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Gonzalez, Mary '8;' FYI

From: Upchurch, James
Sent: Monday, April 26, 2010 3:09 PM
To: Sapp, George; Von Hoene, Kathleen
Cc: Hancock, John A.
Subject: Security Audit Report Draft - Osceola County Jail
Attachments: 4-26-1OcoverletterOsceola audit.doc; Osceola County Jail Review.doc

Please find attached the draft cover letter and audit report concerning the Osceola County Jail. Please advise if you have
any changes, etc. Thanks!

James R. Upchurch
Chief, Bureau of Security Operations
Florida Department of Corrections
850-410-4390
 FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT of
CORRECTIONS Governor
CHARLIE CRIST

secretary
An Equal Opporiunity Employer WALTER A. McNEIL
2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 http://www.dc.state.fl.us

Mr. Fred Hawkins, Jr.

Chairman
County Commissioner, District 5
Osceola County
1 Courthouse Square, Suite4000
Kissimrnee, FL 34741-5433

Re: Security Audit - Osceola County Jail Facility

Dear Chairman Hawkins:

In response to your March 22, 2010 letter, the security audit of the Osceola County Jail
conducted during the period April 5-8, 2010 is attached. The focus of this audit was primarily
limited to escape prevention issues and possible enhancements intended to reduce the likelihood
of hture such incidents. The criterions utilized were derived fiom our department's established
security standards. Those specific standards selected for application to the jail are those generic to
any secure corrections facility, prison or jad, which houses persons posing a significant threat to
public safety. Hopehlly the observations and recommendations in this report will prove to be of
some benefit as you strive to enhance security at the facility.

We wish to express our thanks to the staff and managers at the facility for the helphlness and
cooperation exhibited throughout the assessment period. It was certainly evident that a number of
improvements have already been initiated and plans for others put in place. Staff at all levels
appeared genuinely interested in our suggestions and obviously interested in improving the
security program at the facility.

Please advise if there are any questions or concerns after reviewing the report or if any
clarification or M h e r assistance is needed.

Sincerely,

James R. Upchurch
Chief; Bureau of Security Operations
850-410-4390
Cc:
Walter A. McNed, Secretary
George Sapp, Deputy Secretary of Institutions and Re-Entry
Kathleen Von Hoene, General Counsel
Susan Stephens, Senior Attorney, General Counsel
 FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT of
CORRECTIONS Governor
CHARLIE CRIST

Secretary
An Equal Opportunig Employer WALTER A McNEIL
2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 http://www.dc.state.fl.us

Osceola County Jail Security Assessment

April 5-8,2010

During the period of April 5-8, 2010, a security audit was conducted at the Osceola County Jail.
This audit focused primarily on the escape prevention components of the security program at the
jail in light of recent events leading up to the requested assessment. A team of security consultants
operating under the direction of James R. Upchurch, Bureau Chief of Security Operations, Florida
Department of Corrections conducted the audit. Team members for this audit were Correctional
Services Consultants Thomas Hester and Joseph Falk.

During the course of the evaluation, the team examined the buildings and grounds of the facility.
Additionally, the team inspected the perimeter and interviewed officers throughout the facility on
both shifts. The team also interviewed key supervisory and management staff, reviewed operating
procedures, post orders, and pertinent documentation such as inventories and checkout logs for
weapons, security equipment, and sensitive items. Key control and inmate transportation
procedures were also reviewed.

The matters discussed in this report are of a sensitive security nature and should be considered
confidential and excluded fiom public release.

PERIMETER

Obsewation: Several drain grates within the facility have pipes over 10 inches in circumference.
There is no supportingdocumentation to show that these drains are inspected daily to ensure they
have not been tampered with.
Recommendation: To prevent inmates from gaining access to drainage pipes that provide access
outside the secure perimeter, assign each drainage pipe a number for easy identification and create
a site map to be utilized daily by staff inspecting them to ensure all of these drain gratings are
inspected and that this inspection is documented.

Obsewation: There are several storage sheds located within the secure perimeter that create
hiding spots and visually impede clear sight lines within the facility.
Facility Action: Several of these sheds were removed during the review and others are
reportedly scheduled for removal.
Recommendation: Remove the remaining sheds fiom within the secure perimeter. This will allow
for a better line of sight for perimeter and internal security sta E

Obsewation: Upon questioning perimeter staff in the assigned roving perimeter vehicle,
stationary perimeter posts, and the recreation field tower, it was clear to the auditors that the
assigned staff were unsure as to what level of force they are authorized to use in the event of an
escape attempt fiom the secure perimeter of the facility.
Recommendation: When the security supervisory staff are conducting required security checks,
perimeter staff should be questioned as to the appropriate response to an inmate attempting to
escape. Any discrepancies or uncertainty should be clarified as to the expected appropriate
response and use of force as outlined in the perimeter post orders. We also recommend that the
instructive language in the post orders be worded more clearly and specifically; for example:

Where time permits, give a verbal order to stop andfire a warning shot before the inmate
reaches the perimeter fence.
Thefirearm shall not befired at the inmate until he/she has begun to pass over, through,
or under the perimeter fence.

Obsewation: There is no electronic perimeter detectiodalert system in place on the facility

perimeter.
Recommendation: Install an electronic perimeter detectiodalert system on the facility's
perimeter. There are several options for such a system including fence-mounted sound and
vibration sensing detection systems and non-lethal electrified fence systems providing detection,
deterrence and an enhanced barrier. Either of these two options would work well for this
application and can be combined with an integrated perimeter camera system that can be utilized
to instantlyview intrusion detection events and dispatch perimeter staff as necessary. The
Department of Correctionsutilizes both of these systems extensively and can serve as a resource
in this regard. The anticipated cost of either system is dramaticalk less than the estimate
reportedly provided to jail facility staff for such a system. Additionally, such a system combined
with an adequate razor wire enhanced chain link barrier can significantl~reduce the recurring
costs associated with multiple manned perimeter posts as is presently in place at the facility. The
system's one-time acquisition cost and minimal recurring maintenance cost along with the need
for only one armedlmanned vehicular post will significantly reduce costs while providing
enhanced security and escape prevention for the facility.

Obsewation: The perimeter fence in zone 9 is too close to the Work Release Center and is
approximately 4 feet shorter than the rest of the perimeter fence allowing an inmate to easily climb
on the Work Release Center roof and then jump over the perimeter fence.
Facility Action: A meeting was held by facility security managers with a vendor during the
period of our review to implement the following recommendation.
Recommendation: Move the perimeter fence out approximately 5 feet and raise it to 12 feet to
match the rest of the perimeter.

Obsewation: Razor wire around the perimeter is not attached to the fence fabric or to a concrete
apron at the base of the fence to prevent it fiom being pulled away fiom the fence andforoff the
ground.
Recommendation: Attach the razor wire to the fence fabric approximately every foot with

stainless steel hog rings and to the other rolls of razor wire to create a solid immoveable stack.

Attach the razor wire to the concrete apron and where no apron is present drive rebar into the

ground approximately three feet deep at five-foot intervals to which the razor wire can be securely

attached.

Obsewation: Perimeter staff are armed with a 40-cahier pistol and a can of pepper foam.

Recommendation: If it is afkned that lethal weapons may be used to prevent escapes fiom the

facility, consider equipping perimeter staff with a 12 gauge, 870-pump shotgun as a primary

weapon and the 40-caliber pistol as a secondary weapon. We recommend that the ammunition

selected for the shotgun have relatively short range effectiveness due to the close proximity of

residential neighborhoods and the Turnpike. Post order language should include a caution that the

firearm should not be discharged until the officer is sure of the target and what lies beyond.

Obsewation: The access gate for the recreation tower is approximately 60 feet away fiom the

tower, which requires the officer to walk with a loaded weapon within the secure perimeter.

Recommendation: Seal off the existing gate and install a new gate directly behind the tower with

appropriate fencing. This will ensure the inmates do not have the ability to come in contact with

the assigned, armed staff member.

Obsewation: The recreation tower does not have a fence around to prevent inmates fiom

accessing it and gaining access to weapons.

Recommendation: Secure this tower with fencing and razor wire to prevent inmates fiom

gaining access to the tower or move the recreation tower outside the secure perimeter.

Obsewation: Form 1100.01, Daily Fire Safety 1 Security 1 Sanitation Inspection Checklist,

should be completed within the first three hours of each shift per post order # 400.06. There was

no documentation to demonstrate that this inspection was completed within the required time

fiame. This form is computer generated with no staff signatures required therefore no staff can be

held accountable for completing the required inspections.

Recommendation: Add the date and time to the FSSO inspection stamp for the logs and print

the form out each shift for staff completing the inspection to sign.

Obsewation: The fencing attached to the Work Release Center allows inmates to gain access to

the roof

Recommendation: Remove all fencing that is attached to the Work Release Center or secure the

fence with a sufficient pyramided amount of razor wire to prevent inmates fiom accessing the

roof.

Obsewation: Not all fencing that intersects with the perimeter fence has a sufficient amount of

razor wire to prevent inmates fiom climbing the intersecting fence and using it to go over the

outer perimeter fence

Recommendation: Affix razor wire to the top of all interior cross fencing that intersects with the

perimeter fence in a tripodlpyrarnid configuration for at least ten feet prior to the intersection to

prevent inmate access.

Observation: Perimeter lighting does not adequately light the perimeter fence area. The facility

does have portable lights (temporary) to help overcome this deficiency.

Recommendation: Perimeter lighting should be enhanced to provide clear visibility of the fence

line and the interior area between the facility buildings and the fence. In consideration of the close

proximity of residential neighborhoods and concerns about "light pollution" in this area, it is

recomrnended that directional lighting fixtures be mounted to poles at a height no greater than 15

feet. Although generally desirable, backlighting external to the perimeter fence should be kept to a

minimum. When coupled with the other perimeter security enhancements recomrnended in this

report, adequate lighting for the areas subsequently covered by this plan should be sufficient.

Observation: During the review, it was observed that the height the grass on the facility grounds

was relatively high. This would allow an inmate to get within close proximity of the fence without

being detected.

Facility Action: The grass was mowed during the review.

Recommendation: Maintain the grounds to a standard that would allow for a clear view from the

roving perimeter post and from within.

Observation: The trash compactor located in the kitchen sally port area next to the perimeter

fence has a minimal amount of razor wire affixed for security purposes.

Recommendation: Install 12-foot chain link fencing with appropriate razor wire attached to the

top to better contain and secure this area.

Observation: Utility poles are located next to the perimeter fence.

Recommendation: All utility poles that are in close proximity to the perimeter fence need to have

razor wire installed in a manner sufficient to prevent climbing.

Observation: There is nothing to impede access to the outside of the facility from the

administrative building if an inmate were to gain access to the roof

Recommendation: Fencing, razor wire, and the previously referenced electronic detection

system with integrated cameras should be installed on top ofthe administration building between

the booking area and the point where zone 13 intersects with the building by the visitor entrance.

This will assist in preventing inmates from gaining access outside the perimeter if they gain access

to the roof When a building is located in the perimeter and is therefore part of the containment

features of a facility, it should be included in the 360 degree continuous perimeter security system.

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS:

Recommendation: Razor wire should be added to the entire interior roofline of the Work
Release building to prevent unauthorized roof top access due to the proximity of this building to
the perimeter.

Recommendation: We recommend that all interior containmentlcross fencing be assessed as to

whether it is needed based on the security purpose it serves. If needed it should be 12" in height
and preferably have poured concrete at its base or alternatively a bottom rail to prevent easy
access underneath. Twenty-four to thirty inch diameter, reinforced long barbed razor wire should
be attached to the top portion of all cross fencing throughout the facility to impede access from
either side.
Recommendation: Any cross fencing intersecting with the perimeter fence or building where the
roof may be accessible fi-om the top of the fence should have the appropriate type of razor wire
attached on both sides and the top (pyramidltripod) of the fence for at least a ten (10)-foot span
on the intersecting fence. Razor wire should be placed vertically in the intersecting corner
extending towards the ground not extend lower than seven (7) feet. The opening at the bottom of
the razor wire roll will be closed and secured.

LOCK AND KEY CONTROL

Observation: Staff were observed to have personal sets of keys for the facility. These keys
accessed secure areas such as housing units throughout the facility. The keys are not accounted
for daily and are taken home by the staff during off duty hours.
Facility Action: Facility administration initiated identification of all keys and the creation of
facility key rings for these staff during the review.
Recommendation: Inspect all personal keys brought into the facility to ensure they are not keys
to the facility. Staff who are in possession of such keys should be required to surrender them to
the facility. Keys that access the facility should be issued to staff on a daily basis and should be
returned at the end of the workday in order to account for all keys.

Observation: Vehicle keys are stored in the Support Supervisors office and were not tagged or
hung on key hooks in the key cabinet for easy identification. If a set were missing it would be
impossible to do a quick site check to identi@the missing set.. There were also loose keys in the
cabinet for vehicles.
Recommendation: Each key ring should have a chit that identifies the number of keys and the
key ring number that corresponds with the hook number in the key box for quick identification
and key accountability. Each key ring should be brazed or secured in a manner to prevent
unauthorized removal or addition of keys to the key rings.

Observation: Keys are not being signed out properly on the key logs. The number of keys on the
key ring are not being documented and the key log reflects the area the staff member works as
opposed to the staff member's name who is receiving the keys.
Recommendation: Insure that the control room staff complete the key issue log form by entering
the name of the individual staff member to whom the keys are being issued. The staff member
receiving the keys should not fill out this form.

Observation: Emergency keys are not sealed in the emergency key cabinet, thus allowing staff
the opportunity to access restricted areas without prior approval and without properly
documenting the reason for the use of these keys.
Recommendation: Store these keys in a secure cabinet with a numbered seal affixed to prevent
unlimited access to restricted areas. These seals should be checked at the beginning of each shift
and notated on the daily report log.

Observation: The dead latch mechanism on remotely controlled door locks in the Work Release
Center, which prevents someone fi-om "carding" the door open, was not functioning properly on
numerous doors in the Work Release Center.
Recommendation: IdentifLthose locks that are not hctioning properly and repair as needed.

The locks in the Work Release Center should be evaluated for replacement due to the number of

keys that were noted on personal key rings.

Observation: There is no system in place to check the emergency keys to ensure the keys and

locks k c t i o n properly if an emergency was to occur.

Recommendation: All emergency keys should be physically checked on all locks on at least a

quarterly basis.

Observation: Cross fencing gate locks were not security grade padlocks.

Recommendation: Padlocks for cross fence gates should be a security grade and should be

restricted to a minimum number of necessary key rings authorized by the chief of security.

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that a complete key recall be implemented wherein all facility keys are

physically inventoried and the results compared to available key purchase documents, previous

inventory documents, etc. Depending upon the results of this exercise, it may well be advisable to

rekey the facility to get a "f?esh start" on insuring a comprehensive key control process. There

were sufficient key accountability concerns evidenced during this audit to just@ this exercise as a

priority.

COUNTS

Observation: During the course of the review, it was observed that the facility counts
documented on the Day Report Log did not correspond to the actual number of inmates counted
during the facility head count.
Recommendation: The facility's automated intake system should be utilized during counts to
accurately account for all inmates presently housed in the facility. These totals should then be
transposed to the Day Report log. All gains and loses should also be notated on the Day Report
log in order to justifj and verifi the changes in the count.

CONFINEMENT AND HIGH RISK INMATES

Observation: The cell searches of the high-risk cells are not consistently documented on the
Housing Unit log or the Day Report log with the number of staff conducting the search. These
searches were also reportedly being completed within approximately 30-minute time periods for
eighteen cells. Because, by procedure, inmates have to be restrained prior to being removed fiom
their cells and considering the actual process and time requirement of conducting a thorough
search, the period reported is not reasonably feasible.
Recommendation: Complete all the required documentation with the officers and the rank of the
staff members conducting the searches for accountability and insure that searches are thorough
and accurately documented.

Observation: The cell doors in FB pod do not have a food flaplcuff port for feeding and
handcuffing inmates housed in these cells. These cells house disciplinary confinement and high-
risk inmates. Staff has to violate the facility procedure 400.20, High Risk Inmates, by opening the
door without the inmate properly restrained.
Recommendation: Move the inmates that are in these cells to cells that have a food flaplcuffport
or modifL the cell doors by adding a food flaplcuff port. This would ensure improved officer
safety and compliance with procedure requirements.

TOOLS AND SENSITIW ITEMS

Observation: There is no current inventory for tools or disposable items, i.e. (hacksaw blades,

razor blades). There was also no verification process to account for tools on a daily basis.

Recommendation: Fully implement the recently developed tool control procedure that was

presented to the audit team.

Observation: A forklift was being stored within the kitchen sally port area and not secured or

disabled to prevent an inmate fiom utilizing it as an escape tool.

Facility Action: The forklift was removed and placed under the awning by the booking area.

Recommendation: The forklift should remain parked under the awning by the booking area

outside the secure perimeter.

Observation: Caustics stored in the warehouse were being monitored correctly. However,

caustics stored in other areas throughout the facility were not listed on perpetual inventories to

control and account for their use.

Recommendation: Review the areas outside of the warehouse that caustics are stored, place

these items on inventories, and ensure the proper MSDS information sheets are readily available.

Observation: Milk crates, pallets, and bread racks were stacked along side of the building in the

kitchen sally port area providing the potential for easy access to the roof.

Recommendation: Create a secure area to store these items outside of the secure perimeter and

remove them daily.

Observation: Telephones located in open, direct supervision D and F Pod officers' stations allow

direct access to outside lines thus allowing unnecessary and unauthorized access by staff and

inmates alike to these unrestricted lines.

Recommendation: Allow unrestricted line access only through a switchboard or implement a

code system whereby follow-up review of phone usage can be implemented.

Observation: Roof top access ladders were unsecured.

Recommendation: All roof top ladders should be covered with expanded metal to prevent access

fiom below or climbing up the sides. These should be inspected each shift to ensure that they are

secure.

ENTERING AND EXITING THE FACILITY

Observation: Staff and visitors entering the Facility are not thoroughly searched. When the hand
held metal detector alerts on a particular area of an individual, that area is not completely cleared
by subsequent pat search. Staff are also not required to remove their shoeshots when a metal
detector alert indicates metal in the area of these objects.
Facility Action: Procedures were being implemented to better search staff and visitors during
the review such as outlined in the recommendation below.
Recommendation: When the metal detector alerts, a physical pat search of the area will be
conducted to identie the object that has caused the alarm. When shoes alert they must be
removed and passed through the x-ray machine to ensure no contraband is present.

Observation: Maintenance staff were observed bringing contractual staff into the facility through
the kitchen sally port instead of going through the main entrance and being properly searched.
Recommendation: Require that all staff enter through the main entrance and are properly
identified and searched prior to entering the facility. The kitchen sally port should be used for
deliveries only and not for pedestrian traffic in and out of the facility.

Observation: Vehicles making deliveries through the kitchen sally port are not being thoroughly
searched prior to entering or exiting the facility. These vehicles were also observed unsecured
while inside the kitchen sally port area.
Recommendation: Create a procedure describing the proper method for searching vehicles when
entering and exiting the facility. This should also include the requirement that vehicles be locked
when they are inside the secure perimeter and secured with a steering wheel locking device if lefi
unattended for any length of time. In addition, whenever the sally port gate is opened roving
perimeter staff should be present in the area for additional support.

ARSENAL

Observation: Security equipment stored in the mini-arsenal within the secure perimeter was not
properly accounted for on form 400.004, Pool Weapon 1 Gear 1 Ammunition Inventory Sheet,
The form indicated there should be 675 40-caliber rounds when there were actually 685
rounds present.
The form indicated there should have been 45 40-caliber magazines when there were
actually 39 present.
The watch commander completes this form on each shfi.
Recommendation: Ensure that this form is being completed properly. Consider moving the mini
arsenal out of the secure perimeter and utilize the arsenal in the administration building.

Observation:Ammunition stored in the mini arsenal and the arsenal located in the administration
building had incorrect inventories.
40-caliier duty ammunition inventory indicated 6200 rounds when there were actually
6199 rounds on hand.
40-caliier training inventory indicated 4750 rounds when there were actually 4700 rounds
on hand.
.223-caliier rounds inventory indicated 500 rounds when there were actually 550 rounds
on hand.
Recommendation: Place all bulk ammunition in one storage area and maintain the inventory in
the same physical location as the ammunition.

STAFF SAFETY
Observation: The view windows in the B pod doors accessing the inmate housing areas were

covered and did not allow staff the ability to see into the pods when entering.

Recommendation: Clean the paintlfilm fiom the windows to allow staff to see into the pod when

entering in the event of an emergency.