of the deceased Ana Maria Alcantara, whose
heiress was Carmen, against Andres Garchitorena (also
deceased, represented by his son, Mariano Garchitorena).
Meanwhile, Mariano obtained a judgment for P7,872.23
against the husband of Carmen. Pursuant to a writ of
execution, the sherrief levied an attachment on the said
amount deposited with La Urbana.
Carmen secured a preliminary injunction to restrain the
execution of the judgment. She contended that the deposit
belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana. On
the other hand, Mariano argued that Carmen was the
decedents universal heiress, and prayed for the dissolution of
the injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of Carmen. Hence,
this appeal.
Issue: Whether the La Urbana deposite belongs to Carmen or
to her children as fideicommissary heirs.
Held: It belongs to Carmens children as fideicommissary
heirs. Citing Manresa, the Court enumerated the requisites for
fideicommissary substition, to wit:
1.

A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the

estate;

2.

An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve

and trnsmit to a 3rd person the whole or a part of the
estate

3.

A second heir;

4.

The fideicommissarius be entitled to the estate from

the time the testator dies, since he is to inherit from
the latter and not from the fiduciary

The relevant portion of Anas will provides:

IX. Being single and without any forced heir, to show my
gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of
age, married to my nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara, and
living in this same house with me, I institute her as my
sole and universal heiress to the remainder of my estate
after the payment of my debts and legacies, so that upon
my death and after probate of this will, and after the
report of the committee on claims and appraisal has been
rendered and approved, she will receive from my executrix
and properties composing my hereditary estate, that she
may enjoy them with God's blessing and my own.
X. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order
that my whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her
surviving children; and should any of these die, his share
shall serve to increase the portions of his surviving
brothers (and sisters) by accretion, in such wise that my
estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or
her children in so far as it is legally possible.

Page | 25

XI. Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen Garchitorena, die

after me while her children are still in their minority, I
order that my estate be administered by my executrix,
Mrs. Josefa Laplana, and in her default, by Attorney
Ramon Salinas and in his default, by his son Ramon
Salinas; but the direction herein given must not be
considered as an indication of lack of confidence in my
nephew Joaquin Perez Alcantara, whom I relieve from the
duties of administering my estate, because I recognize
that his character is not adapted to management and
administration.
The fact that the plaintiff was instituted the sole and
universal heiress does not prevent her children from receiving,
upon her death and in conformity with the express desire of
the testatrix, the latter's hereditary estate, as provided in the
following (above quoted) clauses which cannot be disregarded
if we are to give a correct interpretation of the will. The word
sole does not necessarily exclude the idea of substitute heirs;
and taking these three clauses together, such word means that
the plaintiff is the sole heiress instituted in the first instance.
And the fact that the will provides that the Crmane shall
receive and enjoy the estate bolsters the conclusion that a
fideicommissary substition was intended. She may enjoy it, but
she may not dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct
inherent in feideicommissary substition.
Clause X expressly provides for the substitution. It is true
that it does not say whether the death of the heiress herein
referred to is before or after that of the testatrix; but from the
whole context it appears that in making the provisions
contained in this clause X, the testatrix had in mind a
fideicommissary substitution, since she limits the transmission
of her estate to the children of the heiress by this provision, "in
such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of
my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally possible."
Here it clearly appears that the testatrix tried to avoid the
possibility that the substitution might later be legally declared
null for transcending the limits fixed by article 781 of the Civil
Code which prescribed that fideicommissary substitutions shall
be valid "provided they do not go beyond the second degree."
Another
clear
and
outstanding
indication
of
fideicommissary substitution in clause X is the provision that
the wholeestate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children,
that is to say the heiress is required to preserve the whole
estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to
the fideicommissary heirs. This provision complies with another
of the requisites of fideicommissary substitution according to
our quotation from Manresa inserted above.
Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of
fideicommissary substitution, when a provision is therein made
in the event the heiress should die after the testatrix. That is,
said clause anticipates the case where the instituted heiress
should die after the testatrix and after receiving and enjoying
the inheritance.
54. Rabadilla vs CA (2000)
Facts:
This case is about the last will and testament of Aleja Belleza.
In her codicil, she bequeathed two parcels of land in Bacolod
to Jorge Rabadilla. It was provided in the codicil that should

Jorge die ahead of the testator, the property properties shall

be inherited and acknolwedge by the children and spouse of
Jorge. The testator also imposed obligations and conditions
upon Jorge:

Every year, he must give to Maria Marlina

Conscolluela 75 piculs of export sugar and 25 piculs
of domestic sugar until Maria dies.

Should Jorge die, his heir shall have the obligation to

still give the sugar to Maria.

The property shall not be sold, leased, mortgaged, to

anybody except for the testators near decendants
and her sister. And that should the property be sold,
leased, mortgaged as buyer, lessee, mortgagee, as
the case may be, must give 100 piculs of sugar every
year (75 piculs of export and 25 piculs of domestic).

Should any of the conditions in the will be violated,

Maria Marlena may immediately seize the properties.

Jorge eventually died and was survived by his wife and

children, among whom was Johnny (petitioner herein).
Maria Marlena sued the heirs of Jorge, alleging that the
conditions provided in Alejas will was violated. She claimed
that one of the lands was mortgaged to the PNB and Republic
Planters Bank, and they failed to comply with their obligation
to deliver the 100 piculs of sugar.
Meanwhile, Maria and Johnnys son-in-law entered into a
compromise agreement with regard to the delivery of sugar.
But there was no compliance with the agreement except for a
partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar correspondeing to
sugar crop year 1988-1989.
The trial court ruled in favor of Johnny, holding that the
action was prematurely filed, and that Maria must instead
initiate intestate proceedings to establish the heirs of Jorge
Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to
her claim under the codicil. The CA reversed. Hence, this
petition. Johnny claimed that Art. 882 of the Civil Code
regarding modal institution is not applicable as this was a case
of substitution.
Issue: Whether or not this was a case of modal institution
governed by Art. 882.
Held: Yes. Substitution is the designation by the testator of a
person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first
instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may
either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom
the property shall pass in case the original heir should die
before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated
to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her
property to one person with the express charge that it be
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a
fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil sued upon
contemplates neither of the two.
The Court noted that this case can not be that of a
fideicommissary substitution because one important element is
missing. Under Article 863, the second heir or the
fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not
be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A
fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is

Page | 26

not related by first degree to the second heir. In the case

under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to
the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court said that the CA was correct in applying Art.
882 of the Civil Code. The institution of an heir in the manner
prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of
succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution.
In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the
institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left
by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator
upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir
or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the
succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary
disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order
for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The
condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode
obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to
a resolutory condition.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be
gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject
property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise
clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the
said instituted heir and his successors-in- interest to deliver
one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent,
Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter.
However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's
inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee,
dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is
clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with,
the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it
imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however,
affecting the efficacy of such institution.
55. Morente vs De La Santa (1907)
Facts:
The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clause:
1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to
me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa.
2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after
my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; should my
said husband have children by anyone, he shall not
convey any portion of the property left by me, except the
one-third part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall
be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children
should he have any.

Held: No. The Court conceded that testamentary provisions

may be made conditional and that the Civil Code provides that
a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be
validly imposed upon the widow or widower. But in this case, it
cannot be said that Consuelo intended to impose a conidition
upon the absolute gift.
A simple reading of Consuelos will shows that the only
prohibition which attaches a condition is that he should not
have any other children. Here, it is neither alleged nor proven
that any children have been born to Gumerisino.
There being no express condition attached to that legacy
in reference to the second marriage, we cannot say that any
conidition can be implied from the context of the will.
56. Rosales vs Rosales (1987)
Synopsis: The widow/widower to a deceased child of the
decedent is not a compulsory heir of the latter.
Facts:
A Cebuana named Petra Rosales died intestate. Surviving her
was her husband, Fortunato, and their two childrenMagna
and Antonio. She had another child named Carterio, but he
predeceased her. Carterio was survived by his widow, Irenea,
and their daughter, Macikequerox (lets just call her Maci).
Intestate proceedings were instituted by Magna, and the
judge declared the heirs respective shares as follows:
Fortunato (1/4), Magna (1/4), Maci (1/4) and Antonio (1/4).
Thereafter, Irenea insisted in getting a share, claiming that she
was a compulsory heir of the deceased, purusant to Art.
887(3).
The trial court denied Ireneas plea. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Irena, the widow of Carterio, is a
compulsory heir.
Held: No.
The widow or widower referred to in Art. 887 pertains to the
widow or widower of the decedent. There is no provision in the
Civil Code which states that a widow is an intestate heir of her
mother-in-law.
57. Baritua vs CA (1990)
Facts:
A tricycle was being driven by Bienvenido Nacario in Camarines
Sur when it was hit by a bus driven by Edgar Bitancor and
owned by Jose Baritua.

3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the

camarin in which the bakery is located, which is one of the
properties belonging to me.

Edgar and Jose settled with Biens widow, Alicia, for

P18,500. Alicia then executed a release of claim in favor of
the two. Later on, the parents of Bien filed a complaint for
damages against Edgar and Jose.

It so happened that Gumersindo remarried four months

after the death of Consuelo. Thus, Consuelos sister, Elena,
filed a petition in the probate proceedings to annul the legacy
given to him by the testator. The trial court ruled against
Elena.

The trial court dismissed the complaint on the basis of

payment made to Alicia and her child, who are the preferred
heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased. The CA
reversed, holding that the present action was instituted by
Biens parents in their own capacity and not as heirs of Bien.

Issue: Whether or not Gumerisinos remarrying would warrant

the annulment of the legacy in his favor.

Issue: Whether or not the action of Biens parents would

prosper.

Page | 27

Held: No.

Synopsis:

In ruling against Biens parents, the Court answered the

following questions: (1) Was the obligation of Edgar and Jose
extinguished by payment?; (2) Was there proper payment?;
and (3)Was Alicia and her son successors in interest refered to
in law as the persons authorized to receive payment? The
court answered in the affirmative to all those questions.

Juiliana Alfeo (son) Francisco (husband) Jose

(Franciscos son with his second wife). The four nations lived in
harmony. Then everything changed, when Segunda Maria
Nieva (Julianas illegitimate daughter) attacked.

Biens parents claim that Alicia was already estranged

from Bien. But mere estrangement is not a legal ground for
disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the
deceased spouse.
58. Francisco vs Francisco (2001)
Facts:

Facts:
Juliana Nieva was married to Francisco Deocampo. Of said
marriage, Alfeo was born. When Julian died intestate, Alfeo
inherited parcels of land. When Alfeo died intestate and
without issue, the lands passed to his father, Francisco.
Thereafter, Francico married Manuela Alcala, of which
marriage was born Jose. When Francisco died intestate, the
lands passed to Jose.

Gregorio Francisco had a daughter named Aida with his legal

wife (Cirila), and had seven children with his common law wife
(Julia). Two of those children were Regina and Zeneida.

Later on, Segunda Maria Nieva, who was able to prove

that she was a natural daughter of Juliana with an unknown
father, surfaced and sued Manuela Alcala and Jose to recover
from them the parcels of land. She invoked reserva troncal.

Before Gregorio died intestate, he confided to Aida that

the certificates of title of his two parcels of land were in the
possession of Regina and Zenaida.

The trial court dismissed Segundas complaint, because an

illegitimate relative has no right to reserva troncal. Hence, this
petition.

Aida discovered that Gregorio supposedly had sold the

land in favor of Regina and Zenaida for 25,000. Hence, she
filed a complaint to annul the said sale.

Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate relative, such as

Segunda here, has the right to reserva troncal.

The trial court dismissed the complaint, but it was

reversed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or notthe sale is valid.
Held: No.
The sale was simulated as it was proven that Zenaida and
Regina did not have any sufficient source of income during the
period were the alleged sale was consummated. Zenaida
claimed that she was a cashier in a night club and sold ready
to wear items, while Regina worked as a market vendor.
And even if the sale was not simulated, it still violated the
Civil Code provisions insofar as the transaction affected
respondents legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when
the applicable law was the Civil Code and not the Family Code.
[See query]
Query: In the book of Atty. Balane, he said there that the
testator is not prohibited from disposing the legitimes by
onerous title, citing jusrisprudence to the effect that [w]hen
the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no
diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values,
that is, the property sold is replace by the equivalent monetary
consideration.
So, what do we make of the Baritua ruling where the SC
said that even if the sale was not simulated, it still violated the
Civil Code? Was it just an obiter, considering that the main
ruling is that the sale was simulated?
Also, the testator is required to set aside or reserve the
legitime. What does this mean, really? How would one, whos
still alive, know the legitime? Isnt it just an abstract concept
which can be determined upon the death of the decedent?
59. Nieva vs Alcala (1920)

Held: No. Theres a principle permeating the Civil Code to the

effect that the legitimate relationship forms the general rule
and the natural relationship the exception.
The SC said that the reservation in reserva troncal is
established in favor of the parents who are within the third
degree and belong to the line from which the properties came.
It treats of blood relationshipand it also treats of legitimate
relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate
ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which
proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true,
there can be no question, because the line from which the
properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in
favor of that line is the reservation is established. The purpose
of this is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family.
60. Florentino vs Florentino (1919)
Synopsis:
How does a reservable property lose its character as such?
When all the reservatarios are gone and not because the
ascendant disposed of it by virtue of a will.
Facts:
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married twicethe first with
Antonia Faz de Leon and the second with Severina Faz de
Leon. During the first marriage, he begot nine children (the
petitioners in this case). And, during the second marriage, he
bogot two childrenMercedes, and Apolonio III who was born
after Apolonio II died.
Before his death, Apolonio II executed a will instituting as
his universal heirs his 10 children, the posthumos Apolonio III
and his widow Severina. He declared that all his property
should be divided among all of his children of both marriages.
Apolonio III inherited a gold rosary, pieces of gold and silver,
and of table service, livestock, palay, etc.

Page | 28

Apolonio III died, hence the property passed to her

mother Severina. Severina died, leaving a will instituting as her
universal heriress her only living daughter, Mercedes, who
pursuant to that will also received the properties originally
inherited by Apolonio III.
Petitioners then filed an action to recover from Mercedes
the property, which they claimed was reservable property,
under the principle of reserva troncal. Mercedes demurred,
claiming that reserva trocal was not applicable anymore,
considering that the property has passed on to her by virtue of
testacy from her mother, and for such reason the properties
lost the character of reservable properties.
The trial court sustained the demurrer of Mercedes.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the properties subeject of this dispute
lost the character of being reservable by reason of the fact
that it passed on to Mercedes from her mother by virtue of a
will.
Held: No.
When Apolonio II died, the subject property was inherited by
his mother, Severina. But that is not the end of it. Severina
was duty bound, according to the Civil Code, to reserve the
property thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives, within
the third degree, of the line from which such property came.
Any ascendants who inherits from his descendant any
property, while there are living, within the third degree,
relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a
fiduciary of the reservable property received. He is, however,
the legitimate owner of his owner of his own property which is
not reservable property and which constitutes his legitime?
But supposing all the relatives within the third degreee of
the descendant (from whom came the reservable property) die
or disapear, the said property becomes free propety, by
operation of law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of
the ascendant heir who can transmit it t his death to his
legitimate successors or testamentary heirs. This is how a
reservable property loses is character as such. But thats not
what happened in this case.
What of the will executed of Severina? The provisions of
the will converning the reservable property is void inasumuch
as said property is not her own and she has only the right of
usufruct or of fiduciary with the obligation to preserve and to
deliver the same to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own
daughter, Mercedes.
61. Celedonia Solivio vs CA and Concordia Javellana
Villanueva (1990)
Facts:
Esteban Javellana, Jr., a famous novelist who wrote the
critically acclaimed Without Seeing the Dawn, died intestate
and without issue. His only surviving relatives were Celedonia
Solivio (the half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio) and
Concordia Javellana (the sister of his father). The property
subject of dispute was a parcel of land in Iloilo which Esteban
inherited from his mother.

During Estebans lifetime, he was very vocal of his desire

to put up a foundation in his mothers name to help poor but
deserving students obtain a college education. Thus, Celedonia
and Esteban both agreed that the whole estate of Esteban
would be used for the foundation. They also agreed that
Celedonia would take care of the proceedings. Thus, in good
faith, Celedonia was appointed the special administratrix and
was declared the sole heir of Estebans estate.
Later on, Concordia filed a motion for reconsideration of
the courts order declaring Celedonia as sole heir because
she too was an heir of the deceased. This was denied, so she
instituted a separate action for partition and recovery of the
subject property. This was granted by the RTC. Hence, this
petition by Celedonia, in which she invoked reserva trocal
among others.
Issue: Whether or not reserva troncal is applicable in this
case.
Held: No.
It is clear that Estebans property is not reservable property,
because Esteban was not an ascendant but the descendant of
his mother from whom he inherited the subject property.
Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a
reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia, who is a relative
within the third degree on his mothers side. The reserva
troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a
descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or brother
or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a
descendant from his ascendant.
Celedonia still won in this case on the basis of a judicial
admission by Celedonia in which she expressly stated that she
agreed that her whole share in the estate would go to the
foundation.
Trivia: Salustia Solivio Vda. De Javellana Memorial Foundation
Inc. in Iloilo exists up to this day.
62. Mariquita Sumaya and Laguna Agro vs IAC (1991)
Facts:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two different ascendants two
set of properties, to wit: (1) 1/3 pro-indiviso interest in a
parcel of land in Laguna from his father; and (2) 1/7 proindiviso interest in 10 parcels of land from his maternal
grandmother.
Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving
only his mother, Consuelo, as his sole surving heir to the
properties abovementioned. Thus, the share in the properties
passed to Consuelo, who in turn, sold the property to Mariquita
Sumaya, who then again sold the same to Vila Honorio
Devleopment Corp which transferred and assigned its rights
over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative Inc.
Thereafter, the brothers of Raul Balantakbo and the heirs
of another brother sued Mariquita and Agro to recover the
subject properties which they claimed were subject to a
reserva troncal in their favor. The trial court and the CA ruled
in favor of Rauls brothers. Hence, this petition, in which Agro
contends that they are innocent purchasers for value, because

Page | 29

there was no encumbrance nor any lien annotated on the

certificate of title covering the properties.
Issue: Whether or not Agro is an innocent purchaser for
value.
Held: No. It so happened that the affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by Consuelo stating the source of the properties
[thereby showing the reservable nature thereof] was
registered with the Register of Deeds of laguna, and this
issufficient notice to the whole world in accordance with Sec.
521 of the Property Registration Decree. It wasnt Consuelos
fault that the Register of deeds failed to annotate the
reservable character of the property. And besides, in the deed
of sale executed by Consuel in favor of Mariquita, there was a
provision there indicating the reservable character of the
properties.
However, this ruling does not mean that there is no need
to register the reservable character of the property, if only for
the protection of the reservees against innocent third persons.
It is still possible to lose a reservable property in favor of
innocent purchasers for value. Its just that Agro in this case is
not such innocent buyer.
63. Riosa vs Rocha (1926)
Facts:
Mariano Riosa war married to Maria Corral. They had three
childrenSantiago, Jose and Severina. Severina died during
infancy. Santiago, now deceased, married Francisca Villanueva,
who bore him two children named Magin and Consolacion
Riosa, while Jose Riosa, also deceased, married Marcelina
Casas and they had one child who predeceased her father.
Mariano left a will, dividing his property between Santiago
and Jose. Upon the death of Jose, he left a will in which he
named his wife, Marcelina, as his only heir. Despite the
preterition of Joses mother, Maria Corral, Marcelina and Maria
Corral entered into an extrajudicial settlement dividing the
property left by Jose among themselves on the same date of
the filing of the will for probate.
Maria sold the property (which consists of lands 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 10 and 11) to Marcelina Casas, who in turn sold the same
to Pablo Rocha for P60,000. Rocha returned lands 1, 2, 3, 4
and 6 to Maria.
Thereafter, Magin Riosa, for whom the aforesaid property
should have been reserved via reserva troncal, filed an action
against Maria Corral, Marcelina, and Rocha. The complaint
prays that the property therein described be declared
reservable property and that the plaintiffs Jose and
Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees; that this reservation
be noted in the registry of deeds; that the sale of parcels 10
and 11 to Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be declared valid
only in so far as it saves the right of reservation in favor of the
plaintiff Magin Riosa and of the defendant Consolacion Riosa,
and that this right of reservation be also noted on the deeds of
sale executed in favor of Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha;

Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or

entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be
constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.

that Maria Corral, Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha give a

bond of P50,000, with good and sufficient sureties, in favor of
the reservees as surety for the conservation and maintenance
of the improvements existing on the said reservable property.
Issues:
1.

Whether or not Rocha can be compelled to note the

reservation in the titled. Yes.

2.

Whether or not Maria Corral must put up a bond.

No.

Held:
But the land first passed to Marcelina Casas and later to Pablo
Rocha together with the obligation that the law imposes upon
Maria Corral. They could not have acquired a better title than
that held by Maria Corral and if the latter's title was limited by
the reservation and the obligation to note it in the registry of
deeds, this same limitation is attached to the right acquired by
Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha.
The fact that the resolvable character of the property was
not recorded in the registry of deed at the time that it was
acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha cannot affect the
right of the reservees, for the reason that the transfers were
made at the time when it was the obligation of the reservor to
note only such reservation and the reservees did not them
have any right to compel her to fulfill such an obligation.
With regard to the bond contention, the Court said: ).
There is no ground for this requirement inasmuch as, the
notation once is made, the property will answer for the efficacy
of the reservation. This security for the value of the property is
required by law (art. 978, paragraph 4, of the Civil Code) in
the case of a reservation by the surviving spouse when the
property has been sold before acquiring the reservable
character (art 968 of the Civil Code), but is not applicable to
reservation known asreserva troncal (art 811 of the Civil
Code).
In a reservation by the widowed spouse there are two
distinct stages, one when the property goes to the widower
without being reservable, and the other when the widower
contracts a second marriage, whereupon the property, which
theretofore has been in his possession free of any
encumbrance, becomes reservable. These two stages also
affect differently the transfer that may be made of the
property. If the property is sold during the first stage, before
becoming reservable, it is absolutely free and is transferred to
the purchaser unencumbered. But if the sale is made during
the second stage, that is, when the duty to reserve has arisen,
the property goes to the purchaser subject to the reservation,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law.
64. De Papa vs Camacho (1986)
Facts:
This case is a legal dispute between the plaintiffs as the aunt
and uncles of Faustino Dizon and defendant as the niece of
Faustino Dizon.
Faustino died intestate, single and without issue, leaving
his pro-indiviso share in seven parcels of land to his father,
Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said

Page | 30

property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently

annotated on the certificates of title. Eventually, Eustacio also
died intestate, survived by his only legitimate descendant,
Dalisay Tongko (the defendant in this case).
The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial
determination in this case the legal issue of whether defendant
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the
seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs,
as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios
(together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso
share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his
son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said
one-half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven
(7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to threeeights (3/8) of the
rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P.
Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land,
minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to
plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiffs. Hence, this
appeal.
Issue: Whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and
ruled by the lower Court, all relatives of the praepositus within
the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without
distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the
reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code,
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said
relatives are subject to, and should be determined by, the
rules on intestate succession.
Held: Reversion of the reservable property is governed by the
rules on intestate succession.
The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to
assure the return of the reservable property to the third
degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property
originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the
relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).
65. Mendoza vs Delos Santos (2013)
Facts:
Placido and Dominga Mendoza had four children: Antonio,
Exequiel (married to Leonor), Apolonio and Valentin. The
petitioners in this case are the children of Antonio, while the
respondent is Julia (the sister of Leonor). Exequiel and Leonor
had a daughter named Gregoria.
The subject matter in this dispute are three parcels of land
originally owned by Placido and Dominga which eventually
passed to the heirs.
What happened was Exequiel and Leonor eventually died,
leaving the properties to Gregoria, who later on also died
intestate and without issue. After her death, Julia adjudicated
unto herself all the properties as the sole surviving heir of
Leonor and Gregoria.
Thus, petitioners (grandchildren of Placido and Dominga,
as well as first cousins of Gregoria) filed a recovery suit against
Julia.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners, while the CA
reversed.

Issue: Whether or not reversa troncal is even applicable in

this case.
Held: No. There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva
troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by
inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a
descendant called the prepositus. The second transmission is
by operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant
or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last
transmission is from the reservista to the reservees or
reservatarios who must be relatives within the third degree
from which the property came.
The fallacy in the CAs resolution is that it proceeded from
the erroneous premise that Placido is the ascendant
contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil Code. From thence, it
sought to trace the origin of the subject properties back to
Placido and Dominga, determine whether Exequiel
predeceased Placido and whether Gregoria predeceased
Exequiel.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the
property should be an ascendant (also known as the
reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia,
however, is not Gregorias ascendant; rather, she is Gregorias
collateral relative.
Gregorias ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and
Leonor, her grandparents, great-grandparents and so on. On
the other hand, Gregorias descendants, if she had one, would
be her children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Not
being Gregorias ascendants, both petitioners and Julia,
therefore, are her collateral relatives. In determining the
collateral line of relationship, ascent is made to the common
ancestor and then descent to the relative from whom the
computation is made. In the case of Julias collateral
relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria
to her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common
ancestor, that is, Julia and Leonors parents (second
line/degree), and then descent to Julia, her aunt (third
line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregorias collateral relative within
the third degree and not her ascendant.
Moreover,
petitioners
cannot
be
considered
reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the
third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The
person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant/prepositusthe one at the end of the line from
which the property came and upon whom the property last
revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are
Gregorias fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First
cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are
not reservees or reservatarios.
Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable
error in the RTCs disposition of the case. In upholding the
right of petitioners over the properties, the RTC ordered the
reconveyance of the properties to petitioners and the transfer
of the titles in their names. What the RTC should have done,
assuming for arguments sake that reserva troncal is
applicable, is have the reservable nature of the property
registered on respondents titles. In fact, respondent, as
reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the
reservable character of the property on the title.24 In reserva
troncal, the reservista who inherits from a prepositus, whether

Page | 31

by the latters wish or by operation of law, acquires the

inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute
ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him
exclusively, subject to a resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee.
66. Llorente vs Rodriguez (1908)

and that she should have the right to inherit from her who
would be called her natural grandmother, representing her
natural mother, is quite another thing. The latter right is not
recognized by the law in force.
Therefore,
affirmed.

the

judgment

appealed

from is hereby

Facts:
Martina Avalle, widow of Llorente, had during her
marriage four legitimate children named Jacinta, Julio, Martin,
and Francisco, all with the surname of Llorente y Avalle. In the
will executed by her on the 31st of December, 1900, she
instituted as her sole and general heirs her three first-named
children, Jacinta, Julio, and Martin, and the children of the late
Francisco, named Soledad and Adela Llorente.
Jacinta died prior to the testatrix, on the 11th of August,
1901, leaving several legitimate children with the surname of
Rodriguez y Llorente, and besides them, a natural daughter
named Rosa Llorente.
The said Rosa Llorente, the natural daughter of Jacinta
Llorente, wanted to become a party in the proceedings for the
probate of the will of Martina Avalle, but the legitimate children
of the said Jacinta Llorente objected thereto on the ground
that they were the sole and exclusive heirs of their mother, the
late Jacinta Llorente, and that the plaintiff, Rosa Llorente,
absolutely cannot be a party thereto. The Court of First
Instance of Cebu, where the will was admitted for probate,
held that Rosa Llorente had no right whatever to the
inheritance of the late Martina Avalle, and denied her all right
to intervene in the proceedings regarding the estate of the said
deceased.
Issue: Whether or not the hereditary portion which Martina
Avalle left in her will to her legitimate daughter Jacinta
Llorente, and which the latter had not been able to possess
because of her death before that of the testatrix, should also
pass to her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente, the same as to
her legitimate children.
Held: No. From the fact that a natural son has the right to
inherit from the father or mother who acknowledged him,
conjointly with the other legitimate children of either of them,
it does not follow that he has the right to represent either of
them in the succession to their legitimate ascendants; his right
is direct and immediate in relation to the father or mother who
acknowledged him, but it cannot be indirect by representing
them in the succession to their ascendants to whom he is not
related in any manner, because he does not appear among the
legitimate family of which said ascendants are the head.
If Jacinta Llorente had survived her mother, Martina
Avalle, she would have inherited from her, and in what she
inherited from her mother, her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente
would have participated, in conjunction with her legitimate
children, from the day in which the succession became
operative, because she would then appear by virtue of her own
right to inherit from her mother the legal quota that pertained
to her; but, not because she has said right, would she also be
entitled to that of representation, inasmuch as there is no legal
provision establishing such a doctrine; that Rosa Llorente
might and should inherit from her natural mother is one thing,

67. Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties Inc vs

Rodriguez
Facts:
The respondents filed a complaint against petitioner
Ramon Ching and certain corporations. The complaint sought
to nullify an extrajudicial settlement of estate which
adjudicated solely to Ramon the entire estate of the deceased
Antonio Ching, as well as other remedies. The respondents
claimed that Ramon murdered Antonio Ching (A criminal case
against Ramon was pending, with Ramon at large. His wife
was the one managing Antonios estate.), hence, he should be
deemed legally disinherited and prohibited from receiving any
share from the estate of Antonio.
The respondents prayed for the following:
a)

Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who

murdered his father ANTONIO CHING disqualified as
heir and from inheriting to (sic) the estate of his
father;

b)

Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON CHING

transfer (sic) of the six [6] parcels of land from the
name of his father ANTONIO CHING to his name
covered by TCT No. x x x;

c)

Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and WAIVER

executed by plaintiffs x x x in favor of x x x RAMON
CHING for being patently immoral, invalid, illegal,
simulated and (sic) sham;

d)

Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares of

stocks at (sic) PO WING from the names of ANTONIO
CHING and LUCINA SANTOS to the defendant
ANTONIOCHING's name for having been illegally
procured through the falsification of their signatures
in the document purporting the transfer thereof;

e)

Declaring the nullity and to have no force and effect

the AFFIDAVIT OF SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE executed
by x x x RAMON CHING for being contrary to law and
existing jurisprudence;

f)

Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic)

executed by x x x RAMON CHING (i) over two (2)
parcels of land x x x to defendant ASIA ATLANTIC
BUSINESS VENTURES, Inc.; and (ii) one (1) parcel of
land x x x sold to x x x ELENA TIU DEL PILAR for
having illegally procured the ownership and titles of
the above properties;

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the

respondents cause of action should be a subject of a special
proceeding since the case involved the alleged disinheritance
of Ramon among others.

Page | 32

The RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents. Hence, this

petition.
Issue: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction.
Held: Yes. Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be
effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor
shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA
that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended
Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any
instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's
estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for
Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not
partake of the nature.
68. Pecson vs Mediavillo (1914)
Facts:
In 1910, the will of Florencio Pecson was presented to the
CFI of Albay for probate. On the 18th day of September, 1910,
the said Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and
Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion alleging that Rosario
Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate child of
the deceased Teresa Pecson. Teresa was a daughter of the
testator; that the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y
Pecson, was disinherited by her grandfather, the testator
Florencio Pecson, according to clause 3 of the will, because
she failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion
raised her hand against him.
In his will, Florencio Pecson stated that he disinherited
Rosario Mediavillo "because she was grossly disrespectful to
me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not
remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore it is my
will that she, the said Rosario Mediavillo, shall have no share in
my property." Lorayes contended that Rosario should not have
been disinherited, because she did not commit such an act of
disrespect, and if perhaps she did, it was due to the
derangement of her mental faculties.
The trial court ruled that the clause disinheriting Rosario
was void for being contrary to law.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the court may inquire to the cause
of the disinheritance and decide whether disinheritance is
proper; (2) Whether or not Basiliso Mediavillo, the father of
Joaquin Mediavillo, is the latters heir by representation.
Held: Yes, the Civil Code (art. 848) provides that
disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes
expressly fixed by law. In accordance with the provisions of
that article (848) we find that articles 756 and 853 provide the
cases or causes for disinheritance; or, in other words, the
cases or causes in which the ancestors may by will disinherit
their heirs.
Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the
disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in which
shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such
disinheritance. If it is true that heirs can be disinherited only
by will, and for causes mentioned in the Civil Code, it would
seen to follow that the courts might properly inquire whether
the disinheritance has been made properly and for the causes
provided for by law.

The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and

whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or
not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the Civil
Code. Article 850 provides that "the proof of the truthfulness of
the reason for disinheritance shall be established by the heirs
of the testator, should the disinherited person deny it." It
would appear then that if the person disinherited should deny
the truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he might be
permitted to support his allegation by proof. The right of the
court to inquire whether or not the disinheritance was made
for just cause is also sustained by the provisions of article 851,
which in part provides that: Disinheritance made without
statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if
contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul the
designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person
disinherited.
With reference to the second assignment of error, The
Supreme Court held that the right of representation shall
always take place in the direct descending line, but never in
the ascending. In collateral lines, it shall take place only in
favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of
the whole or half blood. It will be remembered that the whole
argument of the appellants with reference to the first
assignment of error was that Rosario Mediavillo had been
disinherited and the court evidently believed that there were
no "legitimate children, descendants of the deceased,
surviving," and that therefore the father or mother of said
legitimate children would inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch,
however, as there was a descendant in the direct line,
surviving, the inheritance could not ascend, and for the reason
the lower court committed an error in declaring that Basiliso
Mediavillo was entitled to inherit that share of the estate that
would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been living.
Therefore, and for all the foregoing, that part of the judgment
of the lower court nullifying and setting aside paragraph 3 of
the will is hereby affirmed, and that art of said judgment which
decrees to Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of the estate of
Florencio Pecson, belonging to Teresa Pecson and which would
have been given to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving,
is hereby revoked.
69. Testate Estate of Vicente Singson Pablo vs De Lim
(1943)
Facts:
Don Vicente Singson Pablo died, leaving a will which
contained a clause, which provides: All of my properties not
disposed of otherwise in this testament shall be distributed in
equal parts to all who are entitled thereto. The widow, as
administratrix, presented a project of partition in which the
properties not disposed of were adjudicated to Vicentes four
brothers and four nieces. The brothers objected, saying that
pursuant to the aforesaid clause above, the nieces are not
entitled to anything. They invoked Art. 751 of the Old Civil
Code, which provides that a disposition made in general terms
in favor of the testators relatives shall be understood as made
in favor of those nearest in degree. The trial court ruled
against the brothers.
Issue: Whether or not the brothers contention is meritorious.
Held: No. The testator, by referring to all who are entitled
thereto instead of relatives precisely meant to avoid the

Page | 33

uncertainty of the interpretation of Art. 751 and to indicate his

wish that the residue of his estate be distributed in equal parts
to all who would have been entitled to inherit from him had he
dies intestate. (Note: Perhaps the Court considered the fact
that Don Vicente was a lawyer who probably knew what he
was doing when he made the will.)

due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator

acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be
brought into question, all juridical questions in connection
therewith being for once and forever closed. Such final order
makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its
extrinsic validity and due execution.

70. Dorotheo vs CA (1999)

It should be noted that probate proceedings deals

generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated, particularly on three aspects: (1) whether the will
submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament; (2)
compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of
wills; (3) the testamentary capacity of the testator; and the
due execution of the last will and testament.

Facts:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro
Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without
her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Petitioner
Lourdes Dorotheo filed a petition for the provate of Alejandros
will. Private respondents then filed a motion to declare the will
intrinsically void, which the trial court granted on Jan. 30,
1986. The trial court declared in that order that petitioner is
not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three
legitimate children (petitioners herein). Lourdes appealed to
the CA, which dismissed the appeal. The dismissal became
final and executory on Feb. 3, 1989.
A writ of execution was issued by the trial court to
implement the CA order. However, Lourdes refused to
surrender to private respondents the TCTs covering the
properties of the late Alejandro. Thus, private respondents
filed a motion for cancellation of the titles and for the issuance
of new titles in their names. An Order was issued on November
29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and
executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order
directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground
that the order was merely interlocutory, hence not final in
character (According to petitioner, an order merely declaring
who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled
cant be the basis of execution). The court added that the
dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the
distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private
respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which
nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and
February 1, 1991.
Petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the
case filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals
was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in
issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to
have no jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to
hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court
of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986
Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will
that was earlier admitted to probate.
Issue: Whether or not a will that was admitted to probate but
declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and
executory still be given effect.
Held: No. It has been consistently held that if no appeal is
taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial court,
the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order
allowing the will became final and the question determined by
the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in
the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of

The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions

regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has
been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that
an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always
intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the
testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the
lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to
the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions
thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the
courts had already determined in a final and executory
decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination
having attained that character of finality is binding on this
Court which will no longer be disturbed.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil
Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy is
preferred to intestacy. But before there could be testate
distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and
safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased
testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his
actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is
usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give
- Nemo praesumitur donare. No intestate distribution of the
estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass
both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically
void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic
validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to
determine its intrinsic validity that is whether the provisions of
the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this
case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was
extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void.
Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial
court. Furthermore, Alejandros disposition in his will of the
alleged share in the conjugal properties of his late spouse,
whom he described as his only beloved wife, is not a valid
reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary
dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the
testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime
cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the
properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will
may still be properly ventilated and determined in the intestate
proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late
spouses estate.
71. Dorotheo vs CA (1999)
Facts:
Agatonica Arreza is the offspring of Pedro Arreza and
Ursula Tubil. The Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the

Page | 34

son of Agatonica. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula

married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the
decedent Justa. Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus
the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica. Domingo
Arnaldo is the brother of Juan Arnaldo. Domingo and his wife
Catalina Azarcon had a daughter, Primitiva Arnaldo. Primitiva
then married Conrado Uriarte who had children, one of whom
was Pascasio Uriarte. The widow and daughters of Pascasio
are the petitioners in his case. Petitioners are thus
grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of
consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte.
The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of
her brother Gregorio. The children of Primitiva by Conrado
Uriarte, aside from Pascasio, are Josefina, Gaudencio,
Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte. The
children of Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitiva's brother, by Julieta
Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa.
These other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives
within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins
Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo. Private respondent
Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court
for the partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The
land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by Justa as
follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan
Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by purchase.
Private respondent claimed to be the sole surviving heir of
Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He
complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the
land as Justa's tenant, refused to give him (private
respondent) his share of the harvest. He contended that
Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could
claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had
inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.
Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was
substituted by his heirs. In their answer, the heirs denied they
were mere tenants of Justa but the latter's heirs entitled to her
entire land. They claimed that the entire land, subject of the
case, was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, their great
granduncle. It was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan
Arnaldo, Ambrocio's nephews, in a holographic will executed
by Ambrocio in 1908. Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the
land and Juan, one-third. The heirs claimed that the land had
always been in their possession and that in her lifetime Justa
never asserted exclusive right over the property but only
received her share of the harvest from it. They alleged that
private respondent did not have any right to the property
because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, the original
owner of the property.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, whereas the CA
reversed and ruled in favor of respondents. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not a nephew is considered a collateral
relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant or spouse
survive the decedent.
Held: Yes. Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between
Justa and private respondent. As already stated, private
respondent is the son of Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is
therefore Justa's nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral
relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or
spouse survive the decedent. That private respondent is only a

half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify

him from being his aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals
correctly pointed out, "The determination of whether the
relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to
determine the extent of the share of the survivors.
72. Sayson vs CA (1992)
Facts:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely,
Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died
in 1952, and Rafaela in 1976. Teodoro, who had married
Isabel Bautista, died in 1972. His wife died nine years later in
1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia,
Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be
their children. On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's
mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the
intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was
resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged
successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedent's
lawful descendants.
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this
time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving
children. The complainants asserted the defense that Delia and
Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were
entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by
right of representation.
The RTC ruled that Delia, Edmundo and Doribel are
entitled to inherit, and the CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the adopted children of Teodoro (Delia
and Edmundo) are entitled to inherit Teodoros share by right
of representation.
Held: No. There is no question that as the legitimate daughter
of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela,
Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the
distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under
Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her
father would have directly inherited had he survived, which
shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other
children.
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of
Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total
strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as
the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is
between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and
does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
73. Bagunu vs Piedad (1987)
Facts:
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando
Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652,
entitled "In the matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the
Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional
Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting

Page | 35

entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H.

Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial
court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad
contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural
infirmities, including an incomplete publications of the notice of
hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and
irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and
withdrawals by the administrator of the estate.
Issue: WON petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil
degree, can inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative
of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated does the rule of
proximity in intestate succession find application among
collateral relatives?
Held: No. Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct
descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt
of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while
petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a
fifthdegree relative of the decedent. The right of
representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives
within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner
and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of
preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and
descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants,
thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the
surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews
and nieces, fourth decedent. Among collateral relatives, except
only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity,
expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an
absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the
collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil
Code gives direction. Respondent, being a relative within the
third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes
petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an
intestato to the estate of the decedent.
74. Castro vs CA (1989)
Facts:
Petitioners Juan and Feliciana Castro are the siblings of
the deceased Eustaquio Castro, while private respondent
Benita Castro-Naval is the only child of Eustaquio. The
petitioners filed an action for partition of properties against
Beinta, alleging that they are the compulsory heirs of Pedro
Castro (the father of Eustaquio Castro). This complaint was
amended into an action for quieting of title. In the pre-trial,
the parties agreed that the sole issue to resolve is whether or
not Benita is the acknowledged natural child of Eustaquio.
It was revealed that Pricola Maregment, the natural
mother of Benita, was wedded to Felix de Maya against her
wishes. While the wedding celebration was ongoing, she
escaped and went to her true sweetheart, Eustaquio. The two
of them eventually lived as husbands and wives. As a result of
their cohabitation, Benita was born. After the death of Pricola,
Benita continued to live with Eustaquio. And when Benita got
married, it was Eustaquio who gaver her away in marriage.
Even after Benitas marriage, Eustaquio still took care of her.
:)
The RTC and the CA both ruled that Benita is the
acknowledged and recognized child of Eustaquio and is

therefore entitled to participate in the partition of the

properties left by him.
Issue: Whether or not Benita is the acknowledged and
recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio.
Held: Yes. There is no question that the private respondent is
an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro. Her father Eustaquio
was a widower when Pricola Maregmen, her mother, went to
live with him. The two could not validly enter into a marriage
because when Pricola fled from her own wedding party on May
23, 1913, the wedding rites to Felix de Maya had already been
solemnized. In other words, the marriage was celebrated
although it could not be consummated because the bride
hurriedly ran away to join the man she really loved. Since
Eustaquio Castro was a widower when Benita was conceived,
Benita is a natural child.
Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of
acknowledgment voluntary and compulsory. The provisions
on acknowledgement are applied to natural as well as spurious
children.
We apply the more liberal provisions of the new Family
Code considering the facts and equities of this case.2
First, Benita Castro Naval is unquestionably the daughter of
the late Eustaquio Castro who was qualified to legally marry
when she was conceived and born. From her birth on March
27, 1919 until the father's death on August 22, 1961 or for 42
years, Benita lived with her father and enjoyed the love and
care that a parent bestows on an only child. The private
respondents, themselves, admitted in their complaint in Civil
Case No. 3762 that Benita is a forced heir of Eustaquio Castro.
Second, the rule on separating the legitimate from the
illegitimate family is of no special relevance here because
Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were the only
immediate family of Eustaquio. There are no legitimate
children born of a legitimate wife contesting the inheritance of
Benita. Third, it was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of
Benita reported and registered. There is no indication in the
records that Eustaquio should have known in 1919 that apart
from reporting the birth of a child, he should also have signed
the certificate and seen to it that it was preserved for 60 years.
Or that he should have taken all legal steps including judicial
action to establish her status as his recognized natural child
during the reglementary period to do so. Fourth, it was
Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her wedding to
Cipriano Naval. The couple continued to live with the father
even after the wedding and until the latter's death. Fifth, the
certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family
during the wake for Eustaquio may not be sufficient proof of
recognition under the Civil Code.
Under the Code's Title VI on Paternity and Filiation there
are only two classes of children legitimate and illegitimate.
The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate
children have been eliminated. Article 175 provides that
"Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
2

This is a special case, because under normal circumstances, the retroactive

application of the Family Code would have been improper (considering that
there are those whose rights would be prejudiced). But the Court
nevertheless allowed a retroactive application, considering the peculiar facts
in this case and for equity considerations.

Page | 36

the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate

children."
There can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the
open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child of Eustaquio Castro and that the action of Benita in
defending her status in this case is similar to an "action to
claim legitimacy" brought during her lifetime.
75. Gonzales vs CA (1998)
Facts:
Petitioners are the siblings of Ricardo de Mesa. Claiming
they were the only heirs of Ricardo, they sought the settlement
of his intestate estate with the CFI of Manila. Meanwhile,
private respondents Honoria, Cecilia and Marian (all surnamed
Empaynado) filed a motion to set aside the proceedings and
for leave to file opposition. They claim that Honoria had been
the common-law wife of Ricardo, while Cecilia and Marian are
their children. Private respondents also disclosed the existence
of Rosemarie, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo with
another woman.
The CFI declared Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie as
acknowledged natural children of Ricardo entitled to succeed
to the entire estate of Ricardo. The CA affirmed. Hence, this
petition.
The petitioners contended that Jose Libuanao, the
deceased husband of Honoria, was actually alive when Cecilia
and Marian were born in 1948 and 1954 respectively.
Petitioners presented an enrolment form of Angelita Libunao
accomplished in 1956 which states that his father was Jose
Libunao. According to petitioners, if it were true that Jose was
already dead in 1943, then it would have said so in that
enrolment form. Lastly, petitioners presented the affidavit of
Dr. Pedro Arenas, Ricardo Abads physician, declaring that in
1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be
infected with gonorrhea, and that the latter had become sterile
as a consequence thereof.
Issue: Whether or not C, M and R are acknowledged natural
children of Ricardo and thus entitled to succeed to the entire
estate of Ricardo.
Held: Yup. The Supreme Court did not believe petitioners
insane theories and proceeded to apply Art. 988 of the Civil
Code, which provides that In the absence of legitimate
descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
76. Diaz, the Guardian vs IAC (1990)
Facts:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976
with the CFI of Cavite in a special proceeding "In The Matter of
the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding
letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be
appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the
deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the
only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and

Petronila Asuncion. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of

their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who
died during infancy. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the
widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero.
Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents
Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Pascual Santero died in 1970, while Pablo Santero died in
1973 and Simona Santero died in 1976. Pablo Santero, at the
time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero
and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children
with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta
Pacursa.
In 1976, the court declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the
sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed
to wit: Petition for the Letters of Administration of the intestate
Estate of Pablo Santero; Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an incompetent
Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; and Petition for
Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene was allowed to
intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual
Santero by Order of the Court in 1977. Petitioner Anselma
Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition
and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti from further taking part or
intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of
Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero. Felixberta Pacursa
guardian for her minor children.
In 1980, the court issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin
"from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of
the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well
as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo
Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the deceased
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."
Felisa Jardin filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and it was
denied by the trial court. On appeal, the Intermediate
Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court and
declaring the Felisa Jardin as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to
interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Issue: Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by
right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a
legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.
Held: No. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the
legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the
provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;
nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child.

Page | 37

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate

child. On the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein)
are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron
curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato
between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They
may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by
law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family
and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment. Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their
father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the
intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992
of the New Civil Code.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code
that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the
word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken
of. The record shows that from the commencement of this
case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of
the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti
Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of
Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the
provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate
estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
77. Corpuz vs Administrator (1978)
Di ko maintindihan. Basahain na lang full text.
78. De la Puerta vs CA (1990)
Facts:
The testator, Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at
the age of 92, leaving her properties to her three surviving
children, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel. Isabel was given the free
portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix
of the will. Vicente and Alfredo opposed the petition for the
probate of the will filed by Isabel. The two claimed that their
mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the
will and did not fully comprehend its meaning, that the
properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to
them exclusively. Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente
the lone oppositor. Vicente de la Puerta filed with the CFI of
Quezon, a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta, which was
thereafter granted. Isabel appealed the said decision to the
CA. Vicente died during the pendency of the appeal, prompting
her to move for the dismissal of the case. Carmelita filed a
motion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the
acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. The said
motion was granted by the probate court granted the motion,

declaring that Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la

Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for her
support. CA affirmed this order of the lower court. Hence, this
petition wherein the petitioner's main argument is that
Carmelita was not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta,
who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and
remained his wife until his death in 1978. Carmelita's real
parents are Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Carmelita. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: WON respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, can claim
successional rights to the estate of her alleged grandmother.
Held: The Court held that Vicente de la Puerta did not
predecease his mother and Carmelita is a spurious child. It is
settled that in testamentary succession, the right of
representation can take place only in the following cases: first,
when the person represented dies before the testator; second,
when the person represented is incapable of succeeding the
testator; and third, when the person represented is
disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases, since there is
a vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the children or
descendants of thefiliation of private respondent Carmelita de
la Puerta, who claims successional rights to the estate of her
alleged grandmother. person represented to succeed by right
of representation.
The law is clear that there is representation only when
relatives of a deceased person try to succeed him in his rights
which he would have had if still living.
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son
Vicente had the right to inherit from her directly or in his own
right. No right of representation was involved, nor could it be
invoked by Carmelita upon her father's death, which came
after his own mother's death. It would have been different if
Vicente was already dead when Dominga Revuelta died.
Carmelita could then have inherited from her in representation
of her father Vicente, assuming the private respondent was a
lawful heir. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred
from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the
Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate
and illegitimate families. This article provides quite clearly: Art.
992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.
Even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred
from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for there would be no
natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal
ties to bind them either. Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of
Vicente de la Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate
estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta.
Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be
filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's
estate and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga
Revuelta's will.
79. Pascual vs Pascual (1992)
Facts:

Page | 38

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the

acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the
latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres
Pascual. Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12,
1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural,
adopted or spurious children. Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the
surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), a Special Proceeding for
administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. On
October 16, 1985, all the heirs entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein
petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual The
Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the
Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and
Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the
intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle. On
September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate
Hereditary Rights and the Memorandum in Support of Motion
to reiterate Hereditary Rights. Both the RTC and CA dismissed
the submitted Motions as well as Motions for reconsideration
reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Art. 992 excludes recognized natural
children from inheritance of the deceased.
Held: The Court dismissed the instant petition for lack of merit
and affirmed the assailed decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals. It cited the previous decided case of Diaz v. IAC,
where such Court ruled that Article 992 of the Civil Code
provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely
a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this
is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.
Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate
child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life;
the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment. Eligio Pascual is a legitimate
child but petitioners are his illegitimate children. Applying the
doctrine, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners
herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the
succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent
Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
80. Manuel vs Ferrer (1995)
Facts:
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is
the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate
without any surviving descendant or ascendant. Petitioners,
the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz
Guiling, filed this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz,
Antonio had an extra-marital affair with Ursula Bautista. From
this relationship, a child named Juan Manuel was born. Juan
Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza
Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter

nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 sqm was

executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two
other parcels of land, were later bought by Juan and registered
in his name. The couple were not blessed with a child that is
why they took private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar
into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter." On
June 3, 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa
Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half
(1/2) portion of his land. Juan Manuel died intestate on
February 21, 1990. Two years later, Esperanza Gamba also
passed away. A month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta
executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication claiming for herself
the three parcels of land. Following the registration of the
document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of
Deeds, the three titles in the name of Juan Manuel were
canceled and new titles, were issued in the name of Modesta
Manuel-Baltazar. Modesta executed in favor of her corespondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and
Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the
land that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980
Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. The petitioners filed a
complaint filed before the RTC Lingayen, Pangasinan, seeking
the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments. The trial
court dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not
being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan
Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the
suit. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners
was denied by the trial court. Hence, this Petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue: WON the petitioners are entitled to inherit in the
intestate estate of their illegitimate brother, Juan Manuel.
Held: The Court ruled that the petitioners are not entitled to
inherit from the intestate estate of their illegitimate brother,
Juan Manuel under ARTICLE 992, an illegitimate child has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The principle of absolute separation between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family wherein such doctrine rejects
succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate
relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other
hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in
the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed
will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on
testamentary dispositions. A barrier dividing members of the
illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family
wherein the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the
children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers
and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child.
Admittedly in her answer, Modesta is not an intestate heir of
Juan Manuel. A ward, without the benefit of formal/judicial
adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir.
Nevertheless, the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the
three TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of
Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was
properly dismissed by the trial court.
81. Tison vs CA (1997)
Facts:

Page | 39

The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece

and nephew of the deceased Tedora Dezoller Guerrero, who
appears to be the sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller .
The present action for reconveyance involves a parcel of land
with a house and apartment which was originally owned by the
spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It.
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any
ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her
husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners'
father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek
to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of
representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed an Affidavit
of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly
as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein
private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter.
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners
filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled
to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of
representation. Tedoro Domingo however, attacks the
legitimacy of Hermogenes.
Issue: Whether or not a third person, not the father nor an
heir, may attack the legitimacy of Hermogenes.
Held: NO. The private respondent is not the proper party to
impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. There is no
presumption of the law more firmly established and founded
on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And
well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be
attacked collaterally.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child
born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the
scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces;
and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved.
It is only in exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to
contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none even
his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an
insult to his memory.
82. Verdad vs CA (1996)
Facts:
Macaria Atega was married twice during her lifetime, first
with Angel Burdeos, and second with Canuto Rosales. She
owned a land in Butuan City about 248 sq. m., Macaria died in
1956. The petitioner is the Zosima Verdad, who purchased the
lot in question for P23,000.00 from heirs of Macarias son
(Ramon Burdeos) in 1982. When Socorro (wife of the
deceased David Rosales who died some time after his mother
Macaria died) found out in March 30, 1987 that the lot was
sold to Verdad, she sought intervention of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa for redemption, her tender of P23,000.00 was
refused because the current value of the property is higher.
October 16, 1987, no settlement was reached, thus a case was
filed by Socorro (private respondent) for Legal Redemption
with Preliminary Injunction, which the RTC denied stating that
redemption period already lapse. On appeal to the Court of

Appeals, it reversed the RTC and declared that Socorro has the
right to redeem the property.
Issue: Whether Socorro Cordero Vda. De Rosales is
capacitated to redeem the property even if she is only related
by affinity to Macaria Atega and not an heir?
Held: Yes, Socorro is capacitated to make the redemption.
Even if she is not an heir to Macaria, she is an heir to David
Rosales who inherited a share of his mothers estate.
Article 995 of the Civil Code, in the absence of legitimate
descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate and their
descendants, whether legitimate of illegitimate, the surviving
spouse shall inherit, without prejudice to the rights of brothers
and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under
article 1001.
The right to redeem spawned from the nondisclosure of
the sale to all co-owners when the sale is in favor of a third
person. In fact, written notice is required under Article 1623,
and the redemption period is 30 days from receipt of such
notice. In the case at bar, no notice was given, hence, the 30
day period stared from the time of discovery of the sale on
March 30, 1987, and stayed by the proceedings in the Punong
Tagapamayapa. There was clear intent to redeem at that time
but the offer was rejected by Verdad.
83. Cacho vs Udan (1965)
Facts:
John, Rustico and Silvina are siblings. Silvina G. Udan died
leaving a purported will naming her illegitimate son, Francisco
G. Udan, and one Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share
and share alike. During the probate of the will, opposition was
made by her two brothers on the ground that the will was not
attested and executed as required by law, that the testatrix
was incapacitated to execute it; and that it was procured by
fraud or undue influence. Francisco died pending the probate.
The RTC denied the oppositions filed by the two brothers.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue: WON oppositor brothers, John and Rustico Udan, may
claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, the late
Silvina Udan.
Held: The Court ruled that the court below correctly held that
they were not, for at the time of her death Silvina's illegitimate
son, Francisco Udan, was her heir intestate, to the exclusion of
her brothers under Articles 988 and 1003 of the governing Civil
Code of the Philippines in force at the time of the death of the
testatrix It decreed that collateral relatives of one who died
intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants,
ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and
sisters can concur with the widow or widower under Article
1101, they do, not concur, but are excluded by the surviving
children, legitimate or illegitimate (Art. 1003). The trial court
committed no error in holding that John and Rustico Udan had
no standing to oppose the probate of the will. For if the will is
ultimately probated John and Rustico are excluded by its terms
from participation in the estate; and if probate be denied, both
oppositors-appellants will be excluded by the illegitimate son,
Francisco Udan, as sole intestate heir, by operation of law. The
death of Francisco two years after his mother's demise does
not improve the situation of appellants. The rights acquired by

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the former are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs
at law not to the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his
mother, for the reason that, as correctly decided by the court
below, the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed
her illegitimate child. This is clear from Article 992 of the Civil
Code. The legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed
her illegitimate child. This is clear from Article 992 of the Civil
Code.
84. Solivio vs CA (1990)
Facts:
Esteban Javellana, Jr., a famous novelist who wrote the
critically acclaimed Without Seeing the Dawn, died intestate
and without issue. His only surviving relatives were Celedonia
Solivio (the half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio) and
Concordia Javellana (the sister of his father). The property
subject of dispute was a parcel of land in Iloilo which Esteban
inherited from his mother.
During Estebans lifetime, he was very vocal of his desire
to put up a foundation in his mothers name to help poor but
deserving students obtain a college education. Thus, Celedonia
and Esteban both agreed that the whole estate of Esteban
would be used for the foundation. They also agreed that
Celedonia would take care of the proceedings. Thus, in good
faith, Celedonia was appointed the special administratrix and
was declared the sole heir of Estebans estate.
Later on, Concordia filed a motion for reconsideration of
the courts order declaring Celedonia as sole heir because
she too was an heir of the deceased. This was denied, so she
instituted a separate action for partition and recovery of the
subject property. This was granted by the RTC. Hence, this
petition by Celedonia, in which she invoked reserva trocal
among others.
Issue: Whether or not reserva troncal is applicable in this
case.
Held: No. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited
by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from
another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to
property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the
reverse of the situation covered by Article 891. Since the
deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers,
sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the
distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil
Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters,
nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral
relatives shall succeed to the estate. The latter shall
succeed without distinction of lines or preference among
them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
However, It is true that by the agreement, she did not
waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree
to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de

Javellana Foundation, and therefore, Concordia is obligated to

honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers. The
petition for review was granted. The decision of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals were SET ASIDE. Concordia J.
Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr.
entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably with
the agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio,
the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the
"Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both
the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and
each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees
to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which
shall administer the same for the purposes set forth in its
charter.
85. Sarita vs Candia (1912)
Facts:
Spouses Apolinario Cedenio and Roberta Montesa are
allegedly the owners of a parcel of land apparently of an area
of 2 cavanes of corn upon which they had planted fruit trees.
Respondent Candia claims ownership over the land having
purchased the same from Villarosa, the vendee of Apolinario.
Petitioners claim on the other hand, that as nieces and
nephews,they are the collateral heirs of Apolinario, through the
latters brothers and sisters. Sarita, however, is the
grandnephew of Apolinario. The RTC absolved the defendant
from the complainant, on the grounds that, with regard to the
animals and real property sued for, there was no proof
whatever that they were in possession of the spouses at the
time of their death, and, with respect to the land: (1) That the
defendant was the possessor in good faith continuously and
was presumed to hold under just title so long as the contrary
should not be proved; and (2) that neither the plaintiffs nor
their alleged predecessors in interest made demand for it
during the period of twenty-six years, since the ownership
thereof was conveyed by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeo to Juan
Basa Villarosa, on the 24th of June, 1881, it being that during
this very long period of time they did not obtain possession of
the property. Hence, the judgment having been appealed
through a bill exceptions.
Issue: WON grandnephews have a right of representation
over the estate of the deceased.
Held: The Court ruled that the right of representation is
limited to nephews and nieces who are children of brothers
and sisters of decedent. The plaintiff Sarita who joins as the
representative of his grandfather in a complaint with others,
who are brothers and nephews of the predecessor in interest,
lacks such right of representation, for it belongs in the
collateral line only to the nephews and not to the
grandnephews. Hence, sister and nephews of the deceased
having appeared to claim the inheritance, they, as the nearest
of kin, exclude a remote relative like a grandnephew.
86. GSIS vs Custodio (1969)
Facts:
GSIS filed a complaint in interpleader to determine who,
among several defendants, is entitled to the retirement
benefits in the amount of P8,339 that fell due to a deceased
GSIS member, Simeon Custodio. Defendant-cross-claimant-

Page | 41

appellee Susana Custodio, a surviving sister of the decedent

and the aunt of the other defendants, claims to be the sole
beneficiary thereof. However, her nephews and nieces contest
her recognition as such and claim to be entitled to share in the
proceeds by right of representation of their deceased fathers,
who are three (3) brothers of the late Simeon. These nephews
and nieces (defendants-cross-claimants-appellees in this case)
are the following: Macario, C., Macario A., Luisa, David,
Romualdo, Julian, Moises, Adriano and Celestina, all surnamed
"Custodio".

even prayed that said motion be granted (Record on Appeal,

page 56), although the court denied it just the same. These
three (3) heirs should inherit per stirpes, in accordance with
Article 1005 of the Civil Code. As Macario C. Custodio (as
distinguished from Macario A., who signed the agreement) is
the only child of Crispin, said Macario C. inherits by
representation the one-fourth () share pertaining to his
father, while Luisa and David Custodio being two (2) of six (6)
children of Jacinto, are each entitled to a sixth of one-fourth
(1/6 x 1/4) equivalent to 1/24 of the hereditary mass.

In the stipulation of facts, it was agreed that shortly after

the death of SIMEON CUSTODIO, there was found among his
personal belongings an undated and unsigned application form
for Retirement accomplished by said SIMEON CUSTODIO
wherein his sister, SUSANA CUSTODIO was named the
beneficiary, although said application form was never
submitted to GSIS. It was also stipulated that: That on July
7, 1957, at the residence of Leon K. Tongohan, son-in-law of
Susana Custodio at Tanay, Rizal, SUSANA, ROMUALDO,
JULIAN, MACARIO A., MOISES, ADRIANO, and CELESTINA, all
surnamed CUSTODIO, and JULIA TONGOHAN executed a
document entitled "Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate Among
Heirs' which provides, among other things that "(c) For any
amount due the decedent SIMEON CUSTODIO, holder of GSIS
policy No. 73557, our Aunt Susana Custodio as the decedent's
only living sister, is hereby recognized by the aforementioned
heirs as the sole and only beneficiary of the decedent SIMEON
CUSTODIO, and giving unto our Aunt Susana Custodio the
right to file, sign and receive whatever retirement pay under
Republic Act 660, as amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 728 and
1123, and other amendments thereto". Copy of said Extra
Judicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs, which consist of
four (4) pages, without, page 5, is hereto attached as Annex
"B" and made an integral part of this Stipulation of Facts

Appellants contend that fraud or mistake rendered null

and void the deed of extrajudicial settlement, such vice of
consent being shown by the pretended badges of fraud, as
follows: the fact that David Custodio was not made a party to
the extrajudicial settlement nor mentioned in its recitals; the
failure to secure the signatures not only of David but also of
Luisa and Macario C. Custodio; the repudiation by the
appellants of the extrajudicial settlement that they had signed
just one day after its execution; the fact that Leon Tongohan,
the son-in-law of Susana Custodia apparently had some
intervention in the execution of the deed; and the adjudication
in favor of Susana Custodio of an alleged unconscionable bulk
of the estate.

It will thus be noted from the stipulation of facts and its

annexes that the deceased retiree, Simeon Custodio had one
(1) sister, appellee Susana Custodio and three (3) brothers,
namely, Vicente, Crispin and Jacinto, who had predeceased
him; that the appellants are the children of these brothers;
that two (2) among these children are both named "Macario"
(Macario A. and Macario C.; that the children, Macario C.,
Luisa, and David Custodio did not sign the deed of extrajudicial
settlement; and that Macario C. is the only child of Crispin,
while Luisa and David are two (2) of the six (6) children of
Jacinto. Susana Custodio made clear her non-opposition to the
division of the estate where Macario C. Luisa and David would
share per stirpes.
The trial court ruled that Susana Custodio was the
beneficiary. On appeal, the CA forwarded the case to the
Supreme Court as only questions of law were involved.
Appellants' first assignment of error is well-taken; that the
intestate heirs, Macario C., Luisa and David Custodio who did
not sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement, not be
considered as having recognized Susana Custodio, as the only
beneficiary of Simeon's retirement money. There is no
evidence the case having been submitted for decision below
solely on a stipulation of facts, that these non-signatory heirs
had agreed, or accepted other benefits under the deed of
partition, as appellee now claims. Susana Custodio did not
oppose their separate motion for reconsideration and, actually,

Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement should be

annulled because of fraud.
Held: No. We affirm the action taken by the Court of Appeals
in certifying the appeal to us. Even if the five (5)
circumstances stated by the appellant be held to be indicative
of fraud or mistake, and infirming the deed of extrajudicial
settlement, the stark fact is that the existence of fraud or
mistake was not stipulated (Miranda vs. Tiangco, et al., 96
Phil. 526). Appellants' raising the issue of fraud or mistake
without having specifically stipulated or pleaded the same,
constitutes and unfair surprise upon their adversary, besides
being in violation of the rule that fraud be specifically pleaded
(Rule 9, Section 9, Rules of Court). Therefore, this plea of
fraud or error is not allowable, being deemed waived by the
lack of proper averment. At any rate, the circumstances now
stressed by the heirs who have actually signed the deed of
partition, and who have been allocated properties therein, fall
short of evidencing fraud or mistake. The failure to secure the
signatures of Luisa, David, and Macario Custodio could not
have escaped their co-heirs, now appellants, and it is unfair to
lay blame therefor on Susana Custodio. The intervention of
Leon Tongohan, her son-in-law, is without particular
significance, since none of the signers was illiterate, nor was
the deed notarized by him. As to the appellants' having
repudiated their signatures, the same was a self-serving act,
more indicative of a belated intention to squirm out of a
disadvantageous transaction, after they entered it with open
eyes, which is no ground for setting the same aside (Noble vs.
City of Manila, 67 Phil. 1). Certainly, it should take much
weightier proof to invalidate a written instrument (cf.
Mendezona vs. Phil. Sugar Estates, 41 Phil. 493; Bank of the
Phil. Is. vs. Fidelity Surety Co., 51 Phil. 57).
87. Abellana de Bacayo vs Borromeo (1965)
Facts:
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937
when she transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to

Page | 42

have resided in Manilacontinuously until 1944. More than ten

(10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known
to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes
of opening her succession and distributing her estate among
her heirs.

children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter

of Ignacio Bagsic, in the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City
against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio
Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties
left by Maura Bagsic.

Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City. The deceased

Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant,
or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives,
namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister
of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia,
Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her
nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only
brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her
(the decedent).

After the death of Maura Bagsic, properties passed on to

Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration of the
same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested
for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were
prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties
yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura
Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the
partition of the same, the plaintiffs brought out the subject
again sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza
acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already
been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the
properties having been effected, thereby leaving the
possession and administration of the same to the defendants.

The trial court ruled that the appellees, as children of the

only predeceased brother of the decedent, are nearer in
degree than the appellant since nieces and nephews succeed
by right of representation.
Issue: Who among the claimants are entitled to the
inheritance?
Held: We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the
deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from the
decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which
both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first
ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the
heir. Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews
and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e.,
per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the
deceased.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that,
in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus
exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins,
etc.) from the succession. Under Article 1009, the absence of
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a
precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.)
being called to the succession. Brothers and sisters and
nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the
surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after
the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the
Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the
nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased,
but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis
the other collaterals. Therefore, a decedent's uncles and aunts
may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces
of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to
succeed.
88. Bicomong vs Almanza (1977)
Facts:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas having
three children: Perpetua, Igmedia and Ignacio. When Sisenda
died, Simeon married Silvestra producing two children: Felipa
and Maura. The subject matter of the complaint concerns the
one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the 5 parcels of
land which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra
Glorioso.
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint, namely: (a) the
Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos,

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The

respondents have the right to inherit from Maura by right of
representation. The appellate court certified the case to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the nephews and nieces from the brothers
and sisters whether full or half blood has the right to inherit.
Held: Yes. The nephews and nieces from the brothers and
sisters whether full or half blood has the right to inherit. In the
absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, Art. 1003 of the NCC provides that collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It
appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue,
and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of
her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives,
namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10)
children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in
accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the NCC.
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no
qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the
maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether
their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the
sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude
the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in
their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in
relation to Art. 1006 of the NCC, which provisions, in effect,
entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the
nephews and nieces of half blood.
89. Fernandez vs Fernandez (2001)
Facts:
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A.
de Venecia were the registered owners of a parcel of land
located at Dagupan City and the two-storey building
constructed thereon. Generosa gave birth to a baby boy
named Rogelio who died when he was only twelve (12) years
old as paralytic. It was revealed that the late Spouses being
childless by the death of their son, purchased from a certain
Miliang for P20.00 a one (1) month baby boy. The boy being
referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the
herein appellant/petitioner. Appellant was taken care of by the

Page | 43

couple and was sent to school and became a dental technician.

He lived with the couple until they became old and disabled.
On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving
his wife Generosa A. de Venecia and Rodolfo Fernandez his
estate. Appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition dividing and allocating to themselves the
properties of Jose. On the same day, Generosa de Venecia
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez,
appellants son over the same properties.
After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano,
Francisco, Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo
and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being nephews and
nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father Genaro
being a brother of Jose, filed on September 21, 1994, an
action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed
of Sale void ab initio.
Their main contention was that petitioner-appellant
Rodolfo was neither a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of
Spouses Fernandez, hence, he could not inherit.
The RTC and CA ruled in favor of the newphews and
nieces. Petitioner argued that both lower courts had no power
to pass upon the matter of filiation because it could not be
collaterally attacked in the present action but in a separate and
independent action directly impugning such filiation.
Issue: Whether or not Rodolfo has right to inherit.
Held: No. It must be noted that the respondents principal
action was for the declaration of absolute nullity of two
documents, namely: deed of extra-judicial partition and deed
of absolute sale, and not an action to impugn ones legitimacy.
The respondent court ruled on the filiation of petitioner
Rodolfo Fernandez in order to determine Rodolfos right to the
deed of extra-judicial partition as the alleged legitimate heir of
the spouses Fernandez. While we are aware that ones
legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no application in the
instant case considering that respondents claim was that
petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the deceased spouses Jose
and Generosa Fernandez; we do not have a situation wherein
they (respondents) deny that Rodolfo was a child of their
uncles wife.
In another case, the Court held: Petitioners recourse to
Art. 263 of the New Civil Code (now Art. 170 of the Family
Code) is not well taken. This legal provision refers to an action
to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because
this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an
action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as
legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim
that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of
the deceased, but that she is not the decedents child at all.
Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged
natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat,
Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of
petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez to the deceased spouses
Fernandez for the purpose of determining what legal right
Rodolfo has in the property subject of the extra-judicial
partition. In fact, the issue of whether or not Rodolfo
Fernandez was the son of the deceased spouses Jose

Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia was squarely raised by

petitioners in their pre-trial brief filed before the trial court,
hence they are now estopped from assailing the trial courts
ruling on Rodolfos status.
We agree with the respondent court when it found that
petitioner Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the deceased
spouses Fernandez. Such is a factual issue which has been
thoroughly passed upon and settled both by the trial court and
the appellate court
Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not
a child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir
of Dr. Jose Fernandez , thus the subject deed of extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez between
Generosa vda. de Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and void
insofar as Rodolfo is concerned pursuant to Art.1105 of the
New Civil Code which states: A partition which includes a
person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void
only with respect to such person.
The Court agreed with petitioner that: since respondents
admitted that the property in question was the conjugal
property of the late spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa
de Venecia, it follows that when Dr. Jose Fernandez died
intestate in 1982, his estate consisted solely of pro indiviso of
the conjugal property and the other half belonged to his wife
Generosa de Venecia; that granting Dr. Jose Fernandez was
only survived by his wife, the respondents nephews and nieces
of Dr. Jose are entitled to inherit the share of the decedents
estate while the share of the conjugal property will still belong
to Generosa as the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, hence the
trial courts order reconveying the possession of the subject lot
and building to respondents was contrary to the admitted facts
and law since respondents are not related by consanguinity to
Generosa vda de Fernandez. Article 1001 of the Civil Code
provides: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one
half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.
Generosa was the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez and as
provided in the above-quoted Article 1001, she is entitled to
the of the inheritance and the respondents to the other . In
effect, pro indiviso is the share of Generosa as the surviving
spouse, i.e., as her share of the conjugal property estate and
of the remaining as share as heir from her husbands estate.
Thus, we find well taken the petitioners assertion that the
annulment of the extra-judicial partition between Generosa
and petitioner Rodolfo does not necessarily result in
respondents having exclusive right to the conjugal property, as
erroneously found by the respondent court. Generosa, during
her lifetime, had the right to enjoy and dispose of her property
without other limitations than those established by law, which
right she exercised by executing a deed of sale in favor of
petitioner Eddie Fernandez.
Petitioners further allege that the respondent court erred in
declaring null and void the deed of sale executed between
Generosa and petitioner Eddie Fernandez concluding that the
same was simulated or false and in affirming the trial courts
findings that the deed was prepared and executed under
abnormal, unusual and irregular circumstances without
however, particularly stating the circumstances. We agree.

Page | 44

Respondents allege that the deed of sale was fictitious and

simulated because there was no consideration for the sale.
However, this assertion was controverted by vendee petitioner
Eddie Fernandez declaration, that the money he paid for the
sale came from his savings as overseas contract worker in
Saudi Arabia from 1982-1989 which respondents failed to
controvert by presenting evidence to the contrary. The
presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot
be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no
consideration. Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, consideration
is presumed unless the contrary is proven.
90. City of Manila vs Archbishop (1917)
Facts:
In 1668, Ana Sarmiento resided with her husband in the
City of Manila. She owned properties consisted of five parcels
of land in Malate and Paco. She made a will and later on added
a codicil to said will. The will contained provisions for the
establishment of a "Capellania de Misas"; that the first chaplain
of said capellania should be her nephew Pedro del Castillo;
that said will contained a provision for the administration of
said property in relation with the said "Capellania de Misas"
succeeding administration should continue perpetually. In
1672, Ana Sarmiento died. For more than two hundred years,
respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, through his
various agencies, has administered said property. Petitioner
city of Manila filed an action before the CFI to have declared
escheated to the city of Manila the mentioned property. The
theory of the petitioner is that one Ana Sarmiento was the
owner of said property and died in the year 1668 without
leaving "her or person entitled to the same." However, the
respondent opposed alleging that it has rightfully and legally
succeeded to the possession and administration of the
property in accordance with the terms and provisions of the
will of Ana Sarmiento. The trial court denied the petition.
Issue: Whether the property can be escheated in favor of City
of Manila.
Held: No. Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides when property
may be declared escheated. It provides, "when a person dies
intestate, seized of real or personal property . . . leaving no
heir or person by law entitled to the same," that then and in
that case such property under the procedure provided for by
sections 751 and 752, may de declared escheated. The proof
shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. She left a will.
The will provides for the administration of said property by her
nephew as well as for the subsequent administration of the
same. She did not die without an heir nor without persons
entitled to administer her estate. It further shows that she did
not die without leaving a person by law entitled to inherit her
property. Therefore, the property in question cannot be
declared escheated. The will clearly, definitely and
unequivocally defines and designates what disposition shall be
made of the property in question. The heir mentioned in said
will evidently accepted its terms and permitted the property to
be administered in accordance therewith. And, so far as the
record shows, it is still being administered in accordance with
the terms of said will for the benefit of the real beneficiary as
was intended by the original owner.
91. Torres vs Lopez (1926)

Facts:
Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable
of taking care of himself and had been placed under the care
of his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. The will instituted
as universal heirs of all his property his daughter Luz Lopez de
Bueno and cousin Lopez. Lopez died 4 days from the time the
will was made and the testator died about a month thereafter.
The time the will was made Lopez had not presented his final
accounts as guardian, and no such accounts had been
presented by him at the time of his death. Margarita Lopez
was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent, filed a case
claiming half of the estate of Tomas by intestate succession as
next of kin and nearest heir. Luz, on the other hand, claims the
same by accretion and in the character of universal heir under
the will of Tomas. Appellant contends that there has
supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the half of the
estate which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and that this
half has descended to the appellant. The trial court ruled in
favor of Luz.
Issue: Whether or not one-half of the estate of Tomas
Rodriquez should go to Margarita Lopez being the next of kin
and nearest heir of Vicente Lopez or to his daughter by
accretion?
Held: Article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect declares
that, with certain exceptions in favor of near relatives, no
testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in
favor of his guardian before the final accounts of the latter
have been approved. This provision is of undoubted application
to the situation before the court and the provision made in the
will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F. Lopez was not
any general incapacity on his part, but a special incapacity due
to the accidental relation of guardian and ward existing
between the parties.
Accretion takes place in a testamentary success when two
or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the
same portion thereof without special designation of shares and
secondly, when one of the persons so called dies before the
testator or renounces the inheritance or is disqualified to
receive it.
In the case before us we have a will calling Vicente F.
Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same
inheritance without special designation of shares. In addition
to this, one of the persons named as heir has predeceased the
testator, this person being also disqualified to receive the
estate even if he had been alive at the time of the testator's
death by reason of his being then the legal guardian of the
testator with accounts unsettled, does not make a case for
intestate succession as to his part of the estate. This article
(982) is the exact application to the case and its effect is to
give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the
undivided half which she would have received in conjunction
with her father if he had been alive and qualified to take, but
also the half which pertained to him. There was no error
whatever, therefore in the order of the trial court declaring Luz
Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.
92. Nepomuceno vs IAC (1985)
Facts:

Page | 45

On July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo died and left a will. In the
said will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner
Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his
estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was
legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two
legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he
had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had
been living with petitioner as husband and wife. The estate
was devised to his legal heirs, except the free portion which
was devised to petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for the
probate of the will but was denied by the court on the
opposition of the legal heirs on the ground that petitioner
admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, thus, she
is wanting in integrity and letters testamentary should not be
issued to her.
The Court of Appeals declared the will to be valid except
that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void,
Petitioner contends that the lower court has no jurisdiction in
passing upon the question of the intrinsic validity of the will.
Issue: Whether or not the probate court may pass upon the
provisions of the will.
Held: No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction
when after declaring the will to be validly drawn, it went on to
pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the
devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the courts
area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of
the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule, however, is not
inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.
The fact that the probate court declared a devise made in a
will null and void will be sustained where no useful purpose will
be served by requiring the filing of a separate civil action and
restricting the court only to the issue of extrinsic validity of the
will. There is no useful purpose that would be served if we
remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a separate
action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a
will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity
of its provisions.
The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against
the making of a donation between persons who are living in
adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes
void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient
may receive. The very wordings of the will invalidate the
legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
93. Pastor vs CA (1983)
Facts:
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died
in Cebu City on June 5, 1966, survived by his Spanish wife
Sofia Bossio (who also died), their two legitimate children
Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely
(SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of
Lewellyn Barlito Quemada (QUEMADA). QUEMADA filed a
petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged
holographic will of PASTOR, SR., which contained a legacy in

favor of Quenada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.s 42% share

in the operation of Atlas Mining. PASTOR, JR. and his wife
claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not
by inheritance Thus, Quemada appointed as special
administrator filed for reconveyance of said claims of alleged
properties including the subject of legacy.
Issue: Whether the probate order resolved with finality the
questions of ownership. Whether the probate ordere resolved
the intrinsic validity of the will.
Held: In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the
issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the
will, As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous
matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality.
Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory of
estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title
thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive,
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title. Probate court erred in assuming in its
implementing order that the probate order adjudged the issues
of ownership. In case of death of one of the spouses, their
respective rights must be liquidated and the debts paid in the
succession proceedings for the deceased spouse. Certiorari is
proper where probate court issued erroneous implementing
orders of its probate order. Legacy made in a will cannot be
distributed without a prior liquidation of the decedents estate
and payment of debts and taxes. A legacy is not a debt of the
estate for which a writ of execution may issue. An order of
execution that varies the terms of a final order can be
questioned in a certiorari proceeding.
94. Sanchez vs CA (1997)
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of
spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while Arturo S.
Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the
legitimate children of Rosalia. Petitioners Rolando, Florida
Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the
illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez. Rosalia filed a petition
for letters of administration over the estate of her mother
following her death and the estate of her father, Juan, who
was at the time in a state of senility. But before the
administration proceedings could formally be terminated and
closed, Juan died. Such that petitioners as heirs of Juan, filed a
petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of
Juan, which petition was opposed by Rosalia. Thereafter,
Rosalia and petitioners executed a Compromise Agreement
wherein they agreed to divide the properties enumerated
therein of the late Juan Sanchez. Petitioners filed a Motion to
require administratrix, Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of 24
hectares and/or to set aside compromise agreement. Private
respondent Rosalia and petitioners entered into and executed
a memorandum of agreement which modified the compromise
agreement. Nine years later, petitioners filed a motion to
require Rosalia to submit a new inventory and to render an
accounting over properties not included in the compromise
agreement. They likewise filed a motion to defer the approval
of the compromise agreement, in which they prayed for the
annulment of the compromise agreement on the ground of
fraud.

Page | 46

The trial court declared the compromise agreement void

and unenforceable, the same not having been approved by the
intestate court and that the same having been seasonably
repudiated by petitioners on the ground of fraud. The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court and declared the modified
compromise agreement valid and binding. Petitioners contend
that, because the compromise agreement was executed during
the pendency of the probate proceedings, judicial approval is
necessary to shroud it with validity.
Issue: Whether or not the compromise agreement entered by
the parties during the pendency of probate proceedings is valid
and binding.
Held: Yes. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise
agreement as "a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one
already commenced." Being a consensual contract, it is
perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties.
Judicial approval is not required for its perfection. Petitioners'
argument that the compromise was not valid for lack of judicial
approval is not novel; the same was raised in Mayuga vs.
Court of Appeals, where the Court ruled: It is alleged that the
lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. A
compromise is a consensual contract. As such, it is perfected
upon the meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract.
And from that moment not only does it become binding upon
the parties, it also has upon them the effect and authority of
res judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially
approved . In the case before us, it is ineludible that the
parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid compromise
agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective counsels,
they each negotiated its terms and provisions for four months;
in fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth
draft. As noted by the trial court itself, the first and second
drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; the third draft
on September 25, 1969; and the fourth draft, which was finally
signed by the parties on October 30, 1969, followed. Since this
compromise agreement was the result of a long drawn out
process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their
respective interests and to come out with the best they could,
there can be no doubt that the parties entered into it freely
and voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. To
be valid, it is merely required under the law to be based on
real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the
parties thereto. Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable
settlement that is not only allowed but also encouraged in civil
cases. Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates that a "court
shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree
upon some fair compromise."In opposing the validity and
enforcement of the compromise agreement, petitioners harp
on the minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myna. Citing
Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend that the court's
approval is necessary in compromises entered into by
guardians and parents in behalf of their wards or children.
However, we observe that although denominated a
compromise agreement, the document in this case is
essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the
Civil Code which provides that "[e]very act which is intended to
put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should
purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction."For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of

the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the following

conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left
no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the
heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the
latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal
representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a
public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of
Deeds. We find that all the foregoing requisites are present in
this case. We therefore affirm the validity of the parties'
compromise agreement/partition in this case.
95. Nazareno vs CA (2000)
Facts:
Maximinoo Nazareno Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband
and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970 , while Maximo Sr. died
on December 18, 1980 . They were survived by their children,
Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico and Maximinoo Jr. Maximinoo
Jr. and Natividad are petitioners in this case, while Romeo and
his wife are respondents. Deceased spouses Nazareno
acquired properties in Quezon City and in Cavite . It is the
ownership of some of these properties that is in question in
this case. It appears that after the death of Maximino Sr.
Romeo filed an intestate case in the CFI of Cavite. Romeo was
appointed administrator of his fathers estate. In the course of
the proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents executed
several deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in
favor of his sister, Natividad. This involved 6 lots in QC one of
which is a lot occupied by Romeo and his wife. This lot was
later sold by Natividad to Maximino Jr.
Romeo filed on behalf of the estate of Maximino Sr., a
case for annulment of sale with damages against Natividad
and Maximino Jr. on the ground that both sales were void for
lack of consideration. Trial Court rendered judgement declaring
the nullity of the deed of sale. CA modified RTC, ordered lots
cancelled and restored to the estate of Maximino Sr.
Issue: Whether upon death of the deceased spouses their
estate alone can seek the annulment of said sale? Whether the
sale is valid?
Held: The petition is without merit. The fact that other
properties had allegedly been sold by the spouses Maximino
Sr. and Aurea does not necessarily show that the deed of sale
made in favor of Natividad is valid. The trial court and CA
found that the Nazareno spouses transferred their properties
to their children by fictitious sales in order to avoid payment of
inheritance taxes. It was also found out that Natividad had no
means to pay for the six lots subject of the deed of sale. The
estate of Maximino alone cannot contest the validity of the
deed of sale because the estate of Aurea has not been settled.
CA decision affirmed.
96. Zaragosa vs CA (2000)
Facts:
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was a registered owner of certain
parcels of land situated at the municipalities of Cabatuan, New
Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Iloilo . He had four children, Gloria,
Zacariaz, Florentina and Alberta . On Decemeber 1964 he died
without a will.

Page | 47

Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint against

Florentino for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of
lots 943 and 871 and for payment of damages. She claims
that, his father in his lifetime partitioned the said properties
among his children. The shares of her brothers and sisters
were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but
without valid consideration. Her share, lots 943 and 871 were
not conveyed then. She averred that because of her marriage,
she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire
lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession.
Petitioners denied that there was partition of the estate of
their father during his lifetime. The trial court ruled and
ordered adjudication lot 871 to the plaintiff Alberta , the claim
for lot 943 is dismissed. Ca reversed RTC in so far as lot 943 is
concerned, ordered Alberta as owner of lot 943.
Issues: (1) Whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio
Zaragoza of his properties which includes lot 871 and 943
valid; (2) Whether the validity of the sale and consequently,
the TCT over lot 943 registered in the name of Petitioners
Florentina be a valid subject matter of the entire proceeding
for the delivery of the inheritance share.
Held: This court affirms the decision of CA, lots 871 and 943
were inheritance shares of respondent, based on documentary
evidence and testimonial evidence. Partition during the lifetime
of Flavio zaragoza is valid. It is basic in the law of succession
that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes
are not prejudiced. Article 1080 of the Civil Code is clear, the
petition, must be dismissed without prejudice to the institution
of a new proceeding were all the indispensable parties are
present for the rightful determination of their respective
legitime. Second Issue. Petition is a collateral attack. It is not
allowed by Sec 48 of PD 1529. The certificate, in absence of
fraud, is eveidence of title and shows exactly the real interest
of the owner. The title once registered. Should not be
thereafter impugned, altered or changed except in direct
proceeding permitted by law.
97. Mendoza vs CA (1991)
Facts: Petitioner Mendoza I et al instituted before CFI of
Bulacan an action for reconveyance of real property against
private respondents spouses Samonte. Petitioners are
legitimate children of deceased Mendoza , Trinidad , their
mother sold a parcel of land to respondents spouses Samonte.
Petitioners aver that they are entitled to legal redemption.
According to the plaintiff, the sale of the disputed property in
favor of the defendants was null and void on the ground that,
as a mere co-owner of an undivided estate, Trinidad Mendoza
had no right to divide the estate into parts and then convey a
part thereof by metes and bounds to a third person, since
there had never been any partition, judicial or extra judicial, of
the estate among the heirs of their late father, Arcadio. The
trial court dismissed the the petitioners complaint. CA affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether the deed of sale is void? Whether petitioners
can still exercise the right of legal redemption?
Held: Petitioner Trinidad is not entitled to one-half (1/2) of
said lot but only to the share of one legitimate child or 1 and
1/3 rights and interest, citing article 996 of the Civil Code. The

deed of sale is void insofar as it affects the rights and interests

of other petitioners because petitioner Trinidad can only sell
her 1 1/3 rights and interest over the said lot and no more
than that. Corollary, the remaining petitioners can still exercise
the right of legal redemption, conformably with Article 1620 of
the civil code.
98. Aznar Brothers Realty vs CA (2000)
Facts: Lot no. 4399 containing an area of 34,325 square
meters located at Brgy. Mactan, Lapu Lapu City was acquired
By Aznar from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of an
extrajudicial Partition of real estate with deed of absolute sale.
Private respondents were allegedly allowed to occupy portions
of lot 4399 provided that they leave the land in the event that
the company would use the property for its purpose. Later,
Aznar entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty for
development of the subject lot into a multi-million peso
housing subdivision and beach resort. When demands to
vacate failed, Aznar filed with MTCC a case for unlawful
detainer and damages. Private Respondents alleged that they
are the successors and descendants of the eight children of
the late Crisanta and that they had been residing in the
concept of owner since the time of their parents and
grandparents. They claim that the deed of absolute sale was
simulated and fraudulent. Thus files with RTC a complaint
seeking to declare the subject document null and void. MTCC
favored Aznar. RTC ordered demolition. CA reversed and set
aside RTC and declared Private Respondents as the rightful
possessors.
Issue: Whether the extrajudicial partition with deed of
absolute sale is valid.
Held: Private respondents claim that not all the known heirs
participated in the extrajudicial partition, and that two persons
who participated and were made parties thereto were not the
heirs of Crisanta. This claim even if true would not warrant
rescission of the deed. Article 1104 of the Civil Code as to
parties who were allegedly not heirs, article 1105 is in point.
Extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale is a notarized
document. As such, it has in its favor the presumption of
regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon
it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence
without further proof of authenticity. Decision of RTC
reinstated.
99. Ralla vs Untalan (1989)
Facts: Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a petition for the
probate of his will in the RTC of Albay. In his will he left his
entire estate to his son, Pablo (herein petitioner substituted by
heirs), leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro.
At the same time, Pedro filed an action for the partition of
the estate of their mother, Paz. With this case, the brothers
agreed to amicably compromise via project partition, whereby
sixty-three parcels of land, apparently forming the estate of
their deceased mother was divided between them. In the
course of the proceeding for the probate of Rosendo, Pablo
filed a motion to dismiss the petition for probate on the ground
that he was no longer interested in the allowance of the will of

Page | 48

his late father for its probate would no longer be beneficial to

him. This motion was denied, it was also denied at the CA. In
its decision the CA said, indeed the petitioner stood to gain if
the testate proceedings were to be dismissed because then he
would not be compelled to submit for inclusion in the inventory
of the estate of Rosendo comprising 149 parcels of land from
which he alone had been collecting rentals and receiving
income, to the exclusion and prejudiced of hi s brother who
was being deprived of his successional rights. Consequently,
the court declared Pedro and Pablo the only heirs of Rosendo
who should share equally upon the division of the latters
estate and thereupon converted the testate proceedings into
one of intestacy.
After eleven years, one Joaquin Chancoco brother in law of
Pablo filed a petition for the probate of the same will of
Rosendo on the ground that the decedent owed him P5000.
The petition for probate was granted. Teodorico Almine, sonin-law of Pablo was appointed special administrator, over and
above the objections of the heirs of Pedro. In taking
possession, Teoderico also took possession of the 63 parcels of
land subject of the partition earlier. Judge Untalan orderd that
the 63 parcels of land should be included in the proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo and thereafter
proceed as probate proceedings. After 2 years, Judge Untalan
reconsidered his order and held that the project partition is
respected and upheld. Petitioners filed an MR but was denied
hence the instant case.
Issue: Whether the partition should be regarded or respected
in view with the probate proccedings of the estate of Rosendo.
Held: Verily, the rule that there can be no valid partition
among the heirs till after the will has been probated. This, of
course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are
the same properties embraced in the will. Thus this rule
invoked, is inapplicable in the instant case where there are two
separate cases each involving the estate of two different
person comprising dissimilar properties. The project partition is
valid and binding upon the brothers as well as upon their heirs
especially as this was accompanied by delivery of possession
to them of their respective shares. They are duty bound to
respect the division agreed upon by them and embodied in the
document of partition. Thus the petitioner could no longer
question the exclusion of the lands subject of the partition
from the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Rosendo. Petition dismissed.
100. Balanay vs Martinez (1975)
Facts: Leodegaria Julian died in Davao City , she was survived
by her husband Felix Balanay Sr. and by their 6 children, Felix
Jr., Avelina, Beatriz, Carolina Delia and Emilia. Felix Jr. filed in
the lower court a petition for the probate of his mothers
notarial will. In the said will, it was declared that, 1.) She was
the owner of the southern half of the nine conjugal lots, 2.)
That it was her desire that her properties should not be divided
among her heirs during her husbands lifetime. She devised
and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by
her. She disposed of in the will her husbands one half share of
the conjugal assets.

Feliz Sr. and Avelina opposed the probate on the ground

of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence preterition of
the husband and alleged improper partitioned of the conjugal
estate. They claim that Felix Jr. should collate certain
properties which he had received from the testatrix. Felix Jr. in
his reply attatched an affidavit signed by Feliz Sr waiving and
renouncing hereditary rigts in the estate of his wife in favor of
their children. Avelina contended that the affidavit was void.
Lower court denied and gave effect to the affidavit and
conformity of Felix Sr.
In the meantime, A lawyer Montana appeared claiming to
be a lawyer of Felix Jr, he filed a motion to withdraw the
probate and to proceed by intestae estae proceeding. The
lower court adopted the view of Atty , Montana that the will
was void. So, it dismissed the petition for probate and
converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding.
Issue: Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the
intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or
formal validity, and declaring it void.
Held: We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual
provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and
because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate.
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the wills
intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established. But the probate court erred in declaring the will
was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an
intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order
it gave effect to the surviving husbands conformity to the will
and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which
presumably included in one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The rule is that the invalidity of one of several dispositions
contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other
dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator
would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid
disposition had not been made. (Art.792 CC) Where some
valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the
invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or
interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing
injustice to the beneficiaries.
The provision of the will of the testatrix should not be
divided among her heirs during her husbands lifetime but
should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in
cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code.
Felix Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his
one-half share of the conjugal partnership (Art. 179 and Art
1041 CC) but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a
donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the
conjugal estate (1061 CC) it should be subject to the
limitations prescribed in Articles 750 and 752 of the CC. A
portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for
his support and maintenance or at least his legitime should be
respected.
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and
her husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in the
manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she
could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate but

Page | 49

since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal

partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the
conjugal estate, such partition has become valid assuming that
the will may be probated. In the instant case, the preterited
heir was the husband, the surviving spouse. His preteritiion did
not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to
his wifes will and renounced his hereditary rights. Hearing for
the petition for probate affirmed.
101. Zaragosa vs CA (2000)
(Note: See previous assignment for the facts)
Both the trial court and the public respondent found that
during the lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned and
distributed his properties among his three children, excepting
private respondent, through deeds of sale. A deed of sale was
not executed in favor of private respondent because she had
become an American citizen and the Constitution prohibited a
sale in her favor. Petitioner admitted Lots 871 and 943 were
inheritance shares of the private respondent. These are factual
determinations of the Court of Appeals, based on documentary
and testimonial evidence. As a rule, we are bound by findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals.[12] Was the partition done
during the lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid? We think
so. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter
vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not
prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this.[13] The
legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as
provided for in Article 1061:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or
right which he may have received from the decedent, during
the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account
of the partition.
Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the
original petition for delivery of inheritance share only
impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition
must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the
institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable
parties are present for the rightful determination of their
respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the
partitioning inter vivos.
102. Plan vs IAC (1985)
Facts: In the intestate proceeding for the settlement of
Regino Bautistas estate, his widow filed a motion dated
December 9, 1964 for authority to sell to Plan the two lots and
theater for not less than P140,000. The purpose was to pay
the debts amounting to P117,220. The motion was set for
hearing. It was indicated that the children were notified
through one child Milagros Bautista. Judge Jimenez of the
probate court granted the authority to sell to Plan the entire
estate of the deceased for not less than P140,000 so as to pay
the obligations of the estate, appearing that all heirs have
conformed thereto. On that day, Florencia and Plan executed a
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage obligations for the

two lots. A motion to approve the sale was filed. Judge signed
the original deed of sale under the word approved to indicate
that the sale was okayed by probate court. Sixteen days after
the sale an opposition to the agreement of absolute sale was
filed by Federico Bautista child of the deceased. Federicos
counsel did not file any objection to the project of partition as
per order by the Judge. The reason is not hard to surmise. The
estate sought to be partitioned had already been sold to Plan.
Federico contended that because there was no compliance
with Section 7 Rule 89 of the Rules of Court the sale was void.
Instead of asking the court to act on his petition for relief from
the orders authorizing and approving the sale, Federico filed a
separate action against Plan to nullify the sale. Judge
dismissed the action. He ruled that the nullity of the sael as to
Federicos 1/16 share should be resolved in the intestae
proceeding. He filed three times same action, all have been
dismissed. Ca ruled in favor of Federico, it declared void the
agreement to sell based on article 1088 of the Civil Code.
103. Rodriguez vs CA (2001)
This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 23, 1994 which affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozamiz City in Civil Case
No. OZ-1397.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and
Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings before the CFI
of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria
Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. On August 1, 1946, the CFI granted
the petition and declared petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child
of Miguel and Rosalina.
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter,
petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement
of Miguels estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal
proportion the estate of Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an
action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of
Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina as
defendants docketed as OZ 349.
On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and
upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the private
respondents appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the
Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with
respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel
and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the
representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no
heirs except his brothers and sisters.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition
covered fourteen parcels of land covering a total area of
224,883 square meters. These properties were divided among
Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel,
represented solely by Rosalina. The heirs of Miguel were given
226 square meters of parcel 2, and 9,567 square meters and
24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and 9, respectively.[1] The
total land area allocated to the heirs of Miguel was 34,250
square meters.
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer
some parcels to the other respondents herein.[2]

Page | 50

Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3,

designated as Lot 504, were transferred to respondents Chuan
Lung Fai,[3] but not included in the Deed of Settlement and
Partition, were transferred to respondent Lilian Express, Inc.
and are now registered under TCT No. T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot
560, was subdivided among Ramon, Jose, Carmen and
Mercedes and was designated as Lots 560-A, 560-B, 560-C,
560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering 500 square meters was
transferred to respondent Victorino Detall[4] and was
subsequently transferred to Jerome Deiparine who registered it
under his name under TCT No. T-10706. Lot 560-B with 500
square meters was transferred to respondent Petronilo
Detalla[5] and was later transferred to respondent Hubert Chiu
Yulo who registered it under his name under TCT No. T11305. Lot 560-C was transferred and registered under the
name of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT No. T-10206. Lot
560-D was sold to and subsequently registered in the name of
Lorensita M. Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The remaining
portion, Lot 560-E consisting of 43,608 square meters was
bought by respondent Immaculate Concepcion College and
was registered in its name under TCT No. T-10208.[6]
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought
to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion
to Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn,
to claim their share of the properties from the
Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and
Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983
partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28,
1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to
include the allegation that earnest efforts toward a
compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the
defendants, but the same failed.[7]
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Its
ruling was premised on the following grounds:[8]
1) that the participation of Rosalina has already
estopped her from questioning the validity of
the partition, and since she is already estopped,
it naturally follows that Maria Elena, her
successor-in-interest, is likewise estopped,
applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code;
2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that
the partition is null and void is weakened by her
inconsistent claim that the partition would have
been alright had she been given a more
equitable share;
3) the action is essentially an action for rescission
and had been filed late considering that it was
filed beyond the 4 year period provided for in
Article 1100 of the Civil Code;[9]
4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never
established.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
December 20, 1994.[10]

Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that

the following errors were allegedly committed by the Court of
Appeals in I. FINDING
THAT
THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION ENTERED INTO
BY DEFENDANT JUREDINI AND DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS RODRIGUEZES WAS VALID AND
BINDING UPON THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN SAID
TRANSACTION
II. CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT HAVE ALREADY PRESCRIBED TWO
(2) YEARS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION
IN
THE
NEWSPAPER
OF
GENERAL
CIRCULATION
III. ...CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
IS
BARRED
OR
ESTOPPED IN FILING THIS CASE (sic) IN VIEW
OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL IN CIVIL
CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY HEREIN
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WHO WERE THEN
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN AC[C]-G.R. NO. SP00208
IV. SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES
CLAIM THAT AS THEY HAVE NOT AS YET
RECOGNIZED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS AN
ADOPTED DAUGHTER OF MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ
IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM TO HAVE
HER PARTICIPATE IN THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS S AND I
V. CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
HAD NOT CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN THAT
MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ WAS A CO-OWNER OF
THE LANDS SOLD AND HENCE IT FOLLOWS
THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OF
THOSE LANDS
VI. FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS NOS. 504
AND
560
SOLD
TO
THE
OTHER
DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES WERE CLEAN AND
FREE FROM ENCUMBRANCES OR ANY FLAWS
HENCE WERE VALID
VII. FINDING THAT THE PLANTIFFAPPELLANT
NEVER APPEARED IN COURT TO TESTIFY OR
REBUT
THE
ASSERTIONS
OF
THE
DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS THAT THERE WAS A
VALID PARTITION
VIII. AWARDING PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DAMAGES
FOR THE INCOME OF HER SHARE IN THE
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION[11]
In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1)
whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition had already prescribed;
(2) whether or not said deed is valid; and (3) whether or not
the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already
been transferred to the respondent buyers.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the
extrajudicial partition has not yet prescribed since the
prescriptive period which should be applied is four years
following the case of Beltran vs. Ayson, 4 SCRA 69 (1962). She
also avers that Sec. 4, Rule 74 which provides for a two-year

Page | 51

prescriptive period needs two requirements. One, the party

assailing the partition must have been given notice, and two,
the party assailing the partition must have participated
therein. Petitioner insists these requirements are not present in
her case,[12] since she did not participate in the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition. She cites Villaluz vs.
Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we held that a deed of
extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the
heirs, who had no knowledge and consent to the same, is
fraudulent. She asserts that she is an adoptive daughter and
thus an heir of Miguel.[13]
Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers were
buyers in bad faith since they failed to exercise the necessary
due diligence required before purchasing the lots in
question.[14] In the alternative, petitioner wants to redeem
the said lots as a co-owner of respondent Rodriguezes under
the provisions of Article 1620 of the New Civil Code.[15]
Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the
partition would be allowed. She asks for the rescission of the
said partitioning under Articles 165-175 of the Civil Code.[16]
Respondents, in response, claim that the action of
petitioner had already prescribed. In addition, they argue that
petitioner, Maria Elena, and Rosalina already have their shares
in the estate of Miguel Rodriguez reflected in the compromise
agreement they entered into with the respondent Rodriguezes
in AC- G.R. SP 00208. Finally, respondents aver that the nonparticipation of Maria Elena in the extrajudicial partition was
understandable since her status as an adopted child was then
under litigation. In any case, they assert that the shares of
Miguels heirs were adequately protected in the said
partition.[17]
Section 4, Rule 74[18] provides for a two year
prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or
taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in
addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1[19] of Rule 74
have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or
heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians.[20]
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in
the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year
prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years
as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964),
which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon
the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have
taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register
of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name
of respondents exclusively.[21]
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed
on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the
questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was
executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on
the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the
applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It
states:

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall

be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.[22]
Under said provision, without the participation of all
persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial
settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule
contemplates a notice which must be sent out or
issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is
agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to
participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition, not after, which was when publication was done in
the instant case.Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs.
Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in the said
partition, the settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply
when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be
annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial
partition executed without including some of the heirs, who
had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent
and vicious.[23] Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with
her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of
Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from
participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article
1003 of the Civil Code.[24] The private respondent
Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria
Elenas adoption since they even filed an action to annul the
decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions
were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was still being
questioned at the time they executed the deed of
partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was
filed only twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption,
patently a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from
inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption
was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent
that private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad
faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.
In the case of Segura vs. Segura, the Court held:
This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in gist
that a person who has been deprived of his lawful participation
in the estate of the decedent, whether as heir or as creditor,
must assert his claim within two years after the extrajudicial or
summary settlement of such estate under Sections 1 and 2
respectively of the same Rule 74. Thereafter, he will be
precluded from doing so as the right will have prescribed.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the
partition in question which was null and void as far as the
plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid
partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid
because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to
equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. As the
partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded
heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their
right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years
from its execution in 1941.[25]

Page | 52

To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in

the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child,
was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only
represented her own interests and not those of Maria
Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate
automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal
shares. Respondent Rodriguezes interests did not include
Miguels estate but only Pilars estate.
Could petitioner still redeem the properties from
buyers? Given the circumstances in this case, we are
constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide
this issue. The properties sought to be recovered by the
petitioner are now all registered under the name of third
parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot
be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.[26]
Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts,
agreements or any other documentary evidence was presented
to justify such claim for damages. Actual damages, to be
recoverable, must be proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture
or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of
damages.[27] The same is true for moral damages. These
cannot be awarded in the absence of any factual
basis.[28] The unsubstantiated testimony of Loreto Jocelyn
Pedrosa is hearsay and has no probative value. It is settled in
jurisprudence that damages may not be awarded on the basis
of hearsay evidence.[29] Nonetheless, the failure of the
petitioner to substantiate her claims for damages does not
mean that she will be totally deprived of any damages. Under
the law, nominal damages are awarded, so that a plaintiffs
right, which has been invaded or violated by defendants may
be vindicated and recognized.[30]
Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained
injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and
properly proved, (2) petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her
legal participation in the partition of the estate of Miguel, her
adoptive father, (3) respondents had transferred portions of
the properties involved to third parties, and (4) this case has
dragged on for more than a decade, we find it reasonable to
grant in petitioners favor nominal damages in recognition of
the existence of a technical injury.[31] The amount to be
awarded as such damages should at least commensurate to
the injury sustained by the petitioner considering the concept
and purpose of said damages.[32] Such award is given in view
of the peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons
extant in this case.[33] Thus, the grant of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner as damages is
proper in view of the technical injury she has suffered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition
executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is
declared invalid. The amount of P100,000.00 is hereby
awarded to petitioner as damages to be paid by private
respondents, who are also ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
104. Opulencia vs CA (1998)
PANGANIBAN, J.

Is a contract to sell a real property involved in testate

proceedings valid and binding without the approval of the
probate court?

Statement of the Case

This is the main question raised in this petition for review
before us, assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in
CA-GR CV No. 41994 promulgated on February 6, 1996 and its
Resolution[3] dated July 19, 1996. The challenged Decision
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower
court dismissing the complaint is SET ASIDE and judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the CONTRACT TO SELL
executed by appellee in favor of appellants as valid and
binding, subject to the result of the administration proceedings
of the testate Estate of Demetrio Carpena.
SO ORDERED. [4]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the
challenged Resolution.[5]

The Facts
The antecedent facts, as
Respondent Court of Appeals are:

succinctly

narrated

by

In a complaint for specific performance filed with the court a

quo [herein private respondents] Aladin Simundac and Miguel
Oliven alleged that [herein petitioner] Natalia Carpena
Opulencia executed in their favor a CONTRACT TO SELL Lot
2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate, consisting of 23,766 square
meters located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna at P150.00 per square
meter; that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but
defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her
obligations under the contract. [Private respondents] therefore
prayed that [petitioner] be ordered to perform her contractual
obligations and to further pay damages, attorneys fee and
litigation expenses.
In her traverse, [petitioner] admitted the execution of the
contract in favor of plaintiffs and receipt of P300,000.00 as
downpayment. However, she put forward the following
affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the contract
formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioners
father), in respect of which a petition for probate was filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna; that at
the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of
the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to
sell was not approved by the probate court; that realizing the
nullity of the contract [petitioner] had offered to return the
downpayment received from [private respondents], but the
latter refused to accept it; that [private respondents] further
failed to provide funds for the tenant who
demanded P150,00.00 in payment of his tenancy rights on the
land; that [petitioner] had chosen to rescind the contract.

Page | 53

At the pre-trial conference the parties stipulated on [sic] the

following facts:
1. That on February 3, 1989, [private respondents] and
[petitioner] entered into a contract to sell involving a parcel of
land situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna, otherwise known as Lot No.
2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate.
2. That the price or consideration of the said sell [sic]
is P150.00 per square meters;
3. That the amount of P300,000.00 had already been received
by [petitioner];
4. That the parties have knowledge that the property subject
of the contract to sell is subject of the probate proceedings;
5. That [as] of this time, the probate Court has not yet issued
an order either approving or denying the said sale. (p. 3,
appealed Order of September 15, 1992, pp. 109-112, record).
[Private respondents] submitted their evidence in support of
the material allegations of the complaint. In addition to
testimonies of witnesses, [private respondents] presented the
following documentary evidences: (1) Contract to Sell (Exh A);
(2) machine copy of the last will and testament of Demetrio
Carpena (defendants father) to show that the property sold by
defendant was one of those devised to her in said will (Exh B);
(3) receipts signed by defendant for the downpayment in the
total amount of P300,000.00 (Exhs C, D & E); and (4) demand
letters sent to defendant (Exhs F & G).
It appears that [petitioner], instead of submitting her evidence,
filed a Demurrer to Evidence. In essence, defendant
maintained that the contract to sell was null and void for want
of approval by the probate court. She further argued that the
contract was subject to a suspensive condition, which was the
probate of the will of defendants father Demetrio Carpena. An
Opposition was filed by [private respondents]. It appears
further that in an Order dated December 15, 1992 the court a
quo granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the
complaint. It justified its action in dismissing the complaint in
the following manner:
It is noteworthy that when the contract to sell was
consummated, no petition was filed in the Court with notice to
the heirs of the time and place of hearing, to show that the
sale is necessary and beneficial. A sale of properties of an
estate as beneficial to the interested parties must comply with
the requisites provided by law, (Sec. 7, Rule 89, Rules of
Court) which are mandatory, and without them, the authority
to sell, the sale itself, and the order approving it, would be null
and void ab initio. (Arcilla vs. David, 77 Phil. 718, Gabriel, et
al., vs. Encarnacion, et al., L-6736, May 4, 1954; Bonaga vs.
Soler, 2 Phil. 755) Besides, it is axiomatic that where the
estate of a deceased person is already the subject of a testate
or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into
any transaction involving it without prior approval of the
probate Court. (Estate of Obave, vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 767).
As held by the Supreme Court, a decedents representative
(administrator) is not estopped from questioning the validity of
his own void deed purporting to convey land. (Bona vs. Soler,
2 Phil, 755). In the case at bar, the [petitioner,] realizing the
illegality of the transaction[,] has interposed the nullity of the
contract as her defense, there being no approval from the
probate Court, and, in good faith offers to return the money

she received from the [private respondents]. Certainly, the

administratrix is not estop[ped] from doing so and the action
to declare the inexistence of contracts do not prescribe. This is
what precipitated the filing of [petitioners] demurrer to
evidence.[6]
The trial courts order of dismissal was elevated to the
Court of Appeals by private respondents who alleged:
1. The lower court erred in concluding that the contract to sell
is null and void, there being no approval of the probate court.
2. The lower court erred in concluding that [petitioner] in good
faith offers to return the money to [private respondents].
3. The lower court erred in concluding that [petitioner] is not
under estoppel to question the validity of the contract to sell.
4. The lower court erred in not ruling on the consideration of
the contract to sell which is tantamount to plain unjust
enrichment of [petitioner] at the expense of [private
respondents].[7]

Public Respondents Ruling

Declaring the Contract to Sell valid, subject to the
outcome of the testate proceedings on Demetrio Carpenas
estate, the appellate court set aside the trial courts dismissal of
the complaint and correctly ruled as follows:
It is apparent from the appealed order that the lower court
treated the contract to sell executed by appellee as one made
by the administratrix of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena for the
benefit of the estate. Hence, its main reason for voiding the
contract in question was the absence of the probate courts
approval. Presumably, what the lower court had in mind was
the sale of the estate or part thereof made by the
administrator for the benefit of the estate, as authorized under
Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires the
approval of the probate court upon application therefor with
notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees.
However, as adverted to by appellants in their brief, the
contract to sell in question is not covered by Rule 89 of the
Revised Rules of Court since it was made by appellee in her
capacity as an heir, of a property that was devised to her
under the will sought to be probated. Thus, while the
document inadvertently stated that appellee executed the
contract in her capacity as executrix and administratrix of the
estate, a cursory reading of the entire text of the contract
would unerringly show that what she undertook to sell to
appellants was one of the other properties given to her by her
late father, and more importantly, it was not made for the
benefit of the estate but for her own needs. To illustrate this
point, it is apropos to refer to the preambular or preliminary
portion of the document, which reads:
WHEREAS, the SELLER is the lawful owner of a certain parcel
of land, which is more particularly described as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx

Page | 54

xxxxxxxxx
WHEREAS, the SELLER suffers difficulties in her living and has
forced to offer the sale of the above-described property, which
property was only one among the other properties given to her
by her late father, to anyone who can wait for complete
clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father.
WHEREAS, the SELLER in order to meet her need of cash, has
offered for sale the said property at ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS (150.00) Philippine Currency, per square meter unto
the BUYERS, and with this offer, the latter has accepted to buy
and/or purchase the same, less the area for the road and other
easements indicated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 2125 duly confirmed after the survey to be conducted by
the BUYERs Licensed Geodetic Engineer, and whatever area
[is] left. (Emphasis added).
To emphasize, it is evident from the foregoing clauses of the
contract that appellee sold Lot 2125 not in her capacity as
executrix of the will or administratrix of the estate of her
father, but as an heir and more importantly as owner of said
lot which, along with other properties, was devised to her
under the will sought to be probated. That being so, the
requisites stipulated in Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court
which refer to a sale made by the administrator for the benefit
of the estate do not apply.
xxxxxxxxx
It is noteworthy that in a Manifestation filed with this court by
appellants, which is not controverted by appellee, it is
mentioned that the last will and testament of Demetrio
Carpena was approved in a final judgment rendered in Special
Proceeding No. B-979 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24
Binan, Laguna. But of course such approval does not terminate
the proceeding[s] since the settlement of the estate will
ensue. Such proceedings will consist, among others, in the
issuance by the court of a notice to creditors (Rule 86),
hearing of money claims and payment of taxes and estate
debts (Rule 88) and distribution of the residue to the heirs or
persons entitled thereto (Rule 90).In effect, the final execution
of the deed of sale itself upon appellants payment of the
balance of the purchase price will have to wait for the
settlement or termination of the administration proceedings of
the Estate of Demetrio Carpena. Under the foregoing premises,
what the trial court should have done with the complaint was
not to dismiss it but to simply put on hold further proceedings
until such time that the estate or its residue will be distributed
in accordance with the approved will.
The rule is that when a demurrer to the evidence is granted by
the trial court but reversed on appeal, defendant loses the
right to adduce his evidence. In such a case, the appellate
court will decide the controversy on the basis of plaintiffs
evidence. In the case at bench, while we find the contract to
sell valid and binding between the parties, we cannot as yet
order appellee to perform her obligations under the contract
because the result of the administration proceedings of the
testate Estate of Demetrio Carpena has to be awaited. Hence,
we shall confine our adjudication to merely declaring the
validity of the questioned Contract to Sell.

Hence, this appeal.[8]

The Issue
Petitioner raises only one issue:
Whether or not the Contract to Sell dated 03 February
1989 executed by the [p]etitioner and [p]rivate
[r]espondent[s] without the requisite probate court
approval is valid.

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Contract to Sell Valid

In a nutshell, petitioner contends that where the estate
of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or
intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any
transaction involving it without prior approval of the Probate
Court.[9] She maintains that the Contract to Sell is void because
it was not approved by the probate court, as required by
Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or
otherwise encumber estate. The court having jurisdiction of
the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or
administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real
estate, in cases provided by these rules and when it appears
necessary or beneficial, under the following regulations:
xxx
Insisting that the above rule should apply to this case,
petitioner argues that the stipulations in the Contract to Sell
require her to act in her capacity as an executrix or
administratrix. She avers that her obligation to eject tenants
pertains to the administratrix or executrix, the estate being the
landlord of the said tenants.[10] Likewise demonstrating that
she entered into the contract in her capacity as executor is the
stipulation that she must effect the conversion of subject land
from irrigated rice land to residential land and secure the
necessary clearances from government offices. Petitioner
alleges that these obligations can be undertaken only by an
executor or administrator of an estate, and not by an heir.[11]
The Court is not persuaded. As correctly ruled by the
Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is
not applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to
Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or
administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented
herself as the lawful owner and seller of the subject parcel of
land.[12] She also explained the reason for the sale to be
difficulties in her living conditions and consequent need of

Page | 55

cash.[13] These representations clearly evince that she was not

acting on behalf of the estate under probate when she entered
into the Contract to Sell.Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by
petitioner has no application to the instant case.
We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the
heir or heirs from the moment of the decedents
death.[14] Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her
hereditary share the moment her father died.Thus, the lack of
judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell,
because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the
whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late
father.[15] Thus, inJakosalem vs. Rafols,[16] the Court resolved
an identical issue under the old Civil Code and held:
Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of
hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir
without interruption from the instant of the death of the
decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted. And Manresa
with reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his
heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left
with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated
to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among
the coowners of the estate while it remains undivided. xxx And
according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner
may assign or mortgage his part in the common property, and
the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted him in the partition upon the
dissolution of the community. Hence, where some of the heirs,
without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by
their deceased father, this Court, speaking thru its then Chief
Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that
the effect thereof was limited to the share which may be
allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.

pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such

administration.[20]

Estoppel
Finally, petitioner is estopped from backing out of her
representations in her valid Contract to Sell with private
respondents, from whom she had already received P300,000
as initial payment of the purchase price. Petitioner may not
renege on her own acts and representations, to the prejudice
of the private respondents who have relied on
them.[21] Jurisprudence teaches us that neither the law nor the
courts will extricate a party from an unwise or undesirable
contract he or she entered into with all the required formalities
and with full awareness of its consequences.[22]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Administration of the Estate Not Prejudiced by the

Contract to Sell
Petitioner further contends that [t]o sanction the sale at
this stage would bring about a partial distribution of the
decedents estate pending the final termination of the testate
proceedings.[17] This becomes all the more significant in the
light of the trial courts finding, as stated in its Order dated
August 20, 1997, that the legitime of one of the heirs has been
impaired.[18]
Petitioners contention is not convincing. The Contract to
Sell stipulates that petitioners offer to sell is contingent on the
complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of
her father.[19]Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was
perfected between the petitioner and private respondents
during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the
consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over
the parcel of land to the private respondents is subject to the
full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and
outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no
basis for petitioners apprehension that the Contract to Sell may
result in a premature partition and distribution of the
properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that the sale
made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the

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