Riff-Raff - Richard Gunn - Marxism, Metatheory and Critique

13/7/2016
riffraffRichardGunn:Marxism,MetatheoryandCritique
Marxism,MetatheoryandCritique
RichardGunn
PostFordismandSocialForm:AMarxistDebateonthePostFordistStateMacmillan,London
1991,pp.193209
Quite often, major political differences can turn on apparently technical and esoteric conceptual
points. Inasmuch as there is no such thing as brute or sheerly immediate politics any more than
there is a brute fact, this should be unsurprising: how we see the world is bound up intrinsically
with what we do. Nonetheless Marxists eager to address firstorder social and political questions
have been perhaps too ready to consign questions of conceptformation to a hinterland of
methodology,whoseproblemsarealwaysontheagendafortomorrowbutwhichisneverdiscussed
today.Ofcourseitwasnotalwaysso:fromLukcss1923declarationthatMarxistorthodoxyrefers
exclusivelytomethodadeclarationwhichLukcssubsequentdiscussionproceededtoundermine1
there developed a Marxist tradition according to which methodological concerns were prioritised
overdebatesofafirstorderorempiricalkind.AsplitarosebetweenwhatIsaacDeutschertermed
political and philosophical Marxism (Deutscher 1972). An exciting feature of debates in the
1960s and 1970s was that there emerged a promise that this split could be healed. But in the
pragmatic Thatcherite 1980s Marxist theorising has too often taken a sheerly empiricist turn.
Understandable political urgency has tended to marginalise conceptual questions, despite the
circumstancethatthesequestionsareaspoliticalasmaybe.ThusitismorethanwelcomethatBob
Jessopcontendsthatonlybyreexaminingmethodologicalassumptions(Jessop1988,p.8)can
adiscussionofstatetheoryproceed.
The methodological assumptions upon which Jessop claims to rely are those of the Critical
Realism advertised by Roy Bhaskar in, most recently, two flagshipstyle articles summarising
presentationstotheUKSocialistConferenceandpublishedinthejournalInterlink(Bhaskaret al.
1988, 1989 see Jessop 1988, pp. 814 and footnotes 1518). Bhaskar offers a realism which is
criticalinasmuchasitchallengesthefetishisedclaimsofsocialappearances,andacriticismwhichis
realistinasmuchasitturnsuponidentifyingenduringstructuresandgenerativemechanismwhich
underlie and produce observable phenomena and events (Bhaskar et al. 1988 the opening
paragrapshofthe1989versionreproducethesameviews).ThemorecomplexstatementofCritical
RealismwhichJessopinvokesturnsonadistinctionbetweenrealmechanisms,actualresultsand
empirical indicators (Jessop 1988, p. 9). For the purposes of the present discussion I set these
complexities aside. Instead my topic will be the conceptual status of Critical Realism per se, this
being a topic which raises quite directly the question of Marxist conceptformation and which
thereforeextendswellbeyondadiscussionofCriticalRealismsspecificclaims.
Bhaskaropenshis1988articlebystatingthattheleftneedstotakephilosophyseriously,whichis
certainly and uncontroversially the case. Throughout its twothousandyears history philosophy,
arrogatingtoitselftheprogrammeofauniquelustafterwisdom,hasreservedquestionsofconcept
formation and conceptvalidation to its own discourse. The more modern the philosophy, the more
https://www.riffraff.se/en/furtherreading/gunn_metatheory.php
1/12
13/7/2016
hubristic has this arrogation become. From Descartes and Kant onwards, philosophy has devoted
itself to evaluating the categories the terms or truthcriteria in and through which firstorder
discourse proceeds. Its quite reasonable entitlement for doing so is that vicious circularity is the
outcomewheneverfirstorderdiscourse,onitsownbehalf,laysclaimtothisrole3:andsoasecond
orderdiscourse(viz.philosophy)iswantedtocarrytheepistemologicalcan.Thisgivesrisetoboth
anarrowingofphilosophicalconcerns3andaproblem.Theproblemisthatthetermsofasecond
orderdiscourserequire,accordingtothesameprogramme,tobevalidatedbyathirdorderdiscourse
andsoon,withouthopeofhalt.Inplaceofviciouscircularity,infiniteregressiscalledintodo
the job. The twentiethcentury philosopher who sees this consequence most clearly, and who most
naivelyandengaginglyacceptsit,isBertrandRussel(inhisIntroductiontoWittgensteinsTractatus
andinhistheoryoflogicaltypes).Butnaiveacknowledgementsbynomeansamountstoresolution.
And so the left needs to take philosophy seriously, brute facts and romanticist politicsof
immediacy being a nonsense. But given the problems of infinite regress it can only take
philosophyseriouslyintheformofcritique.Ithastoreappropriatephilosophicalquestions(thoseof
categoryformation and categoryvalidation) and avoiding the Scylla and Charybdis of vicious
circularityandinfiniteregress,ithastodosobyreopeningthequestionoftherelationbetweenfirst
order theorising and theorising of a higherorder (or metatheoretical) sort. The difficulty with
Bhaskars 1988 pronouncement is that he appears to construe the lefts need to take philosophy
seriouslytomeanthattheleftneedsaphilosophy,namely,hisown.TherootsofCriticalRealismlie
inpreciselythephilosophyofsciencethephilosophywhichclaimstobeabletodemarcatenatural
scientific truthclaims from others which Russels Theory of Types inaugurated. In the old days,
Critical Realism used to be termed transcendental realism (Bhaskar 1975), thereby more directly
indicatingitsKantiansource(whichRusselandphilosophyofscienceshare).Quiteapartfromthe
question of the internal complexity of Critical Realisms statement, there is a question about the
conceptualandpoliticalstatusofCriticalRealismitself.
Ifindeedtheleftneedsaphilosophy(whetherCriticalRealistorotherwise)inordertoaddressthe
issue of its conceptformation then, substituting infinite regress for vicious circularity, it professes
itselfwillingtoascendaladderofmetatheorieswhosetoprungrestsnowherebutuponclouds.Itis
inthelightofproblemsregardingthiskindofidealismthat,Isuggest,Marxscritiqueofphilosophy
in the 1840s advises us simply to leave philosophy aside (Marx 1975, 5, p. xxx) and devote
ourselves to the study of the empirical world. But such passages veering back into vicious
circularityfrominfiniteregressareatypical.ThestrengthofMarxscritiqueofphilosophyisthatit
advertisesamodeoftheorisingwhich,becauseitisatthesametimebothfirstorderandhigherorder
(boththeoreticalandmetatheoretical),escapesthedilemmaofviciouscircularityversusinfinite
regress.
In order to see how Marx achieves this, we have to turn to the thesis of the unity of theory and
practicewhichhistextsofthe1840sannounce.Marxpositsaninternalrelationasbetweentheory
andpractice,andaccepts(orratherstresses)thatjustsucharelatednessobtainsinthecaseofhisown
thought. In other words Marxist theorising is not just reflexive but practically reflexive (Gunn
1987a).Twodefinitionshelptoclearmyargumentsway.
Theorising is reflexive when, and insofar as, it asks after validity of its own categories, concepts,
truthcriteriaand/orterms.Theorisingispracticallyreflexivewhenitdoesthisinthecourseofasking
2/12
13/7/2016
after its practical its social or historical situatedness. The phrase in the course of reports the
internalrelatednessoftheorytopracticeforwhichMarxcontends.Weretheorymerelytoaskafter
its conceptual validity and, separately, to reflect upon its social preconditions (as in bourgeois
sociologyofknowledge)thenasreportedintheconjunctionanditwouldregardtheoryand
practice as linked merely in an external way. Practically reflexive theorising unites not just theory
withpracticebutfirstordertheorywithmetatheorybecause(a)inreflectinguponsociety(itsfirst
orderobject)itreflectsuponitself,andbecause(b)inreflectinguponitself(uponitsowncategorial
validity)itreflectsuponthesocialpracticewhichitchallengesandwithinwhichitinheres.Itsfirst
orderobjectincludesitselfasasecondorderobject,andcomprehensionofitsrelatednesstosocial
practiceasawhole(seeLukcs1971firstessayHorkheimer1972,p.229).Anotherwayofstating
thispointistosaythatpracticalsituatednessimpingesontheorisingnotjustinathirdpersonasin
sociologyofknowledgebutinafirstpersonway.Yetanotherwayofregisteringtheargumentis
tosaythatpracticalreflexivityisbynomeansamethodologydiscussionwhichmightbeconfined
totheintroductionofatextwhichisinformedbyitrather,itisthemodeofpracticeofapractically
reflexivetextitself.
InsumMarxism,quapracticallyreflexive,isneitherfirstordernorsheerlyhigherorderbecauseitis
both together and in the same breath. The same body of theory (or movement of theorising) plays
nowatheoretical,andnowametatheoretical,role.Eventhewordnowintheprecedingsentenceis
problematic, because the role played by any particular conceptual shift is a function only of the
questions which, in relation to it, are posed. In other words instead of a dualism (theory
contraposed to metatheory) we have a totalisation. Marxs 1840s critique of philosophy is not a
matterofturningawayfromthequestionsphilosophyhasreservedtoitselftowardsempiricism,but
ofenunciatingamodeofdiscoursewhichretainspurchaseonphilosophicalissues(suchasthoseof
categoryvalidation) while hurling the philosophical carapace of these same questions aside. It has
goodreasontodososince,asdiscussedabove,nothingbutstonesandwhirlpoolsinfiniteascent
andcircularregressionawaitthetheoreticaltravellerwhoconfrontseithermetatheoryorfirstorder
empiricismontheirown,reciprocallydistinguished,setofterms.
Theargumentjustpresentedcanbetakenastagerfurtheror,rather,itcanbesetintoreversegear.
Sheer metatheory (philosophies and methodologies of science, for example) and sheer empiricism
(positivism, sociology) are discourses which take in one anothers washing. Each relies upon the
othertosubstantiateit:empiricismcallsforthemetatheoreticallyprescribeddemarcationcriteria(for
example, Popper 1972, p. 249) which might prise it away from mysticism, while philosophy of
scienceisforcedtohumbleitselfbyundertakinganunderlabourerroleinrelationtothetheorising
itclaimstolegislateforinorderthatithavesomethingsubstantivetodiscuss.Russell,aphilosopher
bynomeansfamousforhisselfeffacement,concededthislatterpointwhenheremarkedthatany
metatheorywhoseimplicationsclashedwiththeresultsofphysicscouldonlybefalse.
All this said, two crucial theses are in order: (a) whenever theory and metatheory are prised apart
then only on the one side positivism and, on the other, infinite ascent through metatheories
(idealisminonsenseoftheterm)canobtain.And(b)unlesspracticalreflexivityistheconditionof
theorising the course of thought reported in my first thesis is inescapable. To be sure this unless
awaits rigorous proof. But notice its conditions: to avoid it we have to be able to unite first and
thirdpersondiscourseandtheoreticalandmetatheoreticaldiscourseminuspracticereflexivity.Nota
3/12
13/7/2016
singleutteranceinthetwothousandyearsoldtraditionofWesternphilosophysuggeststhatthiscan
be done. Practical reflexivity therefore appears as the catharsis of theoretical truth and of practical
emancipation(involvingdemystification)alike.
PerhapsmyargumentmaystrikeareaderasatopheavycondemnationofwhatBhaskarandJessop
havetosay.Perhapseitherofthemdistinguishestheoryfrommetatheoryinsorigorousafashionas
to qualify as a philosopher in my abovecriticised sense. Possibly practical reflexivity lurks
somewhere within their works. In fact the opposite is the case in demonstration of which I shall
discussapassagefromeachinturn.
Firstly,Bhaskaretal.(1988)reportsthatsocialtheoryandsocialrealityarecausallyinterdependent
in the sense that social theory is practically conditioned by, and potentially has consequences in,
society.Thissoundslikepracticalreflexivityuntilwenoticethecausalismbymeansofwhicheach
ofthesetwocitationsestablishestheconnectionsuponwhichtheyrely.Whatismissingistheinthe
courseof condition which, in my definition, allowed the thesis of an internal relation as between
theoryandpracticetostand.Anditwasthroughthisinternalrelatednessthatfirstordertheoryand
metatheorywereenabledtoformaunity.Causalrelationscanonlybeexternalrelations.Bhaskars
hostagetocausalistfortuneseversfirstpersonfromthirdpersonreflexivityandsuppliesexactlythe
conceptualgapwithinwhichsociologiesofknowledgethrive.Inotherwordsaunityoftheoryand
metatheory is far from being Bhaskars profferment. What obtains even in such encouraging
formulations as the one just quoted is faithfulness to his philosophyofscience (his Russellian and
ultimatelyKantian)roots.
Secondly, Jessop (1988, footnote 18) turns instead to the notion of a double hermeneutic as
developed in Anthony Giddens work. A hermeneutic framework about a reality, says Jessop, is
already preinterpreted by its participants (loc. cit.). Here too something like practical reflexivity
appearstobesignalled:interpretationsarisefromrealityandinformreality(orpractice)intheirturn.
However,ifcausalismunderminespracticalreflexivitysotoofromasitweretheoppositedirection
doesasheerlyhermeneuticalapproach.Fromathirdpersonstandpoint(thatofcausalism)weare
translated over into a firstperson standpoint (that of meaning). Practical reflexivity for its part
requiresatotalisationofthesestandpointsinsuchawaythat,reflectingonthepresenceofourtheory
inourpracticeandofourselvesassubjectsinsociety(ourobject),wecanseeourselvesassocially
conditioned (causalism) and as socially conditioning (hermeneutics) in, once again, the same
breath. To draw two breaths here instead of one is to sever sociological from categorical self
reflection thereby, it is to sever firstorder from higherorder theorising and theory from practice
itself.4 The dialectic between structure and strategy announced by Jessop (1988a) signifies his
endorsement of just such a dualistic approach. Jessop, like Bhaskar, writes and where practically
reflexivity writes inthecourseof. External relations supplant internal relations, as is usual when
sociology (or indeed any other firstorder discourse) calls for metatheoretical methodological or
philosophicalsupport.
ThusIconcludethatitisfairtotaxBhaskarandJessopwithmissingthepointofpracticalreflexivity
and so reproducing, in different fashions, a theory/metatheory split. And a further point in this
connectionistobenoted:suchasplithasconsequencesnotmerelyfortheconceptualstatusof,but
within,thefirstorderdimensionoftheorisingitself.
4/12
13/7/2016
In regard to Jessop something of this has already been indicated: hermeneutics distinguishes itself
fromcausalism,andmethodologyfromsociology,inthesamemovementasstructureand strategy
become firstorder truthclaims controlling terms. In Bhaskars work it appears that the
theory/metatheoryseveranceissoseverethatthereisnorelationatallbetweenCriticalRealismasa
metatheoryandthefirstorderpoliticalprescriptionsCriticalTheoristswishtoraise.Bhaskaret al.
(1989)openswithasummaryofthephilosophicalclaimssetforthinBhaskaretal.(1988)andthen
offersalistofpoliticaldesideratawhichheandhisassociateswouldliketoseetheleftendorse:the
connection between the first and the more lengthy second part of this article remains thoroughly
unclear. Arbitrariness within firstorder theory seems to be the primary consequence of Critical
Realismstheory/metatheorysplit.Oncloserinspection,however,aninterrelationbetweenthelevels
of Bhaskars discussion can be discerned at least in regard to the form of the firstorder political
theory his 1989 article presents. What this firstorder theory amounts to is a defence of certain
models of democratic socialism held to be praiseworthy. Modelbuilding is of course a central
activity of social theory, from neoclassical economics through Weberian sociology, which
understandsitselfasindependentofphilosophicaldictatsfromabove.Models,unlikephilosophies,
canbebuiltandtorndowninandthroughfirstordertheorisingitselfthey(orsomethinglikethem)
becomeneedfulunderthesignofatheory/metatheoryseveranceinasmuchasguidancehastocome
fromsomewhereinthematterofwhichcategoriesfistordertheoryistoemploy.Inotherwords,a
totalisation as between theory and metatheory does obtain in Bhaskar but it is totalisation which
obtainsonlyinthemodeofbeingdenied.Itisatotalisationwhichgoesforwardbehindthebacksof
the Critical Realists who are unconsciously its bearers. The theory/metatheory separation has
consequencesfor,andwithin,bothmetatheoryandtheory:itconstitutestheformerasphilosophy
ormethodologyandthelatterasapositivismwhichuncriticallyderivesthemodelswhichguideit
from the way of the existing social world.The model which it makesmostsense to employ is the
modelinclosesconformitytothisworldsways.
Thismayseemanunfairchargesince,afterall,aremodelling of existing society might amount to
confrontingsocietywithitsfailuretoliveuptotherationalewhichanimatesit:itmightamountto
immanentcritique.TosuchanobjectionIhavetworeplies.Thefirstisthatimmanentcritiquehasto
challengenotjustthecontentofsocialrelationsbuttheirform,and,theorybeingseenasamoment
withinsocialpractice,notjustthecontentoffirstordertruthclaimsbuttheirformaswell.Thatisto
say,itcannotmerelybeamatteroftheempiricalorethicalaccuracyofmodels:andintheenditis
onlysomesuchnotionofaccuracyuponwhichmodelbuildingrelies.TobesureWebersaysthathis
models (or idealtypes) are not to be understood normatively and to be sure Kant says that the
regulative ideas (in effect the buildingblocks of models) which control his ethics are not to be
construed in an empirical way. In each of these cases, the qualifying clause is intrinsic to the
coherenceofthemodelbuildingprogramme.Butinthecaseofimmanentcritiqueitwouldhaveto
beanethicalempiricalunitywhichenabledittogoforward.Inotherwordsthemodelssupporting
an immanent critique would have to be inaccurate, empirical accuracy being infected with ethical
desiderata and ethical accuracy being infected with empirical concerns. Precisely the is/ought
distinction respected by Weber and Kant alike would have to be overcome. I suggest that the best
waytoresolvetheseconundrumsistosaythatimmanentcritiquehasnothingatalltodowithmodel
building.And,onthebasisofthissuggestion,mychargeofpositivismagainstBhaskarstands.
The second of my replies is ad hominem, but to the same effect. In fact Bhaskar understands the
5/12
13/7/2016
relationofmetatheory(CriticalRealism)tofirstordertheoryinawaywhichprecludesthenotionof
immanentcritique.Bhaskaretal.(1989)announceadistinctionbetween(a)emancipatoryactionor
practice and (b) emancipated action or practice, which are often unwittingly confused [This
distinction]isthedistinctionbetweensocialismasamovement(orprogramme)andsocialismasa
society(orwayoflife).
Ileaveaside,here,thequestionoftheegregiousandultimatelybureaucraticelisionofprogramme
withmovement.InsteadIshouldliketofocusonthedistinctionbetweenemancipatoryactionand
itsgoal.AndonthisscoreIshouldliketoconfessmyselfasonewhoisconfused,unwittinglyornot,
bythecircumstancethatMarxreportedcommunismnottobeafutureidealbutastherealoractual
movementoftheworkingclass.Communismisneithertheteleologyofthecapitalistsystemnorits
catastrophe.Itisaconceptthatwecanonlyformulatewithintheformoftransition(Negri1984,
p.165).Onceemancipatoryactionisseparatedfromitsgoal,thenotionofselfemancipationwhich
Marx celebrated throughout his lifes work is undermined. The matter is all the more strange
inasmuchasHilaryWainwright,oneofthesignatoriestoBhaskaretal.(1989),wasacoauthorofa
workentitledBeyondtheFragmentsinwhichthenotionofprefigurativepoliticalorganisationor
inotherwordspoliticalorganisationwhichquitepreciselyrefusedtoseparatethegoalofactionfrom
action itself was deployed against Leninist vanguardists, male intellectuals and other rightlyor
wronglyidentifiedriffraff.Prefiguration(boththeoreticalandpractical)isintheeventnecessaryto
critique if critique is to be immanent, inasmuch as such critique has to be able to discover a basis
within the present on which an emancipatory future might be built. Bhaskars (a)and(b)
distinctionseversactionfromthefuturetowardwhichitaimsandwhich(seewritersasdifferentas
Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Kojave, Bloch and Sartre) selfdetermines and selfdefines it. His
distinctionalienatesactionfromitselfandplacesthequestionoftherightnessorwrongnessofsuch
action (I understand these terms both epistemologically and normatively, and in the face of
positivismsis/oughtdistinctionIwouldstresstheselatterformsunity)inthehandsofmetatheorists
who, qua metatheorists, perforce construe philosophy and methodology as a practiceindependent
realmoftheirown(Marx1975,5,p.447).Statedtheotherwayround:thealienationofactionthe
severance of itself from its goal, and the undermining of its selfdetermination is a firstorder
consequence of the theory/metatheory split, whose roots lie in the theory/practice split (the
subversion of practical reflexivity) itself. Marx reports the same thing when, in the terminological
formulae of The German Ideology, he traces the alienation of theory from practice and the
consequentconstitutionsofphilosophyontheonehandandpositivismontheothertothedivision
between mental and manual labour. For Marx immanent critique turns upon practical reflexivity,
since otherwise neither the rootedness of present theory in past practice nor the internal
(prefigurative)relationbetweenpresentpracticeandatheoryofthefuturethisneithernor
comprisingonceagainasingletotalisationcanbeunderstood.Thus,onceagain,Iconcludethatmy
chargesagainstBhaskaretal.(inthiscasetotheeffectthatmodelbuildingandimmanentcritique
countasentirelydifferentconceptualprocedures)areindeedfair.
IntheprecedingparagraphsIhaveofferedadiscussionoftheconsequencesofthetheory/metatheory
separation (stemming from a theory/practice separation) within firstorder theorising in a moreor
lessunsystematicway.However,itiseasyenoughtodrawthethreadstogetherandtoshowthatone
centraldifficultyunderliesallthathasbeensaid.Oncetheoryisseparatedfrommetatheory,insucha
wayastopermitthelattertodictatetermstotheformerdespiteallthemodestyofphilosophical
6/12
13/7/2016
and methodological underlabouring, and despite firstorder theorys attempt to claw concept
formation back into its own domain through the idea of models universals are privileged over
particularsintheconstitutionoffirstorderthought.Categoriesandtermsarenecessarilyuniversals,
in the sense that they amount to lenses through which a whole series of reciprocally distinct
particularobjectsaretobeseen.Allthoughtproceedsintermsofuniversalssothatathoughtwishing
tofocusonparticularshastobeathoughtwillingtoencompassparadox,and(seeAdorno1973)to
thinkagainstitself.Onthisscorethebasisforcomplaintagainstmetatheoryasadiscretedisciplineis
not that it insists on the cognitive and normativepolitical role of universals it could not do
otherwisewithoutsuccumbingtobrutefacticityandromanticismbutthatitprioritisesuniversals
above particulars in such a way as to deny the latter a cetegorial and political voice. All that
metatheory can prescribe to firstorder theory is the set of spectacles (the universals or categories)
whichsuchatheorisationshouldwear,ititstruthcriteriaaretobedefensible.Metatheoryasseparate
fromfirstordertheoryconstitutesthelatterasadomaininwhichparticularityhasnorights.Andyet
itisparticularswhichfirstordertheoryexperientiallyencounters.Icanstumbleoveranobjectinthe
dark, without my spectacles and halfasleep and before I can find the lightswitch: that is, I can
encounteritasaparticularbefore(intermsofuniversalcategories)Iknowwhatitis.Unsurprisingly,
the history of philosophy records a debate between the cognitive roles of particularity and
universality respectively. The universalism of Platos Theory of Forms declares against the
particularismoftheSophistsintheancientworld,Plato(inhisParmenides)averringforreasonsbest
knowntohimselfthattherearenouniversalFormsofsuchundignifiedmaterialsashairanddirt.5
Intheearlymodernperiod,thesamebattlewasrenewedintheformofastrugglebetweendeduction
(starting from universals: Descartes) and induction (starting from particulars: Bacon), deduction
winning as is consistent with the theory/metatheory severance upon which modern philosophy
turnsthetheoreticalday.(JustthisvictoryiscelebratedinKarlPoppersnotionofrefutability.)In
ourowntimes,philosophicallymarginalisedfigureslikeNietzsche,BatailleandindeedAdornoline
up on the side of particularity as a referencepoint against philosophers of science, from Russell
onwards,comfortableintheirpurelymetatheoreticalrole.
Onepointtonotehereisthatametatheoryprescribingtermstofirstordertheoryseparatesuniversals
(whichhavepriority)fromparticulars(whichcountassecondary)withinfirstordertheoryitself.The
lensanditsobject,nottomentiontheopticianandhis/herclient,areafteralltwodifferentthings.
HencetheneedformodelsoridealtypesorregulativeideasKantinhisCritiqueofJudgement
wasoneofthefirsttoseethedifficultyclearlytomediatebetweencategoriesandtheobjectswhich
categories claim to know. Returning closer to home, the invocation of intermediate categories in
Jessop (see ch. 4) belongs within the same problematic. The programme of mediating between
universalcategories(forexample,capitalism)andmoreparticularcategories(forexample,modes
of regulation, Fordism and postFordism and so on) emerges in the light of the argument just
presentedasafunctionoftheorysdissociationfrompracticebywayothetheory/metatheorysplit.
PerhapsJessopmightreplytothisthattheproblemofintegratinggeneralpointswithmorespecific
onesinheresintheactivityoftheorisingitself.Discussionofcapitalingeneralisanecessaryrather
than a sufficient condition for understanding the quite particular conditions of our 1980s capitalist
world.Werehetosaythishispointaboutspecificityshouldbewelltaken,butthetermsinwhichhis
pointisstatedagenus/speciesdistinctionasbetweencapitalingeneralandthemodesinwhichitis
articulatedwouldremainopentochallengeinMarxistterms.
7/12
13/7/2016
For it is not just a matter of universals tending to overshoot particulars, in the sense of different
flowersbeingabletogrowinanyfielduniversalcategoriesmightcircumscribe.Nor(paceAdorno)
isitjustamatteroftheuprootingofhedgerowsunderminingthesurvivalbasisoffloraandfauna
although, to be sure (Adorno 1973, p. 362), the philosopheme of pure identity connotes death.
Ratherthequestionturnsonthecircumstancethatuniversalscanbeparticularsintheirturn.More
strongly stated: in social life, all universals are particulars (or potentially so). In the self
understanding of social life, therefore, a genus/species distinction can have no place. Nor can a
theory/metatheory distinction, since if universals are particulars then there can be no question of
prescribingtosocialtheorytheuniversalcategoriesintermsofwhichparticularsaretobeseen.Nor,
finally,cantherebeatheory/practicedistinctioninthesenseofanexternalseparationbetweenthe
twosincetheveryabstractionsandgeneralitiesanduniversalsinwhichtheorisinggoesforwardare
oneswhichhaveavividsocial(apractical)modeoflife.
It remains to clarity the claims which my preceding paragraph has raised. Jessop styles his
conception of an interaction between structure and strategy dialectical, but an entirely different
conceptionofdialecticswillbepresentedbelow.PaceJessop,itwillturnnotjustonthenotionof
aninterrelation(intheendacausalistone?)butofmediation,understandingthislatterterminthe
senseofmodeofexistence:twotermsreciprocallymediateoneanotherwheneachisthemode(or
form)inwhichtheothersubsists.Onceagaininternalratherthanexternalrelatedness:universality
andparticularitysubsistinandthroughoneanotherinthedialecticofsociallife.Tobesuretheycan
subsistthroughoneanothercontradictorily,thatis,inthemodeofbeing(eachofthem)denied,and
thisiswhatAdornosepigramconcerningthephilosophemeofpureidentityreports.Universality
existing as particularity can countermand itself, and vice versa. For the present we can set these
complexitiesaside,however,andconfineourselvestoenunciatingtwotheses:(a)anunderstanding
of theory and metatheory as forming two discrete realms of conceptualisation for example,
philosophyandsociologycutsthegroundfromundertheideaofuniversalsexistinginandthrough
practicewhileconversely(b)onlypracticalreflexivetheorycanadmitthepossibilityofuniversals
existinginthisway.
Practicalreflexivitycanadmitthispossibilityinasmuchasitsunderstandingofitsowncategoriesin
the course of reflecting on its practical situatedness implies a similar understanding (an
understandinginwhatIhavecalledthefirstperson)oftheobject,thatis,society,uponwhichit
reflects. In the course of theorising theories, or ideologies, it theorises practice as well. In other
words it problematises not just theory and practice but the relation in which theory and practice
stand. It unites its own subjectivity with social objectivity in the same movement as it construes
ideology as a material existence while equally construing practice as shot through with potentially
mystificatory ideas. Conversely, a sufficient condition of blinding oneself to the possibility of
universalsexistinginandthroughpractice(howevercontradictorily)istoremovemetatheoryfrom
theory:oncethisiseffecteduniversalscanonlybeprescribedtotheunderstandingofparticularsor,
tostatethesamepointtheotherwayround,theycanonlybeunderstoodasabstractedfrom rather
than as inhering in the particulars whose significance they claim to report. A comprehension of
universals as particulars is precluded. Furthermore, if indeed as contended earlier a separation of
theoryfrommetatheoryandpracticalreflexivityaremutuallyexclusive,itfollowsthatmytheses(a)
and(b)reportfromtwodifferentviewpointsthoseoftheoryandpracticeoneandthesamething.
8/12
13/7/2016
Allthis,itseemstome,wassharplyperceivedandregisteredbyMarx.His1857Introductiontothe
Grundrisse,distinguishingasitdoesbetweenlabourasproductioningeneral,thatis,asanactivity
uponwhichallsocialformationsdepend,andlabourasanabstractionwhichquaabstractionobtains
only in a society of generalized commodityproduction (Marx 1973, Introduction Gunn 1989, pp.
105108) announces nothing else. Abstract labour (a universal) is practically real, and indeed
murderous,asanyonewhoselifedependsonthesaleoftheirlabourpowerquitedirectlyknows.But
itispracticallyrealonlywithinaparticularsocialformation(acapitalistone)andonlyasaparticular
conditionofsuchasocialformation(inasmuchasforexampleunsoldandunpaiddomesticlabouris
nolessaconditionofthereproductionofcapitalistrelationsofproductionfromdaytoday).Marxs
critique of political economy turns on the refusal to elide abstract labour as productioningeneral
with abstract labour which, as a socially and practically existing category, appears in and through
generalisedcommodityproductionalone.Toconstruelabourasagenerallyapplicablecategoryfor
all societies is to abstract from particular social conditions to construe labour as a peculiarly
capitalistabstraction,bothintheoryandinpractice,istoapproachitasanabstractioninandofthe
specificsocialworldofthedoublyfreelabourwhosehistoricalpreconditionsthefinalsectionof
Capital Volume I reports. To confuse these two senses of the category labour, and these two
meaningsofabstraction,istorenderoneselfcomplicitintheeternalisationofcommodityproduction
againstwhichMarx,fromthebeginningtotheendofhislifeswork,sotirelesslydeclares.
Abstraction from is compatible with all manner of genus/species, universal/particular,
metatheory/theoryandpractice/theorydistinctionsanddislocationsitentitlesallmannerofmodels
andintermediatecategories,andinfactrequiresthemsoastopreventtheuniversalityoftheorising
and the particularity of theorisations object from floating reciprocally free. Abstractions in and of
(otherwiseknownasdeterminateorsubstantiveabstraction:seeGunn1987bandBonefeld1987)
isthepreserveofpracticallyreflexivetheorisingalone.Indeedpracticallyreflexivetheorisinghasto
be able to construe its abstractions as determinate ones since, otherwise, it would require a
metatheorystandingoutwithfirstordertheoryasthecourtofappealbeforewhichitsabstractions
from were supposed to receive justification and make sense. Abstractionfrom amounts to an
inductionwhichallphilosophersofsciencefromPlato(Donttellmewhichactionsarevirtuoustell
mewhatvirtueis)toPopper(Dontannouncetomealogicofscientificdiscovery,butdescribeto
me the methodology in terms of which one is able to refute a point) have agreed requires
philosophicalormethodologicalbackupofsomesort.Abstractioninandofconfounds,nolessthan
does Marxs refusal to separate emancipatory and emancipated action, the theory/metatheory
distinction upon which such a backup turns. And in fact it is the category oof action, or practice,
whichisallimportant.Onceitsmoments,forexampleitsprojectanditsgoal,areheldapartfrom
one another practical reflexivitys totalisation implodes. Categorial appeal to an alienated practice
reproduces the alienation of practice rather than the (possible) practice which, to use an ancient
Marxistexpression,mightstandalienationonitshead.Ifthetheory/metatheorysplithasitsrootsin
practice,ithaspracticalconsequencesaswell.Andtheseconsequencesareofamurderouskind.
Bhaskar and Jessop agree. Labour as a contradictory relation between usevalue and value
productionbetweenitsparticularityanditsuniversality,eachexistinginacapitalistworldthrough
theotherbutonlyinwhatIhavecalledthemodeofbeingdeniedcanneverbemadesenseofon
a Bhaskar/Jessop account, since once universality is construed as genus and particularity as
something which lurks beneath the notion of species everything becomes properly ordered:
9/12
13/7/2016
contradiction is marginalised as incoherence, instead of being construed as the movement of the

universal/particularrelationitself.
Betweenthem,inotherwords,BhaskarandJessopbyallowingphilosophytocomplementsociology
subtractclassstrugglefromthecategoriesofMarxsmaturework(seeCleaver1979Negri1984).
One way of seeing Marxs intellectual development Althussers way is to counterpose his
youthful humanist zeal against the scientific historical materialism which he announced in his first
exile and as he approached middle age. A quite different way that which the argument of the
presentarticlesuggestsistoregardhisearlycritiqueofphilosophy as beingpursued throughhis
laterstudiesintoacritiquenotjustofpoliticaleconomybutofsociologisminallitsguises:thatisto
say, in the name of practical reflexivity, he hunts down the consequences of a theory/metatheory
separationtoits(andhis)end.Firstofall(theantiphilosophicalpolemicsofthe1840s)comeshis
condemnation of metatheory as a realm of its own. Subsequently, in positivist England and as
announced in the 1857 Introduction, comes his critique of firstorder theory (positivism) which
blusheswhenevermetatheoreticalclaimsareinvoked.Henceadeepeningofanoriginalinsightrather
than an abandonment of it. What confuses this record is the historical materialism the general
theory of historical and social change enunciated in The German Ideology of 184546 and
summonedtomemoryintheformofaguidingthreadinthefamousornotoriousPrefaceof1859.
Historicalmaterialismcansoundalltoolikethekindofsheerlyfirstordertheoryofsocietywhich
Jessop (with complexities) wishes to apply and which Bhaskar (with no less a sequence of
complexitiesbutinametatheoreticalregister)offersphilosophicallytounderpin.Perhapsweshould
get used to seeing historical materialism as a temporary aberration on Marxs part. Nothing in his
critiques of philosophy or political economy turns upon it, and indeed the notion of historical
materialism as a general theory of society which awaits only its historically rich application
reproduces the genus/species distinction against which the notion of determinate abstraction (the
notionofthepresenceoftheuniversalwithintheparticularandviceversa)contends.Likeanyother
sociology,historicalmaterialistsociologyisplacedbyMarxoutofconceptualbounds.
This said, it would be wrong to conclude the present article on a textual note. I set out from the
premise that apparently technical difficulties within concepts can carry potent political points.
Marxists are used to seeing concepts pertaining to Taylorism (in the production process) and to
marketrationalityasfataltomillions.Mypropositionistotheeffectthatconceptsderivingfroma
theory/metatheory severance are fateful, and fatal, no less. If not the theory/metatheory split itself
then, at least, the theory/practice split from which it arises can kill. Selfemancipation initially a
particularpointwithinmyarticlebutnow,construingmyownpointsaspracticallyreflexive,quite
properlybecomingauniversalandconditioningonecountsastorpedoedatthemomentwhensuch
asplitoccurs.IneffectthisisthedbcleofwhatusedtobetermedWesternMarxism.Theunityof
theory and practice enunciated by Lukcs in 1923 has fallen asunder antiquaries with names like
BhaskarandJessopperusetheruinsandwhoitisthatwillreapthewhirlwindremainstobeseen.
References
Adorno,T.W.(1973),NegativeDialectics(London:Routledge&KeganPaul).
10/12
13/7/2016
Althusser,L.(1969),ForMarx(London:AllenLane).
Althusser,L.(1976),EssaysinSelfCriticism(London:NewLeftBooks).
Althusser,L.andE.Balibar(1971),ReadingCapital(London:NewLeftBooks).
Bhaskar,R.(1975),ARealistTheoryofScience(Leeds:BooksofLeeds).
Bhaskar,R.etal.(1988),PhilosophicalUnderlabouring,Interlink8.
Bhaskar,R.etal.(1989),Philosophy:MoreUnderlabouring,Interlink13.
Bonefeld,W.(1987),MarxismandtheConceptofMediation,CommonSense2.
Cleaver,H.(1979),ReadingCapitalPolitically(Brighton:HarvesterPress).
Deutscher,I.(1972),MarxisminOurTime(London:JonathanCape).
Giddens,A.(1981),AContemporaryCritiqueofHistoricalMaterialism(London:Macmillan).
Gunn,R.(1987a),PracticalReflexivityinMarx,CommonSense1.
Gunn,R.(1987b),MarxismandMediation,CommonSense2.
Gunn,R.(1987a),MarxismandPhilosophy,Capital&Class37.
Horkheimer,M.(1972),CriticalTheory:SelectedEssays(NewYork:SeaburyPress).
Jessop, B. (1988), Regulation Theory in Retrospect and Prospect, International Conference on
Regulation Theory, Barcelona, June 1988, subsequently published in PrintedSerie der Zif
Forschungsgruppe Staatsaufgaben 1, University of Bielefeld, West Germany, Zentrum fr
interdisziplinreForschung,Bielefeld.
Jessop,B.(1988b),seeChapter4inthisvolume:RegulationTheory,PostFordismandtheState.
Lukcs,G.(1971),HistoryandClassConsciousness(London:MerlinPress).
Marx,K.(1973),Grundrisse(Harmondsworth:Penguin).
Marx,K.(1974),CollectedWorks(London:Lawrence&Wishart).
Negri,T.(1984),MarxbeyondMarx(Massachusetts:Bergin&Garvey).
Popper,K.(1972),ConjuncturesandRefutations(London:Routledge&KeganPaul).
Notes
1.Lukcs1971,p.1.Lukcsgoesontoarguethatdialecticalmethodisavailableonlyfromtheclass
standpoint of the proletariat, and that indeed an external relation between method (or form) and
11/12
13/7/2016
contentisabourgeoisdeficiencyinKantsthought.
2.SeeAlthusser1971,p.59.Althusserannouncesthattheoreticalpractice(science)isitsowntruth
criterion, but then adds that this thesis applied only to sciences which are truly constituted and
developed for their part. Let anyone make sense of this who can. I quote Althusser because,
althoughIdonotdiscussstructuralismexplicitlyinthepresentpaper,somuchofJessoprelies(via
Poulantzas) on quiterightlyunfashionable Althusserian thought. Notice, in the context of my later
argument, the shiftiness as to the status of philosphy as between Althusser (1969) and Althusser
(1976). It is by no means clear to me that comtemporary Marxism has sorted out the difficulties
whichAlthussersintellectualdemiseleftunresolved.
3.Philosophyusedtoreservetoitselfquestionsnotjustofconceptformation(ormetatheory)but
of cosmology.These latter were both firstorder and higherorder, and couldbebothbecausetruth
wasseenaspreinscribedintheveryorderofthings.Theratcheteffectofenlightenmenthas(despite
Green romanticism) onceandforall undermined any such programme, but see below it is far
fromclearthateithersociologyorphilosophyofscience(orbothincombination)canperformthe
taskwhichcosmologicalphilosophy,asinPlatosemploymentofmimesis,undertook.Ourreckoning
hastobewiththemovementofcontradictionratherthanwithanystaticandharmoniouswhole.
4. See Giddens 1981, pp. 535. Giddens view is that se are in some respects conditioned by our
circumstances and in other respects free. But unless I am in one and the same respect self
determiningthenotionofmyfreedom(myselfdetermination)falls.Abitofcausalismandabitof
human action undermines, through its eclecticism, the latter. Two breaths always prevent the
necessary single breath when, from alienation towards freedom, we are required to totalise our
resourcesandtakejustoneleap.
5.Marxwaslessprurient.InalettertoEngelsoftheearly1850shelooksforwardtohavingputpaid
toallthiseconomicshit.MysuspicionisthatMarxsshit(Scheie)reportsevenperhapsbyway
ofclassicalallusionPlatosdirt.InotherwordsMarxwaspreparedtodwell,fordecades,withinthe
dirt the particularism as opposed to universalism which Plato categorically and categorially
renounced.WhichhairPlatomostmistrustedremainsanopenquestion,butalreadyinthismartinal
encounterwecanseethebattlebetweenuniversalismandparticularismbreakingout.
TranscribedinJuly2005,byPHFK.
12/12

Riff-Raff - Richard Gunn - Marxism, Metatheory and Critique

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Riff-Raff - Richard Gunn - Marxism, Metatheory and Critique

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

13/7/2016

contradiction is marginalised as incoherence, instead of being construed as the movement of the

Você também pode gostar