G.R. No.

192914
NAPOLEON D. SENIT, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision dated November 20, 2009 and the. Resolution dated June 17, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00390-MIN which affirmed with modification the Dedision dated
April 26, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 10, in Criminal
Case No. 10717-00 convicting Napoleon D. Senit (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Reckless Imprudence resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property.
1

The Antecedents
The facts as narrated are culled from the Comments of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
from the assailed decision of the CA:
5

In the morning of September 2, 2000, private complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. was driving north along
Aglayan from the direction of Valencia on board his Toyota pick-up with his wife Rosalinda Toor, their
three-year-old son Mohinder Toor, Jr., and househelper Mezelle Jane Silayan. He turned left and
was coming to the center of Aglayan when a speeding Super 5 bus driven by petitioner and coming
from Malaybalay headed south towards Valencia, suddenly overtook a big truck from the right side.
Petitioner tried to avoid the accident by swerving to the right towards the shoulder of the road and
applying the brakes, but he was moving too fast and could not avoid a collision with the pick-up. The
bus crashed into the right side of private complainants pick-up at a right angle.
All passengers of the pick-up were injured and immediately brought to Bethel Baptist Hospital,
Sumpong, Malaybalay City. However, because of lack of medical facilities, they were transferred to
the Bukidnon Doctors Hospital in Valencia City, Bukidnon. Rosalinda Toor sustained an open
fracture of the humerus of the right arm and displaced, closed fracture of the proximal and distal
femur of the right lower extremity which required two surgical operations. She was paralyzed as a
result of the accident and was unable to return to her job as the Regional Manager of COSPACHEM
Product Laboratories. Mohinder Toor, Sr. spent about P580,000.00 for her treatment and P3,000.00
for Mezelle Jean Silayan, who suffered frontal area swelling as a result of the accident. Mohinder
Toor, Sr. suffered a complete fracture of the scapular bone of his right shoulder while his son
Mohinder Toor, Jr. sustained abdominal injury and a wound on the area of his right eye which
required suturing. The damage sustained by the pick-up reached P106,155.00.
Thus, on May 30, 2001, Carlo B. Mejia, City Prosecutor of Malaybalay City, charged petitioner with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property in an
Amended Information which was filed with Branch 10 of the [RTC] in Malaybalay City. The
information reads:

"That on or about September 2, 2000 in the morning at [sic] Barangay Aglayan, Malaybalay City,
Province of Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally in violation of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, in negligent, careless, imprudent manner and without precaution to
prevent accident [to] life and property, drive a Super Five Nissan Bus, color white/red bearing plate
No. MVD-776 owned by PAUL PADAYHAG of Rosario Heights, Iligan City, as a result hit and
bumped the [sic] motor vehicle, Toyota Pick-up color blue with plate No. NEF-266 driven and owned
by MOHINDER S. TOO[R,] SR., and with his wife Rosalinda Toor, son Mohinder Toor, Jr., 3 years old
and househelp Mezelle Jane Silayan, 17 years old, riding with him. The Toyota pick-up was
damaged in the amount of [P]105,300.00 and spouses Mohinder Toor[,] Sr. and Rosalinda Toor,
Mohinder Toor[,] Jr[.] and Mezelle Jane Silayan sustained the following injuries to wit:
MOHINDER TOOR[,] SR.
= complete fracture of superior scapular bone right shoulder
MOHINDER TOOR[,] JR.
= MPI secondary to MVA r/o Blunt abdominal injury
= Saturing [sic] right eye area
ROSALINDA TOOR
= Fracture, open type 11, supracondylar, humerus right
= Fracture, closed, Complete, displaced, subtrochanter
= and supracondylar femur right
MEZELLE JANE SILAYAN
= Frontal area swelling 20 vehicular accident
to the damage and prejudice of the complainant victim in such amount that they are entitled to under
the law.
CONTRARY TO and in Violation of Article 365 in relation to 263 of the Revised Penal Code. IN
RELATION TO THE FAMILY CODE." (Citations omitted)
6

Upon being arraigned on June 21, 2001, the petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the Information in this case.
7

Trial ensued. However, after the initial presentation of evidence for the petitioner, he resigned from
his employment and transferred residence. His whereabouts allegedly became unknown so he was
not presented as a witness by his new counsel.
8

On April 26, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision in absentia convicting the petitioner of the crime
charged. Thefallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the accused NAPOLEON SENIT y Duhaylungsod
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged, he is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment
of an indeterminate penalty of Four [4] months and One [1] day of Arresto Mayor maximum as
minimum and to Four [4] years and Two [2] months Prision Correc[c]ional medium as maximum. The
accused is further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand
[P50,000.00] Pesos as moral damages, the amount of Four Hundred Eighty Thousand
[P480,000.00] [Pesos] for the expenses incurred in the treatment and hospitalization of Rosalinda
Toor, Mohinder Toor, Jr[.] and Mezelle Jean Silayan and the amount of Eighty Thousand
[P80,000.00] [Pesos] for the expenses incurred in the repair of the damaged Toyota pick-up vehicle.
SO ORDERED.

The RTC issued a Promulgation dated August 4, 2006, which included an order for the arrest of the
petitioner.
10

The petitioner then filed a motion for new trial via registered mail on the ground that errors of law or
irregularities have been committed during trial that are allegedly prejudicial to his substantial rights.
He claimed that he was not able to present evidence during trial because he was not notified of the
schedule. Likewise, he mistakenly believed that the case against him has been dismissed as private
complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. (Toor, Sr.) purportedly left the country.
11

On September 22, 2006, the public prosecutor opposed the motion for new trial filed by the
petitioner.
12

On October 26, 2006, the motion for new trial was denied by the lower court pronouncing that
notices have been duly served the parties and that the reason given by the petitioner was selfserving.
13

Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, the petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal dated November 6, 2006
by registered mail to the CA, on both questions of facts and laws.
14

Ruling of the CA
On November 20, 2009, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty
imposed, the dispositive portion thereof reads:
ACCORDINGLY, with MODIFICATION that [the petitioner] should suffer the penalty of three (3)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, the Court AFFIRMS in all other respects the appealed 26
April 2006 Decision of the [RTC] of Malaybalay City, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 10717-00.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

15

In affirming with modification the decision of the RTC, the CA ratiocinated as follows: first, the
evidence presented by OSG overwhelmingly points to the petitioner as the culprit. A scrutiny of the
records further reveals that the pictures taken after the accident and the Traffic Investigation Report
all coincide with the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which are in whole consistent and
believable thus, debunking the claim of the petitioner that he was convicted on the mere basis of
allegedly biased and hearsay testimonies which do not establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In addition, there was no existing evidence to show that there was an improper motive on the part of
the eyewitnesses.
16

Second, it found the arguments of the petitioner to move for a new trial as baseless.

17

Lastly, it rendered that the proper imposable penalty is the maximum period of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods that is imprisonment for three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor since the petitioner has, by reckless imprudence, committed an act which, had it been
intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony, based on the first paragraph of Article 365 in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
18

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA, in its
Resolution dated June 17, 2010.
19

As a final recourse, the petitioner filed the petition for review before this Court, praying that the
applicable law on the matter be reviewed, and the gross misappreciation of facts committed by the
court a quo and by the CA be given a second look.
The Issues
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC AND THE CA ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL OR TO RE-OPEN THE SAME IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE PETITIONER TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE ON HIS BEHALF; AND
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE
APPARENT FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE
PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
20

Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.
The RTC and CA did not err in denying the petitioners motion for new trial or to re-open the
same.
The Court finds that no errors of law or irregularities, prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
petitioner, have been committed during trial.
The petitioner anchors his motion for new trial on Rule 121, Section 2(a) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. The Court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused have been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment. (Emphasis ours)
To sum up the claims of the petitioner, he theorizes that there was an error of law or irregularities
committed when the RTC promulgated a decision in absentia and deemed that he had waived his
right to present evidence resulting to denial of due process, a one-sided decision by the RTC, and a
strict and rigid application of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure against him.
First, it must be noted that the petitioner had already been arraigned and therefore, the court a
quo had already acquired jurisdiction over him. In fact, there was already an initial presentation of
evidence for the defense when his whereabouts became unknown.
The petitioners claims that he had not testified because he did not know the schedule of the
hearings, and mistakenly believed that the case had already been terminated with the departure of
Toor, Sr., do not merit our consideration.
21

The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. It is established
that notices have been served to the counsel of the petitioner and his failure to inform his counsel of
his whereabouts is the reason for his failure to appear on the scheduled date. Thus, the arguments
of the petitioner against the validity of the proceedings and promulgation of judgment in absentia for
being in violation of the constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail.
22

23

In Estrada v. People, the Court ruled that:

24

Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their respective sides of the controversy.
In the present case, petitioner was afforded such opportunity. The trial court set a hearing on May
14, 1997 for reception of defense evidence, notice of which was duly sent to the addresses on
record of petitioner and her counsel, respectively. When they failed to appear at the May 14, 1997
hearing, they later alleged that they were not notified of said setting. Petitioners counsel never
notified the court of any change in her address, while petitioner gave a wrong address from the very
beginning, eventually jumped bail and evaded court processes. Clearly, therefore, petitioner and her
counsel were given all the opportunities to be heard. They cannot now complain of alleged violation
of petitioners right to due process when it was by their own fault that they lost the opportunity to
present evidence. (Citation omitted)
25

Similarly in the present case, the petitioner clearly had previous notice of the criminal case filed
against him and was given the opportunity to present evidence in his defense. The petitioner was not
in any way deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was duly
accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense, but
he forfeited this right, through his own negligence, by not appearing in court at the scheduled
hearings.
26

The negligence of the petitioner in believing that the case was already terminated resulting to his
failure to attend the hearings, is inexcusable. The Court has ruled in many cases that:
It is petitioners duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted about
the case. It is mandated to inquire from its counsel about the status and progress of the case from
time to time and cannot expect that all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the
case. It is also its responsibility, together with its counsel, to devise a system for the receipt of mail
intended for them. (Citations omitted)
27

The Court finds that the negligence exhibited by the petitioner, towards the criminal case against him
in which his liberty is at risk, is not borne of ignorance of the law as claimed by his counsel rather,
lack of concern towards the incident, and the people who suffered from it. While there was no
showing in the case at bar that the counsel of the petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to inform
him of the notices served, the Court cannot find anyone to blame but the petitioner himself in not
exercising diligence in informing his counsel of his whereabouts.
The Court also agrees with the Comment of the OSG that there is neither rule nor law which
specifically requires the trial court to ascertain whether notices received by counsel are sufficiently
communicated with his client.
28

In GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Judge Principe, the Court held that:
29

[W]hen petitioner is at fault or not entirely blameless, there is no reason to overturn well-settled
jurisprudence or to interpret the rules liberally in its favor. Where petitioner failed to act with
prudence and diligence, its plea that it was not accorded the right to due process cannot elicit this
Courts approval or even sympathy. It is petitioners duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel
so as to be constantly posted about the case. x x x. (Citations omitted)
30

Even if the Court assumed that the petitioner anchors his claim on Section 2(b) of Rule 121 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the argument still has no merit.
"A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following
requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c)
that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of
such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering
party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but
nonetheless failed to secure it." The Court agrees with the CA in its decision which held that "a new
trial may not be had on the basis of evidence which was available during trial but was not presented
due to its negligence. Likewise, the purported errors and irregularities committed in the course of the
trial against [the petitioners] substantive rights do not exist."
31

32

In Lustaa v. Jimena-Lazo, the Court ruled that:

33

Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and orderliness as well as to facilitate
attainment of justice, such that strict adherence thereto is required. Their application may be relaxed
only when rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and substantial justice, which is not present here.
Utter disregard of the Rules cannot just be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction. (Citations omitted and italics in the original)
34

In the instant case, the Court finds no reason to waive the procedural rules in order to grant the
motion for new trial of the petitioner. There is just no legal basis for the grant of the motion for new
trial. The Court believes that the petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard but he chose to put
this opportunity into waste by not being diligent enough to ask about the status of the criminal case
against him and inform his counsel of his whereabouts.
The RTC did not err in convicting the petitioner.
The law applicable to the case at bar is Article 365 of the RPC, which provides that:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. x x x.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.
xxxx
The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the
doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage
results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part
of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.
35

All elements for the crime of reckless imprudence have been established in the present case.
The petitioner questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and claims that their testimonies
are biased. He also claims that Toor, Sr. is the real culprit when he turned left without looking for an
incoming vehicle, thus violating traffic rules resulting to the mishap.
The Court believes that the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the evidence and testimonies
presented in the instant case.
The Court agrees with the OSG that not only were the witnesses narrations of the accident credible
and worthy of belief, their accounts were also consistent and tallied on all significant and substantial
points. These witnesses testimonies are as follows:
36

PO3 Jesus Delfin testified that he investigated the accident at Aglayan. He made the following
findings in his accident report: the pick-up owned and driven by Toor, Sr., together with his family and
a househelper as his passengers, was turning left along Aglayan when it was hit at a right angle
position by a Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner. He noted skid marks made by the bus and
explained that the petitioner was overtaking but was not able to do so because of the pick-up. The
petitioner could not swerve to the left to avoid the pick-up because there was a ten-wheeler truck. He
swerved to the right instead and applied breaks to avoid the accident. The investigator clearly

testified that, on the basis of data gathered, the collision was due to the error of the bus driver who
was driving too fast, as evinced by the distance from the skid marks towards the axle.
37

Albert Alon testified that he saw Toor, Sr.s pick-up turn left along Aglayan. He also saw a big truck
and a Super 5 bus both coming from Malaybalay. The truck was running slowly while the Super 5
bus was running fast and overtaking the big truck from the right side. The bus crashed into the pickup and pushed the smaller vehicle due to the force of the impact. He went nearer the area of
collision and saw that the four passengers of the pick-up were unconscious.
38

Mezelle Jane Silayan testified that while moving towards the center of Aglayan on board her
employers pick-up, she saw a Super 5 bus overtaking a big truck from the right side. Their vehicle
was hit by the bus. She was thrown out of the pick-up and hit her head on the ground.
39

Toor, Sr. testified that while he was driving his pick-up at the corner of the center of Aglayan, a Super
5 bus, moving fast, overtook a big truck from the right side. The bus then hit the pick up, injuring him
and all his passengers.
40

Taken all together, the testimonies of the witnesses conclusively suggest that: (1) the Super 5 bus
was moving fast; (2) the bus overtook a big truck which was moving slowly from the right side; and
(3) when the petitioner saw the pick-up truck turning left, he applied the brakes but because he was
moving fast, the collision became inevitable.
"Well-entrenched is the rule that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled
to great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of significance and influence. This rule is based on the fact that the trial
court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and the conduct of the witnesses." The Court
finds in the instant case that there is no reason for this Court to deviate from the rule.
41

The Court finds the testimonies of the witnesses not biased. There was no evidence of ill motive of
the witnesses against the petitioner.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that Toor, Sr. committed a traffic violation and thus, he should be the one
blamed for the incident. The Court finds this without merit.
1wphi1

The prosecution sufficiently proved that the Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner recklessly drove on
the right shoulder of the road and overtook another south-bound ten-wheeler truck that slowed at the
intersection, obviously to give way to another vehicle about to enter the intersection. It was
impossible for him not to notice that the ten-wheeler truck in front and traveling in the same direction
had already slowed down to allow passage of the pick-up, which was then negotiating a left turn to
Aglayan public market. Seeing the ten-wheeler truck slow down, it was incumbent upon the
petitioner to reduce his speed or apply on the brakes of the bus in order to allow the pick-up to safely
make a left turn. Instead, he drove at a speed too fast for safety, then chose to swerve to the right
shoulder of the road and overtake the truck, entering the intersection and directly smashing into the
pick-up. In flagrantly failing to observe the necessary precautions to avoid inflicting injury or damage
to other persons and things, the petitioner was recklessly imprudent in operating the Super 5 bus.
42

In Dumayag v. People, the Court held:

43

Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all motorists to drive and operate vehicles on
the right side of the road or highway. When overtaking another, it should be made only if the highway
is clearly visible and is free from oncoming vehicle. Overtaking while approaching a curve in the
highway, where the driver's view is obstructed, is not allowed. Corollarily, drivers of automobiles,
when overtaking another vehicle, are charged with a high degree of care and diligence to
avoid collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to it that vehicles coming from the
opposite direction are not taken unaware by his presence on the side of the road upon which
they have the right to pass. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
44

Thus, the petitioner cannot blame Toor, Sr. for not noticing a fast-approaching bus, as the cited law
provides that the one overtaking on the road has the obligation to let other cars in the opposite
direction know his presence and not the other way around as the petitioner suggests.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated November 20, 2009 and the
Resolution dated June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00390-MIN
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158802

November 17, 2004

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City)
JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold
relief: First, that respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner
Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that petitioner be granted a new trial.1 These reliefs are sought on
the basis of purportedly exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) testing on samples allegedly collected from the petitioner and a child born to the victim of the
rape.
By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo de Villa, 2 we
found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity; sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusin perpetua; and ordered him to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral
damages, costs of the suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of the
rape. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.

As summarized in our Decision dated February 1, 2001, Aileen Mendoza charged petitioner
Reynaldo de Villa with rape in an information dated January 9, 1995, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City. When arraigned on January 26, 1995, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." 3
During the trial, the prosecution established that sometime in the third week of April 1994, at about
10:00 in the morning, Aileen Mendoza woke up in her family's rented room in Sagad, Pasig, Metro
Manila, to find petitioner on top of her. Aileen was then aged 12 years and ten months. She was
unable to shout for help because petitioner covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill
her. Aileen could not do anything but cry. Petitioner succeeded in inserting his penis inside her
vagina. After making thrusting motions with his body, petitioner ejaculated. This encounter allegedly
resulted in Aileen's pregnancy, which was noticed by her mother, Leonila Mendoza, sometime in
November 1994. When confronted by her mother, Aileen revealed that petitioner raped her. Aileen's
parents then brought her to the Pasig Police Station, where they lodged a criminal complaint against
petitioner.4
Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was eight months pregnant and
found in her hymen healed lacerations at the 5:00 and 8:00 positions. On December 19, 1994,
Aileen gave birth to a baby girl whom she named Leahlyn Mendoza.5
In his defense, petitioner alleged that, at the time of the alleged rape, he was already 67 years old.
Old age and sickness had rendered him incapable of having an erection. He further averred that
Aileen's family had been holding a grudge against him, which accounted for the criminal charges.
Finally, he interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that at the time of the incident, he was in his
hometown of San Luis, Batangas.6
The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, and
sentenced him to death, to indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the
suit and to support the child, Leahlyn Mendoza.7
On automatic review,8 we found that the date of birth of Aileen's child was medically consistent with
the time of the rape. Since it was never alleged that Aileen gave birth to a full-term nine-month old
baby, we gave credence to the prosecution's contention that she prematurely gave birth to an eightmonth old baby by normal delivery.9Thus, we affirmed petitioner's conviction for rape, in a Decision
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that
he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusin perpetua and ordered to pay the offended
party P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; costs of the suit and to
provide support for the child Leahlyn Corales Mendoza.
SO ORDERED.10
Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once more faced with the question of
Reynaldo de Villa's guilt or innocence.
Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges that during the trial of
the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine once and for all if
Reynaldo was the father of the victim's child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed during the
pendency of the automatic review of petitioner's case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of
paternity.11 This information was apparently furnished by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG)
Anti-Death Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel for petitioner.

Thus, petitioner's brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test in
order to determine the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a result of the rape. 12 This relief
was implicitly denied in our Decision of February 21, 2001.
On March 16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision,
wherein he once more prayed that DNA tests be conducted.13 The Motion was denied with finality in
a Resolution dated November 20, 2001.14 Hence, the Decision became final and executory on
January 16, 2002.15
Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges. Having been informed that DNA tests required
a sample that could be extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of
Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile
cup.16 Leahlyn readily agreed and did so. Billy Joe took the sample home and gave it to the
petitioner-relator, who immediately labeled the cup as "Container A."
Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa. These
samples were placed in separate containers with distinguishing labels and temporarily stored in a
refrigerator prior to transport to the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research
Institute (NSRI).17 During transport, the containers containing the saliva samples were kept on ice.
Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn
Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa
himself. The identities of the donors of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa,
were not made known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory.18
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21, 2003, which showed
that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to
the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner's sample and those of
any of the other samples, including Leahlyn's.19
Hence, in the instant petition for habeas corpus, petitioner argues as follows:
DNA ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT PETITIONER DE VILLA
IS NOT THE FATHER OF LEAHLYN MENDOZA; HIS CONVICTION FOR RAPE, BASED
ON THE FACT THAT LEAHLYN WAS SIRED AS A RESULT OF THE ALLEGED RAPE,
CANNOT STAND AND MUST BE SET ASIDE.20
xxx

xxx

xxx

A NEW TRIAL TO CONSIDER NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE IS PROPER AND MAY

BE ORDERED BY THIS COURT IN VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE DNA TESTS
CONDUCTED.21
Considering that the issues are inter-twined, they shall be discussed together.
In brief, petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent to the trial in order to relitigate the factual issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza. Petitioner alleges that this
issue is crucial, considering that his conviction in 2001 was based on the factual finding that he sired
the said child. Since this paternity is now conclusively disproved, he argues that the 2001 conviction
must be overturned.

In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to collaterally attack the 2001
Decision. The ancillary remedy of a motion for new trial is resorted to solely to allow the presentation
of what is alleged to be newly-discovered evidence. This Court is thus tasked to determine, first, the
propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to release an individual already convicted and
serving sentence by virtue of a final and executory judgment; and second, the propriety of granting a
new trial under the same factual scenario.
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven of relief for those seeking liberty
from any unwarranted denial of freedom of movement. Very broadly, the writ applies "to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which a person has been deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person has been withheld from the person entitled thereto". 22 Issuance of the
writ necessitates that a person be illegally deprived of his liberty. In the celebrated case of
Villavicencio v. Lukban,23 we stated that "[a]ny restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient."24
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such
relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint.
If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
Concomitant to this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to directly assail a judgment
rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived
or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the proceedings.
Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus has
very limited availability as a post-conviction remedy. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of
Appeals,25 we ruled that review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus only in very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a
judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint
of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has
been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. 26
In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final judgment of conviction,
without, however, providing a legal ground on which to anchor his petition. In fine, petitioner alleges
neither the deprivation of a constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the
sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been imposed upon him.
In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the review of findings of fact
long passed upon with finality. This relief is far outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedings. In
the early case of Abriol v. Homeres,27 for example, this Court stated the general rule that the writ of
habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and should not be thus used. The writ of habeas corpus,
whereas permitting a collateral challenge of the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal issuing the
process or judgment by which an individual is deprived of his liberty, cannot be distorted by
extending the inquiry to mere errors of trial courts acting squarely within their jurisdiction. 28The
reason for this is explained very simply in the case of Velasco v. Court of Appeals: 29 a habeas corpus
petition reaches the body, but not the record of the case. 30 A record must be allowed to remain
extant, and cannot be revised, modified, altered or amended by the simple expedient of resort to
habeas corpus proceedings.
Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its
jurisdiction over the case and the person of the defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus; if at all, these errors must be corrected on certiorari or on
appeal, in the form and manner prescribed by law.31 In the past, this Court has disallowed the review
of a court's appreciation of the evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, as

this is not the function of said writ.32 A survey of our decisions in habeas corpus cases demonstrates
that, in general, the writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary
remedy; it may thus be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances. 33 We have been categorical
in our pronouncements that the writ of habeas corpus is not to be used as a substitute for another,
more proper remedy. Resort to the writ of habeas corpus is available only in the limited instances
when a judgment is rendered by a court or tribunal devoid of jurisdiction. If, for instance, it can be
demonstrated that there was a deprivation of a constitutional right, the writ can be granted even after
an individual has been meted a sentence by final judgment.
Thus, in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,34 the writ of habeas corpus was held to be available
where an accused was deprived of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. A defect so
pronounced as the denial of an accused's constitutional rights results in the absence or loss of
jurisdiction, and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused. That
void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of
habeas corpus.35 Later, in Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,36 this Court ruled that, once
a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is
deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of
the detention.37 Although in Feria v. Court of Appeals38 this Court was inclined to allow the
presentation of new evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, this was an
exceptional situation. In that case, we laid down the general rule, which states that the burden of
proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. Where
the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth a process which, on its face, shows
good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new
matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process.39
In the recent case of Calvan v. Court of Appeals,40 we summarized the scope of review allowable in a
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. We ruled that the writ of habeas corpus,
although not designed to interrupt the orderly administration of justice, can be invoked by the
attendance of a special circumstance that requires immediate action. In such situations, the inquiry
on a writ of habeas corpus would be addressed, not to errors committed by a court within its
jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding or judgment under which a person has
been restrained is a complete nullity. The probe may thus proceed to check on the power and
authority, itself an equivalent test of jurisdiction, of the court or the judge to render the order that so
serves as the basis of imprisonment or detention.41 It is the nullity of an assailed judgment of
conviction which makes it susceptible to collateral attack through the filing of a petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Upon a perusal of the records not merely of this case but of People v. de Villa, we find that the
remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
First, the denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged by petitioner. As such, this Court is
hard-pressed to find legal basis on which to anchor the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Much as
this Court sympathizes with petitioner's plea, a careful scrutiny of the records does not reveal any
constitutional right of which the petitioner was unduly deprived.
We are aware that other jurisdictions have seen fit to grant the writ of habeas corpus in order to test
claims that a defendant was denied effective aid of counsel. 42 In this instance, we note that the
record is replete with errors committed by counsel, and it can be alleged that the petitioner was, at
trial, denied the effective aid of counsel. The United States Supreme Court requires a defendant
alleging incompetent counsel to show that the attorney's performance was deficient under a
reasonable standard, and additionally to show that the outcome of the trial would have been different

with competent counsel.43 The purpose of the right to effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that
the defendant receives a fair trial.44
The U.S. Supreme Court asserts that in judging any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, one
must examine whether counsel's conduct undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process to such an extent that the trial did not produce a fair and just result. 45 The proper measure of
attorney performance is "reasonable" under the prevailing professional norms, and the defendant
must show that the representation received fell below the objective standard of
reasonableness.46 For the petition to succeed, the strong presumption that the counsel's conduct
falls within the wide range or reasonable professional assistance must be overcome. 47
In the case at bar, it appears that in the middle of the appeal, the petitioner's counsel of record, a
certain Atty. Alfonso G. Salvador, suddenly and inexplicably withdrew his appearance as counsel,
giving the sole explanation that he was "leaving for the United States for an indefinite period of time
by virtue of a petition filed in his favor."48In the face of this abandonment, petitioner made an
impassioned plea that his lawyer be prevented from this withdrawal in a handwritten "Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration and Opposition of Counsel's Withdrawal of Appearance with Leave of Court"
received by this Court on September 14, 1999.49 Petitioner alleged that his counsel's withdrawal is an
"untimely and heartbreaking event", considering that he had placed "all [his] trust and confidence on
[his counsel's] unquestionable integrity and dignity." 50
While we are sympathetic to petitioner's plight, we do not, however, find that there was such
negligence committed by his earlier counsel so as to amount to a denial of a constitutional right.
There is likewise no showing that the proceedings were tainted with any other jurisdictional defect.
In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek a
re-examination of the records of People v. de Villa, without asserting any legal grounds therefor. For
all intents and purposes, petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his conviction.
We are being asked to reexamine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in this case, not on its
own, but in light of the new DNA evidence that the petitioner seeks to present to this Court. This
relief is outside the scope of a habeas corpus petition. The petition for habeas corpus must,
therefore, fail.
Coupled with the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner seeks a new trial to
re-litigate the issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza.
It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity is not central to the issue of
petitioner's guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different
question, separate and distinct from the question of the father of her child. Recently, in the case of
People v. Alberio,51 we ruled that the fact or not of the victim's pregnancy and resultant childbirth are
irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the
crime of rape. Whether the child which the victim bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by
some unknown individual, is of no moment in determining an individual's guilt.
In the instant case, however, we note that the grant of child support to Leahlyn Mendoza indicates
that our Decision was based, at least in small measure, on the victim's claim that the petitioner
fathered her child. This claim was given credence by the trial court, and, as a finding of fact, was
affirmed by this Court on automatic review.
The fact of the child's paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant to the civil award of child support. It
is only tangentially related to the issue of petitioner's guilt. However, if it can be conclusively

determined that the petitioner did not sire Leahlyn Mendoza, this may cast the shadow of reasonable
doubt, and allow the acquittal of the petitioner on this basis.
Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner once more relies upon erroneous legal grounds in
resorting to the remedy of a motion for new trial. A motion for new trial, under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, is available only for a limited period of time, and for very limited grounds. Under
Section 1, Rule 121, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for new trial may be filed
at any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, that is, within fifteen (15) days from its
promulgation or notice. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an
available remedy. Section 2 of Rule 121 enumerates the grounds for a new trial:
SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment.
In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly "newly-discovered
evidence", i.e., the DNA test subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding petitioner from the child
purportedly fathered as a result of the rape.
The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has
long attained finality, and entry of judgment was made as far back as January 16, 2002. Moreover,
upon an examination of the evidence presented by the petitioner, we do not find that the DNA
evidence falls within the statutory or jurisprudential definition of "newly- discovered evidence".
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following
requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c)
that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of
such weight that that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. 52 It is essential that the
offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial
but nonetheless failed to secure it.53
In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, we
nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for "newly-discovered evidence" that would merit a
new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with
the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Petitioner-relator's claim that he was "unaware" of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was
concluded carries no weight with this Court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing
speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner's counsel. In either
instance, however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner. It is a settled rule that a party cannot
blame his counsel for negligence when he himself was guilty of neglect. 54 A client is bound by the
acts of his counsel, including the latter's mistakes and negligence. 55 It is likewise settled that relief
will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the
loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure. 56

Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by petitioner and his
counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the
father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's
testimony and positive identification as its bases.57The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so,
that the pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape. 58 Therefore, the
DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be
discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on a finding of paternity of
the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction was based on the clear and convincing
testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for habeas corpus and new trial is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, ChicoNazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Panganiban, J., joins Carpio and Callejo, Sr., JJ., in their separate opinion.
Carpio, J., please see separate concurring opinion.
Callejo, Sr., J., please see separate opinion.
Corona, J., on leave.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:
I concur with the ponencia. The DNA evidence presented by petitioner-relator is not material and
relevant to the crime of rape. Even assuming petitioner is not the father of the child that was
conceived within the period of the rape, such fact does not prove that petitioner could not have
committed the crime. The remedies of habeas corpus and new trial are thus unavailing in this case.
However, this case should not close the door to a convicted felon who after final judgment acquires
DNA results exonerating him of the crime for which he was convicted. Legal relief is still available, for
instance, to a felon convicted by final judgment of rape who subsequently gains access to DNA
results showing that the semen in the victim's vagina does not match that of the convicted felon.
While final judgments enjoy the presumption of correctness, the confining and traditional legal
procedures must respond to the revolutionary way that DNA results have been proving the
innocence of convicts. American jurisprudence has shown the way in this regard.
Before the enactment of statutes in some states providing for post-conviction DNA testing, American
courts had no precedents to work on to justify post-conviction DNA testing and the reversal of final
judgments of conviction when the DNA results turned out to be exculpatory. Before the passage of
the DNA testing statutes, it was unclear under what right and procedure a convict was entitled to
post-conviction DNA testing. Even in the absence of statutes, American courts allowed post-

conviction DNA testing by requiring the convict to apply for such testing before the verdict could be
vacated.1 The application enables the courts to determine the basis for the application and to set the
standards in case the request is granted. Once the DNA result confirms the innocence of the convict,
American courts conduct a motion in limine hearing on admissibility or order a new trial. 2 The
prosecution usually refuses to re-try the case and the convict is released.
Under American jurisprudence, post-conviction DNA testing is availed through a petition for habeas
corpus and motion for new trial. These conventional modes of relief, however, have built-in
restrictions that pose problems to the granting of post-conviction DNA testing.
In habeas corpus cases, relief could not be had unless a constitutional violation was committed
during the convict's trial. In a motion for new trial, the convict must show that the DNA test is a newly
discovered evidence and must not be time-barred to warrant a new trial. Despite these legal
obstacles, American courts granted, albeit restrictively, the request for post-conviction DNA testing
on a case-by-case basis. The approach to the legal issues varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
In Summerville v. Warden State Prison3 the Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled that when evidence
is so strong that innocence is highly likely and that evidence alone establishes innocence, that in
itself is already a basis fro habeas corpus review of convictions and imprisonment. Thus, habeas
corpus warranted the granting of a new trial based on the petitioner's claim of actual innocence. In
People v. Callace,4 the New York court considered post-conviction DNA testing as newly discovered
evidence because the type of DNA analysis available at the post-conviction stage was not available
at the time of the trial. In State v. Thomas,5 fundamental fairness allowed the convict to postconviction DNA testing even when the request was already stale.
Habeas corpus review and new trial proved to be narrow remedies as American courts still adhere to
the strict requirements of these two models of relief. Nonetheless, post-conviction DNA testing has
been granted on other grounds. When the application of DNA testing has strong indications that the
result could potentially exonerate the convict, American courts recognized the convict's right to
exculpatory evidence. In Dabbs v. Vergari,6 citing Brady v. Maryland,7 the court categorically upheld
the convict's constitutional right to exculpatory evidence despite the absence of a law providing a
right to post-conviction discovery. DNA results exonerated Charles Dabbs and his conviction was
eventually vacated.8 On other cases,9 the exculpatory potential of DNA evidence compelled the
American courts, in the interest of justice, to allow access to post-conviction DNA testing.
The rectification of a wrong is the underlying reason for the allowance of post-conviction DNA testing
and the eventual reversal of the verdict based on exclusionary DNA result. Even the most stringent
of rules have to give way upon a showing that there is a strong probability that DNA result could
prove the convict's actual innocence. For ultimately, it is the primary duty of the court to prevent the
miscarriage of justice.
Every person has a right to avail of a new technology that irrefutably proves his innocence despite a
prior final conviction, provided the new technology was not available during his trial. This right is part
of a person's constitutional right to due process of law. A person convicted by final judgment does
not lose his constitutional right to due process, and he may invoke it whenever there is a compelling
and valid ground to do so.
The 1987 Constitution expressly empowers the Court to "[p]romulgate rules concerning the
protection and enhancement of constitutional rights."10 Even in the absence of a law allowing postconviction DNA testing, the Court under its constitutional mandate may order a new trial if the postconviction DNA testing will establish that the convicted felon could not have possibly committed the

crime. This is the case when the post-conviction DNA testing shows that the semen in the victim's
vagina does not match that of the convicted felon.
A new trial on the ground of post-conviction DNA testing is different from a new trial under Rule
121,11 which is available only before final judgment. Unlike a new trial under Rule 121, a new trial for
post-conviction DNA testing does not vacate the judgment of conviction, which stands until recalled
by the court as a result of the new trial. A new trial after final conviction may be ordered only on the
sole ground that DNA testing will establish that the convicted felon could not have committed the
crime. Moreover, DNA testing must not have been available or possible during the original trial.
Thus, I submit that a felon convicted by final judgment who could establish through DNA testing that
he could not have committed the crime is not without remedy to prove his innocence and regain his
liberty.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:
I concur with the ponencia and the separate concurring opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio that the
convicted felon must be allowed an opportunity to adduce DNA evidence. However, such a remedy
is sui generis to give the convicted felon a chance to adduce DNA evidence until Rule 121 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is revised anew. Such a remedy is akin to a motion for a new
trial in the original case on the ground of newly discovered evidence under Section 2(b), Rule 121 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment.
G.R. No. 125025

January 23, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BALTAZAR BONGALON y MATEOS, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

This case involves the unlawful sale of 250.70 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a
regulated drug, in violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."
The crime was allegedly committed as follows:1
"That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
(Baltazar Bongalon), not being lawfully authorized by law, and by means of motor vehicle, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another, one (1) heatsealed transparent plastic bag/sachet containing brown crystalline substance weighing 250.70
grams, which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a
regulated drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW." (emphases ours)
When arraigned, the accused pled not guilty.2 Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses, to wit: (1) PO3 Noel Castaeto, the poseurbuyer; (2) PO3 Rogelio Galos, member of the buy-bust operation team; and (3) Police Senior
Inspector Julita de Villa, the forensic chemist. The presentation of PO2 Felipe Metrillo, member of
the buy-bust team, was dispensed with after the prosecution and the defense had stipulated at the
trial that he would merely corroborate the testimony of PO3 Galos.
The prosecution evidence reveals that in the morning of December 7, 1994, a confidential informant
reported to the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in Camp
Ricardo Papa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, that a certain "Baldo" (the accused) was engaged in
selling shabu, a regulated drug. Police Senior Inspector Franklin Moises Mabanag immediately
formed a buy-bust operation team with PO3 Noel Castaeto as the poseur-buyer and PO3 Rogelio
Galos and PO2 Felipe Metrillo as members.3
That same day, the confidential informant contacted the accused through a mobile phone and
introduced PO3 Castaeto to him as a "friend" who wanted to buy shabu. The accused and PO3
Castaeto negotiated the terms of the "transaction" over the mobile phone. PO3 Castaeto told the
accused that he needed 250 grams of shabu.The accused pegged the cost at P1,000/gram
of shabu, for a total sum of P250,000.00. The accused then instructed PO3 Castaeto to call the
following morning to confirm the sale.4
P/Sr. Insp. Mabanag briefed the buy-bust operation team members on their respective roles in the
"sting" and gave to PO3 Castaeto two (2) P500.00 bills bearing serial numbers BT423424 and
BQ352570 and five (5) bundles of "boodle money" to be used as buy-bust money. P03 Castaeto
affixed his signature at the bottom right corner of each bill for identification purposes. 5 They placed
one genuine P500.00 bill on top, and another one at the bottom, of the "boodle" money. The bundles
were first secured with money straps with markings P50,000.00, United Coconut Planters Bank and
wrapped in a transparent plastic then placed inside a brown envelope. 6
At 9:00 a.m., December 8, 1994, PO3 Castaeto talked again to the accused through the mobile
phone to confirm if their transaction would push through. The appellant told him that they would meet

at 3:30 p.m. that same day, near the Burger Machine stall along Doa Soledad in Better Living,
Paraaque.7
PO3 Castaetos team and the confidential informant arrived at the designated place at 3:00 p.m.
using a private vehicle. He and the confidential informant parked their car near the Burger Machine
stall and waited for the accused to arrive. P03 Galos and P02 Metrillo, on the other hand, parked just
a few meters behind the car used by PO3 Castaeto. 8
At 3:30 p.m., the red Nissan Sentra sedan driven by the accused, with plate No. TPL 488, parked in
front of the car of PO3 Castaeto. The accused was alone. The confidential informant and PO3
Castaeto approached the Nissan Sentra and talked to the accused. After a brief conversation, the
accused asked for the money. PO3 Castaeto showed him the buy-bust money.9 Satisfied, the
accused immediately handed over to PO3 Castaeto a package wrapped in a newspaper. After PO3
Castaeto had checked out that the package contained the suspected regulated substance, he gave
the pre-arranged signal to his team by waiving his hand. The back-up team members immediately
announced that they were NARCOM agents and arrested the accused. 10 They informed the accused
of his constitutional rights and brought him to Camp Papa for investigation. 11
On December 9, 1995, the confiscated substance was brought to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination.12 P/Sr. Insp. Julita de Villa, forensic chemist of the PNP
Crime Laboratory Services, conducted a physical, chemical and chromatographic examination on
the substance to determine the presence ofMethamphetamine Hydrochloride. The result is as
follows:13
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh. "A"- One (1) light blue China Station bag containing one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag
marked as Exh. "A-1" with 250.70 grams of brown crystalline substance. xxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug.
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examinations conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the
tests for Methamphetamine hydrochloride (Shabu)."
P/Sr. Insp. De Villa testified that the package containing the shabu was completely sealed when she
received it and she was the one who opened it to examine its contents. 14
For its part, the defense presented the accused himself, Baltazar Bongalon. He tried to refute the
claim of the prosecution witnesses that he was alone when the NARCOM agents arrested him for
the alleged unlawful sale ofshabu. Allegedly, the buy-bust operation was bogus and the NARCOM
agents framed him for extortion.
The accused testified that in the morning of December 8, 1994, he was cleaning his house in United
Paraaque. Just before noon that same day, his brother, Melchor Bongalon, arrived and told him that

their friend, "Boyet," rang him and asked to tell the accused to return the Sega tapes he borrowed.
Boyet, whose real name is Juancho Tangsengco, lives in Syria Street, Better Living Subdivision,
Paraaque. Melchor Bongalon, on the other hand, lives in Tondo, Manila.15
As the accused had previously planned to take his then 4-year old son, Mark Anthony, to Star City,
he decided to go to Better Living at 2:00 p.m. to return the Sega tapes first. Melchor allegedly
accompanied the accused and his son to Boyets house. They used the red Nissan Sentra sedan
owned by their sister.16 The accused was at the drivers seat, Melchor was at the passenger side in
front and Mark Anthony was at the back. He passed via Doa Soledad and Russia Streets. While
cruising along Russia Street, he slowed down a bit because he had to turn right to United Nations
Street. Suddenly, about eight (8) men in civilian clothes bearing armalite automatic rifles
and .45 caliber firearms intercepted him.17 (He learned later that the armed men were NARCOM
agents led by PO3 Castaeto). The firearms were pointed at the car he was driving. He rolled down
the cars window and asked what his violation was and if they had a warrant of arrest against him.
They ignored him and instead, ordered them to get out of the car. He persisted in verifying what his
violation was but did not get any reply from them. Thereafter, they were ordered to board the car
again. Two (2) men boarded his carPO3 Galos sat at his left side, taking the drivers seat, while
the other sat at his right sideand sandwiched him. PO3 Castaeto and PO2 Metrillo also boarded
the car and sat at the back seats, beside Melchor and Mark Anthony. The rest of the arresting team
headed towards their vehicle.18
The accused and his alleged companions were taken to Camp Papa for investigation. When told that
he was carrying shabu in his car, he asked if he could see the substance. Allegedly, the NARCOM
agents refused. After the investigation, P/Sr. Insp. Mabanag asked him if they could go to their house
to check if he stashed any shabuin his house. He agreed.19 They reached his house in United
Paraaque by 7:00 p.m. that same night. About seven (7) policemen entered his house. PO3 Galos
was left in the car to guard him and his son. His brother, Melchor, was left in the custody of
NARCOM in Camp Papa.20
Fifteen (15) minutes later, the police let the accused and his son enter their house as the NARCOM
agents continued searching his house. His wife and his son were seated beside him in the living
room. His wife asked for a search warrant which elicited a cold reply from the NARCOM agents that
it was not necessary ("hindi na uso yon"). The search lasted for two (2) hours and yielded negative
results. The NARCOM agents tried to take the wife of the accused to Camp Papa, but she became
hysterical. They left her behind and instead brought the accused and his son back to the camp. 21
At Camp Papa, the accuseds son was handed over to Melchor as the accused was brought to
another room. It was already late in the evening when his mother arrived at the camp. His son and
his brother were allowed to leave with his mother.22
The accused claimed that the NARCOM agents were trying to extort money from them but he told
his mother not to report the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation because he feared for his
life. He also alleged that several agents had threatened him that P/Sr. Insp. Mabanag would kill if the
latter could not get what he wanted. He accused them of manhandling him. He allegedly sustained
abrasions and contusions, but the NARCOM agents denied his request for a medical treatment. 23
On December 13, 1995, he was brought to Camp Crame in Quezon City. Again, he requested for
medical treatment. His request was also denied because, according to the police, he already had a
medical certificate, referring to the one that was taken before he was mauled. 24

The accused denied that he talked to the confidential informant and to PO3 Castaeto at 5:00 p.m.
on December 7, 1994. He claimed they could not have talked to him because he did not own a
mobile phone and he did not have a telephone in his house. Allegedly, at that time, he was driving
the red Nissan Sentra along MIA Road which he borrowed from his sister. He also denied that he
gave the shabu to or received any money from PO3 Castaeto because he did not know the latter or
any of the NARCOM agents prior to his arrest. He insisted that he was intercepted at the corner of
Russia and United Nations Streets, and not along Doa Soledad. He could not, however, think of
any reason why they did so. Allegedly, except for Boyet, no one knew that he was going to Boyets
house in Syria Street. He claimed he would lodge a complaint against the arresting officers for his
unlawful arrest and the illegal search of his house once his case is finished.
Thereafter, with the courts approval, the defense and the prosecution stipulated that, if called on the
stand, the following witnesses, to wit: (1) Melchor Bongalon, brother of the accused; (2) Nonoy
Ducca, a construction worker who allegedly witnessed the arrest of the accused; (3) Hilda
Capuslanan, housemaid of the Bongalons; and (4) Marcela Bongalon, wife of the accused, would
testify as follows:
Melchor Bongalon would testify that, on December 8, 1994, he went to the house of the accused and
told the latter to return the Sega tapes that the accused borrowed from their friend, Boyet; that he
and the son of the accused accompanied the latter in going to Boyets house in Better Living,
Paraaque; that NARCOM agents intercepted their vehicle at the corner of Ethi(o)pia Street and
Doa Soledad Avenue; that there were no prohibited drugs taken from the accused; that they were
brought to the NARCOM office in Bicutan and that in the evening of December 8, 1994, the
NARCOM agents went to the house of the accused.25
Nonoy Ducca would testify that at about 3:00 p.m., on December 8, 1994, he was taking a snack
along Russia Street in Better Living, Paraaque; that he was a worker at a nearby construction site;
that he noticed armed men pointing their firearms at a vehicle and they forced its occupants to alight;
that the occupants of the vehicle were asked again to board the same and one (1) of the armed men
took the wheel and sped away; that he was twenty (20) meters away from the incident and that he
recognized the driver of the vehicle who was intercepted by the armed men. 26
Hilda Capuslanan would testify that on the night the accused was arrested, the NARCOM agents
went to the house of the accused and ransacked the same; that they returned to the house of the
accused on December 10, 1994 and did the same thing and that a case was then filed against the
NARCOM agents before the PLEB.27
Marcela Bongalon, the wife of the accused, would testify that on December 8, 1994, at about 7:00
p.m., she was in their house when her husband, the accused, and the NARCOM agents arrived; that
the NARCOM agents ransacked their house and took their personal belongings; that said officers
returned on December 10, 1994 and did the same thing but she was not around at that time; that on
December 8, 1994, Melchor Bongalon came to inform the accused to return the Sega tapes and that
her son, the accused and Melchor Bongalon left their house after lunch. 28
Finally, the defense presented as documentary exhibits the sketches of the scene of the incident
prepared by PO3 Castaeto, PO3 Galos and the accused, marked as Exhibits 1, 2 and 3,
respectively. Thereafter, the defense rested its case.

After the trial, the trial court found the accused guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer the
death penalty and ordered to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00. The dispositive portion of its
decision29 reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused BALTAZAR
BONGALON y MATEOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section
15, Article III, of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, Section 15 in relation to number 3 Section 20
thereof, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH and to pay a fine of ONE
MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS and to pay the costs.
The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) confiscated from the accused is ordered forfeited in
favor of the Government and the Clerk of Court is directed without delay to turn over said item to the
Dangerous Drug Board.
SO ORDERED."
The accused filed a Notice of Appeal.30 Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial to
present additional witnesses that included his 4-year old son, Mark Anthony.31 The motion was
denied by the trial court on the ground that the additional witnesses he offered to present were
available during the trial proper of the case.32Subsequently, the accused filed several
motions,33 including a motion to inhibit,34 but they were all denied. The trial court ordered the
transmittal of the records of the case to this Court for automatic review.35
In the meantime, the accused filed a "MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL" with this Court. 36 Pursuant to our
directive, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment.37 After considering their pleadings, we
denied the motion for new trial for lack of merit.38 The accuseds motion for reconsideration was also
denied.39 Finally, the appellant and the Solicitor General filed their respective briefs. 40
The appellant contends that:
"I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING
THAT THERE WAS A BUY-BUST OPERATION CONDUCTED BY THE NARCOM AGENTS
AGAINST BONGALON AND THAT IT WAS A VALID ONE.
A. THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES NOEL CASTAETO AND
ROGELIO GALOS ON THE BUY-BUST OPERATION AGAINST BONGALON ARE NOT
CREDIBLE.
B. THE EVENTS AS BORNE OUT BY THE RECORDS OF THE CASE BELIE THE
EXISTENCE OF A VALID BUY-BUST OPERATION.
C. THERE WAS NO SHABU CONFISCATED FROM BONGALON AT THE TIME OF HIS
UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS ARREST.
D. THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF BONGALON IS (sic) UNLAWFUL AND THE TWO
SEARCHES MADE ON HIS HOUSE ARE (sic) ALSO UNLAWFUL.

E. THERE WAS NO BUY-BUST OPERATION BUT ONLY A PLAN TO EXTORT MONEY

FROM BONGALON AND HIS FAMILY AND ROB THEM OF THEIR VALUABLES.
F. THE PRESENCE OF MELCHOR BONGALON AND MARK ANTHONY BONGALON AT
THE TIME OF THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF BONGALON BELIE THE CLAIM OF THE
NARCOM AGENTS THAT BONGALON WAS DEALING SHABU AT THE TIME OF SUCH
ARREST.
G. THE TESTIMONY OF BONGALON IS CREDIBLE BECAUSE IT WAS GIVEN IN A
STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING BONGALON OF THE VIOLATION OF SECTION
15,ARTICLE III, R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 7659.
A. THE SHABU ALLEGEDLY CONFISCATED FROM BONGALON AT THE TIME OF HIS
UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS ARREST IS INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE.
B. THE ACTS OF THE NARCOM AGENTS CONSTITUTE "INSTIGATION" RATHER THAN
AN "ENTRAPMENT."
C. THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED
HIMSELF FROM FURTHER HANDLING THE CASE IN ORDER THAT BONGALONS MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION/NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY A NEUTRAL AND
IMPARTIAL JUDGE.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE APPROVED THE CONDUCT OF A NEW TRIAL IN ORDER
THAT THE FACTS EVIDENCING THE EXTORTION AND ROBBERY PLAN OF MABANAG AND
HIS MEN COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN DETERMINING THE GUILT OF
BONGALON.
V. THE PENALTY OF DEATH AND FINE OF P1 MILLION IMPOSED BY THE HONORABLE COURT
ON BONGALON ARE NOT THE PROPER PENALTIES TO BE IMPOSED."
We affirm the judgment of the trial court, with modification as to the fine imposed.
The appeal hangs mainly on the alleged lack of credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the
frame-up-for-extortion theory.
It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to
prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties
in a regular manner,unless there is evidence to the contrary.41
To discredit the NARCOM agents involved in the buy-bust operation, the appellant points to certain
facts that would allegedly prove that the operation was bogus, to wit:

(1) There was no prior transaction between him and the poseur-buyer for him to immediately
trust and do "business" with the latter, particularly when it involved a huge quantity of shabu.
(2) The meeting place chosen, Doa Soledad Street, was very risky for a drug-dealer
because it is a very busy street where people could easily observe and report to the police
the exchange of shabu for money and the counting of money.
(3) The NARCOM agents did not take certain measures in the conduct of the buy-bust
operation, namely: (a) the buy-bust operation was not entered in NARCOMs blotter to prove
that such plan exists; (b) there was no documentary proof that the informant and the poseurbuyer transacted with him through his mobile phone; (c) and despite the fact that the
NARCOM agents had ample time to prepare for the operation, the buy-bust money was not
treated with ultra-violet powder, thus, there was no fool-proof evidence of his receipt of the
money.
(4) The NARCOM agents who conducted the buy-bust operation committed material
inconsistencies in their testimonies, particularly on the following: (a) the respective positions
of their cars during the operation and how many vehicles were actually used; and (b) the
buy-bust money used.
(5) It was inconsistent with human behavior for him (the appellant) not to count the money at
the time of the exchange since he had no prior transaction with the poseur-buyer and,
conversely, for the poseur-buyer to just touch the package and conclude that it was shabu.
(6) In his Affidavit, PO3 Castaeto stated that the operation in Doa Soledad was planned on
December 7, 1994, however, in his testimony in court, he claimed that the meeting place and
time was only set on December 8, 1994.
(7) He was not alone during the arrest, thus negating the NARCOM agents claim that he
was dealing drugs at that time.
The factual issues raised by the appellant would not exculpate him.
At the outset, bare denials cannot prevail over the positive identification by the prosecution
witnesses of the appellant as the person who was in possession of, and who delivered
the methamphetamine hydrochloride ("shabu") to the poseur-buyer.42 The prosecution witnesses,
namely, PO3 Castaeto and PO3 Galos, testified that the Narcotics Command in Camp Ricardo
Papa in Taguig received a report from an informant that the appellant was engaged in the illegal sale
of shabu. Acting on the said tip, PO3 Castaeto was designated by P/Sr. Insp. Mabanag to lead the
buy-bust operation team against the appellant. With the informants help, PO3 Castaeto negotiated
with the appellant the possible purchase of 250 grams of shabu for P250,000.00. The next day, PO3
Castaeto called the appellant to confirm if their transaction would push through and the latter
agreed to deliver the subject 250 grams of shabu. The appellant set their meeting place and time. As
PO3 Castaeto did not know the appellant before the buy-bust operation, the informant
accompanied him to the meeting place. The informant identified the red Nissan Sentra sedan driven
by the appellant. It parked right in front of their car. The informant and PO3 Castaeto approached
the appellant, had a brief conversation with the latter and, upon his request, showed him the money.
The appellant gave the package containing the shabu to PO3 Castaeto upon receiving the boodle
money. The sale of the shabu was consummated. PO3 Castaeto then gave the pre-arranged signal

by waiving his left hand to the other members of the buy-bust team who immediately apprehended
the appellant. Clearly, the appellant was arrested by virtue of a valid buy-bust operation.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment that is resorted to for trapping and capturing felons in
the execution of their criminal plan. The operation is sanctioned by law and has consistently proved
to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers. Unless there is a clear and convincing
evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not
properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit. 43
We reject the frame-up theory of the appellant. It is incredible. The appellant did not offer any
satisfactory explanation on why the NARCOM agents would single him out from among the many
vehicles that passed viaDoa Soledad and Russia Streets on that particular day just to frame him up
and extort money from him. The records show that there was no prior surveillance conducted
against the appellant. No evidence was presented if the NARCOM agents knew before his arrest
that he could give a huge sum of money for the agents alleged extortion activity. What was
established was that PO3 Castaeto became aware of the appellants illegal trade only a day before
the buy-bust operation. In fact, the informant had to introduce first PO3 Castaeto to the appellant
before the said poseur-buyer managed to negotiate the shabu deal with him. Even the appellant
admitted that he did not know the NARCOM agents prior to his arrest. There was, therefore, no
motive for them to frame him up. Without proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime
against an accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings
of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over the appellants claim of having been
framed.44
Even the claim that the appellant went to Better Living Subdivision in Paraaque to return the Sega
tapes to his friend, "Boyet", is unbelievable. In these times of electronic gizmos, the appellant would
like us to believe that his brother, Melchor, came all the way from his house in Tondo just to tell him
that Boyet, whose house was just a few minutes away from the appellants, would like to have his
Sega tapes back. Although the appellant denied that he owned a mobile phone or a phone landline
in his house, he admitted he has a pager. Inexplicably, Boyet opted to contact Melchor to relay the
message to the appellant instead of just relaying it straight to the latter. The same holds true for
Melchor, assuming that he did go to the appellants house.
We note, too, that despite the claim that Melchor was also in the car during the buy-bust operation,
Melchor was inexplicably not charged in court along with his brother, the appellant. More perplexing
is the allegation that the NARCOM agents would also take the appellants 4-year old son in Camp
Papa while the latter was under investigation and, after they had searched his house, the NARCOM
agents again took the child to Camp Papa and not leave the child with his mother. To be sure, the
appellants scenario was so contrived that it goes against standard human behavior and experience.
As shown in the records, the prosecution has established with moral certainty all the elements
necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu, namely, (1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object and the consideration, and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. The use of dusted money is not indispensable to prove the illegal sale of shabu. In fact, the
absence of marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution provided that
the prosecution has adequately proved the sale. 45 Moreover, the fact that the appellant did not count
the money first when he gave the shabu to PO3 Castaeto does not necessarily mean that the buybust operation was a sham. The NARCOM agent explained that after showing the boodle money
with the genuine P500 bills to the appellant, the latter was satisfied that he readily gave the package

of shabu to the former. The trial court correctly believed the NARCOM agent. We are convinced that
what actually took place during the operation was, in street parlance, a "kaliwaan". There was
nothing unusual about how the said transaction was consummated. It was done hurriedlythe
giving of the "shabu" upon receipt of the moneyprecisely because the place of the exchange was
a busy street and it would arouse the suspicion of bystanders and passersby if the appellant would
be seen counting a huge sum of money.
For his exculpation, the appellant also points out that it was only in the morning of December 8, 1994
when PO3 Castaeto got the information on the price of the shabu and the place and time of the
delivery. Thus, it was allegedly incredible that P/Sr. Insp. Mabanag could already organize the buybust team on December 7, 1994 and give details about the operation to be held in Doa Soledad on
December 8, 1994. The appellant also focuses on certain inconsistencies in the sketches 46 drawn by
PO3 Castaeto and PO3 Galos as to where they parked their respective cars and how many were
used during the operation.
The appellant fails to persuade us. The records show that the December 8 conversation between the
appellant and PO3 Castaeto was just a confirmation of their agreement regarding the sale of
the shabu. Prior to that, the confidential informant had been talking to PO3 Castaetos superior
officer, P/Sr. Insp. Mabanag, regarding the illegal trade of the appellant and, on account of such
report and the initial negotiations between the appellant and PO3 Castaeto, the buy-bust team was
formed and briefed accordingly.47
As for the locations of the vehicles used by the NARCOM agents when it parked along Doa
Soledad Street, such is a trivial matter that would not affect the their credibility. Such a minor
inconsistency strengthens, rather than weakens, the credibility of the witnesses as it erases any
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.48 We deemed it more important that the prosecution witnesses
testimonies tallied on material points.
The appellant also cannot assail the validity of his arrest on account of the absence of a warrant. He
was caught in flagrante delicto49 selling shabu.50 There was, therefore, no need for a warrant to effect
his arrest pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.51 Said
section provides:
"Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawfulA peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
xxx

xxx

x x x"

Moreover, the rule is that an accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed
to move to quash the information against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving the
arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused
must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 52 Even in the
instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect, and objection thereto
is waived where the person arrested submits to arraignment without objection. The subsequent filing
of the charges and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest against a person illegally
detained will cure the defect of that detention.53

Next, the appellant claims that the search conducted in his house was unlawful. He also laments
that the NARCOM agents robbed him of his personal properties during the search and they received
money from his relatives after his arrest. This Court need not tarry on the validity of the said search
for the appellant consented to the search. He admitted that he voluntarily accompanied the
policemen to his house.54 As for the charges of robbery and extortion, as in the alleged unlawful
search made in his house, those incidents transpired after his arrest. Whether true or not, his liability
for the unlawful sale of shabu remains.
1wphi1

As we have earlier stated, the appellants denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. We are not unaware of the perception that, in some instances, law enforcers
resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians. However,
like alibi, frame-up is a defense that has been viewed by the Court with disfavor as it can easily be
concocted, hence, commonly used as a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. We realize the disastrous consequences on the enforcement
of law and order, not to mention the well-being of society, if the courts, solely on the basis of the
policemens alleged rotten reputation, accept in every instance this form of defense which can be so
easily fabricated. It is precisely for this reason that the legal presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed exists.55
The third and fourth issues need not be discussed at length as the same were already passed upon
by this Court when it denied the appellants Motion for New Trial for lack of merit. 56 We reiterate that
the trial court did not err in denying the motion for new trial. Section 14, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure provides:
"Sec. 14. Motion for new trial.At any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected
and before the judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused becomes final, the latter may
move for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence material to his defense, the motion
to conform to the provisions of Section 4, Rule 121."
A motion for new trial must be based on newly discovered evidence,57 that is, the following must
concur: (a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching and of such weight that, if admitted,
could probably change the judgment. As aptly stated by the trial court, the testimony of the witness
sought to be presented would serve only as impeaching and corroborative evidence. A new trial is
justifiably denied where only impeaching evidence is sought to be introduced as the court had
already passed upon the issue of credibility at the trial and where only corroborative evidence is to
be offered as it would not change the result of the case. 58
The fifth issue refers to the correctness of the death penalty imposed against the appellant. To avoid
any injustice, we re-read the voluminous records of the case. We find that the records support the
findings of the trial court.
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7659 provides:
"Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated
Drugs.The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug.

xxx

xxx

x x x"

Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 was amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659. It now
provides as follows:
"Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of Proceeds or Instrument of the
Crime.The penalties for offenses under xxx Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act
shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
xxx

xxx

xxx

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

xxx

xxx

xxx

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from
prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity."
It was established that the appellant sold 250.70 grams of shabu. The crime, according to the
Information, was committed with the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle. 59 It has been
established that the appellant used a car in going to their meeting place and to transport the subject
substance thus facilitating the commission of the crime. 60 There was no mitigating circumstance.
Applying Section 15 in relation to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659 and Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty of death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 toP10,000,000.00 should be
imposed upon the appellant. Considering the quantity of the shabu involved in the case at bar, the
fine of P1,000,000.00 is reduced to P500,000.00.61
Four (4) members of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty, is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority
vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be imposed accordingly.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque (Branch 258) in Criminal
Case No. 95-0973, sentencing appellant Baltazar Bongalon y Mateos to death for violating Section
15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED, with modification that the fine imposed
shall be reduced to P500,000.00. Costs against the appellant.
Pursuant to Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, amending Section 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon
finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203961

July 29, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RODERICK LICAYAN, ROBERTO LARA AND ROGELIO "NOEL" DELOS REYES, AccusedAppellants.

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On August 15, 2001, this Court affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Marikina
City convicting two of herein accused-appellants, Roderick Licayan (Licayan) and Roberto Lara
(Lara), of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and sentencing them to death. The dispositive portion
of this Court's August 15, 2001 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 272, Marikina City finding accusedappellant RODERICK LICA YAN and ROBERTO LARA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Kidnapping for Ransom and sentencing each of them to death is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that each of the accused-appellants is ORDERED to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages to each of
the complainants. The award ofP20,000.00 as actual damages made in favor of complainant Joseph
Co is deleted. Costs against accused-appellants.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the
finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the
Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
1

The Motion for Reconsideration of Licayan and Lara was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated
October 9, 2001. The Decision became final and executory on November 9, 2001. On November 18,
2003, the trial court issued a Writ of Execution ordering the execution of Licayan and Lara on
January 30, 2004 at 3 :00 p.m.
Before the date of Licayan and Lara's scheduled execution, and with the torrent of initiatives sparked
by the passionate national debate on the morality of capital punishment, two of their co-accused in
the original Information were arrested. On January 9, 2004, Pedro Mabansag (Mabansag), a double
arm amputee and suspected mastermind of the kidnapping of Joseph Tomas Co and Linda
Manaysay, was arrested at Sitio Lanipga, Barangay Magsaysay, Escalante City. On January 12,
2004, Rogelio Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes) was arrested at Barangay Bayang Marihatag, Agusan del
Sur.
In light of these arrests, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) filed with this Court on January 15, 2004
(which was 15 days before the scheduled execution of Licayan and Lara) an Urgent Motion to
Reopen the Case with Leave of Court. Pending resolution of the Urgent Motion, this Court, by a vote
of 7-6, issued a Resolution on January 26, 2004 ordering the temporary suspension of the execution
of Licayan and Lara for a period of 30 calendar days.2 On February 17, 2004, this Court, voting 8-6,
issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court resolves to GRANT pro hac vice the Urgent Motion to
Re-Open the Case with Leave of Court. Accordingly, the execution of the Decision of this Court
dated August 15, 2001 is suspended. The records of the case are hereby REMANDED to the lower
court for further reception of evidence pursuant to Section 2 (b), Rule 121 of the Rules of Court,
together with the trial of accused Rogelio delos Reyes and Pedro Mabansag. In accordance with
Section 6(b) and (c), Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, insofar as the accused Roberto Lara and
Roderick Licayan is concerned, the evidence already taken shall stand and the additional evidence
as the trial court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered
with the evidence already in record. Towards this end, the Court directs Hon. Reuben P. dela Cruz,

Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Marikina City, Branch 272, to hear the case of the
accused Roberto Lara and Roderick Licayan, and thereafter report to this Court with deliberate
dispatch.
Let copies of this Resolution be personally served on the Office of the President and the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections.
3

On April 19, 2005, Mabansag and Delos Reyes were finally arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
crimes charged in the Informations under which their co-accused Lara and Licayan were previously
indicted. We quote the material portions of said Informations here:
Crim. Case No. 98-2605-MK
That on or about August 10, 1998 at around 1:45 a.m., the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with a handgun and with evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of force and
intimidation kidnap JOSEPH TOMAS CO and LINDA MANA YSA Y for the purpose of extorting
ransom in the amount of P 10 million at Goodies Pares Marni House located at Loyola cor.
Constancia St., Sampaloc, Manila, owned and managed by the aforementioned victim Co and
thereafter took them with the use of Toyota Tamaraw FX likewise owned by Co as getaway vehicle to
a house in Daang Bakal, Parang, Marikina and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court where
they were kept under detention against their will until they were able to escape the following day at
around 4:30 in the afternoon on August 11, 1998.
4

Crim. Case No. 98-2606-MK

That on or about August 10 and 11, 1998 at Daang Bakal, Parang, Marikina City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a handgun and with
intent to gain, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and divested (sic) JOSEPH
TOMAS CO and LINDA MANA YSA Y of the following personal properties after forcibly taking them
as hostages for ransom, to wit:
1. Wallet of Co containing his driver's license, original copy of official receipt (OR), certificate
of registration (CR) of his two (2) L-300 vans;
2. Bank time deposit certificate at Metrobank, Valenzuela Branch;
3. Casio G-Shock watch;
4. Necklace and earrings of Manaysay; and
5. P10,000.00 cash
to the damage and prejudice of said victims as owners thereof against their will.

Lara, Licayan, Mabansag and Delos Reyes had five other co-accused in said Informations, namely
Alex Placio, Jojo Sajorgo, Allan Placio, Dodong Adolfo and Benjie Mabansag, all of whom remain atlarge.

On November 15, 2005, Mabansag died while detained at the Marikina City Jail. The trial against
Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes proceeded. On February 17, 2009, the RTC of Marikina City
rendered its Decision finding Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes guilty of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused RODERICK
LICA YAN, ROBERTO LARA and ROGELIO 'NOEL' DELOS REYES in Criminal Case No. 98-2605MK, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM as defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences them to reclusion
perpetua and each of them is also ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages to
each of the complainants.
The period during which the herein accused were in detention during the pendency of this case shall
be credited to them in full provided that they agree to abide by and comply with the rules of the City
Jail of Marikina.
However, in Criminal Case No. 98-2606-MK of the crime of ROBBERY, for lack of sufficient evidence
presented by the Prosecution to prove the guilt of the said accused beyond reasonable doubt,
judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING them of the said offense charged in the Information.
These two (2) cases against the other accused, ALEX PLACIO @ "Tata Pandak," JOJO SAJORGO,
ALLAN PLACIO, DODONG ADOLFO and BENJIE MABANSAG who remain at-large up to the
present are ordered archived and let an (sic) alias warrants of arrests be issued.
6

The RTC Decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, on July 4, 2012, affirmed the
conviction of Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes in toto. Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes filed a Notice
of Appeal, thus allowing this Court another hard look into the events surrounding the captivity of
Joseph Tomas Co and Linda Manaysay on August 10-11, 1998.
7

In this Court's February 17, 2004 Resolution granting accused-appellants' Motion to Reopen the
Case, we held that insofar as the accused Lara and Licayan are concerned, the evidence already
taken shall stand, although additional evidence may be introduced to be taken and considered with
the evidence already in record. This Court summarized said evidence in its August 15, 2001
Decision, thus:
6

Complainant Joseph Tomas Co owns a restaurant called Goodies Pares Marni House with branches
in Valenzuela, Cubao, and Sampaloc. Co's regular routine was for him and the other complainant,
Linda Manaysay, the restaurant's cashier and accounting officer, to make the rounds of the three
branches for inspection and collection of left-over food and cash sales. The rounds would normally
begin late in the evening and last until early in the morning of the next day.
The prosecution evidence shows that on August 9, 1998, complainants went to the Goodies
Valenzuela branch where they stayed until midnight. From there, they proceeded to the Cubao
branch where they stayed until about 12:45 a.m., August 10, 1998. Their last stop was at the
Sampaloc branch which they visited at 1:30 a.m.
While Co was at the Sampaloc branch, supervising the loading of left-over food into the back of his
Tamaraw FX. service vehicle, three men approached him from behind. When Co saw the men, he

asked what they wanted. The men were armed with two caliber .45 pistols and a .38 revolver. None
of the men wore any mask.
Co told the men that if they wanted money, they could get it from the store. The men refused to get
money from the store. Without any warning, one of the men's guns went off. When Manaysay heard
the shot, she came out and asked the men what they wanted. She told them that they could get
money from the store, but they refused to do so. Instead, complainants were made to board the rear
of the Tamaraw FX. Two of the men's companions were already seated in the front seat. The man in
the driver's seat asked Co for the key to the vehicle. The three other men also boarded the vehicle
with the complainants. Co identified accused-appellant Roderick Licayan as one of his five
abductors.
Co said their hands were tied and their eyes taped, and that they were made to wear caps over their
heads as the vehicle reached Quezon Avenue in Quezon City. After 45 minutes, Co said he felt the
vehicle stop. The rear door was opened and he heard the voices of people approaching the vehicle.
Complainants were brought inside a room of a house made of light materials and which had no
ceiling. They were made to sit on the floor. Then, they were transferred to another room where the
covers of their eyes were removed and their feet were tied. Manaysay testified that she saw
accused-appellants in the house after the masking tape was removed from their eyes. Co's wallet
which contained P5,000.00 in cash and his watch and Manaysay's necklace and earrings were taken
from them. A person was left to guard them inside the room, whom both complainants identified as
accused-appellant Roberto Lara.
After about two hours, Manaysay told Co that she wanted to urinate. Hence, Co asked their guard if
Manaysay could go outside to do it. The guard left and came back with a half-gallon container which
he gave Manaysay to urinate in.
Co tried talking to the guard and pleaded with him to let them go. But the guard replied that he was
just following orders. Co offered him some money which he had, but the guard did not accept the
money and instead threw it away.
9

[On August 11, 1998, at around 4:30 p.m., Licayan who was guarding them at that time] fell asleep
and Co and Manaysay somehow managed to escape without being noticed by the look-out outside
their room. After running for several meters, complainants took refuge in a house. An old woman
living in the house allowed them to use the telephone from which Co was able to call the Marikina
Police Headquarters. The woman told them that they were in Kaolin St., Twinriver Subdivision,
Parang, Marikina. Two police officers from the Marikina police arrived, followed by a police SWAT
team. Complainants' case was later turned over to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF) for investigation.
10

On August 11, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., members of the PAOCTF raided the safehouse at Daang
Bakal, Parang, Marikina where Co and Manaysay had been held captive. A man seen running away
was arrested by SPO3 Ismael Fajardo Jr. Upon being questioned, the man identified himself as
accused-appellant Roberto Lara. SP03 Fajardo identified accused-appellant Lara from photographs
shown to him in court as the man he arrested. Lara pointed to accused-appellant Licayan as one of
his companions and told the PAOCTF members that Lara was hiding in his (Lara's) uncle's house at
the back of the San Mateo Rizal Municipal Hall. The P AOCTF members thereafter proceeded to the
house and were able to arrest accused-appellant Licayan.

Lara and Licayan were thereafter brought to the PAOCTF headquarters in Camp Crame where they
were identified by Co and Manaysay in a line-up consisting of Lara, Licayan, and eight PAOCTF
members.
Benjamin Co, complainant Joseph Tomas Co's brother, testified that he was twice called in his office
by unidentified persons who demanded P 10 million for the release of complainants. The kidnappers
were of course frustrated as complainants were able to escape.
Accused-appellants' defense is alibi. Accused-appellant Licayan claimed that on August 11, 1998, at
around 7:00 p.m., he was at home in Sta. Cecilia Village, San Mateo Rizal, having dinner with
Nicolas Salvivia, a dump truck driver; that on the next day, August 12, 1998, he was arrested by
members of the PAOCTF while he was having drinks with Salvivia and Salvivia's father at the latter's
residence in Sta. Cecilia Village; and that when he was arrested, he was not informed of the charges
against him. He said he only learned that he was arrested for the kidnapping of complainants after
he had been brought to Camp Crame.
In Camp Crame, he and his co-accused were handcuffed and made to stand in a police-line up.
They were not assisted by counsel. The complainants pointed to him and Lara as part of the group
who kidnapped complainants. Licayan claimed he only saw complainant Co for the first time when
he (Licayan) was brought to Camp Crame.
On the other hand, accused-appellant Lara, a construction worker, testified that from 7:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m. of August 10, 1998, he was in his place of work in Antipolo. At 7:00 a.m. of August 11,
1999, he went home to Novaliches, stopping by the house of his uncle, Pedro Mabansag, in Parang,
Marikina. Mabansag had driven Lara's family out of his house and Lara had gone there to get his
child's belongings. However, before he could do so, he was arrested by the Marikina Police at
Greenheights.
Lara wanted to ask his cousin Nicolas Salvivia for help. The police beat him up and told him that
they would go to Salvivia's house.
He was made to board a van where his head was covered with a plastic bag and he was again
beaten up. The police found Salvivia and Licayan in Salvivia's house and ordered the two to drop to
the ground. The police poked a gun to Lara's head and told him to identify his companions,
otherwise he would be killed. Thus, according to Lara, he pointed to Licayan.
Lara claimed that at Camp Crame, after he and Licayan were identified by complainants in a police
line-up, they were forced to sign a statement. They were not informed of their right to remain silent
and to be assisted by counsel. Lara denied that Atty. Confesor B. Sansano, who appeared to have
assisted him in making his statement, actually assisted him.
11

In subsequent proceedings, the prosecution presented as rebuttal witness Confessor Sansano, the
lawyer whom Lara had claimed did not really assist him. Sansano testified that as IBP governor and
chairman, he gave free legal assistance to all persons who could not afford the services of a lawyer.
On August 12, 1998, Police Chief Inspector Trampe brought Lara to Sansano's office at the Justice
Hall of Quezon City. Sansano required the police agents to step out of the room when he personally
interviewed Lara for 10 minutes. He apprised Lara of his constitutional rights. He was assured that
Lara will tell the truth, and that La1:"a was not harmed. He even examined the upper torso of Lara
and found no signs of maltreatment. He was present throughout the investigation held in his office,

until Lara affixed his signature in the sworn statement. On cross-examination, Sansano admitted that
he cannot remember the number of persons brought to him by Trampe for legal assistance. He
testified that he warned Lara about the implication of the statement that he will give to the police.
12

During the second trial, Prosecutor Nestor Gapuzan stated that the prosecution is adopting the direct
testimony given by the prosecution witnesses during the first trial. Co, however, was recalled for
additional direct examination on the alleged participation of Delos Reyes.
Joseph Tomas Co testified that Delos Reyes was one of the five men who abducted him and
Manaysay. Delos Reyes was the person who sat at the middle portion of the Tamaraw FX at the
back of the driver, while Co and Manaysay were forced to sit in the rear portion of the Tamaraw FX
with two of their abductors, who later tied their hands. Co identified Delos Reyes in court. He was not
sure whether Licayan was one of the five men who abducted them. Delos Reyes, while seated at the
middle portion of the Tamaraw FX, faced Co and demanded from him with a forceful voice, "Nasaan
ang susi?" and "Akina ang susi." He did not notice any hint of Manilefio or regional accent in the
voice of Delos Reyes and was not aware of said accents. He did not immediately give the key to
Delos Reyes, but the latter repeated "Akina ang susi." The man beside him pointed a gun at him, so
he gave the key to Delos Reyes, who then handed the key to the man seated at the driver's seat.
13

During the time Co and Manaysay were detained in the safehouse, Co identified Licayan and Lara
on different occasions but was not able to see Delos Reyes. He reiterated that he tried to bribe Lara
to get the remaining money inside his pocket but Lara said that he could not do it because he will be
killed. Co explained that he did not identify Licayan and Lara by their feet. Even before he pointed to
their feet, he had already identified them by their faces which he was positive about and he was just
even more assured of their identities when he saw their feet. The defense presented Radio Veritas
reporter Corazon Zony Esguerra, New Bilibid Prison Chaplain Msgr. Roberto Olaguer, Lara's coworker Abelardo Ramirez, Lara's employer Florencia Lavarro Salvador, and accused-appellant Delos
Reyes. Licayan was likewise recalled to the witness stand.
14

15

Radio Veritas reporter Zony Esguerra testified that she was able to interview Mabansag at the airport
after he was arrested. Mabansag told her that his nephew, Lara, had nothing to do with the incident.
Esguerra also interviewed Delos Reyes at the PACER Office in Camp Crame around two hours after
he arrived from the airport. Delos Reyes told her that "talaga wala akong kasalanan pinilit lang nila
akong tagabantay sa victim." According to Delos Reyes, the real culprits are "Tata Placio and Allan
Placio."
16

New Bilibid Prison Chaplain Msgr. Roberto Olaguer, knowing that Licayan and Lara were scheduled
for execution in January 2004, told them before Christmas in December 2003 that he will personally
attend to their case more intensely. When he learned from .Lara that his relatives did not know the
schedule of his execution, he told Lara that he will personally inform his parents. On January 6,
2004, Lara finally gave Msgr. Olaguer the address of his parents, but warned him about his uncle
Pedro Mabansag: there was a warrant for the arrest of Mabansag at the Marikina Police Station. It
occurred to Msgr. Olaguer that if Mabansag would be arrested, the execution of Lara and Licayan
may be postponed. He immediately called Mayor Marides Fernando of Marikina City and told her
about the possibility of helping him get a copy of the warrant. He was able to secure a copy of the
warrant at around 8:00 p.m. of January 7, 2004. He called the station manager of Radio Veritas, who
told him to go to the station as he will contact the chief of the PAO. He asked PAO Chief Atty. Acosta
if there is a possibility that the lives of Lara and Licayan would be saved if Mabansag is arrested,
and she told him about the possibility of reopening the case and suspending the execution.
17

Before going to Bacolod, he told Lara about having secured the warrant. Lara warned him that even
though his uncle "Putol" (Mabansag) had both arms a,mputated, he can still drive a car, fire a
shotgun, and ride a horse. He relayed this warning to Col. A venido,. who organized two to three
teams to arrest Mabansag.
18

In Bacolod on January 8, 2004, Msgr. Olaguer, Col Avenido and his group of around 20 men went to
the house of Lara's mother, and told her that her son will be executed on January 30, 2004. He
invited her to go to Manila and offered to shoulder her travel costs. She told him that BOMBO Radyo
and ABS-CBN already offered to pay for her expenses. During this time, the police were searching
the area and conducting interviews. The police told him that they have to go to a certain sugar
plantation to look for Mabansag. They arrived at the sugar plantation at 2:00 p.m. The people at the
plantation, however, were not cooperative and appeared to be afraid of Mabansag, except for a little
child who gave them a lead. Msgr. Olaguer was regularly updated as regards the search for
Mabansag. At around 2:00 a.m. the following day, January 9, 2004, CoL Inocentes Capuno called
him and said that they were able to apprehend Mabansag.
19

At the police station, Msgr. Olaguer introduced himself to Mabansag. They were allowed to talk in
private, wherein Msgr. Olaguer told Mabansag that his nephew, Lara, will be executed by lethal
injection on January 30, 2004. Mabansag cried and said many things in Ilonggo. Msgr. Olaguer
asked his companion to translate what Mabansag was saying. He understood Mabansag saying
"inosente man si Tungkoy," referring to Lara. When he informed Mabansag about Licayan,
Mabansag was so surprised and told him that he had not seen Licayan for a long time. Mabansag
said that he knew that he was one of the accused in the case, but he was innocent. Mabansag
denied that the house where the kidnap victims were brought was his, but clarified that it was his
daughter's house. The kidnappers offered money if he could lend the house to them. He accepted
because he needed money at that time. Mabansag told him that he somehow participated in the
safekeeping of the victims.
20

Upon their arrival in the airport in Manila, they were brought to the VIP room. When Mabansag was
interviewed by reporter Gus Abelgas, Msgr. Olaguer was surprised to hear Mabansag say that he did
not know anything about the kidnapping. Mabansag also said that he was being threatened by the
police and the media people in Bacolod by telling him "lkaw ang ipapalit kay Roberto Lara."
21

On cross-examination, Msgr. Olaguer testified that Lara told him exactly "Kung pupunta po kayo sa
Nanay ko, mag-ingat po kayo sa tiyo ko. Yung uncle ko, putol po ang dalawang kamay niyan pero
kaya pa na bumaril." Lara further told him that Mabansag was one of the masterminds in the
kidnapping of Co and Manaysay. Msgr. Olaguer observed that the people at the sugar plantation in
Bacolod seemed to be afraid of Mabansag as they told him that Mabansag had a close connection
with the rebels who were somehow controlling the sugar plantation. Abelardo Ramirez testified that
he had known Lara for five years since 1995 because they were neighbors at Daang Bakal, Bagong
Silang, Parang, Marikina. Lara's house was two houses away from his. Everytime he gets a job, he
gets Lara as his co-worker. Lara worked as a ''piyon," who mixes cement.
22

23

On August 10, 1998, he was in his house in Daang Bakal at 6:00 a.m., waiting for Lara. At 7:00 a.m.,
Lara arrived. They took two jeepney rides to their place of work in Antipolo where they were
constructing a residential house. They arrived at the construction site at 8:00 a.m. and worked there
until 5 :00 p.m. They parted ways on Kaolin Street because Lara said he would go to his
grandparent's house in Novaliches. Ramirez arrived home at 6:30 p.m.
24

On August 11, 1998, Lara arrived at Ramirez's house past 8:00 a.m. They proceeded to the same
construction site where they worked until 5 :00 p.m. They left the site at 6:00 p.m. and they parted
ways at Kaolin.
25

On August 21, 1998, Ramirez secured a certification from their employer Florencia Lavarro Salvador
to prove that during the kidnapping, Lara was with him. He placed the certification in a small brown
envelope and kept it for five years. He retrieved the certification in 2003 when he saw on television
that Lara will be executed.
26

Florencia Lavarro Salvador testified that Ramirez, whom she calls "Mang Bado," recommended Lara
to work in the construction of her house. On August 9, 1998, she supervised the work of Ramirez
and Lara, who both arrived at 7:00 a.m. and worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. On August 10,
1998, Ramirez and Lara arrived at 7:30 a.m., worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and left at around
5:30 p.m. On August 11, 1998, Ramirez and Lara arrived past 8:00 a.m., worked until 5:00 p.m., and
left at around 6:00 p.m.
On August 12, 1998, Ramirez told her that Lara was arrested, and requested for a certification to
prove the whereabouts of Lara during the kidnapping incident. Salvador executed such certification.

27

PAO lawyer Howard Areza testified that he assisted in the execution of the Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Delos Reyes and Mabansag. The latter was already deceased at the time of Atty. Areza's testimony.
Since Mabansag had no arms, he stamped his right toe on the document.
28

Atty. Areza confirmed Mabansag's answers in Questions 17 and 18 of the Sinumpaang Salaysay
wherein he narrated that a TV reporter interviewed him upon arrival at the airport in Manila. He said
in the interview that Lara is not liable ("walang kasalanan") because Lara was working in a
construction in Cavite and Antipolo. Atty. Areza also confirmed Mabansag's answers in Question 30
and 31 wherein he stated that he drove away (''pinalayas") Joy, Lara's wife, from Daang Bakal one
week before August 10, 1998. Mabansag did not know whether Joy and Lara lived in Novaliches
after he drove Joy away.
29

Atty. Areza likewise confirmed Delos Reyes's answers in Questions 36 and 37 of the Sinumpaang
Salaysay wherein he stated that, on August 10, 1998, he saw Mabansag in the safehouse.
According to a certain Tata Alex Placio, Mabansag was the financier of the operation as he was the
owner of the house. Atty. Areza also confirmed the answers of Delos Reyes in Questions 15, 16, 18
and 20 that Delos Reyes was interviewed by reporter Zony Esguerra when he was in the PACER
Office. He stated in said interview that Lara is not liable ("walang kasalanan"). Delos Reyes also
stated that he guarded the victims and did not report the matter to the police because of his fear of
Tata Alex Placio, Allan Placio, Jojo Sajorgo and Benjie. Recalled to the witness stand, Roderick
Licayan testified that, in the police line-up, he was at first identified by Co by pointing at his and
Lara's feet. Co did not mention any specific identifying mark on their feet. Licayan heard Co say that
whenever anybody enters the room in the safehouse, he looks at their feet. Licayan cannot recall
how many of his companions in the line-up were wearing shoes and how many were wearing
slippers. Licayan testified that a police officer in civilian clothes instructed Co to point to his face. It
took a few minutes before the victims pointed to their faces. Co identified him and Lara from among
several persons (more than five; not sure if 10) who were in the line-up.
30

31

At the time he and Lara were arrested, Licayan already knew Delos Reyes because the latter was
his townmate. . Delos Reyes was not in the police line-up.
32

Accused-appellant Rogelio "Noel" delos Reyes was arrested on January 12, 2004 in Barangay
Bayang Marihatag, Surigao del Sur, and was taken to Camp Crame where he was detained. Delos
Reyes confirmed the radio interview he had with Zony Esguerra, and that he said therein that he was
forced to guard the victims (''pinilit na magbantay") by Tata Placio, which the latter did by pointing a
gun at him.
33

Delos Reyes testified that on August 10, 1998, he went to the house of Mabansag to accompany a
friend who wanted to buy a fighting cock. He had previously met Mabansag at the "manukan"
sometime that same year, 1998. Delos Reyes stated that he met Tata and Alex for the first time in
Mabansag's house. The sale of the two fighting cocks was done outside Mabansag's house but, with
Mabansag's permission, he entered said house to drink water. Inside the house, Tata and Jojo
pointed a gun at him. He then saw a man and a woman seated near the kitchen. The couple saw
him through the curtain. Mabansag told him, "Noel, magmadali ka lumabas, may mangungupahan
na mag-asawa." Tata, however, said "Dito ka Zang, huwag kang aalis." Delos Reyes answered that
he will leave and that he does not want to stay any longer.
34

The court noted at this point of Delos Reyes's testimony that he mentioned Tata as if he knew him
prior to the time he entered the house. Delos Reyes then admitted that he already knew Tata and
Jojo two months before the incident and that his earlier statement that he did not know Tata and Jojo
when he entered the house was not true.
35

Delos Reyes did not ask Tata and Jojo why they were pointing a gun at him. He saw the hands of
the woman were tied, and suspected that Tata and Jojo were engaged in bad activities. He stayed in
the place from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. He did not help the victims because he was afraid that Allan,
Jojo, Tata and Benjie might shoot him. After leaving the place, he stayed in the house of his
godmother, Emelita Alcober, in Concepcion for two weeks.
36

37

Delos Reyes knows both Licayan and Lara. He visited Lara in his residence every Sunday. Licayan
was his neighbor in the province. Delos Reyes affirmed his statement in the Sinumpaang Salaysay
that Licayan and Lara were not liable ("walang kasalanan"). Lara was not in the safehouse, while
Licayan just happened to pass by. When Delos Reyes entered Mabansag's house, Mabansag told
him that there were kidnap victims inside.
38

During cross-examination, Delos Reyes stated that the friend he accompanied to buy fighting cocks
was named Luisito. He did not know Luisito' s surname because he had known him for only two
weeks. He had known Tata for around two months because Tata accompanied Mabansag when the
latter went to Delos Reyes' s residence three times to bring fighting cocks to sell. Delos Reyes
learned from a neighbor about Mabansag's trade of selling fighting cocks. Mabansag usually brings
the fighting cocks to Delos Reyes, at the latter's godmother's house. Delos Reyes did not know why
this changed on August 10, 1998, when. Mabansag told him to get the fighting cocks at the latter's
house. When Delos Reyes entered the safehouse, his companion, Luisito, had already left to drive a
tricycle; Delos Reyes will just give Luisito the fighting cocks they bought at a later time. Answering a
query from the court, Delos Reyes affirmed that after he and Luisito arrived. at the place, Luisito
immediately left.
39

Delos Reyes asked permission from Benjie Mabansag to go inside the house. He did not ask
permission from Pedro Mabansag to go inside the house since he had already gone to the place four
times. When asked by the court for clarification, Delos Reyes said he did not ask for permission
from Benjie. He asked Tata why he was pointing a gun at him, to which Tata replied that he should
40

41

stay and that Tata will kill him if he reports the matter to the police. When Delos Reyes went near
the kitchen, he saw a man and a woman. He noticed that the woman's hands were tied, but it did not
occur to him that their captivity was the matter that Tata warned him not to tell the police. Delos
Reyes did not consider it unusual to see a woman's hands tied. Despite what was happening, he
stayed in the house for one hour and merely sat on the floor near the door where the man and the
woman were kept. He was also allowed to leave after one hour. He did not notice the persons inside
the room except for the man and the woman. Even after Tata pointed a gun at him and he saw a
woman tied, it did not occur to him after he left the place that something was wrong.
42

43

44

In the appeal now before the Court, accused-appellant Delos Reyes reiterates his defense that the
exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear was present in his case while accused-appellants
Licayan and Lara seek to overturn their conviction on the basis of the newly discovered evidence
presented during their retrial.
Whether or not the exempting
circumstance of uncontrollable fear
should be considered in favor of
Delos Reyes
Delos Reyes, who was still at-large during the first trial, was found guilty at the conclusion of the
retrial. The trial court held:
With respect to accused DELOS REYES, he did not refute the testimony of MR. CO that he was one
(1) of his abductors who [was] seated at the middle portion of the Tamaraw FX and who demanded
from him the key of said vehicle. Instead he admitted going to the house of Pedro Mabansag on
August 10, 1998 accompanying a friend who would buy a fighting cock. According to DELOS
REYES, after he asked permission from Pedro Mabansag, he entered his house to drink water, but
he was met by a certain "TATA" and "JOJO" and they pointed a gun at him and he was told not to
leave. He claimed that Tata Placio and his companion after poking a gun at him threatened him that
they would kill him if he reports the matter to the police. He admitted that he saw two (2) persons
inside the house near the kitchen and the woman was hand tied. After he arrived at the said
safehouse at 3 :00 p.m., of August 10, 1998, he was allowed to leave at 4:00 p.m., of said date. And
after he left the safehouse, he admitted that he feels not anymore being threatened by the group of
Tata Placio, but still he did not report what he witnessed in the house of Pedro Mabansag to the
police authorities. Said accused also claimed that when "TAT A" and "JOJO" poked a gun at him and
was told not to leave and not to report to the police, he acted under the "compulsion of an irresistible
force, hence, one of the exempting circumstances under Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Court begs to disagree. DELOS REYES testified that even before August 10, 1998,
he knows already TATA and JOJO because they went to the house of his Ninang together with Pedro
Mabansag for three (3) times. Since they all know each other, then the court cannot comprehend
why TATA and JOJO still need to poke a gun at DELOS REYES and threatened him. This is only a
last ditch effort of said accused to deny any participation in the conspiracy in kidnapping the two (2)
victims. As could clearly be gleaned from the testimony, DELOS REYES made inconsistent and
improbable statements. The Court also observed the demeanor of said accused when he testified
and he is obviously lying [through] his teeth. Manifest falsehood and discrepancies in the witnesses'
testimony seriously impair their probative value and cast serious doubts on their credibility.
45

The Court of Appeals affirmed these findings, adding that the testimony of Delos Reyes was selfserving and could not stand on its own to prove the elements of the exempting circumstance relied

upon. Before this Court, Delos Reyes again pursues that he is exempt from criminal liability based
on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
46

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. -The following are exempt from criminal
liability:
xxxx
5. A.ny person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.
Delos Reyes claims exemption from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised
Penal Code, because he allegedly acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force, specifically
the fact that a co-accused, who is still at-large up to this date, pointed a gun at him. Delos Reyes has
been invoking practically the same defense even before the trial: in his Radio Veritas interview by
reporter Zony Esguerra, he insisted that "wala akong kasalanan" and that he was merely forced to
guard the victims.
47

In People v. Dansal, this Court held that a person invoking the exempting circumstance of
compulsion due to irresistible force admits in effect the commission of a punishable act, and must
therefore prove the exempting circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically: He must
show that the irresistible force reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only without will but
also against his will. The compulsion must be of such character as . to leave the accused no
opportunity to defend himself or to escape.
48

The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending; and it must be of
such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is
not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. A speculative, fanciful or remote fear, even fear of
future injury, is insufficient.
49

The appellate court did not err when it relied on the doctrine that the matter of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who
had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the
various indicia available but not reflected on the record. It is the trial judge that can capture the truth
from the "forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered
look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch." In the case at bar, the trial court
even expressly stated that it observed the demeanor of Delos Reyes when he testified and found
that he is obviously lying through his teeth. This is in contrast to the testimony of Co which the trial
court described as very clear, positive and straightforward. Even without the advantage of being
able to observe the demeanor of Delos Reyes, however, a mere examination of the transcript of his
testimony convinces us of the hesitation and untruthfulness of his testimony. Delos Reyes kept on
changing details and correcting himself even without inducement from opposing counsel. The
content of the testimony was itself incredible. This Court finds it hard to believe that a person who
accidentally discovers kidnap victims would be held at gunpoint by the kidnappers to guard said
victims; or that a mastermind of a kidnapping syndicate, instead of conducting his fighting cock
selling activities in the regular meeting place, would invite a recent affiliate to the place where he is
holding prisoners; or that Delos Reyes did not find it unusual to see a woman with her hands tied.
50

51

52

In all, we find no reason to doubt that Delos Reyes was part of the plan to abduct and detain Co and
Manaysay.

Whether or not Licayan and Lara

should be acquitted based on
purportedly newly discovered
evidence
The pro hac vice resolution of this Court on January 15, 2004 allows this Court an unusual, though
not unprecedented, task to revisit our own final and executory Decision. It should be stressed that a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence may only be granted by the court on motion of the
accused, or motu proprio with the consent of the accused "(a)t any time before a judgment of
conviction becomes final. Furthermore, the affidavits of Mabansag and Delos Reyes cannot be
considered newly discovered in that the affiants are the movants' co-accused who were already
identified as such during the trial. Nevertheless, the Court, alluding to its power to suspend its own
rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the purposes of justice require
it, and noting the support of the Office of the Solicitor General to Licayan and Lara's motion, voted
8-6 to order the suspension of the Rules of Court itself and remand the case to the trial court for
further reception of evidence.
53

54

55

56

57

On June 24, 2006, more than two years after the pro hac vice Resolution of this Court, Republic Act
No. 9346 was approved, irrevocably sparing Licayan and Lara from the severest and most
permanent of penalties. In the meantime, both the R TC and the Court of Appeals were unmoved by
the new evidence presented for the accused-appellants. Thus, for the second time, Licayan and
Lara were convicted by the trial court and their appeals denied by the Court of Appeals.
58

To put things in perspective, the pro hac vice Resolution expressly granted the effects of Rule 121,
Section 6(b} of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. The effects of granting a new trial or
reconsideration are the following:
xxxx
(b) when a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence already
adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court may, in .the
interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered together with
the evidence already in the record.
In general, the "new" evidence adduced in the second trial consists in (1) allegations that the
identification of Licayan and Lara by Co and Manaysay was unreliable; (2) testimonies and affidavits
of the recently apprehended Mabansag and Delos Reyes, both of whom allege that Licayan and
Lara were not involved in the crime; and (3) testimonies purporting to establish that Lara was at work
in Antipolo during the kidnapping incident.
While the second trial was meant to give Licayan and Lara the opportunity to present newlydiscovered evidence that were not available during the first trial, the focus of their defense was to
show that the identification made by the victims was unreliable. Licayan was recalled to the witness
stand to testify that in the police line-up, he was identified by Co by pointing at his and Lara's feet.
Licayan emphasizes that Co did not mention any specific identifying mark on their feet, and that he
heard Co say that whenever anybody enters the room in the safehouse, he looks at their feet.

Likewise, when Co was recalled to the witness stand to testify as regards the participation of Delos
Reyes in the crime, the cross-examination concentrated on trying to establish that Co was not
certain about the identity of Licayan and Lara. This Court observes that the defense was not
successful in doing so as borne out by the following portions of the transcript:
ATTY AREZA
Q But the reason why you were pointing to the feet of the accused was to assure yourself about the
footwear they were wearing, that was the reason you were pointing to their feet and not to their
faces?
A I was positive with their faces, sir. The feet I was more assured of their identities when I saw their
feet.
COURT
Q You already identified them through their faces?
A Yes, your honor.
Q You told the investigator?
A Yes, your honor.
Q As a support to their identification you pointed to their feet?
A Can I say something Your Honor. On the second day, there was a time that they would come and
enter the room with their faces covered, but there are times that they would forget to cover their
faces so I was able to identify them, that is the reason why I took an extra effort in remembering their
feet and what they were wearing. Your Honor.
ATTY AREZA:
Q What you are trying to say is that you are 100% sure of their identities and you were more assured
by looking at their feet?
PROSECUTOR GAPUZAN:
Misleading. There was no testimony that the witness ...
COURT
Witness may answer.
A I am sure with their faces. I was able to talk to them face to face, sir. I was more assured when I
saw their feet, sir.
59

Even though Co was able to positively identify Licayan and Lara through their faces, prudence
requires that he at least check on the other details from his captivity to identify his abductors. His
certainty is not negated by his meticulosity.
The defense brings up several instances of supposed inconsistencies in Co's testimony, apparently
to prove that Co's memory was unreliable: (1) that Co was uncertain as to whether or not Licayan
was among the armed men who abducted them; (2) that Co was inconsistent as to who asked for
the keys to his Tamaraw FX, which was used to transport them; (3) that Co inaccurately described in
his affidavit what Mabansag looks like and omitted that he was a double arm amputee; ( 4) that Co
saw a family picture of Lara in the safehouse which might have been the basis of his identification of
Lara; and (5) that Co corrected himself about whether there was light in the room where he and
Manaysay were held captive.
We have, on numerous occasions, held that discrepancies in testimonies concerning minor details
and not actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair their credibility. Instead of
weakening the testimonies, these inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility, because they
discount the possibility of their being rehearsed.
60

While Co may have been uncertain as to whether Licayan was among the armed men who abducted
him and Manaysay, he nevertheless positively identified Licayan as the person with medium built,
fair complexion and thin hairline whom he talked with regarding the ransom, and who fell asleep in
the afternoon of August 11, 1998, allowing them to escape. Manaysay also identified Licayan as
one of the persons she saw upon arriving at the safehouse, as the person who removed the
masking tape from her eyes, and the person guarding them who fell asleep, allowing them to
escape.
61

62

63

64

Co and Manaysay had no reason to lie. We find it hard to believe that Co and Manaysay, the victims
of a heinous crime, would use the picture of Lara at the safehouse and make up the following
statements just to pin an innocent person for an offense he did not commit. Co identified Lara as the
short, tiny black man who guarded them shortly after they arrived at the safehouse and brought the
plastic container for Manaysay, the guard with whom he tried to plead with for their lives but who
told them that he was just following orders, and refused the money that Manaysay managed to keep
to herself during their captivity. Manaysay identified Lara as one of the persons she saw upon
arriving at the safehouse, and as the one who guarded them shortly after they arrived at the
safehouse, who gave her a plastic container, and with whom Co pleaded with to help them escape.
65

66

67

68

It bears to stress that both Co and Manaysay had several opportunities to see the faces of Lara and
Licayan. Co and Manaysay each identified Lara and Licayan in both the police line-up and the trial
proper in open court. In the line-up, they were chosen from a group of 10 persons, the other
members of which have appearances that do not offer any clue that differentiate them from Lara and
Licayan.
1avvphi1

69

As regards Co's allegedly faulty identification of Mabansag in his affidavit, wherein he described
Mabansag as "matangkad at medyo matanda na ang tawag nila ay Putol" it was clear that Co was
merely being asked to describe in general the persons he saw during his captivity: "Doon sa bahay
na sinabi mong pinagdalhan sa inyo mayroon ka bang napansin na ibang tao doon maliban sa
limang tao na tumangay sa inyo?" We examined Mabansag's picture in the records and observe
that even in said picture, Mabansag's allegedly short stature and his being an amputee was not
immediately apparent because of what appears to be a jacket he was wearing. If he was wearing
70

71

72

73

similar clothes at the time Co saw him, it is very possible that he simply did not notice Mabansag's
handicap.
The new evidence alluded to by this Court in its pro hac vice resolution to grant a new trial was
supposed to be the testimonies of the then recently captured Mabansag and Delos Reyes, who both
denied that Licayan and Lara participated in the crime. The statements of Mabansag and Delos
Reyes, however, would have been given more weight had they personally admitted their own
involvement in the crime. As testified by Msgr. Olaguer, witness for the defense, Mabansag stated in
his interview with Gus Abelgas that he (Mabansag) does not know anything about the
kidnapping. We cannot give weight to his denial that Licayan and Lara participated in the crime if
he, himself, claims that he does not know anything about the kidnapping. On the other hand, Delos
Reyes swears that he was merely forced at gunpoint to guard the victims, and was at the scene of
the crime only from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. of August 10, 1998. Delos Reyes claims that Lara was
not in the safehouse, while Licayan just happened to pass by. Co and Manaysay, however, placed
Lara at the scene of the crime in the early morning of August 10, 1998, making the testimony as
regards his absence from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. of same day irrelevant. Licayan, on the other hand,
denies having been in the safehouse on August 10 and 11, 1999, and claims that he was at home in
San Mateo, Rizal. The testimony of Delos Reyes that Licayan passed by the safehouse sometime
from 3 :00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. was therefore even unintentionally inculpating as to Licayan.
74

75

76

77

78

Finally, with respect to Lara's witnesses, namely co-worker Abelardo Ramirez and employer
Florencia Lavarro Salvador, their combined testimonies account for Lara's whereabouts during the
following dates and times:
August 9, 1998 (Sunday)-from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
August 10, 1998 (Monday)-from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
August 11, 1998 (Tuesday)-from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Co and Manaysay, however, testified that Lara was at the scene of the crime during the early
morning of August 10, 1998, which was shortly after they were abducted at 1 :30 a.m. of the same
day. We have repeatedly held that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Ramirez's
house, where he was fetched by Lara at 7:00 a.m. on August 10, 1998 is at Daang Bakal, Bagong
Silang, Parang, Marikina - the very same area where the safehouse was located. It was certainly not
physically impossible for Lara to have been at the scene of the crime at around 2:00 a.m. of August
10, 1998 and still be able to arrive. at Ramirez's house within the same vicinity at 7:00 a.m.
Furthermore, on both August 10 and 11, Ramirez testified that he and Lara parted ways on Kaolin
Street, which was the very same street Co and Manaysay ran to when they escaped from the
safehouse.
79

80

81

82

In sum, the new evidence presented by Licayan and Lara not only failed to prove that either of them
was in another place during their alleged participation in the kidnapping of Co and Manaysay, but
likewise failed to discredit the positive identification made by both Co and Manaysay.
Criminal and Civil Liability for

Delos Reyes, Licayan and Lara

The guilt of Delos Reyes, Licayan and Lara for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, having been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. With the passage, however, of Republic Act No. 9346, the
imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited. The RTC thus correctly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua on Delos Reyes, Licayan and Lara.
Nevertheless, we have to modify the amount of damages to be awarded to conform to recent
jurisprudence. In the similar case of People v. Gambao for Kidnapping for Ransom, the Court set
the minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty if
not for prohibition thereof by Republic Act No. 9346, to wit: (1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no
proof; and (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.
83

Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes are jointly and severally liable for these amounts awarded in favor of
each of the victims. These amounts shall accrue interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the date of the finality of the Court's Resolution until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03797 dated July 4,
2012, which affirmed in toto the disposition of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina in Criminal Case
No. 98-2605-MK and 98-2606-MK dated February 17, 2009, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1) Roderick Licayan, Roberto Lara and Rogelio Delos Reyes are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are also ordered to jointly and severally indemnify
each of the victims in the following amounts:
(a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
(c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages,
(2) All of these amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of the finality of the Court's Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
.R. Nos. 168951 & 169000

July 17, 2013

DR. ROGER R. POSADAS and DR. ROLANDO P. DAYCO, Petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Petitioners assail their conviction for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) under Decision 1 dated June 28, 2005 of the
Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case Nos. 25465-66.
The Facts
Petitioner Dr. Roger R. Posadas (Dr. Posadas), a Ph.D. in Relativity Physics graduate from the
University of Pittsburgh, is a longtime professor and former Dean of the College of Science at the
University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus (UP Diliman). He was appointed by the Board of
Regents (BOR) of the University of the Philippines System as UP Diliman Chancellor for a three-year
term starting November 1, 1993 and ending October 31, 1996.
During his term as Chancellor, Dr. Posadasisone of the leading figures in the emerging interdisciplinary field of technology management in the Philippines. Upon the recommendation of the UP
Diliman Task Force on Science and Technology Assessment, Management and Planning composed
of deans and professors from the various colleges in UP Diliman, the BOR on February 23, 1995
approved the establishment of the Technology Management Center (TMC) under the direct
supervision of the Office of the Chancellor, UP Diliman. When the TMC became operational in June
1995, the Task Force on Science and Technology Assessment, Management and Planning wrote
then UP President Dr. Emil Q. Javier, nominating Dr. Posadas for the position of TMC Director. For
undisclosed reason, Dr. Posadas declined the nomination and instead he (Dr. Posadas) designated
Prof. Jose Tabbada of the College of Public Administration as Acting Director of TMC.
On July 26, 1995, Dr. Posadas submitted to the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA) an Application for Funding of his proposed project entitled "Institutionalization of Technology
Management at the University of the Philippines in Diliman" (TMC Project). The TMC Project, to be
funded by a grant from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), aimed to design
and develop ten new graduate courses in technology management for the diploma, masters and
doctoral programs to be offered by TMC.2
On September 18, 1995, a Memorandum of Agreement3 (MOA) was executed between Dr. Posadas,
on behalf of UP-Diliman, and the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) as the Local
Executing Agency of the Policy, Training and Technical Assistance Facility (PTTAF) of CIDA. Under
the MOA, CIDA shall provide the funding for the total project cost (P5,442,400.00), with the NEDA as
the designated PTTAF Project Implementor for the Government of the Philippines, while UP Diliman
shall direct, manage and implement all activities under the approved project with counterpart funding
in the amount of P4,228,524.00.
In a letter dated July 30, 1995, the President of Hua Qiao University in Fujian Province, China invited
Dr. Posadas and a delegation from UP Dilimanto visit on October 30 to November 6, 1995. On
October 5, 1995, then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing (retired Member
of this Court) issued the Authority to Travel for the UP Diliman delegation headed by Dr. Posadas.
Among those who joined the delegation were Dr. Amaryllis Torres and Dr. Rosario Yu, UP Dilimans
Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs and Vice-Chancellor for Student Affairs, respectively.4 Under
Administrative Order (AO) No. 95-170 dated October 24, 1995, Dr. Posadas designated petitioner
Dr. Rolando P. Dayco (Dr. Dayco), Vice-Chancellor for Administrative Affairs, as Officer-In-Charge
(OIC) of UPDiliman effective October 30, 1995 until November 6, 1995. This was followed by AO No.

95-170-A dated October 27, 1995, which amended the previous order by extendingthe OIC
designation of Dr. Dayco to November 7, 1995.5
On November 7, 1995, Dr. Dayco appointed Dr. Posadas as Project Director of UP TMC effective
September 18, 1995 up to September 17, 1996.In another undated "Contract for Consultancy
Services" signed by Dr. Dayco, Dr. Posadas was hired as Consultant for the TMC Project for the
same period.6 As evidenced by disbursement vouchers and admitted by Dr. Posadas, the latter
received his "honoraria"(P30,000.00 per month) and consultancy fees (totaling P100,000.00) as
Project Director and Consultant of the TMC Project until May 1996 when the Commission on Audit
(COA) raised questions on the legality of the said fees.7
In August 1996, payment of the subject "honoraria" and fees was suspended by COA Resident
Auditor Romeo J. Pulido who noted the following deficiencies:
1. Honoraria were in excess of the rates provided for under the National Compensation
Circular No. 73, dated March 1, 1996, x x x.
2. Legal basis for designating the incumbent Chancellor as Project Director by the Officer-InCharge (OIC), considering that the latter can assume the post only in the absence of the
former. An OIC cannot validly designate since the authority to designate/appoint is among
the functions of the Chancellor which cannot be delegated as provided in the University
Charter. Moreover, the authority to appoint can never be delegated since it involves
discretion.
3. On the assumption that the designation of the Chancellor as Project Director and
Consultant is valid, collecting the remuneration for both positions amount to double
compensation which is contrary to existing auditing rules and regulations. 8
In a Memorandum9 dated September 16, 1996, UPs Chief Legal Officer Marichu C. Lambino
addressed the foregoing concerns of COA Auditor Pulido.Atty. Lambino stated that (a) the
compensation received by Dr. Posadas are in the nature of consultancy fees and hence expressly
exempted by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) National Compensation Circular (NCC)
No. 75 dated March 11, 1995; (b) the TMC Project, being a training program, is likewise exempted
from the coverage of NEDA Guidelines on the Procurement of Consulting Services for Government
Projects; and (c) under Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 43, series
of 1993 "Streamlining and Deregulating Human Resource Development Functions" UP is authorized,
without prior approval from the CSC, to determine the rates of honorarium for government personnel
participating as resource persons, coordinator, and facilitator, in training programs. On the issue of
double compensation, Atty. Lambino pointed out that Dr. Posadas was appointed Project Director
because of managerial expertise, and his skills in supervising personnel who are involved in an
academic undertaking, and as Consultant because of his expertise in technology management.
Finding these explanations/justifications acceptable, Auditor Pulido lifted the notices of suspension in
September 1997.
However, even before the issuance of the suspension notices, then UP President Dr. Emil Q. Javier,
ordered an investigation on the basis of an administrative complaint filed by Mrs. Ofelia L. Del
Mundo, a staff of the University Library who was detailed at the TMC as its Administrative Officer. On
July 24, 1996, President Javier created a Fact-Finding Committee to gather, review and evaluate
pertinent documents regarding certain transactions of the TMC. 10 After the conduct of a preliminary

investigation and finding a prima facie case against the petitioners, President Javier issued the
formal charges11 for Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority. Pursuant to the Universitys "Rules
and Regulations on the Discipline of Faculty Members and Employees approved at the 704th
Meeting of the Board of Regents on January 11, 1963," 12 an Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal
(ADT) was constituted, chaired by Atty. Arturo E. Balbastro, a faculty member of the UP College of
Law.
On August 21, 1998, the ADT submitted its Report13 (ADT Case 96-001) to President Javier. The
ADT found petitioners guilty of serious or grave misconduct and recommended the penalty of
dismissal in accordance with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1989, as well as Article
250 of the University Code. The Report likewise stated that the acts of petitioners for which they
were held administratively liable may warrant prosecution under Section 3(h) and (i) of R.A. No.
3019. Under the Order14 dated August 25, 1998 signed by President Javier, petitioners were
dismissed from the service.
On September 3, 1998, Atty. Carmelita Yadao-Guno in her capacity as General Counsel of UP
formally endorsed the findings and recommendations of the ADT to the Ombudsman. 15 The case was
docketed as OMB-0-98-1843.
Meanwhile, the BOR at its 1126th meeting on November 26, 1998, resolved petitioners appeal in
ADT Case 96-001, as follows:
1. The Board affirmed the ADT decision finding the respondents guilty of grave misconduct
and imposed on them the penalty of forced resignation with the accessory penalties defined
in the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order 292 and other Pertinent Civil
Service Laws i.e., cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement
benefits, and disqualification from government service for one year.
2. If after one year they should reapply to the University, they must render an apology to the
University and their reappointments will be subject to Board approval.
3. The respondents are permanently disqualified from holding any administrative position in
the University.
4. The decision takes effect immediately.16
Satisfied with the BORs action, petitioners caused the withdrawal of their appeal before the CSC. 17
On June 9, 1999, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of Ombudsman
recommended the dismissal of the charges against petitioners for insufficiency of evidence.
However, said recommendation was disapproved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto who
ordered that petitioners be indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 7(b) in
relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713.18
The corresponding Informations19 were thus filed against the petitioners before the Sandiganbayan
(Criminal Case Nos. 25465-66), as follow:
Criminal Case No. 25465

That on or about 7 November 1995, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, both highranking public officers, ROGER DELA ROSA POSADAS, being then the Chancellor and a faculty
member of the University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus, and ROLANDO PASCUAL DAYCO,
being then the Vice-Chancellor of the said university and Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the
Chancellor, committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking
advantage of their official and administrative functions, and conspiring and confederating with and
mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted
benefits, privilege or advantage to accused POSADAS, when accused DAYCO appointed or
designated accused POSADAS as a Project Director of the lone project, Institutionalization of the
Management of Technology at U.P. Diliman, of the Technology Management Center (TMC) of the
Office of the Chancellor, U.P. Diliman, which enabled or caused the disbursement and payment of
monthly salary of P30,000.00 of accused POSADAS, duly received by the latter, for the period 18
September 1995 to 17 September 1996, with accused POSADAS also receiving his salaries as
Chancellor and faculty member of U.P. Diliman during this period, and both accused knowing fully
well that the appointment of accused POSADAS was beyond the power or authority of accused
DAYCO as an OIC and likewise violative of the law, rules and regulations against multiple positions,
double compensation and retroactivity of appointment, thereby causing undue injury to the
Government in the amount of PESOS: THREE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND (P360,000.00), to
the damage and prejudice of the Government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 25466
That on or about 7 November 1995, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, both highranking public officers, ROGER DELA ROSA POSADAS, being then the Chancellor and a faculty
member of the University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus, and ROLANDO PASCUAL DAYCO,
being then the ViceChancellor of the said university and Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the
Chancellor, committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking
advantage of their official and administrative functions, and conspiring and confederating with and
mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally engage in the
unauthorized private practice of accused POSADASs profession as a technology manager, when
accused DAYCO appointed or designated accused POSADAS as a consultant to the project,
Institutionalization of the Management of Technology at U.P. Diliman, of the Technology
Management Center (TMC) of the Office of the Chancellor, U.P. Diliman, which enabled or caused
the disbursement and payment of consultancy fees in the amount of P100,000.00 to accused
POSADAS, duly received by the latter, with respondent POSADAS also receiving his salaries as
Chancellor and faculty member of U.P. Diliman, and both accused knowing fully well that the
appointment to and acceptance of the position of consultant by respondent POSADAS was without
authority from the latters superior(s) or the U.P. Board of Regents, to the damage and prejudice of
the Government service.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas were duly arraigned on June 15, 2000 and May 28, 2001, respectively,
both pleading not guilty to the charges against them.20

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

After due proceedings, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision21 dated June 28, 2005, the decretal
portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds both accused Roger R. Posadas and Rolando P. Dayco GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and Section 7(b) of RA 6713 and are
sentenced to suffer the following penalties:
For violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019: accused Posadas and Dayco are sentenced to suffer in
prison the indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years and one day as minimum and twelve (12) years as
maximum, with the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office. Both accused
are directed to jointly and severally indemnify the Government of the Republic of the Philippines the
amount of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P336,000.00).
For violation of Section 7(b) of RA 6713: accused Posadas and Dayco are sentenced to suffer in
prison the maximum penalty of five (5) years and disqualification to hold public office.
SO ORDERED.22
The Sandiganbayan held that the evidence supports a finding of evident bad faith on the part of
petitioners who, knowing very well the limitations of Dr. Daycos power as OIC, effected the
appointment of Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director and Consultant. These limitations are
based on the nature of the power to appoint which is merely delegated to the Chancellor by the
BOR, Section 204 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual, and CSC MC No. 38, s.
1993 on non-retroactivity of appointments.
The Sandiganbayan concluded that petitioners acts caused undue injury to the Government with the
receipt by Dr. Posadas of salaries and consultancy fees. Petitioners contention that the Government
did not suffer loss or damage since the funding for the TMC Project came from CIDA was rejected by
the Sandiganbayan which stated that from the moment UP received the CIDA funds intended for the
TMC Project, said funds became "impressed with public attributes or character," as in fact it was
subjected to the control of UP and audited by the COA.
The Sandiganbayan likewise found no merit in petitioners claim that they were just victims of
"university politics"as they were staunch critics of President Javier. Petitioners adduced documentary
and testimonial evidence to show that Ms. Del Mundos filing of a complaint against petitioners was
triggered by the fact that it was Dr. Posadas who ordered an administrative investigation against her
and recalled her to the University Library, which incident led to the resignation of Prof. Tabbada from
TMC. However, the Sandiganbayan stressed that regardless of the reason for the filing of the cases
against petitioners at the university level, these cases would not have come into being if no law has
been violated in the first place.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied due course for the reason that it has
not been set for hearing as required by the rules, hence the motion ispro forma.

In this petition for certiorari, petitioners allege grave abuse of discretion and blatant violation of their
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
The Issues
The Court is asked to resolve whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction: (1) in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration
on the ground that it was not set for hearing; and (2) in convicting petitioners of Violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 6713 on the basis of facts not supported by
evidence and on inapplicable rules and principles.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners argue that the July 19, 2005 Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration is not
only baseless, but capricious, arbitrary and most unjust because the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan does not require that the motion for reconsideration be set for hearing. They cite the
case of Alvarez v. Sandiganbayan23where this Court ruled that motions for reconsideration of
decisions or final orders of the Sandiganbayan are not governed by Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, as
these may be filed within 15 days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or final order "upon
the grounds, in the form and subject to the requirements, for motions for new trial in criminal cases
under Rule 121 of the Rules of Court."
On the charges of graft, petitioners assert that they did not act with bad faith, manifest partiality or
gross inexcusable negligence. They reiterate that Dr. Daycos designation as OIC Chancellor was
adjusted for one day merely to accommodate the change in the official travel schedule of Dr.
Posadas to China. The appointment of Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director and Consultant was a
valid appointment and was made retroactive for no other reason than to synchronize the activities
relative to the TMC Project with the project schedule as approved by the funding agency. The power
of appointment was within the power of the Chancellor to delegate to the OIC Chancellor, it not being
expressly prohibited by the University rules. Such practice, in fact, is not an unusual occurrence in
UP.
Petitioners also contend that no injury was caused to the government because the TMC Project
budget came from foreign funds, hence not an expense incurred by the Government and neither did
UP incur any expense in relation to the said project, its counterpart funding was not in the form of
money. Consequently, there can be no conviction under the law in the absence of real or actual
damage suffered.
On the "honoraria" and fees received by Dr. Posadas as Project Director and Consultant, petitioners
insist they cannot be held liable for double compensation because these were given for separate
services rendered by Dr. Posadas. As opined by the UP Chief Legal Officer, the compensation were
in the nature of consultancy fees being received by UP personnel in their capacity as private persons
for services to a project outside of their official time, hence it is not covered by the DBM NCC No. 75.
Moreover, petitioners stress that Dr. Posadas did not receive any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference in his appointment as TMC Project Director and Consultant. Dr. Posadas possesses the
superior qualifications and expertise in the field of technology management necessary to ensure that
the project was a success. In fact, his colleagues were expecting him to head the TMC Project and
did not oppose his appointment.

As to the charge of unauthorized outside employment, petitioners point out that the University rules
do not require clearance from the UP President to engage in consultancy work and the same rules
do not prohibit him from performing consultancy work for a project such as TMC.
Therefore, Dr. Posadas appointment as TMC Project Director and Consultant were not prohibited
outside employment.
Petitioners reiterate their "university politics" defense, claiming that President Javier at the time
chose to champion Del Mundos complaint motivated by vengeance and spite against two of his
staunch critics. Thus, despite knowledge of the opinion of the UP Chief Legal Officer clearing
petitioners of any wrongdoing, President Javier underhandedly caused the filing of administrative
charges in the ADT.
Petitioners further submit that the complainant before the Ombudsman, Atty. Carmelita Yadao, was
incompetent as she had no personal knowledge of the contents thereof, which were merely narrated
or reported to her in her capacity as General Counsel of UP at that time. The letter-complaint should
not have been given due course as it was based on pure hearsay and its main proponent suffered
from conflicting interests because she had earlier endorsed the MOA which included the
compensation package for TMC Project Director and Consultant.
Finally, petitioners deny having acted in conspiracy as there was no evidence to prove it. The only
assumed fact considered by the Sandiganbayan is based on its erroneous hypothesis the alleged
act of "extending" the period of OIC Chancellor for one day to accommodate Dr. Posadas. Dr. Dayco
did not even gain anything from his designation of Dr. Posadas. Thus, in the absence of clear and
convincing proof, petitioners cannot be held liable as conspirators.
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Notice of Hearing in Motions
For Reconsideration Is Mandatory
Contrary to petitioners stance, the 2002 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan requires a
motion for reconsideration to be set for hearing, as it provides under Rule VII:
SECTION 1. Motion Day. - Except for motions which may be acted upon ex parte, all motions shall
be scheduled for hearings on a Friday, or if that day is a non-working holiday, on the next working
day.
Motions requiring immediate action may be acted upon on shorter notice.
In appealed cases, the provisions of Sec. 3, Rule 49 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, on Motions shall apply. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the Rules of Sandiganbayan, effective January 10, 1979, a petition for reconsideration of a
judgment or final order may be filed upon the grounds, in the form and subject to the requirements,

for motions for new trial in criminal cases under Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. 24 In the case of
Alvarezv. Sandiganbayan25 decided in 1991, the Court upheld the Sandiganbayan in not considering
"the failure of the movant to fix the place, date and time of the hearing of his motion a substantial
defect, for instead of giving the motion a short shrift, it set the incident for hearing, and even granted
the prosecution ten days from notice within which to oppose/comment." The Court noted what was
then the practice of the Sandigabayan itself, rather than the movant, to determine the date and time
of hearings of motions. The peculiar circumstances of said case heavily weighed in favor of
relaxation of the rules, with the Courts finding that the evidence presented against the petitioner
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and may not be deemed sufficient to support a conviction.
Hence, the Court was not prepared "to declare that petitioners omission to set his motion for hearing
is so grievous an error as to foreclose the award to him of the relief to which he is otherwise
entitled."
In any event, the mandatory setting for hearing a motion for reconsideration to reverse or modify a
judgment or final order of the Sandiganbayan is already settled. This Court categorically ruled in the
recent case of Flores v. People26
Flores filed a motion for the reconsideration. As the motion did Not contain any notice of hearing, the
Prosecution filed its Motion to Expunge from the Records Accuseds Motion for Reconsideration."
In its Resolution, dated November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for being a mere
scrap of paper as it did not contain a notice of hearing and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration of accused Flores is
considered pro forma which did not toll the running of the period to appeal, and thus, the assailed
judgment of this Court has become FINAL and EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
xxxx
Flores claims that the outright denial of his motion for Reconsideration by the Sandiganbayan on a
mere technicality amounts to a violation of his right to due process. The dismissal rendered final and
executory the assailed decision which was replete with baseless conjectures and conclusions that
were contrary to the evidence on record. He points out that a relaxation of procedural rules is
justified by the merits of this case as the facts, viewed from the proper and objective perspective,
indubitably demonstrate self-defense on his part.
Flores argues that he fully complied with the requirements of Section2 of Rule 37 and Section 4 of
Rule 121 of the Rules of Court when the motion itself was served upon the prosecution and the
latter, in fact, admitted receiving a copy. For Flores, such judicial admission amounts to giving due
notice of the motion which is the intent behind the said rules. He further argues that a hearing on a
motion for reconsideration is not necessary as no further proceeding, such as a hearing, is required
under Section 3 of Rule 121.
Flores argument fails to persuade this Court.
Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads:

SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned,
and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after
the filing of the motion.
Section 2, Rule 37 provides:
SEC. 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof. The motion shall be
made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefore, a written notice of which shall be served by
the movant on the adverse party.
xxxx
A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of appeal.
Section 4, Rule 121 states:
SEC. 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. The motion for a new trial or reconsideration
shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. x x x. Notice of the motion for
new trial or reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor.
As correctly stated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Sec.2 of Rule 37 and Sec. 4 of
Rule 121 should be read in conjunction with Sec.5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Basic is the rule
that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant except for those motions which the court
may act upon without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party. The notice of hearing must be
addressed to all parties and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service.
This Court has indeed held, time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court, the requirement is mandatory. Failure to comply with the requirement renders the motion
defective. "As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not
affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading."
In this case, as Flores committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of hearing, his
motion was a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect whatsoever. Thus, his motion was
properly dismissed by the Sandiganbayan.27 (Emphasis supplied.)
We thus find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Sandiganbayan when it denied due
course to petitioners motion for reconsideration on the ground that it "has not been set for hearing
as required by the rules" and the same is "deemed pro forma."
Violation of Section 3(e)of R.A. No. 3019
The essential elements of the crime defined in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, are:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence;
and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.28
There is no question regarding the presence of the first requisite considering that at the time the
subject appointments were made, both petitioners were faculty members and holding administrative
positions in UP Diliman. What petitioners dispute is the existence of the second and third requisites.
In Criminal Case No. 25465, the information charged that petitioners willfully, unlawfully and
criminally gave unwarranted benefits to Dr. Posadas in appointing him as TMC Project Director, in
violation of the prohibition against multiple positions and the rule on non-retroactivity of
appointments, thereby causing undue injury to the Government.
In Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan,29 this Court explained that there are two (2) ways by which a public
official violates Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (a) by
causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. The accused may be charged under either mode or
under both. Moreover, in Quibal v. Sandiganbayan,30 the Court held that the use of the disjunctive
term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. 31 Here,
petitioners were charged with committing the offense under both modes.
Upon the entire evidence on record, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that petitioners were guilty
of causing undue injury to the Government. In Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 32 this Court said that to
hold a person liable for causing undue injury under Section 3(e), the concurrence of the following
elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution:
(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former;
(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her
official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;
(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private
party; and
(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
We sustain the decision of the Sandiganbayan holding petitioners liable for causing undue injury to
the Government in appointing Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director with evident bad faith.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive
or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. 33 It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or some motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. 34 Evident

bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause
damage.35
In Pecho v. Sandiganbayan,36 the Court en banc defined injury as "any wrong or damage done to
another, either in his person, or in his rights, reputation or property; the invasion of any legally
protected interests of another." It must be more than necessary or are excessive, improper or illegal.
It is required that the undue injury caused by the positive or passive acts of the accused be
quantifiable and demonstrable and proven to the point of moral certainty.37 "Undue" means illegal,
immoral, unlawful, void of equity and moderations.38
In this case, that petitioners acted in evident bad faith was duly established by the evidence. We
recall that the MOA was executed on September 18, 1995 and became effective upon the signature
of the parties.39 Between that date and the China trip scheduled in the first week of November (the
invitation was dated July 30, 1995), Dr. Posadas could have already appointed the Project Director
and Consultant as indeed the retroactive appointment was even justified by them because
supposedly "project activities" have already started by September 18, 1995. And yet, he waited until
the China trip so that in his absence the designated OIC Chancellor, Dr. Dayco, would be the one to
issue the appointment. Apparently, Dr. Posadas appointment by Dr. Dayco in an OIC capacity was
pre-conceived. Prof. Jose Tabbada testified that when he was summoned by Dr. Posadas to his
office, the latter asked him how he (Posadas) could be appointed TMC Project Director. He then
suggested that Dr. Dayco as OIC Chancellor can appoint him to the position and even drafted the
memo for this purpose. He admitted that he gave such advice with some reservations but it turned
out to have been pursued by petitioners.40
However, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the delegated authority of the OIC Chancellor has limitations
and did not include the power to appoint.
Section 204 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (Volume I on Government Auditing
Rules and Regulations) provides:
Sec. 204. Appointment issued by an officer-in-charge. -- A person designated in an acting capacity
may be differentiated from one who is designated merely as an Officer-in-Charge (OIC). In the latter
case, the OIC enjoys limited powers which, are confined to functions of administration and ensuring
that the office continues its usual activities. The OIC may not be deemed to possess the power to
appoint employees as the same involves the exercise of discretion which is beyond the power of an
OIC (CSC Res. 1692, Oct. 20, 1978).
To prove the alleged practice in the University of an OIC appointing a Chancellor to a certain
position, petitioners presented copies of temporary appointment papers issued by OIC Chancellor
Paz G. Ramos to former Chancellor Ernesto G. Tabujara who was appointed Consultant-In-Charge
of the Campus Planning, Development and Maintenance Office, UP Diliman with P2,000.00 monthly
honorarium effective January 1, 1986 to December 31, 1986. It must be noted, however, that the
said appointment was made by the OIC "by authority of the Board of Regents" and these were
actually approved and signed by then Secretary of the University, Prof. Martin V. Gregorio, while the
renewal appointment was approved by Secretary of the University Prof. Emerlinda R. Roman. Both
Gregorio and Roman signed the Notification of Approval of Temporary Appointment. 41
Petitioners nonetheless argue that the appointments made by Dr. Dayco were valid on the basis of
Section 9(a) of the Resolution of the BOR reorganizing UP into the UP System adopted at its 828th

meeting on December 21, 1972, as amended at its 863rd meeting on July 31, 1975. Under said
resolution, the BOR authorized the Chancellor of an autonomous university of the UP System to
delegate his functions and responsibilities which have been assigned or delegated to him by the
BOR, unless instructed otherwise by the BOR. It also enumerated those functions that may not be
delegated, among which is:
B. Functions That May Not Be Delegated
xxxx
f. Authority to approve the following appointments
(1) those covered in II, C, 1, and e of the Presidents Memorandum Circular No. 30 dated
August 28, 1975; and
(2) those covered in II, C, 4, a through c of the aforecited memorandum circular of the
President;
x x x x42
MC No. 30 dated August 28, 1975 issued by former UP President Onofre D. Corpuz provided for
"Operating Guidelines on Appointments and Related Personnel Transactions in the University
System," which specifically delineated the authority to appoint of university officials.
The pertinent provisions of said MCNo. 30 read:
C. Delegated Authority of the Chancellor to Appoint
1. The Chancellor of an autonomous University approves appointments to the following positions:
a. directors or heads and assistant directors or assistant heads of units supervised by or
attached to principal units, except those whose starting salaries are equal to or higher than
that of associate professor;
b. program or project directors;
xxxx
5. The Chancellor approves the appointment of personnel, regardless of rank or salary range,
incidental to employment in research projects, study and training programs and other programs or
projects undertaken in collaboration with, or with the support of, public or private institutions or
persons.
TYPES OF APPOINTMENT/PERSONNEL ACTION COVERED:
Appointment as used in II, C, 5 above includes all types of appointment and personnel action
pertaining to appointment, except transfer to permanency of faculty members. (Emphasis supplied.)

According to petitioners, since appointments falling under II, C, 5 was not specifically mentioned in
the enumeration of those functions of the Chancellor that may not be delegated, it follows that such
appointments may be validly delegated, as in this case, the appointments issued by OIC Chancellor
Dayco to Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director and Consultant. Moreover, it is argued that in the
BOR Resolution itself, the designated OIC Chancellor was granted full powers:
E. Extent of Authority of One Appointed in an Acting/Officer-in-Charge Capacity
One appointed/designated, in an acting or officer-in-charge capacity, to the office of chancellor shall
discharge all the functions of the position unless instructed otherwise by the regular incumbent, and
in any case, subject to the latters instructions, to the policies of the Board of Regents and to the
provisions of D herein above and of F herein below; provided, that "all the functions of the position"
as used in and for purposes of this resolution shall be construed as inclusive of all the functions
assigned to the position by competent University authority and all such functions as usually pertain,
or are "inherent," to the position although not expressly assigned thereto by competent University
authority.
Petitioners argument fails to persuade.
It must be emphasized that the subject appointments involve not an ordinary personnel or faculty
member but the Chancellor himself who was also vested with administrative supervision over the
institution implementing the TMC Project, TMC. Note that while II, C, 5 in MC No. 30 speaks of
"personnel, regardless of rank or salary range, incidental to employment," the same could not
possibly refer to the Chancellor himself. This is evident from the exception provided in II, B, 1 where
it is the President himself who approves the appointment, viz:
B. Delegated Authority of the President to Appoint
1. The President approves the appointment of officers and employees (including faculty members if
there are any) who are not included in or covered by the enumerations in II, A above and of those
who are covered in II, C, 5 below who are:
a. in or directly under the Office of the President; or
b. in University-wide units; or
c. in other offices or units, academic or non-academic, that are not part of any autonomous
University;
to the same extent and under the same conditions stipulated in II, C below for the delegated
authority of the Chancellor of an autonomous University to appoint.
TYPES OF APPOINTMENT/PERSONNELACTION COVERED:
Appointment as used in II, B, 1 above includes all types of appointment and personnel action
pertaining to appointment, except transfer to permanency of faculty members. (Emphasis supplied.)

Considering that it is the Chancellor himself who is being appointed to a project covered in II, C, 5,
the BOR resolution on the authority of the Chancellor to delegate his functions may not be invoked
because the situation is covered by II, B, 1, the Chancellor being directly under the administrative
supervision of the UP President as the Chief Executive Officer of the University. The Chancellor, on
the other hand, is the executive officer and the head of the faculty of the Constituent University, who
likewise performs other functions that the BOR or the President may delegate to her/him. This is
clearly indicated in the organizational structure of the UP Diliman, sourced from the Faculty Manual
of the University of the Philippines Diliman43:

Thus, even granting that the subject appointments in UP Diliman, an autonomous educational
institution, are not covered by Section 204 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual, they
are still invalid and illegal, because the delegated authority to appoint in this case, involving as it
does the Chancellor himself, pertains to the President of the University. Indeed, the Chancellor
cannot exercise the delegated authority to appoint in the situations covered by II, C, 5 when he
himself is the appointee. The designated OIC likewise had no authority to make the appointment.
As to the prohibition on government officials and employees, whether elected or appointed, from
holding any other office or position in the government, this is contained in Section 7, Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
xxxx
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency or

instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

(Emphasis supplied.)
The prohibition on dual employment and double compensation in the government service is further
specified under Sections 1 and 2, Rule XVIII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No.
292,44 as follows:
Sec. 1. No appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters or their subsidiaries, unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position.
Sec. 2. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or
indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, xxx.
Under Section 2(d), Rule III of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel
Actions,45appointments of personnel under Foreign-assisted projects shall be issued and approved
as coterminous with the project. The MOA itself provides that the "services of the contractual
personnel of the University for the Project shall be discontinued upon its completion or termination."
The appointment of Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director falls within the prohibition against holding
of multiple positions since there is no distinction in Section 7, Article IX-B as to the employment
status, i.e., whether permanent, temporary or coterminous. Petitioners failed to cite any law to justify
Dr. Posadas holding of concurrent positions as Chancellor and TMC Project Director.
Another legal infirmity in the appointment of Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director is the fact that it
was made retroactive, in violation of CSC MC No. 38, Series of 1993, the Omnibus Guidelines on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions. Section II, 5 B (7) thereof reads:
7. Effectivity of Appointment
a. The effectivity of an appointment shall be the date of actual assumption by the appointee
but not earlier than the date of issuance of the appointment, which is the date of signing by
the appointing authority.
b. No appointment shall be made effective earlier than the date of issuance, except in the
case of change of status in view of qualifying in written examination, the effectivity of which is
the date of release of the result of the examination. However, the issuance of such
appointments shall be within the period of the temporary appointment or provided the
temporary appointment has not yet expired.
xxxx
Petitioners assert that appointment as TMC Project Director is not covered by the above rule
because it is in the nature of consultancy which is no longer required to be submitted to the CSC.
A perusal of the duties and responsibilities of the TMC Project Director reveals that the latter is
tasked to perform the following:

 Provide overall direction to the Project;

Exercise supervision over Project personnel, including the visiting experts;
Approve the recruitment of personnel, disbursement of Project funds, and changes in the
Project activities and schedule;
Coordinate with other persons, agencies and institutions involved in technology
management;
Perform such other functions as may be necessary to ensure the efficient, orderly and
effective management and timely completion of the Project.46
The foregoing duties and responsibilities are not susceptible of partial performance or division into
parts as would justify its classification into lump sum work. Neither are these advisory in nature as
would make it fall under the scope of a consultancy service. 47 The status of Dr. Posadas
employment as TMC Project Director is a coterminous one. Under civil service rules, appointments
of personnel under foreign-assisted projects shall be issued and approved as coterminous with the
project,48 that is, they are considered employees for the duration of the project, in which case, the
name of the project and its completion date shall be indicated in the appointment. 49This status of
employment is to be distinguished from contract of services which covers lump sum work or services
such as janitorial, security or consultancy services, whose appointments need not be submitted to
the CSC for approval.
We also find no merit in petitioners argument that the element of injury caused to the Government is
lacking since the budget for TMC Project came from a foreign source and hence no public funds are
involved. Under the MOA, UP shall be "principally accountable for the project funds" which shall be
released to and properly managed by it to ensure the attainment of the Projects objectives. Clearly,
these funds are in the nature of "trust fund" which is defined by Presidential Decree No. 1445 as
"fund that officially comes in the possession of an agency of the government or of a public officer as
trustee, agent or administrator, or that is received for the fulfillment of some obligation. 50 A trust fund
may be utilized only for the "specific purpose for which the trust was created or the funds
received."51 The Sandiganbayan thus correctly held that the funds received for the TMC Project were
impressed with public attributes or character from the time it came into UPs possession.
The disbursement and payment of the P30,000.00 monthly salary as TMC Project Director to Dr.
Posadas was improper, in view of his invalid appointment. Said amount represents the actual injury
to the Government. The third requisite of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, therefore, was sufficiently
established by the prosecution.
Violation of Section 7(b),R.A. No. 6713
In Criminal Case No. 25466, the charge involves the private practice of profession prohibited under
Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, by appointing Dr. Posadas as Consultant of the TMC Project. Said
provision reads:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute

prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:
xxxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or
xxxx
Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 93-1881 dated May 25, 1993, a contract for consultancy services is
not covered by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations because the said position is not found in the
index of position titles approved by DBM. Accordingly, it does not need the approval of the
CSC.52 CSC MC No. 38, series of 1993 expressly provides that consultancy services are not
considered government service for retirement purposes. A "consultant" is defined as one who
provides professional advice on matters within the field of his special knowledge or training. There is
no employer-employee relationship in the engagement of a consultant but that of client-professional
relationship.53
Consultancy is deemed private practice of profession. Under CSC Resolution 021264 54 dated
September 27, 2002, accepting a consultancy job under a part-time status is subject to the following
conditions:
1. It must not violate the rule against holding multiple positions
2. The employee/officer must obtain permission or authority from his/her head of agency as
the same constitutes private practice of profession;
3. The consultancy job must not conflict or tend to conflict with his/her official functions; and
4. It must not affect the effective performance of his/her duty.
In convicting petitioners, the Sandiganbayan cited Article 250 of the University Code, which provides:
Art. 250. No member of the academic staff, officer or employee of the University shall, without
permission from the President or the Chancellor, as the case may be, practice any profession or
manage personally any private enterprise which in any way may be affected by the functions of his
office, nor shall he be directly financially interested in any contract with the University unless
permitted by the Board. Violation of this provision shall be punishable by reprimand, suspension, or
dismissal from the service. (Emphasis supplied.)

Since Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco entered into the contract for consultancy services for the TMC
Project without prior permission from the University President, the Sandiganbayan ruled that they
violated Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 6713.
Petitioners contend that the section of the University Code cited by the Sandiganbayan had already
been superseded by the guidelines on outside activities promulgated by the BOR at its 1031st
Meeting on June 28, 1990. Thus, in the Faculty Manual of the University of the Philippines Diliman
while the consultancy at TMC Project falls under the coverage of "outside activities," prior
authorization by the University President is no longer required. The pertinent provisions of the
manual read:
10.3 Guidelines on Outside Activities [1031st BOR meeting, June 28, 1990]
10.3.1 Coverage
Outside activities of University personnel shall include: limited practice of profession, management of
private enterprises, outside consultancy, secondment, teaching in other educational or training
institutions with which the University has a Memorandum of Agreement, as well as research and
other activities or projects under the auspices of outside agencies which are not considered integral
functions of the University. Such activities shall not be considered part of the regular workload of the
personnel concerned.
10.3.2 Prior Authorization
No member of the University personnel shall engage in outside activities without prior authorization
from the Chancellor, upon endorsement by the Dean, Director, or head of office concerned, subject
to the exigencies of the service.
xxxx
10.3.5 Penalties
Violation of any of the rules on outside activities shall be ground for disciplinary action. The
immediate superior of the faculty/staff member shall immediately submit a report on any violation of
the rules to the Office of the Chancellor, through channels.
Disciplinary action on any faculty/staff member may be imposed, but only in accordance with the law,
and after due process.
10.3.6 Types
xxxx
c. Limited/private practice of profession
Permission to engage in private practice of the profession of faculty members may be granted only if
such private practice may enhance their usefulness to the University or improve their efficiency. [Art.
252]

The privilege of private practice, when granted, shall be for a definite period of one (1) year,
renewable at the discretion of the Chancellor for one-year periods, and under such conditions as
may be prescribed by him/her regarding the nature of the work, the time of performance, and other
circumstances. [Art. 253; amended at BOR meetings: 839th , Nov. 29, 1973; 1031st, June 28, 1990]
The limited practice of ones profession shall be governed by the following guidelines:
1) No member of the academic staff, officer or employee of the University shall, without prior
permission from the Chancellor, practice any profession or manage personally any private
enterprise which in any way may be affected by the functions of her/his office; nor shall s/he
be directly financially interested in any contract with the University unless permitted by the
Board.
Violation of this provision shall be punishable by reprimand, suspension, or dismissal from
the service. [Art. 250; amended at 1031st BOR meeting, June 28, 1990]
2) Permission to engage in private practice of profession may granted provided that such
practice:
is NOT ADVERSE to the interests of the University;
shall NOT be conducted on official time;
will improve the persons efficiency and usefulness to the University; and
shall be subject to such other requirements as may be imposed by law or
University rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the supposed amendment of the rule on limited practice of profession as contained
in Article 250 of the University Code, we sustain the Sandiganbayan in holding that petitioners
should have obtained prior permission from the University President for the contract for consultancy
services in the TMC Project. As with our conclusion on the issue of authority to appoint the TMC
Project Director, considering that it is the Chancellor himself who was engaged as TMC Project
Consultant, the contract for consultancy services of Dr. Posadas should have been authorized by the
University President as the chief executive officer of the UP System. To hold otherwise is to leave
the matter of determining the criteria or conditions for allowing the private practice of profession
provided in the University rules entirely to Dr. Posadas himself as then UP Diliman Chancellor.
Consistent with the Civil Service rules that prior authorization by the head of the agency or institution
must be sought by the government officer or employee who desires to accept a consultancy job, it is
no less than the University President who should have given permission to Dr. Posadas, the latter
being directly under his administrative supervision.
Upon the established facts and applicable law and jurisprudence, we hold that no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the Sandiganbayan in convicting petitioners for violation of Section 7(b)
of R.A. No. 6713.
Conspiracy

A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a

common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony
and actually pursue it.55 For the accused to be held as conspirators, it is not necessary to show that
two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an
unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out." Therefore, if it is
proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, then a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert
means is proved.56
The Sandiganbayans finding of conspiracy rests on firm factual support. Although Dr. Dayco tried to
downplay his participation, stating that he did not benefit from the subject appointments and that
there were many other appointment papers he had signed in the absence of Dr. Posadas, it is clear
as daylight that he had a principal and indispensable role in effecting the said appointments. To
stress the point, the Sandiganbayan quoted the relevant portions of the Report submitted by the
ADT, as follows:
It would be the height of naivet to assume that before making the two (2) appointments of
respondent Posadas as Director of the TMC Project and as Consultant to the TMC, respondent
Dayco did not, in any manner, confer with respondent Posadas about the matter. To believe the
claim of respondent Posadas that he just saw his appointment papers at his desk when he came
back from his trip is to tax human credulity too much.
Under the said circumstances, the natural course of events necessarily points to connivance
between respondent Posadas and respondent Dayco in the making of the questioned appointments.
Despite the claim of respondent Posadas that he just saw the appointment papers on his desk when
he returned from his trip, the admitted fact is that respondent Dayco made those appointments for
respondent Posadas and the latter acted upon the same favourably as he (respondent Posadas)
collected the compensation therein (Exhibits :E" and "E-1"). In fact, as Chancellor, respondent
Posadas approved his own Disbursement Voucher for payment from the coffers of the University,
covering his honoraria and consultancy fees as Project Director for the TMC Project and as
consultant to the TMC, respectively (Exhibit "E-2").57
Penalty
Any person guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is punishable with imprisonment for not
less than six (6) years and one (1) month nor more than fifteen (15) years and perpetual
disqualification from public office.58Thus, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan which is an
indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years and one day as minimum and twelve (12) years as
maximum, with the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office, is in accord with
law. Petitioners shall also indemnify the Government of the Republic of the Philippines the amount of
THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P336,000.00) representing the
compensation/salaries paid to Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director.
As to the offense defined in Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 6713, Section 11 of said law provides that
violations of Section 7 shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine
not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court,

disqualification to hold public office. The Sandiganbayan imposed the maximum penalty of five (5)
years imprisonment and disqualification to hold public office.
The Court is aware of the sentiments of the succeeding BOR who agonized while deliberating
whether to readmit petitioners into the faculty of UP Diliman, with majority of the Regents lamenting
the loss of two of its distinguished intellectuals and scientists who had served the University for so
long despite the meager compensation UP has to offer compared to private educational
institutions.59 The BOR eventually allowed them to teach part-time in the TMC even waiving the
conditions the previous BOR had imposed -- a move perceived to be a first step in the healing
process for the academic community that was "torn into pieces" by the issue.
However, this Court's mandate is to uphold the Constitution and the laws. Our Constitution stresses
that a public office is a public trust and public officers must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.60 These constitutionally enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are
not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as working standards by
all in the public service.61
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated June 28, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Cases Nos. 25465-66 is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 212865

July 15, 2015

HORACIO SALVADOR, Petitioner,

vs.
LISA CHUA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal proposes to undo the decision promulgated on December 12, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No.
131486, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the respondent's petition for certiorari and
nullified the orders dated October 26, 2011 and August 8, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Pasay City respectively giving due course to the petitioner's notice of appeal, and allowing him to
post bail for his provisional liberty; and the resolution the CA promulgated on June 4, 2014 denying
his Motion for Reconsideration.
1

Antecedents
The petitioner and his wife Marinel Salvador were charged in the RTC with estafa penalized under
Article 315 (a) of the Revised Penal Code docketed as Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR. On
March 30, 2011, the date scheduled for the promulgation of the judgment, their counsel moved for
the deferment of the promulgation inasmuch as the petitioner was then suffering from
3

hypertension. Unconvinced of the reason, the RTC proceeded to promulgate its decision, and
disposed as follows:
4

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, accused spouses Horacio Salvador and Marinel Salvador are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Both spouses are further ordered to
indemnify the victim Lisa Chua the sum of Pl 7,371, 780.00 with interest of eight percent (8%) per
annum until fully paid, plus the amount of P50,000.00, as and by way of moral damages, and
.P.50,000 as attorney's fees.
xxxx
Costs against accused spouses Horacio Salvador and Marinel Salvador.
SO ORDERED.

The RTC then issued a warrant for the petitioner's arrest. He was apprehended on April 7, 2011, or
eight days from the promulgation of the judgment finding him guilty.
7

The petitioner filed his Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal dated April 13, 2011, and attached
thereto the medical certificate dated March 3 0, 2011 purportedly issued by Dr. Paulo Miguel A.
David, certifying that the petitioner had submitted himself to a medical consultation at the Rizal
Medical Center on March 30, 2011 and had been found to be suffering from hypertension.
8

10

In his order dated July 1, 2011, RTC Judge Eugenio G. Dela Cruz initially denied the petitioner's
Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal on the ground of non-compliance with Section 6, Rule 120
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
11

Thereafter, the respondent, who was the complainant in Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR,
filed her Motion for Execution dated July 29, 2011 praying for the issuance of the writ of execution on
the civil aspect.
12

The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the July 1, 2011 order. Judge Dela Cruz granted the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration on October 26, 2011, thereby giving due course to his notice
of appeal.
13

14

On October 27, 2011, the RTC, acting on the respondent's Motion for Execution, issued another
order, to wit:
15

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the subject Motion for Execution and Motion to Commit the Person
of Accused Horacio Salvador to the National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, to Serve his Sentence
are both granted and hereby orders as follows:
1) Let Writ of Execution issue to implement the following, to wit:
a) Indemnify the victim Lisa Chua the sum of P17,371,780.00 with interest of 8% per
annum until fully paid;

b) Pay the victim Lisa Chua P.50,000.00 as moral damages and P.50,000 as
attorney's fees.
2) The Motion to Commit the Person of Accused Horacio Salvador to the National Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City, to Serve his Sentence is hereby granted without prejudice to the
appropriate action of the Executive Judge where the accused is detained pursuant to
Administrative Circular No. 68-2005.
16

On its part, the Prosecution, represented by the private prosecutor, filed its Motion for
Reconsideration against the order issued on October 26, 2011, attaching to the motion the affidavit
executed by Dr. Paolo Miguel A. David affirming that he had not examined the petitioner on March
30, 2011; that he had not issued any medical certificate in favor of the petitioner; that his name of
Paolo had been misspelled Paulo in the medical certificate submitted by the petitioner; that the
signature appearing in the medical certificate was not his; and that the Rizal Medical Center did not
officially issue the medical certificate in question.
17

18

The petitioner opposed the Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration, and prayed that he be
allowed to post bail pending appeal. He submitted another medical certificate issued by Dr. Ma.
Concepcion Santos-Enriquez, an OB-Gynecologist, to the effect that she had seen the petitioner on
March 28, 2011 for headache and dizziness; and that she had advised him to see a cardiologist
because of his elevated blood pressure.
19

20

Meanwhile, Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR was re-raffled to Judge Francisco G. Mendiola,
Presiding Judge of Branch 115, due to Judge Dela Cruz's inhibition. In his order dated August 8,
2013, Judge Mendiola denied the Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration, and fixed bail of
F80,000.00 for the provisional liberty of the petitioner. Consequently, the respondent commenced a
special civil action for certiorari in the CA to nullify the October 26, 2011 order (giving due course to
the petitioner's notice of appeal), and the August 8, 2013 order (allowing him to post bail for his
provisional liberty).
21

22

23

In the decision promulgated on December 12, 2013, the CA granted the respondent's certiorari
petition, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated
October 26, 2011 and August 8, 2013 giving due course to respondent's Notice of Appeal and
allowing him to post bail, respectively, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion. The Order dated July 1, 2011 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

24

The CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its resolution promulgated on June 4,
2014.
25

Issues
Hence, this appeal, whereby the petitioner contends that the CA erred in rendering its December 12,
2013 decision because: (1) the respondent had no legal personality to challenge the assailed orders
of the RTC because only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) could appeal in a criminal case in
behalf of the State; (2) she had no legal personality to file the petition for certiorari in the CA because

her Motion for Execution in respect of the civil aspect of the criminal case had already been granted
by the RTC; and (3) his hypertension on the date of the promulgation of the decision by the RTC
constituted a justifiable cause for him to regain the right to avail himself of the remedies under the
Rules of Court against the judgment of conviction.
The issues are, therefore: (1) whether the respondent as the complainant in the criminal case had
the legal personality to file the petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the orders of the R TC despite
the lack of consent of the OSG; and (2) whether the petitioner had lost his standing in court for his
failure to appear at the promulgation of his conviction.
Ruling of the Court
We DENY the petition for its lack of merit.
1.
The respondent had legal standing to assail
the questioned orders through certiorari
The OSG is the appellate counsel of the State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and in
the CA. This is explicitly provided in Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code, viz.:
Section 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers x x x. It shall have the
following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
xxxx
The Court has stressed that the People of the Philippines, being the real party in interest in every
criminal proceedings, can be represented only by the OSG in criminal proceedings in the CA or in
this Court. Yet, this rule admits of exceptions, for as pronounced in Rodriguez v. Gadiane:
26

27

A special civil action for certiorari may be filed by an aggrieved party alleging grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. In a long line of
cases, this Court construed the term aggrieved parties to include the State and the private
offended party or complainant.
As early as in the case of Paredes v. Gopengco, it was held that the offended parties in criminal
cases have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action
of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. Apropos thereto is the case cited by

petitioner, De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, wherein it was categorically stated that the aggrieved
parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant.
It was further held in De la Rosa that the complainant has such an interest in the civil aspect of the
case that he may file a special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court
on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the
People of the Philippines. He should do so and prosecute it in his name as such complainant. In the
same vein, the cases of Martinez v. Court of Appeals, Santos v. Court of Appeals, and Chua v. Court
of Appeals adhere to the doctrines mentioned above.
Yet, although the respondent's Motion for Execution had already been granted by the RTC, the CA
still held that she. continued to have an interest in the litigation, observing as follows:
x x x [W]ith the public respondents' questioned Orders both granting him leave to appeal the
Decision dated March 30, 2011, the whole case is rendered open for review by Us, including the civil
aspect of the case. An appeal throws the case open for review. Under Section 11, Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm or modify the judgment. An appeal in a
criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not raised by the
parties.
A mere cursory reading of the herein Petition will readily reveal that petitioner desires to question the
propriety of public respondents' ruling giving due course to private respondent's appeal and
subsequently allowing him to post bail. We do not, however, perceive the same as a procedural
misstep thus divesting the petitioner the personality to file the instant Petition. We still lean towards
giving due course to the instant Petition in the interest of substantial justice and considering what to
Us are abuse of discretion committed by public respondents resulting to denial of due process. As
ordained by the Supreme Court in Carmencita G. Carino vs. Merlin De Castro, there can be cases
where a private offended party is allowed to prosecute as an aggrieved party in the interest of
substantial justice for a party cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law.
As to whether or not there was a clear disregard of basic precepts pertaining to an accused who did
not appear for promulgation of judgment despite notice is a query of substance both factual and
legal.
28

We affirm the CA's holding on the respondent's legal standing to institute the special civil action for
certiorari in order to annul the questioned orders of the RTC. For sure, her interest in the criminal
case did not end upon the granting of her Motion for Execution because the questioned orders
opened the possibility of defeating the judgment in her favor should the CA reverse or modify his
conviction. She remained an aggrieved party like the State in every sense, and, consequently, she
had as much right as anyone else in the criminal proceedings to adopt and to take the necessary
procedural steps within the bounds of the Rules of Court to serve and protect her substantial
interest. Although it is true that she could be represented by the OSG if it wanted to, she would be
reckless at that point to be disinterested in the appellate proceedings. Moreover, we would violate
her fundamental right to due process of law if we were to deny her the opportunity to assail and set
aside the improperly resurrected appeal of the petitioner.
2.

Petitioner has lost his right to appeal his conviction

Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently states:
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. - The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of
the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a
light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.
When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the
clerk of court.
xxxx
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite
notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving
him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall
order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons
for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
As the rule expressly indicates, the promulgation of the judgment of conviction may be done in
absentia. The accused in such case is allowed a period of 15 days from notice of the judgment to
him or his counsel within which to appeal; otherwise, the decision becomes final. The accused who
fails to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction loses the remedies available under
the Rules of Court against the judgment, specifically: (a) the filing of a motion for new trial or for
reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). However,
the Rules of Court permits him to regain his standing in court in order to avail himself of these
remedies within 15 days from the date of promulgation of the judgment conditioned upon: (a) his
surrender; and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail himself of the remedies, stating
therein the reason for his absence. Should the trial court find that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he should .be allowed to avail himself of the remedies within 15 days from notice of the order
finding his absence justified and allowing him the available remedies from the judgment of
conviction.
29

30

Under Section 6, supra, the personal presence of the petitioner at the promulgation of the judgment
in Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR was mandatory because the offense of which he was
found guilty was not a light felony or offense. He was charged with and actually found guilty of
estafa, and meted the indeterminate sentence of four years and two months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Based on the records, the
promulgation of the judgment was on March 30, 2011; hence, the petitioner had only until April 14,
2011 within which to meet the mandatory requirements under Section 6, supra.
31

In the attempt to regain his right to avail himself of the remedies under the Rules of Court, the
petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File a Notice of Appeal, and attached thereto the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Paulo Miguel David. Yet, he did not thereby establish that his absence had
been for a justifiable cause because the purported issuer himself, Dr. Paolo Miguel A. David, directly
impugned the credibility of this certificate by denying to have issued the certificate, and to have

examined the petitioner on March 30, 2011, or to have signed the certificate, or that the Rizal
Medical Center issued the certificate. The petitioner later submitted another medicate certificate,
which, aside from being belatedly issued, went unsupported and unauthenticated by the testimony of
the alleged issuing physician, who turned out to be an OB-Gynecologist. The CA justly discredited
the certificates.
32

Even assuming that he had suffered hypertension, which could have validly excused his absence
from the promulgation, the petitioner did not fulfill the other requirement of Section 6, supra, to
surrender himself to the trial court. The term surrender used in the rule visibly necessitated his
physical and voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer any consequences of the
verdict against him.
33

In its assailed decision, therefore, the CA unavoidably declared the petitioner to have lost his
standing in court because of his non-compliance with Section 6, supra. His failure to fulfill the
requirements rendered the conviction final and immutable. He ought to be reminded that the right to
appeal, being neither a natural right nor a part of due process, is a merely statutory privilege that
should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law establishing the
right; otherwise, it is lost.
34

35

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on December 12, 2013; and ORDERS
the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181354

February 27, 2013

SIMON A. FLORES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and
set aside the August 2 7, 2004 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan, First Division (Sandiganbayan), in
Criminal Case No. 16946, finding petitioner Simon A. Flores (Flores) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Homicide, and its November 29, 2007 Resolution 2 denying his motion for
reconsideration.
Flores was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information, dated July 9, 1991, filed before the
Sandiganbayan which reads:
That on or about the 15th day of August, 1989, at nighttime, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province
of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
a public officer, being then the Barangay Chairman of San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, while in the
performance of his official functions and committing the offense in relation to his office, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with intent to kill, shoot one JESUS AVENIDO with an M-16

Armalite Rifle, thereby inflicting upon him several gunshot wounds in different parts of his body,
which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JESUS
AVENIDO.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
During his arraignment, on August 26, 1991, Flores pleaded "Not Guilty" and waived the pre-trial.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Paulito Duran, one of the
visitors (Duran); Gerry Avenido(Gerry), son of the victim; Elisa Avenido (Elisa), wife of the victim; and
Dr. Ruben Escueta, the physician who performed the autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, Jesus
Avenido (Jesus).
For its part, the defense presented as witnesses, the accused Flores himself; his companionmembers of the Civilian Action Force Group Unit (CAFGU), Romulo Alquizar and Maximo H. Manalo;
and Dr. Rene Bagamasbad, resident physician of San Pablo City District Hospital.
The Version of the Prosecution
On August 15, 1989, on the eve of the barangay fiesta in San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, certain
visitors, Ronnie de Mesa, Noli de Mesa, Marvin Avenido, and Duran, were drinking at the terrace of
the house of Jesus. They started drinking at 8:30 oclock in the evening. Jesus, however, joined his
visitors only at around 11:00 oclock after he and his wife arrived from Sta. Rosa, Laguna, where
they tried to settle a problem regarding a vehicular accident involving one of their children. The
drinking at the terrace was ongoing when Flores arrived with an M-16 armalite rifle. 4
Duran testified that Jesus stood up from his seat and met Flores who was heading towards the
terrace. After glancing at the two, who began talking to each other near the terrace, Duran focused
his attention back to the table. Suddenly, he heard several gunshots prompting him to duck under
the table. Right after the shooting, he looked around and saw the bloodied body of Jesus lying on
the ground. By then, Flores was no longer in sight.5
Duran immediately helped board Jesus in an owner-type jeep to be brought to a hospital. Thereafter,
Duran, Ronnie de Mesa and Noli de Mesa went home. Jesus was brought to the hospital by his wife
and children. Duran did not, at any time during the occasion, notice the victim carrying a gun with
him.6
Gerry narrated that he was going in and out of their house before the shooting incident took place,
anxiously waiting for the arrival of his parents from Sta. Rosa, Laguna. His parents were then
attending to his problem regarding a vehicular accident. When they arrived, Gerry had a short
conversation with his father, who later joined their visitors at the terrace. 7
Gerry was outside their house when he saw Flores across the street in the company of some
members of the CAFGU. He was on his way back to the house when he saw Flores and his father
talking to each other from a distance of about six (6) meters. Suddenly, Flores shot his father, hitting
him on the right shoulder. Flores continued shooting even as Jesus was already lying flat on the
ground. Gerry testified that he felt hurt to have lost his father.8
Elisa related that she was on her way from the kitchen to serve "pulutan" to their visitors when she
saw Flores, from their window, approaching the terrace. By the time she reached the terrace, her

husband was already lying on the ground and still being shot by Flores. After the latter had left, she
and her children rushed him to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. 9
As a consequence of her husbands untimely demise, she suffered emotionally. She testified that
Jesus had an average monthly income of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) before he died at
the age of forty-one (41). He left four (4) children. Although she had no receipt, Elisa asked for actual
damages consisting of lawyers fees in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) plus
Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for every hearing, and Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P6,500.00) for the funeral expenses.10
Dr. Ruben Escueta (Dr. Escueta) testified that on August 17, 1989, he conducted an autopsy on the
cadaver of Jesus, whom he assessed to have died at least six (6) hours before his body was brought
to him.11
Based on the Autopsy Report,12 it appeared that the victim suffered four gunshot wounds in the
different parts of his body, specifically: on the medial portion of the left shoulder, between the clavicle
and the first rib; on the left hypogastric region through the upper right quadrant of the abdomen; on
the tip of the left buttocks to the tip of the sacral bone or hip bone; and on the right flank towards the
umbilicus. The victim died of massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to laceration of the liver.
The Version of the Defense
To avoid criminal liability, Flores interposed self-defense.
Flores claimed that in the evening of August 15, 1989, he, together with four members of the CAFGU
and Civil Service Unit (CSU), Maximo Manalo, Maximo Latayan (Latayan), Ronilo Haballa, and
Romulo Alquizar, upon the instructions of Mayor Samuel Bueser of Alaminos, Laguna, conducted
a ronda in Barangay San Roque which was celebrating the eve of its fiesta.13
At around midnight, the group was about 15 meters from the house of Jesus, who had earlier invited
them for some "bisperas" snacks, when they heard gunshots seemingly emanating from his house.
Flores asked the group to stay behind as he would try to talk to Jesus, his cousin, to spare the
shooting practice for the fiesta celebration the following day. As he started walking towards the
house, he was stopped by Latayan and handed him a baby armalite. He initially refused but was
prevailed upon by Latayan who placed the weapon over his right shoulder, with its barrel or nozzle
pointed to the ground. Latayan convinced Flores that such posture would gain respect from the
people in the house of Jesus.14
Flores then proceeded to the terrace of the house of Jesus, who was having a drinking spree with
four others. In a calm and courteous manner, Flores asked Jesus and his guests to cease firing their
guns as it was already late at night and to save their shots for the following days fiesta procession.
Flores claimed that despite his polite, unprovocative request and the fact that he was a relative of
Jesus and the barangay chairman, a person in authority performing a regular routine duty, he was
met with hostility by Jesus and his guests. Jesus, who appeared drunk, immediately stood up and
approached
him as he was standing near the entrance of the terrace. Jesus abruptly drew his magnum pistol and
poked it directly at his chest and then fired it. By a twist of fate, he was able to partially parry Jesus
right hand, which was holding the pistol, and was hit on his upper right shoulder.15

With fierce determination, however, Jesus again aimed his gun at Flores, but the latter was able to
instinctively take hold of Jesus right hand, which was holding the gun. As they wrestled, Jesus again
fired his gun, hitting Flores left hand.16
Twice hit by bullets from Jesus magnum pistol and profusely bleeding from his two wounds, Flores,
with his life and limb at great peril, instinctively swung with his right hand the baby armalite dangling
on his right shoulder towards Jesus and squeezed its trigger. When he noticed Jesus already lying
prostrate on the floor, he immediately withdrew from the house. As he ran towards the coconut
groves, bleeding and utterly bewildered over the unfortunate incident that just transpired between
him and his cousin Jesus, he heard more gunshots. Thus, he continued running for fear of more
untoward incidents that could follow. He proceeded to the Mayors house in Barangay San Gregorio,
Alaminos, Laguna, to report what had happened. There, he found his rondagroupmates.17
The incident was also reported the following day to the CAFGU Superior, Sgt. Alfredo Sta. Ana.
Decision of the Sandiganbayan
On August 27, 2004, after due proceedings, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed
decision18 finding Flores guilty of the offense charged. The Sandiganbayan rejected Flores claim that
the shooting was justified for failure to prove self-defense. It gave credence to the consistent
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Flores shot Jesus with an armalite rifle (M16) which
resulted in his death. According to the Sandiganbayan, there was no reason to doubt the testimonies
of the said witnesses who appeared to have no ill motive to falsely testify against Flores. The
dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 16946 finding the
accused Simon A. Flores GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and to suffer
the penalty of 10 years and 1 day ofprision mayor maximum, as minimum, to 17 years, and 4
months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. The accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs
of the victim Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for the death of Jesus Avenido,
another Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Six Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P6,500.00) as actual or compensatory damages.
SO ORDERED.19
Flores filed a motion for the reconsideration. As the motion did not contain any notice of hearing, the
Prosecution filed its Motion to Expunge from the Records Accuseds Motion for Reconsideration." 20
In its Resolution, dated November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for being a mere
scrap of paper as it did not contain a notice of hearing and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration of accused Flores is
considered pro forma which did not toll the running of the period to appeal, and thus, the assailed
judgment of this Court has becomeFINAL and EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.21

Hence, Flores filed the present petition before this Court on the ground that the Sandiganbayan
committed reversible errors involving questions of substantive and procedural laws and
jurisprudence. Specifically, Flores raises the following
ISSUES
(I)
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE
CREDIT TO PETITIONERS CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE
(II)
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, COMMITTED SERIOUS BUT
REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN ARRIVING AT ITS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
(III)
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN NOT
ACQUITTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME CHARGED22
The Court will first resolve the procedural issue raised by Flores in this petition.
Flores claims that the outright denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Sandiganbayan on a
mere technicality amounts to a violation of his right to due process. The dismissal rendered final and
executory the assailed decision which was replete with baseless conjectures and conclusions that
were contrary to the evidence on record. He points out that a relaxation of procedural rules is
justified by the merits of this case as the facts, viewed from the proper and objective perspective,
indubitably demonstrate selfdefense on his part.
Flores argues that he fully complied with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 37 and Section 4 of
Rule 121 of the Rules of Court when the motion itself was served upon the prosecution and the
latter, in fact, admitted receiving a copy. For Flores, such judicial admission amounts to giving due
notice of the motion which is the intent behind the said rules. He further argues that a hearing on a
motion for reconsideration is not necessary as no further proceeding, such as a hearing, is required
under Section 3 of Rule 121.
Flores argument fails to persuade this Court.
Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads:
SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned,
and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after
the filing of the motion.
Section 2, Rule 37 provides:

SEC. 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof. The motion shall be
made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefore, a written notice of which shall be served by
the movant on the adverse party.
xxxx
A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of appeal.
Section 4, Rule 121 states:
SEC. 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. The motion for a new trial or reconsideration
shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. X x x. Notice of the motion for
new trial or reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor.
As correctly stated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Sec. 2 of Rule 37 and Sec. 4 of
Rule 121 should be read in conjunction with Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Basic is the rule
that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant except for those motions which the court
may act upon without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party.23 The notice of hearing must be
addressed to all parties and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service.
This Court has indeed held, time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court, the requirement is mandatory. Failure to comply with the requirement renders the motion
defective. "As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not
affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading." 24
In this case, as Flores committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of hearing, his
motion was a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect whatsoever. Thus, his motion was
properly dismissed by the Sandiganbayan.
Flores invokes the exercise by the Court of its discretionary power to review the factual findings of
the Sandiganbayan. He avers that the ponente as well as the other members of the First Division
who rendered the assailed decision, were not able to observe the witnesses or their manner of
testifying as they were not present during the trial.25 He, thus, argues that there was palpable
misapprehension of the facts that led to wrong conclusions of law resulting in his unfounded
conviction.
His contention is likewise devoid of merit.
"It is often held that the validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that
the ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a
showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached by him." 26
"Moreover, it should be stressed that the Sandiganbayan, which functions in divisions of three
Justices each, is a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the exchange
of view and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority vote." 27
In the present case, Flores has not convinced the Court that there was misapprehension or
misinterpretation of the material facts nor was the defense able to adduce evidence to establish that

the factual findings were arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the Court sustains the
Sandiganbayans conclusion that Flores shot Jesus and continued riddling his body with bullets even
after he was already lying helpless on the ground.
Flores insists that the evidence of this case clearly established all the elements of self-defense.
According to him, there was an unlawful aggression on the part of Jesus. He was just at the
entrance of Jesus terrace merely advising him and his guests to reserve their shooting for the fiesta
when Jesus approached him, drew a magnum pistol and fired at him. The attack by Jesus was
sudden, unexpected and instantaneous. The intent to kill was present because Jesus kept pointing
the gun directly at him. As he tried to parry Jesus hand, which was holding the gun, the latter kept
firing. Left with no choice, he was compelled to use the baby armalite he was carrying to repel the
attack. He asserts that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part as he merely requested
Jesus and his drinking buddies to reserve their shooting for the following day as it was already late
at night and the neighbors were already asleep.
In effect, Flores faults the Sandiganbayan in not giving weight to the justifying circumstance of selfdefense interposed by him and in relying on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses instead.
His argument deserves scant consideration.
The issue of whether Flores indeed acted in self-defense is basically a question of fact. In appeals to
this Court, only questions of law may be raised and not issues of fact. The factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan are, thus, binding upon this Court. 28 This Court, nevertheless, finds no reason to
disturb the finding of the Sandiganbayan that Flores utterly failed to prove the existence of selfdefense.
Generally, "the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt rather than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent." If the accused, however, admits
killing the victim, but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove such
defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal
aggression on his part. To escape liability, it now becomes incumbent upon the accused to prove by
clear and convincing evidence all the elements of that justifying circumstance. 29
In this case, Flores does not dispute that he perpetrated the killing of Jesus by shooting him with an
M16 armalite rifle. To justify his shooting of Jesus, he invoked self-defense. By interposing selfdefense, Flores, in effect, admits the authorship of the crime. Thus, it was incumbent upon him to
prove that the killing was legally justified under the circumstances.
To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of the
elements of self-defense. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who acts in
defense of his person or rights does not incur any criminal liability provided that the following
circumstances concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The most important among all the elements is unlawful aggression. "There can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the
person who resorted to self-defense."30 "Unlawful aggression is defined as an actual physical
assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be
offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It presupposes actual,

sudden, unexpected or imminent dangernot merely threatening and intimidating action. It is

present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life." 31"Aggression, if
not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense." 32
In this case, Flores failed to discharge his burden.
The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayans assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the
probative value of evidence on record. As correctly noted by the Sandiganbayan, the defense
evidence, both testimonial and documentary, were crowded with flaws which raised serious doubt as
to its credibility, to wit:
First, the accused claims that Jesus Avenido shot him on his right shoulder with a magnum handgun
from a distance of about one (1) meter. With such a powerful weapon, at such close range, and
without hitting any hard portion of his body, it is quite incredible that the bullet did not exit through the
accuseds shoulder. On the contrary, if he were hit on the part where the ball and socket were
located, as he tried to make it appear later in the trial, it would be very impossible for the bullet not to
have hit any of the bones located in that area of his shoulder.
Second, Simon Flores executed an affidavit on September 2, 1989. Significantly, he did not mention
anything about a bullet remaining on his shoulder. If indeed a bullet remained lodged in his shoulder
at the time he executed his affidavit, it defies logic why he kept mum during the preliminary
investigation when it was crucial to divulge such fact if only to avoid the trouble of going through
litigation. To wait for trial before finally divulging such a very material information, as he claimed,
simply stretches credulity.
Third, in his feverish effort of gathering evidence to establish medical treatment on his right shoulder,
the accused surprisingly did not bother to secure the x-ray plate or any medical records from the
hospital. Such valuable pieces of evidence would have most likely supported his case of selfdefense, even during the preliminary investigation, if they actually existed and had he properly
presented them. The utter lack of interest of the accused in retrieving the alleged x-ray plate or any
medical record from the hospital militate against the veracity of his version of the incident.
Fourth, the T-shirt presented by the accused in court had a hole, apparently from a hard object, such
as a bullet, that pierced through the same. However, the blood stain is visibly concentrated only on
the area around the hole forming a circular shape. Within five (5) hours and a half from 12:00 oclock
midnight when he was allegedly shot, to 5:35 a.m. in the early morning of August 16, 1989, when his
wounds were treated, the blood would naturally have dripped down to the hem. The blood on the
shirt was not even definitively shown to be human blood.
Fifth, Jesus Avenido arrived at his house and joined his visitors who were drinking only at 11:00
oclock in the evening. Both parties claim that the shooting incident happened more or less 12:00
midnight. Hence, it is very possible that Jesus Avenido was not yet drunk when the incident in
question occurred. Defense witnesses themselves noted that the victim Jesus Avenido was bigger in
built and taller than the accused. Moreover, the victim was familiar and very much experienced with
guns, having previously worked as a policeman. In addition, the latter was relatively young, at the
age of 41, when the incident happened. The Court therefore finds it difficult to accept how the victim
could miss when he allegedly shot the accused at such close range if, indeed, he really had a gun
and intended to harm the accused. We find it much less acceptable to believe how the accused
1wphi1

allegedly overpowered the victim so easily and wrestled the gun from the latter, despite allegedly
having been hit earlier on his right shoulder.
Finally, it hardly inspires belief for the accused to have allegedly unlocked, with such ease, the
armalite rifle (M16) he held with one hand, over which he claims to have no experience handling,
while his right shoulder was wounded and he was grappling with the victim. 33 (Underscoring supplied
citations omitted)
The foregoing circumstances indeed tainted Flores credibility and reliability, his story being contrary
to ordinary human experience. "Settled is the rule that testimonial evidence to be believed must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself. Hence, the
test to determine the value or credibility of the testimony of a witness is whether the same is in
conformity with common knowledge and is consistent with the experience of mankind." 34
The Court also sustains the finding that the testimony of Dr. Bagamasbad, adduced to prove that
Flores was shot by Jesus, has no probative weight for being hearsay. As correctly found by the
Sandiganbayan:
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Bagamasbad, cannot be of any help either since the same is in
the nature of hearsay evidence. Dr. Bagamasbads testimony was a mere re-statement of what
appeared as entries in the hospital logbook (EXH. "8-a"), over which he admitted to possess no
personal knowledge. The photocopy of the logbook itself does not possess any evidentiary value
since it was not established by the defense that such evidence falls under any of the exceptions
enumerated in Section 3, Rule 130, which pertain to the rules on the admissibility of evidence. 35 x x x
Granting for the sake of argument that unlawful aggression was initially staged by Jesus, the same
ceased to exist when Jesus was first shot on the shoulder and fell to the ground. At that point, the
perceived threat to Flores life was no longer attendant. The latter had no reason to pump more
bullets on Jesus abdomen and buttocks.
Indeed, the nature and number of the gunshot wounds inflicted upon Jesus further negate the claim
of self-defense by the accused. Records show that Jesus suffered four (4) gunshot wounds in the
different parts of his body, specifically: on the medial portion of the left shoulder, between the clavicle
and the first rib; on the left hypogastric region through the upper right quadrant of the abdomen; on
the tip of the left buttocks to the tip of the sacral bone or hip bone; and on the right flank towards the
umbilicus. According to Dr. Ruben Escueta, who performed the autopsy on the victim, the latter died
of massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to laceration of the liver.36 If there was any truth to
Flores claim that he merely acted in self-defense, his first shot on Jesus shoulder, which already
caused the latter to fall on the ground, would have been sufficient to repel the attack allegedly
initiated by the latter. But Flores continued shooting Jesus. Considering the number of gunshot
wounds sustained by the victim, the Court finds it difficult to believe that Flores acted to defend
himself to preserve his own life. "It has been held in this regard that the location and presence of
several wounds on the body of the victim provide physical evidence that eloquently refutes
allegations of self-defense."37
"When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to kill or wound the
original aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation against the
original aggressor."38Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that

was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in selfdefense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused. 39
The Court quotes with approval the following findings of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
x x x. The difference in the location of the entry and exit points of this bullet wound was about two to
three inches. From the entry point of the bullet, the shooting could not have taken place when
accused and his victim were standing and facing each other. Another bullet entered through the
medial portion of the victim's buttocks and exited through his abdominal cavity. A third bullet entered
through the left hypogastric region and exited at the upper right quadrant of the victim's abdomen.
The respective trajectory of these wounds are consistent with the testimony of prosecution witnesses
Elisa B. Avenido and Arvin B. Aveniclo that the accused shot Jesus Avenido while the latter was
already lying on the ground. Moreover, according to Arvin Avenido, the first shot hit his father on the
right shoulder making him fall to the ground. Hence, even on the assumption that unlawful
aggression initially existed, the same had effectively ceased after the victim was first shot and fell to
the ground. There was no more reason for the accused to pull the trigger, at least three times more,
and continue shooting at the victim.40 (Emphasis in the original)
The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and
the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an
unlawful aggression.41 In this case, the continuous shooting by Flores which caused the fatal gunshot
wounds were not necessary and reasonable to prevent the claimed unlawful aggression from Jesus
as the latter was already lying flat on the ground after he was first shot on the shoulder.
In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in finding accused Flores guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-15559

November 29, 1961

CEFERINO E. PAREDES, as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Occidental Misamis, petitionerappellee,

vs.
FELIX V. BORJA, Justice of the Peace of Bonifacio, Occidental Misamis, and CRESENCIO
CATALAN,respondents-appellants.
P. V. Villafuerte for respondents-appellants.
Ceferino E. Paredes for and in his own behalf a petitioner-appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
On 9 July 1958 the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of occidental Misamis filed a petition for certiorariwith
preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of the said province against Felix V. Borja, Justice
of the Peace of Bonifacio, Occidental Misamis, and Cresencio Catalan respondents, alleging that on
2 June the chief of police subscribed and on 3 June 1958 swore to a complaint charging the last

named respondent with malicious mischief for pulling and destroying the corn plants of Josefa
Lapora, a tenant of Exaltacion Jagonia de Amparado, and filed it in the Justice of the Peace Court
(crim. case 488, Annex A); that on 6 June 1958, upon arraignment, respondent, defendant therein,
assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of guilty and the respondent Justice of the Peace Court
sentenced him to indemnify the defended party in the sum of P10, to suffer the penal ten days
imprisonment and to pay the costs (Annex B); that on the same day the respondent filed a motion for
consideration on the ground that the imposition of the penalty of ten days imprisonment "is too
severe considering the fact that under Article 329, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty may be arresto menoror a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not
more than 200 pesos, if the amount involved does not exceed 200 pesos or cannot be estimated,"
and prayed "that instead of the penalty of imprisonment of 10 days the accused be made to pay a
fine only" (Annex C); that on 10 June 1958 the respondent filed an amended motion for
reconsideration alleging that in a civil case between the respondent and his co-heirs on the one
hand and Exaltacion Jagonia de Amparado and her parents on the other hand, involving ownership
of four parcels of land (civil No. 1434) the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis had ordered
the therein defendants to return possession to the herein respondent and his co-heirs one-half of the
parcels of land in question described in certificate of title No. 397; that for that reason he has a
legitimate claim of ownership to the parcel of land from where he uprooted the growing corn plants
and his liability, if any, was only civil and not criminal in nature; and praying that the judgment of
conviction rendered by the respondent Justice of the Peace Court be set aside; that his plea of guilty
be withdrawn and substituted by another of not guilty; and that the case be dismissed (Annex D);
that on 12 June 1958 the respondent Justice of the Peace Court entered an ordering setting aside its
judgment dated 6 June 1958, ordering that a plea of not guilty be entered for the respondent and
setting the case for trial on 18 June 1958 (Annex F); that on 16 June 1958 the respondent filed a
"motion for postponement" of "the hearing of the amended motion for reconsideration" to "some
other dates" (Annex E); that on 25 June 1958 the petitioner filed an "urgent motion for
reconsideration of the order dated June 12, 1958, setting aside the Judgment," on the ground that
the respondent's motion for reconsideration which were in the nature of motions for rehearing were
not verified and not supported by affidavits of merit; that during the arraignment the respondent was
assisted by counsel and he entered a plea of guilty after his counsel had explained to him the
consequences of entering a plea of guilty; and that the respondent's motions for reconsideration
were filed and grant ex parte and without hearing (Annex G); that on the same date, 25 June 1958,
the respondent Justice of the Peace Court, in open court, denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration; that on 2 July 1958 the petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration (Annex H)
and on 3 July 1958, again the respondent Justice of the Peace Court denied the petitioner's motion;
that the respondent Justice of the Peace Court gravely abused its discretion in entering the order of
12 June 1958 (Annex F) and denying the petitioner's motions for reconsideration of 25 June (Annex
G) and 2 July 1958 (Annex H; see Orders of 25 June and 3 July 1958) and entertaining the
respondent's motions for reconsideration despite the fact that they were not verified and not
supported by affidavits of merit; that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law; that the respondent Justice of the Peace Court had set the trial of the
case on 11 July 1958 and unless restrained would try it; and that the trial of the case would work
injustice to the petitioner for it would complicate, aggravate and multiply the issues of the case. The
petitioner prayed that pending determination of the case a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
restraining the respondent Justice of the Peace Court from further proceeding in and trying criminal
case No. 488; that the orders of the respondent Court dated 12 June 1958, setting aside the
judgment dated 6 June 1958 (Annex B), entering a plea of not guilty for the defendant and setting
the case for trial on 18 June 1958 (Annex F) and of 25 June 1958 and 3 July 1958, denying the
petitioner's motions for reconsideration, be set aside and annulled; that the respondent Justice of the

Peace Court be ordered to execute its judgment in criminal case No. 488 (Annex B), and that the
respondent be ordered to pay the costs (civil No. 2119).
On 10 July 1958 the Court of First Instance entered an order directing the respondent Justice of the
Peace Court to desist from further proceeding in criminal case No. 488 and the respondents to
answer the petition within five days from date of service of a copy of the petition.
On 15 July 1958 the respondents filed their answer to the petition setting up the defense that after
rendition of judgment of conviction and before it became final, it was discretionary with the Justice of
the Peace Court to grant or deny the defendant's motion to withdraw a plea of guilty and enter one of
not guilty; that in granting the defendant's petition to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter one of not
guilty, the respondent Justice of the Peace Court did not gravely abuse its discretion; that although
the motions to that effect were not verified and no affidavits of merit were attached thereto, the
defects were cured when the respondent took the witness stand and was examined under oath by
the prosecution and the defense; that the defects were only in form and no prejudice would be
caused thereby; and that to allow the respondent to be convicted of an offense and imprisoned upon
a plea of guilty improvidently entered would result in a miscarriage of justice. On 23 July 1958 the
petitioner filed a reply to the respondents' answer contending that they are estopped from claiming
that the respondent had improvidently entered a plea of guilty since he was assisted by counsel and
citing the cases ofFiscal of Manila vs. Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 20 and People vs. Damiao, 56 Phil. 734,
in support of his position.
On 23 August 1958 the Court entered an order directing the petitioner "to file a motion to decide the
case on the pleadings." On 29 August 1958 the petitioner filed a motion submitting the case for
judgment on the pleadings.
On 29 December 1958 the Court rendered judgment holding "... that the actuations of the
respondent Justice of the Peace is very irregular and suspicious and absolutely unwarranted, ..."
declaring null and void the orders entered by the respondent Justice of the Peace Court on 12 June,
25 June and 3 July 1958, and ordering it to desist from further proceeding in criminal case No. 488
and to execute the judgment rendered therein on 6 June 1958.
On 9 February 1959 the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, on 13 February 1959 the
petitioner, an objection thereto, and on 14 February 1959 the respondents, memorandum in support
of their motion for reconsideration . On 18 March 1959 the Court denied the respondents' motion for
reconsideration. On 18 April 1959 the respondents filed a second motion for reconsideration. On 9
May 1959 the respondents filed a notice of appeal. On the same day, 9 May 1959, the Court denied
the respondents' second motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had abandoned it by
filing a notice of appeal.
Section 6, Rule 114, provides:
The Court may in its discretion at any time before sentence permit a plea of guilty to be
withdrawn. If judgment of conviction has been entered thereon and the same has not
become final, the court may set aside such judgment, and allow a plea of not guilty, or, with
the consent of the fiscal, allow a plea of guilty of a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the charge.

Before a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty become final the Court may, in its discretion,
set aside such judgment and allow a plea of not guilty to be entered by the defendant. Acts done by
an inferior court in exercise of its discretion will not be interfered with by an appellate court in the
absence of grave abuse. The reasons of the respondent Justice of the Peace Court in setting aside
its judgment dated 6 June 1958 convicting the appellant of malicious mischief and directing that a
plea of not guilty be entered in lieu of that of guilty, is that the appellant (the defendant in crim. case
No. 488) asserts a valid homestead claim and has a good defense and the respondent Court has
doubts as to his guilt; and in denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the last mentioned
orders, are:
... upon hearing this motion, the accused testified in open court that the land from which he
had uprooted young corn plants so as to build his house thereon and for which he is now
prosecuted in his homestead acquired from his deceased father as may be shown in
Homestead Patent No. 63050 issued October 18, 1940. The Chief of Police on crossexamination showed the accused copy of the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental in Civil Case No. 1434 affecting the land in question. In view of this
sworn testimony of the defendant, his counsel asked leave to amend his motion now seeking
the dismissal of the charge; and upon continuance of the bearing, the Court directed the trial
of the case on its merits as shown in its order dated June 12, 1958, which is now the subject
of reconsideration by urgent motion of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal, who presented in
evidence the decision of the Court of First Instance in aforecited Civil Case No. 1434
adjudicating half of said land described in Certificate of Title No. 397 to the defendant and his
co-heirs upon reimbursement of a total sum of P3,150.00; which judgment is still pending
execution; or partition pending of the lands therein adjudicated. In the face of these facts, we
doubt very much the guilt of the defendant who appears to have entered an improvident
plea.... (Order of 25 June 1958. Record of civil case No. 2119, page 51).
These reasons find support in the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Misamis on 27 July 1954 in civil case No. 1434, entitled Cesaria Jagonia, et al., plaintiffs vs.
Eduardo Jagonia, et al., defendants, where the appellant is one of the plaintiffs and Exaltacion
Jagonia de Amparado, the landlord of Josefa Lapora, the offended party in criminal case No. 488, is
one of the defendants (Exhibit B), ordering the therein defendants to deliver possession to the
therein plaintiffs one-half of four parcels of land described in O.C.T. No. 397 upon reimbursement to
the former by the latter of the sum of P3,150. Considering the reasons given by the respondent
Justice of the Peace Court, it cannot be said that it had gravely abused its discretion in entering the
orders complained of.
The appellee contends that the respondent Justice of the Peace Court should not have entertained
the appellant's motions for reconsideration because they were not verified and not supported by
affidavits. In support of his contention he cites the cases of Fiscal of Manila vs. Del Rosario, 52 Phil.
20 and People vs. Damiao, 56 Phil. 734, where the rule is that after a judgment of conviction has
been entered in a criminal case, the motion filed for the purpose of substituting a plea of guilty by
one of not guilty is equivalent to a petition for reopening the case, and must not only be verified but
accompanied by an affidavit of merit. Such rule enunciated in those two cases, decided on 25
August 1928 and 31 March 1932, respectively, while the law on criminal procedure was General
Order No. 58, in no longer controlling. The present rules on criminal procedure are as provided for in
the Rules of Court which took effect on 1 July 1940, and do not require that a motion for new trial be
verified. And while the Rules of Court also require, as in the supplanted law, that an affidavit of merit
be attached to support a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, yet the defect of

lack of it in the appellant's motions for reconsideration or rehearsing had been cured by the
testimony under oath of the appellant at the hearing of the motion for reconsideration on 25 June
1958. It was the appellee himself who presented in evidence the judgment (Exhibit B) which is the
basis of the appellant's motions for reconsideration.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the writ prayed for by the appellee is denied, without
pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-33037-42 August 17, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant
vs.
DEMETRIO JARDIN, accused-appellee.
The Solicitor-General for plaintiff-appellant.
Marcos C. Lucero, Jr. for accused-appellee.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Two constitutional rightsspeedy trial and freedom from double jeopardyare interposed as
defenses by the accused in this petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner asks us to review and annul the orders of the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Branch V, which dismissed the criminal cases against accuse Demetrio Jardin because his
constitutional right to speedy trial was allegedly violated.
The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter complaint of the Provincial Auditor of Quezon
requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary criminal action under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public
documents on six counts.
The cases were assigned to Assistant Fiscal Meliton V. Angeles who set them for preliminary
investigation.The accused moved to postpone the investigation twice. On the third time that the
investigation was re-set, the accused and his counsel failed to appear.
On the fourth resetting, the accused and his counsel again failed to appear. Inspire of their absence,
the preliminary investigation was conducted and shortly afterwards, six informations were filed
against the accused before the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, docketed as Cases
Nos. 16052 (0043-M), 16053 (0044-M), 16054 (0045-ML 16055 (0046-M), 16056 (0047-M), and
16057 (0048-M). The arraignment was set for May 9, 1967.
The records show that from May 9, 1967, the arraignment was re-set for June 6; then re-set for June
26; then from August 16, the same was re-set for September 5, all because of the motions for
postponement filed at the instance of the accused. (Original records [0043-M] pp. 54, 61, 66 and 69).

When the arraignment of the accused was called on September 5, 1967, counsel for the accused
verbally moved for reinvestigation on the ground that the accused was not given the opportunity to
present his defense during the preliminary investigation. This was granted by the court and the first
reinvestigation was set on November 24, 1967. On this date, however, the Investigating Fiscal motu
proprio postponed said reinvestigation due to the non-appearance of accused and his counsel and
re-set the date for December 21, 1967.
A series of postponements was again filed by the accused causing further. delays of the
reinvestigation. On June 27, 1968, accused and his counsel appeared together but requested for a
period of fifteen (15) days within which to file a memorandum.
In view of the expiration of the 15-day period, the Investigating Fiscal filed a manifestation before the
court that the records of these cases be returned and the trial on the merits of the same be set.
The court without acting on said manifestation, issued an order transferring the six (6) cases to the
new branch (Branch V) of the Court of First Instance at Mauban, Quezon. Upon receipt by the latter
of the records of these cases, the arraignment and trial were set for December 3, 1968.
On the latter date, the counsel for the accused sought again the postponement of the arraignment
and this was followed by more postponements, all at the instance of the accused. (Original records,
[0043-M] pp. 90,93,120 and 125).
On March 31, 1969, counsel for the accused moved for the postponement of the arraignment and
requested the court that the records be returned again to the Office of the Fiscal for further
reinvestigation. This was granted and the reinvestigation was again set for May 5, 1969. The
accused and his counsel, however, failed to appear and thus, the said reinvestigation was re-set for
June 2, 1969. On this date, counsel for accused requested that he be given five (5) days within
which to file a written sworn statement of the accused which would constitute the defense of the
latter, subject to the cross-examination of the Investigating Fiscal.
Considering the fact that the period to file such sworn statement had already expired without
anything being filed, the records of the cases were returned to the court which set said cases for
arraignment and trial on September 2, 1970. On this date, the accused again moved for
postponement.
When these cases were called for arraignment on September 8, 1970, Demetrio Jardin, pleaded not
guilty to the crime as charged, after which he requested that the trial be postponed and re-set for
September 29, 1970.
On September 29, 1970, the trial scheduled on that day was postponed again on motion of counsel
for the accused. The trial was re-set for October 12, 1970, with notice to both parties.
On October 12, 1970, when the said criminal cases were called for hearing, no one appeared for the
prosecution, except a state witness, Mr. Cesar Alcala of the Provincial Auditor's office who remained
silent during the proceedings.
Invoking his client's constitutional right to speedy trial and seizing the opportunity to take advantage
of the prosecution's failure to appear on that day, the defense counsel moved for the dismissal of the

cases. The respondent court granted the oral motion for dismissal "for reasons of constitutional
rights of the accused Demetrio Jardin. "
Two questions are now raised by the People in this appeal:
I. Considering the factual setting in the criminal cases at bar, was the respondent
Court correct in dismissing the cases and in predicating the dismissal on the right of
the defendant to a speedy trial?
II. Does the present appeal place the respondent accuse in double jeopardy?
The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the cases and in basing
the dismissal on the constitutional right of the accused to speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial
means that the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary
objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of a court
litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible
with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. (See
Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216)
[From a perusal of the facts, it is readily seen that all the delays in the prosecution of the cases were
caused by the accused himself.] All the postponements of proceedings were made at his instance
and for his behalf. Hence, the constitutional right to a speedy trial afforded to an accused by our
Constitution cannot be invoked. From the start of the preliminary investigation of the cases up to the
trial on the merits, the accused always managed to delay the proceedings through postponements
and requests for reinvestigation. [It would, therefore, be a mockery of the criminal justice system if
the accused would be allowed to benefit from his own wrongdoings or tactical maneuvers intended
to frustrate the administration of justice. By his own deliberate acts, he is deemed to have waived or
abandoned his right to a speedy trial. In the case of Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216, we ruled:]
In this case, however, there was a waiver or abandonment of the right to a speedy
trial in the first case when the herein petitioners sought and obtained several
postponements of the trial: first, when they asked for the deferment of the
arraignment because the accused Ladislao Tacipit was not present; second, when
they asked for the postponement of the trial for March 5, 1968 upon the ground that
they have requested the Provincial Fiscal of Cagayan for a reinvestigation of the
case; and finally, when they agreed, with the prosecution, to postpone the hearing
set for November 28, 1968 to January 4, 1969..
The dismissal of the criminal cases against the accused by the respondent court on the ground that
his right to speedy trial had beer violated was devoid of factual and legal basis. The order denying
the motion for reconsideration is similarly infirm. There being no basis for the questioned orders,
they are consequently null and void.
Would a reinstatement of the dismissed cases place the accused in double jeopardy?
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an accused, the
following requisites must be present in the first prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a
competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted,
or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express

consent. (Rule 117, Section 9, Rules of Court; People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77). The last requisite
assumes a valid acquittal and a valid acquittal presupposes a valid judgment by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Since in the instant cases, the dismissal was void for having been issued
without legal basis, it follows that the acquittal brought about by the dismissal is also void. Hence, no
jeopardy can attach from such acquittal. The act of respondent judge in discussing the cases
amounted to lack of jurisdiction which would prevent double jeopardy from attaching. In the case
of People v. Court of appeals (10 1 SCRA 450) we ruled:
Private respondents further argue that a judgment of acquittal ends the case which
cannot be appealed nor reopened, otherwise, they would be put twice in jeopardy for
the same offense. That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As
earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction No double jeopardy attaches,
therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. (Comia v. Nicolas, 29
SCRA 492 [1969]) By it no rights are divested Through it, no rights can be attains &
Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless It neither
binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are
void. (Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717, 722.[1925]; Chavez vs. Court of Appeals,
24 SCRA 663, 685 [1968]; Parades v. Moya, 61 SCRA 526, [1974]). ...
We also note that the dismissall of the criminal cases was upon motion and with the wxpress
consent of respondent Demetrio Jardin. For double jeopardy to attach, the general rule is that the
dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. (People v. Salico, 84 Phil.
722; People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249; People v. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81; and People v. Cuevo, 104
SCRA 312).
If the accused had been denied his right to speedy trial or if some other basic right had been
impaired, the doctrine of waiver of the right to invoke double jeopardy would not apply even if the
accused had expressly moved for the termination of proceedings. In the instant case, however, the
defendant had deliberately used all the available dilatory tactics he could utilize and abused the
principle that the accused must be given every opportunity to disprove the criminal charge. The
doctrine of double jeopardy was never intended for this purpose.
Even as we rule that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion, we also rebuke the
attorneys for both the defense and the prosecution and to a certain extent, the court itself because of
the breach of duties to the courts and to the administration of justice apparent in this case.
The duties of an attorney found in Rule 138, Section 20 include: xxx xxx xxx
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such
means only as are consistent with truth and honor,...
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or
proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest.

xxx xxx xxx

The dilatory tactics of the defense counsel and the failure of both the judge and the fiscal to take
effective counter measures to obviate the delaying acts constitute obstruction of justice.
As aptly stared:
12.09 Obstructing the administration of justice
An attorney as an officer of the court is called upon to assist in the due administration
of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. (Surigao
Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, G.R. No. 11071, Jan. 9, 1972, 31 SCRA 1; In
re Climaco, G.R. Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107) For this
reason, any act on the part of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts or impedes the
administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action
against him. (Cantorne vs. Ducasin 57 Phil, 23 [1932]; De los Santos vs. Sagalongos
69 Phil. 406 [1940]).
Acts which amount to obstruction in the administration of justice may take many
forms. They include such acts as instructing a complaining witness in a criminal
action not to appear at the scheduled hearing so that the case against the client, the
accused, would be dismissed. (Cantorne vs. Ducasin supra) asking a client to plead
guilty to a crime which the lawyer knows his client did not commit, (Nueno v. Santos,
58 Phil. 557 [1933]) advising a client who is detained for a crime to escape from
prison, (Cf. Medina v. Yan, G.R. No. 30978, Sept. 30, 1974) employing dilatory
tactics to frustrate satisfaction of clearly valid claims, Pajares vs. Abad Santos, G.R.
No. 29543, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 748) prosecuting clearly frivolous cases or
appeals to drain the resources of the other party and compel him to submit out of
exhaustion (Samar Mining Co. vs. Arnado, G.R. No. 22304. July 30, 1968) and filing
multiple petitions or complaints for a cause that has been previously rejected in the
false expectation of getting favorable action. (Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
43757, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 173; Ramos vs. Potenciano, G.R. No. 27104, Dec.
20, 1976, 74 SCRA 345; Macias v. Uy Kim, G.R. No. 31174, May 30, 1972, 45 SCRA
251) Acts of this or similar nature are grounds for disciplinary action." Agpalo Legal
Ethics, U.P. Law Center, 1980 Edition, pp. 405-406)
The invocation of constitutional rights by the private respondent is without merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned orders of the respondent court are
hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases Nos. 0043-M, 0044-M, 0045-M, 0046M, 0047-M, and 0048-M
are reinstated and the proper regional trial court is ordered to proceed with all deliberate speed in
these cases.
SO ORDERED.