GSIS CASES

G.R. No. 111812 May 31, 1995

DIONISIO M. RABOR, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, respondent.

FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility
Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao
City. He entered the government service as
a Utility worker on 10 April 1978 at the age
of 55 years.
Sometime in May 1991, 1 Alma, D. Pagatpatan,
an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City,
advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement,
considering that he had already reached the age of sixtyeight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13)
years and one (1) month of government service. Rabor
responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of
Membership" 2 issued by the Government Service
Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At
the bottom of this "Certificate of Membership" is a
typewritten statement of the following tenor: "Service
extended to comply 15 years service reqts." This
statement is followed by a non-legible initial with the
following date "2/28/91."

Thereupon, the Davao City Government,

through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to the
Regional Director of the Civil Service
Commission, Region XI, Davao City
("CSRO-XI"), informing the latter of the
foregoing and requesting advice "as to
what action [should] be taken on this
matter."
In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director
Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised

Davao City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as

follows:
Please be informed that the
extension of services of Mr.
Rabor is contrary to M.C. No.
65 of the Office of the
President, the relevant portion
of which is hereunder quoted:
Officials and
employees who
have reached the
compulsory
retirement age of
65 years shall not
be retained the
service, except for
extremely
meritorious
reasons in which
case the retention
shall not exceed
six (6) months.
IN VIEW WHEREFORE,
please be advised that the
services of Mr. Dominador [M.]
Rabor as Utility Worker in that
office, is already nonextend[i]ble. 3
Accordingly, on 8 August l991, Mayor
Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July
1991 letter of Director Cawad to Rabor and
advised him "to stop reporting for work
effective August 16, 1991." 4
Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional
Director, CSRO-XI, a letter dated 14 August
1991, asking for extension of his services in
the City Government until he "shall have
completed the fifteen (15) years service

[requirement] in the Government so that

[he] could also avail of the benefits of the
retirement laws given to employees of the
Government." The extension he was asking
for was about two (2) years. Asserting that
he was "still in good health and very able to
perform the duties and functions of [his]
position as Utility Worker," Rabor sought
"extension of [his] service as an exception
to Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the
Office of the President." 5 This request was
denied by Director Cawad on 15 August 1991.

Petitioner Rabor next wrote to the Office of

the President on 29 January 1992 seeking
reconsideration of the decision of Director
Cawad, CSRO-XI. The Office of the
President referred Mr. Rabor's letter to the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission
on 5 March 1992.
In its Resolution No. 92-594, dated 28 April
1992, the Civil Service Commission
dismissed the appeal of Mr. Rabor and
affirmed the action of Director Cawad
embodied in the latter's letter of 26 July
1991. This Resolution stated in part:
In his appeal, Rabor requested
that he be allowed to continue
rendering services as Utility
Worker in order to complete
the fifteen (15) year service
requirement under P.D. 1146.
CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 27, s. 1990 provides, in
part:
1. Any request for
extension of
service of
compulsory

retirees to
complete the
fifteen years
service
requirement for
retirement shall be
allowed only to
permanent
appointees in the
career service
who are regular
members of the
Government
Service Insurance
System (GSIS)
and shall be
granted for a
period of not
exceeding one (1)
year.
Considering that as early as
October 18, 1988, Rabor was
already due for retirement, his
request for further extension of
service cannot be given due
course. 6 (Emphasis in the original)
On 28 October 1992, Mr. Rabor sought
reconsideration of Resolution No. 92-594 of
the Civil Service Commission this time
invoking the Decision of this Court in Cena
v. Civil Service Commission. 7 Petitioner also
asked for reinstatement with back salaries and benefits,
having been separated from the government service
effective 16 August 1991. Rabor's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Commission.

Petitioner Rabor sent another letter dated

16 April 1993 to the Office of the Mayor,
Davao City, again requesting that he be
allowed to continue rendering service to the
Davao City Government as Utility Worker in

order to complete the fifteen (15) years

service requirement under P.D. No. 1146.
This request was once more denied by
Mayor Duterte in a letter to petitioner dated
19 May 1993. In this letter, Mayor Duterte
pointed out that, underCena grant of the
extension of service was discretionary on
the part of the City Mayor, but that he could
not grant the extension requested. Mayor
Duterte's letter, in relevant part, read:
The matter was referred to the
City Legal Office and the
Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission, in the advent of
the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Cena vs. CSC, et
al. (G.R. No. 97419 dated July
3, 1992), for legal opinion.
Both the City Legal Officer and
the Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission are one in
these opinion that extending
you an appointment in order
that you may be able to
complete the fifteen-year
service requirement is
discretionary [on the part of]
the City Mayor.
Much as we desire to extend
you an appointment but
circumstances are that we can
no longer do so.As you are
already nearing your 70th
birthday may no longer be able
to perform the duties attached
to your position. Moreover, the
position you had vacated was
already filled up.

We therefore regret to inform

you that we cannot act
favorably on your
request. 8 (Emphases supplied)
At this point, Mr. Rabor decided to come to
this Court. He filed a Letter/Petition dated 6
July 1993 appealing from Civil Service
Resolution No. 92-594 and from Mayor
Duterte's letter of 10 May 1993.
The Court required petitioner Rabor to
comply with the formal requirements for
instituting a special civil action
ofcertiorari to review the assailed
Resolution of the Civil Service Commission.
In turn, the Commission was required to
comment on petitioner's Letter/Petition. 9 The
Court subsequently noted petitioner's Letter of 13
September 1993 relating to compliance with the
mentioned formal requirements and directed the Clerk of
Court to advise petitioner to engage the services of
counsel or to ask for legal assistance from the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO). 10

The Civil Service Commission, through the

Office of the Solicitor General, filed its
comment on 16 November 1993. The Court
then resolved to give due course to the
Petition and required the parties to file
memoranda. Both the Commission and Mr.
Rabor (the latter through PAO counsel) did
so.
In this proceeding, petitioner Rabor
contends that his claim falls squarely within
the ruling of this Court in Cena v. Civil
Service Commission. 11
Upon the other hand, the Commission
seeks to distinguish this case from Cena.
The Commission, through the Solicitor
General, stressed that in Cena, this Court
had ruled that the employer agency, the

Land Registration Authority of the

Department of Justice, was vested with
discretion to grant to Cena the extension
requested by him. The Land Registration
Authority had chosen not to exercise its
discretion to grant or deny such extension.
In contrast, in the instant case, the Davao
City Government did exercise its discretion
on the matter and decided to deny the
extension sought by petitioner Rabor for
legitimate reasons.
While the Cena decision is barely three (3)
years old, the Court considers that it must
reexamine the doctrine ofCena and the
theoretical and policy underpinnings
thereof. 12
We start by recalling the factual setting
of Cena.
Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar
of the Register of Deeds of Malabon,
Metropolitan Manila, on 16 July 1987. He
reached the compulsory retirement age of
sixty-five (65) years on 22 January 1991.
By the latter date, his government service
would have reached a total of eleven (11)
years, nine (9) months and six (6) days.
Before reaching his 65th birthday, Cena
requested the Secretary of Justice, through
the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority ("LRA") that he be allowed to
extend his service to complete the fifteenyear service requirement to enable him to
retire with the full benefit of an Old-Age
Pension under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No.
1146. If Cena's request were granted, he
would complete fifteen (15) years of
government service on 15 April 1994, at the
age of sixty-eight (68) years.

The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from

the Civil Service Commission on whether or
not Cena's request could be granted
considering that Cena was covered by Civil
Service Memorandum No. 27, Series of
1990. On 17 October 1990, the
Commission allowed Cena a one (1) year
extension of his service from 22 January
1991 to 22 January 1992 under its
Memorandum Circular No. 27. Dissatisfied,
Cena moved for reconsideration, without
success. He then came to this Court,
claiming that he was entitled to an
extension of three (3) years, three (3)
months and twenty-four (24) days to
complete the fifteen-year service
requirement for retirement with full benefits
under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146.
This Court granted Cena' s petition in its
Decision of 3 July 1992. Speaking through
Mr. Justice Medialdea, the Court held that a
government employee who has reached
the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five
(65) years, but at the same time has not yet
completed fifteen (15) years of government
service required under Section 11 (b) of
P.D. No. 1146 to qualify for the Old-Age
Pension Benefit, may be granted an
extension of his government service for
such period of time as may be necessary to
"fill up" or comply with the fifteen (15)-year
service requirement. The Court also held
that the authority to grant the extension
was a discretionary one vested in the head
of the agency concerned. Thus the Court
concluded:
Accordingly, the Petition is
GRANTED. The Land
Registration Authority (LRA)
and Department of Justice has

the discretion to
allow petitioner Gaudencio
Cena to extend his 11 years, 9
months and 6 days of
government to complete the
fifteen-year service so that he
may retire with full benefits
under Section 11, paragraph
(b) of P.D. 1146. 13 (Emphases
supplied)

The Court reached the above conclusion

primarily on the basis of the "plain and
ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D.
No. 1146. Section 11 may be quoted in its
entirety:
Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age
Pension. (a) Old-Age
Pension shall be paid to a
member who
(1) has at least
fifteen (15) years
of service;
(2) is at least sixty
(60) years of age;
and
(3) is separated
from the service.
(b) unless the service is
extended by appropriate
authorities, retirement shall be
compulsory for an employee at
sixty-five-(65) years of age with
at least fifteen (15) years of
service; Provided, that if he
has less than fifteen (15) years
of service, he shall he allowed
to continue in the service to

completed the fifteen (15)

years. (Emphases supplied)
The Court went on to rely upon the canon
of liberal construction which has often been
invoked in respect of retirement statutes:
Being remedial in character, a
statute granting a pension or
establishing [a] retirement plan
should be liberally construed
and administered in favor of
persons intended to be
benefitted thereby. The liberal
approach aims to achieve the
humanitarian purposes of the
law in order that efficiency,
security and well-being of
government employees may
be enhanced. 14 (Citations omitted)
While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in
verbally unqualified terms, there were (and
still are) two (2) administrative issuances
which prescribe limitations on the extension
of service that may be granted to an
employee who has reached sixty-five (65)
years of age.
The first administrative issuance is Civil
Service Commission Circular No. 27,
Series of 1990, which should be quoted in
its entirety:
TO : ALL HEADS OF
DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS
AND AGENCIES OF THE
NATIONAL/LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING
GOVERNMENT- OWNED
AND/OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS WITH
ORIGINAL CHARTERS.

SUBJECT : Extension of
Service of Compulsory Retiree
to Complete the Fifteen Years
Service Requirement for
Retirement Purposes.
Pursuant to CSC Resolution
No. 90-454 dated May 21,
1990, the Civil Service
Commission hereby adopts
and promulgates the following
policies and guidelines in the
extension of services of
compulsory retirees to
complete the fifteen years
service requirement for
retirement purposes:
1. Any request for
the extension of
service of
compulsory
retirees to
complete the
fifteen (15) years
service
requirement for
retirement shall be
allowed only to
permanent
appointees in the
career service
who are regular
members of the
Government
Service Insurance
System (GSIS),
and shall be
granted for a
period not
exceeding one (1)
year.

2. Any request for

the extension of
service of
compulsory retiree
to complete the
fifteen (15) years
service
requirement for
retirement who
entered the
government
service at 57
years of age or
over upon prior
grant of authority
to appoint him or
her, shall no
longer be granted.
3. Any request for
the extension of
service to
complete the
fifteen (15) years
service
requirement of
retirement shall be
filled not later than
three (3) years
prior to the date of
compulsory
retirement.
4. Any request for
the extension of
service of a
compulsory retiree
who meets the
minimum number
of years of service
for retirement
purposes may be

granted for six (6)

months only with
no further
extension.
This Memorandum Circular
shall take effect immediately.
(Emphases supplied)
The second administrative issuance
Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office
of the President, dated 14 June 1988
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, this Office has
been. receiving requests for
reinstatement and/or retention
in the service of employees
who have reached the
compulsory retirement age of
65 years, despite the strict
conditions provided for in
Memorandum Circular No.
163, dated March 5, 1968, as
amended.
WHEREAS, the President has
recently adopted a policy to
adhere more strictly to the law
providing for compulsory
retirement age of 65 years
and, in extremely meritorious
cases, to limit the service
beyond the age of 65 years to
six (6) months only.
WHEREFORE, the pertinent
provision of Memorandum
Circular No. 163 or on the
retention in the service of
officials or employees who

have reached the compulsory

retirement age of 65 years, is
hereby amended to read as
follows:
Officials
or employees who
have reached the
compulsory
retirement age of
65
yearsshall not be
retained in the
service, except for
extremely
meritorious
reasons in which
case the retention
shall not exceed
six (6) months.
All heads of departments,
bureaus, offices and
instrumentalities of the
government including
government-owned or
controlled corporations, are
hereby enjoined to require
their respective offices to
strictly comply with this
circular.
This Circular shall take effect
immediately.

By auth

CATAL
Execut

Manila, June 14,

1988. 15 (Emphasis supplied)

employee who has reached

the compulsory retirement age
of sixty-five (65) years, but has
less than fifteen (15) years of
service under Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27,
S. 1990, cannot likewise be
accorded validity because it
has no relationship or
connection with any provision
of P.D. 1146 supposed to be
carried into effect. The rule
was an addition to or
extension of the law, not
merely a mode of carrying it
into effect. The Civil Service
Commission has no power to
supply perceived omissions in
P.D. 1146. 16 (Emphasis supplied)

Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges

posed by the above two (2) administrative
regulations by, firstly, considering
as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No.
27 and, secondly, by interpreting the Office
of the President's Memorandum Circular
No. 65 as inapplicable to the case of
Gaudencio T. Cena.
We turn first to the Civil Service
Commission's Memorandum Circular No.
27. Medialdea, J. wrote:
The Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 27
being in the nature of an
administrative regulation, must
be governed by the principle
that administrative regulations
adopted under legislative
authority by a particular
department must be in
harmony with the provisions of
the law, and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions
(People v. Maceren, G.R. No.
L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79
SCRA 450; Teoxon v.
Members of the Board of
Administrators, L-25619, June
30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585;
Manuel v. General Auditing
Office, L-28952, December 29,
1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v.
Casteel, L-21906, August 29,
1969, 29 SCRA 350). . . . . The
rule on limiting to one the year
the extension of service of an

It will be seen that Cena, in striking down

Civil Service Commission Memorandum
No. 27, took a very narrow view on the
question of what subordinate rule-making
by an administrative agency is permissible
and valid. That restrictive view must be
contrasted with this Court's earlier ruling
in People v. Exconde, 17 where Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes said:

It is well established in this

jurisdiction that, while the
making of laws is a nondelegable activity that
corresponds exclusively to
Congress, nevertheless, the
latter may constitutionally
delegate authority and
promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a
given legislation and effectuate
its policies, for the reason

that the legislature often finds

it impracticable (if not
impossible) to anticipate and
provide for the multifarious and
complex situations that may be
met in carrying the law into
effect. All that is required is
that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but
conform to standards that the
law prescribes. 18(Emphasis
supplied)

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 19 the Court, in sustaining

the validity of a MECS Order which established passing
a uniform admission test called the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as a prerequisite for eligibility for
admission into medical schools in the Philippines, said:

The standards set for

subordinate legislation in the
exercise of rule making
authority by an administrative
agency like the Board of
Medical Education
are necessarily broad and
highly abstract. As explained
by then Mr. Justice Fernando
in Edu v. Ericta (35 SCRA 481
[1970])
The standards
may be either
expressed or impli
ed. If the former,
the non-delegation
objection is easily
met. The
Standard though
does not have to

be spelled out
specifically. It
could be implied
from the policy
and purpose of
the act considered
as a whole. In the
Reflector Law,
clearly the
legislative
objective is public
safety. What is
sought to be
attained
in Calalang v.
William is "safe
transit upon the
roads."
We believe and so hold
that the necessary standards
are set forth in Section 1 of the
1959 Medical Act: "the
standardization and regulation
of medical education" and in
Section 5 (a) and 7 of the
same Act, the body of the
statute itself, and that these
considered together are
sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the nondelegation principle. 20 (Citations
omitted; emphasis partly in the original
and partly supplied)

In Edu v. Ericta, 21 then Mr. Justice Fernando

stressed the abstract and very general nature of the
standards which our Court has in prior case law upheld
as sufficient for purposes of compliance with the
requirements for validity of subordinate or administrative
rule-making:

This Court has considered as

sufficient standards, "public

welfare," (Municipality of
Cardona v. Municipality of
Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547
[1917]); "necessary in the
interest of law and
order," (Rubi v. Provincial
Board, 39 Phil. 660
[1919]); "public
interest," (People v. Rosenthal,
68 Phil. 328 [1939]);
and "justice and equity and
substantial merits of the
case," (International Hardwood
v. Pangil Federation of Labor,
17 Phil. 602 [1940]). 22 (Emphasis
supplied)

Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a

considerably higher degree of detail in the
statute to be implemented, went against
prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the
governing or enabling statute is quite
detailed and specific to begin with, there
would be very little need (or occasion) for
implementing administrative regulations. It
is, however, precisely the inability of
legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many)
possible detailed situations in respect of
any relatively complex subject matter, that
makes subordinate, delegated rule-making
by administrative agencies so important
and unavoidable. All that may be
reasonably; demanded is a showing that
the delegated legislation consisting of
administrative regulations are germane to
the general purposes projected by the
governing or enabling statute. This is the
test that is appropriately applied in respect
of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No.
27, Series of 1990, and to this test we now
turn.

We consider that the enabling statute that

should appropriately be examined is the
present Civil Service law found in Book
V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No.
292 dated 25 July 1987, otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987
and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise
known as the "Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the
matter of extension of service of retirees
who have reached sixty-five (65) years of
age is an area that is covered by both
statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of
P.D. 1146. This is crystal clear from
examination of many provisions of the
present civil service law.
Section 12 of the present Civil Service law
set out in the 1987 Administrative Code
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Sec. 12 Powers and Functions.
The [Civil Service]
Commission shall have the
following powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Prescribe, amend and
enforce rules and regulations
for carrying into effect the
provisions of the Civil Service
Law and other pertinent laws;
(3) Promulgate policies,
standards and guidelines for
the Civil Service and adopt
plans and programsto
promote economical,
efficient and effective
personnel administration in the
government;

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Formulate, administer and
evaluate programs relative to
the development and
retention of aqualified and
competent work force in
the public service;
xxx xxx xxx
(14) Take appropriate
action on all appointments and
other personnel matters in the
Civil Serviceincluding
extension of service beyond
retirement age;
xxx xxx xxx
(17) Administer the retirement
program for government
officials and employees, and
accredit government services
and evaluate qualifications for
retirement;
xxx xxx xxx
(19) Perform all functions
properly belonging to a central
personnel agency and such
other functions as may be
provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
It was on the bases of the above quoted
provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code
that the Civil Service Commission
promulgated its Memorandum Circular No.
27. In doing so, the Commission was acting
as "the central personnel agency of the
government empowered to promulgate

policies, standards and guidelines for

efficient, responsive and effective
personnel administration in the
government." 23 It was also discharging its function
of "administering the retirement program for government
officials and employees" and of "evaluat[ing]
qualifications for retirement."

In addition, the Civil Service Commission is

charged by the 1987 Administrative Code
with providing leadership and assistance "in
the development and retention of qualified
and efficient work force in the Civil Service"
(Section 16 [10]) and with the "enforcement
of the constitutional and statutory
provisions, relative to retirement and the
regulation for the effective implementation
of the retirement of government officials
and employees" (Section 16 [14]).
We find it very difficult to suppose that the
limitation of permissible extensions of
service after an employee has reached
sixty-five (65) years of age has no
reasonable relationship or is not germane
to the foregoing provisions of the present
Civil Service Law. The physiological and
psychological processes associated with
ageing in human beings are in fact related
to the efficiency and quality of the service
that may be expected from individual
persons. The policy considerations which
guided the Civil Service Commission in
limiting the maximum extension of service
allowable for compulsory retirees, were
summarized by Grio-Aquino, J. in her
dissenting opinion in Cena:
Worth pondering also are the
points raised by the Civil
Service Commission that
extending the service of
compulsory retirees for longer

than one (1) year would: (1)

give a premium to latecomersin the government
service and in effect
discriminate against those who
enter the service at a younger
age; (2) delay the promotion of
the latter and of next-in-rank
employees; and (3) prejudice
the chances for employment of
qualified young civil service
applicants who have already
passed the various
government examination but
must wait for jobs to be
vacated by "extendees" who
have long passed the
mandatory retirement age but
are enjoying extension of their
government service to
complete 15 years so they may
qualify for old-age
pension. 24 (Emphasis supplied).
Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of
retirees or would be retirees, something
that is, in itself, quite appropriate. At the
same time, however, we are bound to note
that there should be countervailing stress
on the interests of the employer agency
and of other government employees as a
whole. The results flowing from the striking
down of the limitation established in Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 may
well be "absurd and inequitable," as
suggested by Mme. Justice Grio-Aquino in
her dissenting opinion. An employee who
has rendered only three (3) years of
government service at age sixty-five (65)
can have his service extended for twelve
(12) years and finally retire at the age of
seventy-seven (77). This reduces the

significance of the general principle of

compulsory retirement at age sixty-five (65)
very close to the vanishing point.
The very real difficulties posed by
the Cena doctrine for rational personnel
administration and management in the Civil
Service, are aggravated when Cena is
considered together with the case
of Toledo v. Civil Service
Commission. 25 Toledo involved the provisions of
Rule III, Section 22, of the Civil Service Rules on
Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) which
prohibited the appointment of persons fifty-seven (57)
years old or above in government service without prior
approval of the Civil Service Commission. Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1983 provided
that a person fifty-seven (57) years of age may be
appointed to the Civil Service provided that the
exigencies of the government service so required and
provided that the appointee possesses special
qualifications not possessed by other officers or
employees in the Civil Service and that the vacancy
cannot be filled by promotion of qualified officers or
employees of the Civil Service. Petitioner Toledo was
appointed Manager of the Education and Information
Division of the Commission on Elections when he was
almost fifty-nine (59) years old. No authority for such
appointment had been obtained either from the
President of the Philippines or from the Civil Service
Commission and the Commission found that the other
conditions laid down in Section 22 of Rule III, CSRPAP,
did not exist. The Court nevertheless struck down
Section 22, Rule III on the same exceedingly restrictive
view of permissible administrative legislation
that Cena relied on. 26

When one combines the doctrine

of Toledo with the ruling in Cena, very
strange results follow. Under these
combined doctrines, a person sixty-four
(64) years of age may be appointed to the
government service and one (1) year later
may demand extension of his service for
the next fourteen (14) years; he would
retire at age seventy-nine (79). The net
effect is thus that the general statutory
policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five

(65) years is heavily eroded and effectively

becomes unenforceable. That general
statutory policy may be seen to embody the
notion that there should be a certain
minimum turn-over in the government
service and that opportunities for
government service should be distributed
as broadly as possible, specially to younger
people, considering that the bulk of our
population is below thirty (30) years of age.
That same general policy also reflects the
life expectancy of our people which is still
significantly lower than the life expectancy
of, e.g., people in Northern and Western
Europe, North America and Japan.
Our conclusion is that the doctrine
of Cena should be and is hereby modified
to this extent: that Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of
1990, more specifically paragraph (1)
thereof, is hereby declared valid and
effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146
must, accordingly, be read together with
Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate,
however, the holding in Cena that the head
of the government agency concerned is
vested with discretionary authority to allow
or disallow extension of the service of an
official or employee who has reached sixtyfive (65) years of age without completing
fifteen (15) years of government service;
this discretion is, nevertheless, to be
exercised conformably with the provisions
of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No.
27, Series of 1990.
We do not believe it necessary to deal
specifically with Memorandum Circular No.
65 of the Office of the President dated 14
June 1988. It will be noted from the text
quoted supra (pp. 11-12) that the text itself

of Memorandum Circular No. 65 (and for

that matter, that of Memorandum Circular
No. 163, also of the Office of the President,
dated 5 March 1968) 27 does not purport to
apply only to officers or employees who have reached
the age of sixty-five (65) years and who have at least
fifteen (l5) years of government service. We noted earlier
that Cena interpreted Memorandum Circular No. 65 as
referring only to officers and employees who have both
reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65)
and completed the fifteen (15) years of government
service. Cena so interpreted this Memorandum Circular
precisely because Cena had reached the conclusion that
employees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of
age, but who have less than fifteen (15) years of
government service, may be allowed such extension of
service as may be needed to complete fifteen (15) years
of service. In other words, Cena read Memorandum
Circular No. 65 in such a way as to comfort
with Cena's own conclusion reached without regard to
that Memorandum Circular. In view of the conclusion that
we today reached in the instant case, this last ruling
of Cena is properly regarded as merely orbiter.

We also do not believe it necessary to

determine whether Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27 is fully
compatible with Office of the President's
Memorandum Circular No. 65; this question
must be reserved for detailed analysis in
some future justiciable case.
Applying now the results of our
reexamination of Cena to the instant case,
we believe and so hold that Civil Service
Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992
dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rabor
and affirming the action of CSRO-XI
Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must
be upheld and affirmed.
ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the
Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-21723 November 26, 1970

HILARION BERONILLA, petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, its BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ET
AL., respondents.
Hilarion Beronilla in his own behalf.
L. Monasterial and L. A. Diokno, Jr. for
respondents GSIS, etc., et al.
T. Besa and J. Jimenez for respondent
Rafael S. Recto.
Office of the Solicitor General for
respondent Auditor General.

BARREDO, J.:
A special civil action for prohibition seeking
to declare Resolution No. 1497 of the
Board of Trustees of the respondent
Government Service Insurance System of
August 9, 1963 to the effect that petitioner
"Mr. (Hilarion) Beronilla be considered
compulsorily retired from the service (as
Auditor of the Philippine National Bank)
effective January 14, 1963" as null and void
for having been issued, in the words of the
petition, "in excess of the powers granted to
it by law, a wanton abuse of discretion,
violation of contracts, removal or forced
retirement without due process of law and
to declare all acts heretofore taken in
implementation thereof also void, and to
prohibit said respondent and its
representatives from carrying out or
implementing the aforesaid resolution."
Acting on petitioner's prayer for preliminary

injunction, on August 26, 1963, this Court

issued the writ prayed for upon petitioner's
filing an injunction bond in the amount of
P1,000.00.
At the time of the filing of the present
petition on August 23, 1963, petitioner was
acting as and performing the duties of
Auditor of the Philippine National Bank.
Before that, he had occupied many other
positions in the government and had been
a member of the GSIS during all times
required by law.
In his application for employment, his
applications for life and retirement
insurance as well as his application to be
allowed to take civil service examinations,
ten times from 1917 to 1925, petitioner
uniformly indicated that his date of birth is
January 14, 1898. He also indicated the
same date of birth in his Member's Service
Record which he submitted to the GSIS on
October 29, 1954 pursuant to the
provisions of Section 13-A, Republic Act
No. 660.
On September 29, 1959, he requested the
Commissioner of Civil Service, thru the
Auditor General, that his date of birth
indicated in the records be changed to
January 14, 1900. According to the petition,
it was only in 1955, before the demise of
his mother that petitioner discovered that
his true date of birth is January 14, 1900;
that his mother told him that in 1916, his
uncle, Alvaro Beronilla, purchased a cedula
for him showing in the same that he was
already 18 years old for the reason that his
uncle wanted to take advantage of his
being able to vote for him in La Paz, Abra in
1919, when he would be already twenty-

one years of age and the uncle a candidate

for vice-president of the municipality; that
since then he had been looking for people
who could attest to his true date of birth
and it was only in September, 1959 that he
came upon two old persons of their town,
Felix Alberne and Ricardo Lalin who could
do so; that the former had been a member
of the provincial board and the latter is a
retired justice of the peace; and that his
letter to the Civil Service Commissioner
was supported by the affidavits of these two
persons. This letter was endorsed by the
Commission to the GSIS for action "without
the intervention of the Civil Service
Commission."
In the GSIS, petitioner's letter-request was
referred to the Legal Counsel who, on
October 22, 1959, denied the same since
"all official records point to January 14,
1898 as the birthday of Mr. Hilarion
Beronilla." Upon learning of this denial,
petitioner submitted additional evidence to
support his request. This evidence
consisted of photostat copies of the
yearbooks of the Philippine Institute of
Accountants in 1954 and 1958 wherein his
date of birth is shown as January 14, 1900.
This additional evidence notwithstanding,
on March 21, 1960 the Legal Counsel
reiterated his former denial. Whereupon, on
May 21, 1960 petitioner appealed to the
General Manager of the System who at that
time was Mr. Rodolfo Andal. Upon
favorable recommendation of the 2nd
Assistant General Manager, Mr. F. G. Araa
in a memorandum dated May 30, 1960, on
June 2, 1960, Mr. Andal placed "OK." at the
foot thereof over his initials, thus indicating
approval of the requested change.

Based on this action of the General

Manager, notes of the adjustment of the
date of birth of petitioner to January 14,
1900 were sent to the Auditor General and
the Commissioner of Civil Service and the
proceeds of petitioner's policy was recomputed. The Legal Counsel whose title
and rank had been meanwhile changed to
Assistant General Manager for Legal Affairs
later communicated the aforesaid decision
of the General manager to the Philippine
National Bank on November 2, 1962 and
the Deputy Auditor General on November
12, 1962, by letter and indorsement,
respectively. As emphasized by petitioner,
in the letter to the Philippine National Bank,
it is stated that "his date of birth has been
adjusted by this office, after careful study
and deliberation." On the other hand, in the
2nd indorsement to the Deputy Auditor
General, it was made clear that relative to
petitioner's life insurance policy No. N-2065
which had matured on November 30, 1957,
corresponding adjustment or recomputation
of the maturity value had been effected on
the basis of his changed date of birth. In
the meantime, upon application of
petitioner, on October 1, 1960, he was
issued a new life policy No. 335778
indicating his date of birth as January 14,
1900. Regarding his above-mentioned
policy No. N-2065, on July 7, 1960,
demand was made upon petitioner to pay
the System additionally the sum of
P131.09, due to the adjustment of his date
of birth, which demand, petitioner promptly
complied with.
Almost three years after Mr. Andal
approved the change of petitioner's date of
birth, more specifically, on May 6, 1963, Mr.
Ismael Mathay, then Auditor of the Central

Bank detailed to the Philippine National

Bank, wrote the Board of Trustees of the
GSIS about the service of petitioner and
stated that "in the course of the audit of the
transactions of the Philippine National
Bank, it was found that Mr. Hilarion
Beronilla has been continuously paid since
January 15, 1963, his salary allowances
and other fringe benefits as Auditor of said
Bank notwithstanding the fact that Mr.
Beronilla has attained his sixty-fifth (65th)
birthday last January 14, 1963, the date of
his automatic and compulsory retirement
from the government service as fixed under
Republic Act No. 3096 approved June 16,
1961." Acting on this letter, the Board
referred the same to Assistant General
Manager and Actuary, Dr. Manuel Hizon,
then in charge of the Claims Department.
The latter submitted a memorandum on
August 6, 1963 stating the facts and
evidence in the GSIS records concerning
the determination of the date of birth of
petitioner, including the actions
aforementioned taken thereon by Mr. Andal
and the Legal Counsel. On August 9, 1963,
the Board adopted the disputed resolution
without even notifying petitioner of Mr.
Mathay's letter and without giving him any
opportunity to be heard regarding the
same.
Upon these facts, it is the theory of
petitioner that the approval by General
Manager Andal of his request for the
change of the date of his birth in the official
records of the GSIS from January 14, 1898
to January 14, 1900, after the same had
been previously denied by the Legal
Counsel, could not be legally altered or
modified by the Board of Trustees, not only
because the power to decide such matter

finally is legally lodged in the General

Manager and not in the Legal Counsel, nor
in the Board, but also because even if the
Board were assumed to have authority to
review the acts of the General Manager, it
was either guilty of laches or estopped from
revising the same; and, furthermore, in
approving the resolution in dispute, the
Board of Trustees had denied due process
to petitioner and impaired the obligations of
the contract between petitioner and the
GSIS regarding his retirement. In other
words, the main issue before Us in this
case is one of power and does not call for
Our determination of whether petitioner's
real date of birth is January 14, 1898 or
January 14, 1900. Accordingly, all We have
to decide is whether or not the GSIS Board
of Trustees acted within its powers when it
reversed the approval by General Manager
Andal of petitioner's request for the change
of his date of birth, taking all circumstances
into account including petitioner's
allegations of res adjudicata, laches,
estoppel, denial of due process and
unconstitutional impairment of contractual
obligations. After carefully going over the
facts on record and considering all
pertinent legal principles and statutory
provisions, particularly Commonwealth Act
186, the Charter of the GSIS, as amended,
together with the relevant resolutions of the
Board of Trustees, We have decided to
uphold the superior authority of the Board
over the General Manager and to dismiss
this petition.
We do not deem it necessary to pass upon
petitioner's initial proposition, pressed
vigorously, to be sure, to the effect that as
between the previous denial by the Legal
Counsel and the subsequent approval by

General Manager Andal of his request for

the change of his date of birth in the
records, the latter, which was precisely the
action on his appeal from the Legal
Counsel's denial, should prevail. Even
granting it to be true that, pursuant to what
is generally the practice and the rule,
applications for retirement annuities in the
GSIS are subject to final approval by the
General Manager after its being approved
by one of the Assistant General Managers
and/or one or two Department Managers, 1 it
is clear to Us that under the GSIS charter, the General
Manager's approval is not beyond review and
reprobation by the Board of Trustees. It must be borne in
mind that under Section 16 of said charter, the System
"shall be managed by the Board of Trustees ... " and
Section 17 adds that the Board "shall have the following
powers and authority: (a) to adopt by-laws, rules and
regulations for the administration of the System and the
transaction of its business." On the other hand, the
extent of the functions and powers of the General
Manager are defined in Section 18 as follows:

SEC. 18. Personnel. The

Board shall have the power to
appoint a general manager,
who shall be a person of
recognized experience and
capacity in the subject of life
and social insurance, and who
shall be the chief executive
officer of the System, one or
more assistant general
managers, one or more
managers, a medical director,
and an actuary, and fix their
compensation. The general
manager shall, subject to the
approval of the Board, appoint
additional personnel whenever
and wherever they may be
necessary to the effective
execution of the provisions of

this Act, fix their compensation,

remove, suspend, or otherwise
discipline them, for cause. He
shall have the power to
prescribe their duties, grant
leave, prescribe certain
qualifications to the end that
only competent persons may
be employed, and appoint
committees: Provided,
however, That said additional
personnel shall be subject to
existing Civil Service laws,
rules and regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
It is thus obvious that by express statutory
authority, the Board of Trustees directly
manages the System and the General
Manager is only the chief executive officer
of the Board. In the exercise of its power to
adopt rules and regulations for the
administration of the System and the
transaction of its business, the Board may
lodge in the General Manager the authority
to act on any matter the Board may deem
proper, but in no wise can such conferment
of authority be considered as a full and
complete delegation resulting in the
diminution, much less exhaustion, of the
Board's own statutorily-based prerogative
and responsibility to manage the affairs of
the System and, accordingly, to decide with
finality any matter affecting its transactions
or business. In other words, even if the
Board may entrust to the General Manager
the power to give final approval to
applications for retirement annuities, the
finality of such approval cannot be
understood to divest the Board, in
appropriate cases and upon its attention

being called to a flaw, mistake or

irregularity in the General Manager's action,
of the authority to exercise its power of
supervision and control which flows
naturally from the ultimate and final
responsibility for the proper management of
the System imposed upon it by the charter.
Incidentally, it may be added that the force
of this principle is even more true insofar as
the GSIS is concerned, for the fiduciary
character of the management of the
System is rendered more strict by the fact
that the funds under its administration are
partly contributed by the thousands upon
thousands of employees and workers in all
the branches and instrumentalities of the
government. It is indeed well to remember
at all times that the System and,
particularly, its funds do not belong to the
government, much less to any
administration which may happen to be
temporarily on the saddle, and that the
interests of the mass of its members can
only be duly safeguarded if the
administrators of the System act with
utmost fidelity and care. Not for nothing is
its controlling and managing board called
the Board of Trustees. It results, therefore,
that the first contention of petitioner cannot
be sustained and We hold that any
authority conferred upon the General
Manager by the Board of Trustees
notwithstanding, the said Board may in
appropriate cases and in the exercise of its
own sound discretion review the actions
and decisions of the General Manager. The
mere fact that the resolution granting the
authority expressly gives the character of
finality to the General Manager's acts does
not constitute such a representation to third
persons dealing with the System that such
finality is definite even vis-a-vis the Board

as to create any estoppel, for the simple

reason that it is not legally possible for the
Board to divest itself of an authority which
the charter of the System places under its
direct responsibility. From another point of
view, since the law clearly vests the
management in the Board and makes the
General Manager only its chief executive
officer, all parties dealing with the System
must be deemed to be on guard regarding
the ultimate authority of the Board to modify
or reverse any action of the General
Manager and they cannot complain should
the Board exercise its powers in the
premises.
Petitioner posits, however, that even
assuming that the Board may have the
power to reverse or modify any action of
the General Manager in the exercise of his
authority, because of the failure of the
Board to act from June 2, 1960, when
General Manager Andal acted favorably on
his request to August 9, 1963, when the
Board approved the herein impugned
Resolution No. 1497, or for more than three
years, during which time corresponding
adjustments were made in his GSIS
records, payment and life insurance
policies and due notices were served by
the GSIS itself on all parties concerned on
the basis of his changed date of birth,
respondent should be considered as guilty
of laches or held in estoppel to change or
alter the action of Mr. Andal. While
petitioner's posture is not entirely without
logic, it falls short of the requirements for
the successful invocation of the pleas of
laches and estoppel. We have carefully
considered the lengthy and rather
impressive discussion by petitioner of these
points in his petition, memorandum and

reply to respondent's memorandum as well

as the equally detailed and authoritysupported contrary arguments in the
answer and memorandum of the
respondent, and We have arrived at the
conclusion that petitioner's position cannot
be sustained.
It may be stated at the outset that
petitioner's twin points of laches and
estoppel actually boil down in this particular
case to nothing more than estoppel by
silence. With this clarification, it is meet to
recall that "mere innocent silence will not
work estoppel. There must also be some
element of turpitude or negligence
connected with the silence by which
another is misled to his injury" (Civil Code
of the Philippines by Tolentino, Vol. IV, p.
600) and that "the doctrine of estoppel
having its origin in equity and therefore
being based on moral and natural justice,
its applicability to any particular case
depends, to a very large extent, upon the
special circumstances of the case."
(Mirasol v. Municipality of Tabaco, 43 Phil.
610, 614.) Important also it is not to
overlook that as regards the actuations of
government officials, the general rule is that
their mistakes and omissions do not create
estoppel. (Republic vs. Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Co., L-18841, January
27, 1969, citing Pineda vs. Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; and
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs.
Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724. See also:
Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc., L-26862, March 30, 1970, and the
cases therein cited.)
Moreover, in computing the period of
alleged silence or inaction of the Board,

what is relevant is not the actual or, what

petitioner calls, imputable knowledge of
said Board of the favorable action of Mr.
Andal. Even if such knowledge had come
earlier than May 6, 1963, the date of Mr.
Mathay's letter, what is decisive is that it
was only thru Mr. Mathay's letter that the
Board got notice of the error in Mr. Andal's
action. Precisely because it was not
incumbent upon the Board, as petitioner
himself alleges, to spontaneously or in the
ordinary course review the action of the
General Manager, any knowledge thereof
by the Board, whether actual or imputable,
could not, in logic and conscience, have
placed the Board on notice of any error or
irregularity therein. Consequently, the
immediate steps taken by the Board to
have the facts alleged in Mr. Mathay's letter
verified are inconsistent with the charge of
unreasonable delay, much more of laches.
The compulsory retirement of government
officials and employees upon their reaching
the age of 65 years is founded on public
policy which aims by it to maintain
efficiency in the government service and at
the same time give to the retiring public
servants the opportunity to enjoy during the
remainder of their lives the recompense,
inadequate perhaps for their long service
and devotion to. the government, in the
form of a comparatively easier life, freed
from the rigors of civil service discipline and
the exacting demands that the nature of
their work and their relations with their
superiors as well as the public would
impose upon them. Needless to say,
therefore, the officials charged with the duty
of implementing this policy cannot be too
careful in insuring and safeguarding the
correctness and integrity of the records

they prepare and keep. In this case, all that

the Board has done is to set aside what it
found to be an erroneous decision of the
General Manager in approving the change
of date of petitioner's birth, because from
the evidence before it, the Board was
convinced that the originally recorded date
of birth should not be disturbed. We cannot
see where the charged inequity of such
action of the Board could lie.
Above all, it is a must consideration
whenever principles of equity are invoked
that for such invocation to succeed, it must
appear that if the plea is not heeded the
party making the plea will suffer, in truth
and in fact, inequity and injury, whether
pecuniary or moral or, at least, in a juridical
sense. Such is not the case with petitioner.
Examining the circumstances of this case,
We see nothing inequitous to petitioner in
the questioned resolution of the Board of
Trustees. For decades back, repeatedly
and uniformly, petitioner made it appear in
all material government and public records
and in all his representations to respondent
System that his date of birth is January 14,
1898. His rather belated request for a
change of said date to January 14, 1900
which would unquestionably favor his
interests, pecuniarily or otherwise, and
correspondingly adversely affect those of
the System and, of course, its members,
was duly investigated and found not to be
sufficiently grounded to merit favorable
action by the Legal Counsel in whom is
lodged the authority to evaluate such
request. True this negative action was
reversed by the General Manager, albeit by
virtue of a procedure not strictly in
accordance with the established one as
outlined in footnote 1 of this opinion, but on

the other hand, the favorable action of the

General Manager was in turn reversed by
the Board of Trustees, the final legal
authority in the System, upon its being
informed of the error thereof. It is to be
noted that, after all, it was always the
petitioner who made representations to the
respondent System as to his date of birth,
and not the other way around. All that the
System did was to take his representations
for what they were worth. He was not
believed by the Legal Counsel, but the
General Manager did; on the other hand,
the authority higher than the General
Manager found the action of the General
Manager erroneous. Under these
circumstances, how could the System be in
estoppel where the conflicting
representations are of the petitioner rather
than of the System?
Anent petitioner's contention that he was
denied due process when the Board of
Trustees acted on the letter of Mr. Mathay,
without notifying him thereof or hearing him
thereon, suffice it to say that since there is
no showing that under the procedure
established in the GSIS, such notice and
hearing are required, considering that the
System operates as a business corporation
and generally notice and hearing are not
indispensable for due process in
corporations, and in any event, inasmuch
as what was considered by the Board was
nothing more than petitioner's own
conflicting representations, and if petitioner
really believed he should have been heard,
he could have filed a motion for
reconsideration or reopening, it cannot be
said that indeed he had not had due
opportunity to present his side.

Finally, as regards petitioner's argument

that the Board's resolution in question
constitutes an impairment of the obligations
of his contract of insurance, it is obvious
that the constitutional injunction that is
evidently the basis of such argument refers
to the legislature and not to resolutions
even of government corporations. Besides,
petitioner's life insurance policy, apart from
not having any real relevance in this case,
what is involved being his retirement,
contains specific provisions contemplating
the correction of any error or mistake in the
date of birth of the insured. On the other
hand, the retirement of government
employees is imposed by law and is not the
result of any contractual stipulation.
WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is
dismissed, with costs against petitioner,
and the writ of preliminary injunction issued
herein is hereby dissolved.
`

G.R. No. 104139 December

22, 1992
LYDIA M. PROFETA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, Office
of the President of the
Philippines, respondent.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review
on certiorari assailing a portion of the
decision of the Office of the President,
dated 23 October 1991, declaring petitioner
as compulsorily retired as of 15 October
1991 and the resolution dated 31 January

1992 denying petitioner's motion for

reconsideration of said decision.
The antecedents are the following:
Petitioner, Dr. Lydia M. Profeta, served as
Executive Dean of the Rizal Technological
Colleges from 24 October 1974 to 15
October 1978. From 16 October 1978 to 30
April 1979, petitioner was the appointed
Acting President of said College until her
promotion to President of the same college
on 1 May 1979.
After the 1986 EDSA revolution or on 5
March 1986, petitioner filed her courtesy
resignation as President of the Rizal
Technological Colleges and the same was
accepted on 21 March 1986. A day before
the acceptance of her courtesy resignation,
petitioner applied for sick leave.
On 4 November 1988, petitioner was
appointed Acting President of Eulogio
"Amang" Rodriguez Institute of Science
and Technology (hereinafter referred to as
EARIST) and was thereafter appointed its
President on 29 March 1989.
After reaching the age of sixty-five (65)
years on 16 June 1989, petitioner inquired
from the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) as to whether she may be
allowed to extend her services with the
government as President of EARIST
beyond the age of sixty-five (65) years, to
enable her to avail of the old-age pension
retirement benefits under PD 1146
(Revised Government Service Insurance
Act of 1977). In answer to her query,
petitioner was advised by the GSIS to
return to the service until she shall have
fulfilled the fifteen (15) years service

requirement pursuant of Section 11 of PD

1146, to qualify for the old-age pension
retirement plan. The GSIS declared that
petitioner was not yet eligible to retire under
PD 1146, as she had not rendered the
sufficient number of years of service on the
date of her supposed retirement on 16
June 1989 and that her creditable service
was only twelve (12) years and two (2)
months. As things stood, she could only
claim one hundred percent (100%) of her
average monthly compensation for every
year of creditable service or to a refund of
her premium contributions with the GSIS. 1
On 6 October 1989, as recommended by
the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) Secretary and the Board of
Trustees of EARIST, President Aquino,
through Deputy Executive Secretary
Magdangal B. Elma, extended the term of
petitioner as President of EARIST until she
shall have completed the required fifteen
(15) years of service after reaching the age
of sixty five (65) years on the date of her
normal retirement on 16 June 1989 or for
an additional period of two (2) years, seven
(7) months and twelve (12) days. 2
In March 1990, the EARIST Faculty and
Employees Union filed an administrative
complaint against petitioner before the
Office of the President, for her alleged
irregular appointment and for graft and
corrupt practices. In a memorandum, dated
16 August 1990, the Office of the President
furnished petitioner a copy of the complaint
with a directive to file an answer thereto
with the DECS Secretary, who was duly
authorized to conduct a formal investigation
of the charges against petitioner. Pending
investigation of the complaint, petitioner

was placed under preventive suspension

for a period of ninety (90) days. 3 After serving
the period of suspension, petitioner re-assumed her
duties and functions as President of EARIST.

In a letter dated 20 July 1990, DECS

Secretary Cario recommended the
compulsory retirement of petitioner. 4
For the purpose of investigating the
administrative charges against
petitioner, 5 an Ad-Hoc Committee was created by
President Aquino on 12 February 1991. The parties filed
their respective pleadings and hearings in the case were
conducted by the committee.

Pending resolution of the administrative

charges against her, petitioner was detailed
with the DECS Central Office pursuant to a
memorandum dated 13 February 1991
signed by Deputy Executive Secretary
Sarmiento III. Petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 40, seeking her
reinstatement as EARIST President. After
trial, said petition was dismissed. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the
petition for certiorari on 2 April 1991. 6
Petitioner likewise assailed her
reassignment with the DECS Central
Office, before the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). On 30 July 1991, the CSC denied
petitioner's complaint. She moved for
reconsideration of said resolution but the
same was denied on 3 December 1991,
which prompted petitioner to file a petition
for certiorari before this Court docketed as
G.R. No. 103271. On 3 March 1992, this
Court dismissed said petition.
After evaluating the evidence presented
before the Ad-Hoc Committee, in a

decision 7 dated 23 October 1991, the Office of the

President dismissed the administrative complaint against
petitioner for lack of substantial evidence. In the same
decision, the Office of the President also declared
petitioner as compulsory retired from government
service as of 15 October 1991, holding that:

... (I)f the aforesaid sick leave

of 62 working days
(approximately 3 months) were
to be added to the
respondent's creditable
service, together with the
period of two (2) weeks which
the respondent's counsel
admits in his Memorandum the
respondent had served as
Professorial Lecturer, the
respondent should be
considered as compulsorily
retired as of Oct. 15, 1991,
having completed the required
15 years in the service on or
about the said date after
reaching the age of 65.
Accordingly, the administrative
charges against Dr. Lydia M.
Profeta for her alleged
"irregular appointment and
graft and corrupt practices" are
hereby dismissed. However,
Dr. Profeta is hereby
considered as now
compulsorily retired from the
service as of October 15,
1991, in accordance with the
provisions of Section 11 (b) of
Presidential Decree No. 1146,
having completed fifteen (15)
years in the government
service on or about he said
date after reaching the age of

sixty-five (65) on June 16,

1989. 8
In a letter dated 23 October 1991, petitioner
requested the GSIS to determine the exact
date of her retirement. On 5 November
1991, petitioner was advised by the GSIS
that the exact date of her retirement falls on
14 August 1992. 9
A motion for reconsideration was then filed
by petitioner with the Office of the
President, assailing the portion of its
decision declaring her as compulsorily
retired from the service as of 15 October
1991, alleging that the said office has no
jurisdiction over the issue of her
compulsory retirement from the
government service.
In a resolution 10 dated 31 January 1992, petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Office of
the President. In the same resolution, the Office of the
President clarified that there was an over extension of
petitioner's period of service with the government by
failure to reckon with the sixty-two (62) working days
during which petitioner went on sick leave (from 20
March to 17 June 1986) and the period of two (2) weeks
during which petitioner served as Professorial Lecturer.
In considering petitioner as compulsory retired as of 15
October 1991, the Office of the President held that it
merely resolvedmotu proprio to shorten by three-and-ahalf (3-1/2) months the extension granted to petitioner to
complete the required fifteen (15) years of service for
purposes of retirement. It further declared that it is for
the President to determine whether or not petitioner
could still continue as EARIST President despite her
exoneration from the administrative charges filed against
her.

Under Presidential Decree No. 1146

(Revised Government Insurance Act of
1977), one of the benefits provided for
qualified members of the GSIS is the oldage pension benefit. A member who has
rendered at least fifteen (15) years of
service and is at least sixty (60) years old

when separated from the service, is entitled

to a basic monthly pension for life but for
not less than five (5) years. On the other
hand, a member who has rendered less
than fifteen (15) years of service but with at
least three (3) years of service and is sixty
(60) years of age when separated from the
service is entitled to a cash payment
equivalent to one hundred percent (100%)
of the average monthly compensation for
every year of service.
However, retirement is compulsory for a
member who has reached the age of sixtyfive (65) years with at least fifteen (15)
years of service. If he has less than fifteen
(15) years of service, he shall be allowed to
continue in the service to complete the
fifteen (15) years, 11 to avail of the old-age pension
benefit.

To a public servant, a pension is not a

gratuity but rather a form of deferred
compensation for services performed and
his right to it commences to vest upon his
entry into the retirement system and
becomes an enforceable obligation in court
upon fulfillment of all conditions under
which it is to be paid. Similarly, retirement
benefits receivable by public employees
are valuable parts of the consideration for
entrance into and continuation in public
office or employment. They serve a public
purpose and a primary objective in
establishing them is to induce competent
persons to enter and remain in public
employment and render faithful and
efficient service while so
employed. 12 Retirement laws are liberally interpreted
in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide
for his sustenance and hopefully even comfort, when he
no longer has the stamina to continue earning his
livelihood. 13 The liberal approach aims to achieve the

humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the

efficiency, security and well-being of government
employees maybe enhanced. 14

In the case at bar, at the time petitioner

reached the compulsory retirement age of
sixty-five (65) years, she had rendered less
than the required fifteen (15) years of
service under Section 11 of P.D. 1146.
Thus, to enable her to avail of the old-age
pension benefit, she was allowed to
continue in the service and her term as
President of EARIST was extended until
she shall have completed the fifteen (15)
years service requirement, or for an
additional two (2) years, seven (7) months,
and twelve (12) days, as determined by the
Office of the President.
This period of extended service granted to
petitioner was amended by the Office of the
President. In resolving the administrative
complaint against petitioner, the Office of
the President, ruled not only on the issues
of alleged irregular appointment of
petitioner and of graft and corrupt practices,
but went further by, in effect, reducing the
period of extension of service granted to
petitioner on the ground that the latter had
already completed the fifteen (15) years
service requirement under P.D. 1146, and
declared petitioner as compulsorily retired
as of 15 October 1991.
In other words, the extension of service of
petitioner was until January 1992. However,
the Office of the President made a new
computation of petitioner's period of service
with the government, the Office of the
President included as part of her service
the sixty-two (62) days sick leave applied
for by petitioner covering the period
between 20 March to 17 June 1988 and her

service as a lecturer of approximately two

(2) weeks, or a total of three-and-a-half (3
1/2) months. As a result of this new
computation, petitioner's extension of
service which was supposed to end in
January 1992 was reduced by the Office of
the President by three-and-a-half (3 1/2)
months or until 15 October 1991.
On the other hand, the computation made
by the GSIS as to the exact date of
retirement of petitioner fell on 14 August
1992. 15 Thus, the extension of service granted to
petitioner by the Office of the President for two (2) years,
seven (7) months and twelve (12) days which brought
her services only up to January 1992, would not enable
herein petitioner to complete the fifteen (15) years
service requirement for purposes of retirement. To allow
the Office of the President to shorten the extension of
service of petitioner by three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months
which consist of petitioner's sick leave and service as
lecturer, would further reduce petitioner's service with the
government. Such reduction from petitioner's service
would deprive her of the opportunity of availing of the
old-age pension plan, based on the computation of the
GSIS.

We hold that it is the GSIS which has the

original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine whether a member is qualified or
not to avail of the old-age pension benefit
under P.D. 1146, based on its computation
of a member's years of service with the
government. 16 The computation of a member's
service includes not only full time but also part time and
other services with compensation as may be included
under the rules and regulations prescribed by the
System.17

The sixty-two (62) days leave of absence of

petitioner between 20 March to 17 June
1986 and her part-time service as a lecturer
f approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of
three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months is not
reflected in her service record. Said period
should be considered as part of her service

with the government and it is only but

proper that her service record be amended
to reflect said period of service.
We have observed that the computation
made by the GSIS of petitioner's date of
retirement failed to take into account the
three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of
petitioner which was not reflected in her
service record. If we deduct this
unrecorded three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months
service of petitioner from 14 August
1992, petitioner is to be considered retired
on 30 April 1992.
The order of the Office of the President
declaring petitioner as compulsorily
retired as of 15 October 1991 defeats the
purpose for allowing petitioner to remain in
the service until she has completed the
fifteen (15) years service requirement.
Between the period of 16 October 1991 to
30 April 1992, petitioner should have been
allowed to continue in the service to be
able to complete the fifteen (15) years
service requirement; she was prepared to
render services for said period but was not
allowed to do so; she should, therefore, the
entitled to all her salaries, benefits and
other emoluments during said period (16
October 1991 - 30 April 1992). However,
petitioner's claim for reinstatement to her
former position to enable her to complete
the fifteen (15) year service requirement for
retirement purposes is no longer possible,
considering that she is deemed to have
completed the said service requirement as
of 30 April 1992.
WHEREFORE, the portion of the decision
of the Office of the President dated 23
October 1991 declaring petitioner as

compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991

is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby
declared to have been in the service as
President of EARIST from 16 October 1991
until 30 April 1992 and therefore entitled to
all salaries, benefits and other emoluments
of said office from 16 October 1991 to 30
April 1992. In addition, she is declared as
entitled to her old-age pension benefits for
having reached age 65 years while in the
service with 15 years of service to her
credit, subject to her compliance with all
applicable regulations and requirements of
the GSIS.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92284 July 12, 1991
TEODORO J. SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, respondents.
Leven S. Puno for petitioner.
Cesar R. Vidal for respondent GSIS.

CRUZ, J.:p
The basic issue presented in this case is
the correct interpretation of Executive
Order No. 966, Section 9, providing as
follows:
Sec. 9. Highest Basic Salary
Rate. The compensation of
salary or pay which may be
used in computing the
retirement benefits shall be

limited to the highest salary

rate actually received by an
official/employee as fixed by
law and/or indicated in his duly
approved appointment. This
shall include salary
adjustments duly authorized
and implemented by the
presidential issuance(s) and
budget circular(s), additional
basic compensation or salary
indicated in an appointment
duly approved as an exception
to the prohibition on additional
or double compensation, merit
increases, and compensation
for substitutionary services or
in an acting capacity. For this
purpose, all other
compensation and/or fringe
benefits such as per diems,
allowances, bonuses, overtime
pay, honoraria hazard pay,
flying time fees, consultancy or
contractual fees, or fees in
correcting and/or releasing
examination papers shall not
be considered in the
computation of the retirement
benefits of an
official/employee.
The question was raised by the petitioner in
connection with the computation of his
retirement benefits which he claims was not
made in conformity to the above-quoted
requirement.
The petitioner was employed in the
Commission on Audit as State Auditor IV
with a monthly salary of P7,219.00. In
1988, he was assigned to the COA Auditing

Unit at the Department of Transportation

and Communications and detailed to the
Manila International Airport Authority. On
July 1, 1988, the board of directors of the
MIAA passed the following resolution: 1
RESOLUTION NO. 88-70
RESOLVED, that, as
recommended by
Management, the designation
of Mr. Teodoro J. Santiago, Jr.,
as Assistant General Manager
for Finance and Administration,
effective 15 August 1988, be
approved, as it is hereby
approved, subject to the
following conditions:
1. He will retain his plantilla
position in COA;
2. His compensation from
MIAA, shall be the difference
between the salary of AGM for
Finance and Administration
(MIAA) and that of State
Auditor IV (COA); and
3. His retirement benefits shall
be chargeable against COA.
This resolution was duly communicated to
the COA on July 11, 1988, with a request
for the petitioner's indefinite detail to the
MIAA. In reply, Chairman Eufemio C.
Domingo wrote MIAA on July 14, 1988, as
follows: 2
. . . please be informed that we
are authorizing such detail
through appropriate office
order up to February 15, 1989.

The order includes authority to

collect representation and
transportation allowances
(RATA) of P1,200.00 each
month and other allowances
attendant to the position
chargeable against the funds
of the NAIAA.
As regards your proposal that
Mr. Santiago be allowed to
collect the difference in salary
of his position in the COA as
State Auditor IV and his
designated position as
Assistant General Manager
thereat, likewise chargeable
against the funds of that office,
this Commission interposes no
objection to the proposal to
pay him the difference
between his present monthly
salary of P7,219.00 and that of
Assistant General Manager
which reportedly amounts to
P13,068.00 a month or a
monthly difference of
P5,849.00, provided that he is
formally designated (not
appointed) Assistant General
Manager by the Board of
Directors, NAIAA, and that
payment of his salary
differential is approved by the
same office.
xxx xxx xxx
On August 10, 1988, Secretary Reinerio O.
Reyes, concurrently chairman of the MIAA
board of directors, issued an office order
formally designating the petitioner as Acting

Assistant General Manager for Finance and

Administration, effective August 16, 1988. 3
The petitioner served in this capacity and
collected the differential salary of
P5,849.00 plus his salary of P7,219.00 for
a total compensation of P13,068.00. He
received this compensation until December
5, 1988, when he was transferred to the
Presidential Management Staff under COA
Office Order No. 8811448 dated December
6, 1988.
On March 1, 1989, the petitioner retired
after working in the government for 44
years.
In computing his retirement benefits, the
Government Service Insurance System
used as basis the amount of P13,068.00,
considering this the highest basic salary
rate received by the petitioner in the course
of his employment. 4 The COA disagreed,
however, and paid his retirement benefits on the basis of
only his monthly salary of P7,219.00 as State Auditor
IV. 5

The petitioner requested recomputation

based on what he claimed as his highest
basic salary rate of P13,068.00. This was
denied on December 8, 1989, and he was
so notified on February 5, 1990. On March
7, 1990, he came to this Court to seek
reversal of the decision of the COA on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.
We note at the outset that there is no
dispute regarding the legality of the
petitioner's occupying the second position
in the MIAA and receiving additional
compensation for his services therein. As
the Solicitor General observed. "What the
petitioner was receiving from the MIAA was

the additional compensation allowed under

Section 17 of Act No. 4187 which, in turn, is
allowed under Section 8, Paragraph B,
Article IX of the Constitution."6
In Quimzon v. Ozaeta, 7 this Court held that
double appointments are not prohibited as long as the
positions involved are not incompatible, except that the
officer or employee appointed cannot receive additional
or double compensation unless specifically authorized
by law. The additional compensation received by the
petitioner is not an issue in the case at bar because of its
express approval by the COA and the admission of the
Solicitor General that it is allowed under the cited
provision.

More specifically, Section 17 of Act No.

4187 provides:
Any existing act, rule or order
to the contrary
notwithstanding, no full time
officer or employee of the
government shall hereafter
receive directly or indirectly
any kind of additional or extra
compensation or salary
including per diems and
bonuses from any fund of the
government, its dependencies,
and semi-government entities
or boards created by
law except:
(1) Officers
serving as
chairman or
members of
entities and
enterprise
organized,
operated, owned
or controlled by
the government,

who may be paid

per them for each
meeting actually
attended or when
an official travel;
(2) Auditors and
accountants;
(3) Provincial and
municipal
treasurers and
their employees;
(4) Employees
serving as
observers of the
Weather Bureau;
and
(5) Those
authorized to
receive extra or
additional
compensation by
virtue of the
provision of this
Act. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Solicitor General argues, albeit not too
strongly, that the additional compensation
received by the petitioner was merely an
honorarium and not a salary. As a mere
honorarium, it would not fall under the
provision of Section 9 and so should not be
added to his salary in computing his
retirement benefits.
We cannot accept this contention. An
honorarium is defined as something given
not as a matter of obligation but in
appreciation for services rendered, a

voluntary donation in consideration of

services which admit of no compensation in
money. 8 The additional compensation given to the
petitioner was in the nature of a salary because it was
receive by him as a matter of right in recompense for
services rendered by him as Acting Assistant General
Manager for Finance and Administration. In fact, even
Chairman Domingo referred to it in his letter dated July
14, 1988, as the petitioner's "salary differential."

The Solicitor General's main argument is

that the petitioner cannot invoke Section 9
because he was not appointed to the
second position in the MIAA but only
designated thereto. It is stressed that under
the said provision, "the compensation of
salary or pay which may be used in
computing the retirement benefits shall be
received by an official employee as fixed by
law and/or indicated in his duly approved
appointment." The petitioner's additional
salary was fixed not in a duly approved
appointment but only in a designation.
Belittling this argument, the petitioner
maintains that there is no substantial
distinction between appointment and
designation. He cites Mechem, who defines
appointment as "the act of designation by
the executive officer, board or body, to
whom that power has been delegated, of
the individual, who is to exercise the
functions of a given office." 9 He also
invokes Borromeo v. Mariano, 10 where this Court said
that "the term "appoint," whether regarded in its legal or
in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to the nomination
or designation of an individual."

Strictly speaking, there is an accepted legal

distinction between appointment and
designation. While appointment is the
selection by the proper authority of an
individual who is to exercise the functions
of a given office, designation, on the other

hand, connotes merely the imposition of

additional duties, usually by law, upon a
person already in the public service by
virtue of an earlier appointment (or
election). 11 Thus, the appointed Secretary of Trade
and Industry is, by statutory designation, a member of
the National Economic and Development Authority. 12 A
person may also be designated in an acting capacity, as
when he is called upon to fill a vacancy pending the
selection of a permanent appointee thereto or, more
usually, the return of the regular incumbent. In the
absence of the permanent Secretary for example, an
undersecretary is designated acting head of the
department. 13

As the Court said in Binamira

v. Garrucho: 14
Appointment may be defined
as the selection, by the
authority vested with the
power, of an individual who is
to exercise the functions of a
given office. When completed,
usually with its confirmation,
the appointment results in
security of tenure for the
person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure
because of the nature of his
office. Designation, on the
other hand, connotes merely
the imposition by law of
additional duties on an
incumbent official, as where, in
the case before us, the
Secretary of Tourism is
designated Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the
Philippine Tourism Authority, or
where, under the Constitution,
three Justices of the Supreme
Court are designated by the
Chief Justice to sit in the

Electoral Tribunal of the

Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that
appointment is essentially
executive while designation is
legislative in nature.
Nevertheless, we agree with the petitioner
that in the law in question, the term
"appointment" was used in a general sense
to include the term "designation." In other
words, no distinction was intended between
the two terms in Section 9 of Executive
Order No. 966. We think this to be the more
reasonable interpretation, especially
considering that the provision includes in
the highest salary rate "compensation for
substitutionary services or in an acting
capacity." This need not always be
conferred by a permanent appointment. A
contrary reading would, in our view, militate
against the letter of the law, not to mention
its spirit as we perceive it. That spirit seeks
to extend the maximum benefits to the
retiree as an additional if belated
recognition of his many years of loyal and
efficient service in the government.
As thus interpreted, Section 9 clearly
covers the petitioner, who was designated
Acting Assistant General Manager for
Finance and Administration in the office
order issued by Secretary Reyes on August
10, 1988. The position was then vacant and
could be filled either by permanent
appointment or by temporary designation. It
cannot be said that the second position
was only an extension of the petitioner's
office as State Auditor IV in the
Commission on Audit as otherwise there
would have been no need for his
designation thereto. The second office was

distinct and separate from his position in

the Commission on Audit. For the additional
services he rendered for the MIAA, he was
entitled to additional compensation which,
following the letter and spirit of Section 9,
should be included in his highest basic
salary rate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

The challenged resolution is SET ASIDE
and judgment is hereby rendered
DIRECTING the computation of the
petitioner's retirement benefits on the basis
of his Highest Basic Salary Rate of
P13,068.00, It is so ordered.

It is noteworthy that the petitioner occupied

the second office not only for a few days or
weeks but for more than three months. His
designation as Acting Assistant General
Manager for Finance and Administration
was not a mere accommodation by the
MIAA. On the contrary, in his letter to
Chairman Domingo requesting the
petitioner's services. MIAA General
Manager Evergisto C. Macatulad said,
"Considering his qualifications and work
experience, we believe that a finance man
of his stature and caliber can be of great
help in the efficient and effective
performance of the Airport's functions."

EN BANC

Retirement laws should be interpreted

liberally in favor of the retiree because their
intention is to provide for his sustenance,
and hopefully even comfort, when he no
longer has the stamina to continue earning
his livelihood. After devoting the best years
of his life to the public service, he deserves
the appreciation of a grateful government
as best concretely expressed in a generous
retirement gratuity commensurate with the
value and length of his services. That
generosity is the least he should expect
now that his work is done and his youth is
gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his
bones and glimpses the approach of the
lengthening shadows, he should be able to
luxuriate in the thought that he did his task
well, and was rewarded for it.

[G.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004]

GOVERNMENT
SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu
City
Branch, petitioner,
vs.
MILAGROS
O.
MONTESCLAROS, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision[1] dated 13 December 2000 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
48784.The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
21, Cebu City (trial court), which held that
Milagros Orbiso Montesclaros is entitled to
survivorship pension.
The Facts
Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas
Montesclaros (Nicolas) married Milagros
Orbiso (Milagros) on 10 July 1983.[3] Nicolas
was a 72- year old widower when he married
Milagros who was then 43 years old.
On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)

an application for retirement benefits effective

18 February 1985 under Presidential Decree
No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977 (PD 1146). In his
retirement application, Nicolas designated his
wife Milagros as his sole beneficiary.[4] Nicolas
last day of actual service was on 17 February
1985.[5] On 31 January 1986, GSIS approved
Nicolas application for retirement effective 17
February 1984, granting a lump sum payment
of annuity for the first five years and a monthly
annuity thereafter.[6] Nicolas died on 22 April
1992. Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for
survivorship pension under PD 1146. On 8
June 1992, GSIS denied the claim because
under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving
spouse has no right to survivorship pension if
the surviving spouse contracted the marriage
with the pensioner within three years before
the pensioner qualified for the pension.
[7]
According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros
on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his
date of retirement on 17 February 1984.
On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the
trial court a special civil action for declaratory
relief questioning the validity of Section 18 of
PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving
survivorship pension.
On 9 November 1994, the trial court
rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible
for survivorship pension. The trial court ordered
GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits due
including interest. Citing Articles 115[8] and
117[9] of the Family Code, the trial court held
that retirement benefits, which the pensioner
has earned for services rendered and for which
the pensioner has contributed through monthly
salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions.
Since retirement benefits are property the
pensioner acquired through labor, such
benefits are conjugal property. The trial court
held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD
1146 is deemed repealed for being inconsistent
with the Family Code, a later law. The Family
Code has retroactive effect if it does not
prejudice or impair vested rights.
GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Hence, this petition for review.

In the meantime, in a letter dated 10

January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that
she has accepted GSIS decision disqualifying
her from receiving survivorship pension and
that she is no longer interested in pursuing the
case.[10] Commenting on Milagros letter, GSIS
asserts that the Court must decide the case on
the merits.[11]
The Court will resolve the issue despite the
manifestation of Milagros. The issue involves
not only the claim of Milagros but also that of
other surviving spouses who are similarly
situated and whose claims GSIS would also
deny based on the proviso. Social justice and
public interest demand that we resolve the
constitutionality of the proviso.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial
court that the retirement benefits are onerous
and conjugal because the pension came from
the
deceased
pensioners
salary
deductions. The Court of Appeals held that the
pension is not gratuitous since it is a deferred
compensation for services rendered.
The Issues
GSIS raises the following issues:
1. Whether Section 16 of PD 1146 entitles
Milagros to survivorship pension;
2. Whether retirement benefits form part of
conjugal property;
3. Whether Articles 254 and 256 of the
Family Code repealed Section 18 of PD
1146.[12]

The Courts Ruling

The pertinent provisions of PD 1146 on
survivorship benefits read:

SEC. 16. Survivorship Benefits. When a

member or pensioner dies, the beneficiary

shall be entitled to survivorship benefits

provided for in sections seventeen and
eighteen hereunder. The survivorship pension
shall consist of:
(1) basic survivorship pension which is fifty
percent of the basic monthly pension; and
(2) dependents pension not exceeding fifty
percent of the basic monthly pension payable
in accordance with the rules and regulations
prescribed by the System.
SEC. 17. Death of a Member. (a) Upon the
death of a member, the primary beneficiaries
shall be entitled to:
(1) the basic monthly pension which is
guaranteed for five years; Provided, That, at
the option of the beneficiaries, it may be
paid in lump sum as defined in this
Act: Provided, further, That, the member is
entitled to old-age pension at the time of his
death; or
(2) the basic survivorship pension which is
guaranteed for thirty months and the
dependents pension; Provided, That, the
deceased had paid at least thirty-six monthly
contributions within the five-year period
immediately preceding his death, or a total of
at least one hundred eighty monthly
contributions prior to his death.
(b) At the end of the guaranteed periods
mentioned in the preceding sub-section (a),
the survivorship pension shall be paid as
follows:
(1) when the dependent spouse is the only
survivor, he shall receive the basic
survivorship pension for life or until he
remarries;
(2) when only dependent children are the
survivors, they shall be entitled to the

survivorship pension for as long as they are

qualified;
(3) when the survivors are the dependent
spouse and the dependent children, they shall
be entitled to the survivorship pension so long
as there are dependent children and,
thereafter, the surviving spouse shall receive
the basic survivorship pension for life or until
he remarries.
(c) In the absence of primary beneficiaries, the
secondary beneficiaries designated by the
deceased and recorded in the System, shall be
entitled to:
(1) a cash payment equivalent to thirty times
the basic survivorship pension when the
member is qualified for old-age pension; or
(2) a cash payment equivalent to fifty percent
of the average monthly compensation for each
year he paid contributions, but not less than
five hundred pesos; Provided, That, the
member paid at least thirty-six monthly
contributions within the five-year
period immediately preceding his death or
paid a total of at least one hundred eighty
monthly contributions prior to his death.
(d) When the primary beneficiaries are not
entitled to the benefits mentioned in paragraph
(a) of this section, they shall receive a cash
payment equivalent to one hundred percent of
the average monthly compensation for each
year the member paid contributions, but not
less than five hundred pesos. In the absence of
primary beneficiaries, the amount shall revert
to the funds of the System.
SEC. 18. Death of a Pensioner. Upon the
death of a pensioner, the primary beneficiaries
shall receive the applicable pension
mentioned under paragraph (b) of section
seventeen of this Act: Provided, That, the
dependent spouse shall not be entitled to
said pension if his marriage with the

pensioner is contracted within three years

before the pensioner qualified for the
pension. When the pensioner dies within the
period covered by the lump sum, the
survivorship pension shall be paid only after
the expiration of the said period. This shall
also apply to the pensioners living as of the
effectivity of this Act, but the survivorship
benefit shall be based on the monthly pension
being received at the time of death. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under
PD
1146,
the primary
beneficiaries are (1) the dependent spouse
until such spouse remarries, and (2) the
dependent
children.[13] The
secondary
beneficiaries are the dependent parents and
legitimate descendants except dependent
children.[14] The law defines dependent as the
legitimate,
legitimated,
legally
adopted,
acknowledged natural or illegitimate child who
is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not
over twenty-one years of age or is over twentyone years of age but physically or mentally
incapacitated and incapable of self-support.
The term also includes the legitimate spouse
dependent for support on the member, and
the legitimate parent wholly dependent on the
member for support.[15]
The main question for resolution is the
validity of the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146,
which proviso prohibits the dependent spouse
from receiving survivorship pension if such
dependent spouse married the pensioner
within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension (the proviso).
We hold that the proviso, which was the
sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of Milagros
claim, is unconstitutional because it violates
the due process clause. The proviso is also
discriminatory and denies equal protection of
the law.
Retirement Benefits as Property Interest
Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is
mandatory for the government employee to
pay monthly contributions. PD 1146 mandates

the government to include in its annual

appropriation the necessary amounts for its
share of the contributions. It is compulsory on
the government employer to take off and
withhold from the employees monthly salaries
their contributions and to remit the same to
GSIS.[16]The government employer must also
remit its corresponding share to GSIS.
[17]
Considering
the
mandatory
salary
deductions from the government employee, the
government pensions do not constitute mere
gratuity but form part of compensation.
In a pension plan where employee
participation is mandatory, the prevailing view
is that employees have contractual or vested
rights in the pension where the pension is part
of the terms of employment.[18] The reason for
providing retirement benefits is to compensate
service to the government. Retirement benefits
to government employees are part of
emolument to encourage and retain qualified
employees in the government service.
Retirement benefits to government employees
reward them for giving the best years of their
lives in the service of their country.[19]
Thus, where the employee retires and
meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires
a vested right to benefits that is protected by
the due process clause.[20] Retirees enjoy a
protected property interest whenever they
acquire a right to immediate payment under
pre-existing law.[21] Thus, a pensioner acquires
a vested right to benefits that have become
due as provided under the terms of the public
employees pension statute.[22] No law can
deprive such person of his pension rights
without due process of law, that is, without
notice and opportunity to be heard.[23]
In addition to retirement and disability
benefits, PD 1146 also provides for benefits to
survivors of deceased government employees
and pensioners. Under PD 1146, the
dependent spouse is one of the beneficiaries of
survivorship benefits. A widows right to receive
pension following the demise of her husband is
also part of the husbands contractual
compensation.[24]
Denial of Due Process

The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article

III of the Constitution, which provides that [n]o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws. The proviso is unduly oppressive in
outrightly denying a dependent spouses claim
for survivorship pension if the dependent
spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner
within the three-year prohibited period. There is
outright confiscation of benefits due the
surviving spouse without giving the surviving
spouse an opportunity to be heard. The proviso
undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is
to assure comprehensive and integrated social
security and insurance benefits to government
employees and their dependents in the event
of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of
the government employees.
The whereas clauses of PD 1146 state:

WHEREAS, the Government Service

Insurance System in promoting the efficiency
and welfare of the employees of the
Government of the Philippines, administers
the laws that grant to its members social
security and insurance benefits;
WHEREAS, it is necessary to preserve at all
times the actuarial solvency of the funds
administered by the System; to guarantee to
the government employee all the benefits due
him; and to expand and increase the benefits
made available to him and his dependents to
the extent permitted by available resources;
WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws have
impeded the efficient and effective discharge
by the System of its functions and have
unduly hampered the System from being more
responsive to the dramatic changes of the
times and from meeting the increasing needs
and expectations of the Filipino public
servant;
WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws that
have prejudiced, rather than benefited, the
government employee; restricted, rather than

broadened, his benefits, prolonged, rather than

facilitated the payment of benefits, must now
yield to his paramount welfare;
WHEREAS, the social security and insurance
benefits of government employees must be
continuously re-examined and improved to
assure comprehensive and integrated social
security and insurance programs that will
provide benefits responsive to their needs and
those of their dependents in the event of
sickness, disability, death, retirement, and
other contingencies; and to serve as a fitting
reward for dedicated public service;
WHEREAS, in the light of existing economic
conditions affecting the welfare of
government employees, there is a need to
expand and improve the social security and
insurance programs administered by the
Government Service Insurance System,
specifically, among others, by increasing
pension benefits, expanding disability
benefits, introducing survivorship benefits,
introducing sickness and income benefits, and
eventually extending the compulsory coverage
of these programs to all government
employees regardless of employment status.
PD 1146 has the following purposes:
a. to preserve at all times the actuarial
solvency of the funds administered by
the System;
b.

to guarantee to the government

employee all the benefits due him; and

c. to expand, increase, and improve the

social security and insurance benefits
made available to him and his
dependents such as:
increasing pension benefits
expanding disability benefits
introducing survivorship benefits
introducing
benefits

sickness

income

extending compulsory membership

to all

government
irrespective of status[25]

employees

The law extends survivorship benefits to

the surviving and qualified beneficiaries of the
deceased member or pensioner to cushion the
beneficiaries against the adverse economic
effects resulting from the death of the wage
earner or pensioner.[26]
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The surviving spouse of a government
employee is entitled to receive survivors
benefits under a pension system. However,
statutes sometimes require that the spouse
should have married the employee for a certain
period before the employees death to prevent
sham marriages contracted for monetary
gain. One example is the Illinois Pension Code
which restricts survivors annuity benefits to a
surviving spouse who was married to a state
employee for at least one year before the
employees death. The Illinois pension system
classifies spouses into those married less than
one year before a members death and those
married one year or more. The classification
seeks to prevent conscious adverse risk
selection of deathbed marriages where a
terminally ill member of the pension system
marries another so that person becomes
eligible for benefits. In Sneddon v. The State
Employees Retirement System of Illinois,
[27]
the Appellate Court of Illinois held that such
classification was based on difference in
situation and circumstance, bore a rational
relation to the purpose of the statute, and was
therefore not in violation of constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal
protection.
A
statute
based
on
reasonable
classification does not violate the constitutional
guaranty of the equal protection of the law.
[28]
The requirements for a valid and reasonable
classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply
equally to all members of the same class.
[29]
Thus, the law may treat and regulate one

class differently from another class provided

there are real and substantial differences to
distinguish one class from another.[30]
The proviso in question does not satisfy
these requirements. The proviso discriminates
against the dependent spouse who contracts
marriage to the pensioner within three years
before the pensioner qualified for the pension.
[31]
Under the proviso, even if the dependent
spouse married the pensioner more than three
years before the pensioners death, the
dependent spouse would still not receive
survivorship pension if the marriage took place
within three years before the pensioner
qualified for pension. The object of the
prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable
connection between the means employed and
the purpose intended. The law itself does not
provide any reason or purpose for such a
prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to
prevent deathbed marriages, then we do not
see why the proviso reckons the three-year
prohibition from the date the pensioner
qualified for pension and not from the date the
pensioner died. The classification does not rest
on substantial distinctions. Worse, the
classification lumps all those marriages
contracted within three years before the
pensioner qualified for pension as having been
contracted primarily for financial convenience
to avail of pension benefits.
Indeed, the classification is discriminatory
and arbitrary. This is probably the reason
Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act
No. 8291 (RA 8291),[32] otherwise known as the
Government Service Insurance Act of 1997,
the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD
1146). Under the implementing rules of RA
8291, the surviving spouse who married the
member immediately before the members
death is still qualified to receive survivorship
pension unless the GSIS proves that the
surviving spouse contracted the marriage
solely to receive the benefit.[33]
Thus, the present GSIS law does not
presume that marriages contracted within three
years before retirement or death of a member
are sham marriages contracted to avail of
survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law
does not automatically forfeit the survivorship

pension of the surviving spouse who

contracted marriage to a GSIS member within
three years before the members retirement or
death. The law acknowledges that whether the
surviving spouse contracted the marriage
mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a
matter of evidence. The law no longer
prescribes a sweeping classification that
unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving
spouse and defeats the purpose for which
Congress enacted the social legislation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for
want of merit. We declare VOID for being
violative of the constitutional guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the law the
proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree
No. 1146, which proviso states that the
dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said
pension if his marriage with the pensioner is
contracted within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension. The
Government Service Insurance System cannot
deny the claim of Milagros O. Montesclaros for
survivorship benefits based on this invalid
proviso.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-28093 January 30, 1971

BASILIA BERDIN VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA; JULIANA, PACITA,
MARIA LOURDES, JOSE, JR., RODRIGO,
LINEDA and LUIS, all surnamed
CONSUEGRA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC
HIGHWAYS, HIGHWAY DISTRICT
ENGINEER OF SURIGAO DEL NORTE,
COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE,
and ROSARIO DIAZ,respondentsappellees.
Bernardino O. Almeda for petitionersappellants.

Binag and Arevalo, Jr. for respondentappellee Government Service Insurance

System.
Office of the Solicitor General for other
respondents-appellees.

ZALDIVAR, J.:
Appeal on purely questions of law from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of
Surigao del Norte, dated March 7, 1967, in
its Special Proceeding No. 1720.
The pertinent facts, culled from the
stipulation of facts submitted by the parties,
are the following:
The late Jose Consuegra, at the time of his
death, was employed as a shop foreman of
the office of the District Engineer in the
province of Surigao del Norte. In his
lifetime, Consuegra contracted two
marriages, the first with herein respondent
Rosario Diaz, solemnized in the parish
church of San Nicolas de Tolentino,
Surigao, Surigao, on July 15, 1937, out of
which marriage were born two children,
namely, Jose Consuegra, Jr. and Pedro
Consuegra, but both predeceased their
father; and the second, which was
contracted in good faith while the first
marriage was subsisting, with herein
petitioner Basilia Berdin, on May 1, 1957 in
the same parish and municipality, out of
which marriage were born seven children,
namely, Juliana, Pacita, Maria Lourdes,
Jose, Rodrigo, Lenida and Luz, all
surnamed Consuegra.

Being a member of the Government

Service Insurance System (GSIS, for short)
when Consuegra died on September 26,
1965, the proceeds of his life insurance
under policy No. 601801 were paid by the
GSIS to petitioner Basilia Berdin and her
children who were the beneficiaries named
in the policy. Having been in the service of
the government for 22.5028 years,
Consuegra was entitled to retirement
insurance benefits in the sum of P6,304.47
pursuant to Section 12(c) of
Commonwealth Act 186 as amended by
Republic Acts 1616 and 3836. Consuegra
did not designate any beneficiary who
would receive the retirement insurance
benefits due to him. Respondent Rosario
Diaz, the widow by the first marriage, filed a
claim with the GSIS asking that the
retirement insurance benefits be paid to her
as the only legal heir of Consuegra,
considering that the deceased did not
designate any beneficiary with respect to
his retirement insurance benefits. Petitioner
Basilia Berdin and her children, likewise,
filed a similar claim with the GSIS,
asserting that being the beneficiaries
named in the life insurance policy of
Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled
to receive the retirement insurance benefits
due the deceased Consuegra. Resolving
the conflicting claims, the GSIS ruled that
the legal heirs of the late Jose Consuegra
were Rosario Diaz, his widow by his first
marriage who is entitled to one-half, or
8/16, of the retirement insurance benefits,
on the one hand; and Basilia Berdin, his
widow by the second marriage and their
seven children, on the other hand, who are
entitled to the remaining one-half, or 8/16,
each of them to receive an equal share of
1/16.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing ruling and

apportionment made by the GSIS, Basilia
Berdin and her children1 filed on October 10,
1966 a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction
in the Court of First Instance of Surigao, naming as
respondents the GSIS, the Commissioner of Public
Highways, the Highway District Engineer of Surigao del
Norte, the Commissioner of Civil Service, and Rosario
Diaz, praying that they (petitioners therein) be declared
the legal heirs and exclusive beneficiaries of the
retirement insurance of the late Jose Consuegra, and
that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
the implementation of the adjudication made by the
GSIS. On October 26, 1966, the trial court issued an
order requiring therein respondents to file their
respective answers, but refrained from issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for. On February 11, 1967,
the parties submitted a stipulation of facts, prayed that
the same be admitted and approved and that judgment
be rendered on the basis of the stipulation of facts. On
March 7, 1967, the court below rendered judgment, the
pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:

This Court, in conformity with

the foregoing stipulation of
facts, likewise is in full accord
with the parties with respect to
the authority cited by them in
support of said stipulation and
which is herein-below cited for
purposes of this judgment, to
wit:
"When two women innocently
and in good faith are legally
united in holy matrimony to the
same man, they and their
children, born of said wedlock,
will be regarded as legitimate
children and each family be
entitled to one half of the
estate. Lao & Lao vs. Dee Tim,
45 Phil. 739; Estrella vs. Laong
Masa, Inc., (CA) 39 OG 79;
Pisalbon vs. Bejec, 74 Phil. 88.

WHEREFORE, in view of the

above premises, this Court is
of the opinion that the
foregoing stipulation of facts is
in order and in accordance
with law and the same is
hereby approved. Judgment,
therefore, is hereby rendered
declaring the petitioner Basilia
Berdin Vda. de Consuegra and
her co-petitioners Juliana,
Pacita, Maria Lourdes, Jose,
Jr., Rodrigo, Lenida and Luis,
all surnamed Consuegra,
beneficiary and entitled to onehalf (1/2) of the retirement
benefit in the amount of Six
Thousand Three Hundred Four
Pesos and Fourty-Seven
Centavos (P6,304.47) due to
the deceased Jose Consuegra
from the Government Service
Insurance System or the
amount of P3,152.235 to be
divided equally among them in
the proportional amount of
1/16 each. Likewise, the
respondent Rosario Diaz Vda.
de Consuegra is hereby
declared beneficiary and
entitled to the other half of the
retirement benefit of the late
Jose Consuegra or the amount
of P3,152.235. The case with
respect to the Highway District
Engineer of Surigao del Norte
is hereby ordered dismissed.
Hence the present appeal by herein
petitioners-appellants, Basilia Berdin and
her children.

It is the contention of appellants that the

lower court erred in not holding that the
designated beneficiaries in the life
insurance of the late Jose Consuegra are
also the exclusive beneficiaries in the
retirement insurance of said deceased. In
other words, it is the submission of
appellants that because the deceased Jose
Consuegra failed to designate the
beneficiaries in his retirement insurance,
the appellants who were the beneficiaries
named in the life insurance should
automatically be considered the
beneficiaries to receive the retirement
insurance benefits, to the exclusion of
respondent Rosario Diaz. From the
arguments adduced by appellants in their
brief We gather that it is their stand that the
system of life insurance and the system of
retirement insurance, that are provided for
in Commonwealth Act 186 as amended,
are simply complementary to each other, or
that one is a part or an extension of the
other, such that whoever is named the
beneficiary in the life insurance is also the
beneficiary in the retirement insurance
when no such beneficiary is named in the
retirement insurance.
The contention of appellants is untenable.
It should be noted that the law creating the
Government Service Insurance System is
Commonwealth Act 186 which was enacted
by the National Assembly on November 14,
1936. As originally approved,
Commonwealth Act 186 provided for the
compulsory membership in the
Government Service Insurance System of
all regularly and permanently appointed
officials and employees of the government,
considering as automatically insured on life

all such officials and employees, and

issuing to them the corresponding
membership policy under the terms and
conditions as provided in the Act.2
Originally, Commonwealth Act 186 provided
for life insurance only. Commonwealth Act
186 was amended by Republic Act 660
which was enacted by the Congress of the
Philippines on June 16, 1951, and, among
others, the amendatory Act provided that
aside from the system of life insurance
under the Government Service Insurance
System there was also established the
system of retirement insurance. Thus, We
will note in Republic Act 660 that there is a
chapter on life insurance and another
chapter on retirement insurance. 3 Under
the chapter on life insurance are sections 8,
9 and 10 of Commonwealth Act 186, as
amended; and under the chapter on
retirement insurance are sections 11, 12,
13 and 13-A. On May 31, 1957, Republic
Act 1616 was enacted by Congress,
amending section 12 of Commonwealth Act
186 as amended by Republic Act 660, by
adding thereto two new subsections,
designated as subsections (b) and (c). This
subsection (c) of section 12 of
Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by
Republic Acts 660, 1616 and 3096, was
again amended by Republic Act 3836
which was enacted on June 22, 1963. The
pertinent provisions of subsection (c) of
Section 12 of Commonwealth Act 186, as
thus amended and reamended, read as
follows:
lwph1.t

(c) Retirement is likewise

allowed to a member,
regardless of age, who has
rendered at least twenty years

of service. The benefit shall, in

addition to the return of his
personal contributions plus
interest and the payment of the
corresponding employer's
premiums described in
subsection (a) of Section 5
hereof, without interest, be
only a gratuity equivalent to
one month's salary for every
year of service, based on the
highest rate received, but not
to exceed twenty-four
months; Provided, That the
retiring officer or employee has
been in the service of the said
employer or office for at least
four years, immediately
preceding his retirement.
xxx xxx xxx
The gratuity is payable by the
employer or office concerned
which is hereby authorized to
provide the necessary
appropriation to pay the same
from any unexpended items of
appropriations.
Elective or appointive officials
and employees paid gratuity
under this subsection shall be
entitled to the commutation of
the unused vacation and sick
leave, based on the highest
rate received, which they may
have to their credit at the time
of retirement.
Jose Consuegra died on September 26,
1965, and so at the time of his death he

had acquired rights under the abovequoted provisions of subsection (c) of

Section 12 of Com. Act 186, as finally
amended by Rep. Act 3836 on June 22,
1963. When Consuegra died on September
26, 1965, he had to his credit 22.5028
years of service in the government, and
pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of
subsection (c) of Section 12 of Com. Act
186, as amended, on the basis of the
highest rate of salary received by him
which was P282.83 per month, he was
entitled to receive retirement insurance
benefits in the amount of P6,304.47. This is
the retirement benefits that are the subject
of dispute between the appellants, on the
one hand, and the appellee Rosario Diaz,
on the other, in the present case. The
question posed is: to whom should this
retirement insurance benefits of Jose
Consuegra be paid, because he did not, or
failed to, designate the beneficiary of his
retirement insurance?
If Consuegra had 22.5028 years of service
in the government when he died on
September 26, 1965, it follows that he
started in the government service
sometime during the early part of 1943, or
before 1943. In 1943 Com. Act 186 was not
yet amended, and the only benefits then
provided for in said Com. Act 186 were
those that proceed from a life insurance.
Upon entering the government service
Consuegra became a compulsory member
of the GSIS, being automatically insured on
his life, pursuant to the provisions of Com.
Act 186 which was in force at the time.
During 1943 the operation of the
Government Service Insurance System
was suspended because of the war, and
the operation was resumed sometime in

1946. When Consuegra designated his

beneficiaries in his life insurance he could
not have intended those beneficiaries of his
life insurance as also the beneficiaries of
his retirement insurance because the
provisions on retirement insurance under
the GSIS came about only when Com. Act
186 was amended by Rep. Act 660 on June
16, 1951. Hence, it cannot be said that
because herein appellants were designated
beneficiaries in Consuegra's life insurance
they automatically became the
beneficiaries also of his retirement
insurance. Rep. Act 660 added to Com. Act
186 provisions regarding retirement
insurance, which are Sections 11, 12, and
13 of Com. Act 186, as amended.
Subsection (b) of Section 11 of Com. Act
186, as amended by Rep. Act 660,
provides as follows:
(b) Survivors benefit. Upon
death before he becomes
eligible for retirement, his
beneficiaries as recorded in
the application for retirement
annuity filed with the System
shall be paid his own
premiums with interest of
three per centum per annum,
compounded monthly. If on his
death he is eligible for
retirement, then the automatic
retirement annuity or the
annuity chosen by him
previously shall be paid
accordingly.
The above-quoted provisions of subsection
(b) of Section 11 of Commonwealth Act
186, as amended by Rep. Act 660, clearly
indicate that there is need for the employee

to file an application for retirement

insurance benefits when he becomes a
member of the GSIS, and he should state
in his application the beneficiary of his
retirement insurance. Hence, the
beneficiary named in the life insurance
does not automatically become the
beneficiary in the retirement insurance
unless the same beneficiary in the life
insurance is so designated in the
application for retirement insurance.
Section 24 of Commonwealth Act 186, as
amended by Rep. Act 660, provides for a
life insurance fund and for a retirement
insurance fund. There was no such
provision in Com. Act 186 before it was
amended by Rep. Act 660. Thus,
subsections (a) and (b) of Section 24 of
Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by
Rep. Act 660, partly read as follows:
(a) Life insurance fund. This
shall consist of all premiums
for life insurance benefit and/or
earnings and savings
therefrom. It shall meet death
claims as they may arise or
such equities as any member
may be entitled to, under the
conditions of his policy, and
shall maintain the required
reserves to the end of
guaranteeing the fulfillment of
the life insurance contracts
issued by the System ...
(b) Retirement insurance fund.
This shall consist of all
contributions for retirement
insurance benefit and of
earnings and savings

therefrom. It shall meet annuity

payments and establish the
required reserves to the end of
guaranteeing the fulfillment of
the contracts issued by the
System. ...
Thus, We see that the GSIS offers two
separate and distinct systems of benefits to
its members one is the life insurance
and the other is the retirement insurance.
These two distinct systems of benefits are
paid out from two distinct and separate
funds that are maintained by the GSIS.
In the case of the proceeds of a life
insurance, the same are paid to whoever is
named the beneficiary in the life insurance
policy. As in the case of a life insurance
provided for in the Insurance Act (Act 2427,
as amended), the beneficiary in a life
insurance under the GSIS may not
necessarily be a heir of the insured. The
insured in a life insurance may designate
any person as beneficiary unless
disqualified to be so under the provisions of
the Civil Code.4 And in the absence of any
beneficiary named in the life insurance policy, the
proceeds of the insurance will go to the estate of the
insured.

Retirement insurance is primarily intended

for the benefit of the employee to
provide for his old age, or incapacity, after
rendering service in the government for a
required number of years. If the employee
reaches the age of retirement, he gets the
retirement benefits even to the exclusion of
the beneficiary or beneficiaries named in
his application for retirement insurance.
The beneficiary of the retirement insurance
can only claim the proceeds of the
retirement insurance if the employee dies

before retirement. If the employee failed or

overlooked to state the beneficiary of his
retirement insurance, the retirement
benefits will accrue to his estate and will be
given to his legal heirs in accordance with
law, as in the case of a life insurance if no
beneficiary is named in the insurance
policy.
It is Our view, therefore, that the
respondent GSIS had correctly acted when
it ruled that the proceeds of the retirement
insurance of the late Jose Consuegra
should be divided equally between his first
living wife Rosario Diaz, on the one hand,
and his second wife Basilia Berdin and his
children by her, on the other; and the lower
court did not commit error when it
confirmed the action of the GSIS, it being
accepted as a fact that the second
marriage of Jose Consuegra to Basilia
Berdin was contracted in good faith. The
lower court has correctly applied the ruling
of this Court in the case of Lao, et al. vs.
Dee Tim, et al., 45 Phil. 739 as cited in the
stipulation of facts and in the decision
appealed from.5 In the recent case of Gomez vs.
Lipana, L-23214, June 30, 1970, 6 this Court, in
construing the rights of two women who were married to
the same man a situation more or less similar to the
case of appellant Basilia Berdin and appellee Rosario
Diaz held "that since the defendant's first marriage
has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased.
Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as
putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code,
entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she
survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner
in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she
has an interest in the husband's share in the property
here in dispute.... " And with respect to the right of the
second wife, this Court observed that although the
second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as
it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of
such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership

formed by the second marriage was dissolved before

judicial declaration of its nullity, "[t]he only lust and
equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the
right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the
property acquired by her and her husband and consider
the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of
the first marriage."

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from

is affirmed, with costs against petitionersappellants. It is so ordered.
G.R. Nos. 98395-102449 June 19, 1995
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DR.
MANUEL BARADERO, respondents.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and
MATILDE S. BELO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
In our decision dated October 28, 1994 we
held that government service rendered on
a per diem basis is not creditable in
computing the length of service for
retirement purposes. Thus, we reversed the
questioned resolutions and orders of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) requiring
the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) to consider creditable the services
of private respondents on a per diem basis.
However, private respondent Matilde S.
Belo in G.R. No 102449 filed a motion for
reconsideration dated 17 November 1994,
of this Court 's decision of October 28,

1994. She insists that the services

rendered by her as Vice Governor of Capiz,
between December 31, 1975 to January 1,
1979, be considered as creditable for
purposes of retirement. The Government
Service Insurance System likewise filed a
motion for reconsideration on November
22, 1984 in behalf of both private
respondents Belo and Dr. Manuel Baradero
on essentially the same grounds. We shall
deal with both motions together.

position of Vice Governor of Capiz in a holdover

capacity, broken down into two periods: 2

Central to the averments on the aforestated

motions for reconsideration is the question
of whether or not regular service in
government on a per diem basis, without
any other form of compensation or
emolument, is compensation within the
contemplation of the term "service with
compensation" under the Government
Service Insurance Act of 1987.

In its June 7, 1989 Resolution 3 on the matter,

After a careful consideration of the

arguments in both motions, we are
compelled to reconsider our decision.
While what respondents Belo and Baradero
received were denominated as "per diem,"
the amounts received were actually in the
nature of a compensation or pay. What
should therefore be considered as
controlling in both cases would be the
nature of remuneration, not the label
attached to it.
Respondent Belo held the position of ViceGovernor of Capiz continuously between
January 5, 1972 up to February 1, 1988.
From January 25, 1972 up to December
31, 1979, she held office by virtue of an
election and was paid a fixed salary. 1 From
December 31, 1979 up to February 1, 1988, she held the

1. A period in which she was

paid on a per diem basis from
December 31, 1976 to
December 31, 1979; and
2. A period in which she was
paid a fixed salary from
January 1, 1980 to February
1,1988.

CSC held that the services rendered for the first

holdover period between January 31, 1976 to January 1,
1979 was creditable for purposes of retirement. CSC
noted that during the entire holdover period, respondent
Belo actually served on a full time basis as Vice
Governor and was on call 24 hours a day. Disagreeing
with the CSC's insistence that the period in which
respondent Belo was paid on a per diem basis should be
credited in computing the number of years of creditable
service to the government, GSIS subsequently filed a
petition for certioraribefore this court, questioning the
orders of the CSC. Agreeing that per diems were not
compensation within the meaning of Section 1(c) of R.A.
1573 which amended Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186
(Government Service Insurance Act), we granted the
petitions in G.R. Nos. 98395 and 102449, 4 and reversed
the CSC Orders and Resolutions in question.

A review of the circumstances surrounding

payment to respondent Belo of the per
diems in question convinces us that her
motion is meritorious. We are convinced
that the "per diem" she received was
actually paid for in the performance of her
duties as Vice-Governor of Capiz in a
holdover capacity not as the per
diem referred to by section 1(c) of R.A. No
1573 which amended Section 1(c) of C.A.
No. 186 (Government Insurance Service
Act). A closer look at the aforecited
provision, moreover, reveals a legislative
intent to make a clear distinction between
salary, pay or compensation, on one hand,

and other incidental allowances,

including per diems on the other. Section
1(c) provides:
(c) Salary, pay or
compensation shall be
construed as to exclude all
bonuses, per diems,
allowances and overtime pay,
or salary, pay or compensation
given to the base pay of the
position or rank as fixed by law
or regulations. 5
Since it is generally held that an allowance
for expenses incident to the discharge of an
office is not a salary of office, 6 it follows that if
the remuneration received by a public official in the
performance of his duties does not constitute a mere
"allowance for expenses" but appears to be his actual
base pay, then no amount of categorizing the salary as
base pay, a "per diem" would take the allowances
received by petitioner from the term service with
compensation for the purpose of computing the number
of years of service in government. Furthermore, it would
grossly violate the law's intent to reward the public
servant's years of dedicated service to government for
us to gloss over the circumstances surrounding the
payment of the said remunerations to the petitioner in
taking a purely mechanical approach to the problem by
accepting an attached label at face value.

In G.R. No. 98395, the period disputed was

served by respondent Baradero as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of La Castellana, Negros
Occidental between January 1, 1976 to
October 10, 1978 where he was likewise
paid on a per diem basis. It is not disputed
that during this period, respondent
Baradero rendered full services to the
government as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan. In fact, on the basis of
its earlier resolution on the case of
respondent Belo, the Civil Service

Commission recognized the period in which

respondent Baradero served as a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan as creditable for
retirement purposes instead of allowing his
petition for extension of service in order to
complete the 15 year period of service
required for the purpose of qualifying for
retirement benefits. 7
In the sense in which the phrase "per diem"
is used under the Government Service
Insurance Law, a per diem is a daily
allowance given for each day an officer or
employee of government is away from his
home base. 8 This is its traditional meaning: its usual
signification is as a reimbursement for extra expenses
incurred by the public official in the performance of his
duties. 9 Under this definition the per diem intended to
cover the cost of lodging and subsistence of officers and
employees when the latter are on duty outside of their
permanent station. 10

On the other hand, a per diem could

rightfully be considered a compensation or
remuneration attached to an office. 11 Under
the circumstances obtaining in the case of respondent
Belo the per diems received by her during the period that
she acted in holdover capacity obviously were in the
nature of compensation or remuneration for her services
as Vice Governor of the Province of Capiz, rather than
as a reimbursement for incidental expenses incurred
while away from her home base. In connection with this,
it is important to lay stress to the following facts:

1. Petitioner rendered service

to the government
continuously from January 25,
1972 to February 1, 1988 as
Vice Governor of the Province
of Capiz. During a portion of
the holdover-period, i.e., from
December 31, 1976 to January
11 1979, payment for her
services to the government
was throughper diems for

every regular or special

session of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan attended. 12
2. The CSC noted that: "[F]ormer Vice
Governor Belo was on a full time basis
when she served . . . on a hold-over
capacity. . . As such provincial official
she is (sic) legally and factually on call
by the provincial people and the
province more than eight hours a day, or
at any time of the day beyond the
prescribed working hours.

3. She received no other forms

of remuneration during the
disputed period. 13
The same could be said of the services
rendered by respondent Baradero, who,
before and after the period in question had
an unblemished record of service to the
government as a member of the army and
as a medical officer of the Philippine
Medicare Commission. The disputed period
was served on a full-time basis regardless
of the denomination given to the
compensation received by him.
What ought to be controlling in the cases at
bench therefore, should be the nature of
the remuneration rather than the label
attached to it. While there is no dispute that
the law excepting per diems from the
definition of compensation is clear and
requires no interpretation, however, since
the term per diem may be construed either
as compensation or as allowance, it would
be necessary for us to inquire whether the
term per diem in the GSIS Law refers to
one or the other signification. As explained
above, it is plainly obvious that per diem as
compensation, is not what the law
contemplates. The clear intent of the

Government Insurance Law was to exclude

those extra incidental expenses or incurred
on a daily basis covered by the traditional
definition of the term per diem. An
important fact missed from our earlier
decision was that, while respondent Belo
was paid on aper diem basis during her first
holdover period as Vice Governor she was
subsequently paid a fixed salary, which
apparently rectified an otherwise
anomalous situation. The services
rendered by respondent Belo having been
continuous, the disputed period should be
credited for purposes of retirement.
On the other hand, respondent Baradero
was willing to serve two additional years of
service to government in order to complete
the 15 year period required by our
retirement laws. The Civil Service
Commission felt this was unnecessary and
denied the same on the ground that the
period served on a per diem basis, was,
like the disputed period in the Belo case,
creditable. 14
The distinctions between salary and per
diem made hereinabove were in fact
adverted to in our original decision dated
October 28, 1994. In explaining the
allowance of service rendered on a per
diem basis in the case ofInocencio vs.
Ferrer of the Social Security System, we
noted with approval the Government
Service Insurance System's explanation
that the per diem service which was
credited for purposes of retirement was
Commissioner Ferrer's full time service as
Hearing Officer not his per diem service for
attendance at Board Meetings. Even then,
we indirectly noted the difference
between per diem paid as compensation

for services rendered on a full time basis

and per diem as allowance for incidental
expenses. Respondent Belo asserts, with
reason, that the per diems paid to her,
while reckoned on the basis of attendance
in Board Meetings, were for her full time
services as Vice Governor of the Province
of Capiz. In fact, the same service, albeit
still on a holdover basis, was eventually
paid with a fixed salary.
Retirement benefits given to government
employees in effect reward them for giving
the best years of their lives to the service of
their country. This is especially true with
those in government service occupying
positions of leadership or positions
requiring management skills because the
years they devote to government service
could be spent more profitably in lucrative
appointments in the private sector. In
exchange for their selfless dedication to
government service, they enjoy security of
tenure and are ensured of a reasonable
amount of support after they leave the
government. The basis for the provision of
retirement benefits is, therefore, service to
government. While a government insurance
system rationalizes the management of
funds necessary to keep this system of
retirement support afloat and is partly
dependent on contributions made by the
thousands of members of the system, the
fact that these contributions are minimal
when compared to the amount of
retirement benefits actually received shows
that such contributions, while necessary,
are not absolutely determinative in drawing
up criteria for those who would qualify as
recipients of the retirement benefit system.

It cannot be convincingly asserted that

petitioners could not avail themselves of
the benefits of the policy because no
deductions were made from their salaries
during the disputed periods when they were
paid on a per diembasis. In respondent
Belo's case, before and after that short
interregnum, she was paid a fixed salary.
She was not duly informed that short period
was not to be credited in computing the
length of her service for retirement
purposes. She assumed in all good faith
that she continued to be covered by the
GSIS insurance benefits considering that in
fact and in practice the deductions are
virtually mandatorily made from all
government employees on an essentially
involuntary basis. Similarly, had respondent
Baradero been informed of the need to pay
the required deductions for the purpose of
qualifying for retirement benefits, he would
have willingly paid the required sums. In a
sense, the contract made between the
GSIS and the government employee is
done on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, that is, it
is a virtual contract of adhesion which gives
the employee no choice but to involuntarily
accede to the deductions made from their
oftentimes meager salaries. If the GSIS did
not deduct, it was by its own choice:
contributions were exacted from
petitioner before and after the disputed
period. To assert that petitioners would
have been entitled to benefits had they
opted for optional deductions at that point
misses the principal fact in issue here,
which is the question as to whether or not
the disputed periods should be credited as
service with compensation for the purposes
of retirement.

Moreover, the source of GSIS benefits is

not in essence merely contractual; rather, it
is a social legislation as clearly indicated in
the "whereas" of Presidential Decree No.
1146, to wit:
WHEREAS, provisions of
existing laws that have
prejudiced, rather than
benefited, the government
employee; restricted, rather
than broadened, his benefits,
prolonged, rather than
facilitated the payment of
benefits, must now yield to his
paramount welfare;
WHEREAS, the social security
and insurance benefits of
government employees must
be continuously re-examined
and improved to assure
comprehensive and integrated
social security and insurance
programs that will provide
benefits responsive to their
needs and those of their
dependents in the event of
sickness, disability, death,
retirement, and other
contingencies; and to serve as
a fitting reward for dedicated
public service;
WHEREAS, in the light existing
economic conditions affecting
the welfare of government
employees there is a need to
expand and improve the social
security and insurance
programs administered by the
Government Service Insurance

Systems, specifically, among

others, by increasing pension
benefits, expanding disability
benefits, introducing
survivorship benefits,
introducing sickness income
benefits, and eventually
extending the compulsory
coverage of these programs to
all government employees
regardless of employment
status.
The situation as far as private respondents
and the GSIS are concerned could be
rectified by deducting a reasonable amount
corresponding to the contributions which
should have been deducted during the
period from the amount of retirement
benefits accruing to them. It would be
grossly inequitable as it would violate
the spirit of the government retirement and
insurance laws to permanently penalize
both respondents Belo and Baradero by
ignoring the fact of actual period of service
to government with compensation, and
deny them the retirement privileges that
they, for their unselfish service to the
government justly deserve. Under the
peculiar circumstances of the case at
bench, the demand for equity prompts us to
regard spirit not letter, and intent, not form,
in according substantial justice to both
respondents, where the law, through its
inflexible rules might prove inadequate.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby
GRANTED, our decision dated October 28,
1994 RECONSIDERED and the questioned
resolutions and orders of the CSC requiring
GSIS to consider creditable the services of

private respondents on a per diem basis

AFFIRMED.

surviving spouse of the late Flordeliza

Sarmiento.

SO ORDERED.

The findings of the respondent Commission

are as follows:

ECC
G.R. No. L-65680 May 11, 1989
JOSE B. SARMIENTO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(National Power
Corporation), respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General and The Government
Corporate Counsel for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision
rendered by the Employees' Compensation
Commission in ECC Case No. 2134 on
August 25, 1983 which affirmed the
decision of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) denying the
petitioner's claim for death benefits as

The record shows that the late

Flordeliza Sarmiento was
employed by the National
Power Corporation in Quezon
City as accounting clerk in May
1974. At the time of her death
on August 12, 1981 she was
manager of the budget
division. History of the
deceased's illness showed that
symptoms manifested as early
as April 1980 as a small wound
over the external auditory
canal and mass over the
martoid region. Biopsy of the
mass revealed cancer known
as "differentiated squamous
cell carcinoma." The employee
sought treatment in various
hospitals, namely, Veterans
Memorial Hospital, United
Doctors Medical Hospital and
Makati Medical Center. In
March 1981, a soft tissue mass
emerged on her left upper
cheek as a result of which her
lips became deformed and she
was unable to close her left
eye. She continued treatment
and her last treatment at the
Capitol Medical Center on July
12, 1 981 was due to her
difficulty of swallowing food
and her general debility. On
August 12, 1981, she
succumbed to

cardiorespiratory arrest due to

parotid carcinoma. She was 40
years old.
Believing that the deceased's
fatal illness having been
contracted by her during
employment was serviceconnected, appellant herein
filed a claim for death benefits
under Presidential Decree No.
626, as amended. On
September 9, 1982, the GSIS,
through its Medical Services
Center, denied the claim. It
was pointed out that parotid
carcinoma is "Malignant tumor
of the parotid gland (salivary
gland)" and that its
development was not caused
by employment and
employment conditions.
Dissatisfied with the
respondent System's decision
of denial, claimant wrote a
letter dated October 8, 1982 to
the GSIS requesting that the
records of the claim be
elevated to the Employees'
Compensation Commission for
review pursuant to the law and
the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation. (At
pp. 17-18, Rollo)

On August 25, 1983, the respondent

Commission affirmed the GSIS' decision. It
found that the deceased's death causation
by parotid carcinoma is not compensable
because she did not contract nor suffer
from the same by reason of her work but by
reason of embryonic rests and epithelial
growth.
It may be noted that the petitioner was
earlier paid GSIS benefits in the amount of
P142,285.03 but the claim for employee's
compensation was disallowed.
Hence, the instant petition.
The petitioner, while principally stressing
the compensability of the deceased's
ailment, attacks the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended,
the law on employees' compensation which
superseded the Labor Code and the of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. He alleges
that provisions the said law infringes upon
the guarantees of promotion of social
justice, substantive due process, and equal
protection of laws, and also permits unjust
discrimination and amounts to class
legislation in its enforcement. He prays for
the application of the Old Workmen's
Compensation Act which provided for a
presumption of compensability whenever
an ailment supervened during the course of
the employment.
We dismiss the petition.
We cannot give serious consideration to
the petitioner's attach against the
constitutionality of the new law on
employee's compensation. It must be noted
that the petitioner filed his claim under the
provisions of this same law. It was only

when his claim was rejected that he now

questions the constitutionality of this law on
appeal by certiorari.
The Court has recognized the validity of the
present law and has granted and rejected
claims according to its provisions. We find
in it no infringement of the worker's
constitutional rights. It is now settled
jurisprudence (see Sulit v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483;
Armena v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 122 SCRA 851; Erese v.
Employees' Compensation Commission,
138 SCRA 192; De Jesus v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92)
that the new law discarded the concepts of
"presumption of compensability" and
"aggravation" to restore what the law
believes is a sensible equilibrium between
the employer's obligation to pay workmen's
compensation and the employees' rights to
receive reparation for work-connected
death or disability.
In the case of De Jesus v. Employees'
Compensation, (supra), this Court
explained the new scheme of employees'
compensation as follows:
The new law establishes a
state insurance fired built up by
the contributions of employers
based on the saries of their
employees. The injured worker
does not have to litigate his
right to compensation. No
employer opposes his claim.
There is no notice of injury nor
requirement of controversion.
The sick worker simply files a
claim with a new neutral

Employees' Compensation
Commission which then
determines on the basis of the
employee's supporting papers
and medical evidence whether
or not compensation may be
paid. The payment of benefits
is more prompt. The cost of
administration is low. The
amount of death benefits has
also been doubled.
On the other hand, the
employer's duty is only to pay
the regular monthly premiums
to the scheme. It does not look
for insurance companies to
meet sudden demands for
compensation payments or set
up its own funds to meet these
contingencies. It does not have
to defend itself from spuriously
documented or long past
claims.
The new law applies the social
security principle in the
handling of workmen's
compensation. The
Commission administers and
settles claims from a find under
its exclusive control. The
employer does not intervene in
the compensation process and
it has no control, as in the past,
over payment of benefits. The
open ended Table of
Occupational Diseases
requires no proof of causation.
A covered claimant suffering
from an occupational disease
is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer

opposing or fighting a claim for
compensation, the rules on
presumption of compensability
and controversion cease to
have importance. The lopsided
situation of an employer versus
one employee, which called for
equalization through the
various rules and concepts
favoring the claimant, is now
absent. (At pp. 99-100)
The petitioner's challenge is really against
the desirability of the new law. These is no
serious attempt to assail it on constitutional
grounds.
The wisdom of the present scheme of
workmen's compensation is a matter that
should be addressed to the President and
Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not
the former workmen's compensation
program with its presumptions,
controversions, adversarial procedures,
and levels of payment is preferable to the
present scheme must be decided by the
political departments. The present law was
enacted in the belief that it better complies
with the mandate on social justice and is
more advantageous to the greater number
of working men and women. Until Congress
and the President decide to improve or
amend the law, our duty is to apply it.
Under the present law, a compensable
illness means any illness accepted as an
occupational disease and listed by the
Employees' Compensation Commission, or
any illness caused by employment subject
to proof by the employee that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by

working conditions (Bonifacio v.

Government Service Insurance System,
146 SCRA 276).
Applying the law to the present case,
parotid carcinoma or cancer of the salivary
glands is not an occupational disease
considering the deceased's employment as
accounting clerk and later as manager of
the budget division. The petitioner must,
therefore, prove that his wife's ailment was
caused by her employment or that her
working conditions increased the risk of her
contracting the fatal illness.
The petitioner alleges that as budget
manager, the deceased visited regional and
field operations and was, naturally,
exposed to the elements. According to the
petitioner, the deceased's field trips
necessitated her to take frequent plane
travels which caused deafening and numb
sensations in her ears. This, he says,
caused her "differentiated carcinoma"
which, according to the certificate of Dr.
Ariston Bautista, "apparently started on
external auditory canal."
We find these allegations as mere
conjectures. As with other kinds of cancer,
the cause and nature of parotid carcinoma
is still not known. A medical authority,
however, declares that:
SALIVARY GLANDS
Painless swelling of the parotid
glands is often noted in hepatic
cirrhosis in sarcoidis, in
mumps, following abdominal
surgery, or associated with
neoplasm or infections. The
common factors may be

dehydration and inattention to

oral hygiene. The latter
promotes the growth of large
numbers of bacteria which, in
the absence of sufficient
salivary flow, ascend from the
mouth into the duct of a gland.
Another cause of a painful
salivary gland is sialolithiasis
(salivary duct stone). The
submandibular glands are
most commonly affected. Pain
and swelling associated with
eating are characteristic.
Saliva promotes retention of
artificial dentures because of
its mucin content. Thus,
conditions characterized by
diminished saliva flow often
adversely affect the ease with
which dentures may be worn.
Calcium phosphate stone tend
to form because of a high pH
and viscosity of the
submandibular gland saliva
which has a high mucin
content. Stones are removed
by manipulation or excision.
Autoimmune sialosis is the
MikulicsSjogren Syndrome,
a unilateral or bilateral
enlargement of the parotid
and/or submandibular gland,
and often the lacrimal glands.
Occasionally painful, it is
associated with xerostomia
(dry mouth) due to impaired
saliva formation that is most
common in older women.
Beriow et al., The Merek

Manuel, 14th Edition, pp.

2095-2096).
Another author states the following
regarding squamous cell carcinoma:
Moreover, when the salivary
gland is almost totally
destroyed and replaced by
epidermoid cancer it may be
difficult or even impossible to
ascribe the origin of the growth
to salivary gland tissue. Indeed
many squamous cell
carcinomas, especially of the
parotid, may be metastatic
lesions that develop in lymph
nodes included within the
parotid. And it is important to
stress that the juxtaparotid and
intraparotid lymph nodes are
not merely accumulations of
lymphoid tissue but nodes with
efferent and afferent
lymphatics.
Squamous cell carcinomas of
the major salivary glands are
generally fixed to the skin and
the underlying tissues and, in
the case of the parotid, are
often the cause of facial palsy.
Epidermoid cancers grow
swiftly and the clinical course
is usually rapid. A few tumours,
however, have been present
for as long as two years before
the patient seeks advice.
Some patients remain alive
and asymptomatic after radical
surgery, but ordinarily the

lesions are highly malignant,

infiltrating locally and
metastasizing to the regional
nodes Distant metastasis is
seldom a prominent clinical
feature. In the case of the
submandibular gland the tumor
may simulate osteomyelitis of
the mandible or an abscess in
the gland itself, and if such
lesions are incised a chronic
sinus is liable to persist until
radical treatment is
undertaken. (Evans and
Cruickshank, Epithelial
Tumours of the Salivary
Glands, Vol. 1, p. 254)
Given the preceding medical evaluations,
we affirm the findings of the public
respondents which found no proof that the
deceased's working conditions have indeed
caused or increased the risk of her
contracting her illness.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
The decisions of the Government Service
Insurance System and the Employees'
Compensation Commission denying the
claim are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25299

July 29, 1969

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
ITOGON-SUYOC MINES, INC., and THE
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P.
Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General

Felicisimo R. Rosete and Special Attorney

Oscar S. de Castro for petitioner.
Ramon O. Reynoso, Jr. and Melchor R.
Flores for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The question presented for determination in
this petition for the review of a decision of
the Court of Tax Appeals, one that is of first
impression, would not have arisen had
respondent Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc., the
taxpayer involved, duly paid in full its
liability according to its income tax return
for the fiscal year 1960-61. Instead, it
deducted right away the amount
represented by claim for refund filed eight
(8) months back, for the previous year's
income tax, for which it was not liable at all,
so it alleged, as it suffered a loss instead, a
claim subsequently favorably acted on by
petitioner Commissioner of Internal
Revenue but after the date of such
payment of the 1960-1961 tax. Accordingly,
an interest in the amount of P1,512.83 was
charged by petitioner Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on the sum withheld on
the ground that no deduction on such
refund should be allowed before its
approval. When the matter was taken up
before the Court of Tax Appeals, the above
assessment representing interest was set
aside in the decision of September 30,
1965. That is the decision now an appeal
by petitioner Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. We sustain the Court of Tax
Appeals.
Respondent Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc., a
mining corporation duly organized and
existing in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines, filed on January 13, 1961, its

income tax return for the fiscal year 19591960. It declared a taxable income of
P114,368.04 and a tax due thereon
amounting to P26,310.41, for which it paid
on the same day, the amount of
P13,155.20 as the first installment of the
income tax due. On May 17, 1961,
petitioner filed an amended income tax
return, reporting therein a net loss of
P331,707.33. It thus sought a refund from
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
now the petitioner.
1wph1.t

On February 14, 1962, respondent ItogonSuyoc Mines, Inc. filed its income tax return
for the fiscal year 1960-1961, setting forth
its income tax liability to the tune of
P97,345.00, but deducting the amount of
P13,155.20 representing alleged tax credit
for overpayment of the preceding fiscal
year 1959-1960. 0n December 18, 1962,
petitioner Commissioner of Internal
Revenue assessed against the respondent
the amount of P1,512.83 as 1% monthly
interest on the aforesaid amount of
P13,155.20 from January 16, 1962 to
December 31, 1962. The basis for such an
assessment was the absence of legal right
to deduct said amount before the refund or
tax credit thereof was approved by
petitioner Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. 1
Such an assessment was contested by
respondent before the Court of Tax
Appeals. As already noted, it prevailed. The
decision of September 30, 1965, now on
appeal, explains why. Thus: "Respondent
assessed against the petitioner the amount
of P1,512.83 as 1% monthly interest on the
sum of P13,155.20 from January 16, 1962
to December 31, 1962 on the ground that

petitioner had no legal right to deduct the

said amount from its income tax liability for
the fiscal year 1960-1961 until the refund or
tax credit thereof has been approved by
respondent. As aforestated, petitioner paid
the amount of P13,155.20 as first
installment on its reported income tax
liability for the fiscal year 1959-1960. But, it
turned out that instead of deriving a net
gain, it sustained a net loss during the said
fiscal year. Accordingly, it filed an amended
income tax return and a claim for the refund
of the sum of P13,155.20, which sum it
subsequently, deducted from its income tax
liability for the succeeding fiscal year 19601961. The overpayment for the fiscal year
1959-1960 and the deduction of the
overpaid amount from its 1960-1961 tax
liability are not denied by respondent. In
this circumstance, we find it unfair and
unjust for the Commissioner to exact an
interest on the said sum of P13,155.20,
which, after all, was paid to and received by
the government even before the incidence
of the tax in question." 2
That is the question before us in this
petition for review by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. He argues that the Court
of Tax Appeals should not have absolved
respondent corporation "from liability to pay
the sum of P1,512.83 as 1% monthly
interest for delinquency in the payment of
income tax for the fiscal year 19601961." 3As noted at the outset, we find such
contention far from persuasive.
It could not be error for the Court of Tax
Appeals, considering the admitted fact of
overpayment, entitling respondent to
refund, to hold that petitioner should not
repose an interest on the aforesaid sum of

P13,155.20 "which after all was paid to and

received by the government even before
the incidence of the tax in question." It
would be, according to the Court of Tax
Appeals, "unfair and unjust" to do so. We
agree but we go farther. The imposition of
such an interest by petitioner is not
supported by law.
The National Internal Revenue Code
provides that interest upon the amount
determined as a deficiency shall be
assessed and shall be paid upon notice
and demand from the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue at the specified.4 It is
made clear, however, in an earlier provision
found in the same section that if in any
preceding year, the taxpayer was entitled to
a refund of any amount due as tax, such
amount, if not yet refunded, may be
deducted from the tax to be paid. 5
There is no question respondent was
entitled to a refund. Instead of waiting for
the sum involved to be delivered to it, it
deducted the said amount from the tax that
it had to pay. That it had a right to do
according to the law. It is true a doubt could
have arisen due to the fact that as of the
time such a deduction was made, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue had not
as yet approved such a refund. It is an
admitted fact though that respondent was
clearly entitled to it, and petitioner did not
allege otherwise. Nor could he do so.
Under all the circumstances disclosed
therefore, the applicability of the legal
provision allowing such a deduction from
the amount of the tax to be paid cannot be
disputed.

This conclusion is in accordance with the

principle announced in Castro v. Collector
of Internal Revenue. 6 While the case is not
directly in point, it yields an implication that
makes even more formidable the case for
respondent taxpayer. As there held, the
imposition of the monthly interest was
considered as not constituting a penalty
"but a just compensation to the state for the
delay in paying the tax, and for the
concomitant use by the taxpayer of funds
that rightfully should be in the government's
hands ...."
What is therefore sought to be avoided is
for the taxpayer to make use of funds that
should have been paid to the government.
Here, in view of the overpayment for the
fiscal year 1959-1960, the sum of
P13,155.20 had already formed part of the
public funds. It cannot be said, therefore,
that respondent taxpayer was guilty of any
delay enabling it to utilize a sum of money
that should have been in the government
treasury.
How then, as a matter of pure law, even if
we lay to one side the demands of fairness
and justice, which to the Court of Tax
Appeals seem to be uppermost, can its
decision be overturned? Accordingly, we
find no valid ground for this appeal.
WHEREFORE, the decision of September
30, 1965 of the Court of Tax Appeals is
affirmed. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
1wph1.t

G.R. No. L-26341

November 27, 1968

ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING

CO., petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO,
for herself and in behalf of her minor
children EDWIN, EDGAR and EDNA, all
surnamed PABLO, respondents.
Luisito C. Hofilena for petitioner.
Villavieja and Villanueva for respondent
Workmen's Compensation Commission.
Gualberto C. Opong for respondent Irenea
M. Pablo and her minor children.
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and
Engineering Company (hereinafter referred
to as the IDECO) from the decision dated
February 28, 1966 of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission (hereinafter
referred to as the Commission) affirming
the decision of the Regional Office VII in
Iloilo City, and ordering the IDECO to pay to
the widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo
(Irenea M. Pablo and the minors Edwin,
Edgar and Edna, all surnamed Pablo) the
sum of P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as
reimbursement for burial expenses and
P300 as attorney's fees, and to pay to the
Commission the amount of P46 as fees
pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, as amended.
At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of
January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was
employed as a mechanic of the IDECO,
while walking on his way home, was shot to
death in front of, and about 20 meters away
from, the main IDECO gate, on a private
road commonly called the IDECO road.
The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard
to say anything before or after the killing.

The motive for the crime was and still is

unknown as Cordero was himself killed
before he could be tried for Pablo's death.
At the time of the killing, Pablo's companion
was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee,
who, like Pablo, had finished overtime work
at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the
main IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo
was killed, there were four "carinderias" on
the left side of the road and two
"carinderias" and a residential house on the
right side. The entire length of the road is
nowhere stated in the record.
According to the IDECO, the Commission
erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death
occurred in the course of employment and
in presuming that it arose out of the
employment; (2) in applying the "proximity
rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's death
was an accident within the purview of the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
The principal issue is whether Pablo's
death comes within the meaning and
intendment of that "deceptively simple and
litigiously prolific",1 phrase The two
components of the coverage formula
"arising out of" and "in the course of
employment."2 The two components of the
coverage formula "arising out of" and "in
the course of employment" are said to
be separate tests which must be
independently satisfied;3 however, it should
not be forgotten that the basic concept of
compensation coverage is unitary, not dual,
and is best expressed in the word, "workconnection," because an uncompromising
insistence on an independent application of
each of the two portions of the test can, in
certain cases, exclude clearly workconnected injuries.4 The words "arising out

of" refer to the origin or cause of the

accident, and are descriptive of its
character, while the words "in the course
of" refer to the time, place and
circumstances under which the accident
takes place.5
As a matter of general proposition, an injury
or accident is said to arise "in the course of
employment" when it takes place within the
period of the employment, at a place where
the employee reasonably may be, and
while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged
in doing something incidental thereto.6
The general rule in workmen's
compensation law known as the "going &
coming rule," simply stated, is that "in the
absence of special circumstances, an
employee injured in, going to, or coming
from his place of work is excluded from the
benefits of workmen's compensation
acts."7 This rule, however, admits of four
well-recognized exceptions, to wit: (1)
where the employee is proceeding to or
from his work on the premises of his
employer; (2) where the employee is about
to enter or about to leave the premises of
his employer by way of the exclusive or
customary means of ingress and egress;
(3) where the employee is charged, while
on his way to or from his place of
employment or at his home, or during his
employment, with some duty or special
errand connected with his employment; and
(4) where the employer, as an incident of
the employment, provides the means of
transportation to and from the place of
employment.8
We address ourselves particularly to an
examination and consideration of the

second exception, i.e., injuries sustained off

the premises of the employer, but while
using a customary means of ingress and
egress.
This exception, known as the "proximity
rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber
Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil.9There, the
employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while
proceeding to his place of work and running
to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a
ditch fronting the main gate of the
employer's factory, as a result of which he
died the next day. The sole question was
whether or not the accident which caused
the employee's death arose out of and in
the course of his employment. This Court
ruled in favor of the claimant thus:
The very case of Afable vs. Singer
Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the
petitioner intimated that "we do not of
course mean to imply that an
employee can never recover for
injuries suffered while on his way to
or from work. That depends on the
nature of his employment."
Considering the facts found by the
Commission, namely, that the
deceased Angel Ariar was not under
any shift routine; that his assignment
covered the entire working hours of
the factory; that the first working hour
starts at 6:00 o'clock in the morning;
that it takes at least thirty minutes
before the machine operates at full
speed or load; that the spot where he
fell (ditch fronting petitioner's factory
or sidewalk of its premises), is
immediately proximate to his place of
work, the accident in question must
be deemed to have occurred within

the zone of his employment and

therefore arose out of and in the
course thereof. In Salilig vs. Insular
Lumber Co., G.R. No. 28951,
September 10, 1928, referred to in
the Comments on the Workmen's
Compensation Commission Act by
Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition,
compensation was allowed for injury
received by a laborer from an
accident in going to his place of
work, along a path or way owned by
his employer and commonly used by
the latter's laborers.
In contrast is Pampanga Sugar
Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz,10 which
concerned injuries sustained by a
centrifugal operator. He had reported for
work at 9:30 p.m. (March 7, 1958) and was
dismissed at 5:30 the following morning.
Soon "after he stepped out of the company
gate, and while standing about 2- meters
from it between the shoulder of the highway
and a railroad that came from inside the
compound and intersected the highway,
waiting for a ride home, he was bumped by
a jeepney, as a result of which he
sustained" injuries. In holding that these
injuries were "not produced by an accident
"arising out of and in the course of
employment," " this Court reasoned thus:
The compensability of an injury
suffered by an employee proceeding
to or coming from his work depends
upon whether or not it is "workconnected." As Chief Justice Kenison
of New Hampshire has put it, "the
fact that the employee is travelling to
or from work on a public highway
does not necessarily exclude

coverage (Brousseau vs. Blackstone

Mills, 130 A 2d 543, 545).
Conversely, it is not enough to say
that the employee would not have
been on the public highway had it not
been for his job, since the same can
usually be said of the general public
(Payne & Dolan vs. Industrial
Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The
law, in effect, insures the employee
against losses arising from the perils
of his work. In other words, the
Workmen's Compensation Act covers
occupational injuries, which, as such,
must have a causative
connection with something, not
merely in common with the public,
but peculiar to the employment. In
order to warrant recovery for off-thepremises injuries, it must be shown
that there has been a very special
danger, some particular risk
which the employer could have
caused or allowed to exist. Hence,
It is significant that practically
all successful off-the-premises
cases have involved normal
route of access to the plant, or
an icy sidewalk adjacent to the
premises and
therefore identified with the
premises in the sense that the
employer should have
removed the ice. (Emphasis
ours.)
It is true that in Philippine Fiber
Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L8130 (June 30, 1956), we held the
employer liable for an injury
sustained by an employee who, as

he was running to his place of work

to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into
a ditch in front of the factory's main
gate and near the same. The ditch
was, however, in itself an obvious
hazard which, owing to its proximity
to the gate, the employer should
have taken measures to remove.
Thus, thru his inaction, he had
contributed, in a special way, to the
occurrence of the accident.
In the case at bar, no such special
circumstance appears to exist. There
is no particular causative connection
between the injury sustained by the
employee and either his work or his
employer. Although, as stated in the
decision appealed from, the record
does not show that the company
"had taken measures to make the
waiting place safe for the
employees," neither does the record
show either that the accident
occurred at the usual waiting place of
the employees, or that said place
was particularly unsafe.
Our Workmen's Compensation Act being
essentially American in origin and text, it is
not amiss to pay deference to pertinent
American jurisprudence. In the precise area
of law here involved, we can draw guidance
from an affluence of Federal and State
precedents.
From Samuel B. Horovitz' Injury and Death
under Workmen's Compensation
Laws (1944), pp. 159 to 165, we glean the
following observations:

Suppose, however, that the injury

occurs on the way to work or on the
way home from work. Injuries going
to or from work have caused many
judicial upheavals.
The question here is limited to
whether the injuries are "in the
course of" and not "out of" the
employment. How the injury occurred
is not in point. Street risks, whether
the employee was walking or driving,
and all other similar questions deal
with the risk of injury or "out of" the
employment. "In the course of" deals
mainly with the element of time and
space, or "time, place and
circumstances."
Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen
minutes before working hours and
within one hundred feet of the
employer's premises, on sidewalks or
public roads, the question of "in the
course of" the employment is flatly
raised.
Some of our states refuse to extend
this definition of "in the course of" to
include these injuries. Most of the
states will protect the employee from
the moment his foot or person
reaches the employer's premises,
whether he arrives early or late.
These states find something sacred
about the employment premises and
define "premises" very broadly, not
only to include premises owned by
the employer, but also premises
leased, hired, supplied or used by
him, even private alleyways merely
used by the employer. Adjacent

private premises are protected by

many states, and a few protect the
employee even on adjacent public
sidewalks and streets. Where a city
or any employer owns or controls an
island, all its streets are protected
premises.
There is no reason in principle why
states should not protect employees
for a reasonable period of time prior
to or after working hours and for
a reasonable distance before
reaching or after leaving the
employer's premises. The Supreme
Court of the United States has
declared that it will not overturn any
state decision that so enlarges the
scope of its act. Hence, a deaf
worker, trespassing on railroad tracks
adjacent to his employer's brickmaking premises (but shown by his
superintendent the specific short
crossing over the track), and killed by
a train, was held to be in the course
of his employment when hit by an
oncoming train fifteen minutes before
his day would have begun. So long
as causal relation to the employment
is discernible, no federal question
arises.
The narrow rule that a worker is not
in the course of his employment until
he crosses the employment
threshold is itself subject to
many exceptions. Off-premises
injuries to or from work, in both
liberal and narrow states, are
compensable (1) if the employee is
on the way to or from work in a
vehicle owned or supplied by the

employer, whether in a public (e.g.,

the employer's street car) or private
conveyance; (2) if the employee is
subject to call at all hours or at the
moment of injury; (3) if the employee
is travelling for the employer, i.e.,
travelling workers; (4) if the employer
pays for the employee's time from
the moment he leaves his home to
his return home; (5) if the employee
is on his way to do further work at
home, even though on a fixed salary;
(6) where the employee is required to
bring his automobile to his place of
business for use there. Other
exceptions undoubtedly are equally
justified, dependent on their own
peculiar circumstances.
Schneider (supra, at p. 117) makes this
significant statement:
The proximity rule exception to the
general going and coming rule is that
an employee is generally considered
to be in the course of his
employment while coming to or going
from his work, when, though off the
actual premises of his employer, he
is still in close proximity thereto, is
proceeding diligently at an
appropriate time, by reasonable
means, over the natural, practical,
customary, convenient and
recognized way of ingress, or egress
either on land under the control of
the employer, or on adjacent
property with the express or implied
consent of the employer.
On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR, we find the
following disquisition:

The compensation acts have been

very generally held not to authorize
an award in case of an injury or
death from a peril which is common
to all mankind, or to which the public
at large is exposed. 28 R.C. L. 804.
And they do not as a general rule
cover injuries received while going to
or from work on public streets, where
the employee has not reached, or
has left the employer's premises. The
question whether an injury arises out
of and in the course of the
employment, however, is one
dependent upon the facts of each
case, and in some cases, where an
injury occured while the employee
was going to or from work, but was in
the street in front of the employer's
premises, it has been held
compensable.
Thus, in the reported case (Barnett v.
Brtiling Cafeteria Co., ante, 85) the
injury was held to have arisen out of
and in the course of the employment,
where the employee slipped on ice
on the sidewalk immediately in front
of the employer's place of business,
while on her way to report for duty,
and just before entering by the only
entrance to her place of employment.
The court here recognized the
general rule that, if an employee is
injured while going to or from his
work to his house, or to or from some
point not visited for the discharge of
a duty arising out of the employment,
or while in the use of a public
highway, he does not come within the
protection of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, but stated that

there is an exception to this rule

and that the employment is not
limited by the actual time when the
workman reaches the scene of his
labor and begins it, or when he
ceases, but includes a reasonable
time and opportunity before and
after, while he is at or near his place
of employment. The court reasoned
that in the case at bar, although the
employee had not entered the
employer's place of business, and
the sidewalk was a public highway
so much therefore as was in front of
the employer's place of business
was a necessary adjunct, used in
connection with the business, and
that the sidewalk was to a limited
degree and purpose a part of the
employer's premises.
In Industrial Commission v. Barber
(1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363,
the injury was held to have arisen in
the course of the employment where
an employee, about five minutes
before the hour when he was to go
on duty, was struck by an automobile
owned and driven by another
employee, within a short distance
from the employer's plant, which was
located at the dead end of a street
maintained by the employer from its
plant to the intersection with another
street, and, although the street was a
public one, it led nowhere except to
the employer's plant, and all of its
employees were obliged to use it in
going to and from their work. The
court stated that where the
conditions under the control of an
industrial plant are such that the

employee has no option but to

pursue a given course with reference
to such conditions and environments,
the pursuance of such course is an
implied obligation of the employer in
his contract with such employee, and
that when he, for the purpose of
entering his employment, has
entered into the sphere or zone
controlled by his employer and is
pursuing a course with reference to
which he has no option, he is then
not only within the conditions and
environments of the plant of his
employer, but is then in the course of
his employment; and that, when he
receives an injury attributable to such
conditions and environments, there is
a direct causal connection between
his employment and his injury, and
the injury falls within the class of
industrial injuries for which
compensation has been provided by
the Workmen's Compensation Law.
99 C.J.S., at pp. 807-814, has this to say:
It is laid down as a general rule,
known as the "going and coming"
rule, that, in the absence of special
circumstances, and except in certain
unusual circumstances, and where
nothing else appears, harm or injury
sustained by an employee while
going to or from his work is not
compensable. Such injury, or
accident, is regarded by the weight of
authority of many courts as not
arising out of his employment, and as
not being, or not occurring, in the
course thereof.

However, this rule is not inflexible, is

not of inevitable application, and is
subject to qualifications, and to
exceptions which depend on the
nature, circumstances, and
conditions of the particular
employment, the circumstances of
the particular case, and the cause of
the injury.
Jaynes vs. Potlach Forests11 expresses with
enlightening clarity the rationale for
extending the scope of "course of
employment" to certain "off-premises"
injuries:
We are urged here to again
recognize and apply the distinction
between off-premises injuries which
occur on private property and those
which occur on public streets and
highways. The extension of the
course of employment to offpremises injuries is not based upon
the principle which would justify a
distinction upon the narrow ground of
private and public property; it is not
sound to say that while an employee
is on public highway he is always
there as a member of the public and
in nowise in the exercise of any right
conferred by his contract to
employment; nor is it a complete
answer to say that while he is on his
employer's premises his presence
there is by contract right, otherwise
he would be a trespasser. The
question of whether or not one is a
covered employee should not be
resolved by the application of the law
relating to rights to enter upon lands,

or by law of trespass, licensee,

invitee or otherwise.
A substantial and fair ground to
justify the extension of the course of
employment beyond the premises of
the employer is to extend its scope to
the necessary risks and hazards
associated with the employment.
These risks may or may not be on
the premises of the employer and for
this reason there is no justification to
distinguish between extended risks
on public highways and private
pathways. In fact it is at most a
distinction without a difference.
Under the better reasoned cases the
technical status as public or private is
obviously of no moment or in any
event in and of itself is not
conclusive.
Likewise enlightening is the following
explanation of the premises rule
exceptions:

We have, then a workable

explanation of the exception to the
premises rule: it is not nearness, or
reasonable distance, or even the
identifying or surrounding areas with
the premises; it is simply that, when
a court has satisfied itself that there
is a distinct "arising out of" or causal
connection between the conditions
under which claimant must approach
and leave the premises and the
occurrence of the injury, it may hold
that the course of employment
extends as far as those conditions
extend. (Larson's Workmen's
Compensation Law, 1965 ed., vol. 1,
pp. 210-211)
We now direct our attention to the cause of
the employee's death: assault.
An "assault," although resulting from a
deliberate act of the slayer, is considered
an "accident" within the meaning of sec. 2
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since
the word "accident" is intended to indicate
that "the act causing the injury shall be
casual or unforeseen, an act for which the
injured party is not legally responsible."12
In the cases where the assault was proven
to have been work-connected,
compensation was awarded. In Nava,
supra, the helmsman of a boat was
engaged in hauling the ship's cable and in
coiling the cable partly occupied by a
folding bed of one of the passengers. This
passenger, upon being asked, declared his
ownership of the bed. Nava expressed his
intention of pushing it out of the way and
proceeded to do so. Angered by this, the
passenger exchanged hot words with

Nava, and then, with a piece of wood,

jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach. At
this point, the passenger's brother ran up to
Nava and stabbed him to death. The death
was adjudged compensable.
In Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Vda.
de Mandaguit,13 the truck which Mandaguit
was driving collided with a cyclist going in
the opposite direction. The latter turned
around and immediately pursued the bus.
He overtook it a few minutes later when it
stopped to take on passengers. The driver
then disembarked from the bus to wash his
hands at a drugstore nearby. The cyclist
followed him there and knifed him to death.
We affirmed the grant of compensation
upon the finding that the death arose out of
and in the course of employment.
In Galicia vs. Dy Pac,14 the employee,
Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu of
another employee who had been
suspended from work upon request of his
labor union; while Carla was working, the
suspended employee asked him to
intercede for him, but Carla refused; an
altercation resulted; shortly thereafter the
suspended employee stabbed Carla to
death. The death was held compensable
because "the injury sustained by the
deceased was caused by an accident
arising out of his employment since the
evidence is clear that the fight which
resulted in the killing of the deceased had
its origin or cause in the fact that he was
placed in the job previously occupied by the
assailant."
In the three cases above-cited, there was
evidence as to the motive of the assailant.

In A. P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol,15 the

death of an employee-driver who, while
driving a cab, was killed by an unidentified
passenger, was held compensable by the
Commission. However, the question of
whether the assault arose out of the
employment, was not raised on appeal to
this Court.
In Batangas Transportation Company vs.
Vda. de Rivera,16 that question was raised.
While the employee-driver was driving a
bus, a passenger boarded it and sat
directly behind the driver. After about thirty
minutes, during which the passenger and
the driver never so much as exchanged a
word, the passenger shot the driver to
death and then fled. There was no
competent proof as to the cause of the
assault, although there were intimations
that the incident arose from a personal
grudge. The majority decision17 ruled the
death compensable. The bases: (1) Once it
is proved that the employee died in the
course of the employment, the legal
presumption, in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary, is that the claim
"comes within the provisions of the
compensation law" (sec. 43), in other
words, that the incident arose out of the
workman's employment. (2) Doubts as to
rights to compensation are resolved in
favor of the employee and his dependents.
(3) The Commissioner's declaration on the
work-connection might be binding on the
Court. (4) There are employments which
increase the risk of assault on the person of
the employee and it is in that sense that an
injury or harm sustained by the assaulted
worker arises out of the employment,
because the increased risk to assault
supplies the link or connection between the

injury and the employment. Among the jobs

enumerated as increasing the risk of
assault are (a) jobs having to do with
keeping the peace or guarding property; (b)
jobs having to do with keeping or carrying
of money which subject to the employee to
the risk of assault because of the increased
temptation to robbery; (c) jobs which
expose the employee to direct contact with
lawless and irresponsible members of the
community, like that of a bartender; and (d)
work as bus driver, taxi driver or street car
conductor.
It has been said that an employment may
either increase risk of assault because of
its nature or be the subject-matter of a
dispute leading to the assault. The first kind
of employment, the so-called "increased
risk" jobs comprehend (1) jobs involving
dangerous duties, such as that of guarding
the employer's property, that of carrying or
keeping money, that where the employee is
exposed to lawless or irresponsible
members of the public, or that which
subjects him to increased or indiscriminate
contact with the public, such as the job of a
street car conductor or taxi-driver;18 (2) jobs
where the employee is placed in a
dangerous environment;19 and (3) jobs of
employees whose work takes them on the
highway. On the other hand, the
employment itself may be the subjectmatter of a dispute leading to the assault as
where a supervisor is assaulted by
workmen he has fired, or where the
argument was over the performance of
work or possession of tools or the like, or
where the violence was due to labor
disputes.20

In Rivera, supra, the unexplained assault

on the employee was considered to
have arisen out of the employment
because it occurred in the course of
employment. This Court relied on the
presumption of law that in any proceeding
for the enforcement of a claim, the claim is
presumed to come within the provisions of
the Act.21According to this Court, "this
statutory presumption was copied from
New York." Concerning the corresponding
New York provision of law, Larson has this
to say:
In a few jurisdictions, notably New
York and Massachusetts, a statutory
presumption in favor of coverage has
figured in unexplained-accident
cases. The Massachusetts statute
provides:
In any claim for compensation,
where the employee has been
killed, or is physically or
mentally unable to testify, it
shall be presumed, in the
absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary, that
the claim comes within the
provisions of this chapter, that
sufficient notice of the injury
has been given, and that the
injury or death was not
occasioned by the wilful
intention of the employee to
injure or kill himself or another.
This provision was largely copied
from the New York section on
presumptions, except that the New
York act creates the presumption in
all cases, not merely those involving

an employee's death or inability to

testify.
The sweeping inclusiveness of this
language might seem at first glance
to mean that the mere making of a
claim is also the making of a prima
facie case, as long as death or injury
is shown to have occurred. The New
York and Massachusetts courts have
not so interpreted these statutes,
however. It seems to be necessary to
establish some kind of preliminary
link with the employment before the
presumption can attach. Otherwise,
the claimant widow would have
merely to say, "My husband, who
was one of your employee, has died,
and I therefore claim death benefits,"
whereupon the affirmative burden
would devolve upon the employer to
prove that there was no connection
between the death and the
environment.
It is not yet entirely clear what initial
demonstration of employmentconnection will give the presumption
a foothold. Apparently, the idea is to
rule out cases in which claimant can
show neither that the injury occurred
in the course of employment nor that
it arose out of it, as where he
contracted a disease but has no
evidence to show where he got it. If
there is evidence that the injury
occurred in the course of
employment, the presumption will
usually supply the "arising-out-ofemployment" factor." Larson's
Workmen Compensation Law (1965)
vol. 1, pp. 123-124.

We also quote from the decision of the

Court of Appeals of New York in Daus vs.
Gunderman & Sons:22
The statute is not intended to relieve
completely an employee from the
burden of showing that accidental
injuries suffered by him actually were
sustained in the course of his
employment. "It is not the law that
mere proof of an accident, without
other evidence, creates the
presumption under section 21 of the
Workmen's Compensation Law
(Consol. Law, c. 67) that the accident
arose out of and in the course of the
employment. On the contrary, it has
been frequently held, directly and
indirectly, that there must be some
evidence from which the conclusion
can be drawn that the injuries did
arise out of and in the course of the
employment." Proof of the accident
will give rise to the statutory
presumption only where some
connection appears between the
accident and the employment.
Likewise of relevance is the following
treatise:
The discussion of the coverage
formula, "arising out of and in the
course of employment," was opened
with the suggestion that, while
"course" and "arising" were put under
separate headings for convenience,
some interplay between the two
factors should be observed in the
various categories discussed.

A few examples may now be

reviewed to show that the two tests,
in practice, have not been kept in airtight compartments, but have to
some extent merged into a single
concept of work-connection. One is
almost tempted to formulate a sort of
quantum theory of work-connection:
that a certain minimum quantum of
work-connection must be shown, and
if the "course" quantity is very small,
but the "arising" quantity is large, the
quantum will add up to the necessary
minimum, as it will also when the
"arising" quantity is very small but the
"course" quantity is relatively large.
But if both the "course" and "arising"
quantities are small, the minimum
quantum will not be met.
As an example of the first, a strong
"arising" factor but weak "course"
factor, one may cite the cases in
which recoveries have been allowed
off the employment premises, outside
business hours, when an employee
going to or coming from work is
injured by a hazard distinctly
traceable to the employment, such
as a traffic jam overflowing from the
employment premises, or a rock
flying through the air from a blast on
the premises. Here, by normal
course of employment standards,
there would be no award, since the
employee was not on the premises
while coming or going. Yet
the unmistakable character of the
causal relation of the injury to the
employment has been sufficient to
make up for the weakness of the

"course" factor. Another example of

the same kind of balancing-out is
seen in the line of cases dealing with
injury to travelling men or loggers
while sleeping in hotels or
bunkhouses. It was shown in the
analysis of these cases that,
although the "course" factor is on the
borderline when the employee is
sound asleep at the time of injury, a
strong causal relation of the injury to
the conditions of employment as
where a fellow-logger runs amok, or
a straw falls into the bunkhouseinmate's throat from the mattress
above, or the employee is trapped in
a burning hotel will boost the case
over the line to success; while a
weak causal connection, as where
the salesman merely slips in a hotel
bath, coupled with a weak "course"
factor due to the absence of any
direct service performed for the
employer at the time, will under
present decisions add up to a
quantum of work-connection too
small to support an award. It was
also shown that when the "course"
element is strengthened by the fact
that the employee is at all times on
call, the range of compensable
sources of injury is broader than
when the employee, although living
on the premises is not on call.
A somewhat similar balancing-out
process is seen in the holding that a
borderline course-of-employment
activity like seeking personal comfort
or going to and from work falls short
of compensability if the method
adopted is unusual, unreasonable

and dangerous, while no such

restriction applies to the direct
performance of the work.
As an example of the reverse
situation, a strong "course" element
and a weak "arising" element; one
may recall the "positional" cases
discussed in section 10, as well as
the unexplained-fall and other
"neutral-cause" cases. Here the
course of employment test is
satisfied beyond the slightest doubt:
the employee is in the midst of
performing the active duties of his
job. But the causal connection is very
weak, since the source of the injury
whether a stray bullet, a
wandering lunatic, and unexplained
fall or death, or a mistaken assault by
a stranger is not distinctly
associated with employment
conditions as such, and is tied to the
employment only by the argument
that the injury would not have
occurred to this employee but for the
obligation of the employment which
placed him in the position to be hurt.
Yet, since the "course" element is so
strong, awards are becoming
increasingly common on these facts.
Incidentally, it may be observed that
this "quantum" idea forms a useful
yardstick for measuring just how
generous a court has become in
expanding compensation coverage;
for if a court makes an award when a
case, by the above standards, is
weak both on course of employment
and on causal connection, one can
conclude that the court is capable of

giving the act a broad construction.

Thus, an award was made in Puffin v.
General Electric, where the course
element was weak (rest period) and
the causal element was weak
(setting fire to own sweater while
smoking). Both factors were likewise
very weak in O'Leary v. Brown
Pacific-Maxon Inc., where the course
of employment consisted of a
recreation period interrupted by a
rescue of a stranger, and the arising
factor consisted of drowning in a
channel where decedent was
prohibited from going. And, in Martin
v. Plaut, the course of employment
factor was weak (a cook dressing in
the morning) and the causal factor
was also weak (an unexplained fall);
yet an award was made in New York.
But another New York case shows
that the simultaneous weakness of
course and arising factors may reach
the point where the requisite
quantum is not found. In Shultz v.
Nation Associates, compensation
was denied to an employee who
while combing her hair preparatory to
going to lunch negligently struck her
eye with the comb. Here we see
thinness on all fronts: as to course of
employment time factor, we have a
lunch period; as to the course of
employment activity factor, we have
care of personal appearance; and as
to the causal factor, we have
negligence of the employee. Each
weakness standing alone lunch
period, care of appearance,
negligence would not be fatal;
there are many awards in which one

or another of these is present. But

when all are present, while an award
is not impossible and could be
defended on a point by point basis, it
cannot be relied upon in most
jurisdictions by the prudent lawyer.
Larson's Workmen's Compensation
Law 1965 ed. Vol. 1, pp. 452.97 to
452.100.
In resume:
1. Workmen's compensation is
granted if the injuries result from an
accident which arise out of and in the
course of employment.
2. Both the "arising" factor and the
"course" factor must be present. If
one factor is weak and the other is
strong, the injury is compensable, but
not where both factors are weak.
Ultimately, the question is whether
the accident is work-connected.
3. In a proceeding for the
enforcement of a claim, the same is
presumed to come within the
provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. But a preliminary
link must first be shown to exist
between the injury and the
employment. Thus if the injury
occurred in the course of
employment, it is presumed to
have arisen out of the employment.
4. The "course" factor applies to time,
place and circumstances. This factor
is present if the injury takes place
within the period of employment, at a
place where the employee may be,
and while he is fulfilling his duties or

is engaged in doing something

incidental thereto.
5. The rule is that an injury sustained
while the employee goes to or comes
from his place of work, is not of the
employment.
6. The exception to the rule is an
injury sustained off the employee's
premises, but while in close proximity
thereto and while using a customary
means of ingress and egress. The
reason for extending the scope of
"course of employment" to offpremises injuries is that there is a
causal connection between the work
and the hazard.
7. An "assault" may be considered an
"accident" within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. The
employment may either increase risk
of assault because of its nature or be
the subject-matter of a dispute
leading to the assault.
From the milestones, we now proceed to
take our bearings in the case at bar, having
in mind always that no cover-all formula
can be spelled out with specificity, that the
particular facts and circumstances of each
case must be inquired into, and that in any
perceptive inquiry, the question as to where
the line should be drawn beyond which the
liability of the employer cannot continue
has been held to be usually one of fact.
We shall first dwell on the question of
ownership of the private road where Pablo
was killed. In granting compensation, the
Commission said that "the road where the
deceased was shot was of private

ownership, was called the IDECO road,

and led straight to the main IDECO gate,
thus raising the reasonable assumption that
it belonged" to the IDECO. The
Commission reasoned out that "even if the
ownership of the road were open to
question, there was no doubt that its private
character was obviously exploited by the
respondent for the purpose of its own
business to such an extent as to make it to
all intents and purposes an extension of its
premises," so that the "shooting of the
deceased may be considered to have taken
place on the premises, and therefore within
the employment;" and that "while
respondent allowed its name to be used in
connection with the private road for the
ingress and egress of the employees it did
not apparently take the necessary
precaution to make it safe for its employees
by employing security guards."
But the IDECO denies ownership of the
road. In its memorandum filed with the
Regional Office, IDECO averred that
Pablo's death did not originate from his
work as to time, place and circumstances.
This, in effect, is a denial of ownership of
the road. The decision of the Regional
Office does not state that the road belongs
to the IDECO. All that it says is that Pablo
was shot "barely two minutes after he was
dismissed from work and while walking
along the IDECO road about twenty (20)
meters from the gate." In its "motion for
reconsideration and/or review," the IDECO
emphasized that "the place where the
incident happened was a public road, not
less than twenty (20) meters away from the
main gate of the compound, and therefore
not proximate to or in the immediate vicinity
of the place of work." Again, the ownership

of the road was implicitly denied. And in its

"motion for reconsideration and/or appeal
to the Commission en banc," the IDECO
alleged outright that the "road where the
incident took place, although of private
ownership, does not belong to IDECO.
There is absolutely no evidence on record
that shows IDECO owns the road." If the
road were owned by the IDECO, there
would have been no question that the
assault arose "in the course of
employment."23 But if it did indeed own the
road, then the IDECO would have fenced it,
and place its main gate at the other end of
the road where it meets the public highway.
But while the IDECO does not own the
private road, it cannot be denied that it was
using the same as the principal means of
ingress and egress. The private road leads
directly to its main gate.24 Its right to use the
road must then perforce proceed from
either an easement of right of way or a
lease. Its right, therefore, is either a legal
one or a contractual one. In either case the
IDECO should logically and properly be
charged with security control of the road.
The IDECO owed its employees a safe
passage to its premises. In compliance with
such duty, the IDECO should have seen to
it not only that road was properly paved
and did not have holes or ditches, but
should also have instituted measures for
the proper policing of the immediate area.
The point where Pablo was shot was barely
twenty meters away from the main IDECO
gate, certainly nearer than a stone's throw
therefrom. The spot is immediately
proximate to the IDECO's premises.
Considering this fact, and the further facts
that Pablo had just finished overtime work
at the time, and was killed barely two

minutes after dismissal from work,

the Ampil case is squarely applicable here.
We may say, as we did in Ampil, that the
place where the employee was injured
being "immediately proximate to his place
of work, the accident in question must be
deemed to have occurred within the zone
of his employment and therefore arose out
of and in the course thereof." Our principal
question is whether the injury was
sustained in the course of employment. We
find that it was, and so conclude that the
assault arose out of the employment, even
though the said assault is unexplained.
American jurisprudence supports this view.
In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles,25 the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
Employment includes both only the
actual doing of the work, but a
reasonable margin of time and space
necessary to be used in passing to
and from the place where the work is
to be done. If the employee to be
injured while passing, with the
express or implied consent of the
employer, to or from his work by a
way over the employer's
premises, or over those of another in
such proximity and relation as to be
in practical effect a part of the
employer's premises, the injury is
one arising out of and in the course
of employment as much as though it
had happened while the employee
was engaged in his work at the place
of its performance. In other words,
the employment may begin in point
of time before the work is entered
upon and in point of space before the

place where the work is to be done is

reached. Probably, as a general rule,
employment may be said to begin
when the employee reaches the
entrance to the employer's premises
where the work is to be done; but it is
clear that in some cases the rule
extends to include adjacent premises
used by the employee as a means of
ingress and egress with the express
or implied consent of the employer.
The above ruling is on all fours with our
facts. Two minutes from dismissal and
twenty meters from the main IDECO gate
are "a reasonable margin of time and space
necessary to be used in passing to and
from" the IDECO's premises. The IDECO
employees used the private road with its
consent, express or implied. Twenty meters
on that road from the main gate is in close
proximity to the IDECO's premises. It
follows that Pablo's death was in the course
of employment.
In Carter vs. Lanzetta,26 it was held that
"such statutes envision extension of
coverage to employees from the time they
reach the employer's premises until they
depart therefrom and that hours of service
include a period when this might be
accomplished within a reasonable interval;"
and that "under exceptional circumstances,
a continuance of the course of employment
may be extended by allowing the employee
a reasonable time not only to enter or leave
the premises but also to surmount certain
hazards adjacent thereto."
The private road led directly to the main
IDECO gate. From this description, it would
appear that the road is a dead-end street.

In Singer vs. Rich Marine Sales,27 it was

held that, where the employee, while
returning to work at the end of the lunch
period, fell at the curb of the sidewalk
immediately adjacent to the employer's
premises and one other located thereon,
and the general public used the street only
in connection with those premises, and the
employer actually stored boats on the
sidewalk, the sidewalk was within the
precincts of employment. In that case there
were even two business establishments on
the dead-end street. Here, it is exclusively
the IDECO premises which appear to be at
the end of the private road.
We find in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation28 a
meaningful statement of the obligation of
the employer to its employees: "That the
employer owes, so to speak, a duty of 'safe
passage' to an employee to the point where
he can reach the proper arrival or departure
from his work seems without question."
We next quote extensively from Kelty vs.
Travellers Insurance Company:29
The rule has been repeatedly
announced in Texas that an injury
received by an employee while using
the public streets and highways in
going to or returning from the place
of employment is not compensable,
the rationale of the rule being that in
most instances such an injury is
suffered as a consequence of risk
and hazards to which all members of
the travelling public are subject
rather than risk and hazards having
to do with and originating in the work
or business of the employer....

Another exception, however, which is

applicable is found in the so-called
"access" cases. In these cases a
workman who has been injured at a
plane intended by the employer for
use as a means of ingress or egress
to and from the actual place of the
employee's work has been held to be
in the course of his employment. The
courts have said that these access
areas are so closely related to the
employer's premises as to be fairly
treated as a part of the employer's
premises. We shall discuss the
principal authorities dealing with this
exception to the general rule.
The leading cases in Texas dealing
with the "access" exception, and one
which we think is controlling of this
appeal, is Lumberman's Reciprocal
Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246
S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402. In that case
the employee was employed by
Hartburg Lumber Company, which
company operated and owned a
sawmill in Hartburg, Texas, which
was a lumber town, consisting solely
of the employer's facilities. A railroad
track ran through the town and a part
of the lumber company's facilities
was situated on either side of the
right-of-way. A public road ran
parallel to the railroad tracks which
led to the various buildings on the
property of the lumber company. This
crossing was used by any member of
the public desiring to go to any part
of the lumber company facilities. On
the day in question the decedent quit
work at noon, went home for lunch
and while returning to the lumber

company plant for the purpose of

resuming his employment, was
struck and killed by a train at the
crossing in question. The insurance
company contended (as it does here)
that the decedent's death did not
originate in the work or business of
his employer and that at the time of
his fatal injuries he was not in or
about the furtherance of the affairs or
business of his employer. The
Supreme Court, in an extensive
opinion, reviewed the authorities
from other states and especially
Latter's Case 238 Mass. 326, 130 N.
E. 637, 638, and arrived at the
conclusion that the injury and death
under such circumstances were
compensable under the Texas Act.
The court held that the railroad
crossing bore so intimate a relation
to the lumber company's premises
that it could hardly be treated
otherwise than as a part of the
premises. The Court pointed out that
the lumber company had rights in
and to the crossing which was used
in connection with the lumber
company's business, whether by
employees or by members of the
public. In announcing the "access"
doctrine Justice Greenwood said:
Was Behnken engaged in or
about the furtherance of the
affairs or business of his
employer when he received
the injury causing his death?
He was upon the crossing
provided as the means of
access to his work solely
because he was an employee.

He encountered the dangers

incident to use of the crossing
in order that he might perform
the duties imposed by his
contract of service. Without
subjecting himself to such
dangers he could not do what
was required of him in the
conduct of the lumber
company's business. He had
reached a place provided and
used only as an adjunct to that
business, and was injured from
a risk created by the conditions
under which the business was
carried on. To hold that he was
not acting in furtherance of the
affairs or business of the
lumber company would be to
give a strict interpretation to
this remedial statute, which
should be liberally construed
with a view to accomplish its
purpose and to promote
justice.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v.

Anderson, Tex. Civ. App., 125 S. W.
2d 674, wr. ref., this court followed
the rule announced in Behnken,
supra. In that case the employee was
killed while crossing the railroad track
near his place of employment. In
discussing the question of the situs
of the injury Justice Looney said:
Its use as a means of ingress
to and exit from his place of
work not only conduced his
safety and convenience, but

contributed to the promptness

and efficiency with which he
was enabled to discharge the
duties owing his employer;
hence the reason and
necessity for his presence
upon the railroad track (that
portion of the pathway leading
over the railroad right of way)
when injured, in our opinion,
had to do with, originated in
and grew out of the work of the
employer; and that, the injury
received at the time, place and
under the circumstances,
necessarily was in furtherance
of the affairs or business of the
employer.
Again, in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n
v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App. 53 S. W.
2d 327, err. ref., this court had
occasion to follow the "access"
doctrine. In that case Chief Justice
Jones quoted from the Supreme
Court of the United States in the
case of Bountiful Brisk Company, et
al. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S. Ct.
221, 72 L. Ed. 507, 66 A. L. R. 1402,
as follows:
An employment includes not
only the actual doing of the
work, but a reasonable margin
of time and space necessary
to be used in passing to and
from the place where the work
is to be done. If the employee
be injured while passing, with
the express or implied consent
of the employer, to or from his
work by a way over the

employer's premises, or over

those of another in such
proximity and relation as to be
in practical effect a part of the
employer's premises, the injury
is one arising out of and in the
course of the employment as
much as though it had
happened while the employee
was engaged in his work at the
place of its performance. In
other words, the employment
may begin in point of time
before the work is entered
upon and in point of space
before the place where the
work is to be done is reached.
The ruling enunciated above is applicable
in the case at bar. That part of the road
where Pablo was killed is in very close
proximity to the employer's premises. It is
an "access area" "so clearly related to the
employer's premises as to be fairly treated
as a part of the employer's premises." That
portion of the road bears "so intimate a
relation" to the company's premises. It is
the chief means of entering the IDECO
premises, either for the public or for its
employees. The IDECO uses it extensively
in pursuit of its business. It has rights of
passage over the road, either legal, if by
virtue of easement, or contractual, if by
reason of lease. Pablo was using the road
as a means of access to his work solely
because he was an employee. For this
reason, the IDECO was under obligation to
keep the place safe for its employees.
Safe, that is, against dangers that the
employees might encounter therein, one of
these dangers being assault by third
persons. Having failed to take the proper

security measures over the said area which

it controls, the IDECO is liable for the
injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his
death.
As therefore stated, the assault on Pablo is
unexplained. The murderer was himself
killed before he could be brought to trial. It
is true there is authority for the statement
that before the "proximity" rule may be
applied it must first be shown that there is a
causal connection between the
employment and the hazard which resulted
in the injury.30 The following more modern
view was expressed in Lewis Wood
Preserving Company vs. Jones:31
While some earlier cases seem to
indicate that the causative danger
must be peculiar to the work and not
common to the neighborhood for the
injuries to arise out of and in the
course of the employment (see
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peek, 36
Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121];
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.
v. Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d
189), later cases have been
somewhat more liberal, saying that,
"to be compensable, injuries do not
have to arise from something
peculiar to the employment." Fidelity
& Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Bardon, 79
Ga. App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443,
444. "Where the duties of an
employee entail his presence (at a
place and a time) the claim for an
injury there occurring is not to be
barred because it results from a risk
common to all others ... unless it is
also common to the general public
without regard to such conditions,

and independently of place,

employment, or pursuit." New
Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell,
30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786, cited
in Globe Indemnity Co. v.
MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146
S.E. 46, 47; McKiney v. Reynolds &
Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App.
826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473.
But even without the foregoing
pronouncement, the employer should still
be held liable in view of our conclusion that
that portion of the road where Pablo was
killed, because of its proximity, should be
considered part of the IDECO's premises.
Hence, the injury was in the course of
employment, and there automatically arises
the presumption invoked in Rivera
that the injury by assault arose out of the
employment, i. e., there is a causal relation
between the assault and the employment.
We do say here that the circumstances of
time, two minutes after dismissal from
overtime work, and space, twenty meters
from the employer's main gate, bring
Pablo's death within the scope of
the course factor. But it may logically be
asked: Suppose it were three minutes after
and thirty meters from, or five minutes after
and fifty meters from, would the "proximity"
rule still apply? In answer, we need but
quote that portion of the decision inJean
vs. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which
answered a question arising from an
ingenious hypothetical question put forth by
the defendant therein:
We could, of course, say "this is not
the case before us" and utilize the
old saw, "that which is not before us

we do not decide." Instead, we prefer

to utilize the considerably older law:
"Sufficient unto the day is the evil
thereof" (Matthew 1:34), appending,
however, this admonition: no statute
is static; it must remain constantly
viable to meet new challenges
placed to it. Recovery in a proper
case should not be suppressed
because of a conjectural posture
which may never arise and which if it
does, will be decided in the light of
then existing law.
Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is
basically a social legislation designed to
afford relief to workmen, it must be liberally
construed to attain the purpose for which it
was enacted.32 Liberally construed, sec. 2
of the Act comprehends Pablo's death. The
Commission did not err in granting
compensation.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed
from is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.
G.R. No. 90204 May 11, 1990
MANUEL BELARMINO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM,respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

This seven-year-old case involves a claim

for benefits for the death of a lady school
teacher which the public respondents
disallowed on the ground that the cause of
death was not work-connected.
Before her death on February 19, 1982,
petitioner's wife, Oania Belarmino, was a
classroom teacher of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports assigned at
the Buracan Elementary School in
Dimasalang, Masbate (p. 13, Rollo). She
had been a classroom teacher since
October 18, 1971, or for eleven (11) years.
Her husband, the petitioner, is also a public
school teacher.
On January 14, 1982, at nine o'clock in the
morning, while performing her duties as a
classroom teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who
was in her 8th month of pregnancy,
accidentally slipped and fell on the
classroom floor. Moments later, she
complained of abdominal pain and stomach
cramps. For several days, she continued to
suffer from recurrent abdominal pain and a
feeling of heaviness in her stomach, but,
heedless of the advice of her female coteachers to take a leave of absence, she
continued to report to the school because
there was much work to do. On January 25,
1982, eleven (11) days after her accident,
she went into labor and prematurely
delivered a baby girl at home (p. 8, Rollo).
Her abdominal pains persisted even after
the delivery, accompanied by high fever
and headache. She was brought to the
Alino Hospital in Dimasalang, Masbate on
February 11, 1982. Dr. Alfonso Alino found
that she was suffering from septicemia post
partum due to infected lacerations of the

vagina. She was discharged from the

hospital after five (5) days on February 16,
1982, apparently recovered but she died
three (3) days later. The cause of death
was septicemia post partum. She was 33
years old, survived by her husband and
four (4) children, the oldest of whom was 11
years old and the youngest, her newborn
infant (p. 9, Rollo).
On April 21, 1983, a claim for death
benefits was filed by her husband. On
February 14, 1984, it was denied by the
Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) which held that 'septicemia post
partum the cause of death, is not an
occupational disease, and neither was
there any showing that aforesaid ailment
was contracted by reason of her
employment. . . . The alleged accident
mentioned could not have precipitated the
death of the wife but rather the result of the
infection of her lacerated wounds as a
result of her delivery at home" (p. 14 Rollo).
On appeal to the Employees Compensation
Commission, the latter issued Resolution
No. 3913 dated July 8, 1988 holding:
We agree with the decision of
the system, hence we dismiss
this appeal. Postpartum
septicemia is an acute
infectious disease of the
puerperium resulting from the
entrance into the blood of
bacteria usually streptococci
and their toxins which cause
dissolution of the blood,
degenerative changes in the
organs and the symptoms of
intoxication. The cause of this

condition in the instant case

was the infected vaginal
lacerations resulting from the
decedent's delivery of her child
which took place at home. The
alleged accident in school
could not have been the cause
of septicemia, which in this
case is clearly caused by
factors not inherent in
employment or in the working
conditions of the deceased.
(pp. 14-15, Rollo.)
Hence, this petition for review.
After a careful consideration of the petition
and the annexes thereof, as well as the
comments of the public respondents, we
are persuaded that the public respondents'
peremptory denial of the petitioner's claim
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules
on Employees' Compensation enumerates
the grounds for compensability of injury
resulting in disability or death of an
employee, as follows:
Sec. 1. Grounds (a) For the
injury and the resulting
disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must
be the result of an employment
accident satisfying all of the
following conditions:
(1) The employee
must have been
injured at the
place where his
work requires him
to be;

(2) The employee

must have been
performing his
official functions;
and
(3) If the injury is
sustained
elsewhere, the
employee must
have been
executing an order
for the employer.
(b) For the sickness and the
resulting disability or death to
be compensable, the sickness
must be the result of an
occupational disease listed
under Annex "A" of these
Rules with the conditions set
therein satisfied; otherwise,
proof must be shown that the
risk of contracting the disease
is increased by the working
conditions.
(c) Only injury or sickness that
occurred on or after January 1,
1975 and the resulting
disability or death shall be
compensable under these
Rules.
The illness, septicemia post partum which
resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino, is
admittedly not listed as an occupational
disease in her particular line of work as a
classroom teacher. However, as pointed
out in the petition, her death from that
ailment is compensable because an
employment accident and the conditions of

her employment contributed to its

development. The condition of the
classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to
slip and fall and suffer injury as a result.
The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent
abdominal pains which culminated in the
premature termination of her pregnancy
with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on
the classroom floor brought about her
premature delivery which caused the
development of post partum septicemia
which resulted in death. Her fall therefore
was the proximate or responsible cause
that set in motion an unbroken chain of
events, leading to her demise.
. . . what is termed in American
cases the proximate cause, not
implying however, as might be
inferred from the word itself,
the nearest in point of time or
relation, but rather, [is] the
efficient cause, which may be
the most remote of an
operative chain. It must be that
which sets the others in motion
and is to be distinguished from
a mere preexisting condition
upon which the effective cause
operates, and must have been
adequate to produce the
resultant damage without the
intervention of an independent
cause. (Atlantic Gulf vs. Insular
Government, 10 Phil.
166,171.)
The proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a

natural and continuous chain

of events, each having a close
causal connection with its
immediate predecessor the
final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first
acted, under such
circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to
some person might probably
result therefrom. (Bataclan v.
Medina, 102 Phil. 181.)
Thus in Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366,
372, this Court ruled:
. . . Verily, the right to
compensation extends to
disability due to disease
supervening upon and
proximately and naturally
resulting from a compensable
injury (82 Am. Jur. 132). Where
the primary injury is shown to
have arisen in the course of
employment, every natural
consequence that flows from
the injury likewise arises out of
the employment, unless it is
the result of an independent
intervening cause attributable
to complainants own
negligence or misconduct ( I
Larson Workmen's
Compensation Law 3-279

[1972]). Simply stated, all the

medical consequences and
sequels that flow from the
primary injury are
compensable. (Ibid.)
Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury
that arose in the course of her employment
as a classroom teacher, hence, all the
medical consequences flowing from it: her
recurrent abdominal pains, the premature
delivery of her baby, her septicemia post
partum and death, are compensable.
There is no merit in the public respondents'
argument that the cause of the decedent's
post partum septicemia "was the infected
vaginal lacerations resulting from the
decedent's delivery of her child at home"
for the incident in school could not have
caused septicemia post partum, . . . the
necessary precautions to avoid infection
during or after labor were (not) taken" (p.
29, Rollo).
The argument is unconvincing. It overlooks
the fact that septicemia post partum is a
disease of childbirth, and premature
childbirth would not have occurred if she
did not accidentally fall in the classroom.
It is true that if she had delivered her baby
under sterile conditions in a hospital
operating room instead of in the unsterile
environment of her humble home, and if
she had been attended by specially trained
doctors and nurses, she probably would not
have suffered lacerations of the vagina and
she probably would not have contracted the
fatal infection. Furthermore, if she had
remained longer than five (5) days in the
hospital to complete the treatment of the

infection, she probably would not have

died. But who is to blame for her inability to
afford a hospital delivery and the services
of trained doctors and nurses? The court
may take judicial notice of the meager
salaries that the Government pays its
public school teachers. Forced to live on
the margin of poverty, they are unable to
afford expensive hospital care, nor the
services of trained doctors and nurses
when they or members of their families are
in. Penury compelled the deceased to
scrimp by delivering her baby at home
instead of in a hospital.
The Government is not entirely blameless
for her death for it is not entirely blameless
for her poverty. Government has yet to
perform its declared policy "to free the
people from poverty, provide adequate
social services, extend to them a decent
standard of living, and improve the quality
of life for all (Sec. 7, Art. II, 1973
Constitution and Sec. 9, Art. II, 1987
Constitution). Social justice for the lowly
and underpaid public school teachers will
only be an empty shibboleth until
Government adopts measures to
ameliorate their economic condition and
provides them with adequate medical care
or the means to afford it. "Compassion for
the poor is an imperative of every humane
society" (PLDT v. Bucay and NLRC, 164
SCRA 671, 673). By their denial of the
petitioner's claim for benefits arising from
the death of his wife, the public
respondents ignored this imperative of
Government, and thereby committed a
grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
granted. The respondents Employees

Compensation Commission and the

Government Service Insurance System are
ordered to pay death benefits to the
petitioner and/or the dependents of the late
Oania Belarmino, with legal rate of interest
from the filing of the claim until it is fully
paid, plus attorney's fees equivalent to ten
(10%) percent of the award, and costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84307 April 17, 1989
CIRIACO HINOGUIN petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Armed
Forces of the Philippines), respondents.
Alexander A. Acain for petitioner.

FELICIANO, J.:
This Petition for Review is directed against
the Decision of the Employees'
Compensation Commission ("ECC") in
ECC Case No. 3275 (Ciriaco Hinoguin v.
Government Service Insurance System
[Armed Forces of the Philippines]) which
affirmed the decision of the Government
Service Insurance System ("GSIS")
denying petitioner's claim for compensation
benefit on account of the death of
petitioner's son, Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin
The deceased, Sgt. Hinoguin started his
military service in 1974, when he was
called to military training by the Philippine
Army. He later on enlisted in the Philippine

Army as a private first class. At the time of

his death on 7 August 1985, he was holding
the rank of Sergeant per Special Order P4200, HPA dated 15 October 1985, in "A"
company 14th Infantry Battalion,
5th Infantry Division, PA. The Headquarters
of the 14th Infantry Battalion was located at
Bical, Muoz, Nueva Ecija. Sgt. Hinoguin
was Detachment Non-Commissioned
Officer at Capintalan, Carranglan, Nueva
Ecija, "A" Company being stationed at
Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.
On 1 August 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin and two
(2) members of his Detachment, Cpl.
Rogelio Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes
Alibuyog, sought permission from Captain
Frankie Z. Besas, Commanding Officer of
"A" Company to go on overnight pass to
Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, "to settle [an]
important matter thereat." 1 Captain Besas orally
granted them permission to go to Aritao and to take their
issued firearms with them, considering that Aritao was
regarded as "a critical place " 2 that is, it had peace and
order problems due to the presence of elements of the
New People's Army ("NPA!') in or in the vicinity of Aritao.

Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog

left Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, about noon
on 1 August 1985 and arrived in Aritao,
Nueva Viscaya, about 1:30 o'clock P.M. on
the same day. 3 They proceeded to the home of Dft.
Alibuyog's parents where they had lunch. About 4:00
o'clock P.M., the three (3) soldiers with a fourth man, a
civilian and relative of Dft. Alibuyog, had some gin and
beer, finishing a bottle of gin and two (2) large bottles of
beer. Three hours later, at about 7:00 o'clock P.M., the
soldiers left the Alibuyog home to return to their
Company Headquarters. They boarded a tricycle,
presumably a motor-driven one, Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl.
Clavo seating themselves in the tricycle cab while Dft.
Alibuyog occupied the seat behind the driver. Upon
reaching the poblacion of Aritao, Dft. Alibuyog
dismounted, walked towards and in front of the tricycle
cab, holding his M-16 rifle in his right hand, not noticing
that the rifle's safety lever was on semi automatic (and
not on "safety"). He accidentally touched the trigger,

firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt.

Hinoguin, then still sitting in the cab, in the left lower
abdomen. The Sergeant did not apparently realize
immediately that he had been hit; he took three (3) steps
forward, cried that he had been hit and fell to the ground.

His companions rushed Sgt. Hinoguin to a

hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, for
treatment. Their Company Commander,
Capt. Besas, hurried to the hospital upon
being notified of the shooting and there
talked with the wounded Sergeant. The
latter confirmed to Capt. Besas that he had
indeed been accidentally shot by Dft.
Alibuyog Sgt. Hinoguin was later moved to
the AFP Medical Center in Quezon City and
there he died on 7 August 1985. The Death
Certificate lists "septic shock" as immediate
cause of death, and "generalized
septicemia of peritonitis" as antecedent
cause, following his sustaining a gunshot
wound.
An investigation conducted by H.Q., 14th
Infantry Battalion on 11 August 1985
concluded that the shooting of Sgt.
Hinoguin was "purely accidental in
nature." 4 On 19 November 1985, a "Line of Duty
Board of Officers" was convened by H.Q. 14th Infantry
Battalion, "to determine Line of Duty Status of [the] late
Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA, a member of "A"
Co., 14IB, 5 ID, PA who died ... due to Gun Shot Wound
as a result of an accidental fire (sic) committed by Dft.
Nicomedes Alibuyog 085-5009 (Inf.) PA ... ." After
receiving and deliberating . g on the Investigation Report
dated 11 August 1985 together with the sworn
statements of witnesses Alibuyog, Clavo and Besas, and
after some further questioning of Capt. Besas, the Line
of Duty Board reached the following conclusion and
recommendation:

Sgt. Hinoguin was then the

designated Detachment
Commander of Capintalan
detachment. On or about
011300H August 1985 Dft.

Alibuyog invited Sgt. Hinoguin

and Cpl. Clavo to his home to
celebrate at Aritao, Nueva
Viscaya. They asked
permission to go on overnight
and to allow them to carry their
firearms with them because
the place where they were
going is critical. They were
given such permission verbally
by their Commanding Officer.
The death of Sgt. Hinoguin
was purely accidental as the
Investigation Report presented
here proved beyond
reasonable [doubt] the fact that
Dft. Alibuyog had no grudge
either [against] Cpl. Clavo or
Sgt. Hinoguin
RECOMMENDATION:
The recommendation written
by the Chairman and
unanimously voted for by the
members contain the following:
The Board after a thorough
deliberation on presented
evidences declares that the
Death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin
640407 (Inf.) PA is in Line of
Duty.
The Board recommend farther
that all benefits due the legal
dependents of the late Sgt.
Lemick Hinoguin be
given. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
Sometime in March 1986, petitioner filed
his claim for compensation benefits under
P.D. No. 626 (as amended), claiming that

the death of his son was work-connected

and therefore compensable. This was
denied 6 by the GSIS on the ground that petitioner's
son was not at his work place nor performing his duty as
a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time of his death.

Petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration which Motion was,
however, denied by the GSIS. This denial
was confirmed by the Workmen's
Compensation Commission ("WCC") in a
Decision dated 24 May 1988 which stated
that:
[F]rom the recital of the facts
therein [we found it] very
difficult for us to perceive
where the work-connection of
the events that led to
appellant's son's death lies.
Under the law, death resulting
from injury is considered
compensable if it arises out of
and in the course of
employment. Definitely, the
death of Hinoguin did not
arises out of employment.
Clearly, the facts showed
that he was not on his place of
work nor was he performing
official functions. On the
contrary, he was on pass and
had just came from a
merrymaking when
accidentally shot by his
companion, 7 (Emphasis supplied)
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is
whether or not the death of Sgt. Lemick
Hinoguin is compensable under the
applicable statute and regulations.

Considering that Sgt. Hinoguin died on 7

August 1985, the applicable law is to be
found in Book Four, Title III of the Labor
Code, as amended. It may be noted at the
outset that under Article 167 (g) of the
Labor Code, as amended and Section 4 (b)
(1) of Rule I of the Amended
(Implementing) Rules on Employees'
Compensation, the term "employee"
includes a "member of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines." Rule XIII entitled "Death",
of the Amended (Implementing) Rules
provides in part as follows:
SECTION 1. Conditions to
Entitlement. (a) The
beneficiaries of a deceased
employee shall be entitled to
an income benefit if all of the
following conditions are
satisfied:
(1) The employee had been
duly reported to the System;
(2) He died as a result of injury
or sickness; and
(3) The System has been duly
notified of his death, as well as
the injury or sickness which
caused his death. His
employer shall be liable for the
benefit if such death occurred
before the employee is duly
reported for coverage of the
System.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 167 (k) of the Labor Code as
amended defines a compensable "injury"
quite simply as "any harmful change in the

human organism from any accident arising

out of and in the course of the
employment." The Amended
(Implementing) Rules have, however,
elaborated considerably on the simple and
succinct statutory provision. Rule III,
Section 1 (a) reads:
SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For
the injury and the resulting
disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must
be the result of an employment
accident satisfying all of the
following grounds:
(1) The employee must have
been injured at the place work
requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have
been performing his official
functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained
elsewhere, the employee must
have been executing an order
for the employer.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that because the Amended
(Implementing) Rules are intended to apply
to all kinds of employment, such rules must
be read and applied with reasonable
flexibility and comprehensiveness. The
concept of a "work place" referred to in
Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be
literally applied to a soldier on active duty
status, as if he were a machine operator or
a worker in an assembly line in a factory or

a clerk in a particular fixed office.

Obviously, a soldier must go where his
company is stationed. In the instant case,
Aritao, Nueva Viscaya was not, of course,
Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being
approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the
latter by public transportation. But Sgt.
Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had
permission from their Commanding Officer
to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to us
that a place which soldiers have secured
lawful permission to be at cannot be very
different, legally speaking, from a place
where they are required to go by their
commanding officer. We note that the three
(3) soldiers were on an overnight pass
which, notably, they did not utilize in full.
They were noton vacation leave. Moreover,
they were required or authorized to carry
their firearms with which presumably they
were to defend themselves if NPA elements
happened to attack them while en route to
and from Aritao or with which to attack and
seek to capture such NPA elements as they
might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3)
soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs
while on their way to or from Aritao and
been fired upon by them and if Sgt.
Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet,
we do not believe that respondent GSIS
would have had any difficulty in holding the
death a compensable one.
Turning to the question of whether Sgt.
Hinoguin was performing official functions
at the time he sustained the gunshot
wound, it has already been pointed out
above that the Line of Duty Board of
Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion
Headquarters had already determined that
the death of Sgt. Hinoguin had occurred "in
line of duty." It may be noted in this

connection that a soldier on active duty

status is really on 24 hours a day official
duty status and is subject to military
discipline and military law 24 hours a day.
He is subject to call and to the orders of his
superior officers at all times, 7 days a week,
except, of course, when he is on vacation
leave status (which Sgt. Hinoguin was not).
'Thus, we think that the work-connected
character of Sgt. Hinoguins injury and
death was not effectively precluded by the
simple circumstance that he was on an
overnight pass to go to the home of Dft.
Alibuyog, a soldier under his own
command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not effectively
cease performing "official functions"
because he was granted a pass. While
going to a fellow soldier's home for a few
hours for a meal and some drinks was not
a specific military duty, he was nonetheless
in the course of performance of official
functions. Indeed, it appears to us that a
soldier should be presumed to be on official
duty unless he is shown to have clearly and
unequivocally put aside that status or
condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an
approved vacation leave. 8 Even vacation leave
may, it should be remembered, be preterminated by
superior orders.

More generally, a soldier in the Armed

Forces must accept certain risks, for
instance, that he will be fired upon by
forces hostile to the State or the
Government. That is not, of course, the
only ask that he is compelled to accept by
the very nature of his occupation or
profession as a soldier. Most of the persons
around him are necessarily also members
of the Armed Forces who carry firearms,
too. In other words, a soldier must also
assume the risk of being accidentally fired

upon by his fellow soldiers. This is

reasonably regarded as a hazard or risk
inherent in his employment as a soldier.
We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt.
Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by
an accidental discharge of the M-16 of Dft.
Alibuyog, in the circumstances of this case,
arose out of and in the course of his
employment as a soldier on active duty
status in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and hence compensable.
It may be well to add that what we have
written above in respect of performance of
official functions of members of the Armed
Forces must be understood in the context
of the specific purpose at hand, that is, the
interpretation and application of the
compensation provisions of the Labor Code
and applicable related regulations. It is
commonplace that those provisions should,
to the extent possible, be given the
interpretation most likely to effectuate the
beneficient and humanitarian purposes
infusing the Labor Code.
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the GSIS
taken through its Claim Review Committee
dated 20 November 1986 and the Decision
dated 24 May 1988 of the Employees'
Compensation Commission in ECC Case
No. 3275, are hereby REVERSED and the
GSIS is hereby DIRECTED to award all
applicable benefits in respect of the death
of Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin, to petitioner.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-48594 March 16, 1988

GENEROSO ALANO, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, respondent.

GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The only issue in this case is whether or
not the injury sustained by the deceased
Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is
compensable under the law as an
employment accident.
The facts as found by the respondent
Employees' Compensation Commission are
as follows:
Dedicacion de Vera, a
government employee during
her lifetime, worked as
principal of Salinap Community
School in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan. Her tour of duty
was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30
p.m. On November 29, 1976,
at 7:00 A.M., while she was
waiting for a ride at Plaza
Jaycee in San Carlos City on
her way to the school, she was
bumped and run over by a
speeding Toyota mini-bus
which resulted in her
instantaneous death. She is
survived by her four sons and
a daughter.
On June 27, 1977, Generoso
C. Alano, brother of the
deceased, filed the instant
claim for in come benefit with
the GSIS for and in behalf of

the decedent's children. The

claim was, however, denied on
the same date on the ground
that the "injury upon which
compensation is being claimed
is not an employment accident
satisfying all the conditions
prescribed by law." On July 19,
1977 appellant requested for a
reconsideration of the system's
decision, but the same was
denied and the records of the
case were elevated to this
Commission for review. (Rollo,
p. 12)
The respondent Commission affirmed the
decision of the Government Service
Insurance System. It stated that Section I
(a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation specifically
provides that: "For the injury and the
resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result
of an employment accident satisfying all the
following conditions (1) The employee must
have sustained the injury during his
working hours; (2) The employee must
have been injured at the place where his
work requires him to be; and (3) The
employee must have been performing his
official functions." (Rollo, p. 13)
According to the respondent Commission,
the deceased's accident did not meet any
of the aforementioned conditions. First, the
accident occured at about 7:00 a.m. or
thirty minutes before the deceased's
working hours. Second, it happened not at
her workplace but at the plaza where she
usually waits for a ride to her work. Third,
she was not then performing her official

functions as school principal nor was she

on a special errand for the school. The
case, therefore, was dismissed.
The petitioner then went to this Court on
petition for review on certiorari. He alleges
that the deceased's accident has "arisen
out of or in the course of her employment."
The respondent Commission reiterates its
views and contends that the present
provision of law on employment injury is
different from that provided in the old
Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428)
and is "ategorical in that the injury must
have been sustained at work while at the
workplace, or elsewhere while executing an
order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 44)
The Government Service Insurance
System which received a copy of the
Court's resolution requiring the parties to
submit their memoranda, however
manifests that it does not appear to be a
party to the case because it had not been
impleaded as a party thereto.
We rule in favor of the petitioner.
This case does not come to us with a novel
issue. In the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela
v. Employees' Compensation
Commission (96 SCRA 260,263,264) which
has a similar factual background, this Court
held:
It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela,
Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at
about 5:45 o'clock in the
morning due to injuries
sustained by him in a vehicular
accident while he was on his
way to school from Bacolod

City, where he lived, to

Hinigaran Negros Occidental
where the school of which he
was the principal was located
and that at the time of the
accident he had in his
possession official papers he
allegedly worked on in his
residence on the eve of his
death.
The claim is compensable.
When an employee is
accidentally injured at a point
reasonably proximate to the
place at work, while he is going
to and from his work, such
injury is deemed to have arisen
out of and in the course of his
employment.
In this case, it is not disputed that the
deceased died while going to her place of
work. She was at the place where, as the
petitioner puts it, her job necessarily
required her to be if she was to reach her
place of work on time. There was nothing
private or personal about the school
principal's being at the place of the
accident. She was there because her
employment required her to be there.
As to the Government Service Insurance
System's manifestation, we hold that it is
not fatal to this case that it was not
impleaded as a party respondent. As early
as the case of La O v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA
782) up to Cabanero v. Employees'
Compensation Commission (111 SCRA
413) and recently, Clemente v. Government
Service Insurance System (G.R. No. L-

47521, August 31,1987), this Court has

ruled that the Government Service
Insurance System is a proper party in
employees' compensation cases as the
ultimate implementing agency of the
Employees' Compensation Commission.
We held in the aforecited cases that "the
law and the rules refer to the said System
in all aspects of employee compensation
including enforcement of decisions (Article
182 of Implementing Rules)."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
Employees' Compensation Commission
appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and
the Government Service Insurance System
is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased
the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos
(P12,000.00) as death benefit and the sum
of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos
(P1,200.00) as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78617 June 18, 1990
SALVADOR LAZO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES), respondents.
Oscar P. Paguinto for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the
respondent Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 2883

which affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's

claim for compensation against the
Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS).
The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, is a security
guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines
assigned to its main office in Malate,
Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in
the evening. On 18 June 1986, the
petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock
in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the
evening. But, as the security guard who
was to relieve him failed to arrive, the
petitioner rendered overtime duty up to
5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June
1986, when he asked permission from his
superior to leave early in order to take
home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of
rice.
On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in
the morning of 19 June 1986, the
passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding
on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a
result, he sustained injuries and was taken
to the Angono Emergency Hospital for
treatment. He was later transferred to the
National Orthopedic Hospital where he was
confined until 25 July 1986.
For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed
a claim for disability benefits under PD 626,
as amended. His claim, however, was
denied by the GSIS for the reason that
It appears that after performing
your regular duties as Security
Guard from 2:00 P.M. to 10:00
P.M. on June 18, 1986, you
rendered overtime duty from

10:00 P.M. to 5:06 A.M. of the

following day; that at about
5:06 A.M. after asking
permission from your superior
you were allowed to leave the
Office to do certain personal
matter that of bringing home
a sack of rice and that, while
on your way home, you met a
vehicular accident that resulted
to (sic) your injuries. From the
foregoing informations, it is
evident that you were not at
your work place performing
your duties when the incident
occurred. 1
It was held that the condition for
compensability had not been satisfied.
Upon review of the case, the respondent
Employees Compensation Commission
affirmed the decision since the accident
which involved the petitioner occurred far
from his work place and while he was
attending to a personal matter.
Hence, the present recourse.
The petitioner contends that the injuries he
sustained due to the vehicular accident on
his way home from work should be
construed as "arising out of or in the course
of employment" and thus, compensable. In
support of his prayer for the reversal of the
decision, the petitioner cites the case
of Pedro Baldebrin vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 2 where the Court
awarded compensation to the petitioner therein who
figured in an accident on his way home from his official
station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at
Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. In the accident, petitioner's
left eye was hit by a pebble while he was riding on a bus.

Respondents claim that the Baldebrin ruling

is a deviation from cases earlier decided
and hence, not applicable to the present
case.
The Court has carefully considered the
petition and the arguments of the parties
and finds that the petitioner's submission is
meritorious. Liberally interpreting the
employees compensation law to give effect
to its compassionate spirit as a social
legislation 3 in Vda. de Torbela u. ECC, 4 the Court
held:

It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela,

Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at
about 5:45 o'clock in the
morning due to injuries
sustained by him in a vehicular
accident while he was on his
way to school from Bacolod
City, where he lived, to
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
where the school of which he
was the principal was located
and that at the time of the
accident he had in his
possession official papers he
allegedly worked on in his
residence on the eve of his
death. The claim is
compensable. When an
employee is accidentally
injured at a point reasonably
proximate to the place at work,
while he is going to and from
his work, such injury is
deemed to have arisen out of
and in the course of his
employment.
Again in Alano v. ECC, 5 it was reiterated:

Dedicacion de Vera, a
government employee during
her lifetime, worked as
principal of Salinap Community
School in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan. Her tour of duty
was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30
p.m. On November 29, 1976,
at 7:00 A-M., while she was
waiting for a ride at Plaza
Jaycee in San Carlos City on
her way to the school, she was
bumped and run over by a
speeding Toyota mini-bus
which resulted in her
instantaneous death. ...
In this case, it is not disputed
that the deceased died while
going to her place of work. She
was at the place where, as the
petitioner puts it, her job
necessarily required her to be
if she was to reach her place of
work on time. There was
nothing private or personal
about the school principal's
being at the place of the
accident. She was there
because her employment
required her to be there.
More recently, in Vano vs. GSIS &
ECC, 6 this Court, applying the above quoted
decisions, enunciated:

Filomeno Vano was a letter

carrier of the Bureau of Posts
in Tagbilaran City. On July 31,
1983, a Sunday, at around
3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his
motorcycle with his son as

backrider allegedly on his way

to his station in Tagbilaran for
his work the following day,
Monday. As they were
approaching Hinawanan
Bridge in Loay, Bohol, the
motorcycle skidded, causing its
passengers to be thrown
overboard. Vano's head hit the
bridge's railing which rendered
him unconscious. He was
taken to the Engelwood
Hospital where he was
declared dead on arrival due to
severe hemorrhage.
We see no reason to deviate
from the foregoing rulings. Like
the deceased in these two (2)
aforementioned cases, it was
established that petitioner's
husband in the case at bar was
on his way to his place of work
when he met the accident. His
death, therefore, is
compensable under the law as
an employment accident.
In the above cases, the employees were on
their way to work. In the case at bar,
petitioner had come from work and was on
his way home, just like in the Baldebrin
case, where the employee "... figured in an
accident when he was ping home from his
official station at Pagadian City to his place
of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur
...." 7 Baldebrin, the Court said:
The principal issue is whether
petitioner's injury comes within
the meaning of and intendment
of the phrase 'arising out of

and in the course of

employment.'(Section 2,
Workmen's Compensation
Act). InPhilippine Engineer's
Syndicate, Inc. vs. Flora S.
Martin and Workmen's
Compensation Commission,4
SCRA 356, We held that
'where an employee, after
working hours, attempted to
ride on the platform of a
service truck of the company
near his place of work, and,
while thus attempting, slipped
and fell to the ground and was
run over by the truck, resulting
in his death, the accident may
be said to have arisen out of or
in the course of employment,
for which reason his death is
compensable. The fact
standing alone, that the truck
was in motion when the
employee boarded, is
insufficient to justify the
conclusion that he had been
notoriously negligent, where it
does not appear that the truck
was running at a great
speed.'And, in a later
case, Iloilo Dock &
Engineering Co. vs.
Workmen's Compensation
Commission, 26 SCRA 102,
103, We ruled that
'(e)mployment includes not
only the actual doing of the
work, but a reasonable margin
of time and space necessary to
be used in passing to and from
the place where the work is to
be done. If the employee be

injured while passing, with the

express or implied consent of
the employer, to or from his
work by a way over the
employer's premises, or over
those of another in such
proximity and relation as to be
in practical effect a part of the
employer's premises, the injury
is one arising out of and in the
course of the employment as
much as though it had
happened while the employee
was engaged in his work at the
place of its performance.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, it can be seen that
petitioner left his station at the Central Bank
several hours after his regular time off,
because the reliever did not arrive, and so
petitioner was asked to go on overtime.
After permission to leave was given, he
went home. There is no evidence on record
that petitioner deviated from his usual,
regular homeward route or that
interruptions occurred in the journey.
While the presumption of compensability
and theory of aggravation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act (under which
the Baldebrin case was decided) may have
been abandoned under the New Labor
Code, 8 it is significant that the liberality of the law in
general in favor of the workingman still subsists. As
agent charged by the law to implement social justice
guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the
Employees Compensation Commission should adopt a
liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding
claims for compensability, especially where there is
some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to
the accident.

This kind of interpretation gives meaning

and substance to the compassionate spirit
of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the
New Labor Code which states that 'all
doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor
Code including its implementing rules and
regulations shall be resolved in favor of
labor.'
The policy then is to extend the applicability
of the decree (PD 626) to as many
employees who can avail of the benefits
thereunder. This is in consonance with the
avowed policy of the State to give
maximum aid and protection to labor. 9
There is no reason, in principle, why
employees should not be protected for a
reasonable period of time prior to or after
working hours and for a reasonable
distance before reaching or after leaving
the employer's premises. 10
If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to
an employee who was on his way from
home to his work station one day before an
official working day, there is no reason to
deny compensation for accidental injury
occurring while he is on his way home one
hour after he had left his work station.
We are constrained not to consider the
defense of the street peril doctrine and
instead interpret the law liberally in favor of
the employee because the Employees
Compensation Act, like the Workmen's
Compensation Act, is basically a social
legislation designed to afford relief to the
working men and women in our society.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the

case be remanded to the ECC and the

GSIS for disposition in accordance with this
decision.
SO ORDERED.

WCC
G.R. No. L-14827

October 31, 1960

CHUA YENG, petitioner,

vs.
MICHAELA ROMA, and her minor
children GUADALUPE, PILAR,
ROSARIO, CORNELIO and
GERARDO,respondents.
Pedro B. Uy Calderon and A. Marigomen
for petitioner.
D. V. Nacua and J. D. Palma for
respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission,
dated September 17, 1958, and its
resolution en banc, dated December 4,
1958, awarding compensation for the death
of Santos Romeo.
The appeal raises issues facts and of law,
but since findings of the fact by the
Workmen's Compensation Commission are
final, if supported by substantial evidence
mission are final, if supported by
substantial evidence, (Batangas

Transportation Co., vs. Galicano Rivera, et

al., supra., p. 175; Laguna Tayabas Bus
Co., vs. Consuto, et al., 108 Phil., 62, and
since the record shows that such evidence
is not wanting, the Court will consider the
case on the facts as found by the
commission.
Santos Romeo was, on May 16, 1956,
working for petitioner as cargador in
loading and unloading copra at the former's
warehouse at C. Padilla Street, Cebu City.
In the morning of that day, after asking
permission from his employer, Santos
Romeo went to petitioner's house just
across the street from the warehouse to get
a drink of water, the water pump in the
warehouse being out of order and no
supply being available. Reaching the
kitchen of said house and while he was
drinking, he saw a puppy eating some fried
fish inside an open cabinet. He tried to
drive away the puppy by saying "tse", but
as the puppy still continue to eat the fish,
Santos made a motion with hand to drive it
away, in the course of which his right hand
was bitten by said puppy. On June 26,
1958, Santos Romeo died of hydrophobia
from the dog bite. It appears that the puppy
was not owned by petitioner.
Appellant contends that, under the
circumstances narrated, the death of the
laborer can not be considered to arise "out
of and in course" of his employment.
We find no merit in this contention. The rule
is well established that
Such acts as are reasonably
necessary to the health and comfort
of an employee while at work, such

as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or

other physical demands, or
protecting himself from excessive
cold, are nevertheless incidental to
the employment, and injuries
sustained in the performance of such
act are generally held to be
compensable as arising out of and in
the course of the employment. (58
Am. Jur., sec. 236,p . 742, citing
numerous cases.)
That Santos Romeo was in the kitchen of
appellant's house and not at his usual place
of work does not bring the case out of the
operation of the rule previously quoted, for
the reason that the laborer was practically
driven to that place through the appellant's
fault in not providing an adequate supply of
drinking water at the warehouse.
Appellant urges that the dog bite was
provoked by Santos' trying to take the fish
away from the puppy and hence, while he
was engaged in an independent activity.
We do not regard such act as voluntary
deviation from his duties, considering that
the act of the deceased was practically an
instinctive one, that would naturally be
expected from any person in his position.
Moreover, it was motivated by a sense of
loyalty to his employer, a desire to protect
the latter's property, that can not be
deemed wholly foreign to the duties of the
laborer as such (71 C.J. 675). In fact, it has
been held that the act of saving the
employee's own property from an apparent
danger, is compensable (in re Brightman,
107 N.E. 527, cited in 71 C. J. 670). There,
is was said:

the standard to be applied is not that

which now, in the light of all that has
happened, is seen to have been
directly within the line of labor helpful
to the master, but that which the
ordinary man required to act in such
an emergency might do while
actuated with a purpose to do his
duty.
Compensation has been granted, even if
the injury occurred while the order was not
performing acts strictly within the scope of
his duties, but engaged in an activity either
related or incidental to his duties, or doing
an act in the interest of his employer. Thus,
injury to an employee of a bus firm,
occurring outside of assigned territory, in
undertaking to retrieve personal belongings
of a passenger, was compensable
(Vergoza vs. Arnaz Vda. de Cruz, L-7305,
December 15, 1953); so was that of a
laborer who, trying to alight from a truck to
pick up a sack which had fallen, belonging
to his employer, was caught between the
wheels (Ramos vs. Poblete, 40 Off. Gaz.,
3474); likewise, the death of a worker who
tried to recover a price of board which had
fallen into a molasses tank, and died from
the deal fumes therein (Estandarte vs. Phil.
Motor Alcohol Corp., G. R. No. 39733, Nov.
1, 1933). In the foregoing, an impelling
factor considered by the court was the fact
that the employee was acting in the interest
of the employer.
To the argument that the employee
sustained the injury not from drinking water
but from driving away the puppy, suffice it
to say that under the circumstances that
impelled him to act without opportunity for
deliberate reflection, we are not prepared to

say that his act was unreasonable or

negligent. Driving away a puppy is not so
fraught with potent danger as to deter every
man possessed of reasonable disposition.
As has been said
. . . he was doing a thing which a
man while working may reasonably
doa workman of his sort may
reasonably smoke, he may
reasonably drop his pipe, and he
may reasonably pick it up again.
(Ramos vs.Poblete, supra., citing
M'Lauchan vs. Anderson, S.C. 529.)
By analogy, the deceased in this case may
reasonably get a drink of water to satisfy
his thirst; while drinking, he may reasonably
see a puppy eating some fried fish
belonging to his employer; and he may
reasonably be expected to make a motion
with his hand to drive said puppy away.
At any rate, the resulting injury is not
without causation in the conditions under
which deceased was required to perform
his work. It appears that there were no
adequate and sanitary means of water
supply in the place of work; that petitioner's
workers used, for drinking purposes, water
from a well at the back of the warehouse;
that this well was out or order at the time of
the incident, so that the deceased had to
cross a wide public street to petitioner's
house just to get a drink, thereby exposing
himself to hazards which may well have
been avoided if there were drinking
facilities at, or more proximate to, the place
of work.
Finally, the Workmen's Compensation Act
being a social legislation, and in line with

the intent of the law to effect social justice,

the provisions thereof should be liberally
construed in favor of the workingman
(Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc., vs. Dayao, et
al., 106 Phil., 525; Madrigal Shipping
Co. vs. Baens del Rosario, et al., L-13130,
October 31, 1959).
Wherefore, the decision and the resolution
appealed from are hereby affirmed. Costs
against petitioner.
G.R. No. L-27588

April 28, 1969

LUZON STEVEDORING
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION and ROSARIO VDA. DE
ROSANO respondents.
H. San Luis and L. V. Simbulan for
petitioner.
Juan B. Moreno for respondent Rosario
Vda. de Rosano.
Villavieja, Villanueva and Ocampo for
respondent Workmen's Compensation
Commission.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

Petition filed by the Luzon Stevedoring

Corporation for review of the decision of the
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner
(in R04 WC Case No. 3941), ordering it to
pay claimants Rosario Vda. de Rosano,
minors Rebecca, Edgardo and Baltazar, all
surnamed Rosano death compensation
benefits, burial expenses and attorney's
fees for the death of Pastor Rosano; as
well as of the resolution of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission en
banc denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid decision.
As found by the Acting Referee of the
Department of Labor, supported by the
evidence on record, the facts of the case
are as follows:
At about 6 o'clock in the morning of 30
November 1964, stevedore Pastor Rosano
went to Pier 9, Manila, to await the arrival
of a barge of herein petitioner corporation,
scheduled to dock at 9 o'clock in the
morning. While thus waiting for the vessel
Rosano had a heated verbal argument with
one Benjamin Valdez, another stevedore
engaged by petitioner corporation, over the
possession of a platform used in the
loading and unloading of cargoes taken into
or out of the watercraft. Rosano was able to
get it. As the barge did not arrive as
scheduled, Rosano went home for lunch.
When he returned at about 1 o'clock in the
afternoon, he found the platform again in
the possession of Valdez. Rosano's
demand for delivery to him of said platform
precipitated another argument which
almost ended in fist fight. Valdez finally
gave up the platform, but not before he had
uttered threats against the life of Rosano.
Later, informed that the barge they were

waiting for definitely was not arriving,

Rosano, with two companions, boarded a
passenger jeep bound for Tondo. When he
got off from the jeep near his house, he
was met by Valdez, who whipped out a
knife and stabbed him. Rosano fell to the
ground. He was immediately brought to the
hospital where he expired at 2:30 in the
afternoon of that same day, 30 November
1964 (Exhibit C).
On 1 March 1965, the widow, Rosario Vda.
de Rosano, for herself and on behalf of her
3 minor children filed with the Department
of Labor a formal claim for death
compensation benefits against petitioner
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation for the
death of her husband, Pastor Rosano. The
company answered, denying the
allegations of the complaint and raising the
defense of prescription, in that the claim
was filed beyond the 3-month period from
the death of Rosano, as provided in the
Workmen's Compensation law.
On 15 September 1965, after due hearing,
the Acting Referee rendered judgment,
ordering the company to pay to the
claimants death compensation benefits in
the sum of P6,000.00; P200.00 as
reimbursement for burial expenses;
P200.00, as attorney's fees; and P61.00 as
fees payable to the office. The award was
based on the finding that Rosano was an
employee of the company and that death
arose out of his said employment. The
defense of prescription was rejected, it
appearing that the company had failed to
controvert the claimants' right to
compensation within the period prescribed
in Section 45 of Act 3428. The company
appealed to the Workmen's Compensation

Commission, which affirmed the decision of

the Referee. And when its motion for
reconsideration of said decision was denied
by the Commission en banc, the company
filed the present petition for review,
assigning as all errors committed by the
Commission its finding on the existence of
employee-employer relationship between
the petitioner and the deceased and the
ruling that the right to demand
compensation benefits has not prescribed.
The contention that there existed no
employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and the late Pastor Rosano is
premised on the allegation that the latter
was a "gang boss" working with the
petitioner on an "on and off" basis; that
Rosano worked for petitioner when so
assigned by the union, of which he was a
member, that, if at all, the employeremployee relationship existed only
whenever the deceased rendered actual
service for the petitioner. Since on 30
November 1964 Rosano was not able to
work (because the barge did not arrive),
then, according to petitioner, he was not an
employee when he (Rosano) met his death.
There is no merit to this contention. In the
first place, while petitioner company failed
to submit any evidence that the work
rendered by the deceased was purely
casual, 1 it has been established that prior to
the stabbing incident the deceased, with
other stevedores, was in the pier prepared
to do hauling jobs for the petitioner's
business. And there is unrebutted
testimony that the deceased had been
doing stevedoring work for said petitioner
for 15 years.2 Secondly, even assuming
petitioner's allegations to be true, that the

deceased was a union member, and that it

was the union that furnished laborers and
stevedors when required by petitioner
company, presumably with the latter
delivering the stevedoring charges directly
to the union for distribution to the individual
laborers, these facts did not make the
union an independent contractor whose
intervention relieved the said company of
liability for the death of a laborer specially
where no contractor's bond was required
for the union's performance of its
undertaking. 3 The union here was no more
than an agent of the company and whose
fiction is merely to save the latter from the
necessity of dealing with individual
laborers. And in this kind of indirect
employment, it has been repeatedly held,
the employer is not relieved of liability
under the Workmen's Compensation law. 4
It is next claimed for the petitioner that even
if he were an employee, Rosano's death is
not compensable because it came when he
was outside of the company premises and
not at work.
We do not agree with the appellant. From
the proved sequence of events that took
place on 30 November 1964 involving the
deceased Pastor Rosano, it is evident that
the cause of his fatal stabbing by Benjamin
Valdez (who was thereafter accused and
convicted) can be traced to their
disagreement over the possession of a
platform that was to be used in their work
for petitioner that although the altercation
started in the morning the same was
resumed when they returned in the
afternoon and carried on when Valdez left,
lay in wait near Rosario's house, and there
met and stabbed the latter when he

alighted from the jeep. Neither can it be

said that the employer is exempt from
liability under the Workmen's
Compensation law because the cause of
death arose outside of the company
premises, 5 whereas the quarrel happened
at the waterfront at Pier 9.
For an injury to be compensable, it is not
necessary that the cause therefor shall take
place within the place of employment. If a
workman is acting within the scope of his
employment, his protection "in the course
of" the employment usually continues,
regard of the place of injury. 6 Thus, in one
case, 7 an employee went to the House of
the employer across the warehouse where
he worked to get a drink of water, that
there, while trying to drive away a puppy
that he saw eating fish in the employer's
kitchen, he was bitten in the hand, as a
result of which he later died of hydrophobia.
The death of the employee was held
compensable, on the ground that his trip to
the kitchen was occasioned by the
employer's fault in not providing adequate
drinking water at the warehouse. In the
present case, it cannot be disputed that it is
inherent in the stevedoring work for the
petitioner that the laborers, like the
deceased, stay in the pier and wait for the
docking of petitioner's vessels.
Furthermore, jurisprudence is to the effect
that injuries sustained by an employee
while in the course of his employment, as
the result of an assault upon his person by
another employee, or by a third person, no
question of the injured employee's own
culpability being involved, is compensable
where, from the evidence presented, a
rational mind is able to trace the injury to a

cause set in motion by the nature of the

employment, or some condition, obligation
or incident therein, and not by some other
agency.8
The rule as stated by the Connecticut
Supreme Court is that ... when the
employee is assaulted while he is
defending his employer, or his
employer's interests, or when the
assault was incidental to some duty
of his employment, the injuries he
suffers in consequence of the assault
will, as a rule, arise out of the
employment. He will then be serving
his employer's ends and not of his
own. (Jacquemin vs. Turner and
Sermour Manufacturing Co., Conn.,
103 A. 115; Goldshirch vs. American
Character Doll Co., 135 Misc. 817,
238 N. Y. 519.)
Similarly, in Appleford vs. Kimmel, 296 NW,
861, it appeared that a theater employee's
job required him to handle disturbances in
the theater; that several patrons were
ordered by him to leave the theater
because of disturbances they were
causing; and that after the theater closed
the employee started for home and was
subjected to injurious assault by those he
had previously ordered to leave; the court
held that the evidence sustained the finding
that the employee's injury arose out of, and
in the course of, the employment.
In the leading case of Field vs. Charmette
Knitted Fabric Co., 245 N.Y. 138, where a
superintendent was injured on the sidewalk
by workmen with whom he had quarreled in
the mill, the late Justice Cardozo (then of
the New York Supreme Court) declared the

injury compensable, reasoning that the

quarrel outside of the mill was merely a
continuation or extension of the quarrel
begun within; that continuity of the case
had been so combined with continuity in
time and space "that the quarrel from origin
to ending must be taken to be one".
The rationale applies to the case at bar,
where the facts, shown by the evidence
found by the referee and affirmed by the
Commission, are that Rosano had been
assaulted by the man with whom he had
quarreled barely a half hour after leaving
the place of work where the quarrel
occurred, in connection with the possession
of the platform to be used in unloading
cargo, without any independent agency or
cause for the assault being shown. As
pointed out by Larson (Workmen's
Compensation Law, Vol. I, section 29.21)

since the ultimate test applied by

Judge Cardozo was whether "the
quarrel from origin to ending must be
taken to be one" it should make no
difference how widely separated the
assault was from the employment in
time and space if it remained an
inherent part of an employment
incident.
Other cases applying the same principle
are collated in Schneider, "Workmen's
Compensation", Perm. Ed., Vol. 6, page
131, et seq.
As regards the defense of prescription
raised by petitioner, it is true that the formal
demand for compensation for the death of
Pastor Rosano on 30 November 1964 was

made by the dependent widow and minor

children only on 1 March 1965, or beyond
the 3-month period provided for 'in section
24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
But we are not impressed by petitioner's
disclaimer that it had no knowledge of the
stabbing incident prior to its notification by
the Regional Office of the filing of the claim.
It may be pointed out that the law does not
speak of "formal notice" by the employer of
the accident; it specifies only "knowledge of
the accident". For petitioner to say that it
had no actual knowledge of the stabbing
incident on 30 November 1964 would run
counter to the ordinary course of human
behavior. An employer could scarcely have
been spared the news of the killing of one
of its laborers by another laborer, especially
where the cause therefor started in the
place where the laborers gather and work.
When the widow went to the company
premises to demand compensation for the
death of her husband a week after his
burial, she was able to talk to an unknown
employee inside the compound, who told
her that she could not get anything
because the death of her husband did not
occur in the company premises. Far from
showing lack of knowledge by the
employer, this fact constitutes sufficient
indication that the death of Rosano was
already a matter of common knowledge in
petitioner's office that even an allegedly
unidentified employee could advance the
exact defense that the employer later set
up in the case.

claimants) of giving of notice of injury and

filing of claim within the prescribed period is
non-jurisdictional and does not constitute a
bar to compensation proceedings if the
employer, who had knowledge of the
accident, failed to controvert the claimant's
right to compensation pursuant to section
45 of the law. 9 For such failure of the
employer to controvert the claimant's
constitutes a waiver (or a forfeiture by law)
of its right to question the validity and
reasonableness of the claim and precludes
the setting up of all non-jurisdictional
defenses, such as non-compensability of
injuries, prescription, and the like. 10

The fact remains that the petitioner failed to

controvert in due time the right of the
claimants to compensation, as required by
section 45 of Act 3428. And the rule is now
well-settled that the requirements (for

RESOLUTION

lawphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the

appealed decision of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission and its
resolution en banc, the petition for review is
hereby dismissed, with costs against the
petitioner.
G.R. No. L-22135
1963

December 27,

VISAYAN STEVEDORETRANSPORTATION CO., petitioner,

vs.
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION AND EXALTACION
BARRION, for herself and in behalf of
her minor children ELVIRA, ERLINDA
and SHIRLEY, all surnamed
GUTANA, respondents.
Luisito C. Hofilena for petitioner.

DIZON, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from a resolution of the

Workmen's Compensation Commission in
the case of Exaltacion Barrion, et al. vs.
Visayan Stevedore-Transportation
Company (WCC Case No. R07-757).
It appears that Graciano Gutana was a
laborer of petitioner in its stevedoring
business at the Pulupandan wharf in
Occidental Negros, at a daily salary of
P4.60. Sometime in May 1958, petitioner
undertook the loading of sugar on the
Japanese ship "Hiyeharu Maru" then
anchored about two miles from the coast of
Pulupandan, and Gutana was one of the
more than seventy of its laborers assigned
to do the loading.
In the afternoon of May 19, 1958, after
having rendered the usual eight hours of
work, the laborers were given time off to
take their evening meal before working
over time, as it was the purpose of the
employer to finish the loading of the sugar
as soon as possible. After taking their meal
on board the ship, Gutana and some of the
laborers had to answer the call of nature by
the left side of a barge tied along the right
side of the Japanese ship, in view of the
insufficiency of the sanitary facilities board.
After relieving himself, and as he was
standing and buttoning up his pants, the
raft "Narwhal" came along the right side of
the barge and bumped it, causing it to hit
the right side of the Japanese vessel. As a
result, Gutana was pinned by the end of the
hatch cover of the barge against the side of
the vessel, thereby suffering physical
injuries which resulted in his death.
Petitioner's foreman at the premises
immediately notified the latter of the fatal

incident, and petitioner shouldered all the

funeral expenses.
A claim for compensation for the death of
Gutana was filed by the widow of the
deceased and their children on September
1, 1958, and petitioner controverted it in its
answer filed on the 29th of the same
month.
After hearing, the Regional Office of the
Department of Labor, Bacolod City,
rendered a decision awarding death
compensation to the claimants in the total
amount of P4,000.00, plus attorneys' fees
and costs. Petitioner appealed to the
Workmen's Compensation Commission
which, in turn, affirmed the decision just
mentioned in its resolution of October 15,
1963, the latter being now the subject of
appeal.
The first question raised by petitioner is that
the claim for compensation had prescribed
having been filed more than three months
after Gutana's death. We find petitioner's
contention to be without merit. The case is
covered by the provisions of Section 24,
Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, as
amended, which dispenses with the
requirement of filing a claim for
compensation if the employer had
voluntarily made compensation payments.
Under Section 8 of the same act, burial
expenses are considered as part of the
death benefits due to the heirs of a
deceased laborer. It appears in this case
that petitioner had voluntarily paid the burial
expenses in connection with the burial of
Gutana. Consequently, the late filing of the
claim for compensation is not fatal.
lawphil.net

Petitioner likewise contends that the death

of Gutana was due to his notorious
negligence. On this matter, we are of the
opinion, as was the Workmen's
Compensation Commission, that the facts
established by the evidence do not support
petitioner's contention. Due to the number
of laborers engaged in the loading work,
the sanitary facilities on board the
"Hiyeharu Maru" were rendered
inadequate, thus compelling some of the
laborers to answer the call of nature by
going down a barge tied along the right
side of the ship. The deceased Gutana was
among those who was forced, to resort to
this uncomfortable way of relieving himself.
Moreover, in the circumstances of this
case, it is but logical to consider the barge
as an extension of the premises where the
laborers were working. As already stated,
they took their evening meal on board the
ship and were supposed to resume their
work (overtime work) a reasonable time
thereafter. As, because of this, they were
not free to leave the vessel, the accident
must be deemed to be one arising out of, or
in the course of employment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, we find the
petition under consideration to be without
merit, and the same is hereby dismissed.

ECC
G.R. No. L-48488 April 25, 1980
GLORIA D. MENEZ, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION &
CULTURE), respondents.
Gloria D. Menez in her own behalf.
Manuel M. Lazaro for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari from the
decision en banc dated March 1, 1978 of
the Employees' Compensation Commission
in ECC Case No. 0462, affirming the denial
by the Government Service Insurance
System of the claim of petitioner for
benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626
(now Title II the New Labor Code) and
dismissing said claim.
The records disclose that petitioner Gloria
D. Menez was employed by the
Department (now Ministry) of Education &
Culture as a school teacher. She retired on
August 31, 1975 under the disability
retirement plan at the age of 54 years after
32 years of teaching, due to rheumatoid
arthritis and pneumonitis. Before her
retirement, she was assigned at Raja
Soliman High School in Tondo-Binondo,
Manila near a dirty creek.
On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed a
claim for disability benefits under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended,
with respondent Government Service
Insurance System (p. 1, ECC rec.).
On October 25, 1976, respondent GSIS
denied said claim on the ground that
petitioner's ailments, rheumatoid arthritis
and pneumonitis, are not occupational
diseases taking into consideration the
nature of her particular work. In denying
aforesaid claim, respondent GSIS thus
resolved:
Upon evaluation based on
general accepted medical

authorities, your ailments are

found to be the least causally
related to your duties and
conditions of work. We believe
that our ailments are principally
traceable to factors which are
definitely not work-connected.
Moreover, the evidences you
have, submitted have not
shown that the said ailments
directly resulted from your
occupation as Teacher IV of
Raja Soliman High School,
Manila (Letter-Resolution, p. 4,
ECC Case No. 0462).
On November 24, 1976, petitioner filed a
letter-request for reconsideration of the
aforesaid denial of her claim, which request
was denied by the GSIS in its letterresolution of November 28, 1976 therein
reiterating that on the basis of the evidence
on record, it appears that petitioner has not
established that her employment had any
causal relationship with the contraction of
the ailments (p. 6, ECC rec.).
On March 7, 1977, petitioner again
requested for reconsideration of the second
denial of said claim, still alleging that her
ailments arose out of and in the course of
employment (p. 11, ECC rec.).
On March 11, 1977, respondent GSIS
reaffirmed its stand on the case and
elevated the entire records thereof to the
Employees' Compensation Commission for
review (p. 12, ECC rec.).
On March 1, 1978, respondent Commission
issued a decision en banc thus stating:

... Despite assertions to the

contrary by herein appellant,
this Commission fully agrees
with the respondent system
that appellant's employment
has nothing to do with the
development of her disabling
illnesses. Appellant's ailments
are not listed as occupational
diseases for the employment
she was engaged in as to merit
compensation under
Presidential Decree No. 626,
as amended (p. 13, rec.).
On July 7, 1978, petitioner filed this petition
seeking a review of aforesaid decision of
respondent Commission (p. 2, rec.).
Petitioner claims she contracted
pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with
hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on
January 27, 1975 after wetting and chilling
during the course of employment which are
permanent and recurring in nature and
work-connected (p. 2, rec.).
She specifically alleged that
... said sickness and/or
disabilities arose out of or in
the course of employment and
is aggravated by the condition
and nature of the work in
school, that appellant
belonged to the afternoon and
night shifts as shown by her
time record, Annex D,
subjecting her to varying
climatic (sic) temperature at
noon and night time; and that
the place of work, Raja

Soliman High School, is

surrounded by the Divisoria
market at the north, Sta.
Helena Bridge and Creek
which is heavily polluted; in the
Northeast, is the presence of
many squatter houses too, and
in the south gasoline
stations, bakery, Textile market
as stated before and a fact.
That as a teacher of social
studies handling 250 students
more or less a day, she is
subjected to infections from
students who have flu, colds
and other respiratory infections
which aggravated her ailments
(p. 3, rec.).
Petitioner now maintains that her ailments
arose in the course of employment and
were aggravated by the condition and
nature of her work. Specifically, she asserts
that "pneumonitis or baby pneumonia which
has become chronic that led to
bronchiectasis which is irreversible and
permanent in nature is compensable under
No. 21 of compensable diseases
(Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977)
as conditions were present as attested to
by doctor's affidavits and certifications."
Respondents Commission and System
contend that petitioner's ailments of
rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are
not among the occupational diseases listed
as compensable under Presidential Decree
No. 626, as amended, or under Annex "A"
of the Rules on Employees' Compensation;
and, that respondent Commission's
decision is supported by substantial
evidence in the form of accepted medical

findings thus making said decision final and

conclusive on the matter (p. 33 & 68, rec.).
Article 167 (1) of the new Labor Code
provides that
(1) 'Sickness' means any
illness definitely accepted as
an occupational disease listed
by the Commission, or any
illness caused by employment
subject to proof by the
employee that the risk of
contracting the same is
increased by working
conditions. ...
Rule 111, Section 1 (b) of the Amended
Rules on Employees' Compensation thus
provides:
xx xx xx
(b) For the sickness and the
resulting disability or death to
be compensable, the sickness
must be the result of an
occupational disease listed
under Annex 'A' of these Rules
with the conditions set therein
satisfied; otherwise, proof must
be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is
increased by working
conditions.
Rule III, Section 1 (c) of said Rules states:

(c) Only inqiury or sickness

that occurred on or after
January 1, 1975 and the
resulting disability or death
shall be compensable under
these Rules.
The aforequoted provisions clearly
establish that for an illness to be
compensable, it must either be:
1. An illness definitely
accepted as an occupational
disease; or
2. An illness caused by
employment subject to proof
by the employee that the risk
of contracting the same is
increased by working
conditions.
An occupational disease is one "which
results from the nature of the employment,
and by nature is meant conditions to which
all employees of a class are subject and
which produce the disease as a natural
incident of a particular occupation, and
attach to that occupation a hazard which
distinguishes it from the usual run of
occupations and is in excess of the hazard
attending the employment in general"
(Goldberg vs. 954 Mancy Corp., 12 N. E.
2d 311; Emphasis supplied).
To be occupational, the disease must be
one "due wholly to causes and conditions
which are normal and constantly present
and characteristic of the particular
occupation; that is, those things which
science and industry have not yet learned
how to eliminate. Every worker in every
plant of the same industry is alike

constantly exposed to the danger of

contracting a particular occupational
disease" (Seattle Can Co. vs. Dept. of
Labor, 265, p. 741; Emphasis supplied).
An occupational disease is one which
develops as a result of hazards peculiar to
certain occupations, due to toxic
substances (as in the organic solvents
industry), radiation (as in television
repairmen), repeated mechanical injury,
emotional strain, etc. (Schmidts Attorneys'
Dictionary of Medicine, p. 561).

From the foregoing definitions of

occupational diseases or ailments,
rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis can
be considered as such occupational
diseases. All public high school teachers,
like herein petitioner, admittedly the most
underpaid but overworked employees of
the government, are subject to emotional
strains and stresses, dealing as they do
with intractable teenagers especially young
boys, and harassed as they are by various
extra-curricular or non- academic
assignments, aside from preparing lesson
plans until late at night, if they are not
badgered by very demanding superiors. In
the case of the petitioner, her emotional
tension is heightened by the fact that the
high school in which she teaches is
situated in a tough area - Binondo district,
which is inhabited by thugs and other
criminal elements and further aggravated
by the heavy pollution and congestion
therein as well as the stinking smell of the
dirty Estero de la Reina nearby. Women,
like herein petitioner, are most vulnerable to
such unhealthy conditions. The pitiful
situation of all public school teachers is
further accentuated by poor diet for they
can ill-afford nutritious food.
In her work, petitioner also has to contend
with the natural elements, like the
inclement weather heavy rains,
typhoons as well as dust and
disease-ridden surroundings peculiar to an
insanitary slum area.
These unwholesome conditions are
"normal and consistently present in" or are
the "hazards peculiar to" the occupation of
a public high school teacher. It is therefore
evident that rheumatoid arthritis and

pneumonitis are the "natural incidents" of

petitioner's occupation as such public high
school teacher.

school in Binondo, scampering from one

ride to another, rain or shine, and sweating
in the process.

But even if rheumatoid arthritis and

pneumonitis are not occupational diseases,
there is ample proof that petitioner
contracted such ailments by reason of her
occupation as a public high school teacher
due to her exposure to the adverse working
conditions above-mentioned.

Furthermore, judicial notice should be

taken of the fact that our country is in a
typhoon belt and that yearly we experience
torrential rains and storms. Needless to
say, in her daily rides from Quezon City to
Binondo and back, she had to go through
the ordeal of perspiring and getting wet
from downpours or heavy rains, thus
making her susceptible to contracting her
ailments. Moreover, petitioner was always
in contact with 250 students who might
have been carriers of contagious
respiratory diseases like flu and colds and
who were themselves inadequately
nourished, residing as they do in a
depressed and congested area. And adding
to the unhygienic working atmosphere was
her malnutrition or undernourishment. More
often than not, a teacher who has no other
source of income takes to aside from the
poor man's staple diet of tuyo, daing and
rice legumes like mongo, vegetables
and fruits with edible seeds which contain
much uric and.

Indisputably, petitioner contracted

pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with
hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on
January 27, 1975 after being drenched and
the consequent "chilling during the course
of employment which are permanent and
recurring in nature and work-connected."
Undoubtedly, petitioner's ailments thus
become compensable under the New
Labor Code since under Rule 111, Section
1 (c) of its Implementing Rules, "only
sickness or injury which occurred on or
after January 1, 1975 and the resulting
disability or death shall be compensable
under these Rules."
It must be borne in mind that petitioner was
a teacher of the Raja Soliman High School
which is located in the heart of Binondo
District. She was constantly exposed to the
heavily polluted air and congestion
(squatter's area) characteristic of the area.
She was not only exposed to the elements
- varying degrees of temperature
throughout the day and night - but also had
to withstand long hours of standing while
performing her teaching job. Likewise, she
had to regularly negotiate long trips from
her home in Project 2, Quirino District,
Quezon City (her residence) to said high

Acute arthritis is inflammation of a joint

marked by pain, swelling, heat and
redness; the result of rheumatism or gout
(p. 56, The Simplified Medical Dictionary for
Lawyers). Gout is a disease characterized
by painful inflammation of the joints, in
excessive amount of uric acid in the blood
Poor man's gout is caused by hard work,
poor food and exposure (p. 268, supra). It
may thus be seen that uric acid eventually
causes arthritis, aside from excessive
mental and physical stresses to which

teachers are subject of reason of their

duties.
Consequently, this Court finds petitioner to
have substantially shown that the risk of
contracting her ailments had been
increased by unfavorable working
conditions.
In Dimaano vs. Workmen's Compensation
Commission (78 SCRA 510 [1977]), WE
ruled that illnesses of rheumatic arthritis
with sub-acute exacerbation and
hypertension of therein petitioner, who was
herself a teacher, as service-connected,
after WE considered her working conditions
and nature of employment which are
substantially the same as those of herein
petitioner.
Significantly, also, the Employees'
Compensation Commission, in its
Resolutions Nos. 233 and 432, respectively
dated March 16, 1977 and July 20, 1977,
adopted a more realistic construction of the
provisions of the New Labor Code by
including in the list of compensable
ailments and diseases, cardiovascular
disease which comprehends myocardial
infarction, pneumonitis and bronchial
asthma (Sepulveda vs. WCC, et al., L46290, Aug. 25,1978).
Furthermore, it must be stressed that "the
approval of petitioner's application for
retirement is a clear indication that she was
physically incapacitated to render efficient
service (Sudario vs. Republic, L-44088,
Oct. 6, 1977; Dimaano vs. WCC, et al.,
supra). Petitioner was allowed to retire
under the disability retirement plan on
August 31, 1975 at the age of 54 which is

way below the compulsory retirement age

of 65. Under Memorandum Circular No.
133 issued by the retirement shall be
recommended for approval only when "the
employee applicant is below 65 years of
age and is physically incapacitated to
render further efficient service." Obviously,
petitioner thus retired by reason of her
ailments.
Finally, Republic Act 4670, otherwise
known as the Magna Charta for Public
School Teachers, recognized the
enervating effects of these factors (duties
and activities of a school teacher certainly
involve physical, mental and emotional
stresses) on the health of school teachers
when it directed in one of its provisions that
"Teachers shall be protected against the
consequences of employment injury in
accordance with existing laws. The effects
of the physical and nervous strain on the
teachers's health shall be recognized as
compensable occupational diseases in
accordance with laws" (Pantoja vs.
Republic, et al.. L-43317, December 29,
1978).
WHEREFORE, THE
DECISION OF THE
EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION
COMMISSION IS HEREBY
SET ASIDE AND THE
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
AND CULTURE IS HEREBY
ORDERED
1) TO PAY PETITIONER THE
SUM OF SIX THOUSAND [P
6,000.00] PESOS AS

DISABILITY INCOME
BENEFITS; AND
2) TO REIMBURSE
PETITIONER'S MEDICAL
AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES
DULY SUPPORTED BY
RECEIPTS.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-47521

July 31, 1987

CAROLINA CLEMENTE, petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM Department of Health
(Dagupan City) and EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of
the Employees' Compensation Commission
in ECC Case No. 0509 which affirmed the
decision of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) and denied the
claim for death benefits filed by Carolina
Clemente, widow of the late Pedro
Clemente,
The undisputed facts of the case are
summarized in the memorandum for the
respondent Government Service Insurance
System, as follows:
Petitioner's husband, the late Pedro
Clemente, was for ten (10) years a
janitor in the Department of Health
(Dagupan City), assigned at the
Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, Laoag City.
He was hospitalized from November

3 to 14, 1976 at the Central Luzon

Sanitarium, Tala Sanitarium, Tala,
Caloocan City, due to his ailment of
"nephritis," as per medical
certification of his attending
physician, Dr. Winifredo Samson. He
was also found to be suffering from
such ailments as portal cirrhosis and
leprosy, otherwise known as
Hansen's Disease.
On November 14, 1976, Pedro
Clemente died of uremia due to
nephritis. Thereafter, petitioner filed
with the GSIS a claim for employees'
compensation under the Labor Code,
as amended.
On February 4, 1977, the GSIS
denied the claim of the petitioner
because the ailments of her husband
are not occupational diseases taking
into consideration the nature of his
work and/or (sic) or were not in the
least causally related to his duties
and conditions of work.
On March 9, 1977, petitioner
requested for reconsideration of the
GSIS' denial of her claim, stating that
the ailments of her husband were
contracted in the course of
employment and were aggravated by
the nature of his work. Petitioner
alleged that her husband, as janitor
of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic (Laoag
City), worked in direct contact with
persons suffering from different skin
diseases and was exposed to
obnoxious dusts and other dirt which
contributed to his ailment of
Hansen's disease. Citing further the

cases of Seven-Up Bottling Co., of

the Phil. v. Rimerata, L-24349,
December 24, 1968 and Avana v.
Quisumbing, L-23489, March 27,
1968. Petitioner stated that her
husband's ailment recurred in the
course of employment presumably
due to his direct contact with persons
suffering from this ailment.
Acting upon petitioner's request for
reconsideration, the GSIS, on April
11, 1977, reiterated its previous
denial of her claim.
On April 14, 1977, treating the
request for reconsideration as an
appeal, the GSIS forwarded the
records of the petitioner' claim for
review by the ECC.
On October 26, 1977, respondent
ECC affirmed the GSIS' action of
denial and rendered its own decision
dismissing petitioner's claim (ECC
Case No. 0509).
Respondent ECC's decision was
anchored upon the findings that the
ailments are not listed as
occupational diseases; that there
was no substantial evidence of
causal connection; and that, in fact,
the evidence was that the deceased
had already contracted the Hansen's
disease before his employment. In
the exact words of the ECC:
In the case at bar, since the
deceased's ailments are not
listed as occupational
diseases, appellant herein
must prove that such ailments

were caused by deceased's

employment and that the risk
of contracting the same was
increased by his working
conditions in order to be
compensable.
A mere cursory reading of the
evidences on record, however,
will disclose that appellant
failed to submit the required
proof of causation. There is no
substantial proof in the record
from which we could draw the
conclusion that indeed the
nature of deceased's
employment as Janitor of
Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic could
be traced as the direct cause
of his ailment. Hence, in the
absence of such evidence, we
are not disposed to disturb on
appeal the findings of the
respondent System.
On the contrary, we find the
records that the deceased,
prior to his employment in this
office, was already suffering
from his ailment of Hansen's
disease. This proves that his
working conditions did not
increase the risk of his
contracting the same. If at all,
his employment merely
aggravated his ailments.
Unfortunately, however,
aggravation of a preexisting
illness, a rule under the old
law, is not anymore a ground
for compensation under the
new law. Thus, the cases cited

by the appellant cannot be

raised as authorities to support
her claim.
Petitioner now seeks a review of the
ECC decision. (pp. 76-78, Rollo)
There is no question that the claim falls
under the provisions of the Labor Code, as
amended. Under Article 167(L) of the Labor
Code and Section 1 (b) Rule III of the
Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation, for the sickness and the
resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must be the
result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex "A" of the Rules with the
conditions therein satisfied; otherwise,
proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions (De Jesus v.
Employees' Compensation Commission,
142 SCRA 92, 96).
As the illnesses of the deceased are
admittedly, not listed under Annex "A" of the
Rules as occupational diseases, the
petitioner bases her claim under the theory
of increased risk. She alleges that the
deceased, as janitor of the Ilocos Norte
Skin Clinic, was exposed to patients
suffering from various kinds of skin
diseases, including Hansen's disease or
leprosy. She avers that for ten years, the
deceased had to clean the clinic and its
surroundings and to freely mix with its
patients. She claims that it was during this
time that he was attacked by other dreadful
diseases such as uremia, cancer of the
liver, and nephritis.

On the other hand, the respondent

Employees' Compensation Commission
contends that the petitioner failed to prove
by substantial evidence that the deceased's
ailments were indeed caused by his
employment. It maintains that the deceased
merely had a recurrence of a pre-existing
illness aggravated possibly by the nature of
his employment and that there is no
evidence on record showing that the nature
of the deceased's employment was the
direct cause of any of his illnesses.
The respondent Government Service
Insurance System concurs with the views
of the respondent Commission. It, however,
argues that it should be dropped as a party
respondent in this case. It claims that the
petitioner has no cause of action against it,
the subject of judicial review being the
adverse decision of the respondent
Commission.
We rule for the petitioner.
In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation
Commission (144 SCRA 421, 46) we held
that:
Strict rules of evidence are not
applicable in claims for
compensation (San Valentin v.
Employees' Compensation
Commission, 118 SCRA 160; Better
Building, Inc., v. Puncan, 135 SCRA
62). There are no stringent criteria to
follow. The degree of proof required
under P.D. 626; is merely substantial
evidence, which means, "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion" (Cristobal v.

Employees' Compensation
Commission, supra, citing Ang Tibay
v. Court of Industrial Relations and
National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil.
635; and Acosta v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 109
SCRA 209). The claimant must show,
at least, by substantial evidence that
the development of the disease is
brought largely by the conditions
present in the nature of the job. What
the law requires is a reasonable
work-connection and not a direct
causal relation (Cristobal v.
Employees' Compensation
Commission, supra; Sagliba v.
Employees' Compensation
Commission, 128 SCRA 723; Neri v.
Employees' Compensation
Commission, 127 SCRA 672; Juala v.
Employees' Compensation
Commission, 128 SCRA 462; and De
Vera v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 133 SCRA 685). It is
enough that the hypothesis on which
the workmen's claim is based is
probable. Medical opinion to the
contrary can be disregarded
especially where there is some basis
in the facts for inferring a workconnection (Delegente v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 118
SCRA 67; and Cristobal v.
Employees' Compensation
Commission, supra). Probability not
certainty is the touchstone (San
Valentin v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, supra).
In this case, we find sufficient evidence on
record to sustain the petitioner's view. The
records disclose that in resisting the

petitioner's claim, the respondent

Commission cited the following medical
authorities:
Uremia refers to the toxic clinical
condition associated with renal
insufficiency and retention in the
blood of nitrogenous urinary waste
products (azotemia). Renal
insufficiency may be due to (1)
nephritis, bilateral pyelonephritis,
polycystic kidney disease, uretral or
bladder obstruction, SLE,
polyarteritis, amyloid disease, or
bilateral cortical necrosis; (2) acute
tubular necrosis resulting from
transfusion reaction, shock, burns,
crushing injuries, or poisons; (3)
sulfonamides precipitated in the
kidneys or ureters; (4)
nephrocalcinosis resulting from
extreme alkalosis, diabetic acidosis,
dehydration, or congestive heart
failure may result in azotemia, or
may predipitate (sic) severe uremia
in the presence of already damages
kidneys.
Reference: Lyght, Charles E.: The
Merck Manual of Diagnosis and
Therapy; M.S. & D. Research Lab.;
11th Edition, 1966, pp. 257-258.
Portal Cirrhosis: A chronic disease
characterized by incresed connective
tissue that spreads from the portal
spaces, distorting liver architecture
and impairing liver functions.
Etiology, Incidence and pathology:
Portal cirrhosis occurs chiefly in
males in late middle life. Malnutrition
is believed to be a predisposing if not

a primary etiology factor. The role of

alcohol is not clearly established.
Alcohol probably exerts a direct toxic
effect on the liver, and also increases
malnutrition by providing calories
without essential nutrients. Cirrhosis
has been produced in animals by
diets low in protein and specifically
low in choline. The addition of choline
to these diets prevents cirrhosis.
Chronic poisoning with carbon
tetrachloride or phosphorus produces
changes similar to those from portal
cirrhosis. The liver is diffusely
nodular, scarred and dense.
Microscopic section shows
parenchymal degeneration cellular
infiltration, proliferation or scar tissue
and areas of regeneration. Fatty
changes are present in the early
states.
Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merck
Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy:
M.S. & D. N.J. 11th Edition, 1966, p.
928.
Hepatoma (Liver cancer) refers to
malignant primary tumor of the liver
destroying the parenchyma arise
(sic) from both liver cell and bile duct
elements. It develops most frequently
in the previous cirrhosis liver. A
higher fraction of patients with post
necrotic cirrhosis develop hepatoma
than those with portal alcoholic
cirrhosis. This may reflect the more
active necrotic and regenerative
processes in the post necrotic
cirrhosis liver. Most large series
indicate that 60% or more of
hepatomas develop in a previously

cirrhotic liver. The cirrhosis of

hemochromatosis seems particularly
liable to hepatomas as high a fraction
as 20% of patients with
hemochromatosis die from this
cause.
Reference: Harrison, T.R.: Principles
of Internal Medicine; McGraw Hill;
N.Y., 5th Ed.; 1966, p. 1072.
Leprosy is a chronic, mildly
contagious, infectious disease
characterized by both cutaneous and
constitutional symptoms and the
production of various deformities and
mutilations. The causative organism
is an acid fast rod. Mycobacterium
leprae, first described by Hansen in
1874. The mode of transmission is
obscure, although infection by direct
contact appears likely. The disease is
found predominantly in tropical and
sub-tropical Asia, Africa, and South
America. It is endemic in the Gulf
States of the USA, Hawaii, the
Philippines and Puerto Rico.
Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merk
Manuel of Diagnosis and Therapy; "
M.S. & D.; 11th Ed.; 1966, p. 847.
The nature of nephritis, however, was
discussed by Mr. Daniel Mijares, GSIS
Manager, Employees' Compensation
Department, in his letter dated February 4,
1977, denying petitioner's claim, as follows:
Nephritis is an acute, diffuse
inflammation of the glomeruli or
kidneys. It usually follows previous
streptoccocal infection mostly in the
upper respiratory tract. Because of

this, it is always thought that nephritis

is the result of an auto-immune or
allergic reaction to infection, usually
streptococcal. (Rollo, p. 20)
The foregoing discussions support rather
than negate the theory of increased risk.
We note that the major ailments of the
deceased, i.e. nephritis, leprosy, etc., could
be traced from bacterial and viral infections.
In the case of leprosy, it is known that the
source of infection is the discharge from
lesions of persons with active cases. It is
believed that the bacillus enters the body
through the skin or through the mucous
membrane of the nose and throat (Miller
and Keane, Encyclopedia and Dictionary of
Medicine and Nursing, (1972), p. 530).
On the other hand, infectious diseases
which give rise to nephritis are believed to
be as follows:
Table 294-1
Causes of acute glomerulonephritis
Infectious diseases
A. Post streptococcal
glumerulonephritis
B. Non-Post streptococcal
glumerulonephritis
1. Bacterial: Infective
endocarditis, "Shunt
nephritis," sepsis,
pneumococcal
pneumonia, typhoid
fever, secondary
syphilis,
meningococcemia

2. Viral: Hepatitis B,
infectious
menoneucleosis,
mumps, measles,
varicella, vaccinia,
echovirus, and
coxsackievirus
3. Parasitic: Malaria,
taxoplasmosis
(Harrison's Principles of Internal
Medicine, 10th edition, p. 1633)
The husband of the petitioner worked in a
skin clinic. As janitor of the Ilocos Norte
Skin Clinic, Mr. Clemente was exposed to
different carriers of viral and bacterial
diseases. He had to clean the clinic itself
where patients with different illnesses come
and go. He had to put in order the hospital
equipments that had been used. He had to
dispose of garbage and wastes that
accumulated in the course of each working
day. He was the employee most exposed to
the dangerous concentration of infected
materials, and not being a medical
practitioner, least likely to know how to
avoid infection. It is, therefore, not
unreasonable to conclude that Mr.
Clemente's working conditions definitely
increased the risk of his contracting the
aforementioned ailments. This Court has
held in appropriate cases that the
conservative posture of the respondents is
not consistent with the liberal interpretation
of the Labor Code and the social justice
guarantee embodied in the Constitution in
favor of the workers (Cabanes v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, et
al., L-50255, January 30, 1982; and
Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation

Commission, et al., supra). It clashes with

the injunction in the Labor Code (Article 4,
New Labor Code) that, as a rule, doubts
should be resolved in favor of the claimantemployee (Mercado, Jr., v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 139 SCRA
270, 277).
The respondents admit there may have
been aggravation of an existing ailment but
point out that aggravating is no longer a
ground for compensation under the present
law. They contend that the compensable
factor of increased risks of contracting the
disease is not present in this case.
The fallacy in this theory lies in the failure
to explain how a sick person was able to
enter the government service more than
ten years before he became too ill to work
and at a time when aggravation of a
disease was compensable. There is no
evidence to show that Mr. Clemente was
hired inspite of having an existing disease
liable to become worse.
The petitioner's arguments of recurrence of
an already cured disease or the contracting
of the disease due to increased risks
become more plausible. When there are
two or more possible explanations
regarding an issue of compensability that
which favors the claimant must be chosen.
1avvphi1

We also do not find merit in the respondent

GSIS' contention that it should be dropped
as a party in this case. This Court has
passed upon this issue on several
occasions. Thus, in the case of Cabanero v.
Employees' Compensation Commission
(111 SCRA 413, 419), this Court citing Lao
v. Employees' Compensation Commission
(97 SCRA 782), held:
xxx

xxx

xxx

... This Court is of the opinion that

respondent System, as the ultimate
implementing agency of the ECC's
decision, is a proper party in this
case. The fact that this Court chose
to require respondent GSIS to
comment is an indication that it is a
necessary party. It must be noted
that the law and the rules refer to the
said System in all aspects of
employee compensation (including
enforcement of decisions (Article 182
of Implementing Rules.) (at p. 793).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
decision appealed from is hereby SET
ASIDE and the respondent Government
Service Insurance System is hereby
ordered to pay the petitioner:
1) The sum of TWELVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P12,000.00) as death
benefits; and
2) The sum of ONE THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED PESOS
(P1,200.00) as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.

AMALIA NARAZO, Petitioner, v.

EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (Provincial
Governors Office, Negros
Occidental), Respondents.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for
petitioner.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of
the Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC) dated 19 May 1987, 1 denying
petitioners claim for compensation benefits
under PD 626, as amended, for the death of
her husband, Geronimo Narazo.
Geronimo Narazo was employed for thirty eight
(38) years as Budget Examiner in the Office of
the Governor, Province of Negros Occidental.
His duties included preparation of the budget
of the Province, financial reports and review or
examination of the budget of some provincial
and municipal offices.

occupational disease, nevertheless, his job as

Budget Examiner which required long hours of
sedentary work, coupled with stress and
pressure, caused him many times to delay
urination, which eventually led to the
development of his ailments. The GSIS denied
said motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, the Employees Compensation
Commission affirmed the decision of the GSIS
on the ground that the ailments of the
deceased could not be attributed to
employment factors and as impressed by
medical experts, benign prostatic hypertrophy
is quite common among men over fifty (50)
years of age, regardless of occupation, while
uremia is a complication of obstructive
nephtropathy due to benign prostatic
hypertrophy; 3 hence, this petition.
Petitioner avers that the nature, length of time,
and circumstances of the occupation of the
deceased were not considered in determining
whether the work of the said deceased had
increased the risks of contracting the ailments
which caused his death. The work of the
deceased, which required long sedentary work
under pressure, aggravated the risk of
contracting the disease leading to his hospital
confinement and death. 4

chanroble s.com : virtual law library

On 14 May 1984, Narazo died at the age of

fifty seven (57). His medical records show that
he was confined three (3) times at the Doa
Corazon L. Montelibano Hospital in Bacolod
City, for urinary retention, abdominal pain and
anemia. He was thereafter diagnosed to be
suffering from "obstructive nepropathy due to
benign prostatic hypertrophy", commonly
known as "Uremia."
cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioner, as the widow of the deceased, filed

a claim with the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) for death benefits for the death
of her husband, under the Employees
Compensation Law (PD 626, as amended).
However, said claim was denied on the ground
that the cause of death of Narazo is not listed
as an occupational disease, and that there is
no showing that the position and duties of the
deceased as Budget Examiner had increased
the risk of contracting "Uremia." 2 Petitioner
moved for reconsideration of said decision,
claiming that although the cause of her
husbands death is not considered as an

In controversion, the ECC argues that

petitioner failed to show proof that the disease
which caused the death of her husband is
work-connected; and that no credence could
be given to petitioners claim that her
husbands delayed urination gave rise to the
development of his ailments, for lack of
medical bases. All that petitioner has shown,
according to the ECC, are mere aggravation,
and not work-connection causes. 5
Rule III, section 1, paragraph 3(b) of
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended,
defines a "compensable sickness" as any illness
definitely accepted as an occupational disease
listed by the ECC or any illness caused by
employment subject to proof by the employee
that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by working conditions. 6 The ECC is
empowered to determine and approve
occupational diseases and work-related
illnesses that may be considered compensable
based on peculiar hazards of employment. 7
Thus, a sickness or death caused by said

sickness is compensable if the same is listed as

an occupational disease. If it is not so listed,
compensation may still be recovered if the
illness was aggravated by employment.
However, it is incumbent upon the claimant to
show proof that the risk of contracting the
illness was increased by his working conditions.
The death of petitioners husband was caused
by "Uremia due to obstructive nephropathy
and benign prostatic hypertrophy," which is
admittedly not among those listed as
occupational diseases. 8 As per finding of the
ECC, "Uremia is a toxic clinical condition
characterized by restlessness, muscular
twitchings, mental disturbance, nausea, and
vomiting associated with renal insufficiency
brought about by the retention in blood of
nitrogeneous urinary waste products." One of
its causes is the obstruction in the flow of
urinary waste products. 9
Under the circumstances, the burden of proof
was upon petitioner to show that the
conditions under which her deceased husband
was then working had increased the risk of
contracting the illness which caused his death.

jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

". . . . It may be added that teachers have a

tendency to sit for hours on end, and to put off
or postpone emptying their bladders when it
interferes with their teaching hours or
preparation of lesson plans. From human
experience, prolonged sitting down and putting
off urination result in stagnation of the urine.
This encourages the growth of bacteria in the
urine, and affects the delicate balance between
bacterial multiplication rates and the host
defense mechanisms. Delayed excretion may
permit the retention and survival of microorganisms which multiply rapidly, and infect
the urinary tract. These are predisposing
factors to pyelonephritis and uremia. Thus,
while We may concede that these illnesses are
not directly caused by the nature of the duties
of a teacher, the risk of contracting the same is
certainly aggravated by their working habits
necessitated by demands of job efficiency."
cralaw virtua1aw library

cralawnad

To establish compensability under the

increased risk theory, the claimant must show
proof of reasonable work-connection, not
necessarily direct causal relation. The degree
of proof required is merely substantial
evidence which means such relevant evidence
as will support a decision, or clear and
convincing evidence. Strict rules of evidence
are not applicable. To require proof of actual
causes or factors which lead to an ailment
would not be consistent with the liberal
interpretation of the Labor Code and the social
justice guarantee in favor of the workers. 10
Although strict roles of evidence are not
applicable, yet the basic rule that mere
allegation is not evidence cannot be
disregarded. 11
The nature of the work of the deceased as
Budget Examiner in the Office of the Governor
dealt with the detailed preparation of the
budget, financial reports and review and/or
examination of the budget of other provincial
and municipal offices. Full concentration and
thorough study of the entries of accounts in
the budget and/or financial reports were
necessary, such that the deceased had to sit
for hours, and more often that not, delay and

even forego urination in order not to interrupt

the flow of concentration. In addition, tension
and pressure must have aggravated the
situation. In the case of Ceniza v. ECC, 12 the
Court held that:

Under the foregoing circumstances, we are

persuaded to hold that the cause of death of
petitioners husband is work-connected, i.e. the
risk of contracting the illness was aggravated
by the nature of the work, so much so that
petitioner is entitled to receive compensation
benefits for the death of her husband.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the Employees Compensation
Commission denying petitioners claim for
benefits under PD 626, as amended, arising
from the death of her husband, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-47294 April 8, 1987

HILARIA DABATIAN, petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM (General Services Department,
Cagayan de Oro City),respondent.
Mando Z. Tagarda and Longino G. Tagarda
for petitioner.

Nicasio S. Palaganas and Jose G. de Vera

for respondent ECC.

GANCAYCO, J.:
A petition to review the decision of the
Employees' Compensation Commission
dated June 27, 1977 in ECC Case No.
0217 which affirmed the decision of the
Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) denying the claim for death benefits
of Hilaria Dabatian, widow of the late
Sigfredo A. Dabatian, was filed on
September 26, 1977. However, for failure to
file the necessary docket fees, this Court
denied the petition in a Resolution dated
September 30, 1977.
A Motion for Reconsideration together with
a motion to litigate as pauper was filed by
the petitioner and this Court, in a
Resolution dated November 11, 1977, gave
due course to the petition and required the
parties to file simultaneous memoranda,
The Employees' Compensation
Commission, which was not formally
impleaded as respondent in the petition,
filed its memorandum and so did
respondent GSIS. Petitioner failed to file
her memorandum. The case was submitted
for decision on August 30, 1978.
The undisputed factual background as
found by the ECC which should have been
made the proper respondent in this case, is
as follows:
At the time of his death
Sigfredo A. Dabatian was
employed as Garbage Truck
Driver in the General Services

Department of the City

Government of Cagayan de
Oro City. As Garbage Truck
Driver, he was assigned mostly
in the night shift. In fact, at the
time of his death, his time of
duty started from 10:00 o'clock
at night to 6:00 o'clock in the
morning the next day. It was
gathered from the evidence on
record that the deceased was
a heavy coffee drinker which
was his way of warding off
sleepiness.
Prior to his death, he was
observed by his co-employees
to have been getting paler and
weaker while at work until the
time he collapsed and became
unconscious while on his tour
duty and was brought to his
residence by his companions.
Despite hospitalization, he died
two weeks later on July 3,
1976.
A claim for income benefits
under the Employee's
Compensation Program was
filed by the widow, the herein
appellant. The Government
Service Insurance System
decided against the
compensability of the claim on
the ground that decedent's
ailment, Peptic Ulcer, is not
definitely accepted as an
occupational disease, as listed
under the present law on
compensation. Neither was
there a showing that the same

was directly caused by his

employment and that the risk
of contracting the same was
increased by the working
conditions attendant to the
deceased's employment. 1
The case was then elevated to the ECC
which ruled that:
... Peptic ulcer, the deceased's
main ailment, is a sharp
circumscribed loss of tissue
resulting from the digestive
action of acid gastric juice.
Aggravating factors are
ingestion of alcohol, coffee, tea
and cola drinks. Cigarette
smoking has also been
documented to be a definite
cause of delayed healing of
peptic ulcer. Some drugs also
contribute to its occurrence.
Another factor in the
production of peptic ulcer is the
hereditary predisposition which
seems to play a major role in
the occurrence of peptic ulcer.
Intractable bleeding is a
complication of peptic ulcer.
Death will ensue due to
irreversible shock as a result of
a bleeding peptic ulcer.
(Principles of Internal Medicine
by Harrison).
Upon evaluation based on
generally accepted medical
authorities, the deceased's
ailment was found not to be in
the least causally related to his
duties and conditions of work.

His ailment was principally

traceable to factors which were
definitely not work-connected,
specifically, his inherent
predisposition to drinking
coffee heavily which could
have aggravated his
contraction of the disease
resulting to his death.
However, aggravation of an
illness is not a ground for
compensation under the
present compensation law. 2
On these considerations, the ECC found no
sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the
GSIS denying petitioner's claim. Hence,
this petitioner certiorari.
The sole issue which the Court must
determine is whether or not under the
premises the death of Sigfredo A. Dabatian
is compensable.
The petition obviously addresses itself to
the presumption of compensability and the
principle of aggravation which were
sufficient grounds for entitlement under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. In fact, all
the cases cited by the petitioner were
decided under the old compensation law.
The records show that petitioner died on
July 3, 1976 when the old compensation
law had already been abrogated. No
competent evidence whatsoever was
submitted to prove that Dabatian's ailment
was contracted prior to January 1, 1975 in
order to bring it under the protective mantle
of the old compensation law. 3 There are no
medical findings, affidavits, reports or any other
evidence that deceased suffered from pain or any
discomfort prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code.

No allegation was even made to this effect. True it is,

that strict rules on evidence do not apply in cases such
as this and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of
labor. However, We cannot over-extend the limits of
such rules. Justice and fair play dictate otherwise. The
new law on compensation should be applied to this
case.

The present Labor Code, P.D. 442 as

amended, abolished the presumption of
compensability and the rule on aggravation
of illness caused by the nature of
employment, the reason being "to
restore a sensible equilibrium between the
employer's obligation to pay workmen's
compensation and the employee's right to
receive reparation for work- connected
death or disability ... " 4 It was found, and rightly
so, that the old law, the Workmen's Compensation Act,
destroyed the parity or balance between the competing
interests of employer and employee with respect to
workmen's compensation. The balance was tilted unduly
in favor of the workmen since it was possible to stretch
the work-related nature of an ailment beyond seemingly
rational its. 5

Thus, under the present law, 6 in order for the

employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits,
the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be, or
must have resulted from either a) any illness definitely
accepted as an occupational disease listed by the
Commission or b) any illness caused by employment
subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by working conditions.

Since peptic ulcer is not included in the list

of occupational diseases as drawn up by
the Commission, then petitioner has the
burden of proving that the nature of her
husband's work increased the risk of
contracting the disease.
Aside from the undisputed fact that the
deceased is a heavy coffee drinker, which
was his way of warding off sleepiness, no
evidence was ever adduced by petitioner to
bolster the theory that her husband's work

increased the risk of contracting the

ailment.
Being a heavy coffee drinker may have
aggravated his peptic ulcer, but,
aggravation of an illness is no longer a
ground for compensation under the present
law.
This Court takes notice of the fact that the
conditions in this case are not peculiar to
the work mentioned herein. Many, if not
most, employees are equally exposed to
similar conditions but have not been victims
of peptic ulcer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is denied for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 48664 May 20, 1987
GLICERIA C. CASUMPANG, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM AND BUREAU OF
PRISONS, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of
the Employees' Compensation Commission
in ECC Case No. 0713 entitled "Gliceria C.
Casumpang v. Government Service
Insurance System (Bureau of
Prisons)"which affirmed the decision of the
Government Service Insurance System and
denied the claim for death benefits of

Gliceria C. Casumpang, widow of the late

Jose Casumpang.

reconsideration of the
appellant.

The assailed decision of the Employees

Compensation Commission is as follows:

The preponderance of
mandatory legal postulate
requiring proof of causation
once an ailment upon which a
claim is based is not
considered an occupational
disease as defined and
understood under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended,
would subserve the
respondent System's findings
that the above-titled claim is
not compensable. The
conclusion of the respondent
System cannot be faulted.
From even the cursory reading
of the record, the evidences
(sic) submitted by the appellant
in support of her claim would
fail to indicate that the cause of
death is in occupational
disease, noting further thereon
that the work of the deceased
did not involve handling of
wood products such as those
of wood workers, loggers,
carpenters and employees of
plywood, pulp and paper mills.
Neither did these evidences
(sic) measure up to the
substantial and positive
evidence requirement for a
determination of
compensability, since there is
no showing that the risk of
contracting gastric carcinoma
was increased by the
deceased's working conditions.

The questioned decision

denied the claim for
compensation originally filed
by the deceased employee.
Jose Casumpang, then
working as Prison Guard of the
Bureau of Prisons with
assignment at the San Ramon
Prison and Penal Farm,
Zamboanga City. Upon its
conversion to a claim for
income benefits for death
following the demise of said
Jose Casumpang due to
Cancer of the Stomach, the
claim is now being prosecuted
(sic) on appeal to this
Commission by the herein
appellant-widow, Gliceria
Casumpang.
The System's denial of the
appellant's claim was
predicated on the ground that
the cause of death is not an
occupational disease nor the
result of the deceased's nature
of occupation as Prison Guard,
This is the gist of the System's
letter-denial dated August 5,
1976, reiterated in its
resolutions dated October 4,
1976 and August 18. 1977,
respectively, therein further
denying the requests for

The contention of the appellant

that compensability is
presumed once the ailment is
shown to have supervened in
the course of employment
cannot be accorded merit. The
doctrine of presumptive
compensability which was then
expressly provided under the
old Workmen's Compensation
Act (Act 3428) is not
recognized under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended,
the present law on employees'
compensation. In the latter law,
proof of causation by the
claimant is imperative, such
burden being incompatible with
the presumption of
compensability.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING,
the decision appealed from
should be, as it is hereby
AFFIRMED, and the instant
claim dismissed. (Original
Records, Decision of ECC).
The main issue in the case at bar is
whether or not cancer of the stomach is an
occupational disease and hence,
compensable under Presidential Decree
No. 626, as amended.
This case falls under the New Labor Code,
which fact is admitted by the petitioner
herself (Casumpang's Petition for
Certiorari, p. 3).
After a close perusal of the records of the
case, nowhere does it appear that Jose
Casumpang contracted his disease or

ailments before January 1, 1975. There are

no medical findings. reports, affidavits or
any indication that he was suffering from
any pain or discomfort prior to the effectivity
of the Labor Code which by liberal
interpretation may have worked in his favor.
There is no dispute that prior to his demise
Jose Casumpang had ruptured duodenal
ulcer with generalized peritonitis. 'This
condition according to medical findings on
record, worsened into cancer of the
stomach which disease finally caused his
death. The former ailment was officially
diagnosed in June 28, 1976. In his medical
history, this was traced to hematemesis and
melena which began in November 1975. In
other words, all of his ailments were after
January 1, 1975.
It is Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, therefore, which is applicable in
this case and not the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
It is important to determine which law is
applicable.
Under the former Workmen's
Compensation Act or Act No. 3428 as
amended. the claimant was relieved of the
duty to prove causation as it was then
legally presumed that the illness arose out
of the employment'. under the presumption
of compensability (Tortal v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 124 SCRA
211).
However, under the new law, the principles
of aggravation and presumption of
compensability have been stricken off by
the lawmaker as grounds for compensation

(Milano v. Employees' Compensation

Commission, 142 SCRA 52).
Under Article 167 (b) of the New Labor
Code and Section I (b), Rule Ill of the
Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation, for the sickness and the
resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must be the
result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex "A" of the Rules with the
conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise,
proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions (De Jesus v. Employees
Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA
92).
Under the Labor Code, cancer of the
stomach is not an occupational disease
considering the decedent's employment as
prison guard.
We agree with the Solicitor General that:
... In ECC Resolution No. 247A dated April 13, 1977, cancer
of the stomach and other
lymphatic and blood forming,
vessels was considered
occupational only among
woodworkers; wood products
industry carpenters, loggers
and employees in pulp and
paper mills and plywood mills.
The complained illness is
therefore not compensable
under the first group provided
in the Labor Code.
Under the second ground for
compensability, it should be
shown that an illness is caused

by employment and that the

risk of contracting the same is
increased by working
conditions. In her letter dated
December 6, 1977 to
respondent ECC (Annex B),
petitioner claims that her
deceased husband escorted
inmates to work in the
hinterlands of San Ramon; that
at times he was overtaken by
rain; that he had to work at
night in case of prison
escapes, and that he missed
his meals owing to the nature
of his duties. It should be noted
however, that said conditions
do not bring about cancer of
the stomach. On the ailment of
Jose Casumpang, the GSIS
found that the evidence (you
have) submitted are not
sufficient for us to establish
that his ailment is the direct
result of your occupation or
employment as Prison Guard
in the Bureau of Prisons,
Zamboanga City (GSIS letter
dated August 5, 1976, supra.)
This was reiterated by the
GSIS in its letter dated October
4, 1976 denying a request for
reconsideration. Thus: 'On the
basis, (however), of the papers
and evidence on record which
you have submitted, it appears
that you have not established
that your employment had any
causal relationship with the
contraction of the ailment.'
Petitioner did not demonstrate
that the adverse conditions

mentioned above had direct

causal connection with his job
which would develop into
cancer of the stomach. (Rollo,
pp. 125-126).
The case of Aninias v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, (83 SCRA
806) cited by the petitioner is not applicable
to the cast at bar as the former case
applied the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The petitioner's arguments more properly
apply claims falling under the old law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.,
The decision of the Government Service
Insurance System and the Employees'
Compensation Commission denying the
claim are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. L-46454 September 28, 1989
NICETAS C. RODRIGUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(BUREAU OF ELEMENTARY
EDUCATION), respondent.
Rodrigo V. Coquia for petitioner.

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner's late husband, Hector P.
Rodriguez, was a public school teacher
assigned at Salaan Elementary School in
Mangaldan, Pangasinan. On November 19,
1975 he went on sick leave and was

confined at the Pangasinan Provincial

Hospital after complaining of severe
stomach pains accompanied by nausea
and vomiting, later diagnosed as "Intestinal
Lipomatosis of the Large Colon with
Obstruction of the Ascending Colon." His
ailment called for a surgical operation
which was performed on November
27,1975 but this proved unavailing. A few
days thereafter, on December 2, 1975, he
expired.
On January 28, 1976, petitioner filed a
claim for death compensation under the
Labor Code with respondent Government
Service Insurance System (hereinafter
referred to as GSIS). In a letter-decision
dated February 23, 1976, the GSIS denied
the claim finding that the cause of the death
of petitioner's husband is not an
occupational disease since the nature of
his duties as a teacher, as well as the
working conditions of his employment,
could not have directly caused his ailment
which eventuated in his subsequent
death. 1 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, dated
August 11, 1976, was denied upon the finding that the
evidence failed to establish that the decedent's
employment had any causal relationship with the
contraction of the ailment and there was no showing that
the same directly arose therefrom or resulted from the
nature thereof. 2 A second motion for reconsideration
filed on October 18, 1976 having been denied by the
GSIS, petitioner's claim was elevated for review to the
respondent commission where it was docketed as ECC
Case No. 0266.

On March 16, 1977, respondent

commission affirmed the ruling of the GSIS
and denied the claim of petitioner. The case
is now before us on a petition for review.
The applicable rule established in law and
jurisprudence concerning claims based on

the provisions of the Labor Code on

employees' compensation, particularly on
death benefits under Article 194, is that
they must result from an occupational
disease. A compensable disease means
any illness accepted and listed by the
Employees' Compensation Commission or
any illness caused by the employment
subject to proof by the employee that the
risk of contracting the same was increased
by the working conditions. 3
If the disease is listed in the Table of
Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex
A of the Rules on Employees'
Compensation, no proof of causation is
required. However, if it is not so listed, it
has been held that the employee, this time
assisted by his employer, is required to
prove, a positive proposition, that is, that
the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions. The
fact that the cause of the disease was not
positively identified does not dispense with
this burden of proof. 4
The observations heretofore made do not
mean that proof of direct causal relation is
indispensably required. It is enough that the
claimant adduces proof of reasonable work
connection, whereby the development of
the disease was brought about largely by
the conditions present in the nature of the
job. Strict rules of evidence are not
demanded, the degree of proof required
being merely substantial evidence, which
has been held to be such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as
sufficient to support a conclusion. 5
After the surgical operation performed by
Dr. Arturo de Vera, he gave the clinical

impression that the deceased was suffering

from "Intestinal Obstruction Partial, due to
Lipomatosis of the Colon and Adhesion,"
explained by respondent commission as
follows:
... As established in medical
science, intestinal obstruction
is a condition in which the
passage of intestinal contents
is arrested or seriously
impaired. This is due to causes
which are either mechanical,
vascular or neurogenic.
Mechanical causes are
intrinsic factors as adhesions
and tumors, such as what
happened in the instant case,
and hernia, and such factors
as impacted foreign body or
feces, parasites and
gallstones. Vascular causes
include embolism or trombosis
of a large blood vessel. The
neurogenic causes consist of
those seen in pneumonia and
peritonitis and following
abdominal surgery or injuries
to the spinal cord. (The Merck
Manual-8th edition: Principles
of Internal Medicine by
Harrison). ... 6
Public respondent GSIS in its letterdecision also gave this explanation to
petitioner:
Intestinal Obstruction is failure
of progression of intestinal
contents due to mechanical
causes or to inadequacy of
intestinal muscular activity. In

your husband's case, it was

due to Lipomatosis and
Adhesions. Lipomata are
benigned (sic) tumors
characteristically found in
middle adult life, although they
may have been growing slowly
for many years before making
clinical mischief. They arise
from adipose or fatty tissue
anywhere in the body. The
mesentery of the colon
contains a large amount of
such tissue and this may
produce obstruction by
compression of the intestinal
wall. Worthy of note is the fact
that the abdomen of your late
husband was markedly
obese. 7
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that the
principal duties of her husband as a
classroom teacher alone would not have
any connection with his disease. However,
she posits that the deceased's auxiliary
activities as a classroom teacher directly
affected his physical constitution and
indubitably caused him to have sustained
some trauma in his abdominal cavity and
other parts of the body. According to
petitioner, the deceased was a member of
the basketball team of the public school
teachers in their school for the last five
years prior to his death and had served as
a coach in basketball for three years. He
was also said to have been an active
member of the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines serving as committee chairman
of Unit 671 of the Pangasinan council. 8

It is our considered view that the

circumstances alleged by the petitioner and
the evidence she presented are not enough
to discharge the required quantum of proof,
liberal as it is. There is no clear evidence as
to when the disease commenced and
supervened; the tumors which developed in
the deceased's colon may have been
growing for many years even before he
was employed as a teacher. Neither was
there any indication as to what really
caused the disease: in fact, the nature of
the disease as described militate against a
finding of a causal nexus. The "trauma" that
was supposed to have caused or at least
contributed to the disease was neither
satisfactorily clarified nor adequately
proved. Surely, the activities relied upon by
the petitioner, being outside the regular or
primary functions of a teacher, could not
have been done every working day. It is
safe to assume that they were done only
for certain limited periods of time and on
isolated occasions as, for instance, during
competitions. Thus, it cannot be said that
decedent's work as a teacher exposed him
to hazards different or greater from those
involved in ordinary or normal life-styles.
There is no showing that he did not engage
in other extraneous activities, aside from
playing basketball or being a member of
the Boy Scouts. Of further note is the
observation that the abdomen of the
deceased was markedly obese, which
circumstance may also have been a
causative or contributive factor considering
the etiological and pathological particulars
of said ailment.
Additionally, even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that said co-curricular activities
can be considered as "hazards," as

theorized by petitioner, exposure to the

same was on the voluntary choice of the
deceased. As pointed out by respondent
commission, the decision to engage therein
was at decedent's option since, not forming
part of his work as teacher, there was no
compulsion on him to participate in said
activities.
UNDER THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the instant petition is
DENIED and the decision of respondent
Employees' Compensation Commission is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46654 August 9, 1988
LUPO S. CARBAJAL, petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM (Municipality of San Julian,
Eastern Samar), and EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, respondents.
Pompeyo V. Tan.

PARAS, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks

to set aside and annul the decision of
respondent Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 0168
dated June 27, 1977, which affirmed the
decision of respondent Government
Service Insurance System, denying
petitioner's claim for benefits under the
New Labor Code as amended (P.D. No.
626) for the death of his spouse, Nenita P.
Carbajal (Rollo, Annex "A," p. 14).
The undisputed facts of the case are as
follows:
The late Nenita P. Carbajal was employed
as Campaign Clerk in the Municipal
Treasurer's Office of San Julian, Eastern
Samar. On February 2, 1976 while typing
tax declarations and making entries in their
books, which were her duties aside from
campaigning for tax collections, she
suffered from bleeding per vaginum due to
incomplete abortion. Her hospitalization
and treatment at the Bagacay Mines
Hospital due to profuse hermorrhage of one
month duration secondary to complete
abortion and shock were of no avail for on
March 8,1976, petitioner's wife died.
On May 12, 1976, he filed his claim for
benefits for the death Of his wife with the
respondent Government Service Insurance
System under P.D. No. 626, as amended.
On June 3, 1976, the Senior Assistant
General Manager of the Underwriting and
Claims Department of GSIS, Mr. Domingo
N. Garcia, denied the petitioner's claim
stating that the ailments of his wife were
not occupational.

Petitioner requested reconsideration of

respondent's adverse ruling. However, his
request was also turned down by
respondent GSIS reiterating its previous
stand that ailment which resulted in his
wife's death is not causally related to her
duties and conditions of work. From this
decision, a petition for review was filed by
petitioner before the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC).
On June 27, 1977, the respondent ECC
rendered its questioned decision in ECC
Case No. 0168 based upon the findings of
its Medical Officer, Dr. Mercia C. Abrenica,
that there is no proof to establish the
compensability of the sickness in relation to
claimant's occupation. Neither was there an
increased risk arising from the working
conditions affirming the GSIS decision
denying the claim.
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue raised in the case at bar is
the compensability of petitioner's wife's
ailments.
Section 1, P.D. No. 626, amending Article
165 of the Labor Code, defines a
compensable sickness as "any illness
definitely accepted as occupational disease
listed by the Commission, or any illness
caused by employment subject to proof by
the employee that the risk of contracting
the same is increased by the working
conditions."
Respondent ECC in its decision denying
petitioner's claim, stressed that the causes
of abortion are: (1) fetal, as when there is
defective development of the fertilized
ovum; (2) maternal, as in acute infections,

disease, and when the spermatozoa is

inadequate to give ovum the necessary
generative impulse (Obstetrics, J.P.
Greenhill, 12th Edition, 1060).
Respondent ECC asserted that there is
absence of any proof that the abortion
suffered by petitioner's wife was caused by
her employment and that petitioner failed to
establish risk of his wife's contracting it was
increased by working conditions attendant
in her employment.
Petitioner contends that the decision of the
ECC overlooked the nature and conditions
of employment of his late wife. Petitioner
claims that the risk of contracting the
disease was aggravated/increased by the
working conditions as evidenced by Report
of Injury/Sickness/Death, Municipal Mayor
Matilda A. Operario of San Julian, Eastern
Samar (ECC, Records, p. 11); Medical
Certificate of the two attending physicians
of the deceased (ECC, Records, Annex
"A," p. 15; Annex "B," p. 14); and the
affidavit of the Municipal Treasurer of the
aforementioned town (ECC, Records,
Annex "C," p. 13) which confirmed that the
illness was connected with her work as
Campaign Clerk in the Municipal
Treasurer's Office.
Further, petitioner cites the travels of his
wife and the of heavy tax declaration books
in connection with her work thereby
causing her "two attacks of vaginal
bleeding and hypogastric pain."
Claimant's contention is meritorious.
Under Article 1167 (I), Presidential Decree
No. 626, as amended, a "compensable
sickness means (1) any illness definitely

accepted as an occupational disease listed

by the ECC; or (2) any illness caused by
employment subject to proof by the
employee that the risk of contracting the
same is increased by working conditions."
Records reveal that petitioner's wife while
working as Campaign Clerk in the
Treasurer's Office of San Julian, Eastern
Samar, suffered "two attacks of vaginal
bleeding and hypogastric pain" attributing
said ailment to the lifting of heavy tax
declaration books, due to abortion
incomplete.
This opinion of the decedent's physicians is
in accord with the findings/analysis of
medical authorities which read as follows:
Pregnant women become tired
more readily, therefore, the
prevention of fatigue must be
stressed very emphatically.
The body is made up of
various types of cells, each
type with a specific function.
Depletion of nerve-cell energy
results in fatigue, and fatigue
causes certain reactions in the
body that are injurious.
(Maternity Nursing 12th
Edition, by Fitzpatrick, Reeder
and Mastroianni, Jr.).
It is not considered desirable
for pregnant women to be
employed in the following
types of occupation and they
should, if possible, be
transferred to lighter and more
sedentary works:

(a) occupation that

involve heavy
lifting or other
heavy work;
(b) occupation
involving
continous
standing and
moving about.
(One of the
Standards for
Maternity Case
and Employment
of Mothers
recommended by
the Children's
Bureau of the
United States).
(Rollo, p. 12,).
Moreover, spontaneous abortion may result
from the influence of periodicity as the
uterine muscle reaches a certain state of
detention; or in various accidents as a fall,
strain or overmuscular exertion when the
uterus reacts and expels its
load. (Emphasis supplied; "Anatomy and
Allied Sciences for Lawyers, W.F. English,
p. 181).
Therefore, the opinion of the ECC Medical
Officer (ECC Record, p. 20) that there was
no causal relation between the ailment of
petitioner's spouse and the nature and/or
conditions of his wife's employment cannot
overcome the substantial evidence
submitted by petitioner (See Calvero v.
ECC et al., 117 SCRA 461 [1982], cited in
Parages v. ECC, 134 SCRA 73; Ovenson v.
ECC, GSIS; G.R. No. 65216, December 1,
1987).

Additionally, medical opinion to the contrary

can be disregarded especially when there
is some basis in the facts for inferring a
work connection (Delegente v. ECC, 118
SCRA 67; San Valentin v. ECC, 118 SCRA
160 cited in Sarmiento v. ECC, Sept. 24,
1986, 144 SCRA 421).
Thus, in the cases of Mercado, Jr. v. ECC,
139 SCRA 270 and Mora v. ECC and GSIS,
G.R. No. 62157, December 1, 1987 citing
Cristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329, this Court
ruled as follows:
While the presumption of
compensability and theory of
aggravation espoused under
the Workmen's Compensation
Act may have been
abandoned under the New
Labor Code (the
constitutionality of such
abrogation may still be
challenged), it is significant
that the liberality of the law in
general still subsists.
... As agents charged by the
law to implement social justice
guaranteed and secured by
both 1935 and 1973
Constitutions respondents
should adopt a more liberal
attitude in deciding claims for
compensability specially where
there is some basis in the facts
for inferring a work connection.
(Cristobal v. ECC, supra).
Moreover, "this kind of interpretation gives
meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as

embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor

Code which states that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be
resolved in favor of labor.'" (Cristobal v.
ECC, supra). The policy is to extend the
applicability of the decree to a greater
number of employees who can avail of the
benefits under law, which is in consonance
with the avowed policy of the State to give
maximum aid and protection to labor
(Acosta v. ECC, 109 SCRA 209 cited in
Sarmiento v. ECC and GSIS, L-65648,
September 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 421).
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED
and the decision of respondent Employees
Compensation Commission is hereby SET
ASIDE and another rendered ordering
respondents to pay herein petitioner the full
amount of compensation under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-45910 April 28, 1980
ELIGIO P. MIRASOL, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEE'S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(Department of Education and
Culture), respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of
the Employee's Compensation Commission

in ECC Case No. 0134 entitled "Eligio

Mirasol, Claimant, versus, Government
Service Insurance System (Department of
Education and Culture), Respondent"
affirming the decision of the Government
Service Insurance System denying the
claim for compensation of Eligio P. Mirasol
on the ground that the claimant's ailments,
hypertension and rheumatic infection in
both knees, are not occupational diseases
arising from his employment. 1
The petitioner, Eligio P. Mirasol, while in
good health, was appointed as classroom
teacher on August 1, 1945 in the public
school in Libmanan, Camarines Sur. In
1960, he was appointed as District Food
Production Coordinator and Attendant
Teacher in the same school. He became a
District Revolution Coordinator and
Attendant Teacher in 1972. In 1974, the
petition was given additional assignment as
District Vocational Coordinator. The district
was composed of forty eight (48) central
barrio schools, eighteen (18) of which were
in the mountains which could be reached
only on foot. Eight (8) schools were 30
kilometers and the nearest was 10
kilometers from the petitioner's
headquarters in the town proper of
Libmanan, Camarines Sur. It was the
petitioner's duty to visit monthly all the
district schools. On August 25, 1973, he
experienced for the first time symptoms of
malignant hypertension and rheumatoid
arthritis. The ailments of the petitioner
persisted. He was under continuous
medical treatment until he retired on
February 28, 1976 after having been in the
government service for thirty one (31)
years, more or less. His retirement was
brought about by ailments diagnosed as

high blood pressure and rheumatoid

arthritis, both knees. 2
The petitioner applied for compensation
benefits under P.D. No. 626 to the
Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) in 1976. In a letter dated March 8,
1976, the Senior Assistant General
Manager, Domingo N. Garcia, of the GSIS
denied the claim on the ground that the
ailments of hypertension and rheumatic
infection, both knees, are not occupational
diseases and that the working conditions of
the petitioner's employment could not have
directly caused such ailments. 3
The motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner was denied by the Senior
Assistant General Manager of the
Government Service Insurance System in a
letter dated May 17, 1976. 4
The petitioner appealed to the Employee's
Compensation Commission which affirmed
the decision of the Government Service
Insurance System denying the claim.
It is a fact that part of the duties of the
petitioner was to make monthly visits to
various schools which are not accessible
by road. To reach these mountainous
schools, the petitioner had to hike through
muddy ricefields and climb slippery
mountains during sunny and rainy days.
During these monthly visits, the petitioner
fell down many times because of the
slippery paths in the ricefields and trails in
the mountains. The ailments of
hypertension and rheumatoid arthritis, both
knees, must have been caused by the
exposure to the elements of the petitioner
and his falling down many times while

hiking in muddy ricefields and on slippery

mountain trails under all kinds of weather
conditions on his way to the barrio schools
not accessible by road.

COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE

INSURANCE SYSTEM (DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION AND
CULTURE), respondents.

There is sufficient substantial evidence of

record to show that the ailments of the
petitioner were caused by the duties of his
employment and that the risk of contracting
said ailments was increased by the working
conditions. He is entitled to permanent total
disability compensation.

Alan A. Leynes for petitioner.

The record also discloses that the petitioner

received medical treatment.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
Employee's Compensation Commission
sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside
and the Government Service Insurance
System is ordered:
1) To pay the petitioner the
amount of Six Thousand
Pesos (P6,000.00) as disability
benefit;
2) To reimburse the petitioner
the medical expenses he
incurred, supported by proper
receipts; and
3) To pay the petitioner the
amount of Six Hundred Pesos
(P600.00) as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46200 July 30, 1979
FELIXBERTO VILLONES, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION

Nicasio & Palaganas for respondent ECC.

Manuel Lazaro for respondent GSIS.

MAKASIAR, J.:

1wph1.t

This is a petition for review of the decision

of the Employees' Compensation
Commission affirming the decision of the
GSIS Medicare-Employees' Compensation,
which denied the claim of herein petitioner
for income benefits in connection with the
death of his son, the late Rolando M.
Villones.
The records show that the late Rolando M.
Villones was employed as a secondary
school teacher in the Department of
Education and Culture assigned at
Dayhagan Barrio High School in Bongabon,
Oriental Mindoro, from July 3,1972 up to
the time of his death on September 2, 1975
with a basic salary of P347.60 per month,
plus P50.00 monthly allowance. He died of
pulmonary tuberculosis. On December 23,
1975, the deceased's father and herein
petitioner, filed with the Government
Service Insurance System, in the
prescribed form, a claim for income
benefits for the death of his son under the
provision of Presidential Decree No. 626,
attaching thereto a xerox copy of the
decedent's death certificate (see pages 1 &
4 of ECC Case No. 0137). On February 4,

1976, additional documents were submitted

to the GSIS consisting of: (a) a medical
certificate showing that deceased Rolando
M. Villones was on sick leave of absence
from December 4 to 20, 1972 due to
influenza; (b) a medical certificate issued
by Dr. Fernando B. Viloria, Municipal
Health Officer of Bongabon, Oriental
Mindoro certifying that he examined
Rolando M. Villones on July 19, 1972 and
found him to be physically and mentally fit
for employment; and (c) a certification from
the principal of Bongabon (South District),
Oriental Mindoro to the effect that the
actual duties of the deceased as secondary
school teacher "were teaching secondary
school subjects specifically the following:
chemistry, science, history, and English. He
also led students in some curricular work
like green revolution projects, youth civic
programs, and the like. Aside from these,
he also did community work like helping in
the organization of puroks and
barangay youth clubs" (pp. 5, 6 and 8, ECC
rec.).
On March 9, 1976, the GSIS MedicareEmployees' Compensation denied the
claim on the ground that "the cause of your
son's death, Pulmonary Tuberculosis,
although listed as an occupational disease,
has failed to satisfy other conditions in
order to be compensable," stating further
that:
t.hqw

For Tuberculosis and its

resulting disability or death to
be compensable, the
employee manifesting this
disease should have an
occupation involving close and
frequent contact with a source

or sources of tuberculosis
infection by reason of
employment: (a) In the medical
treatment or nursing of a
person or persons suffering
from tuberculosis, (b) As a
laboratory worker, pathologist
or post-mortem worker, where
occupation involves working
with material which is a source
of tuberculous infection. The
nature of your son's duties as
a Teacher as well as the
working conditions of his
employment did not expose
him to the source or sources of
tuberculous infection
aforementioned (p. 7, ECC
rec.).
After petitioner's request for reconsideration
of the denial of his claim was denied on
June 10, 1976 by the GSIS Medicare
Employees' Compensation, the entire
record of the case was elevated on
September 2, 1976 to the Employees'
Compensation Commission for review in
accordance with the law and rules (pp. 1215, ECC rec.).
On February 17, 1977, the Employees'
Compensation Commission (En Banc)
rendered its decision affirming the earlier
denial made by the GSIS MedicareEmployees' Compensation of herein
petitioner's claim for income benefits,
pertinent portions thereof read as follows:
Pulmonary Tuberculosis
having been ruled out as an
occupational disease in the
occupation in which the

t.hqw

deceased was engaged in,

appellant is repudiating
pulmonary tuberculosis as the
cause of death. Appellant
insisted that the Municipal
Health Officer might have
erred in indicating in the Death
Certificate that his son died of
Pulmonary Tuberculosis, there
being no autopsy conducted.
In other words, appellant would
like to make it appear that
hemoptysis which was the only
visible sign immediately before
the teacher's death, could
have been due to other illness
traceable to employment and
not necessarily as a result of
Pulmonary Tuberculosis.
Be this as it may, a research
has been made on the
possible causes of hemoptysis.
Medical studies show that
blood-streaked sputum or
gross bleeding coming from
the respiratory tract may be
caused by: (1) inflammable
inflammatory causes are hose
of tuberculosis, extending in
severity from the smallest
amount to death from rapid
exsanguination. Other
common causes, mild or
profuse, are bronchiectasis
bronchitis, lung abscess or
pneumonia; (2) Neoplasticbronchogenic carcinoma or
bronchial adenoma; (3)
Vascular-mitral stenosis and
pulmonary infarct, are the most
frequent conditions associated

with pulmonary hemorrhage.

Other causes are left
ventricular failure
arteriovenous mal-formations,
etc.; (4) Traumatic such as
foreign body or lung contusion;
and (5) Hemorrhagic
Hemorrhagic diathesis or anticoagulant therapy. (Principles
of Internal Medicines by
Harrison). All of the above
causes of hemoptysis are
neither related in any way to
the nature of the duties of the
deceased as a teacher, nor to
his working conditions.
As correctly ruled by the GSIS,
the nature and conditions of
the deceased's employment
could have just aggravated his
physical condition. Aggravation
of a pre-existing illness is,
however, no longer
compensable under the
present Employees'
Compensation Program. (pp.
17-19, ECC rec. in ECC Case
No. 0137).
WE find the petition meritorious.
In the case before US, it is undisputed that
petitioner's son, the late Rolando M.
Villones, who was employed on July 3,
1972 as a secondary public school teacher
in Dayhagan Barrio High School in
Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro, died on
September 2, 1975, which was a working
day. The cause of his death, according to
the municipal health officer of Bongabon,

Dr. Fernando B. Viloria, was PTB,

hemoptysis (p. 2, ECC rec.).
The records reveal that the deceased, prior
to his employment as a teacher, was
physically and mentally fit to perform his
duties (p. 5, ECC rec.). While employed as
such teacher, he went on sick leave from
December 4 to 20, 1972 (16 days). Dr.
Fernando B. Viloria, who was his attending
physician, diagnosed his sickness as
"influenza" (p. 6, ECC rec.). Considering,
however, the limited medical facilities in
municipal health centers, it is possible that
what was diagnosed as influenza was
actually pulmonary tuberculosis in its
incipient stage, which may not be easily
detected by physical examination but by
extensive x-ray. In the case of Batangas
Transportation Co. vs. Perez and WCC (11
SCRA 793 [19641) WE stated that: "...
Tuberculosis is not an instantaneous
disease, it is an imperceptible germ
disease that feeds on the lungs whose
presence in the body cannot be easily
discerned and its incipient stage may not
be readily discovered" (see also Bautista
vs. WCC, L-43027, January 31, 1979;
Lorenzo vs. WCC, 85 SCRA 440, 441
[1978], emphasis supplied).
By the very nature of tuberculosis, the
deceased could not have instantly acquired
such illness on September 2, 1975 and
died as a result of that on the same day.
And the observation of petitioner's counsel
that "pulmonary tuberculosis does not
belong to that category of sickness which is
instantaneously fatal to its victim upon
contracting thereof, but takes months, if not
years, before the person afflicted dies" is
realistic as it is confirmed by several

compensation cases that reached this

Court (p. 5, Petition for Review, p. 11, rec.).
Thus, in the case ofManila Railroad
Company vs. Ferrer & WCC (109 Phil. 716
[1960]). the employee was found to be
afflicted with moderately advance PTB on
November 19, 1953 but he was able
continue working until a few months before
he died of said illness on January 27, 1958,
or a period of more than four (4)years from
the time he contracted the disease. In Vda.
de Calado vs. WCC (38 SCRA 567 [1971]),
the employee was diagnosed to be
suffering from advanced PTB on December
18, 1959 and died two and a half (2 1/2)
years later on June 4, 1962. In Lambino vs.
Del Rosario (6 SCRA 1017 [1962]), the
employee was found to be afflicted with a
far advanced PTB in April, 1952 but he was
able to work briefly up to the time of his
death, by reason of said illness, on May 7,
1953, or afterthirteen (13) months. In
another case, the employee was treated for
pulmonary tuberculosis from December,
1952 until he died of said illness on
January 23, 1954 or thirteen (13)
months later (National Development
Company vs. WCC, 19 SCRA 861 [1967]).
And in Manila Railroad Company vs. Vda.
de Chavez (12 SCRA 142 [1964]), the
employee was confined in the hospital from
November 22 to December 2, 1956 for
PTB, after which he was able to work
briefly only to be confined again, and he
died of the aforesaid illness on August 10,
1957 ornine (9) months later.
Considering, therefore, the undisputed
nature of the deceased's employment as
certified by the principal of Bongabon
(South District); and in addition, the fact
that he had plenty of homework to do after

his regular working hours such as

preparing the lesson plans for the next
day's classes, correcting test papers and
making various school reports and in doing
all these, he would usually stay up-late at
night; that with a meager monthly pay of
P397.60, with his parents, a sister, and two
(2) brothers depending on him for support,
he could barely afford to buy and eat good
food; and that as such teacher, it becomes
inevitable for him to be in constant contact
with students and other types of people
who may be afflicted with PTB, which is a
highly communicable disease, it is not
surprising that he should contract
tuberculosis, so that from December 4 to
20, 1972, only five (5) months after he was
employed as a teacher, he was forced to go
on sick leave by reason of the aforestated
illness. When he was able to resume work,
he was again exposed to same working
conditions thus aggravating his illness until
he suddenly died on September 2, 1975 of
sever hemoptysis due to PTB as certified
by Dr. Fernando B. Viloria.
It has been clearly shown that the
deceased did not only engage in teaching
such academic subjects as chemistry,
science, history and English but he was
also assigned to such co-curricular courses
like green revolution projects, youth civic
action programs (YCAP), and in such other
community works as helping organizepurok
and barangay youth clubs.
And as noted in the decision of the
Employees' Compensation Commission,
one of the causes of hemoptysis a
condition which includes both bloodstreaked sputum or gross bleeding coming
from the respiratory tract is tuberculosis,

extending in severity from the smallest

amount to death from rapid exsanguination
(pp. 17-19, ECC rec.).
Likewise, in her findings submitted to the
Employees' Compensation Commission,
Dr. Mercia C. Abrenica, a medical officer of
the Employees' Compensation
Commission, stated that of the
inflammatory causes of hemoptysis,
tuberculosis is still the major cause, and
that while PTB is the most probable
diagnosis in the instant case, it can be
considered occupational only when the
occupation involves exposure to source or
sources of tuberculosis infection (p. 10,
ECC rec.).
Consequently, in the instant case, the
cause of action accrued as early as
December 4, 1972 when the late Rolando
Villones contracted his illness and
continued to run until September 2, 1975
when he died by reason thereof; hence, the
cause of action accrued before the
effectivity of the New Labor Code. And WE
ruled in Corales vs. ECC, et al. (L-44063,
February 27, 1979) that the governing law
in the prosecution of the cause of action
which accrued prior to the effectivity of a
new law on the same subject matter, shall
be the law in force at the time of the accrual
of said cause of action. Since the
Workmen's Compensation Act was then in
full force and effect, then it should govern in
the case at bar. It is based on the principle
that
t.hqw

Rights accrued and vested

while a statute was in force
ordinarily survive its repeal.

The repeal of a statute does

not operate to impair or
otherwise affect rights which
have been vested or accrued
while the statute was in force.
This rule is applicable alike to
rights acquired under contracts
and to rights of action to
recover damages for torts.
Where a new statute continues
in force provisions of an old
statute, although in form it
repeals then at the moment of
its passage, a right of action
created by the old statute is
not thereby destroyed ... (82
CJS 1010).
It must be pointed out that as early as
December 4 to 20, 1972, the deceased
Villones was already entitled to disability
benefits under Section 14 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, as amended, because
his illness prevented him from reporting to
his work for more than three (3) days; and
under such a situation, his employer
(Department of Education and Culture) was
obligated under Section 37 of the same Act
to file a notice of illness with the Workmen's
Compensation Commission and to manifest
its intention of whether or not to controvert
his right to compensation. There is no
showing that respondent employer has
complied with its duty under Sections 37
and 45 of the Workmen, s Compensation
Act, as amended, of filing with the
Workmen's Compensation Commission a
notice of the initial illness of its employee,
Rolando Villones, as well as his
subsequent death on September 2, 1975,
and of controverting the right to
compensation within the prescribed period

of fourteen (14) days from the occurrence

of the disability or death, or within ten (10)
days from knowledge thereof.
It cannot be denied that respondent
employer had knowledge of the illness of
the deceased Villones because he applied
for sick leave from December 4 to 20, 1972
which presumably was acted upon by his
principal and/or supervisor, they being his
immediate superiors (Gallemit vs. Republic,
75 SCRA 382, 383, 385, 386 [1977]).
Likewise, respondent employer had
knowledge of the subsequent death of
Rolando Villones on September 2, 1975
because he died on a regular working day;
hence, the fact of death could not have
escaped the notice or knowledge of the
principal and/or supervisor. Such
knowledge of the illness and death of
Rolando Villones by the principal and/or
supervisor, being agents of the respondent
employer, is deemed in law as knowledge
of the respondent employer, which is
sufficient to charge it with its duty under
Sections 37 and 45 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, as amended (Gallemit
vs. Republic, supra; MRR vs. WCC, 10
SCRA 665 [1961]). WE have repeatedly
ruled that failure to comply with said
sections constitutes a renunciation of the
employer's right to controvert the claim,
resulting in the waiver of all its nonjurisdictional defenses, such as the noncompensability of the claim (Paraiso vs.
Castelo-Sotto, 85 SCRA 419 [1978];
Republic vs. WCC, 85 SCRA 107 [1978];
Lamco vs. WCC, 84 SCRA 401 [1978]; and
Canonero vs. WCC, 81 SCRA 712 [1978]).
Moreover, this Court, in consistently holding
that the disease of tuberculosis is an

occupational disease or work connected in

such occupations as that of a teacher,
laborer, driver, land inspector and such
other occupations, hence compensable,
aptly stated and WE quote: "Medical
science has it that tuberculosis as an
ailment is latent in man regardless of his
age, sex and occupation. When given
favorable conditions, this disease becomes
active and prominent. Some of these
favorable conditions are: too much physical
exertion without the corresponding rest;
exposure to excessive heat and cold; lack
of good food as to weaken the body
constituents and contact with people
suffering from tuberculosis ..." (Corales vs.
ECC, supra).

of the causes of hemoptysis. Even

unexplained deaths, the occasion and
circumstances of which are unknown or
undertermined, are usually deemed
compensable, as long as there is some
basis in the facts for inferring a workconnection, a casual relation between the
death and the employment (Mulingtapang
vs. WCC, 80 SCRA 610 [1977]; Castro vs.
WCC, 75 SCRA 179 [1977]; ITEMCOP vs.
Florzo, 16 SCRA 2104 [1966]). And, in case
of doubt in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor
Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations, the same shall be resolved in
favor of the laborer (Art. 4, PD No. 442, as
amended; Art. 1702, New Civil Code).

It is heartening to note that the ECC, in its

Resolutions Nos. 233 and 432, respectively
dated March 16, 1977 and July 20, 1977,
adopted a more compassionate
construction of the otherwise restrictive
provisions of the new Labor Code (PD No.
442, as amended by PD Nos. 570-A, 626,
643, 823, 849, 850, 865-A, 891, 928, 1389)
by including in the list of compensable
ailments and diseases, cardiovascular
disease which comprehends myocardial
infarction, pneumonia and bronchial
asthma (Sepulveda vs. ECC, et al., L46290, Aug. 25, 1978).

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF

RESPONDENT EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS
HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM IS HEREBY ORDERED

Finally, the grant of compensation benefits

to herein petitioner will not be impaired
even if he (petitioner himself entertains
doubts as to the real cause of the death of
his son when he stated that no autopsy
was made nor was there anybody who
actually examined the deceased prior to or
after his death. At any rate, as aforestate,
pulmonary tuberculosis is concededly one

3. TO PAY PETITIONER BURIAL

EXPENSES IN THE AMOUNT OF TWO
HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS;

1. TO DAY HEREIN PETITIONER THE

SUM OF SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00)
PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS;
2. TO REFUND PETITIONER's MEDICAL
AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY
SUPPORTED BY PROPER

4. TO PAY SIX HUNDRED (P600.00)

PESOS AS ATTORNEY' FEES; AND
5. TO PAY ADMINISTRATIVE COST.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 94167

January 21, 1991

MABUHAY SHIPPING SERVICES, INC.

AND SKIPPERS MARITIME CO.,
LTD., petitioners,
vs.
HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION) AND
CECILIA SENTINA, respondents.
Victorino Alba for petitioners.
Rodolfo B. Dizon for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The employer is exempted from liability for
burial expenses for a seaman who commits
suicide. How about in a case of one who
ran amuck or who in a state of intoxication
provoked a fight as a result of which he
was killed? Is the employer similarly
exempt from liability? This is the issue in
this case.
Romulo Sentina was hired as a 4th
Engineer by petitioner Mabuhay Shipping
Services, Inc. (MSSI) for and in behalf of
co-petitioner, Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd. to
work aboard the M/V Harmony I for a
period of one year. He reported for duty
aboard said vessel on July 13, 1987.
On January 16, 1988 at about 3 p.m., while
the vessel was docked alongside
Drapetona Pier, Piraeus, Greece, Sentina
arrived aboard the ship from shore leave
visibly drunk. He went to the messhall and
took a fire axe and challenged those eating
therein. He was pacified by his shipmates
who led him to his cabin. However, later he
went out of his cabin and proceeded to the
messhall. He became violent. He smashed
and threw a cup towards the head of an
oiler Emmanuel Ero, who was then eating.
Ero touched his head and noticed blood.

This infuriated Ero which led to a fight

between the two. After the shipmates broke
the fight, Sentina was taken to the hospital
where he passed away on January 17,
1988. Ero was arrested by the Greek
authorities and was jailed in Piraeus.
1

On October 26, 1988, private respondents

filed a complaint against petitioners with the
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) for payment of
death benefits, burial expenses, unpaid
salaries on board and overtime pay with
damages docketed as POEA Case No. (M)
88-10-896. After submission of the answer
and position papers of the parties a
decision was rendered by the POEA on
July 11, 1989, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering Mabuhay Shipping
Services, Inc. and Skippers Maritime
Co., Ltd. to pay complainant Cecilia
S. Sentina the sum of TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P230,000.00) representing
the deceased's death benefit and
burial compensation, the sum of
THREE HUNDRED FIFTY US
DOLLARS (US$350.00) or its peso
equivalent at the time of payment
representing unpaid shipboard pay
and fixed overtime pay plus ten
percent (10%) of the total judgment
award by way of and as attorney's
fees.
All other claims are ordered
dismissed
SO ORDERED.

A motion for reconsideration and/or appeal

was filed by petitioners which the
respondent First Division of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

disposed of in a resolution dated March 31,

1990 dismissing the appeal and affirming
the appealed decision.

or death is directly attributable to the

seamen.

A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by

petitioners was denied by said public
respondent in a resolution dated June 29,
1990.
Hence, the herein petition
for certiorari wherein the following grounds
are invoked:
The Hon. NLRC, gravely abused its
discretion in holding that "The
payment of Death Compensation
Benefit only requires that the seaman
dies during the term of the contract,
and no other."
That the Hon. NLRC, gravely abused
its discretion in holding that even if
the subject seaman's death resulted
from the fight he himself created,
such nonetheless does not constitute
a "deliberate or wilfull act on his own
life."
That the Hon. NLRC, gravely abused
its discretion in holding, that the
death of the late 4/Engr Romulo
Sentina is compensable.

The same provision of the standard format

also provides
In case of death of the seaman
during the term of his contract, the
employer shall pay his beneficiaries
the amount of
xxx

xxx

xxx

b. P210,000.00 for other officers

including radio operators and master
electrician. (Memo Circular No. 5
effective March 1, 1986)
In interpreting the aforequoted provision in
its decision, the POEA held that payment of
death compensation benefits only requires
that the seaman should die during the term
of the contract and no other. It further held
that the saving provision relied upon by
petitioners refers only to suicide where the
seaman deliberately and intentionally took
his own life.
5

Public respondent in affirming the said

POEA decision made the following
disquisition

The petition is impressed with merit.

Part II, Section C, No. 6 of the POEA
Standard Format for Filipino seamen
employed in ocean going vessels states
that
No compensation shall be payable in
respect of any injury, incapacity,
disability or death resulting from a
deliberate or willful act on his own life
by the seaman, provided
however that the employer can prove
that such injury, incapacity, disability

It is not difficult for us to understand

the intent of the aforequoted "Part II,
Section C, No. 6 of the POEA
Standard Format" that to avoid death
compensation, two conditions must
be met:
a) the subject death much have
resulted "from a deliberate or willful
act on his own life by the seaman;"
and
b) such death "directly attributable to
the seaman" must have been proven
by the "employer."

Thus, even if arguendo, the

appellants may successfully prove
that the subject seaman's death
resulted from the fight he himself
created, such, nonetheless does not
constitute a "deliberate or willful act
on his own life." On this ground
alone, the instant appeal would
already fail.
6

The mere death of the seaman during the

term of his employment does not
automatically give rise to
compensation. The circumstances which
led to the death as well as the provisions of
the contract, and the right and obligation of
the employer and seaman must be taken
into consideration, in consonance with the
due process and equal protection clauses
of the Constitution. There are limitations to
the liability to pay death benefits.
1wphi1

When the death of the seaman resulted

from a deliberate or willful act on his own
life, and it is directly attributable to the
seaman, such death is not compensable.
No doubt a case of suicide is covered by
this provision.
By the same token, when as in this case
the seaman, in a state of intoxication, ran
amuck, or committed an unlawful
aggression against another, inflicting injury
on the latter, so that in his own defense the
latter fought back and in the process killed
the seaman, the circumstances of the
death of the seaman could be categorized
as a deliberate and willful act on his own
life directly attributable to him. First he
challenged everyone to a fight with an axe.
Thereafter, he returned to the messhall
picked up and broke a cup and hurled it at
an oiler Ero who suffered injury. Thus
provoked, the oiler fought back The death
of seaman Sentina is attributable to his
unlawful aggression and thus is not
compensable.

Even under Article 172 of the Labor Code,

the compensation for workers covered by
the Employees Compensation and State
Insurance Fund are subject to the
limitations on liability.
Art. 172. Limitations of liability.
The State Insurance Fund shall be
liable for the compensation to the
employee or his dependents except
when the disability or death was
occasioned by the employee's
intoxication, willful intent to injure or
kill himself or another, notorious
negligence, or otherwise provided
under this Title.
Private respondent pointed out that
petitioner MSSI endorsed the claim for
compensation of private respondents. Said
petitioner admits this fact but asserts that it
was not favorably acted upon by its
principal, petitioner Skippers Maritime Co.,
Inc. because of the circumstances that led
to the death of Sentina.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The questioned decision of the POEA
dated July 11, 1989 and the resolutions of
public respondent dated May 31, 1990 and
June 29, 1990 affirming the same are
hereby set aside and another judgment is
hereby rendered dismissing the complaint.
SO ORDERED.
[Syllabus]

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 115497. September 16, 1996]

INTERORIENT
MARITIME
ENTERPRISES, INC., FIRCROFT
SHIPPING CORPORATION and
TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE

CO.,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
and
CONSTANCIA
PINEDA, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Are the local crewing or manning agent

and its foreign principal (the shipowner) liable
for the death of a Filipino seaman-employee
who, after having been discharged, was killed
in transit while being repatriated home?
The instant petition seeks the reversal
and/or
modification
of
the
Resolution dated March 30, 1994 of public
respondent
National
Labor
Relations
Commission dismissing
the
appeals
of
petitioners and affirming the decision
dated November 16, 1992 of Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
Administrator Felicisimo C. Joson, which
ordered that:
[1]

[2]

As can be gathered from the records of the

case, it was alleged that deceased seaman,
Jeremias Pineda was contracted to work as
Oiler on board the vessel, MV Amazonia,
owned and operated by its foreign principal,
Fircroft Shipping Corporation for a period of
nine (9) months with additional three (3)
months upon mutual consent of both parties
with a monthly basic salary of US$276.00
plus fixed overtime rate of US$83.00 and a
leave pay of 2 1/2 days per month; that on
October 2, 1989, he met his death when he
was shot by a Thai Policeman in Bangkok,
Thailand; that considering that the deceased
seaman was suffering from mental disorders
aggravated by threats on his life by his fellow
seamen, the Ship Captain should not have
allowed him to travel alone.

[3]

xxxxxxxxx

[4]

[5]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing

consideration, respondents are hereby jointly
and severally held liable to pay the
complainant the following amounts:
1. P130,000.00 as death compensation
benefits.
2. P18,000.00 as burial expenses.

The Facts
The proceedings below originated as a
claim for death compensation benefits filed by
Constancia Pineda as heir of her deceased
son, seaman Jeremias Pineda, against
Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. and its
foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping Corporation
and the Times Surety and Insurance Co.,
Inc. The following facts were found by the
POEA Administrator:
[6]

In its Answer/Position Paper, respondent

agency averred that deceased seaman signed a
contract of employment as Oiler for a period
of nine (9) months with additional three (3)
months upon mutual consent of both parties
with a monthly salary of US$276.00, fixed
overtime rate of US$83.00; that on December
21, 1988, deceased seaman joined the vessel
MV Amazonia and proceeded to discharge his
duties as Oiler; that on September 28, 1989,
he finished his contract and was discharged
from the port of Dubai for repatriation to
Manila; that his flight schedule from Dubai to
the Philippines necessitated a stopover at
Bangkok, Thailand, and during said stopover
he disembarked on his own free will and
failed to join the connecting flight to
Hongkong with final destination to Manila;
that on October 5, 1990, it received a fax
transmission from the Department of Foreign
Affairs to the effect that Jeremias Pineda was
shot by a Thai Officer on duty on October 2,
1989 at around 4:00 P.M.; that the police
report submitted to the Philippine Embassy in
Bangkok confirmed that it was Pineda who

approached and tried to stab the police

sergeant with a knife and that therefore he was
forced to pull out his gun and shot Pineda;
that they are not liable to pay any death/burial
benefits pursuant to the provisions of Par. 6,
Section C, Part II, POEA Standard Format of
Employment which state(s) that no
compensation shall be payable in respect of
any injury, (in)capacity, disability or death
resulting from a willful (sic) act on his own
life by the seaman; that the deceased seaman
died due to his own wilfull (sic) act in
attacking a policeman in Bangkok who shot
him in self-defense.
After the parties presented their respective
evidence, the POEA Administrator rendered his
decision holding petitioners liable for death
compensation benefits and burial expenses.
Petitioners appealed the POEA decision to
the
public
respondent. In
a
Decision
dated March 30, 1994, public respondent
upheld the POEA.
Thus, this recourse to this Court by way of
a special civil action for certiorari per Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
The Issues
The petitioners
assignment of errors:

made

the

following

Respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse

of discretion in ruling that herein petitioners
are liable for death compensation benefits
despite the fact that there is no direct evidence
proving that Pineda was mentally sick at the
time of repatriation.
Respondent NLRC committed a serious error
of law in not upholding the provisions of Par.
6, Section C, Part II of the POEA standard
format Contract of Employment.
Respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse
of discretion in finding for compensability of

Pinedas death when respondents (should read

petitioners) have proven that his death was not
work-connected.
The principal issue in this case is whether
the petitioners can be held liable for the death
of seaman Jeremias Pineda.
The petitioners challenge the factual bases
of the NLRC Decision, and argue that there
was no evidence, whether documentary or
testimonial, that the deceased Pineda, at the
time of his repatriation was not in full control of
his mental faculties, and that there (was) no
showing that seaman Pineda acted strangely
when he disembarked from the vessel in Dubai
where he was discharged, and from which
point he flew to Bangkok without any untoward
incident during the entire trip. They thus insist
that they were under no obligation to have
Pineda accompanied home when he was
discharged at the end of the contract term of
nine months, that they were in no position to
control the deceaseds movements and
behavior after he was repatriated and therefore
should not be held answerable for the
deceaseds own voluntary acts, and that the
deceased could have, while in Bangkok,
ingested some drugs or other mind-altering
substance resulting in his aggressive behavior
and untimely demise.
The Courts Ruling
Procedural and Substantive Defects
At the outset, we note that the petition
suffers from serious procedural defects that
warrant its being dismissed outright. Petitioners
acted prematurely, not having filed any motion
for reconsideration with the public respondent
before bringing the instant petition to this
Court. This constitutes a fatal infirmity.

x x x The unquestioned rule in this

jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of

law against the acts of public respondent. In

the instant case, the plain and adequate
remedy expressly provided by the law was a
motion for reconsideration of the assailed
decision, based on palpable or patent errors, to
be made under oath and filed within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the questioned
decision.
[7]

(T)he filing of such a motion is intended to

afford public respondent an opportunity to
correct any actual or fancied error attributed
to it by way of a re-examination of the legal
and factual aspects of the case. Petitioners
inaction or negligence under the
circumstances is tantamount to a deprivation
of the right and opportunity of the respondent
Commission to cleanse itself of an error
unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of
an act unfairly imputed. x x x
[8]

x x x And for failure to avail of the correct

remedy expressly provided by law, petitioner
has permitted the subject Resolution to be
come final and executory after the lapse of the
ten day period within which to file such
motion for reconsideration.
[9]

But even if the aforesaid procedural defect

were to be overlooked, the instant petition
nevertheless suffers from serious substantive
flaws. The petition assails the Resolution of the
respondent Commission as lacking factual and
legal bases to support the same. A petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court will lie only in cases where a grave
abuse of discretion or an act without or in
excess of jurisdiction is clearly shown to have
been
committed
by
the
respondent
Commission, and this Courts jurisdiction to
review decisions or resolutions of the
respondent NLRC does not include a
correction of its evaluation of the evidence.
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule that the
factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like
the respondent NLRC, if supported by
substantial evidence, are generally accorded
not only great respect but even finality, and are
binding upon this Court, unless the petitioner is
[10]

able to clearly demonstrate that respondent

Commission had arbitrarily disregarded
evidence before it or had misapprehended
evidence to such an extent as to compel a
contrary conclusion if such evidence had been
properly appreciated.
[11]

First Issue: No Direct Evidence of Mental

State?
At any rate, even disregarding for the
nonce the substantive as well as procedural
defects discussed above, a judicious review of
the records of this case turns up no indication
whatsoever that the respondent Commission
committed any grave abuse or acted beyond or
without jurisdiction. On the contrary, the
petitioners contention that the assailed
Resolution has no factual and legal bases is
belied by the adoption with approval by the
public respondent of the findings of the POEA
Administrator, which recites at length the
reasons for holding that the deceased Pineda
was mentally sick prior to his death and
concomitantly, was no longer in full control of
his mental faculties.
First, a word about the evidence supporting
the findings of the POEA Administrator. We
have held that claims of overseas workers
against their foreign employers should not be
subjected to the rules of evidence and
procedure that courts usually apply to other
complainants who have more facility in
obtaining the required evidence to prove their
demands. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court provides that in cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies (like the
POEA), a fact may be deemed established if it
is supported by substantial evidence, i.e., that
amount of evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. In this instance, seaman Pineda,
who was discharged in Dubai, a foreign land,
could not reasonably be expected to
immediately resort to and avail of psychiatric
examination, assuming that he was still
capable of submitting himself to such
examination at that time, not to mention the
fact that when he disembarked in Dubai, he
was
already
discharged
and
without
[12]

[13]

employment -- his contract having already run

its full term -- and he had already been put on
a plane bound for the Philippines. This explains
the lack or absence of direct evidence showing
his mental state.
The
circumstances
prior
to
and
surrounding his death, however, provide
substantial evidence of the existence of such
mental defect or disorder. Such mental
disorder became evident when he failed to join
his connecting flight to Hongkong, having
during said stopover wandered out of
the Bangkok airports immigration area on his
own. We can perceive no sane and sufficient
reason for a Pinoy overseas contract worker or
seaman to want to while away his time in a
foreign land, when he is presumably unfamiliar
with its native tongue, with nothing to do and
no source of income, and after having been
absent from kith and kin, hearth and home for
almost an entire year. Nor can we find any
plausible reason for him to be wielding a knife
and scaring away passersby, and even taking a
stab at an armed policeman, unless he is no
longer in full possession of his sanity. To our
mind, these circumstances are sufficient in
themselves to produce a firm conviction that
the deceased seaman in this case was no
longer in full control of his senses when he left
his work. To reiterate, in this case, no more
than substantial evidence is required.
Second Issue: Employer Exempted from
Liability?
It is petitioners contention that Pinedas
death caused by his own willful act of attacking
a Thai policeman and getting shot at in selfdefense is not compensable, inasmuch as Par.
6, Section C, Part II of the POEAs Standard
Format Contract of Employment for Seamen
states that:

No compensation shall be payable in respect

of any injury, incapacity, disability
or death resulting from a (deliberate or)
willful act on his own life by the seaman(,)
provided, however, that the employer can
prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or

death is directly attributable to the seaman.

(underscoring supplied).
Moreover, petitioners contend that this Court
already held in the case of Mabuhay Shipping
Services, Inc. vs. NLRC and Cecilia
Sentina that the employer is not liable for the
willful act of an employee on his own
life. Further, Article 172 of the Labor Code
provides for a limitation on the liability of the
State Insurance Fund when the disability or
death was occasioned by the employees
intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill
himself or another, notorious negligence x x x.
[14]

Petitioners are in error. This Court agrees

with the POEA Administrator that seaman
Pineda was no longer acting sanely when he
attacked the Thai policeman. The report of the
Philippine Embassy in Thailand dated October
9, 1990 depicting the deceaseds strange
behavior shortly before he was shot dead, after
having wandered around Bangkok for four
days, clearly shows that the man was not in full
control of his own self:
[15]

(CAD) IN REPLY TO TELEX SENT TO

EMBASSY BY ADM. SARMIENTO/DELA
ROSA OF OWWA/DOLE RE CAUSE OF
DEATH OF DECEASED SEAMAN
JEREMIAS PINEDA, KINDLY ADVISE HIS
OFFICE THAT SUBJECT ARRIVED
BANGKOK 1515H ON BOARD XC903 ON
A STOP OVER FLIGHT FROM DUBAI ON
HIS WAY TO HONGKONG PROCEEDING
TO MANILA. UNFORTUNATELY PINEDA
FAILED TO TAKE THE SAME FLIGHT
OUT AT 1630H, CHECKED OUT OF
IMMIGRATION, WENT OUT OF AIRPORT
AND WANDERED OUT AND FEW DAYS
LATER MET HIS UNTIMELY
DEMISE. PLS. REFER TO OURAD DATED
5 OCT 89 QUOTING FULL TEXT OF
POLICE REPORT ADDRESSED TO THIS
EMBASSY RECOUNTING INCIDENT
LEADING TO FATAL SHOOTING OF
PINEDA. KINDLY FURNISH
OWWA/DOLE FULL TEXT OF SAID
REPORT FOR THEIR INFO.

PER REPORT RECEIVED FROM AIRPORT

PERSONNEL PINEDA WAS ACTING
STRANGELY, REFUSED TO BOARD HIS
SCHEDULED FLIGHT AND
DISAPPEARED FROM AIRPORT. POLICE
REPORT ALSO CONFIRMED HIS
STRANGE BEHAVIOR LEADING TO HIS
ARREST, THEN RUNNING AMOK AND
CAUSING TROUBLE TO PASSERS AND
ATTEMPT TO STAB THE DUTY
POLICEMAN WHO TRIED TO PACIFY
HIM.
PINEDA SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN
SUFFERING FROM SOME MENTAL
DISORDER AS CAN BE GLEANED FROM
HIS PERSONAL LETTERS DISCOVERED
AMONG HIS PERSONAL EFFECTS. HE
COMPLAINED OF SUFFERING FROM
SEVERE HEAD PAINS AND EVEN
REPORTED TO CAPTAIN OF A SHIP
ABOUT THREATS ON HIS LIFE BY
FELLOW SEAMAN WHICH INVARIABLY
LEAD (sic) TO HIS BEING REPATRIATED
HOME WHICH GREATLY AFFECTED HIS
DISPOSITION.
SUGGEST DOLE CONTACT CAPTAIN OF
M/V AMAZSON (sic) AND ASCERTAIN AS
TO WHY PINEDA HAVE (sic) TO
DISEMBARK AND SUBSEQUENTLY
REPATRIATED. IF PINEDA WAS
ALREADY SUFFERING FROM MENTAL
DISORDER AS FEARED, HE SHOULD
HAVE NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO TRAVEL
HOME ALONE AND SHOULD HAVE
BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A
PHYSICIAN. (underscoring supplied)
The POEA Administrator ruled, and this
Court agrees, that since Pineda attacked the
Thai policeman when he was no longer in
complete control of his mental faculties, the
aforequoted provision of the Standard Format
Contract of Employment exempting the
employer from liability should not apply in the
instant case. Firstly, the fact that the deceased

suffered from mental disorder at the time of his

repatriation means that he must have been
deprived of the full use of his reason, and that
thereby, his will must have been impaired, at
the very least. Thus, his attack on the
policeman can in no wise characterized as a
deliberate, willful or voluntary act on his
part. Secondly, and apart from that, we also
agree that in light of the deceaseds mental
condition, petitioners should have observed
some precautionary measures and should not
have allowed said seaman to travel home
alone, and their failure to do so rendered
them liable for the death of Pineda. Indeed, the
obligations and liabilities of the (herein
petitioners) do not end upon the expiration of
the contracted period as (petitioners are) duty
bound to repatriate the seaman to the point of
hire to effectively terminate the contract of
employment.
[16]

[17]

The instant case should be distinguished

from the case of Mabuhay, where the
deceased, Romulo Sentina, had been in a
state of intoxication, then ran amuck and
inflicted injury upon another person, so that the
latter in his own defense fought back and in the
process killed Sentina. Previous to said
incident, there was no proof of mental disorder
on the part of Sentina. The cause of Sentinas
death is categorized as a deliberate and willful
act on his own life directly attributable to
him. But seaman Pineda was not similarly
situated.
Incidentally, petitioners conjecture that the
deceased could have been on drugs when he
assaulted the policeman. If this had been the
case, the Thai police and the Philippine
Embassy in Bangkok would most certainly
have made mention thereof in their respective
reports.But they did not do so.
Third Issue: Was Death Work-Related?
Petitioners further argue that the cause of
Pinedas death is not one of the occupational
diseases listed by law, and that in the case
ofDe Jesus vs. Employees Compensation
Commission, this Court held that x x x for the
sickness and the resulting disability or death to
[18]

be compensable, the sickness must be the

result of an occupational disease listed under
Annex A of the Rules (the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation) with the conditions
set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease
is increased by the working conditions.
[19]

Petitioners
reliance
on De
Jesus is
misplaced, as the death and burial benefits
being claimed in this case are not payable by
the Employees Compensation Commission
and chargeable against the State Insurance
Fund. These
claims
arose
from
the
responsibility of the foreign employer together
with the local agency for the safety of the
employee during his repatriation and until his
arrival in this country, i.e., the point of
hire. Though
the
termination
of
the
employment contract was duly effected in
Dubai, still, the responsibility of the foreign
employer to see to it that Pineda was duly
repatriated to the point of hiring subsisted.
Section 4, Rule VIII of the Rules and
Regulations Governing Overseas Employment
clearly provides for the duration of the
mandatory personal accident and life insurance
covering accidental death, dismemberment
and disability of overseas workers:

least. Such attitude harks back to another time

when the landed gentry practically owned the
serfs, and disposed of them when the latter
had grown old, sick or otherwise lost their
usefulness.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition
is
hereby DISMISSED and
the
Decision
assailed
in
this
petition
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr.,
Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

[1]

Rollo, pp. 2-17.

[2]

In NLRC NCR CA No. 004354-93; rollo, pp. 19-26.

Second Division, composed of Pres. Comm. Edna

Bonto-Perez, ponente, Comm. Domingo H. Zapanta,
concurring, and Comm. Rogelio I. Rayala, dissenting.
[3]

In POEA Case No. (M) 90-07-840 entitled "Constancia

Pineda vs. Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc., Fircroft
Shipping Corp., and Times Surety & Ins. Co., Inc.";rollo,
pp. 30-35.
[4]

[5]

Rollo, p. 35.

[6]

Rollo, pp. 30-32.

Restituto C. Palomado vs. National Labor Relations

Commission, G.R. No. 96520, June 28, 1996, at p. 8,
citing Sec. 9, Rule X, New Rules of the National Labor
Relations Commission.

Section 4. Duration of Insurance Coverage. -The minimum coverage shall take effect upon
payment of the premium and shall be
extended worldwide, on and off the job, for
the duration of the workers contract plus sixty
(60) calendar days after termination of the
contract of employment; provided that in no
case shall the duration of the insurance
coverage be less than one year. (underscoring
supplied)

[7]

The foreign employer may not have been

obligated by its contract to provide a
companion for a returning employee, but it
cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its
agreement to assure the safe return of said
worker. The uncaring attitude displayed by
petitioners who, knowing fully well that its
employee had been suffering from some
mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him
to travel home alone, is appalling to say the

[10]

Pure Foods Corporation vs. NLRC, 171 SCRA 415,

425, March 21, 1989. See also Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC) vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 245 SCRA 668, 674-675, July 7,
1995, citing Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Ed. [1988], 459-460,
in turn citing Villa-Rey Transit vs. Bello, L-18957, 23 April
1963.
[8]

[9]

Palomado vs. NLRC, supra.

Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Gallo, 229 SCRA 654,

659-660, February 4, 1994, cited in Palomado vs.
NLRC, supra.
St. Mary's College (Tagum, Davao) vs. NLRC, 181
SCRA 62, 66, January 12, 1990; Tropical Hut
Employees' Union-CGW vs. Tropical Hut Food Market,
Inc., 181 SCRA 173, 187, January 20, 1990; Loadstar
Shipping Co., Inc., vs. Gallo, supra; Inter-Orient Maritime
Enterprises, Inc. vs. NLRC, 125 SCRA 268, 277, August
11, 1994; Five J Taxi vs. NLRC, 235 SCRA 556, 560,
August 22, 1994.
[11]

Cuadra vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 207

SCRA 279, 282, March 17, 1992.
[12]

Rase vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 237

SCRA 523, October 7, 1994, citing Atlas Consolidated
Mining and Development Corp. vs. Factoran, 154 SCRA
49, 54, September 15, 1987. See also Ang Tibay vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642; Police
Commission vs. Lood, 127 SCRA 762, February 24,
1984 and Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. vs. Palmos,
232 SCRA 448, May 20, 1994.
[13]

[14]

193 SCRA 141, January 21, 1991.

[15]

Rollo, pp. 105-106.

[16]

Rollo, p. 34.

[17]

Decision of the POEA Administrator, p. 4; rollo, p. 33.

[18]

142 SCRA 92, 96, May 27, 1986.

[19]

Rollo, p. 15.