SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 1

The social consequences of punishment:

Third-party punishment signals morality and irrationality
Diogo Conque Seco Ferreria
Anthony M. Evans

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 2

Abstract
When social norms are violated, people sometimes engage in acts of costly third-party
punishment, spending money to reduce the outcomes of those who act selfishly. The present
research investigates how people perceive punishers, and under what conditions punishment can
function as a signal of prosociality by conveying long-term reputational benefits. Across four
studies, we find that punishers are preferred over nonpunishers as interaction partners, and are
seen as more moral and more likely to cooperate in the future. However, punishment is only
viewed positively under certain conditions. Punishment is seen as irrational when it involves
withholding a reward instead of taking away earnings (Study 2), if the degree of punishment is
too severe (Study 3), or if the act of punishment does not occur in response to an intentional
transgression (Study 4). Third-party punishment has the potential to convey long-term
reputational benefits, but there are many situations where punishing others leads to a negative
social evaluation.

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1. Introduction
1.1. The social consequences of punishment: Third-party punishment signals morality and
irrationality
Human beings often engage in helpful and cooperative behavior (Van Lange, Joireman,
Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013), but betrayal and selfishness are unavoidable in social decisionmaking. When transgressions occur, uninvolved third-parties sometimes take action to punish
those who act unfairly (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). But how do people perceive those who
punish wrongdoers? Is punishment viewed as a form of cooperative behavior, or is it seen as an
act of irrational aggression? Previous studies have found both positive (Nelissen, 2008) and
negative (Ozono & Watabe, 2012) reactions to third-party punishment. To address these
conflicting results, we report a series of experiments to investigate when third-party punishment
is perceived as a costly signal of the punishers prosociality. The present results suggest that
punishment can function as a signal of altruism, conveying long-term social benefits to the
punisher, but only when specific conditions are satisfied. Many acts of punishment are viewed as
irrational (rather than moral), emphasizing that it is important for institutions to design
mechanisms for punishment that convey prosocial intentions.
1.2. Cooperation and third-party sanctioning
Societies are able to prosper, in part, because individuals are often willing to help others
at a cost to themselves (Rand & Nowak, 2013). The existence of prosocial behavior challenges
the basic game-theoretic assumption that humans are narrowly concerned with self-interest
(Binmore, 2007). Prosocial behavior may be supported, in part, through third-party sanctioning,
acts of approval or condemnation provided by an uninterested audience. When a violation

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occurs, sanctioning behavior is more effective when it is administered by a third-party, as the
victims of violations often lack the resources to retaliate (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). To
demonstrate the pervasiveness of third-party sanctioning, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) allowed
participants to act on the result of a Dictator Game by spending resources to reduce the dictators
earnings. Indeed, participants spent money to punish selfish dictators. Similar results have been
observed using different procedures and various types of social dilemmas (Fehr & Gaechter,
2002; Henrich et al., 2006).
Examples of sanctioning behavior raise the question of why third-parties sacrifice
resources to influence the outcomes of other parties. Sanctioning may induce prosocial behavior,
but what motivates third-parties to engage in costly acts of punishment or compensation?
Sanctions can be interpreted as a second-level public good (Yamagishi, 1986) because they
benefit the collective interest by encouraging prosociality, while bearing a cost to the sanctioner
(Horne, 2007). Some have noted the danger of infinite regress in this reasoning (e.g. Kiyonari &
Barclay, 2008). Any prosocial behavior would require a higher-level explanation, making even
the most trivial altruism act theoretically intractable (but see Horne, 2008 and Sober & Wilson,
1999 for opposing arguments).
The view of sanctioning as a second-order public good assumes that the sanctioner
receives no direct benefits. However, sanctioning may be utilized as a way for people to signal
the values they uphold. Competitive altruism (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006) and costly signaling
(Fehr & Gaechter, 2002) theories propose that sanctioning can serve as a way for the third-party
to appear more attractive and desirable for future interactions. In this way, sanctions may be
justified without a need for higher-order interventions. These theories predict that observers will

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react positively to third-parties who punish wrongdoers, and will be more likely to select the
punishers as partners over third-parties who do not take action.
1.3. Competitive altruism and costly signaling
The competitive altruism hypothesis (Hardy & van Vugt, 2006) suggests that prosocial
actions are sometimes used to signal qualities or dispositions that make the signaler more
attractive to interact with. An action is a valid signal of an underlying disposition if it meets three
specific criteria: First, the action must be costly in the short-run. This handicap indicates that
although the behavior is costly (in terms of time, money, or exposure to risk), the signaler has the
resources to accept these costs and is willing to do so to access the long-term benefits. In the
absence of signaling costs, the reliability of the signal will decrease to the level of cheap talk
(Fraser, 2012), a central problem to theories of signal evolution (Maynard-Smith & Harper,
2003).
Second, the cost of signaling a trait should be inversely proportional to the quality of the
trait possessed by the signaler. In other words, the cost of signaling is lower for high-quality
signalers. This criterion makes cheating, signaling traits one doesnt possess, unviable. For
example, prosocial behavior is intrinsically rewarding and leads to positive emotions for
altruistic individuals (Schug et al., 2010; Zaki & Mitchell, 2011). Compared to bona-fide
altruists, who receive nonmaterial benefits from acting prosaically, signaling cooperation is more
difficult and costly for selfish individuals (Fraser, 2012). T Third, there must also be a long-term
benefit for the signaler, making her a more attractive partner to interact with in future occasions.
This means that there must be a selective pressure on partner selection, so that people have the
opportunity to choose which individuals to interact with (Campenni & Schino, 2014). Similarly,
the receiver must also have incentives to identify the high-quality signaler (Johnstone, 1997).

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Prosocial behavior satisfies the preceding criteria (Roberts, 1998). First, altruism is
costly, as the time dedicated to helping others could be invested in self-interested actions.
Second, helping is even costlier for those faking it. Selfish individuals will pay the same price
to signal, but wont receive some of the intrinsic rewards of altruism (Schug et al., 2010; Zaki &
Mitchell, 2011) and may be less interested in reputation building, since they are less likely to
cooperate in the future. Finally, there is competition for altruistic partners (Fehrler and
Przepiorka, 2013). Altruism benefits both the signaler (being picked as partners on future
interactions) and the receiver (picking future partners more likely to cooperate).
1.4. Perceptions of third-party punishment
The present research investigates when third-party punishment can function as a signal of
prosociality by conveying reputational benefits to the punisher. Initial evidence suggests that
individuals who engage in third-party punishment are seen as prosocial and are desired as
partners (Barclay, 2006; Nelissen, 2008), but other studies have provided conflicting results
(Kiyonari & Barclay, 2008; Ozono & Watabe, 2012).
To test if third-party punishment conveys reputational benefits, Nelissen (2008) asked
participants to play a trust game with one of three other players who made decisions in a
fictitious third party-punishment experiment. Participants chose between playing with a
nonpunisher, or partners who engaged in weak or strong acts of third-party punishment.
Participants preferred to play the trust game with strong punishers and rated them as being more
fair and generous compared to those who engaged in weak-punishment or took no action.
Similarly, Barclay (2006) found that punishers were seen as more trustworthy, but only when
punishments were in response to a transgression. Antisocial punishers, third-parties who harmed
cooperative players, were viewed negatively.

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Other studies, however, demonstrate that acts of punishment may have ambiguous or
even negative consequences. Kiyonari and Barclay (2008) found that third-party punishers were
not preferred over those who took no action, and participants did not directly reward punishers or
punish individuals who took no action as third-parties. Horita (2010) found mixed perceptions of
punishers, noting that they were more likely to be chosen to allocate rewards, but less likely to be
selected as the recipients of future rewards. Ozono and Watabe (2012) found that punishers,
compared to rewarders or individuals who took no action, were perceived negatively as partners
in a series of economic games. Other studies suggest that people generally prefer to interact with
those who compensate victims over punishers (Chavez & Bicchieri, 2013). Together, these
findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that third-party punishment is perceived as a signal of
prosociality. Participants who compensate the victim are preferred over those who punish the
violator, but if there is no option to compensate, then punishers are preferred over nonpunishers.
Social cognitive findings give insight into why third-party punishment may also be
viewed unfavorably. Studies on the TAR (Transfer of Attitudes Recursively) effect found that
people tended to form negative attitudes towards those who negatively evaluated other people
(Gawronski & Walther, 2008). Related phenomena, such as the Kill-the-Messenger Effect
(Walther et al. 2005) and Spontaneous Trait Transfer (Mae, Carlston & Skowronski, 1999), also
show that messengers are evaluated based on the contents of their messages. Considering that
punishment is a violation of the do-no-harm principle (Baron, 1996), these accounts would
suggest that third-party punishers will be seen as antisocial due to the intrinsic negativity and
destructive nature of punishment. Acts of punishment might be interpreted as competitive (Van
Lange, 1999) or irrational (Binmore, 2007).
1.5. Overview of studies

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The present report investigates how people perceive acts of third-party punishment in
economic games. Our central hypothesis is that third-party punishment is perceived as an
altruistic action, and punishers are preferred as interaction partners over third-parties who take no
action. To test this hypothesis, we conducted four experiments to measure how people react to
different forms third-party punishment. We test the initial hypothesis that punishment functions
as a signal of prosociality (Study 1) and identify boundary conditions for this effect. Applying
the framework of instrumental conditioning (Skinner, 1953), Study 2 tests if people prefer
punishment when it is framed positively (taking away money) or negatively (denying an
additional bonus). Building on studies which suggest that larger acts of punishment are
preferable (Nelissen, 2008), Study 3 investigates if more-is-better when it comes to punishment,
or if some acts of punishment are perceived as too extreme. Finally, Study 4 addresses whether
punishment is valued as a general tool to restore equality of outcomes, or if it is only an
appropriate response when economic inequality is due to an intentional transgression.
These studies contrast two different accounts of how punishment may be perceived as an
institutional mechanism to promote prosocial behavior. If third-party punishment is evaluated
according to its outcomes, then framing would not matter (positive vs. negative, Study 2); more
severe acts of punishment should be preferred (Study 3); and it wouldnt matter if the initial
outcomes are based on random allocation or intentional choices (Study 4), since the financial
consequences of punishment would be comparable in either case. On the other hand, if thirdparty actions are interpreted based on perceived intentions, then framing would matter because
positive punishment is harsher and more socially costly than negative punishment; severe acts of
punishment would be viewed less favorably, since they may convey ambiguous motivations; and
punishment would be more acceptable when it occurs in response to an intentional transgression.

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2.1.1. Study 1
The central premise of the present research is that third-party punishers will be preferred
as interaction partners. To test this hypothesis, participants read about a decision-making
scenario where an uninvolved third-party decided to punish (or ignore) an initial act of betrayal.
In this scenario, the third-party could potentially spend his own resources to reduce the earnings
of the betrayer. Our primary dependent variable was whether people preferred to interact with
third-party punishers as partners in a social dilemma. We also measured future expectations of
cooperation for third-party punishers, as well as perceptions of their morality and rationality.
Presumably, punishers will be seen as more moral and rational, and more likely to cooperate in
the future.
2.1.2. Method
Participants. American participants were recruited from MTurk, N = 202. The average
age was 32.2 years (SD = 10.47) and 44% were women. All but three participants were native
English speakers. Participants were paid 50 cents for their time.
Materials and procedure.
Third-party punishment scenario. During the first part of the experiment, participants read
about a social decision-making scenario. This scenario involved three workers from MTurk
named Anthony, Brett, and Chris and took place in two stages (see Figure 1): During the first
stage, Anthony and Brett played a trust game in the roles of trustor and trustee, respectively.
After reading about the game, participants were asked about the choices they would make if they

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 10

were assigned to the roles of trustor and trustee. Participants indicated their own choices, then
learned that Anthony chose to trust Brett, who responded by betraying Anthony. At the end of
the first stage, Anthony had no earnings and Brett had 120 cents.

Figure 1. Participants read about a third-party punishment scenario which occurred in two
stages. During the first stage, Anthony trusted Brett, who did not reciprocate. In the second
stage, Chris a third-party, decided whether to spend money to punish Brett.
During the second stage, Chris learned about Anthony and Bretts choices in the trust
game and chose between two allocations of money. If Chris chose Option 1 (no action), then
Brett lost nothing and Chris received 80 cents. If Chris chose Option 2 (punishment), then Brett
lost 40 cents and Chris received 60 cents. Thus, Chris had a choice to pay 20 cents in order to
decrease Bretts earnings by 40 cents. Note that the amount of Chris punishment was equal to
the bonus that Brett received for choosing betrayal, but punishing Brett would not directly
benefit Anthony, who would always end up with nothing. After reading about this scenario,
participants were informed that Chris had chosen to take no action (Option 1) or punish Brett
(Option 2). The full text of the scenario is reported in the Appendix.

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Partner preferences and expectations of cooperation. After learning about Chris thirdparty decision, participants then read about a second scenario described as an experiment that we
planned to conduct in the near future. This follow-up experiment consisted of a basic Prisoners
Dilemma (PD). In this game, workers on MTurk would be randomly assigned to partners and
then choose between two options, labeled SHARE and KEEP. If both workers chose SHARE,
then they would receive 40 cents each. If both workers chose KEEP, then they would receive 20
cents each. If one worker chose KEEP and the other chose SHARE, then the workers would
receive 60 and 0 cents, respectively.
To measure partner preferences, participants were asked to state whether they would
want to play the PD with each of the three workers using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very
much). To measure expectations of cooperation, participants were asked to estimate how likely
the three players described in the previous scenario (Anthony, Brett, and Chris) would be to
choose SHARE, using a scale from 1 (Definitely choose KEEP) to 7 (Definitely choose
SHRAE).
Character judgments. After stating their expectations of cooperation and partner
preferences, participants evaluated Chris using a series of adjectives measuring morality
(trustworthy, generous, and moral; = .94) and rationality (rational, intelligent, and clever; =
.89). Morality and rationality judgments were made using a 9-point scale (1 = Not at all accurate;
9 = Very accurate). Participants also evaluated Chris personality using a peer-report version of
the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003), but these ratings
were not analyzed in this report.
Additional measures. After evaluating the third-partys character and personality,
participants were asked an attention check question. We presented participants with the

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punishment decision they had read about earlier in the experiment and asked them to recall
which choice Chris had made, Option 1 or Option 2. Participants were also asked about the
punishment decision that they would have made if they were assigned to the third-party role. At
the end of the study, participants provided basic demographic information and received a
completion code.
2.1.3. Results
Attention check. Given the complexity of the scenario, it was important to verify that
participants paid sufficient attention. At the end of the experiment, we asked participants to recall
the third-partys choice: either to punish the trustee or take no action. 154 out of 202 participants
(76.2%) answered this question correctly. This rate of task comprehension is comparable with
previous studies of economic games conducted on MTurk (e.g., 72% accuracy in Study 1 of
Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012).
Removing the participants who provided incorrect responses did not substantially change
our results. Therefore, the following analyses were conducted using the 154 participants who
responded correctly to the attention check.
Partner preferences. The hypothesis that punishment functions as a costly signal of
prosociality suggests that punishers are preferred as interaction partners over nonpunishers.
Indeed, participants were more willing to play the PD with the punisher (M = 4.55, SD = 1.60)
than the third-party who took no action (M = 3.58, SD = 1.86), t(152) = 3.42, p = .001, d = .55.
Expected cooperation. Consistent with the idea that punishment signals altruism, thirdparties who engaged in costly punishment were seen as more likely to cooperate (M = 4.55, SD =
1.71) than nonpunishers (M = 3.58, SD = 1.91), t(152) = 3.32, p =, .001, d = .54. Not

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 13

surprisingly, expectations of cooperation and partner preferences were closely related, r(152) =
.68, p < .001.
Character judgments. We also investigated the effects of third-party behavior on
perceptions of morality and rationality. Perceptions of morality and rationality were significantly
correlated, r(152) = .49, p < .001. Third-parties who engaged in punishment were seen as
significantly more moral (M = 5.94, SD = 1.82) than those who took no action (M = 4.61, SD =
1.96), t(152) = 4.30, p < .001, d = .69. Third-party punishers, however, were seen as slightly less
rational (M = 5.72, SD = 1.87) than nonpunishers (M = 5.87, SD = 1.58), although the difference
was not statistically significant, t(152) = .49, p = .62, d = .079.
2.1.4. Discussion
The results of Study 1 support the hypothesis that third-party punishment functions as a
costly signal of prosociality. Third-parties who spent money to reduce the earnings of a selfish
player were seen as more likely to cooperate and were preferred as partners in a PD game.
Judgments of the third partys character suggest that punishment is positively associated with
morality, but not rationality.
2.2.1. Study 2
Extending previous studies on reactions to third-party sanctioning, we are also interested
in how people perceive different forms of punishment. According to the theory of instrumental
conditioning, punishment may be positive, introducing an undesirable stimulus after behavior
occurs, or negative, withholding a desirable stimulus (Keller and Schoenfeld, 1950; Skinner,
1953). In the domain of economic games, the third-party can punish by removing money from
another player (positive) or by denying that player an additional bonus (negative). The thirdparty behavior described in the previous study can be interpreted an example of positive

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 14

punishment. To the best of our knowledge, no previous research has examined whether these
forms of punishment are viewed as equivalent. From a game-theoretic point-of-view, acts of
punishment should be perceived in terms of the players final outcomes (Binmore, 2007).
However, psychological research suggests that there may be important differences in how people
react to the intentions underlying positive and negative punishment.
Research on the do-no-harm principle suggests that people are generally averse to actions
that cause others to experience losses (Baron, 1995). Framing a decision in terms of losses, rather
than gains, reduces the willingness to negatively influence others payoffs (Van Beest, Van Dijk,
De Dreu, & Wilke, 2005). Arguably, the harmful nature of positive punishment may enhance its
potency is a signal of prosociality because positive punishment may be seen as more
psychologically costly. Consistent with this view, Nikiforakis and Mitchell (2014) suggested that
withholding reward may be a cheap form of punishment, as it is less likely to lead to retaliation.
Negative punishment can be used to express dissatisfaction (Masclet et al., 2003; Noussair and
Tucker, 2005), but costly signaling theories suggest that expensive action should generate signals
of better quality. To test this hypothesis, Study 2 compared reactions to positive and negative
acts of punishment. Third-parties could respond to an act of betrayal by causing the betrayer to
lose money (positive punishment) or by withholding a bonus (negative punishment).
2.2.2. Method
Participants. American participants were recruited through MTurk, N = 405. The
average age was 31.05 (SD = 9.75) and 36% were women. Data collection occurred in two
stages. We recruited an initial sample of 201 participants, but analyses of our central dependent
variable (partner preferences) were inconclusive (nearly significant). We conducted a second
wave of data collection, doubling our sample size. There were no detectable differences in our

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 15

dependent measures across the two periods of data collection, and controlling for the time of data
collection did not change any of our analyses.
Materials and procedure. Participants read about the decision-making scenario reported
in Study 1. We also manipulated the framing of Chris punishment decision (positive vs
negative). This manipulation was designed so that the final outcomes of the three players
(Anthony, Brett, and Chris) were identical in both framing conditions. In the positive frame
condition, the third-partys decision was presented as a choice about whether to spend 20 cents to
take away 40 cents from Bretts final earnings. In the negative frame condition, the third-party
had a choice about whether to spend 20 cents to prevent Brett from receiving an additional bonus
of 40 cents. In order to make the final outcomes consistent across framing conditions, it was
necessary to change Bretts payoffs in the negative frame condition so that he received 40 fewer
cents during the first stage of the scenario (see Table 1).

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Table 1. Positive and negative framing conditions of the punishment scenario (Study 2)
Stage 1

Stage 2

Final
outcomes

Positive frame
A: 20 cents / B: 60 cents

Negative frame
A: 20 cents / B: 20 cents

Anthony chooses TRUST and

Brett chooses SHRAE
Anthony chooses TRUST and
Brett chooses STEAL

A: 40 cents / B: 80 cents

A: 40 cents / B: 40 cents

A: 40 cents / B: 120 cents

A: 40 cents /B: 80 cents

Chris chooses Option 1 (no

action)

A receives nothing
B receives nothing
C receives 80 cents

A receives nothing
B receives 40 cents
C receives 80 cents

Chris chooses Option 2

(punishment)

A receives nothing
B loses 40 cents
C receives 80 cents

A receives nothing
B receives nothing
C receives 80 cents

Chris chooses Option 1 (no

action)

A: 0 cents / B: 120 cents /

C: 80 cents

A: 0 cents / B: 120 cents / C: 80

cents

Chris chooses Option 2

(punishment)

A: 0 cents / B: 80 cents / C: 60
cents

A: 0 cents / B: 80 cents / C: 60
cents

Anthony chooses KEEP

2.2.3. Results
Attention check. As in the previous study, participants were asked to recall the choice of
the third party at the end of the experiment. 316 out of 405 participants (78%) answered this
question correctly. We report analyses on the participants who responded correctly.
Framing manipulation. The framing manipulation was designed so that the final
outcomes of the third-partys choice were equivalent across conditions. To do this, it was
necessary to change the payoffs in the trust game so that the trustee had more money in the
positive-frame condition when the third-party made his choice (see Table 1). This raises the
possibility that the framing manipulation influenced how participants perceived the initial trust
game. Acts of trust and betrayal may be seen as more justifiable in the positive (or negative)
framing condition, which could influence perceptions of the third-partys behavior.
To investigate this possibility, we tested the effects of the framing manipulation on
participants self-reported trust and reciprocity choice. Rates of trust were comparable in the
positive frame (66.5%) and negative frame (63.8%) conditions, 2(1, n = 316) =.25, p = .61.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 17

Rates of reciprocity were also comparable across frame conditions (Positive: 56.9%; Negative:
65.8%), 2(1, n = 316) =2.61, p = .10. These null results alleviate concerns that the framing
manipulation altered how participants interpreted the initial trust game.
Partner preferences. A two-way ANOVA was used to test the effects of third-party
behavior (punishment vs taking no action) and framing (positive vs negative) on partner
preferences, the willingness to play the PD with the third party. There was a significant
interaction, F(1, 312) = 7.10, p = .008, 2 = .022. Given the interaction, we did not interpret the
main effects of third-party action and framing. Planned comparisons were then used to
understand the simple effects of positive and negative punishment. In the positive frame
condition, participants preferred to interact with a third-party who punished (M = 4.64, SD =
1.95) over one who took no action (M = 3.52, SD = 1.62), t(165) = 4.02, < .001, d = .63. In the
negative frame condition, there were comparable preferences for third-parties who punished (M
= 4.15, SD = 1.97) and took no action (M = 4.10, SD = 1.52), t(147) = .18, p = .86, d = .03. This
pattern of results is illustrated in Figure 2 (a).
Expectations of cooperation. A two-way ANOVA was used to test the effects of thirdparty behavior and framing on expectations of cooperation. There was a marginally significant
interaction between framing and third-party behavior, F(1, 312) = 3.05, p = .08, 2 = .01. The
pattern of the interaction was similar to the previous results for partner preferences: When
punishment decisions were framed positively (causing harm to the trustee), third-parties who
punished were seen as more likely to cooperate (M = 4.35, SD = 1.65) than nonpunishers (M =
3.48, SD = 1.49), t(165) = 3.59, p < .001, d = .55. On the other hand, when punishment decisions
were framed negatively, punishers were seen as no more likely to cooperate (M = 4.03, SD =

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 18

1.66) than nonpunishers (M = 3.78, SD = 1.53), t(147) = .95, p = .34, d = .16. Figure 2 (b)
illustrates the effects of third-party decisions and framing on expectations of cooperation.

Figure 2. The effects of third-party behavior and framing on expectations of cooperation (a) and
partner preferences (b). Error bars denote standard errors of the means.
Character judgments. We also investigated the effects of third-party behavior and
framing on perceptions of morality and rationality. Morality judgments were influenced by a
significant interaction between third-party behavior and framing, F(1, 312) = 11.09, p = .001, 2
= .035. Participants in the positive frame condition perceived the punisher as being more moral
(M = 5.99, SD = 1.79) than the third-party who took no action (M = 5.00, SD = 1.65), t(165) =
3.69, p < .001, d = .57. In the negative frame condition, third-parties who punished were seen as
slightly less moral (M = 4.89, SD = 2.01) than nonpunishers (M = 5.19, SD = 1.42), though the
difference was not statistically significant, t(147) = 1.09, p = .27, d = .18.
Perceptions of rationality were also affected by a significant third-party choice by
framing interaction, F(1, 312) = 4.8, p = .029, 2 = .015. In the positive frame condition, thirdparty punishers were seen as slightly less rational (M = 5.71, SD = 1.66) than those who took no

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 19

action (M = 6.04, SD = 1.39), t(165) = 1.39, p = .64, d = .21. Critically, in the negative frame
condition, punishers were seen as significantly less rational (M = 5.21, SD = 2.06) than those
who took no action (M = 6.32, SD = 1.10), t(147) = 4.19, p < .001, d = .69. The effects of
punishment on morality (a) and rationality (b) are displayed in Figure 3.

Figure 3. The effects of third-party behavior and framing on perceptions of morality (a) and
rationality (b). Error bars denote standard errors of the means.
2.2.4. Discussion
Replicating the results of Study 1, third-parties who engaged in acts of positive
punishment were more likely to be chosen as partners for future interactions, and were seen as
more moral and more likely to cooperate. These benefits, however, were not conferred to thirdparties who engaged negative punishment. When the third-partys choices were framed in terms
of denying an additional bonus, punishers were not preferred as partners, nor were they seen as
more moral or more likely to cooperate. In fact, negative punishers were seen as significantly
less rational than those who took no action. Although the final outcomes of positive and negative
punishment were the same, people preferred punishment when it was viewed as an active

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 20

gesture. These results are consistent with the idea that passive sanctions are seen as less costly in
terms of their social consequences, because they do not involve directly harming the transgressor
(Nikiforakis & Mitchell, 2014) and highlight the importance of perceived intentions in acts of
punishment.
2.3.1. Study 3
The previous study revealed that not all acts of punishment are viewed as signals of
prosociality. Study 3 investigates how the severity of punishment influences the punishers
reputational signal. Previous results suggest that larger acts of punishment are viewed more
positively. For example, Nelissen (2008) found that strong punishers (participants who spent
30% of their resources to punish) were trusted more than weak ones (participants who spent 15%
of their resources to do so) and nonpunishers. In these studies, both strong and weak punishers
had the same financial impact on the transgressors outcome, reducing it by three Euros. Here,
we address how people react to acts of punishment that severely (vs moderately) affect the
transgressors earnings. Is more punishment always better, or are severe acts of punishment seen
as immoral and irrational?
An outcome-based view of punishment would suggest that severe punishment should be
preferred over moderate punishment. For an action to be perceived as a legitimate signal of
prosociality, it must reliably indicate the signalers resources, motivations, or intentions (Van
Vugt, Roberts & Hardy, 2007). This means that costless behavior should not be taken seriously
because it is a form of cheap talk (Fraser, 2012) and more expensive actions should be seen as
higher quality signals. On the other hand, severe punishment could also lose signaling value by
conveying ambiguous intentions. In the context of social interactions, more is not necessarily
better. For example, in bargaining games people may be suspicious of unusually generous

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 21

behavior (Steinel, van Beest, & van Dijk, 2013) because a generous offer may be seen as
irrational or as an attempt to conceal ulterior motives. Similarly, in social dilemmas people
sometimes exclude overly altruistic individuals, feeling that they set an undesirable standard of
conduct (Parks & Stone, 2010). This same reasoning could be applied to severe acts of
punishment, which may be interpreted as vengeful, spiteful, or plainly sadistic.
In Studies 1 and 2, the degree of third-party punishment was proportional to the trustees
initial offense. The transgressor earned a profit of 40 cents by not reciprocating the initial act of
trust and the third-party, in turn, had a choice to decrease the trustees earnings by 40 cents.
Study 3 investigated whether severe (disproportionately large) acts of third-party punishment
would still be interpreted as a signal of prosociality, or if people believe that there is a limit to the
size of appropriate and moral punishments.
2.3.2. Method
Participants. American participants were recruited from MTurk, N = 302. The average
age was 32.93 (SD = 9.76) and 41% were women.
Materials and procedure. The materials were similar to those used in Study 1. The
major difference was that the third-party in the decision-making scenario (Chris) was given an
additional, severe-punishment choice (Option 3). If Chris chose Option 3, then he would pay 60
cents (out of his 80 cent bonus) to remove 120 cents from Brett, the betraying trustee. The fullpunishment option left the betraying trustee with nothing. To emphasize the extremity of this
choice, the payoffs of the trustor (Anthony) were increased by 40 cents at the start of the
scenario. In the event that severe-punishment was chosen, Anthony, the trustor, would end up
with more money (40 cents) than Brett, the trustee (0 cents).
2.3.3. Results

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 22

Attention check. As in the previous studies, the following analyses were restricted to the
222 out of 302 participants (73.5%) who correctly answered the attention check question.
Partner preferences. Third-party behavior had a significant influence on partner
preferences, F(2, 219) = 3.50, p = .032, 2 = .031. Third-parties who engaged in moderatepunishment were preferred over partners who engaged in severe-punishment, t(151) = 2.25, p =
.015, d = .36 , and nonpunishers, t(151) = 2.20, p = .03, d = .35. Participants did not prefer to
interact with third-parties who engaged in severe-punishment over those who took no action,
t(136) = .34, p = .73, d = .05.
Expectations of cooperation. A one-way ANOVA was used to test the effects of thirdparty behavior on expectations of cooperation. Contrary to our previous studies, we did not find
a significant difference between the three conditions, F(2, 219) = 1.63, p = .19, 2 = .015. Note
that the pattern of means across conditions was similar to the findings of Studies 1 and 2. Partialpunishers were seen as (slightly) more likely to cooperate than full-punishers and nonpunishers
(Table 2).
Table 2. Perceptions of moderate- and severe-punishment
No action

Moderate-

Severe-punishment

punishment
Expectations of cooperation

3.96 (1.84)

4.31 (1.44)

3.83 (1.92)

Partner preferences

3.83 (1.89)

4.44 (1.58)

3.71 (2.10)

Morality

5.14 (1.97)

5.65 (1.52)

5.05 (2.21)

Rationality

6.27 (1.58)

5.56 (1.37)

4.69 (1.94)

Means are reported with standard deviations in parentheses.

Character judgments. Third-party behavior did not significantly affect perceptions of
morality, F(2, 219) = 2.25, p = .107, 2 = .020. Again, we note that the pattern of means was

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 23

consistent with our previous studies. Individuals who engaged in moderate punishment were
seen as somewhat more moral than those who took no-action and severe-punishers.
Finally, we found that third-party behavior significantly influenced perceptions of
rationality, F(2, 219) = 16.18, p < .001, 2 = .129. Third-parties who took no action were seen as
significantly more rational than partial-punishers, t(151) = 2.97, p < .001, d = .48, and fullpunishers, t(136) = 5.22, p < .001, d = .89. Full-punishers were also seen as less rational than
partial-punishers, t(151) = 3.23, p = .001, d = .52.
2.3.4. Discussion
In contrast to previous studies, which emphasized that more expensive acts of
punishment were seen as stronger signals of prosociality (Nelissen, 2008), we found that severe
acts of punishment conveyed no benefits to the punisher and were instead viewed negatively.1
Participants preferred to interact with moderate-punishers over those who engaged in severepunishment and those who took no action. Moreover, severe-punishers were seen as significantly
less rational than both moderate-punishers and nonpunishers. Compared to Studies 1 and 2,
participants viewed moderate-punishment in a somewhat negative light. Moderate-punishers
were preferred as interaction partners, but the effects of moderate-punishment on expectations of
cooperation and perceptions of morality were somewhat less pronounced, though the differences
were in the same direction. Moreover, moderate-punishers were seen as significantly less rational
than nonpunishers.
2.4.1. Study 4
In Studies 2 and 3, we investigated how participants reacted to different forms of thirdparty punishment. Study 4 addressed how the nature of the interaction preceding punishment

Note that in Nelissen (2008), the severity of punishment was manipulated by increasing its costs to the participant,
holding its effectiveness constant.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 24

influenced perceptions of the third-party actor. In this study, participants had to evaluate thirdparties who responded in situations where the outcomes of the other players were randomly (vs.
intentionally) generated.
In this scenario, third-party punishment may be seen as undeserved or meaningless, since
the initial allocation of resources did not involve a clear norm transgression. In our previous
studies, acts of punishment always occurred in response to a violation of the deeply ingrained
norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). However, people are more willing to accept unfair
outcomes when they are randomly generated (Blount, 1995; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2008).
When events are attributed to nonsocial causes, people behave according to traditional economic
assumptions, making decisions based on absolute payoffs. However, if human interaction is
present, then distributive and procedural justice concerns become active, altering the way people
act (Blount, 1995; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2008). Yet, in our experimental procedure, thirdparty punishment in response to random outcomes may be viewed as justified, or at least
plausible, since it would make the final outcomes more egalitarian (Van Lange, 1999).
Distributive justice also plays a role in social decision-making (Falk et al., 2008), suggesting that
people may react positively towards third-parties who change unfair allocations.
2.4.2. Method
Participants. We recruited 501 American participants from MTurk. The average age was
30.5 (SD = 10.1) and 37% were women. Participants were paid 50 cents for their time.
Material and procedure. Participants read about the decision-making scenario used in
the previous studies. We also manipulated whether the outcomes of the first stage of the scenario
were based on human choices (intentional-outcomes) or if they were randomly determined
(random-outcomes). Participants in the intentional-outcomes condition read about the decision-

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 25

making scenario described in Study 1. In the random-outcomes condition, the first two players in
the scenario (Anthony and Brett) did not make choices. Instead, their payoffs were determined
by a computer. Anthony and Bretts possible outcomes were the same as in the intentionaloutcomes condition, but they were determined by chance. In both version of the scenario, the
third-party, Chris, had a choice about whether to spend 20 cents to reduce Bretts earnings by 40
cents.
2.4.3. Results
Attention check. The following analyses were restricted to the 403 out of 501
participants (80.1%) who correctly answered the attention check question. Note that results were
similar for analyses conducted using all participants.
Partner preferences. The willingness to play the PD with the third-party was influenced
by a significant third-party behavior (punishment vs taking no action) by scenario-type (random
vs intentional outcomes) interaction, F(1, 399) = 9.54, p = .002, 2 = .023. Participants in the
intentional outcomes condition were more willing to interact with punishers (M = 4.42, SD =
1.62) than nonpunishers (M = 3.39, SD = 1.76), t(186) = 4.17, p < .001, d = .61. Participants in
the random outcomes condition did not significantly prefer punishers as partners (M = 3.81, SD =
2.02) compared to nonpunishers (M = 3.92, SD = 1.92), t(213) = .40, p = .68, d = .05.
Expectations of cooperation. A two-way ANOVA was used to test the effects of thirdparty behavior and scenario on expectations of cooperation. There was a marginally significant
behavior by scenario interaction, F(1, 399) = 2.86, p = .09, 2 = .007. Consistent with our
previous studies, participants in the intentional outcomes condition viewed punishers as more
likely to cooperate (M = 4.21, SD = 1.57) than nonpunishers (M = 3.18, SD = 1.67), t(186) =
4.32, p < .001, d = .63. Those in the random outcomes condition rated punishers as only

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 26

somewhat more likely to cooperate (M = 4.02, SD = 2.01) than those who took no action (M =
3.62, SD = 2.05), t(213) = 1.44, p = .15, d = .19.
Character judgments. Morality judgments were influenced by a significant interaction
between third-party behavior and scenario, F(1, 399) = 4.45, p = .035, 2 = .011. Participants in
the intentional outcomes condition perceived the punisher as being more moral (M = 5.79, SD =
1.90) than the third-party who took no action (M = 4.79, SD = 1.53), t(186) = 3.69, p < .001, d =
.57. In the random decision condition, third-parties who punished were seen as slightly more
moral (M = 5.22, SD = 1.87) than nonpunishers (M = 5.07, SD = 1.96), though the difference was
not statistically significant, t(213) = .59, p = .55, d = .08.
Perceptions of rationality were also affected by a significant third-party choice by
framing interaction, F(1, 399) = 3.82, p = .05, 2 = .01. In the intentional outcomes condition,
third-party punishers were seen as significantly less rational (M = 5.51, SD = 1.86) than
nonpunishers (M = 6.22, SD = 1.37), t(186) = 3.69, p = .003, d = .54. The negative effects of
punishment on perceptions of rationality were stronger in the random outcomes condition, where
punishers were seen as less rational (M = 4.88, SD = 1.98) than nonpunishers (M = 6.26, SD =
1.57), t(213) = 5.67, p < .001, d = .77. The effects of punishment on morality (a) and rationality
(b) are displayed in Figure 4.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 27

Figure 4. The effects of third-party behavior in response to intentional transgressions and

random outcomes.
2.4.4. Discussion
Consistent with our previous studies, third-parties who punished were preferred as
interaction partners, and were seen as more moral and more likely to cooperate. Yet, these
benefits were only conferred to punishers who responded to an intentional transgression. Acts of
punishment, when they occurred in response to randomly generated outcomes, were no longer
viewed positively. Punishers were generally seen as irrational, but even more so when the act of
punishment was based on randomly generated outcomes. When people evaluate third-party
punishers, they focus on the nature of the event thats being punished.
3. General Discussion
Four studies investigated the perception of third-party punishment. Those who punished
were consistently seen as more moral and more likely to cooperate, and were preferred over
nonpunishers as interaction partners in social dilemmas. These results are in line with costly
signaling theories, which argue that although punishment involves short-term financial costs, it
may confer long-term reputational benefits to the punisher. Those who punish may be more

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 28

likely to be selected to participate in collaborative projects or trusted with financial resources in
the future. Building on previous research, Studies 2-4 identified conditions where punishment no
longer signaled prosociality. Participants only responded positively to acts of punishment that
were framed as harmful (Study 2), that were proportionate to the initial transgression (Study 3),
and occurred in response to intentional transgressions (Study 4). We identified several situations
where punishers were not seen as moral, and were instead seen as irrational. These results
emphasize that reactions to third-party sanctioning are shaped, in part, by the intentions
conveyed by the specific mechanism of punishment.
3.1. Competitive altruism and costly signaling
Third-party sanctioning has been proposed as a mechanism to encourage cooperation in
groups and societies (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). Interestingly, previous studies have failed to
find evidence of second-order punishment: people do not punish third-parties who decline to
punish transgressions (Kyonari & Barclay, 2008). This raises the question of why people spend
resources to engage in costly acts of punishment. The results presented here suggest that people
may punish because doing so provides reputational benefits for future interactions (Barclay,
2006; Nelissen, 2008). Consistent with competitive altruism and costly signaling perspectives,
third-party punishment can broadcast desired traits, characteristics or dispositions to future
interaction partners.
3.2. When does punishment signal prosociality?
The present research builds on the understanding of punishment as a costly signal by
identifying some of the contextual factors that limit the reputational benefits of punishment.
Third-party punishment signals prosociality, but only under certain conditions. For example,
most existing research has not distinguished between positive and negative acts of punishment,

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 29

an important distinction in theories of learning and conditioning (Skinner, 1953). Study 2
suggests that there are important differences in how people react to these different forms of
punishment. People are generally averse to actions that harm others (Van Beest et al., 2005), but
the element of harm enhances, rather than detracts, from the social benefits of punishment. In
Study 2, individuals who engaged in negative punishment (withholding a reward) were not seen
as more moral or likely to cooperate, and were not preferred as partners. Further work is needed
to investigate why negative punishment is viewed unfavorably. Withholding a reward may be
seen as less costly than taking away resources, because it is less likely to provoke retaliation
(Nikiforakis & Mitchell, 2014), or it may be seen as a less effective in changing undesirable
behavior. It would also be useful to know whether third-party actors prefer to engage in positive
(vs negative) punishment; it seems likely they would be reticent to harm others.
Our work also adds to the understanding of how severity influences perceptions of
punishment. Previous research has emphasized that costlier acts of punishment are preferred over
smaller ones (Nelissen, 2008), but there may be a limit to the size of socially appropriate
punishments. In Study 3, there were no reputational benefits for third-parties who engaged in
disproportionately severe acts of punishment. Moderate punishments, which were proportional to
the size of the original transgression, were viewed positively, but future work is needed to
identify what people consider to be an ideal degree of punishment, which may lie somewhere
between the moderate and extreme options offered in Study 3. Interestingly, the addition of a
severe punishment option in Study 3 dampened the appeal of moderate punishers, suggesting that
perceptions of punishment are shaped, in part, by assessments of the unchosen alternatives.
Finally, in Study 4 we found that punishment was only seen as indicative of prosociality
when it was a response to a violation of the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), it was not

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 30

accepted as a general tool to reduce economic inequality. This raises the question of how
punishment would be viewed in noisy situations, where it is difficult to disentangle random
outcomes and intentional behavior (Klapwijk & Van Lange, 2009). Such uncertainty may
attenuate the positive perceptions of sanctioning, by creating the possibility that the apparent
transgression was, in fact, innocent. Similarly, people may view punishment less favorably in
contexts where the norms encouraging prosocial behavior are less salient or are entirely absent; it
may be less appropriate to punish others who act selfish when they are playing the Wall Street
game (Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004).
3.3. Punishment and perceptions of irrationality
Although punishment conveyed positive reputational benefits, third-party punishers were
sometimes seen as irrational, especially when the act of punishment involved withholding
rewards (Study 2), resulted in a disproportionately severe penalty (Study 3), or occurred as a
response to random outcomes (Study 4). Perhaps participants understand that punishment,
especially in one-shot games, is not in the third-partys economic best interests. This means that
although punishers may be preferred as interaction partners in social dilemmas such as the
Prisoners Dilemma or Public Goods Game, they may be avoided in situations that require
intelligence or creative thinking.
Under different circumstances, an act of punishment may be seen as a rational response.
In a repeated interaction, punishing the transgressor can potentially influence her future behavior
(Rand et al., 2009). Similarly, second- and third-party punishment may be viewed differently.
Acts of second-party punishment may serve as a warning to future interaction partners, those
who dont punish may be more likely to become the victims of future transgressions (Binmore,
2007).

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 31

3.4. Limitations and future directions
In the present studies, we investigated perceptions of third-party punishment in one-shot
games with players from a diffuse and largely anonymous population (MTurk workers).
Interestingly, these characteristics should minimize, rather than enhance, the reputational
benefits of punishment, as workers on MTurk are unlikely to learn each others identities or cross
paths in real-life. Still, it is important for future work to address how punishment is perceived in
different organizational (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980) and cultural (Henrich et al., 2006) contexts.
Punishment may be seen as especially desirable when there is no legitimate source of authority,
or if the costs of transgressions are particularly large.
There are some situations in which social norms are violated and third-parties decline to
punish transgression (Balafoukas & Nikiforakis, 2012). In these cases, the reputational benefits
of punishment may be perceived as smaller than the perceived risks of exerting the punishment.
Considering that these benefits are crucial to the competitive altruism hypothesis (Van Vugt,
Roberts & Hardy, 2009), it would be interesting to design experimental procedures that directly
test these long-term benefits. The prevalence of punishment should decrease when the benefits of
being preferred as an interaction partner do not outweigh the costs of third-party sanctioning.
Alternatively, when the benefits of punishment exceed its costs, it can be used in a strategic way,
such as to signal conformity to social norms (Willer, Kuwabara & Macy, 2009).
4. Conclusion
During the present research, one participant emailed the experimenters with the following
comment: I don't get why someone would lose money themselves to punish a stranger,
particularly when they're working on MTurk for less than minimum wage. Ridiculous. The

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 32

present results reveal that although third-party punishment is costly in the short-term, it may
confer long-term reputational benefits that justify the short-term expense.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 33

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Appendix
The following materials were used in Study 1. The study consisted of ten screens in total.
Participants completed the study using Qualtrics.
Screen 1
Please read the following instructions carefully.
Recently, we conducted a study where workers from Mturk participated in an economic game.
Each worker received instructions about the game, similar to the ones below. In this game,
workers had opportunities to earn bonuses. However, the amounts that each player earned
depended on their decisions (and the decisions of other workers). The game took place in two
stages.
At the beginning of our experiment, workers were randomly assigned to groups of three.
We are going to tell you about the decisions of three workers who participated in this study:
Anthony, Brett, and Chris.
Screen 2
Stage 1
In the first stage of the game, Anthony and Brett played a game where they could earn different
amounts of money, depending on their choices. The rules of the game are as follows:
First, Anthony chooses TRUST or KEEP.
If Anthony chooses KEEP, the game ends and Brett does not make a choice.
If Anthony chooses TRUST, the game continues and Brett chooses SHARE or STEAL.

Example

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 37

If Anthony chooses KEEP:

Anthony receives 20 cents
Brett receives 60 cents
If Anthony chooses TRUST and Brett chooses SHARE:
Anthony receives 40 cents
Brett receives 80 cents
If Anthony chooses TRUST and Brett chooses STEAL:
Anthony receives 0 cents
Brett receives 120 cents
If you were a participant in this study assigned to Anthony's role, would you choose TRUST or
KEEP? (participants chose TRUST or KEEP)
If you were a participant in this study assigned to Brett's role, would you choose SHARE or
STEAL? (participants chose SHARE or STEAL)
Screen 3
Stage 1 Result
In the first stage of the game, Anthony chose TRUST and Brett chose STEAL.
This means that Anthony received 0 cents and Brett received 120 cents.

Screen 4
Stage 2

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 38

In the second stage of the game, Chris, a new participant, was given a choice about how to
distribute money. His decision affected his earnings, as well as the earnings of Anthony and
Brett.
He had two options about how to distribute money:

To show that you understand Chris' decision, please answer the following questions:
If Chris chooses Option 1...
If Chris chooses Option 2...
[For these questions, participants had to choose the correct amounts of money from dropdown
lists. They could not proceed to the following screen until each question was answered
correctly.]
The final earnings in the game are based on Anthony and Brett's decisions in the first round, and
Chris' decision in the second round.
The following table illustrates the final earnings of each player depending on the choice that
Chris makes:
When Chris made a decision, he knew that this was the last stage of the game.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

Chris should choose Option 2:
[responses were made on a scale from 1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree]
Screen 5
[on this screen, participants learned that Chris had decided to take no action or to spend money to
punish Brett]
Stage 2 Result
Chris chose Option 2

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 39

At the end of the scenario, the final earnings for the three players were:

Screen 6
We are planning to conduct another experiment involving another economic game. The rules of
the game are as follows:
Two workers, Player 1 and Player 2, must choose between two options, called SHARE or KEEP.
In this game, the two workers make their decisions at the same time.

If both workers choose SHARE, both receive 40 cents.

If both workers choose KEEP, both receive 20 cents.
If Player 1 chooses SHARE and Player 2 chooses KEEP:
Player 1 receives 0 cents
Player 2 receives 60 cents
If Player 1 chooses KEEP and Player 2 chooses SHARE:
Player 1 receives 60 cents
Player 2 receives 0 cents
To what extent would you want to play this game with the three players (Anthony, Brett, and
Chris) described on the previous pages:
[Ratings were made on a scale from 1 not at all to 7 very much]
To the best of your ability, predict the decisions (SHARE or KEEP) that each of the three players
would make in this game:
[Ratings were made on a scale from 1 definitely choose KEEP to 7 definitely choose
SHARE]

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 40

Screen 7
Below are a series of adjectives to describe Chris, please rate how accurate each adjective is on a
scale from 1 (not at all accurate) to 9 (very accurate).
[Adjectives rated: trustworthy, generous, moral, rational, intelligent, clever]
Below are a series of personality traits to describe Chris.
Please rate how accurate each adjective is in describing Chris on a scale from 1 (Not at all
accurate) to 7 (Very accurate).
[Participants were presented with the following ten pairs of adjectives: Extraverted, enthusiastic;
Critical, quarrelsome; Dependable, self-disciplined; Conventional, uncreative; Open to new
experiences, complex; Calm, emotionally stable; Disorganized, careless; Sympathetic, warm;
Reserved, quiet; Anxious, easily upset]
Screen 8
If you were asked to make a decision in the second stage of the game, making the same decision
that Chris made, which option would you choose?

If you were asked to make a decision in the second stage of the game, making the same decision
that Chris made, which option would you choose?
[Ratings were made on a scale from 1 Definitely choose Option 1 to 7 Definitely choose
Option 2]
Screen 9
In the second stage of the game, Chris had two options to choose from.

Which option did Chris choose? [Participants selected Option 1 or Option 2]

Screen 10

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 41

Thank you for your time. The experiment is almost complete. Please answer the following
questions about your demographics before completing the survey. On the following page, you
will receive your completion code which you will need to copy in order to receive compensation
for this HIT.
What is your gender? [male / female]
What is your current age?
In which state do you currently reside?
Is English your native language? [yes / no]