(Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing 235) Kofi Kissi Dompere (Auth.) - Fuzzy Rationality - A Critique and Methodological Unity of Classical, Bounded and Other Rationalities-Springer-Verlag Berlin

Kofi Kissi Dompere
Fuzzy Rationality
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Kofi Kissi Dompere
FuzzyRationality
A Critique and Methodological Unity of
Classical, Bounded and Other Rationalities
ABC
Author
Prof. Kofi Kissi Dompere
Department of Economics
Howard University
Washington, D.C., 20059
USA
E-Mail: kdompere@howard.edu
ISBN 978-3-540-88082-0
e-ISBN 978-3-540-88083-7
DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-88083-7
Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing
ISSN 1434-9922
Library of Congress Control Number: 2008935495

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To all scholars, researchers and supporters working

on the epistemic foundations of fuzzy logic, approximate reasoning, and other new methodological approaches to the construct of our knowledge systems
and total intellectual heritage of humanity.
In memory of the following family members:
Kwabena Atta, Kwabena Aware, Kwame Amakye, Ama
Nkansa, R. Yaw Deberah, Osei Yaw, Yaa Ankoma,
Kofi Nkrumah, Yaw M. Frimpong, Kwame Asante,
Kwaku Ameyaw Frimpong, Frank Kwame Somuah
In appreciation of the following family members:
Kwasi Asiedu, Abena Wiredu, Abena L. Somuah,
Abena Amponsa, Lydia Anyei Somuah, H.I. Somuah,
Ernest Somuah, Frederick Somuah, Alex Yaw Somuah,
Joyce Somuh and Doris Somuah, Kwasi Minttah
Preface
Philosophy involves a criticism of scientific knowledge, not from a

point of view ultimately different from that of science, but from a point
of view less concerned with details and more concerned with the harmony of the body of special sciences.
Here as elsewhere, while the older logic shut out possibilities and
imprisoned imagination within the walls of the familiar, the newer logic
shows rather what may happen, and refuses to decide as to what must
happen.
Bertrand Russell
At any particular stage in the development of humanity knowledge
comes up against limits set by the necessarily limited character of the
experience available and the existing means of obtaining knowledge.
But humanity advances by overcoming such limits. New experience
throws down the limits of old experience; new techniques, new means
of obtaining knowledge throw down the limits of old techniques and old
means of obtaining knowledge.
New limits then once again appear. But there is no more reason to
suppose these new limits absolute and final than there was to suppose
the old ones absolute and final.
Maurice Cornforth
The claim that certain portion of human knowledge is exact science has from
time to time been subjected to criticisms by many scientists, philosophers of
science, methodologists, epistemologists and others. These criticisms have
always centered around certain cognitive imperfections such as vagueness, ambiguities, linguistic deformities, subjectivity, problems of explication and others
in perception and reasoning that generate defective information-knowledge
VIII
Preface
structure. This defective information-knowledge structure renders the claim to

be void of the content or of partial truth. See for example the whole debate on
vagueness and approximation [R23] [R23.49] [R23.51] or on bounded rationality [R18]. In every account, these criticisms are directly or indirectly levied
against the foundations and structure of the classical paradigm composed of
its logic and mathematics and the conditions of truth acceptance. In spite of
the gains in human knowledge on the basis of the classical paradigm, its logical foundations are artificially protected by inflexible steel walls with leaks
that constrain the natural growth and expansion of knowledge on the basis of
cognitive imperfections. The principle of complete exactness shuts out creative imagination. The principle of degrees of exactness or inexactness opens
doors to powerful creative imagination and continual improvement toward
perfection.
Some notable scientists and philosophers of science have come to rescue
the claim of the principle of exactness and absolute truth from time to time
and invent plugs to try to close the logical leaks that give rise to paradoxes
and contradiction in the classical paradigm. The whole theory of probabilistic
reasoning is one such important attempt where the principle of classical inductive reasoning is equated with probabilistic logic. We shall make explicit,
in the development of this monograph, that the probabilistic reasoning cannot
deal with the presence of vagueness, ambiguity and hedging or other imperfections that arise from explication and limitations of our linguistic structures.
This has been pointed out by a number of researchers on fuzzy phenomenon.
The claim of exactness and the rescue of the claim seem to suggest a type of
lofty intellectual edifice whose foundations are fortified by iron walls of faultlessness, purity and indestructibility that hold absolute truth. Instructions from
Kaufmann and Gupta point to the idea that: There is no such thing as absolute
truth. At best it is subjective criterion, but one based upon valuation [R10.54,
p. xii]. The defenders of exact science define it to be the only defensible pure
knowledge that allows ultimate mastery of nature and society in a manner that
provides us with the power of rational control of natural and social forces to
follow our will. The claim and its defense are done within the classical paradigm itself and the methods of exact classical rationality. The foundations of
the treasure house of exact knowledge, and the manner in which knowledge
items are admitted into the treasure house from the classical paradigm, composed of its logic and mathematics, are rigidly placed in the epistemic capsule
of the paradigm of Aristotelian logic.
A carefully judicious examination of the foundations of exact science and
exact reasoning leads to some important epistemic unhappiness. This unhap-
Preface
IX
piness finds expressions in series of unsustainable patchworks done and continues to be done on the leaks in the foundations of the intellectual treasure
house which has been constructed from the classical paradigm that contains
exact reasoning and science when problems of ambiguities, vagueness, contradictions and paradoxes are encountered. This unhappiness is further aggravated by the claim that exact science and reason are free from presuppositions
and subjectivity. The fact remains that in general, every knowledge element is
abstracted by decision-choice process with a given rationality from a defectively perceptive information structure containing vagueness and ambiguities
with defective cognitive process from complex social and natural systems.
Under such conditions exact reason and exact science cannot take undisputable claim to universality of its truth as absolute.
The universality of truth of exact science and reason find expressions in restricted domain of human perceptive model of the world of senses. This restricted domain is most of the time irrelevant to other parts of the complexities
of behavior in decision-choice space. The irrelevance is revealed by the neglect by the classical paradigm of any statement that falls between true and
false as extreme logical values. This neglect is done with arrogance of principle of exactness and certainty. The fundamental principle of classical paradigm that any proposition is either true or false and that true and false characteristics cannot coexist in the same statement is problematic in our knowledge
production process as well as the use of knowledge as an input for decisionchoice actions. As it is stated by Bertrand Russell that: The first difficulty
that confronts us is as to the fundamental principles of [classical] logic known
under the quaint name of laws of thought. All propositions are either true
or false, for example, has become meaningless. If it were significant, it would
be a proposition, and would come under its own scope. Nevertheless, some
substitute must be found, or all general accounts of deduction become impossible [R20.77, pp. 63-64]. This principle is that which gives rigidity to the
foundation of the classical paradigm. What kind of substitute can we find to
replace the ridge steel frames with leaks that form the protective belt for the
classical foundation?
One approach to this problem of classical rigidity in the law of thought is to
build a new knowledge house with elastic steel foundation without leaks. Another approach is to redesign the classical ridge foundation and rebuild it with
elastic steel in such a way that the treasure house of knowledge accommodates all the valid classical propositions and non-classical propositions where
the elastic frame will allow examinations of classical contradictions, anomalies and paradoxes. It is argued, in this monograph, that the nature of our lin-
Preface
guistic and cognitive process is such that this required flexibility can be done
with fuzzy paradigm working with its logic and mathematics. The fundamental principle of fuzzy logic is that all propositions contain true and false characteristics in varying proportions where the acceptance of all true propositions
and false propositions is simply by decision-choice actions operating on some
rationality. From fuzzy analytic viewpoint the truth value of every proposition is seen as a set whose number of elements is grater than one. It is this rationality that gives meaning to the wisdom to committing resources for
knowledge enhancement and the growth of our knowledge enterprise through
research and learning by doing.
The redesigning is basically cognitive and hence paradigm shifting. The
new paradigm is referred to as the fuzzy paradigm. It is designed to be selfcontained and yet as an enveloping of the classical paradigm with two-valued
logical system where sets and categories are crisp with exact probabilities.
The development and the use of fuzzy paradigm and approximate reasoning
with linguistic variables in analytical work have been going on for many decades. It has found voice in many sectors of knowledge and this voice will continue to echo in many different knowledge sectors such as mathematics, geography, information theory, medical sciences, physical sciences, engineering,
and expand into many other areas of social sciences that are classified under
inexact science. The fuzzy paradigm offers researchers and social scientists,
especially economics, new toolbox and methods of logical and mathematical
reasoning in the same rigorous mode as classical system with a bonus of analytical accuracy in dealing with inexactness, vagueness and ambiguities that
are fundamental elements of the subject. In this respect, when scholars and
researcher in social sciences discover and understand the power of fuzzy
paradigm and the epistemic foundations on which it is born, they will make
time and effort to study its logic and mathematics for reasoning.
Through fuzzification-defuzzification process a covering with elastic steel
is created as an analytical envelope that contains the foundation of the classical paradigm as well as that of non-classical reasoning. This shift allows for
greater generality and enhancement of methods and techniques of knowledge
construction and reduction that move from complete imprecision containing
vagueness, ambiguities and hedging to classical exactness. Fuzzification allows the fuzzy logic to bring into our reasoning process important elements of
human limitations such as subjectivity, vagueness in thought, ambiguities in
reasoning and imprecision and others in our linguistic systems. Defuzzification allows decision-choice actions on the acceptable levels of tolerance for
ambiguity, vagueness and inexactness when projections or determinations are
Preface
XI
made for exactness of knowledge items and other scientific statements to be

admitted into the universal knowledge bag. Here lies the contributions and
utility of the fuzzy paradigm for reasoning and knowledge construction that
structure the theory of knowledge.
With the expansion and intense research and use of the fuzzy paradigm, it
becomes necessary to reflect and specify for discussions and analysis, its epistemic foundation for general understanding and analytical debate in relation to
the foundation of classical paradigm. The necessity is imperative if we are to
avoid what Max Planck calls phantom problems in science [R14.53] or, at
least, have a path to its foundation when something paradoxical goes wrong
with the superstructure of the knowledge house. Additionally, a number of
researchers and users of the toolbox of fuzzy paradigm enter into the fuzzy
research program after acquiring and mastering some of the mechanical elements in the toolbox of the fuzzy paradigm without clear epistemic understanding of its strengths and weaknesses. It is this lack of foundational understanding that leads to a debate as to whether probabilistic reasoning cannot do
the fuzzy reasoning and whether fuzzy measures are not the same as probability measures. This unclearness is due partly to a problem of explication and
partly to the problem of relative understanding of the goals, objectives and
foundations of fuzzy and non-fuzzy research programs.
The simple, but difficult task of this monograph is defining the epistemic
foundation of fuzzy paradigm composed of its logic and mathematics as they
are related to rationality and knowledge production. The discussions are presented to reveal the relational conditions between the fuzzy and classical
paradigms and their rationalities in acceptance of true or false propositions.
The work here is to establish the epistemic meaning, limits and scope of the
fuzzy paradigm and inexact or approximate reasoning that constitute the general characteristics of human cognition. The work will lead us to understand
duality of exact and inexact science. The resulting understanding will show
that exactness is a derivative of inexactness by subjective decision-choice
judgment. Exact science, therefore, must be viewed as collectively accepted
degree of inexact science through collective decision-choice process. In fact,
probabilistic reasoning attests to this proposition. However, probabilistic reasoning relates to limited information whether fuzzy or non-fuzzy while fuzzy
reason relates to ambiguous information whether limited or full.
The epistemic structure of reasoning, in dualities and with techniques and
methods of substitution-transformation process through graduation, suggests
to us that exactness, objectivity, precision and any other exotic terms that
connote purity are nothing but acceptable levels of degrees of tolerance of the
XII
Preface
elements of the duals whose acceptance cutoffs are individually and or collectively subjective. If they were not subjective then our cognition could not constitute knowledge. The presence of subjective phenomenon in human decision-choice processes creates doubt-surety duality in our informationknowledge construct with conflicts that provide it with the dynamism and living essence.
When one accepts the imperfection of human senses and the positional
statement of an African epistemologist that: There is nothing in the intellect
that has not already been in the sense, that is, in the sense organs, that has not
already been in sensible things from which are distinguished things not perceptible to the senses. Nothing can be inferred there from except the operation
of the mind, sensation and thing itself. [R20.1b, p. 102 (1700-1760)]. Another
way of relating the same statement to the fuzzy paradigm in light of the
knowledge production process is from Max Planck discussions on exact science. Since exact science deals with measurable magnitudes, it is concerned
primarily with those sensory impressions which admit of quantitative data in
other words, the world of sight, the world of hearing and the world of touch.
These fields supply science with its raw material for study and research, and
science goes to work on it with the tools of a logically, mathematically and
philosophically disciplined reasoning. [R14.53, pp. 87-88].
These sensory fields generate perceptive information structure that becomes the raw input into our reasoning machine. The perceptive information
structure provides us with a model of our sense world. This model is inexact
that contains vague and ambiguous elements with limited and defective perception, all of which are generated by sight, hearing, touch, smell, taste and
feelings, from which our knowledge is derived. Amos statement involves the
totality of human sense world as information input to derive the knowledge
structure by the operations of the mind through reasoning that applies to all
sense experiences but not just a subset of them. Plancks statement involves a
subset of our sense world that admits of measurable magnitudes as input on
the basis of which knowledge is constructed through exact reason. Max
Plancks statement of exactness is consistent with classical paradigm that provides the toolbox of logical, mathematical and philosophical reason. Thus the
toolbox of classical paradigm neglects inexact and qualitative values that are
of linguistic numbers characterizing such senses as smell, taste and feeling.
Amos statement points to the existence of both exactness and inexactness in
cognition, and hence the presence of inexact science whose knowledge construction through cognition requires a different toolbox from the toolbox of
exact science.
Preface
XIII
It may be stated that the nature of human imperfections, learning by doing,

error-making and error-correction processes seem to suggest that the creation
of a perfect toolbox for exact logical analysis by the same defective mind is
impossible even if we work with exact quantities that are the creation of Perfect Being. This is the epistemic problem of defective information-knowledge
structure as an input to decision-choice process. An alternative way of looking
at the problem of defective information-knowledge structure is from a statement by Max Planck. Considered as a whole, the matter [objective knowledge] reduces itself to the fact that we human beings have no direct access to
knowledge conveyed to us by exact science, but must acquire it one by one,
step by step, at the cost of painstaking labor of years and centuries. [R14.53,
pp.86-87]. The epistemic point, here, is simply that a major portion of cognitive process follows approximate logic of reasoning that uses both quantitative, qualitative and linguistic numbers in both penumbral and non-penumbral
regions of decision-choice actions. It may be added that the constructed tool
boxes of paradigms are themselves cognitive constructs subject to decisionchoice action for acceptance. The required characteristics of exact knowledge
place important limitations in using our imperfect cognition to expand the
boundaries of knowledge by the use of the classical paradigm.
As we have pointed out, the use of Aristotelian true-false characterization
of statement is problematic and paradoxical in the classical paradigm. Every
statement is either true or false presents logical problem in human reasoning
since it comes under its own scrutiny, in that, it is either false or true but not
both. If every statement is either true or false is taken to be absolutely true,
then it violates the principle that it advocates. This may be viewed as an entry
point of fuzzy paradigm. The fuzzy paradigm has emerged, therefore, not to
replace the classical paradigm but to fill the epistemic loopholes and resolve
the paradox that has become impediments to the expansion of knowledge in
areas of existing sciences and emerging ones on the basis of a paradigm that is
inclusive of exactness and inexactness.
The fuzzy paradigm works through the true-false duality with substitutiontransformation process operating through cognitive categorial conversions
within the same statement or hypothesis. The fundamental principle is that
every proposition is a set defined by a true-false duality that contains true and
false characteristics in varying proportions inclusively between zero and one
[0,1]. This may be viewed as the fundamental law of thought in fuzzy paradigm. This proposition, unlike the classical fundamental law of thought, meets
its own test where the acceptance of all true and false propositions is not on
the conditions of absolutism but simply by decision-choice actions operating
XIV
Preface
through certain rationality to resolve the conflict in the true-false duality.

Statements are accepted to be true if the truth characteristics outweigh the falsity characteristics and vice versa. The use of this law of thought can be made
analytically rigorous as the use of the classical law of thought. The advantage
is to overcome the limitations of the classical paradigm in analytical work in
soft and inexact sciences.
The inclusiveness of exact and inexact science or reason by using fuzzy
paradigm is reflected in the notion that the concepts of exact and inexact constitute a duality, where the characteristics of both inexactness and exactness
are mutually defining and negating where the conditions of convertibility of
one to the other is established through reasoning. Generally, the inexactness is
taken as primary category of reality and exactness as a derived category of
reality by knowledge construction. Similarly, the concepts of exact and inexact sciences constitute a duality where exact science and inexact science are
derivatives, and the perceptive information structure constitutes their primary
category of reality. The principle of inexactness-exactness duality does not
mean that the elements in the universal object set are inexact. The exactness
and inexactness refer to our knowledge construction process about the universal object set. In our knowledge construction process, the elements of the universal object set are initialized as exact by assumption, but our knowledge
about them is inexact. The concepts of exact and inexact are linguistic variables that are subjectively defined in degrees or shades of meaning. In this
respect it is not different from linguistic numbers, such as big, tall, and others.
The knowledge elements qualify as acceptable knowledge only by decisionchoice action defined over fuzzy statement that reconciles preferences over
relative degrees of exactness and inexactness.
The implication is simply that knowledge sectors and methods of cognitive
inquiry are claimed to be exact, not because they are exact by nature, but they
are, by some method of collective rationality for their acceptance. Since we
project the fuzzy paradigm to be inclusive of inexact and exact reasoning
whose toolbox can be applied to exact and inexact knowledge sectors, what
are the foundations on the basis of which the fuzzy paradigm takes off from
the classical paradigm in order to develop a system of logical and mathematical reasoning that provides an enveloping for the classical logic and mathematics with equal analytical rigor? What is its relational structure to the theory
of knowledge and scientific discovery? How does this foundation relate to
verification, falsification and corroboration between theory and observed in
the information-knowledge process where information is the work of our
Preface
XV
senses and knowledge is the work of the mind through a process with information as its input?
These are some of the important questions that this monograph on fuzzy rationality directs its labor. The primary purpose is to make explicit, the epistemic foundations of fuzzy paradigm as well as motivate the understanding of
the role and place of approximate reasoning in established and emerging areas
of knowledge so that researchers and students in the areas of mathematics,
physics, economics, psychology, engineering and others may not only find
value in fuzzy paradigm but learn to formulate inexact and relevant problems
that may lead to exact solutions through fuzzification-defuzzification module.
A supporting objective in this monograph is to make explicit, the structurally
epistemic process of knowledge construction by moving from the potential to
the actual with explicitly defined intermediate steps that are related to approximate reasoning and subjective valuations in the presence of vagueness,
ambiguities and linguistic constraints.
The monograph is essentially about fuzzy optimal rationality and its relationship to knowledge construction and reduction, methodology of science,
scientific discovery and approximate reasoning in relation to critique and appraisal of classical and bounded rationality. It defines conditions under which
fuzzy framework provides a cognitive covering for optimal and sub-optimal
rationalities. It , further provides us with conditions of approximate reasoning
in both classical and non-classical decision-choice problems where the information-knowledge structure is seen as an input into the decision-choice process as we cognitively move from the potential to the possible, from the possible to the probable, and from the probable to the actual through the logic of
knowledge square. It helps to explain as well as specify the philosophical origins of fuzzy paradigm shifting and the role of ideology as an enhancement or
hindrance in thought processes in the process of scientific discovery. In general, the book is to make explicit the philosophical essential of fuzzy paradigm in our information-knowledge construction. The ontological and epistemological problems of decision-choice rationality are presented as composing
of problem of rationality as an attribute of decision-choice agents and problem
of rationality as an ideal state of decision-choice process that must reflect rationality as an attribute. Here, the classical and fuzzy rationalities are distinguished and unified under the postulate of optimal decision-choice rationality
where the Eulers mini-max principle operates, in general substitutiontransformation process within categorial dynamics of actual-potential duality.
Fuzzy decision-choice rationality is analyzed as a critique and methodological
XVI
Preface
unity of classical and bounded rationalities that are affected by social ideologies.
The structure of ideology, it is argued, affects decision-choice rationality in
science and general knowledge production as well as directions of personal
and social decisions. The nature of such effects is related to Lakatos research
program, Kuhns paradigm stability and shifts, stability and changes in Poppers research cluster of theories and stability and changes of Kedrovs procedural research framework, all of them relate to the nature of scientific discovery. The ideological conformity creates cognitive dogma that affects information-processing capacities and decision-choice rationality forcing decisionchoice agents to operate with fuzzy optimal rationality under conditions of
subjectivity, vagueness and ambiguities rather than the optimal classical rationality with exactness. Additionally, the capacity limitation leading to
Simons bounded rationality is enhanced by ideology. This monograph is a
continuation of my work on rationality [R17.22] and on methodological problems of development economics as viewed from substitution-transformation
process [R20.22].
The book is organized in four chapters. Chapter One introduces the nature
of scientific (exact) and non-scientific (inexact) knowledge production as a
work of information-decision-interactive processes that allow cognition and
decision to be examined as an interactive processes regarding fundamental
questions of existence and knowablity. Chapter Two examines the essential
characteristics of the structures of explanatory and prescriptive sciences, their
paths to knowledge and their corresponding explanatory and prescriptive
theories through the relative meanings of information and knowledge. The
fundamental principle behind the analysis and synthesis of the development of
all theories, is that knowledge production is a processes that is governed by
decision-choice rationality where such rationality is abstracted from a given
paradigm. Chapter Three furthers the epistemic discussions on the notion that
the development of enterprise of science, general cognition and knowledge
construction are embedded in human decision and choice behavior under rationality that covers exactness and inexactness in reasoning. Rationality is
viewed as a guide to cognitive activities at the level of critical deliberation as
well as a process of selecting the best path of scientific practice that maximizes the possibility and the probability of either the discovery of what there
is, or maximizing the explanatory and predictive power of the explanans and
predicens.
The cognitive system of decision and choice is introduced and discussed as
relational interactions among objectivity, subjectivity, decision and choice and
Preface
XVII
how these interactions establish the need for understanding the epistemic conditions of rationality. The epistemological problem of decision-choice rationality is posed and analyzed in terms of concept, meaning and relevance in
human affairs. Chapter Four concludes the volume with discussions on the
meaning and the concept of ideology and the role it plays in decision-choice
systems as we examine both subjective and objective phenomena in knowledge construction and the use of knowledge in execution of individual and
collective decision-choice programs. It presents an epistemic argument that
ideology is a constraint on decision-choice rationality in problem selection,
analysis, syntheses, and acceptance of true-false propositions. The ideological
constraint contributes to the structure and nature of the existence of true-false
duality in statements and propositions. The concept of ideology is divided into
grand and institutional ideologies both of which are instruments of social control and conformity. They, however, play different but interactive roles in the
decision-choice space and decision-choice rationality in the relevant paradigm
and whose effects may be analyzed by methods and techniques of fuzzy rationality. There is an important lesson that the role of ideology imposes on us.
And that is, when we study a theory or a theoretical system, we must see it in
the context of the intellectual history that gave rise to it and the ideological
milieu in which it flourishes. In this way, we can understand and appreciate
the set of interrelated problems that were under cognitive scrutiny for enhancing the intellectual history of humanity.
Acknowledgements
The theory of rational process, also characterized as the theory of rationality,
irrespective of how it is conceived and interpreted, affects all areas of human
thought and the laws of thought that may guide decision-choice behavior toward actions in managing our social set-ups in time and over time. There are
many cognitive paths to the construct of the theory of rational process. One
path may be conceived from the viewpoint of theory of knowledge. Any of
these paths to the theory of rationality, therefore, is about the discovery of
intelligence in human action, and explanation as to how this intelligence
manifests itself in information-knowledge structure and decision-choice processes that allow the universal object set to be reflected in human mind relative
to social and natural processes. The greatest danger to the discovery of this
intelligence and understanding of applications that may be required of it, is
ideological and scientific credulity. This ideological and scientific credulity
XVIII
Preface
finds expression in the classical paradigm with the principle of exactness and
absolute truth that cement the foundations of current scientific knowledge.
The danger may be diminished by developing cognitive habits of different
forms of mendacity in order to develop a more robust foundation of fuzzy
paradigm composed of its logic and mathematics. In this respect, in the development of fuzzy paradigm, enhancement of its logic and expansion of its
mathematical domain, we must be thankful for all researchers and scholars
who have freed themselves from the ideological grip of the classical paradigm
with Aristotelian principle in order to working on the frontier of fuzzy phenomena in all areas of the knowledge enterprise. This monograph has benefited from their contributions.
Special thanks go to friends and foes whose positive and negative encouragements respectively have make this work enjoyable to the finish. My thanks
also go to all my graduate students in my courses in economic theory, mathematical economics and cost-benefit analysis for allowing me to introduce
them to new techniques and logic of thinking in attempt to free them from the
rigid logical structure of the classical system. I express grate appreciation to
Dr. Grace Virtue for providing editing advice that has allowed this work to be
clearer and easier to read. This monograph has also benefited from the works
of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Cheik Anta Diop, and W.E. Abraham by way of
motivation.
November 2008
Kofi Kissi Dompere
Table of Contents
General Epistemics on Science and Rationality ...................................1

1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
Decision and Cognition .....................................................................1

The Unity of Science, Philosophy and Rational Inquiry ...................7
Methodology of Science and Decision-Choice Rationality.............13
Explanatory and Prescriptive Sciences............................................19
1.4.1 Explanatory Science and Decision-Choice Rationality.........26
1.4.2 Prescriptive Science and Decision-Choice Rationality .........31
1.5 An Epistemic Reflection on Explanatory Theory, Prescriptive
Theory and Decision-Choice Rationality ........................................36
1.5.1 Comparison of Explanatory and Prescriptive
Rationalities in the Knowledge Enterprise............................37
1.5.2 Decision-Choice Rationalities, Constructionism,
Reductionism in Social Knowledge Construct......................46
2
Information and Knowledge in Decision-Choice Rationality............55

2.1 Information Definition and Representation in
Decision-Choice Systems................................................................58
2.1.1 The Concept and Nature of Information in Cognitive
Systems .................................................................................59
2.1.2 Information and Reality ........................................................70
2.2 Knowledge Definition and Representation in Decision-Choice
Systems............................................................................................73
2.2.1 The Concept and Nature of Knowledge................................75
2.2.2 Knowledge, Illusions and Reality .........................................85
Decision, Choice and Rationality .........................................................89

3.1 Epistemological Problem of Rationality .........................................97
3.1.1 The Concept of Rationality ...................................................98
XX
Table of Contents
3.1.2 Epistemic Conditions of Rationality ...................................102

3.1.3 Quality-Quantity Duality and Decision-Choice
Rationality ...........................................................................107
3.1.4 Critique of Some Criticisms of Rationality / the Futility
of Criticizing the Optimal Rationality Postulate .................112
3.2 Decision and Choice Explicated....................................................116
3.3 Decision, Rationality and Optimality ............................................119
3.3.1 Rationality and Optimality..................................................120
3.3.2 Optimality and Equilibrium in Decision Systems...............125
3.4 Choice, Rationality and Optimality ...............................................128
3.4.1 Rational Choice as an Action on Rational Decision ...........132
3.4.2 Rationality, Choice, Optimality and Equilibrium ...............139
4
Ideology and Decision-Choice Rationalities......................................143

4.1 Ideology and Rationality in Institutions and Society.....................144
4.2 Ideology and Decision-Choice Rationality in Science and
Knowledge Production ..................................................................147
4.3 Social Costs and Benefits of Ideology in Decision-Choice
Rationality .....................................................................................151
4.4 Contents of Ideology and Decision-Choice Rationality ................153
References....................................................................................................167
R1 On Aggregation and Rationality....................................................167
R2 Cost-Benefit Rationality and Decision-Choice Processes.............170
R2.1 On Cost-Benefit Rationality and Accounting Theory.........172
R2.2 On Cost-Benefit Rationality and Real Economic
Costing ................................................................................172
R2.3 On Cost-Benefit Rationality and Decision-Choice
Criteria ................................................................................176
R2.4 On Cost-Benefit Rationality and Pricing ............................178
R2.5 On Cost-Benefit Rationality and Discounting ....................180
R2.6 Cost-Benefit Rationality and Contingent Valuation
Method (CVM) ...................................................................182
R2.7 Cost-Benefit Rationality and the Revealed Preference
Approach (RPA)..................................................................185
R3 On Rationality and Social Decision-Choice Process.....................187
R4 On Expectations, Uncertainty and Rationality ..............................195
R5 On Decision-Choice Process, Fuzziness and Rationality ..............199
R6 On Fuzzy Decisions, Applications and Rationality.......................209
Table of Contents
XXI
R7 On Game Theory, Risk Analysis. Fuzziness and Rationality........215

R8 On Fuzzy Logic and Rationality....................................................221
R9 On Fuzzy Optimization and Decision-Choice Rationality ............225
R10 On Fuzzy Mathematics and Optimal Rationality ..........................229
R11 On Fuzzy Probability, Fuzzy Random Variable and Random
Fuzzy Variable ..............................................................................238
R12 On Rationality and General Decision-Choice Processes...............241
R13 On Rationality, Ideology and Decision-Choice Process ...............243
R14 On Rationality, Information and Knowledge ................................244
R15 Rationality and Category Theory in Mathematics, Logic and
Sciences .........................................................................................249
R16 On Rationality, Probabilistic Concepts and Reasoning.................250
R17 On Classical Rationality, Optimality and Equilibrium..................253
R18 On Bounded Rationality ................................................................258
R19 On Rationality, Information, Games and Decision-Choice
Conflicts ........................................................................................260
R20 On Rationality and Philosophy of Science ....................................262
R21 On Rationality, Riskiness, Decision-Choice Process and
Paradoxes.......................................................................................268
R22 On Theories of Utility and Expected Utility .................................270
R23 On Vagueness and Approximation................................................271
R24 On Rationality, Prescriptive Science and Theory of Planning ......276
Index.............................................................................................................277
General Epistemics on Science and

Rationality
When one considers the rapid growth in technological and scientific knowledge in contemporary societies, one comes to understand that this is only
meaningful in relation to human decisions to manage societies under the constraints of social and natural forces. Here, we must deal with the meaning and
substance of decision and choice in order to understand the usefulness of the
accumulation of global scientific and technological knowledge without direct
reference to the decision-choice process. The accumulated knowledge has
taken place through the activities of human cognition as an essential part of
self-preservation. It also presents an inter-supportive relationship between
decision and cognition. Cognition may be viewed as information-decisioninteractive processes. Thus, to understand and appreciate the role of fuzzy
rationality and its relation to classical and bounded rationalities; and how
fuzzy rationality presents a critique and unifying position, we need to examine
decision and cognition as human activities.
1.1 Decision and Cognition

An analysis of human history reveals to us an important social phenomenon
that human activities in nature and society are driven by decisions and choices
where such decisions and choices proceed with the use of information and
knowledge about nature as well as human and social organism. There are dynamic relationships among information, knowledge and decision. The dynamics of information and knowledge are rooted in human quest for survival and
improvement of conditions of existence. Although the obtained information
and acquired knowledge are critical to human survival and transforming activities in nature, human cognition of nature had quite a narrow range of reliK.K. Dompere: Fuzzy Rationality, STUDFUZZ 235, pp. 154.
springerlink.com Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
1 General Epistemics on Science and Rationality
able application for greater part of history. Cognition, defined in terms of

critical deliberation, for the greater part of history, was not a conscious process to acquire information and develop knowledge about nature in order to
improve human ability to cope with it and with the difficulties of societal organizing. Information and knowledge were simply products of unconscious
social activities resulting from direct and indirect human interaction with nature and other humans. Yet the resulting knowledge became input into human
decision-choice processes as unconscious activity. The conflicts between the
results of decision activities and desires, transformed the unconscious to conscious decision-choice process. The driving force of this transformation is
learning by doing, through the dynamics of actual-potential duality that became linked to conscious acquisition of information and knowledge. Cognition as mass conscious social activity is probably few centuries old relative to
known human history.
When people began to engage in a conscious process of acquiring information and knowledge about nature, and to deliberately utilize them to either
enhance or degrade their existence in nature, information and knowledge as
phenomena acquired a new and important quality in social formation and
management. Conscious production and uses of information and knowledge
became increasingly reliable and their acquisitions about nature, of which
man is part, became socially acceptable as science with defined characteristics. The beneficiary is human conscious decision-making, and choice activities became elevated to the level of science. Decision as a science and scientific cognition together became not only socially respectable activities but a
necessity for creating efficient social life. It also became a conscious process
directed towards acquiring information and knowledge that are explicitly formulated, general in their entire constrained scope, systematically organized
and highly dependable in practice. In other words, decision, choice, information and knowledge became both inter-reactive and dialectical.
Even at such a high level of development of knowledge production and information science, scientific cognition and decision remained the business of
a small group of private individuals. They were neither woven into the entire
social fabric nor were they socially and deliberately organized to benefit the
entire social process over the long time. Production and practice of science as
continually and consciously institutionalized inquiry into the understanding of
nature and society, and the use of their results into decision and choice are
recent phenomena. This is also true for both individual and collective decisions. Decision making is a characteristic of all living things in conscious and,
or unconscious states. Information usage is also a conscious or unconscious
activity of all living things. Humans moved from being unconscious instrument of evolutionary process to conscious instrument of creational process in
both positive and negative ways through decision-information activities.
These activities acquired preponderating force of human-self transformation.
They also became instruments to influence the direction of the evolutionary
process of social and natural environments under the behavioral dynamics of
transformation-substitution duality.
People came to engage consciously in the active cultivation and practice of
science as methods and tools for knowledge creation which then became input
into their decision-making processes. The process is such that they increased
consciously and deliberately their mastery of nature and human social organization and its management. The result is such that people do not only prolong
their existence and create comfort, but socially define the meanings of their
existence through the decision-choice process. As a result of this consciousunconscious transformation in the information-knowledge process, humans
increased their domain of influence on nature, society and other humans. Indeed, the pursuit and practice of science, as information-knowledge activity,
have become the major sources of energy for human innovative transforming
activities in nature, and for the domination by people over people. All these
relate to cognition and decision in all aspects of human life. Science is rooted
in human quest for freedom while production has become the practice of science. Scientific cognition is a practice of production as well as a determinant
of production. In the last analysis, however, both production and science are
encapsulated in the organic process of human decision-choice activities. Decision is the creating force of human history generated by different kinds of scientific and non-scientific information and knowledge activities.
As science, broadly conceived, becomes evermore ramified, refined and
structurally interdependent with human decision, and as scientific information
and knowledge accumulate from cognition at a rate unparalleled in human
history, it gives rise to interpretational complexities. The complexities brought
a growing need for philosophy to help reinterpret old data in a new setting,
analyze the new and synthesize the new and old data. The analysis and synthesis help to generalize the accumulated data that will form the essential
element of knowledge for input into decisions and choices. Decision-choice
processes are the beneficiaries of the results of scientific activities and the
path of progress of science is decision-choice-determined. Decision-choice
process is the organic enveloping of social production in terms of direction
and results. In this respect, as science becomes more and more interwoven
into the entire social fabric, and as its practice becomes increasingly more
successful, dependable and goal-oriented, there tends to arise as well an ever
increasing concern of all reflective people on certain philosophical problems
of scientific concepts and definitions, techniques and methods of scientific
inquiry. These concerns are carried over to the path of cognition, and in fact,
extended to the social utility of activities of scientific research, and other cognitive activities in addition to ethnical uses and practice of science. The questions that may be raised about science reduce to questions about rationality of
human decision-choice activities in the whole field of production where concepts, methods, techniques and others become scrutinized under decisionchoice rationality.
The fundamental principles for dealing with such philosophical problems
of concepts, methods, techniques and social utility of scientific research fall
under philosophy of science. Thus philosophy of science can be viewed in
terms epistemics of decision theory or meta-theory of knowledge. As an epistemics of decision theory, it marks off a specialized area of philosophical
cognition and analysis that not only examine thought in the decision processes, but the intelligence embodied in decision-making and choice processes
without which the human knowledge space is non-constructible. This decision-choice intelligence will be examined as part of general science of methodology in the view that the practice of science is also the that of decisionmaking and that the techniques and methods of philosophical investigation of
science are equally applicable to that of decision-making or the theory of decision-choice process.
Here many views exist. These views tend to influence thought on decision
making, intelligibility of decision and decision outcomes. In order to constrain
these views, a certain cognitive scope must be defined and held with elastic
bounds on science itself and growth of knowledge. The establishment of these
elastic bounds imposes certain philosophical problems of scientific concepts,
definitions, and techniques, methods of scientific inquiry and social utility of
scientific research. Decision-choice rationality may be viewed in terms of a
general process of epistemological construct. Even though this is not the only
way of viewing decision-choice theory, it is a powerful and useful way in
conceptualizing the growth of knowledge through a rational process.
The foundational approach to deal with these problems falls under the philosophy of science and in particular, epistemics of cognition where philosophy of science marks off a specialized area analysis and synthesis. In the area
of human decisions the fundamental approach to the problems will fall under
philosophy of decision-choice science. Here, some care must be taken since
philosophy itself is also under scrutiny by decision-choice activities and corresponding rationalities. The philosophy of decision-choice science, just like
philosophy of science, in general, is a meta-theory on theories of decision
making and choice action in all areas of human activities, including knowledge production. The logical process for organizing this meta-theory is the
science of methodology as applied to reflections, concepts, analysis, syntheses
and conclusions on the theoretical constructs. The subject matter of the metatheory is thought, that has its own validity and social utility. It involves philosophical inquiry that covers a miscellany of problems of cognition. It has
been pointed out that the whole enterprise of science and other aspects of
cognition are integral part of human decision making and as such the study of
the decision-choice rationality is also the study of the rationality of growth of
knowledge. It cannot be looked otherwise as to do so is to neglect the fundamental idea that life itself is production-consumption duality or life-death polarity with tensions, resolutions and development. These tensions, resolutions
and developments draw their energy from decision-choice process and institutions that transmit those processes into actions. This may be shown to be valid
in humanistic and non-humanistic systems. At the level of the abstract, the
production-consumption duality may in turn be related to transformationsubstitution duality.
For any given institutions of decision making, and any arrangement of social norms, the philosophy of science of decision making just like the philosophy of other sciences, acquires different character with various reflective minds. The particular set of views on the nature and content of philosophy of science that one holds would be particular to ones school of thought
within philosophical categories. Working knowledge and awareness of these
views of differential nature are important to the development of philosophy
of science and the rational path that the science of methodology may take.
These views must always be confined into a flexible scope that allows philosophical analysis of scientific problems to be critical, illuminating and
analytically contributing to our understanding of cognition and decisionmaking. In fact, the scope can be neither rigid nor absolute since such characteristic will constrain the evolution of science and the whole enterprise of
knowledge creation.
The more ramified science becomes the more varied does the philosophical views about science and the implied methodology become. In this respect, both science and philosophy place important critical demands on each
other as a mutually determining process within the decision-choice envelop-
ing as human cognition advances on its path of inquiry and knowledge. The
critical demands on philosophy and science are reflected in discussions on
convincing answers to a classical question: how do people learn about the
world, universe and society of which they are integral part? In other words,
how do people come to know the truth and reality about nature and society
and how does this knowledge come to affect social decision making at all
fronts? This question relates to existence of what there is and its knowability
in terms of how what there is can be known by humans. The knowability of
what there is, is cognitive activity that requires decision-making which, in
turn, demands some intelligent behavior as well as requiring basic information. Alternatively stated, knowledge production is decision-choice process
that has its own rational support.
In an attempt to answer this important question of what there is, and related
ones, two schools of thought with corresponding logics have emerged. They
are materialism and idealism which then branch off into metaphysics and dialectics. For the current analysis, it suffices to know that the philosophical materialism suggests to us that the answer to the above question may be found
through the observation that matter is the source of human knowledge. This
position accords matter as the primary category of reality on the basis of
which knowledge is acquired. Philosophical idealism, on the other hand, suggests to us that the answer to the same question may be found through human
cognitive process as the organizing source of knowledge. This position affirms the mind as the primary category of reality on the basis of which human
knowledge is acquired. Each of these positions is cognitively ridged in the
knowledge evolution and unsustainable in understanding the substitutiontransformation process of actual-potential duality. A rigid adherence to any of
these positions becomes an ideological constraint as well as an important barrier to the process of knowledge discovery and application to which it may be
put to the service of humanity. As we have argued in [R20.20] human knowledge combines both position in terms of duality and polarity, and science and
philosophy have unity in the cognitive process whose results come to affect
human decision-making process. Knowledge and decision appear as inseparable duality with continuous give-and-take relations. Knowledge is acquired
through cognition; cognition develops through human decision, which is
shaped by the state of accumulated knowledge that is composed of scientific
and non-scientific elements, as well as proven and over-proven characteristics. All these appear as dualities, and polarities in unity.
1.2 The Unity of Science, Philosophy and Rational Inquiry
1.2 The Unity of Science, Philosophy and

Rational Inquiry
In general, cognition proceeds through philosophical deliberation and scientific analysis and synthesis. Here science examines philosophy and philosophy
analyzes science in terms of their collective contributions to accumulated
knowledge and the growth of knowledge. In terms of relative relations of philosophy and science and how they are connected to rationality, we have to
seek answers to some fundamental questions as: What is science? What is
philosophy/ and what is rationality? What is the relationship between philosophy and science in terms of human cognition? The first question involves differences in content and methods of human cognition and how they contribute
to knowledge accumulation and justified or unjustified belief. The second
question involves the relative mutual interdependence of philosophy and science within the process of cognition. The third question involves the best path
of knowing. A question thus arises as to whether philosophical thought is different from scientific thought and whether the processes of thinking and
knowing are different in the two cases. Yet another question arises as to how
philosophy contributes to scientific thought and how science contributes to
philosophical thought and what are the defining rational elements in their approaches.
There are many views that are held on these questions depending on a particular conception of knowledge and knowledge acquisition in which one operates. From the perspective of social production, science may be looked at as
a process of discovering that which is new in nature and society. The enterprise of science on the other hand is the organization for the production of
scientific thought. As an analytical distinction, philosophy may be viewed as
the process of illuminating questions about general cognition through critical
reflections in attempts to find some meaningful and intelligible answers to
questions of interest which may include questions about science and rationality. The activities of philosophical thought are the enterprise of philosophy. In
this way the philosophy of science may be seen as a thought process that is
directed toward illuminating questions about science, scientific thought and
the enterprise of science in attempts to find intelligibility of scientific answers
and utility of a particular and general enterprise of science. For example, philosophy of science may raise a question as to the nature and character of different categories of sciences and their attempt to provide answers to internally
specific questions that are sought to improve social formation and manage-
ment of society. It may provide philosophical critiques and clarifications of

concept explication, concept formation and content formation of science. It
may also provide critical reflections on methods and techniques used in the
production process of scientific knowledge that will also include the best (optimal) epistemic path of accumulation of scientific know-how.
Philosophy of science may further subject the methodology of the whole
scientific enterprise of cognition to critical analysis and synthesis as well as
examine the social utility of results and uses of knowledge outcomes. Furthermore, it may examine the methods and techniques for accepting outcomes
of scientific cognition as true knowledge. All these involve human decisionmaking activities that must be guided by some collective intelligence. Philosophy of science therefore is a critical investigation about scientific thought,
but not the production of scientific thought. Its goal is to guide and help find
desirable path to scientific knowledge. If philosophy engages the enterprise of
a specific category of cognition such as decision science then we speak of philosophy of the areas category such as philosophy of decision science, economics or education or mathematics or others. This is not the only way to
view philosophy of science as it relates to critical reflections on subject matters of cognition.
As presented, philosophy of science (here, the term science is used in a
general definition) concerns itself with the analysis and synthesis of the structure of scientific knowledge and the path to it. Since there are many paths, and
each path entails cost, philosophy of science helps to provide decision-choice
rules for best path selection. It helps in clarifying the nature of criteria for accepting the results of scientific activity as knowledge, through examination of
conditions of confirmation and verification of scientific conclusions that are
claimed to be true. All philosophical and scientific productions are connected
to the initial question as to how people learn about the universe and the society of which they are integral part and how the acquired knowledge can be
used to improve human conditions. Thus, in general, philosophy raises questions about the theory of knowledge that may contain the sub-theory of scientific discovery and the need for methodology of scientific research as conscious and rational process.
Science meanwhile is an enterprise of critical inquiry into discovering the
realities of nature and society, and philosophy of science is a critical inquiry
into science as a set of cognitive tools for knowledge creation and accumulation. Philosophy reflects on science and science theorizes about philosophy in
the general cognition. This interaction presents a special unity of human
knowledge creation with defined conditions of relationality between science
and philosophy as guided by collectively acceptable conditions of rational

inquiry. The nature of the relationship (conflict and cooperation) between science and philosophy has been an important source of energy for a creative
dialogue between philosophy and science and between philosophers and scientists. Whether a scientist admits of or not, his or her path of knowledge activities is shaped and continually being shaped by philosophical reflections
and ideology that has taken hold of the society.
Similarly, the path of philosophical reflections is shaped and being shaped
by the progress of science. In fact, one may look at the relationship in terms of
science-philosophy duality under tension in cognitive unity, where philosophy
tends to negate and challenge science, and science tends to negate and challenge philosophy. Of course, we can speak of sociology, economics and history of science, but these can be treated under the ambit of philosophy and
science broadly defined. The nature of relationship between science and philosophy in the process of cognition has produced disagreements between scientists on one hand and philosophers on the other that create intra-group conflicts among scientists and philosophers. Such disagreements, in the unity of
cognition, are the energy sources for maintaining a creative tension between
science and philosophy and between science and philosophy on one hand and
the growth of knowledge on the other. All these take place under conditions of
rational inquiry.
Philosophy, on the course of its critical investigation into scientific propositions and conclusions about nature and society, tends to formulate crude theoretical content of reality (what there is) from which different branches of science tend to emerge and grow in the cognitive process. When such branches
of science or knowledge sectors emerge, the nature of their contents, claims
and appropriate methodological guidance for their development and growth
then becomes important objects of philosophical inquiry under the ambit of
philosophical rationality that provides a set of critical rules that assists the
conduct and methodology of science. Science on the other hand may investigate philosophical claims and critiques in terms of scientific rationality that
provides a set of admissible rules in acceptance of philosophical reflections.
Thus, science and philosophy exist in dynamic unity. This unity lies in the
idea that some initial philosophical understanding may be obtained from critical reflections upon the content and nature of science and scientific methodology. In this way philosophical reflections on scientific methodology, mode of
thinking, content of science and utility of scientific knowledge, are essential
10
to the growth of philosophical knowledge and critical inquiry into scientific

contents and claims.
From the position of theory and unity of knowledge accumulation, the development of philosophy tends to increase the domain of scientific inquiry
and cognition while scientific investigation and their results increase the domain of philosophical inquiry as they provide new fertile grounds of knowledge verification. In general, therefore, philosophical interpretations and critique of contents and results of science become fertile grounds for further scientific inquiry, theory and the discovery of that which is humanly new in nature and society. Philosophy draws on achievements of science while science
draws on the gains of philosophy. In this way a dynamic and intellectual intercourse and creative conflict are maintained between philosophy and science
as well as between philosophers and scientists. On the road to human cognition and discovery of what there is, (the actual), conditions of its existence,
change what there is and actualize what would be, (potential) from what there
is not (space of potentials), philosophy guides the scientist while on the road
to philosophical generalization and interpretation of scientific data, science
guides the philosopher. This is the trajectory of the growth and development
of human mastery of nature and society. It is this dynamic behavior as science-philosophy duality, that places critical demands on the scientist to acquire the skills of philosophical rationality, and on philosophers to also acquire the skills of scientific rationality, and both scientists and philosophers to
search for cognitive rationality in the enterprise of knowledge creation generated by decision-choice process.
The mastery of nature and society is embedded in the dynamics of actualpotential duality on the road to cognition and development. From the view
point of general cognition or theory of knowledge, philosophy may be viewed
as an organized system of generalized theoretical views of the world, of nature, of society and of people. Philosophy is thus a special type of science. It
seeks to confirm a definite orientation of reality. A question may, therefore,
be asked as to what are the set of conditions under which philosophy may be
regarded as science? The question puts us in the domain of science in the
sense that we are forced to look for conditions of existence and the content of
philosophy. To look for conditions that define the boundaries of philosophy
an important corresponding question tends to arise. What is science? Any attempt to answer this question places us in a category of philosophy. The answers that may be given to those dual questions will depend on whether one
subscribes to idealism or materialism as primary category of philosophical
inquiry, and within them, whether one views the world metaphysically or dia-
11
lectically. It is also admissible that a mixture of these may be followed to abstract answers to these questions.
In spite of all these demanding questions, history of the development and
growth of knowledge suggests that the intellectual intercourse and creative
conflicts between philosophy and science have increased the power of philosophy and science to delve deeply into the structure of natural and social
phenomena in the process of answering the question of what there is and its
knowability on one hand and what would be and its actualization on the other
hand. This growth in knowledge has been done through the answers given by
various aspects and areas of science to questions of their own specificities and
with further reflectively philosophical understand of various paths of methodology and contents of science. The importance of whether philosophy is science and science is philosophy vanishes, or reduces to minimum if one views
science and philosophy as duality in the categories where categorial transformations occur between philosophy and specific area of science with dialectical unity in cognition.
Philosophical generalizations and interpretations of scientific methodology
and data are fed back creatively into critical science. Such generalizations and
interpretations become fertile grounds for further scientific inquiry as well as
objects of scientific enterprise. In this way creative conflict is maintained between science and philosophy and between scientific rationality and philosophical rationality. Science tends to investigate philosophical claims and philosophy reflects on a meta-theoretic ways of science and the enterprise of science. There is, therefore, a living unity between science and philosophy at
every moment of development of cognition and the reasoning path for knowledge accumulation where philosophy examines the logic of reasoning in terms
of induction and deduction or construction and reduction. As such, a mechanical separation of science from philosophy leads to an important denial of
any possibly dynamic process of cognition, fruitful theoretical transformations, corrective-feedback process and effective social realization of knowledge where every claim to truth is temporary and open-ended.
Every investigator in any specific area of science directly or indirectly
works with some degree of philosophical rationality. Similarly, every investigator, in any specific area of philosophy directly or indirectly works with
some degree of scientific rationality. Both investigators in the enterprise of
knowledge production are constrained by socially acceptable conditions of
cognitive rationality in the sense of providing admissible set of rules of general knowledge production that provides guidance for both philosophical and
12
scientific rationalities. All rationalities are driven by conditions of decisionchoice process which provides discriminatory measures for their usefulness in
the knowledge enterprise. The discovery of scientific truth or a knowledge
item is always on the path of approximations through uncertainties and degrees of rationality. We shall find out in our later discussions that the degrees
of rationality are best classified under conditions of human ignorance characterized by knowledge limitativeness and vagueness, and analyzed by stochastic and fuzzy rationalities, which tend to define the structure and the boundaries of cognitive rationality. Knowledge limitativeness places us under conditions of stochastic rationality. Knowledge vagueness places us under conditions of fuzzy rationality. When the two are combined we find ourselves
placed under conditions fuzzy-stochastic or stochastic-fuzzy rationalities
The history of human cognition may be seen as an enveloping of the dynamic behavior of philosophy-science duality induced by the collective decision-choice process. In this respect, unless one realizes the power of such enveloping and living unity of science and philosophy, then on the road to scientific truth or what there is, one may tend to deal with superficialities of either
conflict or harmony in the cognitive process. Alternatively, if one has a profound intuitive sense of cognitive motion and process unity between the structural developments of categories of science and philosophy, we are inclined to
think that, one is likely to get to the roots of reality or truth if it is not found.
The dynamics of science-philosophy duality may be viewed in terms of
Kuhns structure of scientific revolution [R20.47] or Kedrovs theory of
scientific discovery [R20.41], [R20.42].Here, the creative conflict between
philosophy and science is that scientific discoveries outside the prevailing
scientific culture are presented as paradigm shifts by Kuhn while Kedrov presents them as overcoming cognitive barriers which are generated in terms of
changes in scientific culture [R20.20] [R20.21]. It will become clear in these
discussions that paradigm and cognitive barriers are generated by a collective
search for conformity. They become constraints on scientific rationality. Both
of them are elements of institutional ideology of science where the set of
characteristics of institutional ideology constitutes a subset of the set of characteristics of general social ideology.
The unity of science and philosophy tends to be strengthened by recognizing the living unity between nature and society in that science and philosophy
are the main tools, in the abstract, to understand human conditions in order to
transform nature and society through decision making and the practice of decision through choice action. At the level of cognition, science investigates
the working mechanism of nature and society. At the level of cognitive unity,
1.3 Methodology of Science and Decision-Choice Rationality
13
philosophy of science presents itself as a theory of scientific discovery of

what there is and the nature and character of what there is. The process of
scientific discovery encompasses unity of science and philosophy where conflicts tend to arise given the living essence of the development and growth of
knowledge through construction-destruction dynamics of available knowledge. Destruction does away with belief system of held subjective knowledge
that is not corroborated and verified while construction replaces the belief system with new knowledge that is yet to be corroborated and verified. This
morphological process molds the conflicts, controls them and finally integrates them into a new functional whole of social knowledge that shapes
thinking and decisions which in turn influence activities of enterprises of science, philosophy and their applications.
Cognition is not only decision-choice activity, it is decision-choice-driven
and hence at the level of production of knowledge, a question arises naturally
as to whether there is rationality in the discovery, justification, corroboration
and verification of scientific truth. In other words: is there decision-choice
rationality that constitutes a belief support for knowledge construct? Simply
stated: how do we accept some statements and elements to be true but not
false and vice versa? This question brings us to consider methodology of science and the science of decision-choice processes. The analytical structure
being presented here is that universal knowledge structure is the result of decision-making in acceptance and rejection of cognitive elements as socially
acceptable knowledge elements. Knowledge accumulation therefore is the
product of as well as an input into decision-choice process induced by some
social rules of intelligence in the cognitive space.
1.3 Methodology of Science and Decision-Choice

Rationality
The whole enterprise of knowledge production and accumulation requires social decision making. This can easily be seen if one relates the enterprise of
knowledge production to the choice of methodology, selection of problem of
interest and the choice of what constitutes either scientific truth or knowledge
element. At the level of metatheory, philosophy points us to the examination
and analysis of criterion for evaluating the strength, and appropriateness of
criteria of decision and choice for demarcating science from non-science, and
acceptance of theories in scientific enterprise all of which require a number of
decision-choice actions. These decision-choice actions involve critical under-
14
standing of the methodological and epistemological underpinnings of theories

and empirical observations within the general context of philosophy of science that must examine the outcomes of dynamic behavior of accrualpotential transformations. They further involve the epistemics of discovering
of scientific truth through explication, explicit specification of the subjects
and contents of scientific theories, direct identification of methods and analysis of theoretical constructs that are applicable to the subject matters of specific theories of science, as well as the process of accepting the conclusions of
scientific theories. The decision-choice actions are further complicated by
decision-choice constructs of the language of science through explicandumexplicatum transformation-substitution processes in the language of general
communication. The concepts of science and non-science and the required
demarcation bring into focus the need for explicit relative discussions on exact and inexact sciences as they relate to classical and fuzzy decision-choice
rationalities. The differential positions and the method of acceptance of true or
false conclusions will be made clear.
The conceptual framework of methodology is that of decision making
which is driven by the metatheory whose objective is to advance a logical system of thought that would allow theories to be evaluated in terms of their contents, internal consistency, validity of theoretical conclusions, and preferences
over rival theories that would lead to the acceptance of cognitive elements as
knowledge elements. The empirical universe of the metatheory is the set of
scientific theories broadly defined. At the level of decision and choice,
metatheory on science and knowledge creation presents itself as an evaluative
criterion for decision and selection of cognitive elements that must enter into
the social knowledge bag. Thus, metatheory involves the study of the reasoning and thinking that make up rationality of the logic of science and the wisdom of the enterprise of science.
The result of a metatheory is the discovery of rationality in scientific
thought that will answer the question whether there is a rational process of
scientific inquiry and discovery. The objective of discovering rationality in
scientific inquiry, research and discovery is to ascertain the consistency that
may be observed in any satisfactory scientific research process and knowledge-creation program. From the observed regularities of successful scientific
practices and knowledge creation, certain rules that may be followed are then
deduced under cognitive rationality as a set of optimal decision-choice rules
to be followed if the objective of the scientist is to be realized. The set of deduced rules becomes the guidelines for good scientific practice. It is a para-
15
digm of scientific thinking as well as knowledge production in the society of

its creation.
The metatheory defines and establishes the decision rules that explicitly assist the scientists in resolving disagreements and conflicts in the theater of the
game of scientific research, knowledge production and discovery of scientific
truth. The logically theoretic explanation of regularities associated with successful scientific practice and the conversion of these regularities into prescriptive decision rules for good scientific activities constitute the metatheory
which is critical philosophical reflections on science, scientific enterprise and
knowledge production. Here, meta-algorithms are carefully designed to provide socially constraint optimal path and flexible steps for the practice of science, knowledge production and discoveries in science. At the level of discovery of scientific truth the metatheory acts as a discriminator among the
choices of alternative paths toward the discovery of what there is. At the level
of scientific research, the metatheory presents itself as a selector (decision and
choice) of optimal sequence of steps on the trajectory of cognitive activities.
At the levels of both the discovery of scientific truth and the practice of science the set of metatheoretic decision rules for good scientific practice or
good practice to knowledge creation is simply human intelligence in the enterprise of science for general cognition. At the level of knowledge accumulation and growth, the metatheory presents itself as s guide to the selection and
revisions of local optimal paradigms toward the attainment of the global optimal paradigm. In this way the practices of science takes claim to rationality
and cognition is said to be scientific if it follows this human intelligence (the
established knowledge culture). The logical validity of this human intelligence
is established by theory of decision in terms of rational inquiry.
Here emerges the relational dynamics of philosophy and science in transformation-substitution process toward the establishment of rational inquiry for
societal knowledge production. The transformation-substitution process is
such that on one hand we have philosophy-science polarity and on the other,
we have science-philosophy duality. In each pole of the polarity, we have the
residence of science-philosophy duality whose behavioral dynamics tend to
induce a conversion of the poles and hence the polarity. The relational dynamics between philosophy and science are such that two interactive types of human intelligence are generated as guides to knowledge production and accumulation. These types of intelligence are philosophical and scientific rationalities. The general dynamics of the science-philosophy duality is such that science is not a spectator of philosophical activities and hence dormant on be-
16
havior of philosophical rationality into knowledge production. The human

intelligence of good scientific practices as established by philosophy is itself
subject to scientific inquiry and critical reflection as to the degree of scientific
rationality of philosophy. The structure of philosophical rationality is the result of the joint effort of both philosophers and scientists where in most cases
the philosopher scientists hold the key to unlock the optimal path to knowledge creation and accumulation within a particular subject matter of science
or knowledge sector.
The essential belief in the construct of the metatheory is that there is a rational path to scientific discovery and there is a sequence of rational steps for
good scientific practice. These rational path and steps constitute decisionchoice rationality in science and can, and must be found with structural variations that are demanded by the content of specific knowledge sector. Such
decision-choice rationality is the optimal behavior in scientific activities. The
objective of the embodied optimal decision-choice rules projected by the
metatheory, is to limit subjectivity in scientific disagreements on the path to
scientific consensus that allows costs to be minimized and the chances to discover scientific truth to be optimized in the social set-up of productionconsumption systems.
The metatheories on practice of science and discovery of scientific truth
are cognitive attempts in critical contemplations to provide rational accounts
of general behavior in the enterprise of science and to ascertain the codes of
conduct that must guide the enterprise to successfully create explicatum (scientific terms and language) from explicandum (non-scientific terms and
common language) in other to find the explanandum (that which is to be explained) and the corresponding explanans (that which explains) through decision-choice process. The finding of what there is, and the explanation of what
there is, is not sufficient to justify the resource commitment to, as well as satisfy the human quest for knowledge. The sufficiency lies on how the acquired
knowledge can be used to improve human conditions. This brings us directly
into the effectiveness and ethics of scientific knowledge and scientific enterprise or what may be characterized as ethical rationality of the enterprise of
science.
Implied in the whole enterprise of science and the supporting culture is scientific rationality. The enterprise of philosophy of science is to assist in finding the path of scientific rationality in the sense of best path of decisionchoice practices in knowledge production. The search for scientific rationality
demands philosophical rationality which in turn affects cognitive rationality in
general. The path of scientific rationality requires that each element in the so-
17
cial knowledge space satisfies three basic conditions before it is conditionally

accepted into the pool of temporally true knowledge. These three conditions
come under principles of justification, corroboration and verification of
knowledge. Justification is a set of evidential elements that leads one to belief
and claim that subjective knowledge has been obtained regarding an object, or
a state, or a process or an event in the universe. The justification is a process
driven by two factors of reception of a set of attribute signals from the universal set of characteristics, and subjective reason that allows the attribute signals
to be named and cognitively processed into an evidence-supporting belief of
subjective knowledge. Here arises the problem of reliability of how good are
the evidences in support of claims to new knowledge. This is the reliability
question of the evidence
An approach to answer the reliability question is to appeal to the principles
of insufficient reason due to complexities in that the evidence in support of
the claims is reasonable and probabilistically reliable indicator of reality, as
registered by human belief-formation in obtaining knowledge. The justification of subjective knowledge based on information and reason may be faulty
due to cognitive flaws in reason and lost of attribute signals in the communication process. This may produce knowledge that is fallible or vague or ambiguous and hence other decisions based on such knowledge as their inputs will
be seriously defective. The justification principle must be supported by the
conditions of corroboration.
The concept conditions and principle of corroboration as being advanced
here in support of cognitive rationality are different from those suggested by
Popper [R20.70] Lakatos [R20.53] [R20.54]. Here the set of conditions of
justified belief through perception and reasoning is compared to the set of
characteristics defining the element of reality. The lack of corroboration between the set of justification conditions and the set of characteristic conditions
leads to temporary rejection of the underlying belief as well as critical examinations of the claim to objectivity of the acquired new subjective knowledge.
If the set of justification conditions is corroborated, then the new subjective
knowledge element is verified against the element of reality in order to be
sure that the new subjective knowledge element must belong to the true
knowledge set (or bag). The nature and structure of the principles of justification, corroboration and verification are discussed fully in Chapter 2 under the
title Information and Knowledge in Decision Choice Rationality. It may be
pointed out that the conditions of justification, corroboration and verification
are used to establish decision-choice rationality in accepting true knowledge.
18
The principles of justification, corroboration and verification constitute a

unity in pyramidal logic where the center is our knowledge construct. The
acceptance of scientific truth requires the three principles.
The decision choice rationality in accepting or rejecting a cognitive element
into the knowledge set constitutes a social paradigm of knowledge creation. It
is the result of metetheoretic activities. It defines the prevailing social attitude
toward knowing and knowledge creation. The decision-choice rationality in
knowledge production is simply the cognitive rationality that defines the
boundaries of rational behavior and inquiry in the construct of the knowledge
set. At this point it is useful to view cognitive rationality in terms of general
and specific rationalities. General cognitive rationality consists of a set of socially established and agreed upon decision-choice rules that are abstracted as
constituting conditions of common behavior of rational inquiry, irrespective
of the subject matter of a knowledge area. In a sense, it may be viewed as an
enveloping of the common elements that characterize decision-choice rationalities in various specific areas of social cognition where decisions and
choices are the driving forces on the paths of social knowledge construction
and reduction. Specific rationality builds upon the general rationality in a way
that allows decisions and choices to be made about knowledge items in specific areas of sciences and knowledge sectors.
Rationality and rational analysis are universal cognitive aids for knowledge
construction, knowledge reduction and decision-choice systems. They constitute foundations of unity of science and general human cognition. They also
form the foundations of logics of constructionism and reductionism. In this
respect, the history of global intellectual heritage may be viewed as the historical unity of cognitive (intellectual) systems constructed by certain persons
or group of persons whose efforts were, or, are directed toward particular
ideas through certain paths of analysis and synthesis on the basis of reason
and socially agreed upon rules. This basis of reasoning leading to socially acceptable knowledge element into the universal knowledge bag (or set) is the
prevailing cognitive rationality as the dominant paradigm of knowledge production. In this respect, the history of scientific discovery and the discovery of
natural and social realities is also the history of the search for collective rationality without which the construction and reduction of human knowledge
will be taken over by the tyranny of opinions.
It is this cognitive rationality that constitutes the foundation of encyclopedic integration of knowledge sectors, human endeavors and ambitions in the
general decision-choice space. It is here that decision-choice rationality assumes its cognitive universality and establishes the basis for systemecity. The
1.4 Explanatory and Prescriptive Sciences
19
unifying factor among knowledge sectors and hence areas of sciences is the
search for rationality in exlicandum-explicatum, (pre-scientific-to-scientific)
explanandum-explanans, (that which is to be explained-to-that which explains) praedicendum-praedicens (that which is to be predicted-to-that which
predicts) and praescricendum-praescricens (that which is to be prescribed-tothat which prescribes) processes of human actions toward the development of
knowledge bag of global intellectual heritage. The point of emphasis is that
scientific and philosophical rationalities are part of universal cognitive rationality of knowledge creation and human activities through decision-choice
processes. It is on the basis of this framework that it is useful to view human
history as enveloping of success-failure outcomes in decision-choice space.
These success-failure outcomes are the result of individual and collective intelligence that we call decision-choice rationality.
The decision-choice rationality as established in societies at any point of
time is a product of collective work whose foundations rest on the societal
belief system that have taken hold at the same relevant time points. Thus, decision-choice rationalities in general and specific are belief-system dependent.
As such, the paradigm of knowledge creation, as a product of general rationality, is also dependent on and restricted by the social belief system that has
taken hold on the society. We shall discuss this idea in details when we deal
with rationality and ideology under conditions of vagueness and cognitive
limitations. We simply want to point out that the global intellectual heritage
composed of sets of knowledge elements with proven and unproven ideas is
the product of decision-choice rationality that rests on categories of belief systems that are derived from the dominant ideologies of societies. The decisionchoice rationality and the belief systems may be related to two broad categories of knowledge structure of explanatory and prescriptive sciences to which
we turn our attention.

A question related to the task of science arises in all sectors of sciences. Is
science about problem solving or is it about the discovery of what there is and
explanation of the behavior of what there is or is it about actualizing what
ought to be from the space of what there is not? Should the discovery of what
there is, the scientific explanation and prescription be considered as human
problem solving activities? To what extent are these questions different from
each other or related to one another? The answers to these questions lead to a
20
particular school of thought and category of science. There are two schools of
thought that may be identified in the practice of science at the modern knowledge constructions process and uses of knowledge. There are those knowledge
seekers who think that science is concerned with discovery and explanation of
what there is. In other words, the task of science is to produce explanandum
(that which is to be explained) and explanans (that which explains). The explanans leads to conclusions that must be examined against the explanandum.
We shall refer to this category of activities of science as explanatory science
and logical construct as explanatory theory whose cognitive path is shown in
Figure 1.4.1b. Similarly there are those who think that science is about improvement of what there is by bringing into being that which ought to be from
among the elements in the space of what there is not. In other words, the task
of science is to actualize the desired potential that resides in nature. We shall
refer to this category of activities of science as prescriptive science and the
logical construct as prescriptive theory whose cognitive structure is shone in
Figure 1.4.1c. In both cases the enterprise of science is about the dynamic behavior of actual-potential duality where explanatory and prescriptive sciences
have cognitive unity that is inseparable. Both the explanatory and prescriptive
theories begin from explication where the language of science is formed by
moving from pre-scientific to scientific as shown in Figure1.4.1a.
1
A1
From
Common
Language
A2
To
The
Language
of
Science
A3
Fig. 1.4.1a. Process of constructing a Scientific Language System

A1 = Explicandum A 2 = Explicatum A 3 = Science space , where i ' s are cognitive transformation functions and 3 = 1 2
B1
B2
3
C1
T
H
E
P
A
T
H
O
F
B3
f1
f3
B3
21
f2
C2
E
X
P
L
A
N
A
T
O
R
Y
T
H
E
O
R
Fig. 1.4.1b. Cognitive Transformation Path of Explanatory Science

where B1 = Explanandum (that which is to be explained) B 2 = Explanans (that which
explains) B 3 = Result (conclusion) C1 = Praedicendum (that which is to be predicted) C 2 = Praedicens (that which predicts). The values 1 , 2 , with 3 = 1 2
and f1 , f 2 with f3 = f1 f 2 are logical transformation functions and I is an identity
transformation function
The emerged theoretical construct in explanatory science is an explanatory

theory while the emerged theoretical construct in prescriptive science is a prescriptive theory. In explanatory science and the corresponding category of
explanatory theories, the primary category of cognitive activities is the actual
where an explanatory theory provides us with a set of decision rules for the
recognition of the existence and understanding of the behavior of the actual.
From successful explanatory theory, that which is to be predicted (praedicendum) and that which predicts (praedicens) are derived and practiced. In the
prescriptive science, and the corresponding category of prescriptive theories
the primary category of cognitive activities is the potential where a prescriptive
22
T
H
E
g1
D1
D
g
g2
E1
O
F
D3
h1
h3
E3
E2
h2
P
A
T
H
P
R
E
S
C
R
I
P
T
I
V
E
T
H
E
O
R
Fig. 1.4.1c. Cognitive Transformation Path of Prescriptive Science

where D1 = Praescricendum (that which is to be prescribed) D 2 = Praescricens (that
which prescribes) D 3 = Result (conclusion) E 1 = Ex-post Explanandum (that which is
to be explained ex-post) E 2 = Ex-post explanans (that which explains). The values
g1 ,g 2 , with g 3 = g1 g 2 and h1 ,h2 with h3 = h1 h2 are logical transformation functions
and I is an identity transformation function.
theory provides us with a set of decision rules for actualizing the preferred
potential among the elements of what there is not which are inherent in nature and society. Similarly, from the prescriptive theory that which is to be
explained (explanandum) and that which explains (explanans) are obtained
where the praescricendum becomes ex-post explanandum and prescricens
becomes ex-post explanans in the knowledge creational process. Thus,
within the structure of general scientific practice, we have two sets of cognitive constructs composed of sets of explanatory decision rules and sets of
prescriptive decision rules. There are as many of these sets as there are theories given either that which is to be explained or that which is to be pre-
23
scribed. In this respect, two explanatory theories are set to be equivalent for
a given phenomenon if their sets of explanatory decision rules are contained
in each other without a residue. This statement holds for two prescriptive
theories in the senses of identity, similitude and indifference. Two explanatory or prescriptive theories are said to be rival if their sets of explanatory or
prescriptive decision rules are either disjoint or their symmetric difference is
non-empty. This requires us to examine the internal relations of categories
of theories.
Definition 1.4.1
If A is a set of constructed Decision rules and A is its complement for
Theory 1, ( T1 ) about a specified element, z, in a given environment, v, and B
is a set of Decision rules for ( T1 ) and B is its complement for theory 2, ( T2 )
for the same element and environment then T1 and T2 are said to be completely rival theories if A B= . They are said to be partially rival if either
A B with A B , B A and ( A B ) ( B A ) = . Two
theories T1 and T2 , 1 2 are said to be completely modifying (modification
theories) if A B and either A B or B A . They are said to be partially modifying if they are partially rival. They are said to be equivalent
if A B or B A .
We shall now generalize the above definition.
Definition 1.4.2
L et E be a logical mapping from a theory space, T = {T1 , T2 Ti Tn } ,
into a space A = { A 1 , A 2 A i A n } of sets of constructed decision rules
about a given element, z, in a specified environment, v, such that
E ( Ti ) A i and E T j A j and let R andC be rivalry and competing
relational operators respectively then ( i j )
( )
Ti R T j
A A = , complete rivalry
j
i
if A i A j or A j A i
then A i A j A j A i = , partial rivalry
) (
And hence A iC A j ; where Ti R T j and A iC A j mean T j and Ti are rivalry theories and A i and A j are competing sets of decision rules for an element, z, in
an environment, v in degrees otherwise they are said to be non-rival and noncompeting.
24
A B=
Fig. 1.4.1. Disjoint Sets of Decision Fig. 1.4.2. Containment Set for ComRules for Completely Rival Theories
pletely Modifying Theories
Ti and T j , i j
Ti and T j , i j
AB
( A B ) ( B A )
Fig. 1.4.3. Non-Disjoint Set of Decision Rules for Partially Rival and Partially Modifying Theories Ti and T j , i j
Definition 1.4.3
Any two theories are said to be mutually modifying if
Ti
M Tj
A A or A A , mutually modifying
j
j
i
i
if A i A j , A i A j or A j A i
and A i A j A j A i = , partial modifying
) (
where M is a modifying relation over theories, T j and Ti
25
A decision-choice problem regarding a preferred theory does not arise if

constructed theories and the corresponding decision rules about the same phenomenon are non-rival, non-competing and completely modifying. In this
case, they are mutually modifying with respect to the given phenomenon. A
question arises, however, as to how we establish preferences over rival, and
partially rival theories about the same phenomenon in the same environment,
and what are the optimal selection rules for choosing an optimal theory. The
set of rules for selecting the optimal theory is the decision-choice rationality
which is established by criteria index over the rival theories in the knowledge
production process. The analytical foundation for the construct of such criteria
index is the meta-theory on science. The preference ordering over theories is
based on degrees of scientific truth contained in the theories and such degree
of scientific truth is established through fuzzy rationality that allows the applications of techniques of soft sciences (inexact science)to deal with vagueness
problems, ambiguities in linguistic structures and approximations in reasoning
in hard sciences (exact science).
The current development in the theory of soft computing is increasingly
opening up new avenues of scientific reasoning where allowance is made for
the investigator to interact with the problem under study. The cognition in
both explanatory and prescriptive sciences generates scientific theories. A
theory is said to be scientific if it contains a set of deductive decision rules for
explanation and prediction of a behavior of a phenomenon, or for a prescription to actualize a phenomenon on the path for construction of either the explanatory or prescriptive decision rules that satisfy the conditions of established paradigm. The derived decision rules will correspond to the deductive
principles of the human intelligence of the theory, ex-post in the case of the
former and ex-ante in the case of the latter. The former belongs to explanatory
science and the latter belongs to prescriptive science. Let us turn our attention
to explanatory science, prescriptive science and decision-choice rationality
while keeping in mind that definitions 1.4.1, 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 are neutral to explanatory and prescriptive theories such that we can examine each one of
them in the dynamics of explanation-prescription duality. A definitional distinction of rationality will be useful at this point.
Definition 1.4.4
Rationality is a set of optimal selection rules that explains or prescribes action
steps in decision-choice process. It is said to be stochastic if it incorporates
random elements due to limited exact information. It is said to be fuzzy if it
incorporates elements of vagueness of all forms.
26
1.4.1
Explanatory Science and Decision-Choice Rationality
Explanatory science involves explanation and prediction of a phenomenon.

The deductive activities in explanatory science leads to explanatory theory
while the empirical activities lead to the test of the logical claims of the theory. The explanatory science corresponds to classical science. The practitioners of the classical science hold the view that the primary objective of scientific activity is the explanation and prediction of what there is, or the reality.
Considered in terms of actual-potential duality, science, in classical cognitive
system, takes claim to actual as the primary category of analysis and synthesis
and the potential as the derived category of analysis and synthesis. The metatheoretic analysis examines the validity of the explanatory-predictive decision
rules implied in the classical cognitive system of sciences.
In the explanatory science there are five items involved in decision-choice
rationality that constitutes the set of explanatory and predictive decisionchoice rules for knowledge construction (make reference to Figure 1.4.0b). At
the basic level of theoretical construct, we have the general environment that
may be partitioned into subsets by the use of assumptions where such subsets
may be placed into categories. The collection of these partitions will be designated by with a generic element . These five items help to sprit the
inductive and deductive structures into logical parts given that explication has
been completed to arrive at explicatum. On the side of explanation, we have
the explanandum that may be identified with the required explanatory element, and the corresponding explanans that may be identified with the set of
decision rules, A contained in a theory T . The explanandum identifies the
phenomenon to be explained. The explanans relates to the set of decision rules
that provides explanation to the explanandum given a particular environment, . At the level of prediction we have the praedicendum and the
corresponding praedicens. The praedicendum identifies the phenomenon
whose future course is to be predicted under the environment of explanatory
construct composed of explanatory decision-choice rules.
The praedicens constitutes the set of decision rules that provides the understanding of the occurrences of the future course of the praedicendum under
the same environment of the construct of the explanans. The set of decision
rules for either the explanans or praedicens must contain at least one empirical
regularity regarding the phenomenon under explanans or praedicens. Thus explanation and prediction are the necessary characteristics of classical science
where each theory by necessity contains a component of explanation and a
component of prediction. Explanatory decision rules may be viewed from the
standpoint of the logic of constructionism while the predictive decision rules
27
may be viewed from the stand point of the logic of reductionism. The scientific
truth about the implied regularities is necessary as well as contingent which has
vague and approximate characteristics that are defined in a fuzzy space involving explication that allows us to move from pre-scientific environment of
common language to scientific environment of specialized languages.
Let us suppose from the structure of Definitions 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 that we are
working in explanatory science and that there are a number of completely and
partially rival explanatory theories about a phenomenon, b B in given environment where B is a set of explananda whose generic element is b .
Let this set of rival explanatory theories be specified as
T = {Ti | i I , b B and }
(1.4.1.1)
where I is an index set of all available theories about b B in an assumed

environment . Corresponding to this set of theories is a family E of
sets of explanatory decision rules, E (explanans) that may be specified as:
E = {Ei | i I ,b B and }
(1.4.1.2)
and a corresponding family of A , of sets of predictive decision rules (praedicens), A about the praedicendum, b B of the form:
A = { A i | i I , b B and }
(1.4.1.3)
From the families E and A we obtain the set of predicted outcomes B for
future behavior of b B that may be written as:
B = {Bi | Ti T , Ei = f ( Ti ) , A i = g ( E ) ,i I , Bi = q ( A i ) , b B and }
(1.4.1.4)
where f ( i ) , g ( i ) and q ( i ) are logical functions such that Ei depends on Ti ,
A i depends on Ei and Bi depends on A i . f ( i )
In an explicit language the theory Ti generates a set of explanatory decision rules, Ei which then generates prediction, A i about future behavior of
b B with an outcome Bi . Care must be taken in interpreting equation
(1.4.1.4). The B is a set of all predicted values on the basis of all available
theories. For any Bi , Ti is an information support of Ei in the sense that it
produces the set of explanatory decision rules about the observed as well as
provide the basis of justified belief in Ei . Similarly Ei generates the set of
predictive decision rules for A i about the future behavior of what there is and
28
Ti
Ei
g
q
Bi
Ai
E
X
P
L
A
N
A
T
O
R
Y
T
H
E
O
R
Y
Fig. 1.4.1.1. Logical Transformation Functions in Construction of Explanatory Theory:

The Explanatory Knowledge Square
hence by logical extension Ei is the information support of A i . The implication is that Ti is an information support for A i , i I by reduction. The
sets Ti , Ei and A i constitute information support for the belief of existence
and explanation of what there is and its predicted outcome, B.
Given these four, T , E , B and A , the rationality of implied explanatory
(classical) science may be derived. First, we define an ideal set, E , of explanatory decision rules for a given explanadum and an ideal set, A , of predictive decision rules for a given praedicendum and predicted ideal outcome
B B under an environment . The set Ei is said to be a perfect explanation (explanans) if Ei = E and its corresponding set of predictive decision
rules is said to be perfect if A i = A . The set of explanatory decision rules Ei
is said to offer no explanation if Ei E = and the set of predictive decision
rules A i is said to offer no useful prediction if A i A = .
Now let ( i ) be a measure of degree of explanatory power and ( i ) the
measure of degree of prediction power. Both ( Ei ) and ( i ) are themselves
under scientific constructs and philosophical deliberation leading to the establishment of another set of decision-choice rules. The value, ( Ei ) = 1, if
Ei E and E Ei . The value, ( i ) = 0 if Ei E = . Similarly, ( A i ) = 1
if A i A . The conditions of explanation may then be written as:
29
= 1 if Ei E and E Ei
( perfect explanation )
( Ei ) = 0 if Ei E =
( no explanation )
( 0 ,1) if Ei E and Ei E ( degrees of explanation )

(1.4.1.5)
These are the conditions of explanatory theory that may be subjected to empirical analysis through the process of corroboration. The corresponding conditions of prediction may be stated as:
= 1 if A i A and A A i
( perfect prediction )
(1.4.1.6)
( A i ) = 0 if A i A =
( zero prediction )
( 0,1) if A i A and A i A ( degrees of prediction )
If ( Ei ) = 1 and ( A i ) = 1 then not only is Ei = E and A i = A but that

Bi = B and ( B B ) O without a residue where O is the relational empty
set. It will be shown that the conditions ( Ei ) ( 0,1) and ( A i ) ( 0 ,1) define paths of knowledge accumulation that involve lack of information and
presence of vagueness where stochastic and fuzzy uncertainties are present
leading to probabilistic or approximate logical reasoning to establish stochastic rationality or fuzzy rationality or hybrid of both. Both stochastic and fuzzy
rationalities provide justifications for the refinements of theories and updating
of knowledge accumulation.
Given the above description of abstract model of classical science we can
derive the implied classical rationality in the explanatory (classical) science.
It simply states that select from the set of rival explanatory theories, the theory, T T which has both highest explanatory and predictive indexes. The
decision-choice rationality for knowledge production, given the parametric
characterization of the environment, may be stated as:
max ( A i )
Ti
st. Ti T = {Ti | ( Ei ) [ 0,1] , ( A i ) ( 0 ,1] , Bi B, and b B}

Ei = f ( T i , )
A i = g ( Ei , )
Bi = h ( A i ,)
(1.4.1.7)
30
There are three sub-rationalities involved in this classical cognitive process.

There is a set of conditions of rational explanation (rational explanans) that
relates to the theorys constructed explanatory decision rules and the rational
praedicens that relates to the constructed predictive decision rules and thirdly,
there is a set of conditions for rational selection of a preferred theory on the
basis of best explanans and praedicens.
For an explanatory theory within the classical science to meet conditions of
classical rationality, it must pass the test of conditions of explanatory rationality and predictive rationality in order to become a contender for the application of choice rationality. The optimal solution to equation (1.4.1.7) through
the application of meta-algorithms and soft-computing will appear in the form
such as A*i where A*i = g E*i and E*i = f Ti* . The cognitive structure
Ti* is the optimal theory in the sense that it has the highest explanatory power
and predictive power among the contending theories given the environment
and the object what there is for explanation. We must add that explanatory and corresponding theories involve decision-making and problem
solving. Such decision and problem-solving activities are directed toward revealing the secrets of what there is but not to change it.
The optimal decision-choice rationality implied in theory-selection problem
of equation 1.4.1.7 has no restriction on the explanatory power. It may be tightened by imposing explanatory constraint through the construct of -level set of
acceptable degree of explanation by the constraint ( Ei ) ( 0 ,1) . In this
respect, the explanatory constraint problem for the selection of the optimal theory may be written as:
( )
( )
( )
max ( A i )
Ti
st. Ti T = {Ti | ( Ei ) [ 0 ,1] , ( A i ) ( 0 ,1] , Bi B, and b B}

Ei = f ( T i , )
A i = g ( Ei , )
( Ei )
(1.4.1.8)
In this meta-theoretic framework and soft computing, theories about a phenomenon are ranked by both explanatory and predictive indexes where the
computable decision-choice rationality is defined in terms of highest degree of
perfection indexes of explanation and prediction. The problem could also be
stated as soft optimization of the explanatory index for a predetermined fixedlevel of predictive power.
1.4.2
31
Prescriptive Science and Decision-Choice Rationality
Prescriptive science is devoted to the examination, development, analysis

and synthesis of prescriptive rules for either changing completely the actual,
or bringing into being what there is not (potential) or improving on what
there is. Thus the main scientific objective is not the explanation and prediction of what there is, but rather to change what there is to what there is not
in the actual-potential duality through substitution-transformation process.
This prescriptive view on science may be considered as non-classical science. Considered in terms of actual-potential duality, science in nonclassical cognitive system, places the potential as the primary category of
analysis and synthesis where the actual is a derived category of analysis and
synthesis. This distinguishing feature of primacy of actual and potential is
extremely important in understanding the relative contribution to knowledge
of the theories that emerge out of them, in addition to the study of science of
evolution-creation process. The activities of science in this non-classical
thinking system are decision making and problem solving regarding the
creation of what there is not that involves the direct interventions into the
dynamic behavior of actual-potential duality and transformation-substitution
process. In this framework, philosophy of science and the implied metatheoretic analysis examine the nature of the selection of the potential to be
actualized. It further examines the prescriptive decision rules contain in prescriptive theories. This examination proceeds in terms of how intelligent are
the prescriptive decision rules (praescricens) and how relevant are they to
the actualization of the potential and the disappearance of the actual. The
judgments of both the desirability of the potential and non-desirability of the
actual involve subjective phenomena in a vague environment that may be
collectively or individually motivated.
In the prescriptive science, there are three items involved in decision-choice
rationality. At the level of prescriptive construct we have the assumed environment for which the theory is developed and examined to be valid. The assume environment is part of the general environment surrounding the behavior of the potential whose actual is sought. Let G be the collection of all possible environments with a generic element G for each theory, Ti . At the
level of construction of prescriptive theory we have the praescricendum and
corresponding to it we have praescricens. The praescricendum identifies the
phenomenon whose future outcome and its path of occurrence are to be prescribed in a given environment of the theory. The praescricens constitutes the
constructed decision rules that provide the action steps for bringing into exis-
32
tence the phenomenon associated with the praescricendum in an assumed environment. The praescricendum and praescricens are associated with the potential in the actual-potential duality where the selected potential is to be actualized and the unwanted actual is to be potentialized from existence. The
praescricendum is always the potential that is to be actualized in a given environment in which its presence is unrecognized. The praescricens presenting
the decision rules for actualizing the potential may be defined in a fuzzy space
or in the space of dynamic approximations where the differences among outcomes and ideals provide the laws of motion that govern the sequential approximation process of the praescricens and updating of the prescriptive theory toward transformation-substitution dynamics. The speed with which updating occurs depends on the institutions of knowledge accumulation, paradigm of scientific activities and the diameter of social tolerance that spins the
circumference of the knowledge-production space.
The theories developed within prescriptive (non-classical) science are also
decision-choice constructs that are intended to provide optimal steps to be
followed in order to bring into being what ought to be (from the space of what
there is not) in the actual environment which it is non-existent. The environment of a particular theory may be different from those of other theories. For
each theory let hi H be the assumed environment where i I is the index
set for all possible environments associated with the theories and h H is the
ideal environment for an ideal theory T for the development of ideal prescriptive rules. The prescriptive theory has its own logical stand that must
meet the rigorous test of science. When prescriptive theory meets the test
conditions of science [R12.6], [R12.20] [R20.21] it is said to be scientific
where the prescriptive decision rules, the praescriscens, are derived by an acceptable logical process. At the level of scientific test, the prescriptive and
explanatory theories become separate in terms of procedures of the test of scientific validity. At the basic level of knowledge creation, however, a prescriptive theory is not different from an explanatory theory in terms of scientific
requirements of cognitive construct. At the level of scientific test of theoretical claims, in terms of corroboration or verification, they become separate and
demand separate conditions and logical paths of procedure and test.
Let us consider a set, T , of rival prescriptive theories about a praescricendum, v V to be actualized where V is a set of praescricenda. The praescricenda constitute the set of potentials and v V is that which out to be and
must be actualized. The set of rival prescriptive theories for the actualization
of the praescricendum v V may be written as:
T = T j | j J , j G and j V
33
(1.4.2.1)
where J is an index set for all the competing theories and j G is the assumed environment for the construct of jth-theory in the set of all possible
environments, G , and v is fixed in V . Corresponding to the set of the rival
theories is another set, P of sets of prescriptive decision rules, Pj P which
are associated with the set of theories T j , j J which may be written as:
P = Pj | T j T , j J , v j V and j G
(1.4.2.2)
A question arises as to which of the prescriptive theories must be preferred for

practice.
Alternatively, is there a way to impose decision-choice rationality on the
theories and the corresponding decision rules? To answer this question, we
observe that for any given set of prescriptive decision rules, Pj and the corresponding theory, T j we have prescriptive outcome, w j that depends on the
set of prescriptive decision rules Pj through the theory, T j . The set of these
prescriptive outcomes may be written as:
( )
( )
W = w j = k Pj | T j T , Pj P , Pj = h T j , j V , j G , j J
(1.4.2.3)
Equation (1.4.2.3) like that of (1.4.1.4) must be carefully interpreted. The
terms h ( i ) and k ( i ) are relations rather than explicit mathematical functions.
They impose particular requirements of soft computability through metaalgorithms. The relation, h ( i ) maps the relevant conclusions of the theory,
T j into the space of optimal prescriptive rules for decision-choice action. The
relation, k ( i ) on the other hand maps the set of optimal prescriptive rules
Pj into the set of prescriptive outcomes, W , through decision-choice actions.
The set, W , is composed of prescriptive outcomes, w j ' s such that the prescriptive theory T j is the logical support of the set of prescriptive decisionchoice rules Pj that generates the prescriptive outcome w j when the set of
the optimal prescriptive rules Pj is followed. The set of Pj ' s P is the information support for w j given the sets T , P , W , G , and V . The cognitive
transformation path is exemplified in Figure 1.4.2. 1.
We must make sure to distinguish between the set, W , which is composed
of prescriptive outcome (actual) ex post decision-choice action and the set, V ,
which is composed of the potential elements ex ante decision-choice action.
34
P
Ei
k
L
V
P
R
E
S
C
R
I
P
T
I
V
E
T
H
E
O
R
Y
Fig. 1.4.2.1. Logical Transformation Functions in Construction of Prescriptive Theory:

The Prescriptive Knowledge Square. The forms h, and k, are transformation functions
with I defining an identity function in Prescriptive knowledge square
Equations (14.2.1 1.4.2.3) present two structures depending on the questions

under cognitive analysis and synthesis. One structure involves the case where
v j vi V , i j J and the corresponding environments j and i G
may or may not be different. The evaluation of T j and Ti T must assess the
subjective relative desirability of v j vi V . The other structure involves the
case where v j = vi = V for all i and j J . Here the assessment of relative
desirability of theories T j and Ti T with i j J must not involve subjective desirability of v V since v V is given. This, however, does not exclude the discussion of its social rationality.
There are as many prescriptive outcomes as there are prescriptive theories
given the potential v V . There is therefore a decision-choice rationality implied in the prescriptive science. The rationality may be made explicit by first
observing that the set of prescriptive decision rules Pj from j-theory is directed toward the ideal v V . We then postulate the existence of an ideal
prescriptive theory T * with an ideal set of ideal optimal prescriptive decision
rules P that will actualize the potential v V under an ideal environment
G . The set of prescriptive rules Pj , j J is said to be an ideal set of opti-
35
mal prescriptive rules if Pj = P* and its corresponding theory is said to be

identical with T j = T * , hence w j = v V and the environment, j * G of
the theory; * G is the ideal environment. The preference process in selection of a prescriptive theory for practice requires an establishment or a construction of a ranking epistemic index of prescriptive theories. The epistemic
system is such that if w j = v V then Pj P* and P* Pj which provides
us with a perfect set of prescriptive decision rules. The prescriptive decision
rules are of no use relative to v V if P* Pj = for j G .
Let us consider a measure, ( i ) which is defined over the set W .The value
Pj measures the degree of accuracy of prescription or it is an index of
prescriptive force contained in Pj and hence the power of the prescriptive
theory T j . Thus we can write the index of the prescriptive force as:
( )
= 1 if Pj P* and P* P ( perfect prescription )
= 0 if P P* =
irrelevant
prescription
(
)
j
Pj | j G
( 0 ,1) if Pj P*
( degrees of prescription accuracy )
where V is given.
(1.4.2.4)
We immediately notice that if ( Pj | j ) = 1 , then not only is Pj = P* but that

w j is actualized in a manner where w j = v V with w j O and O is
the set of relational zeros. We shall examine the epistemic nature of the preference ordering and selection process of the optimal prescriptive theory. The
implied classical rationality is that all the relevant prescriptive theories for the
praescricendum, v V are ordered by the size of the degree of accuracy of
the prescriptive force where the best or the most preferred theory is the one
with the highest prescriptive force. This is the implied decision-choice rationality of classical nature that may be written as
max Pj | j , j J
Pj
)
T T = {T | ( P |
w = k (P | ) W
s.t. Pj = h T j | j P
j
j , j J [ 0 ,1] , V , and j G
(1.4.2.5)
Equation. (1.4.2.5) defines a classical reasoning to the selection of preferred

theory.
36
There are two sub-rationalities that constitute the global rationality in this
prescriptive structure. There are conditions of rational praescricens around
the praescricendum in order to arrive at the set of prescriptive decision rules
and hence a set of rival theories. This is supported by a rational selection
rule for the available competing prescriptive theories. To be considered for
selection, a prescriptive theory must pass the test of prescriptive rationality.
The optimal theory is one with Pj | j max where Pj = h T* | j and
= *j = k Pj | j . The theory T*j is the optimal theory relative to the prescriptive power and that which is to be actualized. The number of theories
that may be considered for selection may be restricted by a fix-level set for
the index of prescriptive accuracy where the theory entries must satisfy
( Pj | j ) [ 0 ,1] . We can then modify the theory selection problem of
equation (1.4.2.5) as:
max Pj | j , j J
Pj
)
T T = {T | ( P |
w = k (P | ) W
(P | , j J )
s.t. Pj = h T j | j P
j
j,
j J [ 0 ,1] , V , and j G
(1.4.2.6)
This is decision-choice rationality in knowledge production process that allows us to evade the tyranny of subjective claims of knowledge elements that
must be added to the social knowledge set.
1.5 An Epistemic Reflection on Explanatory Theory,

Prescriptive Theory and Decision-Choice
Rationality
From the discussions on prescriptive and explanatory theories, a question
arises as to whether the partition of the space of science into prescriptive and
explanatory is crisp, mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. If it is
not, then what are the logical connections? This question requires us to visit
the basic characteristics of both theories and examine them in terms of explanation, prediction and prescription. Essentially, the task of an explanatory
theory within the explanatory science is to construct a logical system of a set
of explanatory decision rules which is then supported by a set of predictive
1.5 An Epistemic Reflection
37
decision rules for a given phenomenon and a given environment. The sets of
explanatory and predictive decision rules are developed in the same assumed
environment and subjected to scientific test given that the conditions of the
theory approximate the essential characteristics of the actual environment.
The task of a prescriptive theory within the prescriptive science, on the other
hand, is to construct a logical system of a set of prescriptive decision rules in
an assumed abstract environment of the theory. The set of the prescriptive
decision rules is scientifically claimed to provide efficient path and steps for
actualizing the potential in an actually existing environment. The assumed
applicable environment of the set of prescriptive decision rules is an approximation of the essential characteristics of the actual environment. Knowledge
is gained through the set of prescriptive decision-choice rules when by its
practice the potential is actualized just as new knowledge is gained when the
set of explanatory-derived predictive decision rules leads to affirmation of the
explanatory decision-choice rules.
1.5.1
Comparison of Explanatory and Prescriptive Rationalities

in the Knowledge Enterprise
There is a close relationship between prescriptive and explanatory theories

through their behavior in the information-knowledge space for examining the
structures of rationality associated with the set of decision rules that they present respectively. The set of prescriptive decision rules may be divided into
two. One case is where the information for prescriptive decisions is based on
the results of an explanatory theory. We shall refer to this set of prescriptive
decision rules that results from explanatory theory as explanatory-theorybased prescriptive rationality. The alternative is non-explanatory-theorybased prescriptions where the information needed to support the set of the
prescriptive decision rules is part of the theory. We shall refer to the intelligence given by the resulting prescriptive decision rules as non-explanatorytheory-based prescriptive rationality. In general knowledge accumulation, we
have explanatory rationality that projects a particular logic toward what there
is, and prescriptive rationality that projects a particular logic towards what
ought to be, the preferred potential from among the set of what there is not,
the set of the potential elements.
The prescriptive rationality involves a systematic and critical deliberation on
conditions of transformation. This deliberation is directed toward analysis,
evaluation and synthesis of information about the praescricendum, the potential
and the limitations that are imposed on it. It requires the identification of the
38
praescricendum, the definition of the problem of the actual and potential, diagnosis, construction of the praescrisens, test of its scientific truth, evaluation of
current social relevance and implementation of the contained prescriptive rules.
The praescricens embodied in the prescriptive rationality is directed toward the
construction of best strategies and tactics for creating the set of decision rules
and the required environment that are needed to bring into existence a predetermined potential (praescricendum) or to solve the problems of actualizing
the potential under social and natural complexities.
The Prescriptive rationality is strictly about the potential ex ante in its construct. The potential is considered as primary logical category and the actual is
a derived category. The actual reality is important to the extent to which the
potential is directed toward replacing it. By construction, its theoretical support is not relevant to the existing realities. The prescriptive rationality presents ex ante intelligent system for decision and practice to actualize a potential object in an environment which it was not in existence before. Alternatively, the intelligent system for decision and practice may be directed to actualize a potential environment for either enhancing the efficient behavior or
hastening the destruction of existing reality. The test of scientific accuracy or
truth of prescriptive rationality in terms of its prescriptive force in actualizing
the potential is ex post of its practice and application. The essential characteristic of prescriptive rationality is that the supporting theory constitutes prescriptive decision rules ex ante the actual. The same prescriptive decision
rules ex ante the actual, become explanatory decision rules after actualizing
the potential ex post. The transformation-substitution process is such that the
potential is transformed into the new actual. The old actual is transformed into
a new potential, thus fading away from existence and in its place the new actual is substituted. The dynamics of the process may also be referred to as
categorial transformation [R13.24] [R20.20]
Prescriptive rationality is connected to a thinking system of universally
controllable systems where it is held that all potential and actual phenomena
in the universe are subject to either internal and external manipulations in accordance with respective sets of prescriptive decision rules involving control
systems, their environments, controllers and states. The sets of prescriptive
decision rules when optimal constitute the explanatory conditions of behavior
of the phenomena of the systems. At the level of prediction, the set of prescriptive decision rules methodologically constitute an empirical law which
predicts that when the set of prescriptive decision rules are applied to the
praescricendum, then the potential phenomenon will be actualized in the assumed environment. The praescricendum becomes praedicendum and the
39
praesricens becomes praedicens within the prescriptive theory. Epistemologically, such prediction process may or may not be modeled. If it is modeled, it
will present predictive decision rules whose rationality may or may not coincide with the prescriptive rationality. This view on the structure of science
emerges out of control systems and systemicity of our modern technological
age where explanation is not necessary for the construct of prescriptive decision rules. The areas of knowledge sector of this view include engineering
sciences, social interventions, financial engineering, planning and biological
entities as systems.
Explanatory rationality may be connected to prescriptive rationality in the
sense that it may be involved in the development of the set of prescriptive decision rules. In this case it operates not on control paradigm but on explanatory-prescriptive paradigm. Here, the conditions surrounding the set of the
optimal explanatory and predictive decision rules are accepted. They then become inputs into developing a set of prescriptive decision rules for practice.
The practice is to actualize the explanadum in an environment in which such
explanandum is non-existent. In a logical manner the explanandum, therefore,
becomes praecricendum in the new environment. The explanatory decision
rules may also form the basis for potentializing the actual through the destruction of conditions of its existence. The logic and reasoning for this kind of
prescriptive decision rules may be referred to as explanatory-theory-based
prescriptive rationality. In this non-control paradigm, explanation and prediction are necessary for the development of prescriptive decision rules. Prescription is not necessary for the development of explanans (that which explains)
to an explanadum (that which is to be explained) and similarly not necessary
for the development of praedicens (that which predicts) to praedecendum (that
which is to be predicted).
In accordance with explanatory rationality the optimal prescriptive decision
rules must either be developed or emerge from an explicit or implicit theory
of explanation and prediction where the predictive decision rules are operationalized into a set of prescriptive decision rules. At the level of general prescription, explanatory rationality is inadequate unless the set of its explanatory
decisions rules could constitute a rational basis for actualizing the explandum
(that which was explained) in an environment in which such a phenomenon is
absent or constitute bases for destroying what there is. At the level of conscious transformation in the same environment, explanatory rationality offers
us nothing about the nature and understanding of the potential and possible set
of optimal decision rules to actualize the potential in the place of the actual.
40
At the very best, the explanatory rationality in the process of knowledge

accumulation can present the understanding and isolation of the conditions
that maintain the actual and hence the conditions for its destruction. It can also
point to the pracscricendum (that which is to be prescribed) for a new environment where the explanadum (that which is to be explained) in the old environment becomes the potential. The logical process may be referred to as
praecricendization of the praedecendum. One thing stands out clearly in the
classical system of science and that is, explanatory rationality for prescriptive
decision rules requires the presence of derived theoretical law of explanation
that is empirically supported through a test of collaboration or verification.
The satisfaction of the empirical test of the explanans is necessary and sufficient to the construct of explanatory-theory-based-prescriptive rationality for
actualizing the explanandum in a new environment.
There are a number of comparative behavioral characteristics in terms of
epistemic differences and similarities of explanatory and prescriptive rationalities relative to decision rules for optimal transformation in categories or
inter categories of potential-actual distributions of what there is, what there is
not and what ought to be. The explanatory-theory-based prescriptive decision
rules, which constitute the explanatory rationality for prescription always,
have as given the explanadum (that which is to be explained) with supporting
explanans (that which explains). The explanandum, after the construction of
the explanatory theory, is transformed to praedecendum (that which is to be
predicted) in the same environment by the constructed explanans. The constructed explanans for the explanandum is then transformed by an acceptable
logic into praedicens (that which predicts) in the same given environment.
The praedecendum (that which is to be predicted) is then transformed epistemically into praescricendum (that which is to be prescribed); that is, it becomes the potential to be actualized not in the same environment but in completely different environment. Similarly the praedicens (that which predicts) is
cognitively restructured into praescricens (that which prescribes) for actualizing the praescricendum (that which is to be prescribed).
The process of praecricendization of the praedecendum is such that at the
level of explanatory rationality what is there, after explanation and prediction in environment, I, is logically transformed into what would be (praesricendum) among the set of what there is not (space of potentials) in an environment II. The derived conditions of sets of optimal explanatory and predictive decision rules about what there is (explanandum) in environment I
then become the epistemic basis for the construct of a set of optimal pre-
41
scriptive decision rules (praesricens) for transforming what there is (explanandum) in environment I, to what ought to be (praescricendumpreferred potential) in environment II to what there is (explanandum) in environment II. The success of this logical transformation then becomes a
supporting evidence for the validity of the explanatory theory. In this respect, the sets of optimal explanatory and predictive decision rules of what
there is in environment I also become the conditions of explanation and prediction of what there is in an environment II.
It must be noted that the conditions of the sets of optimal explanatory and
predictive decision rules do not constitute the conditions for the set of optimal
prescriptive decision rules. They mainly form the basis for constructing the set
of optimal prescriptive decision rules relative to what there is in environment
I. The conditions of explanation and prediction of what there is may also
serve as bases or provide important information into a prescriptive construct
of optimal decision rules to change what there is through a destruction
construction process. In other words, the explanatory rationality at the level of
transformations may be directly embedded into the dynamics of constructiondestruction duality. Epistemically, it must be noted that explanatory rationality when projected into prescriptive rules is simply about either the destruction of what there is in its environment or the actualization of what there is in
a new environment.
At the level of prescriptive rationality, what ought to be (praesricendum)
is subjectively determined from the set of what there is not (space of potentials) as part of the prescriptive theoretical construct. The subjective phenomenon embodied in prescriptive rationality points to the view that science
is about searching for conditions of improvement of what there is (the actual) as humanly determined but not simply the explanation of conditions of
its existence. In this respect, science works on the paradigm of where the
criterion of rationality incorporates the elements of improving the reality
through the dynamics of actual-potential duality. In this paradigm, the potential, subjectively considered as better, is set against the actual subjectively considered as inferior through the practice of the set of optimal prescriptive decision rules. Knowledge is gained when the potential is actualized by the application of the set of the optimal prescriptive decision rules.
Different knowledge is gained when failure occurs. This success-failure
process shapes the path of prescriptive rationality.
42
After the implementation of the set of optimal decision rules, what ought to
be, the pracsericendum, is logically transformed into what has been predicted,
the praedicendum, in the same environment at the success of the implementation and by logical extension, it becomes a transformed explandum, what
there is. Similarly the cognitive conditions of the set of optimal prescriptive
decision rules (praescricens) becomes the basis of the predictive cognitive
decision rules, the praedicens (that which predicts) and by logical extension
are cognitively transformed to explanans (that which explains) in the same
environment. The process may simultaneously be referred to as praedecendization and explanandization of the praescricendum (that which is to be prescribed). The decision-choice intelligence that emerges may be referred to as
prescriptive-theory-based-explanatory rationality where the praescricens becomes the explanans.
Prescriptive rationality may epistemically be viewed as the reversed process of scientific methodology of explanatory rationality. The explanatory
rationality allows us to research into factors that enhance the paths of research on explanation and prediction. The prescriptive rationality, on the
other hand, allows us the possibilities of research to explore the creative talents of human direct effects on transformations to improve reality. As presented, sciences are linked together by the a common problem and that is:
the problem of a search for decision-choice rationality in all fields of human
cognition. In every area of science in knowledge sectors, there is a search
for rationality in the sense of finding the best path to knowledge discovery
and accumulation. Thus unity of science is here conceived in terms of decision-choice rationality whose task is to study optimal selection rules in the
field of paths, steps and processes of scientific discovery of what there is,
paths of optimal explanatory rules of the behavior of what there is and the
paths of optimal prescriptive decision rules for actualizing what ought to be
from the space of elements of what there is not. The rationality of knowledge construct is transformed to rationality of social practice of knowledge.
The comparative similarities and differences in explanatory and prescriptive sciences may further be seen in terms of the nature and structure of their
theories and the implied decision-choice rationalities in the knowledge space.
It is analytically useful to see the similarities and differences in terms of the
logics of constructionism and reductionism. The structure of decision-choice
rationality in knowledge construction by the logic of constructionism is presented as cognitive geometry in Figure 1.5.1.1 while the logic of reductionism
is presented in Figures 1.5.1.2 and 1.5.1.3.
43
CONSTRUCTIONISM
Science
Type
KNOWLEDGE
ACTIVITY
EXPLANATORY
SCIENCE
EXPLANATION
PRESCRIPTIVE
SCIENCE
PREDICTION
PRESCRIPTION
Praescricendum
ITEM
Explanandum
Praedicendum
Praescricens
THEORY
Primary
constructed
decisionchoice rules
Explanans
Praedecens
Non-prescriptivetheory-based
explanatory
rationality
Nonprescriptivetheory-basedpredictive
Basis for prescription ex post

explanation under destructionconstruction process
Non-explanatorytheory-based
prescriptive
rationality
Basis for explanation

and prediction ex
post prescription
under actualpotential
transformation
THE KNOWLEDGE SPACE
Fig. 1.5.1.1. The Cognitive Geometry of the Logic of Constructionism in Relation to

Explanatory and Prescriptive Sciences in General
44
REDUCTIONISM
Science
Type
EX POST
PRESCRIPTION
EXPLANATORY
SCIENCE
KNOWLEDGE
ITEM
THEORY
Prescription
Praescricendum
Praescricens
Prediction
Praedicendum
Praedecens
Explanation
Explanandum
Explanans
ACTIVITY
Reduction
A prescriptive derived set of

optimal explanatory decision
rules ex post prescription
prescriptivetheory-basedpredictive
rationality
Prescriptivetheory-based
explanatory
rationality
THE KNOWLEDGE
SPACE
Fig. 1.5.1.2. The Cognitive Geometry of the Logic of reductionism in Relation
45
REDUCTIONISM
Science
Type
EX POST
PRESCRIPTION
EXPLANATORY
SCIENCE
KNOWLEDGE
ITEM
THEORY
Prescription
Praescricendum
Praescricens
Prediction
Praedicendum
Praedecens
Explanation
Explanandum
Explanans
ACTIVITY
Reduction
A prescriptive derived set of

optimal explanatory decision
rules ex post prescription
prescriptivetheory-basedpredictive
rationality
Prescriptivetheory-based
explanatory
rationality
THE KNOWLEDGE
SPACE
Fig. 1.5.1.3. The Cognitive Geometry of the Logic of Reductionism in Relation to Prescription Rationality ex-post Explanatory Rationality
46
1.5.2
Decision-Choice Rationalities, Constructionism,

Reductionism in Social Knowledge Construct
There are four types of broad rationalities in the process of knowledge accumulation that we have indicated on explanatory and prescriptive sciences. On
explanatory process we have non-prescriptive-theory-based and prescriptivetheory-based explanatory rationalities. On the prescriptive process we have
non-explanatory-theory-based and explanatory-theory-based prescriptive rationalities. The non-prescriptive-theory-based rationality and non-explanatorytheory-base rationality are identified with the logic of constructionism from the
primary logical category in the development of the universal knowledge bag.
The prescriptive-theory-based explanatory rationality and explanatory-theorybased prescriptive rationality are also identified with the logic of reductionism
from the derived logical category in the process of creating the universal
knowledge bag. We must keep in mind two important logical categories of
cognition. They are: 1) transformation-substitution process as a vehicle of
categorial conversion, and 2) dynamics of actual-potential duality that constitutes the basic elements of transformation and substitution within both explanatory and prescriptive rationalities. There are some differences between
explanatory-theory-based prescriptive rationality and non-explanatory-theorybased prescriptive rationality in the knowledge acquisition and knowledge
practice processes. Similarly there are differences between prescriptivetheory-based explanatory rationality and non-prescriptive-theory-based explanatory rationality. The differences arise from the initial conditions and
primary category on one hand and secondary conditions and derived category
of logical relevance for the development of the conditions that support the
resulting rationalities on the other. The relational structure among explanatory
science, prescriptive science, constructionism and reductionism may be seen
in terms of ex-ante and ex-post conditions of theoretical constructs with science at its center. Such relational structure may be seen in terms of pyramidal
logic as presented as epistemic relational geometry in Figure 1.5.2.1.
The pyramidal logic of transformation-substitution process in knowledge
production under conditions of rationality is base on relational interactions of
dualities whose conflicts induce changes in the center of science and its practice. The dualities constituting knowledge production are: constructionismreductionism, explanatory-prescriptive and ex-post-ex-ante conflict cords. The
logical nature of the epistemic geometry as it relates to rational inquiry toward
knowledge production is that each pyramid is composed of three interconnected dualities. There are two such pyramids that show how explanation,
47
RATIONALITY
REDUCTIONISM
EX-ANTE
SCIENCE
CONSTRUCTIONISM
EX-POST
PRESCRIPTIVE
Fig. 1.5.2.1. The Pyramidal Geometry of Relationships among Constructionism, Reductionism, Explanatory Science, Prescriptive Science in Ex-post and Ex-ante Theories
constructionism and ex-post, form three connecting dualities on one hand in a

rational inquiry; on the other hand, there is prescription, reduction and ex-ante
that form the three connecting dualities. The two logical pyramids are superimposed on each other to constitute the logic of tension in transformationsubstitution process of rational inquiry in the understanding of the actual and
potential and their interchanging roles in human quest for freedom. The relational logic of rationality requires that one of the pyramids be initialized as the
primary logical category while the other is taken as derived logical category
of knowledge production and practice. This transformation-substitution process in knowledge production, interactions between rationality and theory that
lead to a policy recommendation to actively intervene in the process of knowing and understanding behavioral dynamics is presented in Figure 1.5.2.2.
One may take ex-ante-ex-post-knowledge pyramid as the primary logical
category while the pyramidal structure of rationality, explanation and prescription is taken as derived category as one pursues the logical lines of either
constructionism or reductionism.
48
RATIONALITY
EX-POST
EX-ANTE
SCIENCE
EXPANATORYTHEORYBASED
PRESCRIPTIVETHEORY BASED
KNOWLEDGE
Fig. 1.5.2.2. Relational Geometry of Rationality, Explanation, Prescription, Ex-post and

Ex-ante
1.5.2.1 The Non-prescriptive-Theory-Based Explanatory

Rationality
In the case of non-prescriptive-theory-based explanatory rationality, the primary item (explanandum) to be explained is known and given from a known
environment. The knowledge acquisition process is such that the explanandum (that which is to be explained) is categorially converted to become
praedecendum (that which is to be predicted). The cognitive task is to construct the explanans (that which explains) that allows a cognitive channel for
the establishment of praedecens (that which predicts) and the task is complete
for the examination of degree of knowledge contained in the resulting rationality, at least for now. The explanandum constitutes the primary category under categorial conversion through the constructed explanans that constitutes
the primary category of logical transformation. The praedecendum emerges
Primary
Categorial
Item:
Explanandum
E1
Primary Logical
Category:
Explanans
E5
E4
Derived
Logical
Category:
Praedecens
E2
E6
Derived Categorial
Item:
Praedecendum
E3
49
P
U
R
E
E
X
P
L
A
N
A
T
O
R
Y
T
H
E
O
R
Y
Fig. 1.5.2.1.1. The Path of Categorial Conversions in Non-prescriptive-theory-based

Explanatory Rationality in the Knowledge Production process. The terms Ei s are logical transformation functions where E5 = E1 E2 and E6 = E3 E4 where ( ) is a composition operator: The Explanatory-Transformation Square in Pyramidal Logic of Categorial Conversions.
out as derived category of explanandum and praedecens emerges out as a derived logical category of transformation through categorial conversions. The process present itself
as a simple triangular relationship between the primary and derived in the knowledge
search process as presented in Figure 1.5.2.1.1.
1.5.2.2 The Non-explanatory-Theory-Based Prescriptive

Rationality
In the case of non-explanatory-theory-based prescriptive rationality, the primary item (praescricendum) to be prescribed is unknown and must first be
found from the set of potential items. The environment in which the item is to
be actualized is assumed to be known. The cognitive task involves two sequences of logical actions. The first cognitive task is to establish subjective
preferences over the available potentials in order to select that which ought to
be (the praescricendum) from the set of potentials (that which is not). Given
the praescricendum, the second cognitive task is to construct the needed
praescricens, that which prescribes the course of decision-choice actions for
50
actualizing the preferred potential which it is hoped to become a new actual.

This is the logic of constructionism where the explanandum is an element of
the primary cognitive category and praecendum is an element in the derived
category in the explanation process. Similarly, the praescricendum is an element of primary category and the new actual is an element in the derived
category. The logical process presents a theoretical picture of how the concepts which characterize the praecendum and new actual are formed by
cognitive process from the concepts that characterize the explanandum and
praescricendum respectively. The praescricendum constitutes the primary
category under categorial conversion through the constructed praescricens
that constitutes the primary category of logical transformation to set the potential against the actual through substitution. The explanandum emerges
out as derived category of praescricendum and the explanans emerges out as
a derived category logical of transformation through categorial conversions
of the praescricens. The process also presents itself as a simple triangular
relationship between the primary and derived in the knowledge search process
as presented in Figure 1.5.2.2.1.
Primary
Categorial Item:
Praescricendum
L1
Primary Logical
Category:
Praescricens
L5
L4
Derived
Logical
Category:
Explanans
L2
L6
Derived Categorial
Item:
Explanandum
L3
P
U
R
E
P
R
E
S
C
R
I
P
T
I
V
E
T
H
E
O
R
Y
Fig. 1.5.2.2.1. The Path of Categorial Conversions in Non-Explanatory -theory-based

prescriptive Rationality in the Knowledge Production. The terms L i s logical transformation functions where L5 = L1 L 2 and L 6 = L 3 L 4 : The Prescriptive Transformation Square in Pyramidal Logic of Categorial Conversions
51
1.5.2.3 Prescriptive-Theory-Based Explanatory Rationality
In the case of prescriptive-theory-base explanatory rationality, the primary

element of logical relevance is the new actual which is an element in derived
category of non-explanatory-theory-based prescriptive rationality that now becomes the given item for prediction and explanation in its environment, and
where the praescricendum (as an element in the primary category) becomes the
praecendum (an element in the derived category) and then explanandum (an
element in the derived category). Alongside of the praesricendum-praecendumexplanadum transformation process, we have the praescricens to become the
praedecens and the explanans by reductionism. This logic of reductionism fails
if the potential (praescricendum) is not actualized by the application of decision-choice rules implied in the praescricens. The scientific procedure is to reduce the praescricendum to praecendum and then to explanandum on one hand,
and the praescricens to praedecens and then to explanans on the other. In other
words, the explanas is derived from the praescrices as the primary category by
h1
Praescricendum
Praecendum
(PC)
(DC)
h1 h2
L
O
G
I
C
A
L
P
R
O
C
E
S
S
h2
Praescricens
(PC)
Explanandum
(DC)
L
O
G
I
C
A
L
I
T
E
M
S
1 2
2
Praedecens
(DC)
Explanans (DC)
Fig. 1.5.2.3.1. Geometry of Prescriptive-Theory-Based Explanatory Rationality where

hi 's and i 's are cognitive transformation functions and PC and DC represent primary
and derived categories
52
reduction. Alternatively, stated the explanatory rationality is derived from the

prescriptive rationality as the primary logical category. The path of knowledge construction is projected by a relational geometry as in Figure 1.5.2.3.1.
1.5.2.4 Explanatory-Theory-Based Prescriptive Rationality
In the case of explanatory-theory-based prescriptive rationality, the primary

item of cognitive relevance is the explanandum which is logically transformed
into praedecendum and then to praescriscendum. Here, we have explanandumpraedecendum-praescricendum transformation process. Corresponding to this
item-transformation process, we have the logical transformation of explanas to
praedecens and to praescriscens or explanas-praedecens-praescriscens conversions induced by logical transformations where by of reductionism the explanans is held as the primary logical item while the praesriscens is held as derived
logical item for a new environment. The result of the application of decisionchoice process, implied in the explanatory-theory-based prescriptive rationality,
becomes evidence that justifies the validity of the explanans. In other words the
praescricens is derived from the explanans as the primary logical category. Under conditions of optimal decision-choice rules, the prescriptive rationality belongs to derived logical category crafted from the explanatory rationality as
main element of the primary logical category.
In the logic of reductionism for the development of knowledge bag, there
are two cognitive tasks. On the side of explanatory science with prescriptivetheory-based explanatory rationality, the cognitive task is to show how concepts contained in the praescricens, and hence prescriptive rationality, are
reduced completely to concepts or propositions that characterize the explanans and hence explanatory rationality. On the side of prescriptive science with
explanatory-theory-based prescriptive rationality, the cognitive task is to show
how propositions and concepts contained in the explanans and praedecens,
and hence explanatory-predictive rationality are reduced to propositions and
concepts contained in the praescricens, and hence prescriptive rationality.
Both logics of constructionism and reductionism in the knowledge accumulation process must be related to the logic of nominalism in the sense of language foundations where reality is held as primary and all other extensions are
taken to be derivatives on a increasing logical plains [R20.20] [R13.21]
[R13.24]. We must also be analytically careful how one relates the structures
of projections of rationality to the relative positions of empiricism and rationalism in the development of various knowledge sectors of the intellectual heritage of humanity.
k1
Explanandum (PC)
k3 =k1 k2
L
O
G
I
C
A
L
P
R
O
C
E
S
S
Explanancs
(PC)
Praedecens (DC)
Praecendum (DC)
k2
Praescricendum
(DC)
53
L
O
G
I
C
A
L
1
T
E
M
S
3 = 1 2
2
Praescricens
(DC)
Fig. 1.5.2.4.1. Geometry of Explanatory-Theory-Based Prescriptive Rationality where

ki 's and i 's are cognitive transformation functions and PC and DC represent primary
and derived categorie
The relationships among empiricism, rationalism and decision-choice rationality in the construct of the global knowledge bag will be explicated through
deferential representations of reality and knowledge in Chapter Two. We must
keep in mind that reality is not knowledge and knowledge is not necessarily
reality. The distinguishing factor is perception. As related to explanatory and
prescriptive rationalities in the knowledge construct and scientific discovery,
reality is independent of perception while knowledge is dependent on perception. The concepts of reality and potential as they relate to the knowledge development process are disturbing. Their relationships to each other, and the
primary and derived categories in the construction-reduction process under
nominalism are complex. We want to make clear that every element in the
space of potentials is also an element in the space of reality; otherwise its actualization is impossible. The potential, that is ought to be, is linked to the
space of all potentials by perception and knowledge. Every potential is an actual and every actual is a potential in the knowledge development process
where the potential is the primary category and actual is the derived category
54
in the process of cognition. In this respect, various decision-choice rationalities are knowledge-driven and take place under uncertainty that may be due to
fuzziness or randomness or both in the perception space.
The fuzziness and randomness are the results of processes of information
flow, knowledge construction, knowledge limitation and imperfections of
human activities in the universal system of cognition that generates uncertainties in the decision-choice space to effect rational inquiry and rationality in
general. Uncertainties are the results of the presence of fuzziness and knowledge incompleteness in the universal system of information-knowledge process that support the decision-choice activities. The driving force of our discussion on rationality is that all human activities are decision-choice driven and
these activities are supported by human intelligence through the use of knowledge that may be limited or vague or both. The manner in which the intelligence is used in general decision-choice processes is rationality. We shall now
turn our attention to knowledge, information and rationality, and how they
mutually define themselves in the decision-choice space.
An essential point that emerges from these meta-theoretic discussions is
that symbolic representations of thought on the road to knowledge discovery
through mathematics, logic, or linguistic frames cannot be exact. It must take
into account the characteristics of vagueness, ambiguities, inexactness, subjectivities and approximations. Our collective cognitive ability to incorporate
vagueness, ambiguities, inexactness, subjectivity and approximation in our laws
of thought will answer Bertrand Russells concerns regarding vagueness and
Aristotelian laws of reasoning and acceptance of true and false propositions in
knowledge production and scientific works [R14.62] [R20.77], [R23.5]. The
same concerns are raised by Black [R20.4] [R23.4] Zadeh [R8.62] [R8.63],
Gains [R8.11] [R8.13] and others. It is from these concerns that fuzzy paradigm, composed of its logic and corresponding mathematics, draws its intellectual legitimacy and provides a new approach to knowledge production and
a path of scientific discovery that incorporates the essential features of the
classical paradigm.
Information and Knowledge in

Decision-Choice Rationality
In Chapter One of this monograph, we presented the distinguishing and uniting features of explanatory and prescriptive sciences. This was done through
an abstraction of what constitutes the structural parameters and the basic characteristics of explanatory and prescriptive theories. The abstraction proceeded
from a process of developing the path to understand how the universal knowledge bag and the intellectual heritage of humanity are constructed through
decision-choice process. The objective of information-knowledge process is
to create knowledge in support of decision-choice activities that in turn go to
support the control and management of social and natural systems, it is argued. The foundational principle behind the analysis and synthesis is that
knowledge production, just like any human activity, is a decision-choice process. Such a decision-choice process has input and output. The input is cost and
the output is benefit, both of which are reversible depending on situations and
circumstances. We shall project an analytical system such that information is
seen as input and knowledge is seen as output. The movements from information to knowledge are substitution-transformation processes that involve the
behavior of dynamics of actual-potential duality. The basic raw material for
this knowledge development is information whose cognitive manipulations
give rise to fuzziness and randomness in the development and management of
human and non-human affairs. In order to discuss uncertainties and their effects on rationality in the presence of simultaneous existence of fuzziness and
randomness we need to examine the definition and analytical roles that information and knowledge play in decision-choice process in the social knowledge acceptance.
The cognitive characterization of the role of information and knowledge in
decision-choice process brings us head on to some analytical difficulties of
decision-choice rationality. Let us keep in mind that the position advanced in
K.K. Dompere: Fuzzy Rationality, STUDFUZZ 235, pp. 5587.
56
2 Information and Knowledge in Decision-Choice Rationality
this monograph is that all human actions are decision-choice processes without exception whether intentionally or unintentionally conceived. The development of the universal knowledge bag is a decision-choice process. The
structure of decision-choice processes depends on information and instruments of reasoning which generate input-output process that defines the history of the systems dynamics. This position can be extended to all living and
organic bodies.
Critical examination of decision-choice processes, information, knowledge
and input-output processes leads to a number of important questions whose answers will affect our concept and practice of decision-choice rationality. Are
information and knowledge two different human conceptual elements or are
they the same? If they are different concepts then what are the distinguishing
elements? In other words, what is information and what is knowledge? Are
there some conditions such that information and knowledge are the same? Do
cognitive systems make decisions and choices on the basis of information or on
the basis of knowledge? Is decision-choice rationality information-supported or
knowledge-supported or just simply belief-supported? Is decision-choice rationality a subjective or an objective phenomenon? One may also ask a question
as to whether methods and technique of reasoning leading to computable rationality are knowledge-supported or information-supported.
There are other equally important questions that may erupt up to the surface
as we discuss the core ideas of, and seek answers to these questions. Let us
now examine the definitions and conceptual values of information and knowledge and how they may be related. Such definitions must keep in mind the
relevant questions whose answers may improve our epistemic and operational
understanding of decision-choice rationality in all activities involving human
endeavors. The cognitive process imposes on us the need to reconcile our
meta-theoretical constructs with ordinary and scientific languages which are
not simply composed of vocabulary and grammar, but also a frame of reality
and a process of knowing. In general, language and grammar are spun by
cognitive categories of reality and conceptual framework for the discovery
and understanding of what there is. Such discovery and understanding are also
decision-choice driven where decision-making forms the logical basis for ascertaining the similarities and differences between information and knowledge
and how these information and knowledge interact with the decision-choice
process to affect cognitive rationality in the decision space.
A brief conceptual reflection of the decision space in which human activities take place is required at this point. The decision space is conceived as
composed of three subspaces: a) space of actual, b) the space of the potential
57
and 3) the space of categorial conversions. The space of the potential in the
general decision space defines a collection of cognitive objects from which
selections may be made for actualization. The space of the actual in the decision space, on the other hand defines elements that are cognitively conceived
as known to exist and which may be selected to be potentialized from existence with a replacement of new actual from the potential space. The selection
process of a potential to be actualized and an actual to be potantialized may be
conscious or unconscious process. The unconscious selection process predominantly involves the natural evolution and change with the disappearance
of the actual and the emergence of a new actual from the potential space in
substitution. The conscious selection process involves social evolution and
change at a higher level of cognition where the desired potential or the undesirable actual is selected to be consciously acted upon in transformationsubstitution process. The space of categorial conversions is made up of cogni-
Disappearance:
work of
knowledge
Space of the
Potential:
works of
information
Space of the
Actual: work of
information
Decision
Center
New: works
of knowledge
and
information
Old: works of
knowledge and
information
Space of the
Categorial
conversion: works
of knowledge
Fig. 2.1. Relational Geometry of Subcategories of Actual, Potential and Categorial

Conversions with the roles of Information and Knowledge.
58
tive transformation functions on the basis of conscious actions that operate the
mechanism of transformation-substitution module to effect the disappearance
of the old and the emergence of the new. This conceptual framework will be
logically tightened up in Chapter Three after we have discussed the definition
and representation of information and knowledge. The main objective in these
discussions is a search for a unified structure of decision-choice process in
terms of rationality.
The subspaces of potential, actual and categorial conversions are inseparably linked with information and knowledge which in turn drive the decisionchoice process and determine the structure of decision-choice rationality. The
process may be presented in a simple pyramidal logic of their relations as in
Figure 2.1. The basic common characteristics between the space of actual and
the space of the potential are that they are the works of information. The space
of categorial conversion on the other hand is the works of knowledge.
2.1 Information Definition and Representation in

Decision-Choice Systems
The concept of information from decision-choice process must be viewed
from two interdependent components of properties of objects and relationships among objects. On one hand, information constitutes the general set of
the overall properties of objects, states and processes. On the other hand, information is a set of relationships among objects as they pass through states
and processes by means of sender-recipient modulus. The former is objective
in the sense that they exist independently of the awareness of other entities.
The latter is subjective in that the relationships and their types require the
awareness of other objects. Information is thus defined in terms of objectivesubjective duality as relationally viewed in term of properties and relationships that characterize universal system of objects, states, processes and
events. Some important questions arise from the basis of the dual character of
information. Under what set of conditions is information a set of the overall
properties of objects, states and processes? Similarly under what set of conditions does information constitute a set of relationships among objects given
their states, processes and events? Let us look at the required conditions while
we keep in mind the evolving argument that knowledge and decision-choice
rationalities are shaped by the dynamics of objective-subjective duality of information. The relational effects are presented in Figure 2.2.
2.1 Information Definition and Representation in Decision-Choice Systems
59
INFORMATION
OBJECTS
in the
Universal
Object Set
RELATIONS
among Objects
ActualPotential
Dynamics
SUBJECTIVE
OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION
Fig. 2.2. Relational Geometry of General Information, Subjective Information and Objective Information with Interactions among Objects in the Universe.
2.1.1
The Concept and Nature of Information in Cognitive

Systems
We begin the definition and representation of information relevant to the understanding of the decision-choice processes and rationality with the postulate
that objects, states, processes and events exist as realities. The character and
identity of any object, state, process and event in the universal system are
completely defined by a set of properties, which present themselves as characteristics. Each entity is viewed uniquely as composed of a bundle of characteristics (quantitative and qualitative). The core idea of the postulate is that each
entity in the universal system is identified by a set of characteristics. Variations and non-variations in the set of characteristics establish differences and
similarity in entities. The universe presents itself as a collection of entities that
appear in variety. The properties of objects are naturally presented as something that helps to identify the objects and classify them into similarities, dis-
60
similarities, resemblance and hence place them into categories. This something is a set of attributes, which present themselves as objective information.
The attributes become established through cognitive processes as something
that generates awareness called information relations among objects. The information relations present themselves as subjective information. The somethingness that gives evidence of identity and existence of objects, states, processes and events for a given awareness is called information which is a unity
of objective and subjective information.
We shall now give a formal definition of information. The definition is
couch in both verbal and set-theoretic representation for clarity. We begin
with the concept of the universe and then its representation.
Definition 2.1.1A -: Verbal (Universal Object Set)
The universe is composed of the collection of all objects, states, processes and
events that are exhaustive, complete and infinite, referred to as the universal
object set.
Definition 2.1.1B : Set-Theoretic (Universal Object Set)
If is the generic elemental representation of objects, states, processes and
events in the universal system then the collection of all constitutes the
global unity and is simply the universal object set, , written as:
= ( 1 ,2 ) | L where L is an infinite index set of .
The universal object set is also the universal object space. Each object, , in
the object space, , [ ] is well-defined and identifiable by attributes that
allow naming, concepts, relational ideas and thought to be formed about the
elements in the object set by cognitive objects. The elements in the universal
object set are divided into cognitive objects that have awareness and noncognitive objects that have no awareness. Both cognitive and non-cognitive objects reside in the universal unity. The entities in the universal object set, composed of objects; states, processes and events are infinite in number. Their existence is objective and defined by objective information. Their awareness is subjective and defined by subjective information. The concept of objective and subjective information will be explicated in terms of their philosophical and scientific unity. The distinguishing factor for real existence and identification of the
elements of the universal object set requires a definition that follows.
Definition 2.1.2A : Verbal (General Information)

Information is a set of characteristics that provide evidence regarding existence and identity of the elements in the universe in an objective sense. It is
also a set of relations that create awareness possibilities among objects in a
subjective sense.
61
Definition 2.1.2B : Set-Theoretic Universal Characteristic Set

If x is the generic elemental representation of attributes on the basis of
which similarities, differences, sameness and resemblances of objects,
states, processes and events in the universal object set are naturally defined,
identified and separated then the collection of all x constitutes the total
space called the universal characteristic set, X , that may be written as:
X = ( x1 ,x2 x j ) | , and j J where J is the infinite index set of all

attributes, x .
The set defines all elements in the universe while the set, X defines objective information in terms of attributes associated with elements in independently of awareness of any of the objects in the universal object space. All
cognitive and non-cognitive objects, processes, states and events belong to the
Characteristic
Identification
Function
Universal
Object Set,
I : X
Object
Identification
Function
I-1 : X
Objective
Information
( ,X )
OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION
FOR OBJECTSPECIFIC
Association
Function
Universal
Characteristic
Set X
Processing
Function
Characteristic
Clustering
Modules
Fig. 2.1.1. The Cognitive Path for Defining Objective information, where I , maps the
attributes of each object in the Universal Object Set into the Universal Characteristic Set
and I -1 is an Inverse function for object identification
62
universal object set, which is infinitely closed under object collections. The
set X is also infinitely closed under attribute collection. Relationally, we
have objects defined by characteristics that present objective information in a
triangular structure as in Figure 2.1.1. From definitions 2.1.1(A and B) and
2.1.2.(A and B), we can now define a partition of the characteristic set, X
that imposes categories of reality in the universal object set, .
Definition 2.1.3A : Verbal (partitioned characteristic set)
The partition of the universal characteristics set is the collection of non-empty
groups of attributes that give sameness and difference, which impose groupings or categories on the elements in the universal object space .
Definition 2.1.3B : Set-theoretic (partitioned characteristic set)
A partitioned characteristic set, X is a collection of attributes, x j about any
fixed such that X = ( x1 ,x2 x j ) | j J J and is fixed in L
where J is a finite index set of attributes that define the identity ,
X = X and J = J
By combining definitions, (2.1.1. 2.1.3), we may define the objective universe, U as a schedule in terms of universal object set, and universal characteristic set X that meets the conditions of partitioning in term of categories.
Definition 2.1.4 -: Category of Reality
The categories of reality C ' s are collections of all identical elements
where each of the th categories is identified by a partitioned characteristic set,
X in the form: C = ( ,x j ) | j J J , , x j X and is fixed in L
where X is the full attribute condition of a particular reality .
Similarly, it may be written as C = ( ,X ) | L
where
X = x1 ,x2 x j
| jJ J , L .
{(
Postulate 2.1.1A -: Objective Universe

The objective universe, U , is an exhaustive, mutually exclusive and infinite
collection of categories, C , whose elements appear as schedules in the form
U = C | L = ( ,X ) | L .
} {
Postulate 2.1.1B -: Category

Given the universal object set, and characteristic set, X let ( ) be an identicality relation defined over X then the group, C , is said to be a category if
63
and only if there exist ( 1 , 2 ,..., ) such that ( X1 X 2 ... ...X ) X

then ( 1 , 2 ,..., ) C . Alternatively if there exist ( 1 , 2 ,..., ) C then
the corresponding characteristic sets are identical in the sense that.
( X1 X 2 ... ...X ) X
Postulate 2.1.2 -: Universal Object Set
The universal object set is a partition with respect to C -categories such that
C , C = , and for any i j L , Ci C j = , with C = = U
It may be noticed that corresponding to each element, , there is a set

of attributes, X , that identifies it. The collection of all, with attributes,
X constitutes a category C and the collection of all these categories constitutes the objective universe U . The universal object set, , is simply the objective universe, U , without the defining characteristic set, X that partitions,
into categories of entities. Thus = C | L = ( ,X ) | L
where X =
X
J
, J =
} {
and # X = # J . Both U and represent
the collection of the primary categories of reality. Definitions (2.1.2 2.1.4)

specify the objective existence of entities, states, processes and events that
constitute the sources of characteristics-based information set which we have
referred to as objective information. The sources present two important items
of the universal object set and the universal characteristics set X . The two
sets are considered as factual reality in the sense that their existence is independent of awareness of any object in the universal object set. Thus the characteristics-based information set is objective reality. Furthermore the universal object set is infinitely closed under categorial formation. The structure in
defining characteristics-based information may be represented in a cognitive
path as in Figure 2.1.2. as an objective information square.
The definitional process of Figure 2.1.2 is such that first we have a set-tosubset mapping followed by a set-to-object mapping. This is followed by a
set-to-subset mapping which is completed by a point-to-set mapping as an
illustrative path of definition of objective information.
To conclude the specifications, definitions and representations of over all
information set we shall deal with subjective aspects of information. We begin
with the observation that every element in the universal object set sends attributive signals that correspond to the number of attributes that define its
64
Characteristic
Partitioning
Function
Universal
Characteristic
Set X
Object
Identification
Function
P1 :X {X i | i I}
Set
Objective
Information
Object
Partitioning
Function
X : C | L
{X }
Processing
Function
OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION FOR
CATEGORYSPECIFIC OBJECTS
C : X
Partitioned
Characteristic
I : X
Object
Identification
{( , X ) |
Fig. 2.1.2. The Cognitive Path for Defining Objective information where P1 , Induces a
partition on Universal Characteristic Set into subsets leading to Object Identification by
I-function where the partitioned Characteristic set is then used to induce a partition on
the object in the Universal Object Set (The Objective Information Square)
identity. The attribute signals create conditions for awareness by cognitive

objects in terms of relations between the source objects and recipient objects.
Every entity in the universal object set is both a source object and a recipient
object in the sense that it sends and receives information through signals. In
this way the source-recipient modules establish relationships that are defined
by information flows and subjectively interpreted by the recipients. Let us put
this idea in a definitional mode.
Definition 2.1.6 -: Attribute Signal Set
If s is an attribute signal that corresponds to a characteristic x X and sent
from source then the collection of all such attribute signals from X
is an attribute signal set S from the object that may be written as
S =
{( s
1 ,s 2 ,
,s j ,
)|
, X X , j J J and
is fixed in L ,
where J is a finite index set of attribute signals from the source.
Universal
Characteristic
Set X sent
From
SOURCE
Subjective
Identification
Function of
objects by the
recipient
Characteristic
Partitioning Function
P2 :X X | L
65
Partitioned
Characteristic
Set
{X } from
SOURCE
SUBJECTIVE
INFORMATION FOR
OBJECTS AND
CATEGORIES
Signal Item
Function
G : X S
C : X
Subjective
Information
on U by the
Recipient
Subjective
Partitioning
Function
X : {C | L }
Object
Identification by
receiving end
{( ,S ) |
Fig. 2.1.3. The Cognitive Path for Defining Subjective information where P1 , Induces a
partition on Universal Characteristic Set into subsets leading to Subjective Identification
by signal item function where the partitioned characteristic set is then used to induce a
subjective partition on the objects in the Universal Object Set (Subjective Information
Square).
The elements of the attribute signal set pass through cognitive filters, become
processed and transformed into a perception characteristics set that establishes a set of information relations. Thus S defines conditions of subjective
information which we define as relation-based information about
from information characteristics set, x X . This is shown in Figure 2.1.3 as
subjective information square.
The definition of information that has been offered divides the concept of
information into two interrelated sub-concepts of characteristic-based information and relation-based information. The characteristic-based information
is defined by attributes of objects, states, processes and events that exist independently of awareness of objects in the universal object space, whose cognitive activities may attach meanings and interpretations. The relation-based
66
information defines attribute characteristic signals between the source objects

and recipient objects where naming, meaning and interpretations are attached
to the attribute signals. The naming, meaning and interpretation require capacities for processing mechanism of the received attribute signals. The meaning and interpretation that result form the processing mechanism of attribute
signals require awareness of recipient objects. As such information relations
among objects, states and processes are subjective.
The view of organic concept of information as two interrelated subconcepts of objective and subjective puts information into the heart of the philosophical problem of what there is (the objective) and how what there is can
be known (subjective). This approach is a semantic theory of information that
can form the foundation for the analysis and explanation of decision-choice
rationality in general and specific rationalities such as classical rationality
bounded rationality and others in particular, from the viewpoint of decisionchoice environment induced by information and cognitive limitations. It will
further allow us to introduce fuzzy rationality as a generalized concept of rationality. The conceptual system of definition and information representation
is shown in Figure 2.1.4.
At each state, and for each object in the universe of objects, for each process in the world of processes, for each event in the world of events, there is
some things about them that uniquely define their individual identity and existence at their natural states that allow the identification of their existence. This
something is that which establishes the varieties in nature as well as defining
channels of grouping or categorizing in terms of similarity and difference. It is
the same something that gives rise to capacity for language development,
composed of vocabulary, grammar and cognitive framework. The varieties
thus establish the differences and similarities among objects and processes
where their natural existence is independent of awareness of living and nonliving things in the universal object set. This objective-subjective quality approach to information allows us to separate the philosophic problem of existence from the cognitive problem of knowability. Existence of objects is objective and independent of awareness of other objects while knowability is subjective and requires awareness on the part of affected objects.
The awareness of the existence of objective information (characteristicbased information) is established through communication channels and sending of attribute signals among objects given capacity of awareness. By awareness we mean an ability of a recipient to receive attribute signals from
sources, assign meanings, inteprete them for identification of the objects and
their source. The attribute (characteristic) signals must be produced and
67
THE CONCEPT OF INFORMATION

Definition
Begins with the universal

object set
Representation
{( ,
1
)|
Definition
Characteristic set
Representation
X = ( x1 ,x2
Partition
characteristics
set
xj
) | , and j J }
Definition
Representation
X = ( x1 ,x2 x j
)| j J
J and is fixed in L
Definition
Category
Representation
C = ( ,x j ) | j J J , , x j X and is fixed inL
Definition
Partitioned
universe
Representation
U = = C | L = ( , X ) | L
General
Information
} {
Objective Information
Attribute signal set
Subjective
information
S =
{( s
,s 2 ,
,s j ,
)|
, X X , j J J and is fixed in L
Fig. 2.1.4. Conceptual System of Information Definition and Representation
68
transmitted by objects from the source. The signals must be received processed, assigned meaning and interpreted by receiving objects that allow relations to be established among objects from this source and at the receiving
end. This is relation-based information whose subjectivity is derived from the
fact that knowability of characteristic based information from the source in
addition to meaning and interpretation of attribute signals depend on the conscious state of the receiving objects and process.
The attribute signals are transmitted and responded to through material media. Different classes of attribute signals will be transmitted and responded to
through a material media with differential properties. The degree of accuracy
of transmission of attribute signals depends on the quality of the set of properties of channels of transmission and the source. The degree of accuracy of reception at the receiving end will depend on the efficiency of the receptor component of the receiving object. The degree of efficiency of receptor component
of the receiving object will also depend on the organizational complexity of the
awareness mechanism of the receiving object and its processing efficiency. The
degree of accuracy of response by the receiving object will depend on the qualitative properties of the receiving object. The type of relationships that may be
established among the sources and receiving ends will depend on the efficiencies of the receptor, processor and response mechanisms. Importantly the characteristic-based information (objective information) defines and set parameters
of the environment for both the objects at the source and objects at the receiving
end since all of them belong to the universal object set. The relation-based information (subjective information) defines the opportunity to append meanings
and interpretations of the nature and type of environment in which objects exist. It is stimuli-response process whose degrees of efficiency and interpretational accuracy depend on sending, receiving processing and interpretational
mechanisms of entities with appropriate capacities.
While all objects and processes in the universal object set produce and receive attribute signals in the environment not all of them are quipped with capacity to be aware of the signals that fill the environment through the information characteristics set. Thus relationships that are formed among objects and
processes may be divided into active and passive. Similarly objects may be
divided into those with awareness capacity and those with non-awareness capacity. Corresponding to awareness and non-awareness capacities are active
and passive relations respectively. Those objects with awareness capacity to
process and respond to attribute signals have active information relation while
those with non-active awareness to process and respond to received attribute
responses have passive information with other objects. Those objects that can
69
process and respond to received attribute signals around them can do so with
varying degrees of accuracy. Such degrees of accuracy depend on the nature
of the conscious state of objects and processes. Among the objects that have
awareness capacity, there are some that intentionally seek information from
their relevant environments for responses and adjustments to the active relations that they form with other objects. Special properties are required of objects and processes in order to be able to process, interpret, assign meaning to,
and respond to attribute signals from other objects, processes and events in the
general environment in which objects find themselves.
The nature of responses of objects in the environment to attribute signals
and the relationships that may be established among objects in the environment depend on the complexities of internal organizations of objects for accuracies in receiving, naming, processing and interpreting such attribute signals.
Just as information relations can be classified, as either passive or active so
also can the objects and processes be grouped. If an object is incapable of responding to attribute signal then we shall refer to it as info-passive. On the
other hand, an object or process is said to be info-active if such an object or
process is not only capable of awareness of attribute signals but it is capable
of responding to them. As presented, an object that is info-passive has passive
relations with all other objects and hence lacks capacity of environmental
awareness. Info-active objects and processes have active relations with all
other objects and hence possess capacity of environmental awareness. The
info-active objects and processes while possessing the property of environmental awareness have differential capacity and accuracy to receive, recognize, (names) process and respond to attribute signals. The differences are
qualitative in complexities of internal arrangements and energies of objects.
The info-active objects and processes are those that are associated with differential development of cognitive systems. Out of this set emerges an intelligent life whose members additionally and intentionally seek information for
executing a purpose. The subset of those members possessing intelligent life
is humans that are capable of creating names of categories and developing
concept from simple meaning of attribute signals, integrate them into reason
to understand environment for decision-choice process where accumulation of
experience becomes an engrained attribute.
We may infer from the above decisions, that mathematical theory of information or informatics is devoted to the study of relation-based information.
The measurements of the content of information is basically measurements of
quantity of the content of attribute signals that reach the receiving objects and
70
allow reduction of (possibilities) ignorance and improvement of awareness of

the environment by info-active objects. The theories in sciences are about the
studies of characteristics-based information that allows the understanding of
character and behavior of objects as well as re-enforce the clarity of information relations and the content of attribute signals. The theories of scientific
measurements are thus devoted to measurements of attributes in either aggregate or specificity that allows functional relations to be established between
objective information and subjective information (that is, between characteristic-based information and relation-based information). Every object and process contains characteristic-based information whose received relation-based
information will be less than or equal to that of characteristic-based information for any given receiving object or process in the process of establishing
the existence of reality.
2.1.2
Information and Reality
Let us now examine the relationship between information and reality. We

have stated the fundamental postulate that the existence of objects, states,
event and processes are established by characteristics or attributes that are
independent of awareness domain of objects and processes in nature. The collection of all these attributes constitutes the general characteristics-based
information set of objects, states, events and processes of the universal system. The characteristics-based information defines the objective existence of
reality in the universal system of things. It further provides channels through
which differences, similarities, groups and individuality are objectively established. Objective reality is not established by relations-based information
rather it has correspondence with characteristics-based information. There is
subjective reality that is established by relations-based information through
perceptive mechanism.
The characteristics-based information can be partitioned into subsets of
attributes of objects, states, events and processes. These subsets are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive but infinite in some sense of all
properties that exist in our universal system. They petition all events, objects, process and states into categories that are pair-wise disjoint. Each of
the subsets corresponds to a particular reality that is independent of the existence of and awareness capacity of other objects and processes. Each subset
of characteristics-based information presents potential for objects, processes, events and states to be distinguished and identified from one another
by cognitive agents through the nature of relation-based information. For
71
example, a subset of the family of sets of birds defines the family of ducks.
In a similar process, different subsets of characteristics-based information
allow distinction and identification of birds and their groups and so on the
universal object set is established.
The union of all these subsets that allow different birds and their groups to
be identified, objectively or uniquely defined the family of families of birds.
The example also applies to all objects, events, processes and states in our
universal system. The exhaustive subsets of the general characteristics-based
information present individual objects, processes, events and states of our
universal system in distinction, identification, comparison and classifications
without awareness of cognitive agents. The objective existence of the subsets
of characteristics-based information constitutes the foundation and motivation
of the classificatory science, cluster analysis, decomposition analysis, category formation, zonal analysis in the universal object space.
The concept of information as both characteristics-based (objective) and relations-based (subjective) allows a creative links to be made between information and identification processes of object, states, processes and events; between information and pattern recognition in terms of sameness, difference
and resemblance; between information and cluster analysis; between information and category formations; between information and the discoveries of
general laws of nature and social development; between information and the
discovery of objective truth; between information and transformations; between information and human intelligence in the field of decision and; between information and knowledge.
The universal unity is naturally decomposed into categories and subcategories where each is distinguished by a set of information characteristics and
identified by cognitive objects through subsets of information relations. The
characteristics-based information (objective information) is stable, indestructible and infinite with infinite family of finite subsets that together establish
the factual realty of the universe in the sense that their existence that defines
objects, states, processes and events in sameness, difference and resemblance
is independent of awareness of objects. The universe is composed of variety
of objects, states, processes and events that are individually and collectively
partitioned into categories on one had, and linked together in unity on the
other hand by information relations. The number of elements and the number
of categories in the universal object set are infinite and closed under any
transformation. In this framework, characteristic-based information partitions
the universal object set into categories. Relations-based information brings the
72
OBJECTIVE
REALITY
(Primary
Category of
Reality)
Subjective
Comparison
Function
C : X
COGNITIVE
REALITY
(Derived Category
of Reality)
Characteristic
Defining Function
F 1 : X
CHARACTERISTIC
BASED
INFORMATION
{( ,X ) |
(Primary Logical Reality)
UNITY OF
OBJECTIVE AND
SUBJECTIVE
INFORMATION
Signaling
Item
Function
G1 : X S
RELATIONS-BASED
INFORMATION
Cognitive
Processing
Function
S : {C | L }
{( ,S ) |
(Derived Logical Category)
Fig. 2.1.2.1. The Relational Unity between Characteristic-Based Information and Relations-Based Information in Distinguishing Objective Reality from Cognitive Reality
categories together in universal unity. A question, therefore arises as to how

do cognitive objects know this factual reality? The answer to this question
brings us to knowledge definition and how knowledge is spun by subjective
information that must be compared to objective information to establish cognitive reality.
Objective reality is the true state of existence of all universal elements independent of their awareness of their mutual existence. Cognitive reality is the
perceptive state of existence that is dependent on existence of cognitive agents
and activities of cognition. The cognitive reality is thus subjective reality.
Thus the concepts of reality and information are seen in terms of objectivesubjective dualities. It is these objective-subjective dualities that present us
with the cognitive dynamics of knowing and how the process of knowing affects reasoning in decision-choice process. In terms of evolution of thought
and construction of knowledge, the universal object set is the primary category of reality; the cognitive reality is a derived category of reality. Similarly
the characteristic-based information is the primary logical reality and rela-
2.2 Knowledge Definition and Representation in Decision-Choice Systems
73
tions-based information is a derived logical reality. All of these reside in universal unity under cognitive tension.
To say that the universal object set is the primary category of reality is to
say that nothing is conceivable outside this set which gives material meaning
to cognitive reality as a derived category of reality. It is also to say that every
cognitive reality is not only constructible from the perceived conditions of the
universal object set, but its defining essence is by all logical account reducible
to the essence of an element in the primary category of reality. Similarly the
characteristic-based information as the primary category of logical reality
gives meaning to relations-based information as a derived category by the
methods of both reductionism and constructionism.
2.2 Knowledge Definition and Representation in

Decision-Choice Systems
We now turn our attention to the concept of knowledge and examine how it
relates to information in terms of similarity and difference. Knowledge comes
to us through a process. The process acts through environmental awareness of
objects that have cognitive properties. The acts proceed through receiving,
interpreting, naming and processing of attribute signals that are generated by
subsets of information characteristics of the relevant environment. The domain of awareness is the zone of epistemological accessibility of information
that turns to knowledge acquisition through cognitive formation. Knowledge,
therefore, is nothing more than cognitive awareness where such awareness
depends on received attribute signals, and the relationship formed between the
recipient object and the source. The zone of epistemological accessibility is
also the zone of knowledge formation, which depends on the cognitive complexity of internal organization of the recipient object.
There are few questions that must be answered in order to understand
knowledge and knowledge formation. How does a cognitive object know that
an awareness of the environment has been established and hence some knowledge has been secured? What role does the relations-based information play in
linking cognitive objects to characteristics-based information that defines factual reality? What degree of awareness corresponds to true knowledge? Can
an index of awareness be constructed from received attribute signals to indicate the degree of awareness and hence knowledge. Since awareness is the
result of relations-based information, and knowledge is established through
awareness, knowledge is derived from relations-based information which re-
74
sults from receiving, and processing attribute signals from the elements of
characteristics-based information leading to identifying, naming, managing,
and grouping of elements in the universe.
Following the discussions under information, the cognitive path from relations-based information, and knowledge is a derived category of reality from
the universal object set. We shall show how this statement may be abstracted
from the above discussion on information. Knowledge as derived category is
simply a surrogate representation of aspects of reality. Consider Definition
2.1.6 of the structure of attribute signal set, S , which is also the relationsbased information which alternatively may be written as:
S = s j | s j = ( , X
) jJ
J , and is fixed in L
(2.2.1)
It was pointed out that the elements of the attribute signal set pass through
cognitive filters, become processed and transformed into a perception characteristics set. The processing and transformation take place through cognitive
modulus, , such that x j = s j where ( i ) maybe viewed as cognitive
conversion moment that transforms subjective information, s j into objective
information, x j as knowledge. The element, x j is a subjective knowledge representation of the true attribute x j X X .
The cognitive transformation function ( i ) is a conversion process that
may be viewed in terms of a community of scholars engaged in scientific and
scholarly research toward general or scientific discovery of what there is, the
reality. In the general society, ( i ) is established by the social paradigm of
arriving at social knowledge about reality through perception characteristics
set as a model of reality but not necessarily the reality itself. In scientific and
scholarly research ( i ) may be viewed in terms of Kuhns paradigm
[R20.48] [R20.49] [R20.50] as defining a totality of the ruling research culture, beliefs, values, ideology, techniques and methods towards the discovery
and explanation of what there is, the reality. The discovery of a knowledge
element may proceed as problem-solving or puzzle-solving activities while
anomalies are conveniently ignored within the social conditions on the basis
of which the cognitive transformation function is constructed. The social
paradigm and the scientific paradigm are equivalent to what we have discussed in Chapter 1 as decision-choice rationality in the development of the
universal knowledge bag.
It is useful to notice how the cognitive transformation function fits into the
competition and crash of what I wish to refer to as competing ideologies of
knowledge acquisition and problem-solving process; and the rise of methodo-
( )
75
logical controversies with competing paradigms leading to what Kuhn refers

to as a kind of gestalt switch in the sense of transformation of relations-based
information to knowledge formation. The paradigm or the conditions defining
the transformation function, becomes what Kedrov calls cognitive barrier to
knowledge acquisition process [R20.42] [R20.43]. It is this cognitive barrier
as general human limitation that produces boundedness on decision-choice
rationality as well as generates Kuhns anomalies in the enterprise of the
knowledge production, storage and retrieval. Thus, in terms of Kedrov, the
process of scientific discovery is a process of overcoming cognitive barriers
as have been established by the ruling scientific culture. This boundedness in
rationality on the road of knowledge production or scientific discovery is
more or less equivalent to Professor Simons bounded rationality in decisionchoice process in general. To develop definition and representation of knowledge let us pick up from the definition and representation of relations-based
information.
2.2.1
The Concept and Nature of Knowledge
Definition 2.2.1
Given attribute signals, s j S from the sources in the universal object
set , and cognitive transformation function, ( i ) such that x j = s j
is the perceived element that is associated with the corresponding
elements in the characteristic set, X then the collection of all x j
of the form
constitutes the perception characteristics set, X
X = ( S ) = ( x ,x
x
|
,
x
x
,x
,
i
X
I , L
( i) i
1
2
i)
i
and I is the general index set of
where I I , is a finite index set of X
attributes signals sent by .
. This simply instructs us that the
Let us observe that # X = # S # X
space of reality is far greater than the space of acquired knowledge. Further X since there may be some elements in X
more, we cannot claim that X
that are not in X . The perception characteristics set X constitutes the conditions of justification of subjective knowledge about whose partitioned char
acteristic sets is X . In this way X is the primary category of reality and X
is derived category reality through a process. Subjective knowledge is a subset
of characteristics-based information, and cognitive processes generate perceptual images of objects, states, processes and events in the universe system
with appropriate qualitative properties through the cognitive conversion proc we can specify
ess. By the means of the perception characteristics sets, X
( )
76
which satisfies the justification principle as,

the subjective knowledge set,
=
; X | ( S ) = X , L L .
as
The cognitively derived category of reality (subjective knowledge), C
established by the perception characteristic set X and the partitioned subjective knowledge set may be written as:
{(
= (
X , L L
; x i ) | i I I ,
, x i X
C
C = {( ; x ) | i I
i
(2.2.2)
X , L L
, x i X
I ,
(2.2.3)
is cognitively derived attribute condition in support of belief that
Where X
is an acquired subjective knowledge element through cognitive transformation
GENERAL
INFORMATION
OBJECTS in
the Universal
Set
RELATIONS
among Objects
COGNITIVE
PROCESSING
CENTER
OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION
SUBJECTIVE
INFORMATION
SUBJECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE
Fig. 2.2.1. Relational Geometry of General Information-Knowledge Process in cognition and Supporting Principle.
77
function and L L is a finite index set of known subjective knowledge

elements. The general trend is accepting the principles of similarity and difference in the universal object set. The similarity principle imposes a partition
and principle of difference allows categorial recognition. The objects in the
universal object set presents information that allows relations to be formed
and subjective knowledge to be developed from the relations through the activities of the cognitive processing center as shown in Figure 2.2.1.
We can now tighten the justification condition by a definition in support of
knowledge from the relational geometry.
Definition 2.2.2-: Rational Belief
as knowledge of is said to be raA belief system B in support of
tional in the knowledge accumulation process if there exist a cognitive transformation function ( i ) , characteristic-based information, X and relation X for any element .
based information, S such that : S X
The perception characteristic set, X is the support of B while both B and

constitute the justification principle for subjective knowledge element
.
X
Subjective knowledge is a pair of objects of knowledge and sets of justification conditions of claims to knowledge. Subjective knowledge about objects, states, processes and events must only satisfy the justification principle
that the cognitive object (e.g. human) has available but must also satisfy conditions that allow claims to knowledge of an object or state or process or event
in the universal system. The justification conditions allow beliefs to be formed
about the subjective claim to new knowledge about reality. This subjectively
claimed new knowledge may not meet conditions of factual correctness of
reality or true knowledge. The verification of acquisition of true knowledge
requires comparability analysis among elements in subjective knowledge
and the objective knowledge set . The knowledge acquisitionset,
decision process involves expectations about the chances of the discovery of
to be
what there is, through the logical construct of what is claimed
knowledge. The role of expectations in epistemic analysis of rationality will
be dealt separately. We must, at least, point out that every step in human decision-choice action involves uncertainties, expectations and risks that constrain
the conditions of rationality.
The distinction between knowledge and information may be viewed in
terms of primary and derivative of categories by categorical conversion
[R20.20] [R13.24]. Information and knowledge are separated into two interdependent categories of reality where one is derived from the other. One is
78
objective reality and the other is subjective reality. It is through the subjective
reality that knowledge is formed and true knowledge is conditionally established. The argument advanced here is that characteristics-based information
constitutes the primary category of reality. Knowledge is a derived category
of reality through a process of categorical conversion or transformation that is
conditioned on the motion of attribute signals and perception transformations
leading to the formation of subjective knowledge among source objects and
recipient objects. The tools for categorical conversion are logic and science
which are contained in nominalism, constructionism and reductionism. According to the initial requirements of nominalism and constructionism one
holds the elements in characteristic-based information as primary category of
reality and holds elements in the subjective knowledge to be part of reality in
so far as any subjective knowledge element can be shown to be derived from
characteristic-based information. Similarly, the requirements of nominalism
and reductionism is such that knowledge is held as derived category of reality
while characteristic-based information is held to be the primary reality in so
far as it can be known by a logical process that an element in the subjective
knowledge set is reducible to an element in the characteristic-based information. The truthfulness or knowledge appears in degrees and is verified in the
primary category of reality and accepted or rejected by decision-choice action.
The conditions of justification principle of knowledge acquisition are
found in the derived category of reality while the conditions of verification
principle must be derived from the primary category if the perceptual knowledge (subjective knowledge) is to have a claim to reality. We know that true
knowledge is acquired through information relation if perceptual knowledge
satisfies the justification principle in the derived category of reality as well as
verification or collaboration principle in the primary category of reality. The
justification and collaboration principles connect the primary and derived
categories of reality through the logical vehicle of cognitive categorial conversion. From nominalism, we must understand and appreciate the role of explication that takes place between common language and scientific language
and how they relate to knowledge and decision-choice rationality of knowledge acceptance in the enterprise of knowledge production. Furthermore we
must appreciate the power of partitioning of the universal object set into categories in language formation. Let us keep in mind that the universal object set
is composed of elements, process, states, events that are infinite in collection
in a manner that allows the universal object set to be closed. Let us also observe that a rational belief system is necessary but no sufficient for justification principle of knowledge in that the belief may be false. It must also be
79
kept in mind that belief system involves expectations about knowledge discovery. Expectations involve risk of successes and failures in all dimensions
of the decision-choice process.
Definition 2.2.3 -: Full Justification Belief
about reality
A belief system, B , in support of knowledge element
X X
(that is, the perception
is said to be fully justified if X
characteristic set X and the characteristics-based information set, X are in

X = and partially justimutual containment. It is said to be false if X
fied if X X .
is

If a belief system in support of subjective knowledge element
partially justified as equivalent to true knowledge element then the
subjective knowledge appears in degrees (or shades) of truth in knowing. The
presence of shades of truth demands from decision-choice activities as to what
level of degree of truth must be socially accepted in order to conclude that the
is in close resemblance representation

subjective knowledge element
of the objective knowledge . This knowledge acceptance process is
subjectively defined by decision-choice rationality in fuzzy space as we shall
show later.
A question arises as to how do we know that the subjective knowledge
is a true knowledge of with characteris with justification, X

tics set, X . The answer requires that the elements in the subjective knowledge
| L L be compared with the elements in the objective
=
;X
set,
reality, = ( ; X ) | L such that corroboration and verification conditions are met. Every individual or collective claim to knowledge that satisfies
the justification principle is first treated as a rational opinion that must pass
through other tests such as corroboration and verification. Rational opinions do
not necessarily enter into the knowledge bag. Let us examine the epistemic nature of the principles of corroboration and verification as they relate to decisionchoice rationality. The knowledge production process derives its developmental
force from the dynamics of objective-subjective duality that resides in information polarity where reality is being converted to subjective knowledge and subjective knowledge is being converted to reality. The process requires rational
justification (justified belief) that knowledge has been obtained; and rational
corroboration that the knowledge item is found in the set of item of reality; and
finally verification that the two items are identical.
{(
80
Definition 2.2.4 -: Corroboration Principle

Given a universal object set, and universal characteristics set, X then a
X
is
with justification condition X

subjective knowledge element,
= # X , L and x x , j = i with
said to be corroborated in full if # X
j
i
fixed in L , j J , i I and # J = # I . It is said to be partially corrobo < # X , L and or x x for some j = i but # I = # J
rated if # X
j
i
Note: As defined, it may be observed that partial corroboration is equivalent to
< # X , L .
partial knowledge. The knowledge is said to be partial if # X
Partial knowledge may be viewed in terms of degrees of corroboration as we
have pointed out.
Definition 2.2.5 -: Degree of Corroboration
If X is the characteristics-based information set in support of the reality
is the justification condition in support of subjective
, L and X
with fixed in L then the degree of corroboration, k

knowledge
and objective knowledge, X is defined
between subjective knowledge, X
as : k = # X
where
#X
X X
1 full corroboration X
# X
k =
( 0,1) partial corroboration X X
X
#
X =
0 no corroboration
X
Note: It will be shown that partial corroboration analysis and knowledge inclusion decision problem may be done by method of optimal fuzzy decisionchoice rationality.
Definition 2.2.4 -: Verification Principle
Given a universal object set, and the universal characteristics set, X , then
is said to be
with justification condition, X
the subjective knowledge
= with k = 1 , partially verified
fully verified to be a true knowledge if
= with k ( 0,1) and fails the test of the verification principle if
if
k = 0 . The rationality involves in acceptance of subjective knowledge is
made up of justification, corroboration and verification as we have discussed
The cognitive path is provided in Figure 2.2.2 with various cognitive transformation functions involving justification decision, corroboration decision
and verification decision.
3
S
81
1
X
SOURCE
C
U/
(i)
Justification
(i)
A (i)
V (i)
Verification
Corroboration
Fig. 2.2.2. The Cognitive Path of Decision-Choice Rationality in Information Reception, Information Processing and Knowledge Construction. The i s are Cognitive
Transformation Functions at the Various Stages ( i ) =Justification Test Function,
( i ) =Corroboration Test Function V ( i ) =Verification Test Function and A ( i ) =
= Subjective
Knowledge Acceptance Test Function. The Space U / = Reality,
Knowledge.
Let us keep in mind that the objective knowledge corresponds to the primary
category of reality that exist independently of general awareness and existence
of cognitive objects while the subjective knowledge corresponds to derived
category of reality through awareness, perceptive process and transformation
activities of cognitive agents on relations-based information set. The acceptance principle must meet certain conditions of comparability through ranking. We can now construct a knowledge possibility set by combining the derived category of reality with the index of degrees of corroboration in order to
establish the universal knowledge bag.
Definition 2.2.5: Knowledge Possibility Set
82
( )
of element is a derived category

The knowledge possibility set, P X
of reality whose elements are equipped with index of degree of corroboration,
k , as well as satisfying the verification principle that may be written as
( ) {( x
=
P X
i ,k ;
)|iI
, , L L

,
where is an index set of individuals who claim to have knowledge about
.
Proposition 2.2.1: Comparability Principle
obtained from individual , a set of

All subjective knowledge
individuals claim to have objective knowledge can be compared and ranked by
index of corroboration, k [ 0,1] on the principles of corroboration and verification. Thus if k , and a fixed L then either k i > k j or
k i < k j or k i = k j where = {( k 1 ,k 2 k ) | for a fixed L} and
that if k i > k j , k i > k j k i > k q where 1 , 2 q and the
subscripts identify different individuals.
Proposition 2.2.1 -: Acceptability Principle (Rationality Principle)
, fails both the cor in the knowledge possibility set, P X
Any element
. By
roboration and verification tests if k < ( 0,1] and hence
element to element comparison we can define socially accepted knowledge
knowledge set where is the belief support
and socially rejected
set,
T
R
as
index for
( )
= {(
( )
)| k
,k ) P ( X
We must note that P ( X

) =
}
, ,

= , L L ,
}
| k
= (
, ,
,k ) P X
= , L L ,

<
and

= where the value is the
P
T
P
minimum index belief level for knowledge acceptance. It may also be interpreted as the minimum level of confidence index for corroboration and verification principles of the content of knowledge. We can now present the cognitive geometry of definition and representation of knowledge by combining the
definitions, principles and the geometric structures to obtain the Figure 2.2.3.
In knowledge definition and representation given the universal object set, the
primary logical category is the attribute signal set, followed by perception
characteristic set that allows a subjective partition to be imposed on the perception characteristic set.
83
THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE

Definition
Begins with the attribute

signal set
Representation
S = {s j | s j = ( , X ) j J
J , and is fixed in L
Definition
Perception
`Characteristic set
Representation
=( S ) = ( x ,x x ) |, x =( x ) ,x X X, iI , L
X
1 2
i
i
i
i
Definition
Justification
i i l
Representation
{( ; X ) | ( S ) = X ,
L L
Definition
Category of
subjective
knowledge set
Representation
= (
X , L L
; x i ) | i I I ,
, x i X
C
Definition
Partitioned
knowledge set
Accepted Knowledge
Bag
( )}
= (
,k ) P X
Comparability, Acceptability
and rationality principles
=
Representation
{( ; X ) |
L L
Corroboration and Verification principles
# X [ 0 ,1]
k = #X
Knowledge Possibility set

= ( x ,k ;
, , L L
) | i I ,

P X
i
( ) {
Fig. 2.2.3. Conceptual System of Knowledge Definition and Representation
84
The path of knowledge accumulation through information representation may

be presented in a logical geometry by combining the essential elements of
information and knowledge representation as in Figure 2.2.4.
Universal Object Set, = | L
Universal Characteristics Set X = x j | j J
Partitioned Characteristics Set
X = x j | j J J , fixed in L
C
O
N
S
T
R
U
C
T
I
O
N
I
S
M
X=
{( x
Primary Category of Reality
; ) | j J J , , fixed in L
Attribute Signal Set/ Conditions of Justification Principle
S =
{( s ;) | j J
j
J , , fixed in L
Categorial Cognitive Conversion X = ( S
) = {x i | i I
, L
Derived Category of Reality/ Perception-of-Reality Set
=
X
{( x
, L L
) | i I ,

;
=
Subjective Knowledge,
{( ; X ) |
L L
Knowledge Possibility Set

= ( x ,k ;
, , L L
) | i I ,

P X
( ) {
Socially Accepted Knowledge Set
( )
| k
= (
,k ) P X
= , L L ,
,,
INPUT INTO DECISION-CHOICE MODULE
Fig. 2.2.4. Cognitive Geometry of the Path of Knowledge Accumulation
R
E
D
U
C
T
I
O
N
I
S
M
2.2.2
85
Knowledge, Illusions and Reality
True knowledge is information supported claim with a degree of subjective

certainty defined by a degree of collaboration between the primary character from attribute signals for any
istics set X and derived characteristics set X
object, or process or state or event from the universal object set. This is another way of looking at and presenting the traditional definition that knowledge is a form of justified true belief where belief is information-supported
[R14.20, p85] or reason-based as epistemic justification. Whatever are the
finding characteristics of true knowledge the argument in this monograph
projects knowledge to be a product of the process of cognition involving
what there is and its knowabilityy on the basis of some assumed decisionchoice rationality. Any knowledge element in the knowledge set must satisfy three conditions of a) justification condition, b) corroboration condition
and c) verification condition. These three conditions constitute the condition
for justified true belief for acceptance. Knowledge element is thus justified,
collaborated and verified characteristics-based-information supported belief.
Subjective knowledge is true belief, supported by relations-based information
through reason or cognitive transformation of attribute signals of what there
is, an element, in the universal object set, socially or scientifically true
knowledge is thus distinguished from subjective or perceptive knowledge.
The distinction finds expression in principles of justification, corroboration,
verification and social rationality in the construct of the knowledge set on the
basis of relation-based-information belief system. This belief system gives
rise to paradigms, barriers to knowledge discoveries, fuzziness in knowledge
interpretation, conditions of paradigm shifts and limitations on decisionchoice rationality.
The concept of characteristics-based information accepts the idea that basic
information represented as a set of attributes of objects, events, states and
processes is indestructible and infinite. The objects of reality appear in subjective knowledge through awareness that is brought about by a process of receiving, naming, processing and interpreting attribute signals generated by
subsets of information characteristics about category of elements in the universal object set. The domain of awareness is the zone of epistemological accessibility of characteristics-based information for true knowledge formation
through categorical conversions. The establishment of the zone of epistemological accessibility demands the development of the theory of zonal analysis.
In humans, the categorical conversions from characteristics-based information to true knowledge through the transformation function ( i ) is restricted
86
by a number of limitations which include, inefficiencies of signal reception,

limited capacity-processing ability, limited-storage capacity, ambiguities in
naming, in concept formation and linguistic relations of objects: lost of signals, carelessness or deceit, inefficiencies in the retrieval and interpretation
processes and others, all of which bring about possible differences between
the primary characteristics set X of reality and derived characteristics set,
of reality; and between the primary categories of reality X and derived
X
for any element . These limitations are both natucategory of reality X
ral and societal.
By zonal analysis it may be shown that at each point of time the limitations
restrict individual and societal awareness. The general effects of these limitations allow us to partition the information space into zone of epistemological
accessibility (ZEA) and the zone of epistemological ignorance (ZEI). The
ZEA is composed of true knowledge and illusory knowledge which combine
to establish perceptual knowledge. The accepted knowledge satisfies the conditions of justification, collaboration and verification with acceptable degree
of uncertainty. The illusory knowledge satisfies only the conditions of justification that are influenced by preconceptions and unproven held belief that is
manufactured in the social ideology. The ZEI is defined by the characteristicsbased information that is not epistemologically accessible. At the level of decision and choice, ZEA specifies the zone of conditionally epistemological
certainty while ZEI specifies the Zone of epistemological uncertainty. The
presence of illusory knowledge generates obstacles that are epistemological
noise in the process of knowing. The greater is that noise, the large is the zone
of illusory knowledge and the stronger are limitations in correctly receiving
information signals of events, states, processes as well as correctly processing,
interpreting, storing and utilizing them as true knowledge in decisions and
actions. The implication for social knowledge accumulation is that there is a
ZEA-ZEI duality under tension with mutual negation through categorial conversion in the knowledge production process. At every stage the socially accepted knowledge forms the initial basis and conditions for further knowledge
production.
The ZEA and ZEI exist in duality under cognitive tension. The principle of
categorial conversion operates between ZEI and ZEA transforming elements
in ZEI and ZEA into one another thus reducing uncertainty. Similarly, it may
transform some elements in ZEA into ZEI through lost and forgetfulness. Uncertainties surrounding events, processes and states are viewed as ignorance.
The measure of uncertainty is a measure of epistemological ignorance regarding an event. The measure of information contained in an attribute signal is a
87
measure of reduction of the epistemological ignorance. Knowledge then defines the level of certainty that has been acquired about elements . The
growth of knowledge is an increase in the true knowledge set. It is basically
an expansion of the zone of epistemological accessibility of characteristicsbased information set. Alternatively stated, the growth of knowledge is a reduction in the ZEI and uncertainty. Here cognitive rationality finds itself
through the search for the best path in reducing uncertainties that surround
decision, choice and implied rationality to which we now turn our attention.
We must, however, keep in mind that our claimed and accepted knowledge
items are collectively subjective model representation of natural and social
states and processes in time and over time as we perceive them. The model
representations are under our constant scrutiny, revision, refinement and acceptance process that together provide cognitive dynamism of our knowledge
production and decision-choice process in terms of cognitive check and balances. The direction of this dynamism is influenced by our knowledge structure, linguistic hedging, approximate reason and fuzzy concepts and categories of state and processes that assert preponderating effects on our decisioninformation-interactive processes that may be rational or sub-rational.
Decision, Choice and Rationality
The nature of enterprise of science, general cognition and scientific activities

are shown to be embedded in human decision and choice behavior under reason. Within this context of knowledge construction, rationality is seen as a
guide to cognitive activities at the level of critical deliberations. Here rationality is viewed in terms of decision-choice process in operating on the best cognitive path of scientific practice that maximizes the possibility and probability
of the discovery of what there is or maximizes the explanatory and predictive
powers of explanans and predicens respectively. Rationality is further related
to the selection process of the best path for actualizing that which ought to be
from the potential (that which is not). Human history is thus seen as an enveloping of success-failure outcomes of decision and choice behaviors at the levels of both individual and the collective. In other words, social history is continuously interconnected outcomes of decision-choice processes whether these
are established by some intelligence or not. By some slight qualifications this
statement may be generalized to all living things. Viewed in terms of resource
commitment to knowledge production, and in terms of Eulers maximumminimum principles of universal system, decision-choice rationality is seen in
terms of benefit maximization and cost minimization in knowledge construction process.
The global human history includes the intellectual history of humanity. The
manner in which decisions and choices are made will not only influence the
direction and the path of the history but will exert preponderating effects on
decision-choice outcomes. Because of these preponderating effects of decisions on the evolving human civilization, three important questions tend to
arise. They are: a) is there an intelligence that guides good decisions and
choices? b) How do people come to discover such intelligence of good decisions and choices, and hence practice it if the answer to question a) is affirmative? and c) Does this intelligence has objective or subjective existence as
90
3 Decision, Choice and Rationality
viewed from the universal object set? The first question is the problem of existence in terms of what there is. The second question involves the problem of
knowability of the existence and the third involves the problem of realityperception duality. A search for solutions to these problems requires us to
take a critical look at the relationships among four basic cognitive items of
objectivity, subjectivity, decision and choice and how they may be related to
intelligence of critical deliberation.
In this meta-theoretic analysis or epistemic model, objectivity, subjectivity,
decision and choice are considered as the basic items for epistemic modeling
of rationality. To present the structure requires a critical examination between
the concept formation on one hand and center of information and knowledge
on the other, and how they relate to each other and decision-choice process of
cognitive agents. This examination is undertaken in Chapter Two in terms of
how information differs from or similar to knowledge in the process of influencing decision-choice activities. The relational structure of subjectivity and
objectivity in decision-choice process may be represented at the four corners
of a rectangle that allows a construct of relational algebra and soft computing
as in Figure 3.1. The four basic items are now related to reality and perception
Objective
(O)
Subjective
(S)
Cognitive
System
Decision (D)
Choice (C)
Fig. 3.1. Four Basic Elements of Epistemic Model in Relational Duality of Decision and
Choice
91
on one hand and primary and derived categories of reality on the other. From
the four basic cognitive items, we analytically obtain objective-subjectivedecision pyramid and objective-subjective-choice pyramid. We have established in Chapters One and Two the conditions of objective existence through
the analytical construct of the universal object set and characteristic-based
information set. We have also, from the same analytical construct, established
conditions of subjectivity through the relation-based information set and the
perception-characteristic set. We have discussed in the same analytical process how the objectivity and subjectivity are related to primary and derived
categories of reality.
Let us relate these concepts to each other in order to obtain some clarity of
relational structures of decision, choice and rationality given any cognitive
system. The relationships among decision, rationality, choice, objectivity,
subjectivity and reality may first be examined through pyramidal interactions
as presented in Figure 3.2. At the center of the pyramidal geometry
[where ( ) represents conceptual pyramid] is the cognitive system around
which decision, choice and rationality may be referenced. There are relational
interactions of two pyramidal structures of decision-rationality-choice pyramid ( O-R-C ) with decision-choice duality base, and objective-rationalitysubjective pyramid ( O-R-S ) with objective-subjective duality base. Some
daunting questions tend to arise within the epistemic model. Which of the
three elements of decision, choice and rationality belongs to the primary category of reality? And which ones must be considered as belonging to the derived category of reality? Can choice exist independently of decision? What
meaning does rationality have without decision or choice? What role does
praxeology have in understanding rationality or intelligence of success-failure
decision-choice processes in human action?
From the viewpoint of general theory of knowledge, the problem of existence of some intelligence for decision and choice of knowledge item to be
included in the universal knowledge bag may be conceptualized in two
ways. At the level of knowability, the problem of what intelligence there is
belongs to the universal object set. It is however unknown cognitively and
hence must be discovered. The problem belongs to a philosophical category
and analytical structure of the theory of scientific discovery. The intelligence to be discovered exists as actual or potential. When it is found, the
ensuing properties must establish the best path and sequential steps to
knowledge discovery.
92
RATIONALITY
(R)
OBJECTIVE
(O)
SUBJECTIVE
(S)
COGNITIVE
SYSTEM
DECISION
(D)
CHOICE
(C)
RATIONALITY
(R)
Fig. 3.2. Pyramidal Geometry of Decision, Choice and Rationality (D=Decision)

(C=Choice), (R=Rationality), (O= Objective) and (S=Subjective)
The best path to scientific discovery is thus imbued with the belief in its actual
existence. It is always hidden as a potential in nature and hence can be found.
At the level of understanding, however, what intelligence there is, is given or
known. Its behavior and practice must be explained. The problem of the understanding of the character of the decision-choice intelligence thus belongs to
the philosophical category and analytical structure of explanatory theory of
what there is. There are many types of decisions and hence the explanatory
power must satisfy a number of external conditions of specific subject matter
of decision and choice theories and applications that may be required of the
theories for internal consistencies and analytical usefulness. The explanatory
power must also elucidate some scientific problems of contradictions between
decision and choice within general cognition, epistemology and the limitations that restrict the discovery of the decision-choice intelligence. Attempts
to resolve these contradictions take place through the construct of degree of
explanatory power as we have discussed in Chapter Two of this monograph.
The relationships that connect decision, choice and rationality in terms of
objectivity and subjectivity may be examined through an alternative pyramidal
93
Reality
Rationality
Choice
COGNITIVE
SYSTEM
Objective
Subjective
Decision
Fig. 3.3. Epistemic Geometry of Relationships among Decision, Choice and Rationality in Duality
logic and relational categories of duality involving objective-subjective duality and decision-choice duality. The pyramidal logic begins with the question
as to whether rationality is an objective or subjective phenomenon. Similarly,
are decision and choice subjective or objective phenomena? The cognitive
geometry of pyramidal analysis of objective-subjective relationships to decision, choice and rationality is presented in Figure 3.3. Again a question involving the relational primacy arises in the process of finding answers to the
questions surrounding the objective-subjective relationships of decision,
choice and rationality. Are decision, choice and rationality primary or derived
categories of reality?
The answers that may be provided to these questions will depend on assignments of meanings to objective and subjective phenomena as we have tried to
explain. Subjectivity may be real but may exist in illusions in that its existence
is inseparable from cognitive agents. Subjective phenomena exist as a result of
the existence of cognitive agents. Objective phenomena exist independently of
awareness of cognitive agents. They also satisfy conditions of reality. Reality
94
Decision (PCR)
Rationality
(PCR)
Choice (DCR)
COGNITIVE
SYSTEM
Rationalit
y (DCR)
Choice
(DCR)
Decision (DCR)
Fig. 3.4. Epistemic Geometry of Relationships among Decision, Choice and Rationality
in Duality [PCR=Primary Category of Reality, DCR=Derived Category of Reality]
exists independently of perceptions of cognitive agents and hence devoid of

illusions. Reality appears in two forms as a primary category or as a derived
category. The relational structure that connects decision, choice and rationality to primary and derived categories of reality may also be examined through
a pyramidal logic whose cognitive geometry is presented in Figure 3.4.
The analytical structure is such that we must establish among the three
epistemic elements of decision, rationality and choice, which one is the primary category of reality from which others are derivatives. Epistemically, we
may assume rationality to be an attribute of cognitive agents. Alternatively,
we may consider rationality as attribute of cognitive systems to be selfevident truth. The two alternatives are equivalent. To assume rationality to be
an attribute of decision agents is also to assert its objective existence and
hence real in so far as decision agents are real. Such an objective existence
can only appear as a derived category from a primary category of reality
which we must show to exist. To assume rationality to be a learned behavior
is to deprive it of its objective existence and impose on it a complete subjectivity that may be either real or illusory. On the other hand, if decision is assumed to be objective, then rationality must be an attribute of cognitive agents
95
to the extent to which they exist as category of reality. Decision, under this
assumption, acquires objective existence but it is conditional on objective existence of cognitive agents.
Epistemic analysis of decision, choice and rationality with their possible relationships must be initialized with existence postulate of cognitive systems or
agents that belong to the universal object set with a defined characteristicbased information set. The cognitive agent is then taken as a primary category
of reality for the cognitive system whose characteristics include awareness
and information-signal reception. Decision, choice and rationality are thus
derived categories of reality from cognitive systems. We must keep in mind
that the starting point of any theory is the epistemic environment on the basis
of which it is constructed. Such an environment may be defined and established by assumptions about certain key variables or elements or behavior.
The environment for the theory may also be established by taking the variables or elements or behavior as self-evident truths. Thus self-evident truths
and assumptions may be viewed as two sides of the same coin.
Given the cognitive system, decision may be viewed as a primary logical
category of reality while rationality and choice are derived categories of reality from decision. In fact, at the level of categorial transformation, one may
view rationality as a derivative of decision; and choice as a derivative of rationality and hence by logical consistency choice is a derivative of decision.
In this primary-derived categorial relationship, one can not speak of choice
without decision. While decision does not imply choice, choice always implies decision. Similarly, we cannot speak of rational choice without the structural foundation of rational decision. The conceptual structure of rationality
takes claim to meaningfulness only at the presence of decision. In this epistemic construct from Figure 3.3, we have a pyramidal logic of relational transformations that allows the establishment of decision-rationality-choice pyramid ( D-R-C ) that is superimposed on reality-objectivity-subjectivity
pyramid ( R-O-S ) .
We must keep in mind that in pyramidal logic and categorial transformations, every derived category can serve as a primary category of reality for
another derived category of reality by the logic of constructionism. Thus, rationality is a derived category of reality and by logic of reductionism it is a
decision. Rationality is a derived category of reality but serves as primary
category of reality from which choice is derived and by logical extension
choice is a derivative of decision. The conditions of primary and derived categories of reality are expressed in Chapter Two. We only need to remind our-
96
selves that a category is said to be derived if it can be shown by logic of reductionism to emerge from a category that serves as its primary by logic of
constructionism.
From the logic of pyramidal interactions and referring to Figures (3.3) and
(3.4) the rationality-objective-subjective pyramid is the primary pyramid from
which decision-rationality-choice pyramid is derived. Here, decision is either
objective or subjective as viewed from the universal objective set and characteristics-based information set on one hand, or from perception-characteristic
set and relations-based information set on the other hand. All decisions derived from the characteristics-based information set are objective and all decisions derived from the relations-based information set are subjective. Objective decisions are supported by objective knowledge while subjective decisions are supported by subjective knowledge. Since rationality and choice are
both derived from decision, they are objective or subjective to the extent to
which decision is objective or subjective. Decision is an attribute of cognitive
agents. In other words it belongs to the characteristics-based information set.
Rationality and choice are derived attributes of decisions and hence may have
tendencies to belong to either characteristics-based information set or relations-based information set.
Decision is taken to be the primary category of reality because it precedes
choice while rationality appears in decision-choice interactions. The sense in
which these interactions take place will depend on the dynamic behavior of
objective-subjective duality in knowledge production space and categorial
transformation from the primary category of reality to derived category of
reality. In terms of the logic of categorial conversions, choice is also a categorial derivative by transformation from decision. Choice rationality is a logical transformation from decision rationality. Rationality as an attribute of decision is transformed into an attribute of choice by categorial transformation.
The pyramidal logic that connects decision, rationality and choice leads to an
epistemic structure that produces three elements of duality of decisionrationality duality, rationality-choice duality and decision-choice duality under tension. The pyramid of these three categories of duality is then superimposed on another pyramid constructed from three categories of duality composed of reality-objective duality, objective-subjective duality and realitysubjective duality as represented in Figure 3.3. The pyramidal logic will allow
us to examine in details the epistemological problems of rationality, decision
and choice. The concept of rationality has no epistemic meaning and substantive relevance without a reference to decision-choice processes.
3.1 Epistemological Problem of Rationality
97

We begin with an assumption that decision and choice are characteristics of
cognitive agents of which humans are integral part. This is supported by a
postulate that all human activities can be subsumed under decision and choice
which we have characterized as decision-choice processes. Any decisionchoice process involves transformations and substitutions in the reality space
producing an enveloping of success-failure outcomes that define human history. The transformation-substitution processes are made possible by relational categories of dualities. A question, therefore, arises as to whether decision and choice are objective attributes of cognitive agents. We shall then examine the epistemic meaning of rationality in relation to human activities. We
shall refer to the intelligence that is embodied in human decision-choice behavior and produced by cognitive quality as rationality. Such intelligence may
be seen in diverse forms and so also the rationality. An explication is required
to give the concept of rationality a scientific content. In the practice of history
creation the human intelligence that shapes decisions and choices and their
possible outcomes is composed of subjective and objective phenomena. Here
reason or intellect is seen to define and establish the nature of intelligence of
human decisions and choices on the basis of available knowledge. Knowledge
is an input to reasoning which in turn must produce output. Such knowledge
may be objective or subjective depending on whether it satisfies the conditions of characteristics-based information or relations-based information as we
have established in Chapters One and Two of this monograph. Information is
an input to knowledge production while reasoning is the mechanism for information processing into knowledge as output.
At the level of cognitive source, reasoning, in general, appears at both conscious state and subconscious state in inseparable unity. At the level of transformations, reasoning appears as both objective and subjective processes in
inseparable unity. At the level of cognition the objective process takes place
in the conscious state while the subjective process takes place in the subconscious state in a unified process. In human understanding, cognitive activities
and communication, rationality as a concept is both part of descriptive language of commonsense and scientific analysis after explication. It is also part
of the reporting language of human inquiry about natural and social phenomena which include choices and decisions outcomes. What then is the concept
of rationality and what is its content?
98
3.1.1
The Concept of Rationality
It is these characteristics that make the concept of rationality a disturbing one

in the theory of knowledge and general decision-choice process. Rationality
has a multiplicity of meaning, measurement and usage. This multiplicity of
meaning and usage creates differences in its interpretation even when the
same epistemological problem is under critical deliberation. The result is that
there are many facets of rationality that may be of interest to different investigators of science and philosophy in different disciplines of knowledge.
Among the various usages, one may take note of ethical rationality, procedural rationality, logical rationality, empirical rationality, explanatory rationality and prescriptive rationality and others in decision-choice processes in
actual-potential social transformations. All these types of rationality may fall
under one of these epistemic categories of classical rationality, bounded rationality and fuzzy rationality.
In these discussions, I wish to examine primarily the concept of fuzzy rationality and its relationship to classical rationality [R12][12.8][R12.10]
[R12.14] [12.20][R17] [R17.3] [R17.7], bounded rationality [R18], [R18.18]
in decision-choice processes in human activities. I will present a particular
philosophical interpretation of human intelligence and its knowability as embodied in decision and choice, and then show how fuzzy rationality by shifting
the paradigm of classical logic and its corresponding mathematics leads to
decision making and information processing that generalize the classical and
bounded rationalities. It will be argued that any characterization of rationality
is subsumed under classical, bounded or fuzzy rationality under praxeological
conditions. The bounded rationality and the classical rationality are epistemologically linked together by the same classical paradigm of reasoning. This
claim can be carefully abstracted by critical examination of models of classical rationality and bounded rationality.
Finally it will become clear that classical and bounded rationalities are contained within the epistemic confines of fuzzy rationality by shifting the classical paradigm to fuzzy paradigm of logical and mathematical reasoning. The
epistemological problem of rationality brakes down into its conceptual meaning, content, existence, knowability as seen under conditions and domain of
its applications, and interpretation of its results. What do we mean when we
claim that an agent with awareness is rational or irrational? Is rationality associated with all living things or associated with cognitive agents or simply associated with humans as a subset of cognitive agents? Generally, we associate
rationality with conscious deliberation and reason. It is then claimed that
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INFORMATION
OBJECTIVE
SUBJECTIVE
PERCEPTION CHARACTERISTIC SET
UNIVERSAL
OBJECT SET
RELATIONSBASED
INFORMATION
CHARACTERISTICSBASED
INFORMATION
SUJECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE
OBJECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE
DECISION
REASON
DELEBERATION
RATIONALITY
ANALYSIS
AND
SYNTHESIS
COGNITIVE
COMPUTING
CONCLUSIONS
RESULTS
CHOICE
Direction of Constructionism
Direction of Reductionism
Fig. 3.1.1.1. Epistemic Geometry of the Relational Paths of Decision, Rationality and
Choice
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humans are the only cognitive agents that have capacity for conscious deliberation and reason, and hence have capacity to be rational. What is rational
and, the rational in relation to what? Classical, bounded and fuzzy and many
others adjectives that we can think of are mere qualifications to rationality.
They acquire meaning, differences and relative contents when rationality is
accorded meaning and content. The general epistemological problem is thus
giving meaning and content to rationality in cognitive systems. Here, it must
be pointed out that decisions and choices within transformation-substitution
processes involve all living things. The transformation-substitution processes
must be viewed in terms of dynamics of cost-benefit duality in the interactive
behavior of actual-potential spaces. The set of all the decisions and choices in
the transformation-substitution processes may be partitioned into those that
are the results of conscious deliberations and those that are not due to deliberations. Such conscious deliberation is associated with rationality in general
epistemology. Rationality is a given content on the basis of the best-worst
principle or what may be called the Eulers maximum-minimum principle in
universal system where from the viewpoint of human actions: Nothing happens in the universe that does not have a sense of either certain maximum of
minimum [R14.74, p.1].
An important question crops up from the general epistemological problem
of rationality for our epistemic reflection. Is rationality a product of thought
arising from the development of perception characteristics set; or is it an attribute of decision agents arising from characteristics-based information set or
is it an ideal state as a potential element in the universal object set that is to be
achieved or actualized in the decision-choice processes? We are also confronted with another important question. Do differences in thought arise
among cognitive agents in the differential nature of conceptual meaning, content, existence, knowability, conditions of rationality, and domain of its application and interpretation of its results? To abstract answers to these questions,
it may be useful to follow a sequential path that connects information, knowledge, decision, rationality and choice. Such a path is presented as an epistemic
geometry in Figure 3.1.1.1.
As presented, decision, rationality and choice must be seen in terms of dynamics of actual-potential duality in transformation-substitution processes.
Decision, rationality and choice are works of knowledge which in turn is the
work of information given cognitive agents and the universal object set. In
Chapter Two we modeled the knowledge bag from relation-based information
set and perception-characteristic set through cognitive transformation processes that may be said to be the works of reasoning. Such reasoning was
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somehow related to rationality in the sense of finding the best path of deciding
and choosing processes of what subjective information constitutes knowledge
to be included in the social knowledge bag.
In the actual-potential category, rationality as product of thought or as an
attribute of decision agents, belongs to the category of actual while rationality
as an ideal state of decision process belongs to the category of potential. The
epistemological problem involving rationality either as a product of thought or
as an attribute of decision agents, and hence actual falls under the class of problems of explanatory science and explanatory theory where the objective is to
explain the decision behavior of what there is, the product of thought or an attribute of decision agents. The epistemological problem of rationality viewed as
an ideal state of decision processes falls under the class of problems of prescriptive science and prescriptive theory where the objective is not to find and explain what there is (the observed decision behavior) but to improve the decision
process to the ideal state which involves judgmental conditions of what ought
to be a good decision as we have explained in Chapters One and Two.
The rationality as an ideal state of decision-choice behavior implies its existence without which its discovery is impossible. It belongs to the characteristics-based information set and hence to the universal object set by the logic of
reductionism. It belongs to the reality space. It must be discovered and applied
to decision-choice situations to arrive at best decision and choice. It, therefore,
must be viewed as a real qualitative instrument in the transformationsubstitution process to arrive at the best (best in a specified sense), viewed
from the perception characteristic set but not from the universal object set.
The meaning of rationality in general epistemic process must, therefore, acquire a comparative sense of states, processes and events whether explanatory
or prescriptive system is under cognition. In general epistemic process, therefore, rationality connotes some sense of best cognitive path of general decision making to reach a destination through choice implementation. This path
includes assessments, procedures, criteria and cognitive imputations. It is
within this concept of the best cognitive path that different interpretations and
concept extensions tend to arise. Such differences and extensions are the results of praxeological activities in decision-choice processes in different
knowledge zones. They do not arise from the concept of rationality.
Qualification to rationality acquires no useful content if the general concept
is devoid of explication. For example, what meaning should be assigned to
phrases like explanatory rationality, prescriptive rationality, classical rationality, procedural rationality, substantive rationality, bounded rationality and
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many others that one encounters in epistemic discourse and models of application in various areas of knowledge enterprise without the general meaning
of rationality? These qualifications to rationality came into being as a result of
criticisms and objections to economic characterization and application of the
concept of rationality which is referred to in various literature and decision
theory as classical rationality. The analytical foundation of this classical rationality is the paradigm of the classical logic of two-tail-truth value with corresponding mathematics. All these criticisms and the qualifications that are
made about rationality rely on the analytical process of the classical paradigm
and the corresponding mathematics. On this basis, we can say that all these
qualifications and modifications are paradigmatically non-substantive but
cosmetic. This claim will be tightened up as we focus on fuzzy rationality and
examine its general epistemic conditions for either an attribute or an ideal decision-choice state.
3.1.2
Epistemic Conditions of Rationality
The idea of best as a defining attribute of rationality relates to states, processes and events, in other words to a goal. It places rationality as a derived
element of the perception-characteristics set but not directly as an element of
the universal object set. Diversity is an attribute of the universal object set that
allows categories to be formed. Comparative analysis in terms of qualitative
judgment is not. Qualitative judgment that leads to comparative conclusions
appears as thought action with development of perception characteristic set by
cognitive agents. In this perception-characteristic set, appear the two boundary points of judgment of worse and best that constitute the worst-best duality.
The worst-best duality is a characteristic of all relative concepts depending on
the input-output relation in transformation-substitution dynamics of processes,
states and events. The worst-best duality is a qualitative concept that may be
translated into many quantitative concept involving minimum and maximum
which in conflict relations translate into min-max duality. In this respect we
are reminded by Euler that nothing happens in the universe that does not
have a sense of either certain maximum or minimum [R14.75, p.1]. This
minimum or maximum may be qualitative or quantitative. There are many
paths to any one of them. The search for the best path to the minimum or
maximum may be done with reason or without reason. When it is done with
deliberation we assign it to reason. The reason that leads us to the best path is
assign the qualitative value of rationality. These minimum and maximum are
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elements of every set that is definable by human cognition, thus defining the
epistemic conditions of rationality as optimal in concept and scope.
It may be noted that the sense of differences and similarities in the universal object set are established through categorial formation and establishment
of categorial equilibrium. Categorial formation involves in the cognitive actions of partitioning of the universal object set into actual and potentially identifiable categories. Categorial equilibrium defines a state where each category
remains in the state of being while unidentifiable transformations may be taking place. We shall refer to the sense of differences among objects in the universal object set as categorial difference. This categorial difference may be
treated as ontological. The sense of comparison of categories and elements of
categories is not part of the establishment of categorial equilibrium. It is part
of perception-characteristic set that helps to establish the knowledge bag. We
shall refer to this comparison quality as categorial relativity. This categorial
relativity is epistemological. The implication here for the general decisionchoice process in understanding rationality is that rationality is both ontological and epistemological that together produce conceptual unity through the
interplay of decision-choice attribute of cognitive agents and ideal decisionchoice state in praxeology of decision-choice activities. The relational formation and mutual determination are presented in Figure 3.1.2.1 where the logic
of categorial conversion is combined with pyramidal logic for clarity.
Rationality as an ideal decision-choice state in the general epistemic process
must be taken to mean the best cognitive path of general decision making. This
best path includes goal setting, assessment of conditions, procedures, criteria
setting and cognitive imputation. The discovery of such an ideal state of decision-choice behavior requires assembling together the conditions of its existence, packaging them in an algorithmic structure and disseminating the package to decision-choice agents for use as a decision aid. A question arises as to
whether the ideal state is a subjective existence or objective existence. Objective existence corresponds to objective reality that is independent of human
cognition and hence part of the universal object set. Subjective existence corresponds to awareness and hence subjective reality whose shape and form depend
on human perception of conditions that give rise to the ideal state.
It is analytically useful to keep in mind that just as true knowledge is a subset of information so also is subjective space a subset of information. Similarly the space of potential is an unknown reality and hence a subset of space
of reality. The logic of the projected statements can be seen by looking at the
actual-potential polarity where each pole has actual-potential duality in a
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RATIONALITY
Attribute of
Decision-Choice
Agents
Ideal DecisionChoice State
CONCEPTUAL
UNITY
Ontological
Element
Epistemological
Element
SubstitutionTransformation process
ACTUAL-POTENTIAL
DUALITY
Categorial
Formation
ZONAL
ANALYSIS
Categorial
Equilibrium
Categorial
Difference
Fig. 3.1.2.1. The Conceptual Unity in Defining and Understanding Decision-Choice

Rationality
manner where the potential is contained in the actual and actual is also contained in the potential. They, therefore exists in a universal unity in actualpotential dynamics within the transformation-substitution processes. As such,
the decision-choice rationality reveals itself in terms of its external conditions
that present themselves as a surrogate representation of rationality as attribute
defining the internal conditions of decision-choice agents.
Rationality, as an attribute of decision agents, may be viewed as an element
of the characteristics-based information set. It is an element that is a product
of thought as well as an input of thought as decision agents go through reasoning to decide and choose. The characteristic set of cognitive agent includes
105
reasoning as an attribute. This attribute induces a particular behavior in the

space of realities of actual-potential duality acting through transformationsubstitution processes. Here, rationality as a product is the result of an attribute of cognitive agents. In other words, attribute and product are the same
elements that give rise to rationality as a characteristic of decision making in
individual and the collective. In this respect, rationality is simply a deliberative intellectual virtue of human decision-choice actions in arriving at goals
and objectives where such goals and objectives include events, states and
processes. The goals and objectives may be viewed in terms of best within the
resources to reach them.
The decision-choice actions in arriving at any event or state or process may
be seen as problem solving and the best path of the problem solving is also a
goal that must be found by a cognitive process. But what epistemic meaning
shall we assign to rationality as an attribute? Is this attribute directly observable or observable through the outcome of decision-choice processes? Can the
concept of rationality as an attribute be explicated in a manner that gives scientific meaning and relevance in the search for the best path to knowledge
construction? If the behavior of decision-choice agents is the result of this
attribute then how do we explain success-failure processes of decision-choice
outcomes in the theater of cognitive activities? Here, an explanatory theory is
to explain the behavioral process of intellective faculty in decision-choice
space, and why outcomes of decisions and choices propelled by calculative
intellectual virtues have differential grades of successes. Furthermore, it must
provide some explanation as to why some cognitive agents have successes
and other experience failures for the same decision-choice structure?
Rationality as attribute and rationality as an ideal state seem to be at variance with each other. This is not the case as seen through relational and zonal
analysis. They may be brought into unity through the actual-potential transformations of processes, states and events where the actual represents the results of the decision-choice processes that uses calculus of reasoning and the
potential represents the ideal state of perfect decision making composing of
the best goal and the best cognitive path for goal selection and problem solving. The categorical transformation is a corrective adaptation of the deliberative intellectual virtue of decision agents to the ideal state of perfect decisionchoice processes where outcomes may, or may not, correspond to the desired
or willed. The desired or willed is contained in the set of potentials. The outcomes are contained in the set of actual elements. The actualized potential
may differ from the willed potential in reference to the dynamic behavior of
actual-potential duality in transformation-substitution processes.
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For full understanding of the argument been presented, we must always

keep in mind the structure of the epistemic model of rationality being constructed. Here, we begin with reality that is defined by the universal object
set where the object set is a set of categories with infinite dimension.
Each category is defined by characteristics-based information set that
constitutes conditions of objective reality of the set of universal objects that
exist independently of the awareness of cognitive agents. The total information, in the reality space is the union of the characteristics-based informa
tion set == . To the cognitive agents that must make decisions and
=1
choices reality, , appears as a set of potential elements, and a set of
actual elements, such that = = , and = . From

=1
the viewpoint of cognitive agents, elements of total objective information are
either subjectively know or subjectively unknown. That which is claimed to be
known constitutes subjective knowledge, which is partitioned into true
knowledge, , illusory knowledge, , such that = . The set, ,
is the subjective knowledge which we shall argue becomes input into the decision-choice processes and hence will affect the definition, content and analysis
of rationality. The subjective knowledge set has a belief support system derived
from perception characteristic and relations-based information sets which we
have explained in Chapter Two of this monograph. Thus in the final analysis the
belief support system comes to influence the concept, content and defining
characteristics of rationality. The manner in which this belief support system is
conceived becomes important to epistemic analysis of rationality and success
and failure outcomes of decisions and choices even under identical decisionchoice structure. We must keep in mind that the belief support system is generated by the perception characteristics set and relations-based information set
that are affected by the nature of awareness of cognitive agents.
From the literature on rationality and decision-choice processes we may
examine certain defining characteristics of rationality to see their epistemic
values. The epistemic meaning of rationality cannot be cast simply in goals or
objectives without explication of their knowledge meanings. When rationality
as attribute of decision agents, and rationality as an ideal state of decision
processes, are brought into unity, the categorial transformation of actual-
107
potential duality acquires an important epistemic role where corrective adaptation becomes a learning vehicle to ascertain the conditions that maintain the
existence of the ideal state, as well as the steps that facilitate the best adaptive
process toward the ideal state. In other words, the ontological conditions are
brought into unity with both epistemological and praxeological conditions of
rationality. In this transformation process, the explanatory decision theory and
prescriptive decision theory become inter-supportive as well as maintaining
the actual-potential substitution processes in the general resource space defined by the universal object set. The explanatory theory must reveal the conditions of successful and unsuccessful decisions, through the understanding of
decision behavior, while the revealed conditions of the results of decisions on
the basis of intellectual deliberation are used to construct the model of the
ideal state of the decision process. The decisions and choices that follow this
path of calculative intellective faculty to provide decision agents best goals
are said to be rational decision and rational choice respectively, as seen in
terms of Eulers mini-max postulate of universal events.
3.1.3
Quality-Quantity Duality and Decision-Choice Rationality
The epistemic analysis of rationality as has been advanced so far puts it in a

qualitative characterization in terms of best as viewed in transformationsubstitution processes. Praxeology demands that the qualitative value, best, as
a defining character of rationality must be transformed to quantitative value,
best. Here some quantitative measures are required to explicate the concept of
best. These quantitative measures vary over decision-choice sectors and different areas of human decision-choice activities. It is these praxeological
transformations within quality-quantity duality that have given rise to intense
criticism of rationality. Interestingly, it is very rare to find explicit definition
of rationality in term of either an attribute or an ideal state of decisions and
choices as they relate to the behavior of cognitive agents over the elements of
the universal object set composed of processes, states and events.
We have argued that rationality as an attribute of cognitive agents or as an
ideal state of decision-choice process resides in an inseparable unity. Thus,
whether one seeks explanatory or prescriptive analysis for any selected
knowledge area one must answer a number of questions involving either the
nature of the attribute of the decision agents or the nature of the path of the
ideal decision-choice state. These questions may be enclosed in an overall
question: How does one define the nature of comparative conditions that al-
108
low best to be applied to a particular knowledge area? Given the attribute endowment of decision agents, is it possible to abstract a common decisionchoice structure that may be followed by decision agents for all decision
choice processes irrespective of the agent? Such a decision-choice structure
must provide us with expression of conditions of rationality as an ideal state
that reveals internal conditions of rationality as attribute of decision-choice
behavior.
The last question epistemically acquires an affirmative answer through organization of decision making. It is in fact a supporting structure to Figure
3.1.1.1. The general structure on the basis of reason and critical deliberation,
irrespective of praxis, simply states that rationality in decision-choice processes requires an interactive process between objective information composed
of universal object set and characteristics-based information set on one hand
and subjective information composed of relations-based information set and
knowledge bag on the other hand. The information signals are intentionally
sought and converted to knowledge by conscious decision agents. Such intentionality is a categorial derivative of the rationality as attribute of decision
agents in producing reasoning and deliberation without which rationality as
ideal state is non-constructible. The interactions between objective and subjective knowledge take place through reasoning and deliberation that imposes
some cognitive order on decision agents. Rationality as an ideal decision state
is thus a derivative of rationality as an attribute of decision agents without
which the former acquires no foundation. Alternatively stated, the latter (rationality as an attribute) is the primary category of reality and the former (rationality as an ideal state) is a derived category of reality where both of them
reside in cognitive unity.
Rationality as an attribute qualitatively resides in the cognitive structure
while rationality as an ideal state resides in operational structure to define the
unified rationality in decision-choice process. Here rationality as an attribute
cognitively shapes rationality as an ideal decision-choice state. The statement
that rationality as an attribute is a primary category of reality is demonstrated
by the logic of constructionism. The statement that, rationality as an ideal decision-choice state is a derived category of reality from rationality as an attribute is shown by the logic of reductionism. The statement that the attribute
and an ideal state reside in universal unity of rationality is demonstrated by
the logic of categorial conversion under transformational conditions of potential-actual duality.
Rationality as an attribute is internal to decision agents while rationality as
an ideal decision-choice state is external to the decision agent but is in unity
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with the former. The result of rationality as an ideal state becomes the external
conditions and causes for changes in the decision-choice process. They also
become the causes for learning, restructuring and adaptation. Rationality as an
attribute defines the internal conditions and causes as basis for change. At the
level of praxeology the conditions of rationality as attribute of decision-choice
agents become operative through the conditions of rationality as an ideal state
that give them an external expression. Thus a self-contained automatic feedback process is indicated for the organic decision-choice system on the basis
of rationality. It is in this respect that learning takes place and corrective
measures are integrated into the conceptual system of rationality.
The construct of subjective knowledge as input into decision making is due
to rationality as an attribute. This subjective knowledge must be defined in a
general way to include knowledge abstractions from information signals about
preferences, alternative goals, capacity for processing information signals and
limitations defined in terms of real costs and benefits for substitutiontransformation processes in the behavioral dynamics of goal-constraint duality. Preferences and goals are internal to the decision agent while limitations
are external, given the cognitive attribute. On the road to the discovery of intelligence of decision agents and hence rationality, there are two alternative
paths that may be used in examining the decision-making process of cognitive
agents under internal and external conditions of rationality. One path follows
the line of reasoning where rationality as an attribute and rationality as an
ideal state may be simultaneously included in the decision-choice modeling
process either as an explanatory or prescriptive phenomenon. In other words,
the two types of rationality are integrated in the modeling process. The other
path follows a line of reasoning where one of the categories of rationality is
assumed as given. In almost all cases, rationality as an attribute to decisionchoice agents is taken as given on the basis of which decision-choice theories
are built.
Most models of either explanation or prescription in the decision-choice
process, take as given from the initial state rationality as an attribute of decision-choice agents. They also indirectly accept the Eulers min-max postulate
of universal events. For example the mini-max postulate appears in economic
theory of decision-choice process as the postulate of non-satiation. This given
is then characterized as axioms of behavior of decision-choice agents to operationalize the min-max postulate of universal events in the unified field of
decision-choice behavior of cognitive agents. The models then are geared to
explain or prescribe rationality as an ideal state of decision-choice behavior. If
110
the models explain rationality as an ideal state then by logical reductionism

they explain rationality as an attribute of decision-choice agents. In this epistemic process, rationality as an attribute is taken as the primary category of
reality and rationality as an ideal state is a derived logical category.
The simultaneous modeling of attribute and ideal state of rationality is an
odious task which so far has not been used in the analytical system of decision-choice modeling. The analytical path of taking one of them as given has
been the tradition. There is an epistemic justification for this second approach.
The first element of justification is the simplification that it offers for the epistemic complexity involved in the discovery of intelligence in decision-choice
processes. The second justification is the abstraction through the logic of reductionism where the rationality as an ideal state is reducible to rationality as
an attribute and hence, by the logic of categorial conversion we can take the
attribute component of rationality as given and work with the ideal state. The
logical implication of this analytic path is that certain things due to rationality
as an attribute may be taken as given and used in initializing the decisionchoice model for either explanatory or prescriptive construct of rationality as
an ideal state. These given things may include knowledge about preferences,
alternatives, and limitations on decision and other relevant things that are internally associated with rationality as an attribute.
All these given things define the parametric structure of establishing rationality as an ideal state. They indirectly become inputs in the epistemic model of
rationality as an ideal decision-choice state where internal and external conditions on the decision-choice processes are expressed in terms of dynamics of
real cost-benefit duality. There is an alternative to the second path. This alternative path postulate separability conditions on the general rationality. Rationality as an attribute is not assumed but is modeled to obtain a solution
which is treated as a constraint on the model of rationality as an ideal decision-choice state. This alternative path has not been used. Its feasibility is
however being examined in some models by dealing with some notion of
knowledge representation in bounded rationality [R18.3 ], [R18.24]. The analytical structure of meta-theoretic model of rationality as an attribute has been
presented in Chapter Two as part of knowledge discovery and accumulation
through transformation-substitution processes and categorial dynamics of actual-potential duality in the reality space.
Given rationality as an attribute of decision agents, the rationality as an
ideal decision-choice state is the work of cognitive interactions among reasoning, subjective information and objective information. These interactions produce a cognitive input sequence of the form: 1) specify the required alternatives
111
INFORMATION
OBJECTIVE
SUBJECTIVE
PERCEPTION CHARACTERISTIC SET
UNIVERSAL
OBJECT SET
COGNITIVE
AGENT
CHARACTERISTICSBASED INFORMATION
IN SUPPORT OF
OBJECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE
RELATIONS-BASED
INFORMATION IN
SUPPORT OF
INTERSECTIONS
SUJECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE
DECISION
AGENT
RATIONALITY AS AN ATTRIBUTE
REASON
DELEBERATION
RATIONALITY AS AN IDEAL STATE
PROBLEM
FORMULATION,
ANALYSIS AND
SYNTHESIS
GENERAL
RATIONALITY
COGNITIVE
COMPUTING AND
ALGORITHMS
CONCLUSIONS
RESULTS
CHOICE
Direction of Constructionism
Direction of Reductionism
Fig. 3.1.3.1. Epistemic Geometry of Relational Decision-Choice process as an Atribute

and Ideal State
112
that are applicable in a particular decision-choice situation; 2) define a functional structure that links each alternative to its possible consequence that will
allow cognitive or soft computing of the consequences; 3) define preference
ordering or criterion index that allows the consequences to be cognitively arranged on the scale between worse (minimum) and best (maximum); and 4)
develop an algorithm to select the alternative whose consequence meets the
condition of qualitative value of best as the stopping rule of rationality as we
traverse between worse and best qualitative paths. This sequence constitutes
the mechanism to connect the internal and external conditions of organic rationality. On the basis of the above sequence best decision is made and best
choice is undertaken and implemented. There are many paths that can accomplish this decision-choice sequence. The best cognitive path is the ideal state
of the decision-choice process of which we refer to as rational decisionchoice process that characterizes rationality as an ideal decision-choice state.
It provides conditions of optimal rationality and any diviation from this may
be referred to as sub-optimal rationality. The sequential path of rationality as
an ideal state of the decision-choice is presented as an epistemic geometry in
Figure 3.1.3.1. It must be pointed out that rationality as an attribute expresses
the internal conditions while rationality as an ideal decision-choice state expresses external manifestations (conditions) of decision-choice behavior.
3.1.4
Critique of Some Criticisms of Rationality / the Futility of

Criticizing the Optimal Rationality Postulate
We have argued that the epistemic analysis of decision-choice intelligence

presents itself in two interdependent sub-structures of rationality as an attribute of decision agents and rationality as an ideal state of decision making.
This ideal state of decision making, given the cognitive attribute of decision
agents, is common to all areas of human decision-choice activities. It basically
constitutes a paradigm if decision-choice analysis from either a point of view
of explanatory science or a point of view of prescriptive science. When the
decision-choice problem and the abstraction of its solution are framed in the
paradigm of classical logic and the corresponding mathematics we obtain the
intelligence of the ideal state of decision making as the classical rationality
under given conditions of rationality as an attribute of decision-choice agents.
The form of the classical rationality is presented by various classical models
of constrained or unconstrained optimization composed of linear and nonlinear optimizations which can also be grouped under static and dynamic op-
113
timizations which may further be grouped under stochastic and non-stochastic

optimizations.
All other techniques of problem formulation and solution abstraction of decision making under classical logic and mathematics such as classical game
theory, gradient methods, penalty, discrete or continuous methods and other
discriminating names will fall under one of the above broad groupings. The
nature of the group used in the problem formulation and solution abstraction
is expressed by the set of assumptions about rationality as an attribute of decision agents. Whatever group one adopts the task of rationality as an ideal decision-choice state is to find and reach the constrained or unconstrained qualitative best which may be expressed quantitatively between minimummaximum scale orders. The process of application of this classical rationality
has given rise to certainty theories of decision, risk theories of decision and
uncertainty theories of decision under one-person decision process. The three
theories may also be formulated in terms of theories of games where conflicts
arise in multi-criteria or multi-person decision-choice processes. This classical
rationality as an ideal state of decision process has been used extensively in
economics, statistics and operations research, engineering, and other areas of
sciences whose algorithmic backbone finds expression in mathematical theories of optimization. We shall discuss the epistemic structure of rationality as
an ideal state in the decision-choice process for certainty, uncertainty and risk
theories in Chapters Four. Problem groupings and the corresponding mathematical algorithms of classical rationality are shown in Figure 3.1.3.2. Technically, the working mechanisms of these algorithms must directly or indirectly meet the conditions of Aristotelian logic of true-false propositions.
A number of criticisms have been levied against the paradigm of classical
rationality as an ideal state of decision-choice process. The criticisms originate from the use of the classical paradigm in the epistemic presentation of
rational man in economic theory where the criticisms are directed against optimality (minimum and maximum). Much of the criticisms have come from
psychologists, sociologists and political scientists. They criticize the assumptions that define the environment or the applicable boundaries for constructing
the theory of classical rationality such as 1) given alternatives of choice, 2)
known net consequences of the various alternatives, 3) a given criterion defined in terms of utility for complete ordering of the consequences associated
with the alternatives and 4) optimality (minimum or maximum) decisionchoice behavior as the descriptive element of rationality. The first group of
assumptions is about information requirement for constructing explanatory or
114
MODELS OF CLASSICAL RATIONALITY
CERTAINTY
UNCERTAINTY
NON-STOCHASTIC
STOCHASTIC and RISK

NON-LINEAR
LINEAR
CONSTRAINED
UNCONSTRAINED
DYNAMICS
STATIC
GAME THEORY
NON-GAME
THEORY
MULTI-DECISION
AGENTS
ONE DECISION
AGENT
OPTIMIZATION
Fig. 3.1.3.2. The Problem and Algorithmic structure of the Classical Rationality
prescriptive theories of decision-choice behavior of rationality as an ideal

state. This is the information assumption. The second group of assumptions is
about the optimality (minimum or maximum) as the motivational requirements of behavior of choice-decision agents for constructing explanatory or
prescriptive theories of decision-choice rationality as an ideal state that allows
discrimination among alternatives. This is the optimality (motivation) assumption. These two assumptions are backed by algorithms of classical logic and
corresponding mathematics to develop optimality conditions and to abstract
the optimal values. We shall refer to the conditions of optimality and the implied calculations as computability requirements.
The criticisms may also be grouped into two; that is, criticism about the information assumption (information criticism) and criticism about optimality
assumption (optimality criticism) as elements in theoretic presentations of
115
ideal state of decision-choice behavior. These two groups of criticisms are

further backed by criticisms of limitations of computational capacity of decision-choice agents. We shall refer to this group of criticisms as the capacitylimitative criticism. The types of assumptions and criticisms may be presented in terms of epistemic geometry of pyramidal relational structure in
Figure 3.1.3.3. The information assumption, the optimality assumption and
computability assumption constitute a pyramidal structure that provides the
cognitive channel to connect the internal to the external conditions of rationality. The information criticism, the optimality criticism and the capacitylimitation criticism constitute a pyramidal structure that seeks to dismantle
optimal rationality.
The groups of criticisms overlook the two sides of rationality as attribute of
decision-choice agents and as an ideal state of decision making. First, we observe that the inner circle presents internal conditions of decision maker with
rationality as an attribute which is a derivative from the decision-maker as an
Information Assumptions
Cognitive
Capacity Limitation
Criticisms
Optimality
Criticisms
Rationality as
an Attribute
Optimality
(Motivational)
Assumptions
Computability
Assumptions
(Requirement)
Information Criticisms
Fig. 3.1.3.3. An Epistemic Geometry of Pyramidal Relations of Assumptions and Criticisms
116
element of the universal object set. The outer circle defines the required internal conditions for establishing the boundary for defining the external conditions required to examine how the internal conditions of rationality are translated into external conditions for rationality as an ideal state of decisionchoice action. A question therefore arises as to whether the criticisms against
decision-choice rationality are directed toward the assumed rationality as an
attribute of decision-choice agents or toward rationality as the ideal state of
the decision-choice process. Let us examine the validity and relevance of each
of the criticisms as applied in some areas of decision-choice practices. We
shall then relate the examination to futility of criticizing the optimization and
rationality.
3.2 Decision and Choice Explicated

Both decision and choice take claims to existence of logical rationality. Such
claims have come to be accepted in modern decision and choice theories in
such a way that decision paradigms are taken to be the same as choice paradigms. An epistemological question arises in this circumstance as to whether
decision and choice are the same and if not what are the distinguishing factors? Is rational choice the same as rational decision and vice versa? Is an action of choosing the result of decision or is the action of deciding the result of
choice? What are the similarities and differences between decision theory and
choice theory? The answers to these questions are not simple; nonetheless, the
literature on theories of decision and choice seems to equate both without substantive distinction. Choice theory is understood to emerge from the logical
development of a consistent decision that reflects the ordered preferences over
alternative objects in a given choice set. This is also true of decision theory
that also reflects the logical development of consistent choice from ordered
preferences over objects in a given set of decision alternatives.
The preferences are qualitative ranking index of the alternatives over a
spectrum of worst, worse, bad, good, better and best that must be translated
into quantitative ranking index. These relative concepts that allow ranking of
the items exist only in the perception characteristics set that provides beliefsupport of the elements in the constructed knowledge bag. The nature of
quantitative ranking index will depend on the specific area of decision and
choice applications. Is the index of ranking of decision alternatives not the
same as that of choice alternatives? And can choice action be implemented
without decision? These alternatives may be viewed in terms goal spectrum.
3.2 Decision and Choice Explicated
117
We may also ask a follow up question. Can rationality as an ideal state acquire meaning to decision-choice agents who do not have rationality as attribute? In other words is rationality as an ideal state intelligible to decisionchoice agents who have no rationality attribute? Can a decision-choice agent
who has no attribute of rationality practice rationality as an ideal state in
choice-exercising process?
The first important thing we must observe from the structure of the universal object set and the perception characteristic set is that decisions and choices
are external expressions of internal attribute of cognitive agents. This internal
attribute, for the purpose of survival of cognitive agents, finds expression in
the selective activities in the universal object set as expressed in the perception characteristic set. Thus decision and choice reside in the capsule of selective activities. However, a critical look of the concepts of decision and choice
at the level of cognition seems to suggest that decision is different from
choice as viewed from selective activity in the perception characteristic set.
They are, however, the same under a set of specified abstract conditions
viewed from the universal object set. All decisions are preceded by deliberation and cognitive reflections on decision alternatives whether they are real or
exist in perception. The decision, when made, is followed by an act of intention directed to a predetermined goal from the goal spectrum. Intellectually
calculative decision does not have to be followed by choice action and choice
action does not have to be preceded by calculative decision process.
Decisions merely reside in the minds of decision maker since decisions can
be made entirely in private in the sense of being mental activities. Decision is
subjectively internal expression of attribute of reason with knowledge towards
a selection of a goal. Such an attribute of reason with knowledge is directed to
realize the best goal even if such goal is either unattainable or unknown. The
attribute conditions of reasoning in decision making provide internal expression of rationality as an attribute of decision agents seeking the best from the
understanding of elements or the universal object set. To help us in the analytical construct of decision-choice rationality let us present an epistemic geometry of this relationship to selection capsule, universal object set and the
perception characteristics set as in Figure 3.2.1. The fundamental principle
here is that cognitive agents seek best goals in operating in the selection capsule and this cognitive activity toward the best goal is the rationality as an
attribute of decision agents. The best goal is broadly defined such that it will
include finding the best path for knowledge construction or in general the
greatest benefit given any cost support.
118
Cognitive Agent
Decision
Choice
Knowledge
Bag
Perception
Characteristics
Set
Universal
Object Set
Selection Capsule
Fig. 3.2.1. Relational Geometry of Knowledge use in Decision and Choice Processes
Choice on the other hand, may be indeliberate and may not be followed by an
act of intention. Choice does not exist in the mind. It is publicly performed
and this is also true for even choice with most private intent. Choice might be
preceded by intention in relevant regard; however, it is not followed by relevant intention. Since decisions are followed by relevant intentions towards a
goal and since choice may often be preceded by intentions of relevant regard
it may be postulated that decision may lead to choice but choice may not lead
to decision (see also [R2.2.6] [R7.35]). When decision precedes choice it lays
down the logic of the choice or the belief-support of the choosing. The epistemic implication is simply that the set of possible choice items of interest
will always be different from the set of possible decision items of interest.
The set of decided items on the basis of rationality as an attribute belongs
to the internal rational decision set. The conditions of internal rational decision set must find expression in the external rationality as an ideal decision
state. There are many reasons why the choice items may differ from the decision items. Whether the set of choice items contains the same items as the set
of rational decision items will depend on the choice exercise of decision and
impulsive exercise of choice outside rationality as an attribute. If every choice
3.3 Decision, Rationality and Optimality
119
item has decision support then the choice set will be the same as the decision
set and then theories about rational decision will constitute cognitive supports of
theories of rational choice. This does not imply that choice is the same as decision. Criticisms of the theories of rational choice neglect the fundamental distinction between choice and decision [R12.7], [R12.13] [R12.16], [R12.27].
When one considers the theory of rational choice and the theory of rational
decision, one can derive the required conditions of cognitive similarity and difference. The conditions start with the basic assumption that every rational
choice action is supported by rational decision at the level of rationality as
an ideal decision-choice state. Given internal rationality as an attribute of
decision-choice agents, there are four sets composed of a) the set of decision
alternatives that constitutes category D , b) the set of rational decision elements that defines category D , c) the set of choice alternatives that defines
category, C , and d) the set of rational choice elements that specifies category C . Corresponding to these categories, are three transforming functions
of f ( i ) , g ( i ) and h ( i ) that cognitively link the sets of rational actions in the
way described in equation (3.2.1).
f :D h :D
# h ( f (D ) ) = # g ( C ) = # C
g : C h : C
(3.2.1)
As described in eqn. (3.2.1) every rational decision is a rational choice and vice
versa by logical construct. The sizes of D and C are non-comparable in the
sense that there are decision elements that are not choice elements and there are
choice elements that are not revealed as decision elements. Epistemologically, a
case can be made where every rational choice is a rational decision but not
every rational decision is in the rational choice set. From the axiomatic foundations of theories of rational decision and choice two cognitive systems may be
examined at the level of rationality as an ideal decision-choice state. Let us turn
our attention to examine the concepts of optimality and equilibrium in relation
to rationality at the level of ideal decision state.

The theory of rational decision based on subjective preferences in ordinal
space has its foundations on a number of axioms. These axioms are comparability, preference consistency, optimal (selection decision, dominance, conti-
120
nuity of preferences that relates to the nature of choice transformation, and

convexity that relates to the structure of the rate of substitution in the transformation process). The axioms emerge as our descriptive understanding of
rationality as an attribute of decision-choice agents. They are taken as external
expression of internal conditions of decision-choice agents in order to define
the environment of decision in the process of searching for decision-choice
rationality as an ideal state give behavioral attributes of the decision agent?
We have suggested that rationality must be viewed in terms of categorial dualities. Furthermore, rationality must be seen in terms of an organic goal that
satisfies the mini-max postulate which the postulate of optimality of universal
event as seen by cognitive agents. Let us examine rationality and optimality.
3.3.1
Rationality and Optimality
From the viewpoint of environment of decision space comparability requires

that the decision space is ordered such that all alternative decision elements
are arranged in ascending or descending order of preference in qualitative or
quantitative magnitudes and hence objectively comparable between worst and
best and between minimum and maximum respectively. The comparability on
a quantitatively ranking scale as a transformation of qualitative ranking is collectively established and independent of the individual decision agent. It is
objective in this respect in the sense that the quantitative measure and its order
of magnitude are collectively agreed upon. It is thus the same for all decisionchoice agents operating in the same decision-choice environment. It is the social
agreement of units of measure that establishes external comparability that is
independent of individual subjectivity. Thus the objectivity of ranking of elements in environment of decisions with socially agreed upon units of measure is
collectively subjective and individually objective. The comparability on qualitative rankings that have no collectively accepted quantitative magnitude, on the
other hand, is individual-decision-agent dependent. Rationality, therefore, is
relationally defined in terms of language, knowledge construction and decisionchoice process. The relational structure involves quality, quantity, given subjectivity-objectivity duality and is represented in Figure 3.3.1.
The best-worst duality is our ordinary linguistic expression that requires
explication as attempts are moved to establish scientific language. The process is to transform the concept of best and worst to quantity-quality dualities
wherever and whenever possible. The best decision is associated with maximum in the space of benefits given its cost support; and associated with
minimum in the case of cost given its benefit support. Every decision associated
121
RATIONALITY
BEST
WORST
COGNITIVE
AGENTS
QUALITATIVE
QUANTITATIVE
DECISION-CHOICE
ACTION
Fig. 3.3.1. Relational Geometry of Best-Worst Duality and Quantity-Quality Dualities

in Defining Decision-Choice Rationality
RATIONALITY
SUBOPTIMALITY
OPTOMALITY
COGNITIVE
AGENTS
QUALITATIVE
QUANTITATIVE
DECISION-CHOICE
ACTION
Fig. 3.3.2. Relational Geometry of Quantity-Quality Dualities and Optimality-Suboptimality Duality in Defining Decision-Choice Rationality
122
with best and worst under specified conditions are optimal and every decision
relative to the best and worst are defined to be sub-optimal.
This produces rationality that is relationally defined under conditions of optimal-sub-optimal duality. The relational structure presented in Figure 3.3.1 is
thus transformed to a relational structure of quantity-quality duality and optimality-sub-optimality duality that provides conditions of definition of rationality as presented in Figure 3.3.2. This relational structure will allow us to abstract conditions of irrationality that may not be equated with sub-rationality.
At the level of behavioral attribute the comparability axiom implies that the
decision agent is imbued with characteristics that allow him or her to subjectively order all elements in the decision space given the units of magnitude
such that all elements of decision are subjectively comparable in accord with
the internal rationality of the decision agent. The transformation-substitution
process from direct measures of quantitative magnitudes into subjective ranking may differ from decision-choice agent to decision-choice agent even when
the same decision-choice item is under consideration. It is this situation that
presents critical conflicts in the objective-subjective duality within the collective decision-choice processes. Here we must deal with internal conditions
that establish collective (aggregate) rationality as collective attribute. This
must be followed by dealing with external conditions that will establish collective rationality as collectively ideal decision-choice state. It is through the
reconciliations of rationality as an attribute of decision-choice agents and rationality as an ideal state that Arrows Impossibility Theorem finds meaning
and scientific relevance. It is within the same framework that the theories of
collective decision-choice process seeking collective rationality find their difficulties and the theories of democratic decision rules find their theoretical
challenges.
At the level of explanans, these difficulties may lead to poor performances
of either verification or collaboration principle as one may find in political
theories or theories in cognitive psychology. At the level of preascricens these
difficulties and challenges are complicated by information requirements in
implementing democratic decision rules. Rationality as an attribute may be
referred to as internal rationality while rationality as an ideal state of decision
process may be referred to as external rationality. In all decision processes,
the conditions of external rationality are surrogate expression of conditions of
internal rationality in the sense that external rationality is a derived category
of reality from internal rationality as the primary category of reality.
The concept of best decision must be explicated. Explication requires an establishment of on index of criteria of decision whether a maximum or mini-
123
mum element must be selected from the ordered scale of decision alternatives.
The order and comparability are subjective that differ from one decision agent
to another depending on internal subjective transformation-substitution process on the basis of individual preferences. At the levels of environment of decision where internal conditions of rationality as an attribute find external expression of a decision agent, axiom of consistency implies no schizophrenic
ranking of any triplet where if element x1 is ranked over x2 and x2 over x3 then
it should not be the case that x3 is ranked over x1 . At the levels of decision
environment, the internal conditions of rationality as an attribute of decision
agents find explication in the axiom of optimal decision that implies that the
best decision (in specific sense) will be made from the decision elements.
Given the internal rationality any decision space is said to be rational in the
sense of ideal state (external rationality) if its environment is such that the
decision elements are comparable with consistency and best decision. A decision agent is said to be rational if his or her decision behavior exhibits comparability of decision items with consistency and best decision (in a specific
sense).
The three basic axioms of decision rationality composed of comparability,
consistency and best decision are further strengthened by axioms of dominance, continuity of preference or ranking and convexity of preference or
ranking. These axioms allow the elements in the decision space to be vectorized where the composite values of vector decision elements will retain the
three basic axioms of rationality. At the decision space of vector elements the
dominance axiom requires that vector elements are comparable if every component values dominate the component values of other vectors irrespective of
whether the environment of decision or attribute of decision agent is the focus
of rationality defined in terms of the best decision. The axiom of continuity of
preference establishes in the decision space and decision characteristics of the
decision agent the conditions of indifference and hence transformationsubstitution possibilities of equivalent values under the same measurement
scale. This imposes a set of indifferent values that may be transformed to one
another on an equal ranking curve. The axiom of convexity shows the rates at
which the transformations occur through substitutions to ensure vector-value
equivalence on the equal ranking curve where the rate of substitution is well
defined and increases for compensatory transformations.
The best decision is said to be optimal. The best decision is interpreted to
correspond to maximum when good (benefit) characteristics are being evaluated and minimum when bad (cost) characteristics are being evaluated for de-
124
cision. What then is the relationship between decision rationality and decision
optimality? The search for the relationship requires finding answers to some
epistemic questions. Can optimal decision be achieved without rational decision? These are important epistemic questions, particularly when the construct
of cognitive algorithms are to be transformed into decision aid to assist other
decision agents in the general decision-making processes. In order to achieve
the optimal decision element at the level of environment, the decision space
must be rational and at the level of attribute of decision agent the decision
agent must also be rational in decision behavior.
The set of conditions of rational decision space at the level of decision environment or the set of conditions of rationality as an attribute of decision
agent is to ensure the existence of optimal element. The existence of optimality is the result of conditions of rationality which also implies the existence of
a search process and a stopping rule to allocate the optimal element. Rationality as an attribute of decision agents demands that all the information available to the decision agent be efficiently used in the search process to reach the
optimal element. It further requires that all the information at hand be processed into knowledge for attaining the rationality as an ideal state of decision.
This search process requires rationality as an ideal state of decision if it is to
be efficient while the search engine is defined through either a ranking scale
or a preference order in some objective or subjective form conditional on
available information. The stopping conditions of the search are either conditions of maximum or conditions of minimum which are generally referred to
as optimality conditions.
The maximum and minimum values are positively and negatively infinite
respectively in resource-free environments depending on preference transformation-substitution process in terms of convexity or concavity. This minimum
or maximum must be viewed in terms of Eulers statement that Nothing happens in this universe that does not have a sense of either maximum or minimum. [R14.75, p. 1]. This statement has been referred to in this essay as the
Euler min-max postulate of universal events. However, the statement acquires
meaning only in the perception-characteristic set but not in the universal object set. There is no best or worst or maximum or minimum event processes in
the universal object set. These linguistic descriptions that are related to optimality appear only in reflections of cognitive agents. The search for optimality requires the use of all the available information in the hands of the decision
agent. This is referred to as information-constrained optimality when there are
no resource limitations on decision. The maximum-minimum conditions are
constrained when resources for attaining them are taken into account as limi-
125
tations on decision. This is what is referred to as resource-constrained optimality of the decision process.
At the level of ideal decision state, rationality is optimality and optimality
is rationality in either closed or open system. The optimality is informationally defined while rationality is constrained by the information set available to
the decision agent. The epistemic implication is that the decision agents ranking of alternative states for external decision expression at the level of rationality as an ideal state, will remain the same, and hence stable, under the same
information set. The rationality as an ideal decision process is defined by full
available information and efficient algorithm given the psychology of decision agents. The rationality as an attribute is defined by cognitive capacity of
knowledge and computability. Thus rationality in general finds expression in
information, cognitive capacity of knowledge, computability and efficient
algorithms. Given knowledge capacity, computability and efficient algorithms, the information set defines the optimal element and hence optimal rationality. Changing the information set at the level of rationality as ideal decision state leads to reordering of decision items through re-computation of
consequences and final decision. This process finds expression in the construction of sensitivity functions (example, demand and supply functions in
economics [R2.31][R3.35] functions of parameter variations in optimal control systems and other sciences [R24.11]).
3.3.2
Optimality and Equilibrium in Decision Systems
In socio-economic decision processes, this optimality by economists conceptual orientation has been given the name of equilibrium of the decision agent.
Thus the concept of equilibrium has a special interpretation within that of rationality as an ideal state of decision process. Decision equilibrium is an end
product of rationality as an ideal decision process in so far as it is informationally optimal. There are other uses of equilibrium to characterize agents
and systems behavior in the economic space. The epistemic picture that
emerges, is that there are some equilibrium processes that are not optimality
processes and vice versa and whether anyone of them satisfies the conditions
of rationality depends on the nature of the process and the state. Equilibrium
as applied to economic analysis under conditions of rationality draws its
strength from conflicts in social dualities. At the level of rationality as an ideal
state, we have cost-benefit duality as primary category of reality in which all
decision agents operate to reach the best decision. From cost-benefit duality
emerges supply-demand duality as derived category of reality. Both supply
126
and demand establish paths of different optimal decision behaviors relative to

changing information set. These paths are also designated as equilibrium
paths of supply-demand behaviors relative to information set and institutions
of exchange. At optimal decision levels, the supply and demand establish
equilibrium duality.
In the conditions of benefit (good) or cost (bad) the rational decision space
as characterized by the basic axioms has no upper bound and hence no immediately identifiable optimal element. The decision elements are comparable in
grades of either good or bad but contained in an open set. To abstract the optimal element with the search engine, the set of rational decision elements
must be closed and bounded in the sense of compactness. The problem is that
the conditions of rational decision are constructed in either the benefit space
(good) or the cost space (bad) but not both. In other words all decision systems
must be cost-benefit closed in abstract sense. When the decision space is costbenefit closed we can abstract the optimal elements for any given information
set. An explication of both decision system and equilibrium is required in order
to relate equilibrium to optimality and by logical extension to rationality.
Definition 3.3.1:- Decision System
A decision system is a configuration of entities under transformationsubstitution forces where such forces are generated by conflicts in cost-benefit
duality given a cognitive agent. It is said to be rational if it satisfies both conditions of rationality as an attribute of decision agents and rationality as an
ideal decision state of the decision process.
Definition 3.3.2:- Optimal Decision System
A decision system is said to be optimal if there are no other alternative element that can be ranked as better than the decided element in the system. It is
said to be in equilibrium if all the available information to the decision agent
is such that the agent has no inclination to revise his or her decision for
change and hence the system can remain indefinitely in this state of configuration without any change of the forces that create the state relative to the information set.
Proposition 3.3.1
If a rational decision system has an optimal element relative to available information then it is in equilibrium relative to transformation-substitution
forces in the decision making process.
The definitions 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and proposition 3.3.1 have some epistemic
importance. If the decision system is rational in terms of ideal state then it has
127
an optimal element relative to the best use of all the available information.
Thus, given the information set on the basis of which the optimal element is
abstracted, the rationality as attribute of decision agent demands no further
action in the transformation-substitution process. Epistemologically, therefore
the optimal element is also the equilibrium element in the rational decision
systems. Rationality, optimality and equilibrium are relationally triangular.
Information, knowledge and decision are also relationally triangular. These
two triangular relations interact to produce ideal decision outcomes on the
basis of which other decision outcomes may be referenced, and at the center
of which is the system of cognitive agents. The relational structures and pyramidal interactions may be presented as in Figure 3.3.2.1.
From the epistemic structure of relations and interactions as presented in
the explanation and Figure 3.3.2.1 it becomes clear that while not every equilibrium system is optimal, every optimal system is an equilibrium one. We
can distinguish two types of equilibria. They are optimal equilibrium and suboptimal equilibrium in decision systems. At the moment we are not concerned
RATIONALITY
INFORMATION
KNOWLEDGE
COGNITIVE
SYSTEM
OPTIMALITY
EQUILIBRIUM
DECISION
Fig. 3.3.2.1. Epistemic Geometry of Relations and Interactions of Information, Knowledge and Decision on One hand and Rationality, Optimality and Equilibrium on the
other Hand
128
with other abstract equilibrium or optimal systems that have no decisionmaking relevance. There are many reasons why a decision system may be in a
sub-optimal equilibrium in transformation-substitution process. It will become
clear from our critique of criticisms of rationality that all other claimed behaviors of decision system (for example bounded rationality) that are not optimally rational fall under sub-optimal equilibrium systems. We have argued
that if a decision system is in optimal equilibrium then it is optimally rational.
Can we say that a sub-optimal equilibrium decision system is sub-optimally
rational or that sub-optimal equilibrium system is an irrational system? Does
sub-optimality implies irrationality? Can we say that if a decision system is in
sub-optimal state then it is in disequilibrium state? What are the epistemic
differences among sub-optimality, disequilibrium and irrationality? The
search for answers to these questions will lead us to critical examinations of
criticisms of decision rationality and other theoretical reconciliations. We
have constantly referred to the concept of decision-choice rationality which
turns to suggest a lack of difference between decision rationality and choice
rationality. What is the difference, therefore, between the theory of rational
decision and the theory of rational choice? Is there any conflict between rational decision and rational choice? Can we speak of rational choice in isolation from rational decision? To find answers to these questions let us take a
look at the theories about rationality, choice equilibrium and optimality.
3.4 Choice, Rationality and Optimality

Having considered the epistemic structure of the theory of rational decision let
us turn our attention to that of rational choice since we have argued that they
are identical under a defined set of conditions. In fact, we will argue that rational choice presupposes existence of rational decision. Every choice has a
decision support that may be optimally rational or sub-optimally rational. The
theory of rational choice, like that of rational decision is established by a set
of axioms. These axioms are a) given limitation on choice, b) existence of
choice from a compact set of alternatives, c) optimal choice, d) existence of
resource conditions of any choice (existential condition for choice) e) index of
choice preference, f) choice consistency and g) existence of unattainable alternatives. Like the theory of rational decision, a question arises as to whether
these axioms define the environment of choice or the attribute of the choosing
agent. From the viewpoint of environment of choice the axiom of limitation
on choice implies restrictions that can only be defined by available resources
required to implement choice.
129
At the level of behavioral attribute the limitations on choice appear as costs

to the choosing agent where the limitations on choice define an allowable area
for implementing the choice action and seek to close the open decision space.
At the level of environment of choice, or at the level of attribute of choosing
agents, the axiom of existence of choice implies that an element in the choice
set is selected and the selected item must satisfy the given limitations on
choice. At the levels of both environment of choice and attribute of choosing
agents, the selected choice element must be optimal in the sense of being at
the boundary of compact choice set that depends on the interactions of limitations and the choice space. These axioms, in abstract, define costs and benefits in exercising choice. Any choice space is said to be rationally induced if
the environment of choice is such that the choice elements are constrained by
a given limitation, (axiom on limitation) has an existence of choice elements
(axiom on alternatives) from the choice space that satisfies the limitations and
that the best choice (in specific sense) can be made (axiom on optimality).
Similarly a choosing agent is said to be rational if he or she has the capacity to
behave in a manner that satisfies these three basic choice characteristics in the
sense that critical reflections are made on choice alternatives and limitations
on choice. We shall find out that this critical reflection comes from rational
decision as the cognitive foundation of choice.
The three basic axioms on limitations, alternatives and optimality are reinforced by additional axioms that seem to establish separating conditions of
choice from decision. The existence of resource conditions of any choice implies that at the levels of environment of choice, and behavioral attribute of
choosing agents, there is a resource support that will make a particular choice
element possible (axiom of attainable choice). The axiom of consistency imposes on both choice space and the choosing agents asymmetric behavior of
choice in that if A is selected over B then it cannot be the case that B is
selected over A for a given resource support and information set. These two
axioms indirectly impose conditions of comparability, transformation, substitution and continuity at the levels of both the choice environment and attribute
of the choosing agent.
At the levels of both environment of choice space and the attribute of the
choosing agent, the axiom of unattainable choice element in the choice space
implies that the limitations on choice are binding and that every condition of
limitation yields choice elements that are resource prohibitive, for stronger
limitations. In other words, there always exist some choice elements that are
unavailable for selection when the limitations on choice space are established.
130
This axiomatically imposes a separation condition on the choice space and the
behavior of the choosing agent into accessible and inaccessible choice sets. A
question arises as to whether the theories of choice are independent of social
institutions. In view of rationality, the epistemic structure of the theory of rational choice may be viewed in terms of relational interactions of costs, benefits, assumptions and logical deductions. The costs and benefits are summary
information that defines the essential characteristics of elements under choice.
The assumptions help define the environment in which choice is being exercised. The logical deductions are translations of cognitive computations that
may be of soft or hard computing of both. The epistemic geometry of the
structure of rational choice theory is shown in Figure 3.4.1. From the relational structure of choice theory in Figure 3.4.1, let us turn our attention to
choice interactions of equilibrium and optimality in rationality as ideal state.
The choice theory, given the axioms of behavior, assumptions on the choice
space and the computational logic to abstract a solution reconciles benefits and
costs in order to arrive at the optimal value. The process of choice behavior and
the computational arrival at the optimal value conditional on all available
CHOICE THEORY
COSTS
BENEFITS
Rationality
OF
CHOICE
ASSUMPTIONS
LOGICAL
CONSTRUCT
CHOICE AXIOMS
Fig. 3.4.1. Epistemic Geometry of Relations and Interactions of Cost, Benefit, Assumptions, Axioms of Choice, Logical Construct and Rational Choice Theory
131
RATIONALITY
INFORMATION
KNOWLEDGE
CHOOSING
AGENT
OPTIMALITY
EQUILIBRIUM
CHOICE
Fig. 3.4.2. Epistemic Geometry of Relations and Interactions of Information, Knowledge and Choice on One Hand and Rationality, Optimality and Equilibrium on the
Other Hand
information constitute optimal rationality as an ideal state of choice behavior.

This ideal state of choice behavior is conditional on optimal rationality as an
attribute of behavior. It is also the cost-benefit rationality in decision-choice
processes. When such optimally rational behavior is reached, rationality as an
attribute of choosing agent imposes conditions of no change until there are
reasons to do so from the nature of the information set or the knowledge structure. The tendency of no change at optimal rationality induces an equilibrium
state. This equilibrium state is the result of balances of cost-benefit forces.
The relationships among choice, optimality, and rationality are presented as
relational geometry in Figure 3.4.2. Can rationality, as an ideal state of choice
behavior, be independently exercised outside of rationality as an attribute of a
choosing agent? If the choice process is externally expressed to be optimally
rational, then it must be the case that it is optimally rational at the level of attribute of choosing agent. There are situations where at the process of rationality as ideal state the choice behavior may be sub-optimal. Can this suboptimal choice behavior be called sub-optimally rational or can it be call irra-
132
tional? What kinds of belief support that justify our claim of rationality and
irrationality? We have discussed decision and choice in section 3.2, but to
answer these questions let us turn our attention to the interaction between rational choice and rational decision.
3.4.1
Rational Choice as an Action on Rational Decision
The relationship between rational choice and rational decision may be abstracted by super imposing the decision space on the choice space. Remember
from section 2.2 that every element in the decision space is preceded by deliberation and critical cognitive reflection and that decision when made is followed by an act of intension directed to a predetermined goal. However the
resources necessary to implement the decision through choice action may not
be available to the choosing agent. At this analytical juncture, it is useful to
distinguish between decision agent and choosing agent. Conceptually, and at
the level of application, it is possible that the two may or may not be the same.
It is this separability condition that leads to principal and agent problem and
the development of decision support systems. The point here, is that the problem space of cognitive activities is partitioned into a sequence of cognition
and problem-solving activities. The resource necessity is introduced into the
choice space through limitations on choice. The superimposition of the choice
space onto the decision space immediately introduces limitations on decision
and the decision space as well since choice may be indeleberate and may not
exist in mind, while decision exits in the mind and is deliberate. How then do
we reconcile their interactions for action and epistemic understanding?
To bring the two together, let us again consider the decision space D and
optimal decision set, D and sub-optimal decision set D' such that D D' =
and D D' = D on one hand. On the other hand, we consider the choice space
C and optimal choice set C with sub-optimal choice set, C' such that
C C' = C and C C' = . We know that D D and C C . In other
words the set of optimal decisions is contained in the set of all decisions and
so also the set of optimal choices is contained in the set of all choices. Furthermore, D C . We have argued that there is a cognitive process, h ( i )
which takes D into C as it is revealed in eqn. 3.2.1. The set, D is the decision
support for the choice set C and hence each element in D constitutes cognitive
justification for the corresponding element in C and hence D C D such
that D C = D C . Now let A be an attainable set in C and A a choice action set in D C = referred to as the decision-choice space.
133
The attainable set of choice is constructed from considerations of costbenefit interactions that define goals and constraints. The elements in the set
constitute both decision and choice elements where some of the choice elements may have decision support while others do not. Similarly, some of decision elements may have no choice action exercised on them. There are elements
in D that constitute a justification in believing that there are some elements
RATIONALITY AS AN ATTRIBUTE
(Internal Conditions)
DELIBERATION AND
REFLECTION
SOCIAL
DECISION
PRIVATE
ACT OF RELEVANT INTENTIONS
DECISIONSUPPORTED
SOCIAL
CHOICE
PRIVATE
NON-DECISION
SUPPORTED
RATIONALITY AS AN IDEAL STATE

(External Conditions)
Fig. 3.4.3. Cognitive Interactions of Rationality, Decision and Choice
134
in C that are deliberate choice elements while others are not. The epistemic
conclusion is that there are decision-supported choices and non-decision supported choices. In terms of social decisions the rationality may be presented as
cognitive interaction between decision and choice as in Figure 3.4.3.
Let us notice that A and A' . The following decision-choice actions can be abstracted as postulates over the constrained decision-choice
space D C = where decision is combined with choice action.
Postulate 3.4.1 -: Decision Support
1. x if x A and x A then x C C x D D
In other words, for all choice elements in the choice set, if an element is contained in both attainable and action sets then it is optimally selected by optimal decision justification. The implication is that the selected element is in
both the optimal decision and choice sets.
Postulate 3.4.2 -: Sub-Optimal
2. x, y if x, y A and x A , y C y D . (The element x A is optimally rational element while y D' )
In other words, given a pair ( x, y ) of choice elements in the choice set, if
both are attainable and one is chosen, then the other is considered suboptimal
by decision action.
Postulate 3.4.3 -: Optimal Rationality
3. If x x A and x A then x C x D
Simply stated, if there is a choice element, x in the choice-decision set, ,
such that the element is attainable and acted upon, then there is an optimal
choice element that is supported by an optimal decision as its justification.
Postulate 3.4.4-: Equivalence
4. If x x A and x A then y if y Aand y A then x, y C
with x, y D D x = y .
This statement simply means that if there is a choice element x in the decision-choice set such that it is attainable and acted upon, then for any other
element y in the decision-choice space that is attainable and acted upon, then
it is the case that the element belongs to both optimal decision and choice sets.
In this case, both elements are the same or perfect substitutes under the given
conditions. If x C C and x D D then D is said to be an optimal decision covering for an optimal choice set C .
It must be pointed out that the ordering in the choice-decision space might
have been subjectively or objectively induced where objectivity is defined in
135
terms of social acceptance of the order of the units of magnitude. In choicedecision activities in physical systems, the order is objective with a defined
objective scale that allows socially general comparability. In the case of humanistic decision-choice system, the order is subjectively induced by individual preference order on ordinal scale. The rationality at the level of attribute
simply requires individual decision-choice agent to 1) collect the best information on goals, objectives and limitations that define the building blocks of
the decision system, 2) process the collected information into justified knowledge system as input into decision 3) organize cognitively the best logical
path in utilizing the knowledge system to make the best decision (defined in
specific sense) in accordance with the subjective preferences.
The best decision must be defined in terms of what Euler stated: Nothing
happens in the universe that does not have a sense of either certain maximum
or minimum. [R14.75, p. 1] I have pointed out from this statement that the
best decision is the minimum when cost is the driving force of decision and
the best decision is the maximum if the driving force of decision is benefit.
The implication here is that nothing happens in either objective or subjective
universe of transformation-substitution processes that does not have a sense of
costs and benefits and hence cost-benefit balances that must be linked to rationality [R2] [R2.5] [R7.34] [R7.35]. The best decision is that which is optimal and the choice of the best decision element is rational relative to knowledge structure. The optimal decision-choice rationality is defined in relation to
cost-benefit balances in the decision-choice space.
Rationality, as an ideal decision state, suggests that the choosing agent
must accept the conditions of rationality as an attribute of decision agent as
given and translates this decision rationality into choice rationality. In other
words rationality as an attribute of decision agent must be translated into rationality as ideal state of decision making through choice action. In this process the rationality as an attribute is inseparably linked to rationality as an ideal
state through the decision-choice processes. Rationality as attribute is what we
would like to referred to as internal rationality and rationality as ideal state is
what we would like to referred to as external rationality of decision-choice
agent.The internal rationality takes place at the level of decision while the external rationality takes place at the level of choice. The internal rationality is
the cognitive support of the external rationality. Similarly, the decision rationality is the operational support of choice rationality.
Given the rationality as an attribute of decision agent, the rationality as an
ideal state requires that from the perception characteristic set, or the subjective
136
information, the choosing agent must 1) specify his or her goal-objective set
and the set of limitations on action, 2) organize and integrate knowledge that
will allow the choice elements of the goal-objective set to be choice-ordered
in accordance with the framework of optimal decision induced by conditions
of rationality as an attribute of decision into a choice system and then 3) exercise cognitive computations on the choice system for the best element that is
revealed by the optimal decision system (the deliberative intellectual faculty).
Even here, given the same information on the decision-choice action, the optimal choice element will vary from individual decision agent to another.
All decision agents, however, behaving accordingly in line with the cognitive attribute toward the best decision, will be internally rational but with differential optimal choices that are explainable by differences in the ordinal
scales used in ordering the decision-choice elements. The decision-choice interactive mode with information, knowledge, and cognitive algorithms are
presented as a relational geometry in Figure 3.4.4 where external rationality is
a derived logical category from internal rationality as the primary logical
Information Collection
Utilization of
Cognitive algorithms
Problem
Specification
Rational
DecisionChoice
System
Construction of
Cognitive algorithms
Knowledge
Construction
Specification of GoalObjective Set
Fig. 3.4.4. Epistemic Geometry of Relations and Interactions of Information, Knowledge and Cognitive Algorithms with Specifications of Goal-objective set, Problem and
Algorithms that establishes the Interactive Path of Internal and External Rationality
137
category. Viewed in a broad general way, decision is a primary category of

cognitive action and choice is a derived category of cognitive action. Every
choice has a decision support but not every decision is translated into choice.
From the decision-choice system when the orderings of decision-choice
elements are subjective, different decision agents acting on the basis of rationality as an attribute (internal rationality) may arrive at different optimality
even when the same element is under decision making. This, of course, will
lead to different optimal choices on the basis of rationality (external rationality) as ideal state of decision-choice process. The important epistemic point
here is that cognitive agents acting on the basis of both rationality as an attribute, and rationality as ideal state, may arrive at different optimal decisionchoice element when the decision-choice index of assessing best is purely
subjective in the sense that there is no collectively agreed unit of measure of
the index of best.
The differences in the optimal values will exist even if different cognitive
agents have the same perception characteristics set and knowledge structure.
At the level of equal knowledge structure for all decision-choice agents, the
differences in optimal elements of different cognitive agents are explainable
by differences in subjective units that induce differential ordering of decisionchoice elements between worst and best for the same decision-choice system.
The differences in individual optimality may be amplified by individual perception characteristics set and the individual behavior of the cognitive transformation function that may impose some limitations on the knowledge formation and supporting justification. In these entire situations cognitive agent
seeking the best decision-choice element and process will be said to be rational. Such rationality will be supported by differential individual optimality
on the basis of qualitative measure of ranking.
Alternatively, when the orderings of decision-choice elements are objectively defined, different decision agents acting on the basis of rationality as a
cognitive attribute may arrive at same optimality when the same elemental
structure is under decision making. This, of course, will lead to same optimal
choices on the basis of rationality as ideal state of decision-choice process.
The important epistemic point here is that cognitive agents acting on the basis
of both rationality as an attribute and rationality as ideal state will arrive at the
same optimal decision-choice element when the decision-choice index of assessing best is purely objective in the sense that the units of measure of the
index of best are collectively agreed upon. The optimal decision values, at the
level of rationality as an attribute of cognitive agents, will be the same for all
138
decision agents working with the same given knowledge structures and their
supporting justifications.
The same equality of the optimal values will prevail at the level of rationality as an ideal state of the decision-choice process. The same mathematicophilosophical implications can be drawn when rationality is considered at the
level of the environment where the decision-choice space is objectively preordered by a cardinal order operator. Examples of such rationality are decisions
in mechanical systems involving a choice of optimal controller or optimal risk
or optimal stability. At this point where the decision-choice space is objectively preordered the individual subjective ordinal choice behavior can not be
exercised and hence the optimal choice is independent of the decision agents.
All decision agents will operate by the objective ordering operator and be
guided by rationality as an attribute of cognitive agents who are decisionchoice optimizers. The resulting optimal decision will be exercised through
optimal choice at the level of rationality as an ideal decision-choice process.
Conceptually, there should be no difference in optimal decision and optimal
choice at the level of both internal rationality and external rationality, irrespective of the decision or the choosing agent when the ordering index is objectively induced by collective acceptance. Differences that may arise in the
optimal choice by individuals given optimal decision are explained by computational mistakes and algorithmic differences. The possible differences between optimal decision and optimal choice may be attributable to mistakes in
the computational system in the choice process. The optimal choice in decision system of mechanistic type is universal. In this decision-choice setting, it
is the procedure of choice that is subject to rationality. This fits into what is
referred to as procedural rationality in the decision-choice process [R17][RI8],
[R18.9], [R18.29]. It is also the expression of external rationality. The decision-choice agent is also said to be rational if he or she follows specific decision-choice algorithms in processing the given information on the choice system into the best knowledge structure and its best use to arrive at the optimal
element.
In all these cases and views on decision and choice, rational choice is
viewed as an activity to implement rational decision which is viewed as human deliberative activity in defining and supporting rational choice. We must
raise some questions for critical reflection. Can there be a theory of rational
choice without a theory of rational decision. Can a theory of rational decision
be considered as a theory of rational choice? In an epistemic sense, is choice
the same as decision? Can choice be exercised without a decision (that is are
all choices decision-supported)? Do all decisions translate into choices? We
139
have argued that rational choice is a subset of rational decision. Conceptually,

the choice space is a subspace of the decision space. It is, however, not necessarily a subspace of the rational decision space which is a subspace of the
general decision space. It is important to keep in mind that axioms on decision-choice theories relate to rationality as cognitive attribute of decisionchoice agents while algorithms of decision-choice theories relate to rationality
as an ideal state of decision-choice processes. It is this separation that renders
the criticisms of theories of rationality futile and philosophically barren. The
criticisms may be handled with conditions of fuzzy paradigm and analytical
structure of fuzzy optimal rationality.
3.4.2
Rationality, Choice, Optimality and Equilibrium
Every rational choice has a supporting rational decision and rational procedure. Every rational decision, however, does not lead to rational choice and
every choice does not necessarily have rational decision support. Every decision is deliberative but not necessarily optimal and by logical extension not
optimally rational. The rational choice is interpreted as the optimal procedure
to abstract the optimal choice element consistent with the optimal decision
element. Rationality as an ideal choice process involves the whole choice system. It is composed of sub-systems of a) problem representations in accordance with optimal decision systems, b) system of algorithmic techniques for
processing information about the problem representations and c) set of conditions for verification of optimality and stability.
In socio-economic choice processes, the conditions of choice optimality
constitute conditions of equilibrium of the choosing agent as viewed by
economists. Thus the concept of choice equilibrium in choice systems has a
special interpretation within the concept of rationality as an ideal state of optimal choice process. Choice equilibrium is a defining product of rationality as
an ideal choice process in so far as it is optimal in relation to information and
algorithmic procedures. When the choice is optimally rational in accordance
with the knowledge structure and algorithmic procedures, the choosing agent
is at equilibrium and has no tendency to change. This equilibrium may be referred to as procedural equilibrium. There are other uses of equilibrium to
characterize agents and systems behavior in the economic space. Equilibrium as applied to economic decision analysis under conditions of rationality
draws its strength from conflicts in social dualities.
At the level of rationality as an ideal state, we have cost-benefit duality as
primary category of reality in which all choice agents operate to exercise
140
choice over the best decision as revealed by internal rationality. From the
cost-benefit duality emerges optimal supply-demand duality as derived category of reality. Both supply and demand establish paths of different optimal
decision behaviors relative to changing information set and knowledge structure of supply-demand decisions in support of production decisions. These
paths are also designated as equilibrium paths of supply-demand behaviors
relative to different information set, knowledge structure and institutions of
exchange. At optimal decision levels, the supply and demand establish equilibrium duality. The information set and knowledge structure are not necessarily generated signals of market institutions for production and exchange decisions. The information signals and knowledge structure may also be generated
by non-market structure [R7.34], [R7.35].
In the conditions of benefit (good) or cost (bad) the rational decision space
as characterized by the basic axioms has no upper bound and hence no immediately identifiable optimal element. The decision elements are comparable in
grades of good and bad but contained in an open set. To abstract the optimal
element with the cognitive search engine, the set of rational decision elements
must be closed and bounded in the sense of compactness. The problem is that
the conditions of rational decision and hence rational choice are constructed in
either the benefit space (good) or the cost space (bad) but not both. In other
words, all choice and decision systems must be cost-benefit closed in abstract
sense. When the decision-choice space is cost-benefit closed we can abstract
the optimal elements for any given information set on costs and benefits. An
explication of both cost-benefit system and equilibrium is required in other to
relate choice equilibrium to choice optimality and by logical extension to
choice rationality.
Definition 3.4.1 :- Rational Choice System
A choice system is an external expression of decision configuration of entities
under transformation-substitution forces where such forces are generated by
conflicts in real cost-benefit duality. It is said to be rational if it satisfies rationality as an ideal decision state given rationality as a cognitive attribute of
decision agents.
Definition 3.4.2:- Optimal Choice System
A choice system is said to be optimal if there are no other alternative element
that can be ranked as better than the chosen element in the system in accordance with real cost-benefit configuration. It is said to be in equilibrium if all
the available information on costs and benefits to the choosing agent is such
141
that the agent has no inclination to revise his or her decision for change and
hence the system can remain indefinitely in this state of configuration without
any change of the forces that create the state relative to the information set
and knowledge structure.
Proposition 3.4.1
If a rational choice system has an optimal element relative to available information set and knowledge structure then it is optimally rational and hence in
optimal equilibrium relative to cost-benefit forces in the decision making
process.
The definitions 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 and proposition 3.4.1 provide us with some
epistemic basis to examine the relational structure of rationality, optimality
and equilibrium in choice systems. If the choice system is rational in terms of
ideal state or procedural then it has an optimal element relative to the best use
of all the available information. Thus given the information set and knowledge structure on the basis of which the optimal choice element is abstracted,
the rationality as attribute of decision agent demands no further action in the
transformation-substitution process in costs and benefits. In this way, the optimal element is also the equilibrium element in the rational choice systems.
Rationality, optimality and equilibrium are relationally triangular. Information, knowledge and decision are also relationally triangular. These two triangular relations interact to produce ideal choice outcomes on the basis of which
other decision outcomes may be referenced, and at the center of which is the
system of cognitive agents. The relational structures and pyramidal interactions may be presented as in Figure 3.4.2.
Ideology and Decision-Choice

Rationalities
We have discussed rationality as if it is free from social system and its relevant institutions and value systems. Every decision-choice process is driven
by perception formation of knowledge about goals and objectives, and about
costs and benefits of competing decision-choice elements in the action space.
This perception formation takes place against a foundation of socially accepted knowledge, the social background as well as depends on the personality characteristics of decision-choice agent relative to the social knowledgebase and the background. The social background includes beliefs, preconceptions, prejudices, aspirations, value judgments, myths, rituals, politico-legal
parameters, historical circumstances and other countless cultural elements
such as held traditions, mode of communication, religious views and ways of
life. These elements define as well as are defined by the social ideology that
derives its support from the acceptable knowledge base of the society.
The acceptable knowledge base of the society includes justified and unjustified knowledge elements. The social ideology, when formed, establishes a
particular range of rules and norms that are intended to control individual and
collective behavior such that, unless decision-choice behavior falls within the
established boundaries, it would not only be inconsistent with the social ideology but would be deemed by the members as irrational behavior. In the
previous chapters, a distinction was made between irrationality and suboptimal rationality. A decision is said to be irrational if it is counter to the
ideological requirements of the society in which the decision-choice action is
taken. A decision-choice action may be ideologically irrational and yet optimally rational. Social ideology is not restricted to any particular society. The
character of ideology is, however, social system specific as well as defining
the nature of the social system and the quality and quantity of informationknowledge structure and the general decision-choice rationality.
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4 Ideology and Decision-Choice Rationalities
4.1 Ideology and Rationality in Institutions and Society

Every social system has permissible boundaries of conduct with common
ethical standard and behavioral rules that not only bind the individual members to a common social essence but provide framework for decision and
choice behavior. The social essence and common rules of conduct are established by the dominant ideology of the society to which the members gravitate
regarding general knowledge creation and rationality (intelligent behavior) in
the decision-choice processes. The social ideology may be seen in two levels
of general society and institutions. At the level of general society there is the
grand ideology whose objective is to create and maintain boundaries of unity
and social cohesion through societal creation and evolution of instruments of
conformity. The grand ideology then is the grand protective belt of the society
in which it is created and corresponding to it is the grand decision-choice rationality that establishes a set of conditions of behavioral unity. Every deviation from this grand decision-choice rationality is viewed as irrational and
socially unacceptable until the characteristics of such behavior are integrated
into prevailing norm of social behavior. We shall refer to this and related ones
as ideological rationality. To be acceptable all decision-choice rationality
must obey the ideological rationality.
A society is a composite aggregation of institutions that are brought into
unity by the grand ideology and the corresponding grand decision-choice rationality. The boundaries of decision-choice rationality of these institutions as
social collectivities are defined by the grand decision-choice rationality that
integrates them into a unified system of acceptable social actions. Each institution is composed of either sub-institutions or individuals that are brought
into institutional unity by a sub-ideology that is particular to that institution.
We shall refer to this as institutional ideology. The character of a subideology is institutional specific with institutional aims, goals, vision, purpose
and aspirations that may be opposed to those of other institutions of the same
society but not opposed to those of the general society. The main goal of institutional ideology is to establish boundaries of institutional behavior in the
sub-space of decision-choice process as applied to specific needs. The subideologies seek to establish conditions of institutional decision-choice rationality that defines institutional unity of relevant area of decision-choice agents.
The institutions evolve instruments of conformity to monitor and maintain
the accepted institutional decision-choice rationality. The institutional ideologies become the protective belts of the various decision-choice rationalities
that instruct the members the rules of commonness, acceptable methods of
4.1 Ideology and Rationality in Institutions and Society
145
analysis, reason and verification of conditions of rationality and correctness of

methodological applications in arriving at conclusions. The sets of conditions
of both the grand and institutional ideologies are broadly specified to allow
for individual flexibility within the institutional restrictions, and institutional
flexibility within the socially defined boundaries of ideological rationality.
The individuals with their respective goals and objectives are constrained not
to go beyond the permissible boundaries of the ruling institutional ideology.
Similarly, individual institutions must function within the permissible boundaries of the grand ideology of the society in the general decision-choice space.
The set of conditions of grand social unity, cohesion and boundaries of behavior establishes the general framework of social paradigm of knowledge
construction, reduction and validation of social and scientific truth and falsehood. The established social and scientific truths and falsehood affect all levels of individual and collective decision-choice rationalities in social practice.
The ideology constrains and molds the behavioral structure of rationality as an
attribute as well as shapes the path of rationality as an ideal state of decisionchoice process. Ideology, at both social and institutional levels, seeks to maintain and define specific orders of social knowledge creation, belief systems
and the selected path of scientific and non-scientific truths. The best path of
knowledge creation that is consistent with the defined ideological boundaries
is then deemed to be the path of optimal decision-choice rationality to the discovery of scientific and non-scientific truth. Thus, optimal decision-choice
rationalities as we have discussed in previous chapters must satisfy the ideological rationality of the social system in which decision-choice actions take
place. As discussed, ideology of rationality in knowledge production and scientific research is to establish boundaries and methods of science and to maintain and defend decision-choice rationality in problem selection, research behavior, conditions for testing, verifying and accepting perceived scientific
truth. Further, when these behavioral decision-choice activities go counter to
the established range, the paradigm will be considered as erroneous, invalid
and irrational. Alternatively, conflicts may tend to arise within the ideological
structure that provides social unity and stability. Conditions of optimal decision-choice rationality in institutions of sciences constitute more or less conditions for demarcation of science from no-science. Sets of conditions of specific paradigms constitute divisional lines of scientific sectors with acceptable
methodology and problems of interest. The grand social ideology imposes on
the society the relevant uses of scientific knowledge. All sub-ideologies and
corresponding behaviors are relationally defined in terms of grand and institu-
146
tional ideologies whose structure is presented in Figure 4.1.1. The diagrammatic structure presents a way of viewing the society in terms of its own limitations and paradigm of reasoning.
SOCIETY
GRAND SOCIETAL PARADIGM
GRAND
IDEOLOGY
GRAND
DECISIONCHOICE
RATIONALITY
C
O
N
T
R
O
L
GRAND SET OF
INSTRUMENTS
TO ENSURE
COMFORMITY
GRAND
COGNITIVE
PROTECTIVE
BELT
SOCIAL UNITY OF
INSTITUTIONS
AND INDIVIDUALS
SPECIFIC
INSTITUTIONAL
IDEOLOGY
INSTITUTION
AL SPECIFIC
DECISIONCHOICE
RATIONALIT
C
O
N
T
R
O
L
INSTITUTIONAL
SPECIFIC SET
OF
INSTRUMENTS
TO ENSURE
INSTITUTIONAL
SPECIFIC
PROTECTIVE
BELT
INSTITUTIONAL PARADIGMS
INSTITUTIONS
Fig. 4.1.1. Relationships among Grand and Institutional Ideologies and Rationality
4.2 Ideology and Decision-Choice Rationality in Science and Knowledge
147
If the goals of controlling behavior and maintaining the order of decisionchoice rationality in general social activities, knowledge creation and scientific progress are to be achieved, then the instruments of reasoning composed
of logic, mathematics and linguistics must by necessity, be seen as instruments of conditions of decision-choice rationality that constitutes the systems
intellect. In every knowledge-research program in support of various decisionchoice actions, there is a specific ideology that supports the justified and unjustified belief system of the process of knowledge creation. The ideology
holds together the fundamental principles of research conduct of the researchers and knowledge seekers about the nature of relevant questions, problems,
methodology as well as the structure of valid knowledge that is to be crafted
according to the socially and institutionally acceptable rationality in the decision-choice space. The social decision-choice rationality is a product as well
as a defining factor of the grand paradigm of social behavior. The institutional
decision-choice rationalities are products and determinants of the institutional
paradigms of institutional decision-choice behaviors. The grand paradigm and
institutional paradigms are inseparable and mutually determining, shaping and
reshaping each other on the path of substitution-transformation process in the
conduct of the dynamics of the information-knowledge structure. Ideology
affects decisions and choices while the decision-choice intelligence molds the
character of the social ideology. Let us examine the effects of ideology on the
interactive process of decision-choice rationality in science and general
knowledge production.
4.2 Ideology and Decision-Choice Rationality in

Science and Knowledge Production
Every scientific revolution takes place within a research program in Lakatos
terminology [R20.53] or within a paradigm in Kuhns terminology [R20.47],
[R20.49] or within a research cluster of theories in Poppers terminology
[R20.70] or within procedural research framework in the terminology of
Kedrov [R20.41] [R20.42].Whether you accept the descriptive terminology of
Lakatos or Kuhn or Popper or Kedrov the perceptive fact remains that research programs, research paradigms, research clusters of theories and research frameworks come under the ambit of institutional ideologies within the
grand social ideology. This is the conformity principle that is maintained by
the protective belt of institutions of knowledge creation and societies of individuals where decision-choice activities to accept or not to accept knowledge
148
are made. The conformity principle creates cognitive dogma as well as anchorage in thinking in knowledge production and decision-choice processes.
Thus, scientific revolution and revolution in knowledge take place with established social ideologies. Research programs, paradigms, cluster of theories,
and procedural research framework are ideology-specific without which the
intellectual results will be meaningless. The general implication is that every
scientific revolution takes place through inter-ideology changes that lead to
either intra or inter-paradigm shifting. Thus revolution in knowledge is also a
revolution in social and institutional ideologies.
Epistemically, the four descriptive notions of enterprise of science and scientific progress involve decision-choice rationality in the sense that they are
relationally interconnected. In fact, a research program is derived from a
paradigm that presents an organic principle with supporting sub-principles for
scientific research in the social knowledge enterprise. Every paradigm of
knowledge production generates decision-choice rationality that ensures the
type of research program that the members are brought into unity. Different
paradigms generate different and competing programs that establish different
schools of thought as well as distinguish them from one another within a particular knowledge sector. Research cluster of theories are generated within a
research program and different clusters arise from competing programs with
their supporting paradigms. The institutional decision-choice rationality generated by a paradigm of research program produces a common procedural research framework to ensure research unity, common scientific purpose and
knowledge acceptance principle. This decision-choice rationality is the guide
to follow the best path of knowledge creation. It may be emphasized that all
these take place with the established ideologies of institutions and societies.
Intra-ideological changes mainly accommodate Kuhnian anomalies, delays
Gestalt switch, expands Lakatorian protective belt, increase the size of Popperian cluster of theories, widens Kadrovian common procedural framework,
intensify cognitive barriers and maintain the ruling decision-choice rationality
to defend the Lakatorian hardcore within a paradigm. In other words, intraideological changes tend to maintain the ideological rationality in which different optimal rationalities are defined. Inter-ideological changes in knowledge production either scientific or non-scientific are complete changes of
paradigms and the corresponding decision-choice rationalities that will establish new hardcore, new protective belts, new clusters of theories and a new
common procedural research frameworks with a rise of anomalies by solving
old anomalies and getting rid of old barriers.
4.2 Ideology and Decision-Choice Rationality in Science and Knowledge
149
From the viewpoint of optimal decision-choice rationality, scientific revolution in knowledge sectors are preceded and hastened by inter-ideological
changes within the corresponding institutions. The rates at which these revolutions can occur depend on the elasticity of boundaries as established by the
grand ideology and the corresponding decision-choice rationality. Every scientific revolution or every revolution in knowledge production is a revolution
in sub-ideology that gives rise to new optimal decision-choice rationality in a
particular knowledge sector consistent with the grand ideology of society.
Viewed alternatively, every paradigm has its ideological support. A paradigm
shifting requires changes of ideology and in ideology that arise from within
the true-false conflicts in scientific research and the decision-choice rationality that engenders it. All these depend on human knowledge that contains
fuzzy and random characteristics due to human limitations about the true nature of the universal object set.
At any time, there are actual and potential competing programs with different competing paradigms and decision-choice rationalities that are generated
by different research ideologies at their cores. The competing programs generate competing clusters of theories that are supported by different procedural
research frameworks which are consistent with corresponding institutional
decision-choice rationalities in the sense of the best path of scientific research.
Research programs, paradigms, clusters and procedural frameworks must
have fundamental shifts in decision-choice rationalities in the knowledge production in order to qualify as competing entities. Given a research program
with its supporting paradigm, we can speak of competing theories within it
but under the same ideology and decision-choice rationality. Here enters the
relevance of meta-theory on knowledge production. The meta-theory helps us
to understand differences and similarities among different programs, paradigms, clusters of theories and procedural research frameworks and corresponding ideologies that impose decision-choice rationality on the participants.
Within any progressive meta-theory there is a recognition that theories arise
from the ideological milieu of a society and it is this that gives the contents of
the theories their meanings and ensures their survivability or demise. The
ideological milieu of the society is composed of grand milieu and institutional
specific milieus. The grand ideological milieu affects the conduct of decisionchoice rationality by defining the boundaries of socially acceptable knowledge as well as socially relevant questions to which answers are to be found
and on the basis of which decisions and choices are to be made. The institu-
150
tional specific ideological milieus in turn affect the contents of institutional

specific decision-choice rationalities by specifying the conditions of scientific
levels of tolerance in specific areas of sciences around the four concepts of
research programs, paradigms, clusters of theories and research procedural
GRAND SOCIAL IDEOLOGY
INSTITUTIONAL IDEOLOGY
OF NON-SCIENCE
INSTITUTIONAL IDEOLOGY
OF SCIENCE
KNOWLEDGE
PRODUCTION ENTERPRISE
KUHNS
PARADIGM
LAKATOS
RESEARCH
PROGRAM
POPPERS
CLUSTER OF
THEORIES
KADROVS
RESEARCH
FRAMEWORK
REVOLUTION IN SCIENCE/ AND KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION
CLAIMED NEW KNOWLEDGE

REDUCTIONISM
CONSRUCTIONISM
TEST OF NEW KNOWLEDGE
CLASSICAL
RATIONALITY
FUZZY
REVOLUTION IN IDEOLOGY
Fig. 4.2.1. Relational Structure of Ideology, Rationality and Knowledge Production
4.3 Social Costs and Benefits of Ideology in Decision-Choice Rationality
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frameworks. The elements in the ideological milieu create boundedness that

restricts decision-choice agents to reach the optimal decision-choice rationality for optimal path of knowledge discovery.
To participate in any defined scientific research program requires one to
accept the ideological framework that governs the decision-choice rationality
of the corresponding paradigm. This acceptance is crucial to a successful participation in a particular research program since it is the research ideology that
gives a countenance to ensure the paradigms decision-choice rationality in
particular knowledge construct. All the four terminologies of scientific research claim their decision-choice rationalities not only from their specific
ideologies but also from the grand ideology that restricts and in many cases
override the specific ideologies within social boundaries of knowledge production and acceptance. The ideologies of scientific institutions become a
pointer to methodology of research which then becomes a guide to scientific
practice and theory construction within a paradigm and a program of a particular knowledge sector. The justification of researchable questions must satisfy two set of ideological boundaries of relevant institutions of research and
knowledge production, as well as the grand ideology of the society. To appreciate the constraint of the grand ideology as applied to decision-choice rationality in science, one may refer to the debates on race-intelligence research and
stem-cell research in the recent and current history. The epistemic structure is
presented in Figure 4.2.1.
4.3 Social Costs and Benefits of Ideology in

Decision-Choice Rationality
The existence of ideology has costs and benefit to society and hence the relational effects of ideology on decision-choice rationality may be examined in
terms of real social costs and benefits. At the levels of benefits to society and
specific institutions, ideology generates unity and common behavior that ensures communicational understanding. It produces boundedness of commonness in thought by narrowing social disagreements on fundamental issues of
general society regarding social and institutional goals, objectives and constraints that limit collaborative efforts in individual and social achievements.
Furthermore, ideology provides the society and its institutions the benefit of
working with the same conditions of decision-choice rationality, set of acceptable rules for construction and acceptance of knowledge elements by
152
specifying the general path of reasoning, resolution of paradoxes and ability to

invent new hypothesis to rescue anomalies in generally accepted social reasoning. In all these, the aggregate benefit of ideology is similarity in thought
and conformity in action at the levels of institutions and society where collective agreements may easily be abstracted.
At the level of cost to both society and institutions, ideologies limit creativity constrains inventiveness and undermines initiatives of the members of society and institutions in all aspects of decision-choice activities. The grand
and institutional ideologies create cognitive barriers to institute blind spots on
the optimal road selection as well as on the road to discoveries of new knowledge. They further create cognitive and methodological inflexibility due to
held decision-choice rationality and absolutism regarding claims of truth and
falsehood of new knowledge. Ideologies lead to the defense of degenerating
decision-choice rationalities by rationalizing indigestible anomalies as well as
inventing hypotheses to support cognitive myths and paradoxes that are irresolvable within a paradigm. All these negative characteristics point to aggregate social costs of restrictions on social knowledge construction and beneficial decision-choice activity.
The aggregate ideological costs of decision-choice rationality may be so
powerful and extremely limiting as to lock a society or an institution in an
important zone of knowledge ignorance for the surviving period of the ideologies. This may be due to the ideological creation of dogmatism and anchorage in reasoning and thinking. The net usefulness of any ideology, therefore, depends on how it positively and negatively affects all levels of decision-choice rationality of the substitution-transformation process in the dynamics of actual-potential duality. The epistemic point from these discussions
is that every true revolution in science or in society is also a revolution in ideology that allows the existing decision-choice rationality to be replaced by
new and more encompassing decision-choice rationality as new experiences
are encountered and new information signals reach the perception space. If,
on aggregate, the benefits outweigh the costs, the ideology is said to be
knowledge-growth promoting or progressive. On the other hand if the costs
outweigh the benefits, the ideology is said to be knowledge-growth restricting
or retrogressive.
4.4 Contents of Ideology and Decision-Choice Rationality
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4.4 Contents of Ideology and Decision-Choice

Rationality
At this point in the meta-theoretic analysis, it would be useful to examine the
distributional categories of ideology, their contents and how they shape decision-choice activities and place boundedness on optimal decision-choice rationality of society and the constituent institutions. The contents of an ideology may be partitioned into two categories. One category contains justified
claims to knowledge which is referred to here as scientific ideology. The other
category contains unjustified claims to knowledge which is referred to here as
illusory ideology. Ideology, at both levels of society and institutions, contains
ideas formed and elaborated in the process of human interactions with elements in the universal object set through reception, processing and interpretation of information signals from the elements of contact. The cognitive processing of received information signals, their interpretations, and acceptance
constitute the social knowledge. This social knowledge and further abstraction
in addition to cognitive prejudices and derived preconceptions, constitute the
grand ideological basis of society in terms of what is claimed to be known
within human cognition.
For one thing, what is claimed to be known is scattered over a terrain of
cognition composed of knowledge and ignorance in the general decisionchoice space in such a way that truths and illusions tend to arise in the same
space of the decision-choice process. Not only that, but that truth and falsehood reside in each other as duality. The terrain of cognition, as has been discussed in Chapter Two, comes to us as a circumference whose diameter is the
sum of illusory and scientific lengths of the ideological distance. The greater the
length of the diameter of illusory ideology, relative to that of scientific ideology,
the larger is the proportion of the area of the circumference of the cognitive ignorance, and the more the members hold on to the corresponding decisionchoice rationality even when it has lost its intellectually decision-choice credibility. The relationships among illusory and scientific ideology and knowledge
and ignorance are illustrated by concentric circles as in Figure 4.4.1.
The cognitive process toward knowledge construction is such that abstract
ideas are formed on the basis of interactions and experiences with the elements of universal object set. These abstract ideas become directly or indirectly separated from the actual human experience from which they were derived. From these cognitive abstractions, particular and general ideas are
formed on the basis of decision-choice rationality as to what must be accepted
154
The Zone of
Cognitive Ignorance
due to Illusory
Ideology
The Zone of
Scientific Knowledge
on the Basis of
Scientific Ideology
Diameter of
Scientific
Ideology
Diameter of Knowledge Containing

Illusory and Scientific Ideologies
Fig. 4.4.1. The Relational Structure of Knowledge, Ignorance and Ideological Space
or not accepted as knowledge for decision-choice activities in other sectors of

life. The cognitive abstractions may be divided into pure scientific truth and
pure myth on the basis of accepted logic and consensual justification in the
social spectrum of thinking.
The pure scientific truth and pure myth exist as duality in an inseparable
unity in our knowledge structure. The pure scientific truth reduces ignorance
and vagueness in the knowledge structure that enters as input into decisionchoice process thus increasing the possibility and probability for decisionchoice agents to act on the basis of optimal decision-choice rationality. The
pure myth enhances ignorance and vagueness in the knowledge structure that
enters as input into the same decision-choice process thus creating reasoning
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boundedness and cognitive barriers that prevent decision-choice agents from

acting in accordance with optimal decision-choice rationality as an ideal path
given rationality as an attribute. In this way, the sub-optimal decision-choice
rationality that may be observed, is explainable by defective knowledge structure, defective linguistic reasoning and personality characteristics all of which
are creations of ideology.
The consensual justification defines some acceptable myths as social knowledge. In this way, social ideas and opinions generally cease to be completely
truthful reflections of the fundamental realities and acquire ideological illusions
that also become inputs into individual and collective decision-choice process
with some fixed notions of what constitutes decision-choice rationality. The
illusions arise within the ideological conditions that guide knowledge research
and productions as well as are produced by the basic knowledge construct on
the basis of which further ideas are formed. First, there is the primary category
of perceptive knowledge and then there are hierarchies of derived perceptive
knowledge formed from the primary category by abstraction and further abstractions. Every knowledge structure, at any given moment, is a family of
knowledge subsets of concentric circles with a core. The core constitutes the
primary category of basic knowledge and instruments of reasoning. The core is
the parent and the derivatives constitute the family whose members are obtained
by the method of constructionism while the derivatives as family members are
reducible to the core, as the primary category, by the method of reductionism.
These derived categories by abstractions from the primary carry with them
truths and myths that create fuzzy characteristics in the perceptive knowledge
structure. The communications of new knowledge imposes language expansion
that also carries it vagueness and ambiguities. The truth, embodied in the perceptive knowledge, enhances the scientific component of ideology towards further scientific knowledge discovery. The myths, embodied in the same perceptive knowledge, amplify the illusory component of ideology toward further
creation of illusions and ignorance. Such ideological illusions constitute important impediments to meaningful definition, contents and applications of decision-choice rationality in all aspects of human behavior.
The growth of knowledge or the size of social knowledge structure at any
time point may be viewed as expanding concentric circles or as nested circular
sets with increasing ideological diameter whose foundation is its core. Thus,
over infinite past time spectrum of human existence, two important interactive
variables of knowledge size, K , and an index of progress toward the ideal
decision-choice rationality may be identified. The index of progress is seen in
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terms of the diameter of ideology D . The diameter of ideology spins the

knowledge space on the basis of optimal decision-choice rationality. A scientific ideology has a tendency to generate a dependable knowledge structure
while illusory ideology has a tendency to generate accepted knowledge with
greater societal ignorance. The growth of knowledge as nested circular sets is
diagrammatically represented in Figure 4.4.2.
Kt
K t 1
K t 2
K t i
CORE
C
DC
D t i
Dt 2
D t 1
Dt
Fig. 4.4.2. The Relational Geometry of circumference of Knowledge K and Ideological Diameter D
157
The size of the knowledge structure at any time point is an enveloping of the
previous knowledge sets. Let us consider an enveloping process of our knowledge construction from an unknown antiquity to any present time. Let the current knowledge structure be defined by a knowledge set of the form:
K t = K t i | K t =
K
iI
t i
K t i K t j ,i j & i, j I
(4.4.2.1)
And by the method of reductionism we can write the knowledge core C as
C = K t i | C = K t i K t j K t i ,i j & i, j I
iI
(4.4.2.2)
On the basis of the knowledge core and structural enveloping, the ideological diameter that spins the knowledge space is such that
DC Dt j Dt i i j & i, j I . The quality of the knowledge structure and
the validity of the socially accepted knowledge are always at the mercy of the
decision-choice rationality that is shaped by the relative composition of scientific and illusory ideologies. The quality of the knowledge structure presents
itself in terms of completeness, exactness and vagueness that give rise to total
uncertainty from which optimal decision-choice rationality is abstracted.
At the level of scientific inquiry, illusions develop within a paradigm of a
research program to serve a definite purpose of protecting the paradigm core
of the decision-choice rationality in problem selection, choice of methods and
research framework, selection of acceptable cluster of theories and the specification of conditions of acceptance and rejection of true and false hypotheses,
and risk-taken process in human action. The general ideological illusions in
the society tend to enforce the illusions in paradigm in knowledge construct
and decision-choice activities. For example, a society constructed on an ideology of race superiority leads to ideological illusions and myth in research
paradigm where scientific research is not to answer the question whether there
are differences in various human races. The research question centers on:
what is the set of conditions that supports superior-inferior race ideological
illusions? Critical research is devoted to find conditions that will tend to support the claimed hypothesis of existence of superior and inferior races. The
myth is then projected onto the terrain of race-intelligent relations as measured by constructed mythical index. The ideological illusion comes to shape
the optimal decision-choice rationality in the acceptance of scientific truth.
158
The answers obtained come to affect optimal decision-choice rationality at the

level of social policy and management of society which then provide further
incentive for maintaining the entrenched illusions in research. The myths contained in the core become the primary category from which others are derived
in the knowledge construct. The greater the new myth in the ideological construct, the greater the size of ignorance in the knowledge structure, the more
stubborn the cognitive boundedness and the higher the scientific difficulty in
arriving at the optimal decision-choice rationality.
Another example of illusions in a paradigm is current research on the origin
of HIV-AIDS whose answer is motivated by race ideology. A hypothesis is
advanced that the virus originated from Africa. The research question then is:
what is the set of conditions that can be abstracted to support the hypothesis?
The critical research is confined in finding the conditions that will support this
hypothesis. Any research finding that fails to support this hypothesis is then
rejected by the ideologically established decision-choice rationality. In support
of this hypothesis, a monkey-eating principle has been invented to sustain and
protect this illusion in race ideology. Critically unresolved scientific questions
are neglected as anomalies. How long have the African people been eating
monkeys? Were the Africans forced from their homes and brought into slavery
in Americas and Europe monkey-eaters? If they were, why was the HIV-AIDS
virus dormant for over a century and half? Notice that the hypothesis (the
myth) becomes the conclusion and then claimed to be knowledge.
The effects of ideology on optimal decision-choice rationality may be illustrated by another example involving stem-cell research debate where ideological illusions of Devine Laws are invented to stop a search for optimal path
of scientific rationality. In such social process the illusions become entangled
with the decision-choice rationality in the political sphere where the sympathetic ears of the political elite draw enforcement against science by state
power. Religion and science are brought into social confrontation by human
ignorance that is claimed to be knowledge and increase risk to society. The
relevant question of knowledge is reframed by the influence of ideological
illusions away from science and into the question of whether God wants us to
undertake such research. Religious myths replace scientific rationality which
becomes accused atheism and sacrilegious.
The debate is redefined and shifted away from science and placed onto an
orbit of religion and energies drawn onto the discussions in the religious plane
involving morality, ethics and divine conditions. Again, one may refer to the
global-warming debate and the split in the scientific community along ideological lines where the relevant scientific questions are neglected in favor of
159
questions of ideological illusions that cloud the vision of political optimal decision-choice rationality. Similarly, we may refer to another important example of effects of ideological illusions on optimal decision-choice rationality in
knowledge production. This is the evolution-creation debate in the sphere of
knowledge construct. Here, the scientists hold on to the explanatory logic of
substitution-transformation process in the dynamics of actual-potential duality
with ideological illusions about the initial conditions of the substitutiontransformation process. The religious fundamentalists, on the other hand, invent an Intelligent Designer to sustain their ideological illusions without justification, contrary to the path of optimal decision-choice rationality. The point
here is simply that, ideology, whether conceived at the level of society or at
the level of institution, tends to influence decision-choice agents to operate
below optimal decision-choice rationality.
The ideological influence is transmitted through its affects on perception
formation, knowledge structure, the uses to which knowledge is put in the
decision-choice processes, the relevance of problems in knowledge development and the type of solutions that may be constructed. The channels through
which ideology affects decision-choice agents and move them to operate at
sub-optimal decision-choice rationality, are the same whether we are dealing
with explanatory or prescriptive science. Ideology then is an important element that creates cognitive boundaries of decision-choice agents in efficiently
operating with optimal decision-choice rationality. It is the same ideology that
creates barriers, anomalies, paradoxes, degenerating programs in theories in
various knowledge sectors by protecting irrefutably held assumptions, preconceptions and system of justified and unjustified views on decision-choice
objects.
In all, these ideological effects on optimal decision-choice rationality, the
most important ideological illusions appear not in the knowledge construct or
scientific reasoning but rather in the explicit and implicit assumptions that
define the environment of conditions of the decision-choice rationality. The
things taking for granted are the fundamental assumptions on the basis of
which the paradigm rests, the research core is defined, programs are designed,
methodological framework is established and cluster of theories are constructed and tested. All these create fuzziness as well as constitute the path of
knowledge research which may or may not correspond to that of optimal decision-choice rationality. Thus, if we want to understand the nature of ideological illusions, sophistry, and their impact on decision-choice rationality in
terms of cognitive boundedness, we must examine the implicitly and explic-
160
itly assumed conditions as foundations of knowledge structure on the basis of

which the conditions of decision-choice rationality are abstracted and practiced. Furthermore, we must examine the psychological effects of ideological
illusions on the personality characteristics of decision-choice agents as they
operate in the real world of decision-choice processes.
It is the set of fundamental assumptions as generated by ideologies that
give rise to paradigms and maintain and sustain them in programs of actions
whether these actions are scientific or not. The rise of paradigms creates cognitive dogmas and anchorage in thinking that affect decision-choice rationality. It is also changes in the assumed fundamental conditions that give rise to
the overthrow of existing paradigms which are then replaced with new paradigms with restructuring of conditions of decision-choice rationality in all
areas of human endeavor. Old cognitive dogmas and anchorages of thinking
are then replaced with new ones. At this point, it is important to distinguish
between ideologically induced assumptions that are fundamental to a paradigm from explicit assumptions that are logical necessities in the knowledge
construction process within a paradigm. The assumptions within paradigms
cannot violate the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm. The fundamental
assumptions are primary to the paradigm and other assumptions are derivatives to justify the conditions of defining the decision-choice rationality within
the paradigm. For example, in the neoclassical economic knowledge construct, the fundamental assumption is the ideology of social individualism and
selfishness in the market place. All other assumptions are imposed to be consistent with this paradigm of methodological individualism to arrive at conditions of optimal decision-choice rationality. It is precisely this fundamental
assumption that gives rise to the Arrows Impossibility Theorem in the study
of decision-choice collectivity and also the emergence of game-theoretic
paradigm in the study of competitive strategies.
When ideology becomes engrained in the social order, it takes hold of the
minds of the people and decision-choice agents at all levels of social classes
and activities. Ideas, facts and illusions become integrated preconceptions that
are used to work out the conditions of decision-choice rationality in all aspects
of human behavior either in nature or society. The ideological illusions become input as well as an important part of foundations of reasoning by taking
them as facts and self-evident truths without question and justification toward
the acceptance of the derived optimal decision-choice rationality. What is being optimized is justified under the principle of self-evident truth that is
known a priori. Subjective interpretations of results of abstractions are taken
to be objective reality. The dynamics of true-false duality are justified by their
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correspondence with the abstractions rather than how far they serve the social
knowledge structure. By this way, the conditions of decision-choice rationality become entangled with sophistry and ideological illusions. Here, we are
projecting the idea that ideology gives countenance to conditions of optimal
decision-choice rationality.
There are other ideological complications where conditions of decisionchoice rationality in acceptance of theories in social and natural processes are
claimed to be fact-supported and hence absolutely true. Here, problems arise
in social decision-choice actions that are based on theological knowledge
which is claimed to be factually true by Devine revelations. The examination
of ideological effects on decision-choice rationality requires us to keep in
mind that the history of human perceptive knowledge is such that there are
inseparable interactions among theological speculations, social ideology and
scientific investigations all of them shredded in vagueness. If optimal decision-choice rationality in a given paradigm is to be based on theological
knowledge then what would be the supporting facts? Are theological and scientific beliefs not derived from the same social system within the same ideological system of society? As we have pointed out every perceptive knowledge element contains true and false characteristics that define its duality.
Thus the acceptance of statements as true or false on the principle of factsupporting must be conditional with skepticism on true-false proportions.
An absolute truth or false of perceptive knowledge element is a claim under
conditions of ideological illusions. Claims may be logically false or true but
not necessarily factually false or true. In other words logical truth cannot be
claimed to be factual without some qualifications. History of knowledge production seems to reveal that perceptive knowledge is constructed through
creative combination of experience and reason with defined conditions of decision-choice rationality for acceptance of knowledge construct. The acceptance is valid only for specified knowledge sector and time. Both experience
and reason operate within the perceptive process in knowledge construction
with simultaneous existence of true and false characteristics but not one or the
other. This is the essence of fuzzy optimal decision-choice rationality that accepts contradictions and incoherence in human reason and decision-choice
actions. It is here that fuzzy paradigm and conditions of fuzzy optimal decision-choice rationality constitute a critique and unity of classical optimal rationality and bounded rationality. Both classical and bounded rationalities are
subsets of fuzzy optimal decision-choice rationality. The classical one constitutes the extremes of fuzzy optimal decision-choice rationality. The bounded
162
rationality is a classical sub-optimal rationality that has a covering in fuzzy

optimal decision-choice rationality.
We have argued that rationality is defined in terms of optimality in decision-choice processes and that conditions of optimal rationality are derived
from ideological settings. We have also pointed out that decision-choice
agents seek for the best among alternatives that are available to them with a
given set of limitations on cognition and use of knowledge. This conditions of
best is consistent with Eulers statement that Nothing happens in the universe that does not have a sense of either certain maximum or minimum
[R14.75, p.1]. The optimal rationality may then be viewed from Eulers minimax principle of universal events. Substantially, this points to the futility of
criticizing optimal decision-choice rationality in economic theory and in all
areas of human decision-choice actions. The concept of optimality should not
be the object of contention but rather what is to be optimized and the method
of arriving at the optimum. What is to be optimized in the decision-choice
process is under ideological contention. For example, in economics, different
optimizing behaviors of decision-choice agents are claimed. Such claims under capitalist market ideology, range from optimization of profit, or revenue
or welfare, or cost, of net benefit and many others. All these indexes of behavior accept the fundamental idea of optimal decision-choice rationality. The
methods, algorithms and computational techniques constitute a process of
finding the conditions of optimal rationality as the ideal state of decisionchoice process. It is here that epistemic contentions must arise, but not on the
principle of optimality. The contention of what is to be optimized finds expression in cost and benefit characteristics of decision-choice activities and
their possible distributions over stakeholders since such distribution may give
rise to social and institutional tension particularly when social collectivity is
in question regarding resource commitment to implement decision-choice actions.
For example, the decision-choice action on the optimal (best) path among
different paths of knowledge construction is always under intellectual battles
induced by ideologies of paradigms. The object of optimization will dictate
the mechanism for achieving the conditions of optimal decision-choice rationality. These conditions are not free from experience and reason which are derived from within a particular ideology. Similarly, the object of optimization
must meet the basic axioms of ordering as well as point to extra axioms of
behavior in ranking, logic and mathematics needed for soft or hard computing, reasoning and abstraction.
163
The contents of ideology point to the direction of optimal decision-choice

rationality in all aspects of human activity. The prevailing social paradigm of
knowledge production basically rests on social ideology that constitutes the
essential core of conditions of decision-choice rationality. The concepts of
minimum, maximum, and optimum are ideologically free as well as social
system independent. The object of minimization, maximization and optimization are social-system and ideologically dependent. It is the confusions among
the concept of optimization, the object of optimization, the process of optimization and the failure to provide epistemic distinctions among them that create
critics and form the foundation of criticisms of optimal decision-choice rationality. There is nothing wrong with optimization as paradigm of rationality
that has received substantial criticisms in its applications in economics and
other areas of social science. The concepts and practices of satisficing level,
aspiration level and others evolve around optimality and optimal decisionchoice rationality without which these behavioral concepts have no claim to
explication. These concepts do not only evolve around optimality through adjustment processes and approximate reasoning, but they are substantially influenced by the ideological environment in which these levels are set and
moved. The object of satisficing or aspiration level like the object of optimization is ideologically dependent and in terms decision-choice actions it defines an adjustment process to the optimal decision-choice rationality. The
concept of optimality is value-free in the sense that it is not ideologically dependent. What is to be optimize, however is ideologically dependent and
hence value-anchored.
In a more or less summary, ideology has profound effect on decisionchoice rationality by influencing the choice of the object to be optimized and
conditions of optimum. It does not affect the principle of optimal decisionchoice rationality. It, however affects the conditions that establish the path of
optimal decision-choice rationality. It defines the conditions of social paradigm of knowledge construction and its uses. It shapes perception formation,
interpretations of information signals as they are experienced and linguistic
reasoning to derive conclusions. It influences consciousness of decisionchoice agents in the selection process of things of relevance and irrelevance
through the assessment of their relative degrees of social importance. Ideology also affects the scientific attitude through encouragement or discouragement of practices of optimal decision-choice rationality by affecting the personality characteristics of decision-choice agents as well as artificially and
164
temporally imposing boundaries of problem selection, methods of reasoning

and demarcation between rationality and sub-rationality.
By affecting the personality characteristics and changing the social properties of decision-choice agents, ideology alters the overall perception and thus
influences decision-choice agents capacity to distinguish between what is
knowledge and what fiction is and so alters patterns of locating the paths to
wise decisions by imposing cognitive boundedness on decision-choice agents
in the practice of optimal decision-choice rationality. The boundedness of optimal decision-choice rationality is magnified by social policies of information
and knowledge dissemination where such policies are products of the grand
and institutional ideologies. From pure conditions of optimal decision-choice
rationality and given the objectives of decision-choice agents, it is possible to
observe the actions of the decision-choice agents to be sub-rational and yet
when these actions are carefully examined against the social background for
the decision-choice actions, they may produce contrary results. This is due to
incompleteness of the problem specification or ill-defined problem as it is reflected in the levels of aspiration on satisficing research where ideological
constraints are neglected by assumption [R20], [R20.36], [20.46], [R20.48].
In this respect, any analysis or theory of bounded rationality or theory of
decision-choice process pretext on aspiration level must proceed with full appreciation of connections among sociology of knowledge, psychology of ideology and limitations of abilities of decision-choice agents to transcend beyond established norms of social behavior within which decision-choice actions must be undertaken. Unfortunately, it happens only too often that decision-choice agents think that they have complete freedom to exercise their
capacity for optimal decision-choice behavior towards their goals and objectives. They fail to observe the simple fact that they are constrained within
permissible social limits and cognitively bounded by the ideological content
of the society to reach the preferred optimal decision-choice rationality. They
also fail to understand that their goals and objectives are selected from the
admissible social set of the social goals and objectives that are deemed rational by the ruling ideology.
At the level of decision-choice behavior, ideology presents itself in human
action as simultaneous interactions of facts and illusions in the knowledge
structure. It also presents itself at the level of linguistic reasoning as simplifications of process of thought. At the level of decision-choice rationality, ideology presents itself as defuzzification of vagueness in complexities in cognitively computable systems. At the level of society, ideology seeks to bring a
specific order into decision-choice behavior while at the level of institutions,
165
it seeks to integrate diverse institutional behaviors into unity and different institutional beliefs into an organic behavioral belief system to establish a paradigm. Paradigm therefore is nothing more than a network of principles and
rules for the guidance and critical appraisal of conditions of optimal decisionchoice rationality as the accepted conduct of behavior for the society in which
decision-choice action are undertaken and implemented. This way of viewing
ideology and decision-choice rationality gives rise to social implicit contract
at the level of society and the constituent institutions. By means of this implicit contract, members wave their rights in one form or the other in other to
conform to the accepted decision-choice rationality for acceptance even when
the ideological protective belt shows itself to be problematic.
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R22
On Theories of Utility and Expected Utility
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R23 On Vagueness and Approximation
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[R22.8]
[R22.9]
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R23
On Vagueness and Approximation
[R23.1]
Adams, E.W., Levine, H.F.: On the Uncertainties Transmitted

from Premises to Conclusions in deductive Inferences. Synthese 30, 429460 (1975)
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Black, M.: Vagueness: An Exercise in Logical Analysis. Philosophy of Science 17, 141164 (1970)
Black, M.: Reasoning with Loose Concepts. Dialogue 2, 112
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[R23.2]
[R23.3]
[R23.4]
[R23.5]
272
[R23.6]
[R23.7]
[R23.8]
[R23.9]
[R23.10]
[R23.11]
[R23.12]
[R23.13]
[R23.14]
[R23.15]
[R23.16]
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[R23.21]
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[R23.23]
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R24
[R24.1]
References
On Rationality, Prescriptive Science and Theory

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Index
acceptability principle, 82 85
accounting theory, 172
actual potential category, 101 102
actual-potential duality, 2 5, 20, 26,
31, 104 107, 152
aggregation, 168 170
ambiguities, 155 157
approximation, 271 275
Aristotelian logic, 113
Arrows Impossibility Theorem, 122
attribute signal set, 64 67
attribute signal, 17
axiom of existence, of choice, 129
axioms of decision-choice rationality,
129 131
axiomatic foundation, 119 125
categorial relativity, 103 105
categorial transformation,38, 95 97
categories of duality, 93 94
category, 62 69
category formation, 71 72
category of philosophy, 10
category of reality, 62 66
category theory, 249 250`
characteristic-based information set,
61 69, 79 87,97 102
choice theory, 116 126
classical paradigm, 102 104
classical rationality, 1, 29, 98 113,
253 258
classical science, 25 30
basic axioms, 128 132

belief system, 77 81
best decision, 120 125
best path of knowledge, 145
bounded rationality, 1, 98 112,
258 260
boundedness in rationality, 75
C
categorial conversion, 49, 57 60
categorial derivative, 108 112
categorial difference, 103 106
categorial equilibrium, 103 105
categorial formation, 103 107
categorial reality, 62 65, 108 109
classificatory science, 71
cluster analysis, 71
cognitive algorithms, 124 127, 136
137
cognitive barriers, 12
cognitive conversion moment, 74
cognitive conversion process, 75 76
cognitive dogma, 148 151
cognitive filters, 65
cognitive geometry, 43 45, 93
cognitive rationality, 8 13, 74, 87
cognitive reality, 72
cognitive system, 59 70
cognitive unity, 108
278
Index
cognitive transformation function,

74 75
cognitive transformation path, 21 23
comparability principle, 82 83
composition analysis, 71
computational logic, 130
concept of ideology, 153 164
concept of information, 58 69
concept of knowledge, 82 84
concept of rationality, 98 102
conceptual unity, 103 108
conformity in action, 152
conformity principle, 147-`151
conscious-unconscious transformation, 3
consensual justification, 155
construction-destruction dynamics,
12 13
constructionism, 26 27, 46 54, 73
79,155
containment set, 24
contingent valuation method, 182
185
corroboration, 13 16, 29, 78 85
corroboration principle, 80
corroboration test function, 81
cost-benefit duality, 126
cost-benefit rationality, 131, 170
187
creation of illusion, 155 165
creational process, 2 3
creative conflict, 10
criticisms of rationality, 112 116
capacity limitation, 115
compatibility requirement, 114
information assumption, 114
optimality assumption, 114
D
Decision-choice rationality, 42
decision rules, 14 16
decision support system, 132 139
decision system, 125 128
decision theory, 116 128
decision-choice attribute, 103

decision-choice criteria, 176 177
decision-choice process, 1 13, 56,
105 112, 187 195, 241 244,
199 209
decision-choice rationality, 4 20,
144 165
decision-choice space, 113
decision-choice structure, 105
decision-rationality-choice pyramid,
91 95
decision system defined, 116 126
decision theory, 107 112
definition of objective universe, 62
64
definition of information, 58 62
definition of justification, 79
definition of knowledge, 75 80
definition of knowledge possibility
set, 82
defuzzification, 164 165
degree of accuracy, 68 69
degree of corroboration, 80
degree of prediction, 29
derived logical category, 47 54
derived category of reality, 72 75
descriptive language, 97
Devine Laws, 158
discounting, 180 182
E
economic costing, 172 176
economics, 9, 113
empirical law, 38
empirical rationality, 98 101
enterprise of knowledge creation, 10
15
enterprise of science, 7 13
epistemic geometry, 93 94, 111,
127 128
epistemological accessibility, 73, 85
87
epistemological certainty, 86 87
epistemological ignorance, 86 87
Index
epistemological noise, 86
epistemological uncertainty, 86
equilibrium, 125 128, 253 258
ethical rationality, 16, 98 101
Eulers max-min principle, 98, 100
107, 115 116, 135 136, 162
evolution-creation process, 31 35
exact science, 25
existence postulate, 95
expectation, 195 199
expected utility, 270 271
explanandization, 42
explanandum, 19 35, 37 45, 48 54
explanans, 19 35, 37 45, 48 54,
118
explanation-prescription duality, 25
explanation-prescription paradigm,
39 41
explanatory constraint problem, 30
explanatory decision rules, 27 30,
37 39
explanatory decision theory, 107 109
explanatory index, 29 30
explanatory knowledge squire, 28
explanatory power, 92
explanatory rationality, 98 102
explanatory science, 19 35
explanatory theory, 36 45
explanatory-theory-based prescriptive
rationality, 36 54
explanatory-transformation square, 49
explanandum, 16 21, 36 49
explanans, 19 21, 36 49, 122 124
explicandum-explicatum, 14 16
explicandum, 14 16
explication, 97 102
explication of choice, 116 119
explication of decision, 116 119
explicatum, 14 16
external rationality, 118, 122 125
F
fix-level set, 36
fuzziness, 54, 85, 199 209, 215 221
279
fuzzy decisions, 209 215

fuzzy logic, 221 225
fuzzy mathematics, 229 238
fuzzy optimality, 225 229
fuzzy probability, 238 241
fuzzy random variable, 238 241
fuzzy uncertainty, 29
fuzzy rationality, 1, 12 13, 29 30=
98 102
fuzzy space, 27, 32, 79
fuzzy-stochastic rationality, 12
G
game theory, 113, 215 221, 260
262
gestalt switch, 75
global-warming debate, 158 159
grand ideology, 145 148
growth of knowledge, 155 158
H
hard science, 25
history of science, 9
human intelligence, 15, 98 102
I
ideal decision state, 118 119
ideal set, 28
ideological effects, 147 150
ideological rationality, 145 150
ideology, 9, 143 164, 243 244
ideological diameter, 156 160
ideological space, 154
ill-defined problem, 164 165
illusory ideology, 153 160
index of best decision, 137 139
inexact science, 25
info-active, 69
info-passive, 69
information, 1, 56 81, 244 250
information-decision-interactive, 1 6
information-constrained optimality,
124 125
280
Index
information definition, 58 66
information-knowledge process, 76
information relation, 60 69
information representation, 58 69
information Science, 1 4
information square, 65
information usage, 2
input-output process, 56
institutional ideology, 12, 144 147
instrument of conformity, 144 145
intellectual heritage of humanity, 52,
55
intellectual history of humanity, 89
Intelligent Designer, 159 156
internal attribute, 117 119
internal rationality, 118 119, 122
132
irrational behavior, 143
J
justification, 13 19, 76 83
justification condition, 17
justification principle, 79 84
justification test function, 81
justified belief, 17 18, 79
K
Kedrov, 12, 75, 148 151
Kedrovian common procedural
framework, 148 151
Kedrovs cognitive barrier, 75
knowability, 6, 74
knowledge, 1, 55 80, 244 250
knowledge acceptance process, 79
85
knowledge bag, 14, 55, 74, 101
knowledge definition, 73 81
knowledge enterprise, 37 54
knowledge illusions, 85
knowledge possibility set, 82, 157
158
knowledge-production space, 32 33
knowledge production, 74 75
knowledge representation, 73 80
knowledge square, 28, 34

knowledge verification, 10 13
Kuhn, 12, 75, 147 151
Kuhnian anomalies, 148 151
Kuhns anomalies, 75
L
Lakatorian protective belt, 148 151
Lakatos, 17, 147 151
life-death duality, 5
logic of constructionism, 43, 48, 95
97
logic of reductionism, 95 97
logical rationality, 98 101
logical transformation function, 16
M
market ideology, 162 163
metatheory, 5 19
methodology of science, 13 19
mini-max principle, 89, 100 107
model of reality, 74
modification theories, 23 27
morphological process, 13
mythical index, 157 158
N
nature of science, 9 10
new actual, 38 40
nominalism, 52 54, 78
non-rival theories, 18 20
non-science, 13, 145
non-scientific information, 3
non-prescriptive-theory-basedexplanatory rationality, 46 54
O
Objective existence, 103 105
objective information square, 63 64
objective information, 60 67
objective information set, 76 83
objective-rationality-subjective pyramid, 91 94
Index
objective reality, 70 71
objective-subjective-choice pyramid,
91 94
objective-subjective duality, 58 59,
93 96
optimal choice system, 140 141
optimal decision-choice rationality,
135 142
optimal prescriptive rule, 33
optimal prescriptive theory, 35
optimal rationality, 134
optimal risk, 138
optimal selection rules, 3, 25, 42
optimal stability, 138
optimal theory, 25
optimality, 119 132, 139 141
optimality condition, 124
optimization, 116, 163
P
paradigm of rationality, 163 165
paradigm of scientific thinking, 14
19
paradoxes, 268 270
path of categorial conversion, 50
perception characteristic set, 65, 91,
117 120
philosophical category, 92 93
philosophical idealism, 6
philosophical rationality, 7 13, 16
19
philosophy of science, 4 19, 262
268
Popper, 17, 148 151
Popperian cluster of theories, 148
151
Postulate of non-satiation, 109
Postulates, 134
Potential, 21, 31 33, 59 61
praedicendum, 21 45, 48 54
praedicens, 21 45, 48 54
praedecendization, 42
praescricens, 31, 37 42, 48 54, 122
praescricendum, 31, 37 42, 54 60
281
praxeological transformation,107
praxeology,91, 109
predictive decision rule, 28 30
predictive index, 29
prescriptive decision rules, 15, 33
3731
prescriptive decision theory, 107 112
prescriptive force, 35
prescriptive knowledge square,34
prescriptive rationality, 31 36, 98
100
prescriptive science, 19 36, 276
prescriptive theories, 32 42
prescriptive-theory-based
explanatory-rationality, 51 54
pricing, 178 180
primary category, 6, 93 96, 108 109
primary category of reality, 72 75
primary logical category, 47 54
principle of justification, 17 18
principle of corroboration, 17 18
principle of verification, 17 18
probabilistic logical reasoning, 29
30, 250 253
problem of existence, 66 68, 90
problem of knowability, 66 68,90
problem of rationality, 97 116
procedural rationality, 98 101
processes, 1 6
properties of objects, 58
protective belt, 144 147
psychology of ideology, 164 165
pyramidal logic, 18, 49 52, 58, 9297
pyramidal geometry, 47, 92 95
production-consumption duality, 5
Q
qualitative judgment, 102 105
qualitative-quantitative duality, 107
116
quantity-quality duality, 120, 122
125
282
Index
Race ideology, 158

race-intelligent relation, 157
relational unity, 72
random fuzzy variable, 238 241
randomness, 54
rational choice, 132 141
rational choice theory, 130 132
rational choice system, 140 141
rational decision, 132 141
rational path, 5 9
rationality as attribute, 117 119
rationality defined, 25
rationality-objective-subjective pyramid, 93 96
reality-perception duality, 90
reality-subjective duality, 96 100
reductionism, 37 54, 73 77, 155
relational geometry, 48, 57 60, 121
relation-based information, 68, 97
relational unity, 72
relations among objects, 58 60
religious fundamentalist, 159 162
religious myths, 159 160
resource-constrained optimality, 125
risk analysis, 215 221
rival theories, 23 25, 33
revealed preference method, 185 187
scientific test, 32 37
scientific thought, 7
scientific truth, 12 13, 154
scientific validity, 32 37
self-evident truth, 94 95
similarity in thought, 152 153
social ideology, 143 151
social knowledge construct, 46 54
social paradigm, 18, 74, 144 150
sociology, 9
sociology of knowledge, 164 166
soft optimization, 30
soft science, 25 26
somethingness,60
stochastic-fuzzy rationality, 12 13
stochastic rationality, 12 13, 29
sub-ideologies, 145
subjective existence, 103 105
subjective information, 60 68, 108
112
subjective knowledge, 16, 79 85,
107 112
sub-optimal choice, 128 134
sub-optimal equilibrium, 128
sub-optimal rationality, 112 116
sub-rationality, 137
substitution-transformation process, 6,
success-failure outcome, 97
supply-demand duality, 125 126
science-philosophy duality, 10 17
scientific consensus, 16
scientific contents,10
scientific culture, 12 13, 75
scientific discovery, 12 17, 91 96,
148 151
scientific explanation, 20
scientific ideology, 153 156
scientific 1nquiry, 157
scientific knowledge, 1 11
scientific language, 20, 78
scientific methodology, 9 10
scientific rationality, 9 12
scientific revolution, 75, 147 151
technical knowledge, 1 11
that which is not, 89
that which is to be explained, 22
that which is to be prescribed, 22 23
that which ought to be, 32, 89
theory of planning, 276
theory selection problem, 30
transformation-substitution duality,
17
transformation-substitution modules,
58
transformation-substitution process,
14 20, 97 101, 104 124
Index
U
uncertainty, 158 161
unity of science, 7 116
universal characteristic set, 61 67
universal knowledge bag, 55
universal object set, 60 67, 103 105
universal object space, 60, 71 77
universal unity, 71 75, 103 105
V
vagueness, 155, 164, 271 275
value judgment, 143 147
verification, 13 19, 79 84
verification principle, 81
verification test function, 70
W
what intelligence there is, 92 94
what ought to be, 19, 32, 101
283
what there is, 6 12, 19 26, 56, 90,

101 102
what there is not, 10, 19, 22, 32
what would be, 10 12
worst-best duality, 102 107, 120
125
worst decision, 120 125
Z
zonal analysis, 71, 104
zone of epistemological accessibility,
73, 85 87
zone of epistemological certainty, 86
87
zone of epistemological ignorance,
86 87
zone of epistemological uncertainty,
86
zone of knowledge formation, 73

(Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing 235) Kofi Kissi Dompere (Auth.) - Fuzzy Rationality - A Critique and Methodological Unity of Classical, Bounded and Other Rationalities-Springer-Verlag Berlin

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(Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing 235) Kofi Kissi Dompere (Auth.) - Fuzzy Rationality - A Critique and Methodological Unity of Classical, Bounded and Other Rationalities-Springer-Verlag Berlin

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Kofi Kissi Dompere

Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, Volume 235

Vol. 227. Eugene Roventa, Tiberiu Spircu

Vol. 220. Humberto Bustince,

Vol. 228. Adam Kasperski

Vol. 221. Gleb Beliakov, Tomasa Calvo,

Vol. 229. Sadaaki Miyamoto,

Kofi Kissi Dompere

Library of Congress Control Number: 2008935495

To all scholars, researchers and supporters working

Philosophy involves a criticism of scientific knowledge, not from a

structure. This defective information-knowledge structure renders the claim to

made for exactness of knowledge items and other scientific statements to be

It may be stated that the nature of human imperfections, learning by doing,

through certain rationality to resolve the conflict in the true-false duality.

Kofi Kissi Dompere

General Epistemics on Science and Rationality ...................................1

Decision and Cognition .....................................................................1

Information and Knowledge in Decision-Choice Rationality............55

Decision, Choice and Rationality .........................................................89

3.1.2 Epistemic Conditions of Rationality ...................................102

Ideology and Decision-Choice Rationalities......................................143

R7 On Game Theory, Risk Analysis. Fuzziness and Rationality........215

General Epistemics on Science and

1.1 Decision and Cognition

1 General Epistemics on Science and Rationality

able application for greater part of history. Cognition, defined in terms of

1.1 Decision and Cognition

1 General Epistemics on Science and Rationality

1.1 Decision and Cognition

1 General Epistemics on Science and Rationality

1.2 The Unity of Science, Philosophy and Rational Inquiry

1.2 The Unity of Science, Philosophy and

1 General Epistemics on Science and Rationality

ment of society. It may provide philosophical critiques and clarifications of

1.2 The Unity of Science, Philosophy and Rational Inquiry

and philosophy as guided by collectively acceptable conditions of rational

1 General Epistemics on Science and Rationality

to the growth of philosophical knowledge and critical inquiry into scientific

1.2 The Unity of Science, Philosophy and Rational Inquiry

1 General Epistemics on Science and Rationality

1.3 Methodology of Science and Decision-Choice Rationality

philosophy of science presents itself as a theory of scientific discovery of

1.3 Methodology of Science and Decision-Choice

1 General Epistemics on Science and Rationality

standing of the methodological and epistemological underpinnings of theories

1.3 Methodology of Science and Decision-Choice Rationality

digm of scientific thinking as well as knowledge production in the society of

1 General Epistemics on Science and Rationality

havior of philosophical rationality into knowledge production. The human

1.3 Methodology of Science and Decision-Choice Rationality

cial knowledge space satisfies three basic conditions before it is conditionally

1 General Epistemics on Science and Rationality

The principles of justification, corroboration and verification constitute a

1.4 Explanatory and Prescriptive Sciences

1.4 Explanatory and Prescriptive Sciences

1 General Epistemics on Science and Rationality

Fig. 1.4.1a. Process of constructing a Scientific Language System

1.4 Explanatory and Prescriptive Sciences

Fig. 1.4.1b. Cognitive Transformation Path of Explanatory Science

The emerged theoretical construct in explanatory science is an explanatory

1 General Epistemics on Science and Rationality

Fig. 1.4.1c. Cognitive Transformation Path of Prescriptive Science