Terrorism and Political Violence

ISSN: 0954-6553 (Print) 1556-1836 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20

Adversary Group Decision-Making Regarding

Choice of Attack Methods: Expecting the
Unexpected
Sarah E. Knight, Carys Keane & Amy Murphy
To cite this article: Sarah E. Knight, Carys Keane & Amy Murphy (2015): Adversary Group
Decision-Making Regarding Choice of Attack Methods: Expecting the Unexpected, Terrorism
and Political Violence, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2015.1064398
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1064398

Published online: 09 Oct 2015.

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Terrorism and Political Violence, 0:122, 2015

Copyright # 2015 Crown Copyright
ISSN: 0954-6553 print=1556-1836 online
DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2015.1064398

Adversary Group Decision-Making Regarding

Choice of Attack Methods: Expecting
the Unexpected
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SARAH E. KNIGHT
Information Management, Dstl, Fareham, UK

CARYS KEANE
National Offender Management Service (NOMS), London, UK

AMY MURPHY
Information Management, Dstl, Salisbury, UK
Anticipating whether an adversary group will continue to use their usual (conventional), expected attack methods is important for military and counterterrorism
practitioners tasked with protecting the security of others. Conventional attack methods
are by their nature easier to plan and prepare for whilst innovative methods may take
those responsible for security and counterterrorism by surprise and, as such, may
have more impact and more serious consequences. The present study aimed to develop
understanding of how, when, and why adversary groups might decide to use conventional
attack methods or opt to do something innovative instead. A literature review was
conducted and findings were applied to develop a thorough understanding of the
decision-making process that underlies an adversary groups choice of attack method.
Identified are three stages preceding the execution of an attack: a) strategic
direction; b) incubation; and c) planning and preparation, plus overarching
and contextual factors that can influence the process at each stage. It is suggested
that it is these factors and how they influence decision-making that result in innovative
methods being used to execute an attack, or convention prevailing. Findings can aid
practitioners and policy-makers in counterterrorism, security, and law enforcement,
to support their understanding, evaluation, and countering of current and future threats.

Sarah E. Knight, PhD, is a Principal Social Psychologist at Dstl and a Visiting Research
Fellow at the Department of Psychology, University of Portsmouth, UK. Her expertise and
interests lie in the relationship between attitudes, beliefs, emotions, and behaviour, in particular regarding violent and non-violent extremism and lone actor extremism. Carys Keane
is the National Specialist Lead for Extremism within Intervention Services in the National
Offender Management Service (NOMS), and at the time of writing was a consultant Senior
Psychologist at Dstl. Carys is a Chartered and Registered Forensic Psychologist, whose interests lie in extremism, the assessment of risk and threat, and rehabilitation. Amy Murphy, PhD,
is a Senior Social Psychologist at Dstl and an Honorary Research Fellow at the School of
Psychology, University of Kent. Particular research interests focus on group processes and
intergroup relations, as well as gender and socio-cultural psychology.
Address correspondence to Sarah E. Knight, Information Management, Dstl, Portsdown
West, Portsdown Hill Road, Fareham, PO17 6AD, UK. E-mail: seknight@dstl.gov.uk
Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at
www.tandfonline.com/ftpv.

S. E. Knight et al.

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Keywords adversary group decision-making, attack methods, attack planning,

counterterrorism, innovation, malevolent creativity

Understanding adversary group1 decision-making regarding choice of attack method

is important for practitioners and policy-makers tasked with, and responsible for
security, law enforcement, and counterterrorism. Expected methods can be anticipated
and therefore more easily prepared for and countered compared to novel attacks
that may have more impact and the potential for more serious consequences due to
their unexpected nature. Understanding what the decision-making process looks like,
in terms of stages in the process and factors that facilitate or hinder the process
at different stages, is important for national security. Knowledge of how, when, and
why a group might make decisions regarding choice of attack methods can help those
responsible for risk assessment and countering such attacks a) distinguish between
groups that are likely to use conventional methods and those that may not, b) identify
what stage of planning a group is at, and c) respond in the most effective way.
Many terrorist organisations have a short lifespan,2 and the survival of such
systems may be in part dependent on their ability to adapt, innovate, and be creative
in response to their environment.3 Whilst empirical research in this area is lacking,
it has previously been suggested that terrorists are mostly consistent and conservative
in that their approach and their methods tend to be limited, unchanging, and
rarely innovative.4 As the literature in this area has matured, however, it is clear that
innovation is in fact a regular feature of terrorism.5 This has led to investigations
into Malevolent Creativity and Innovation (MC&I),6 a term which refers to
creative ideas that are developed into innovative attack methods intended to cause
deliberate harm and=or negative consequences to another person, people, or
system.7 Creativity is distinct from innovation in that it refers to the generation
of ideas and novel concepts, while innovation refers to the implementation of these.8
With few exceptions,9 little is currently known about the use of creativity and
innovation for malevolent purposes.
The current article investigates and synthesises relevant, multidisciplinary
literature in order to understand the Adversary Group Decision-Making (AGDM)
process, in terms of identifying stages in this process and factors that underlie
decisions to execute an attack using either conventional or innovative methods.
A key assumption made in the early phases of this work was that whilst the nature
of the aims and objectives driving individuals and groups will differ in terms of their
intent to cause harm to others (or not), the process of how a creative idea emerges
and evolves into an innovative outcome is likely to be similar for groups that have
either benevolent or malevolent intentions. Based on this assumption, the literature
on both benevolent and malevolent creativity and innovation was examined in order
to develop a thorough understanding of how creativity evolves into innovation.
In particular, Organisational Psychology was identified as an analogous area
of research that was applied to understand decision-making at both individual and
group level. This innovative approach was taken because empirical studies
that examine AGDM are rare, due mainly to a variety of methodological issues that
hinder or prevent the collection of reliable and valid data from groups with
malevolent intent. Findings led to the development of a comprehensive framework
that comprises a model that visually represents the AGDM process, and supporting
guidance that explains the model.

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The Creativity and Innovation Process

Little is currently known about creativity and innovation in groups with malevolent
intent, but there are numerous well-established models that describe the creativity
and innovation process for benevolent purposes.10 Whilst there are identifiable differences between these various models,11 there are also fundamental similarities. In sum,
the creativity and innovation process, whether for malevolent or benevolent purposes,
involves: a) problem identification and exploration of ideas; b) idea consolidation
where the problem is established and ideas to address this are developed; c) solution
finding; and d) solution implementation and evaluation. A general outline of the stages
involved in the creativity and innovation process are shown in Figure 1, and were used
as a starting point to develop a model representing the AGDM process. Understanding
the problem (stages 1 & 2) and solving the problem (stages 3 & 4) overlap because,
at this midpoint in the process, it is likely that understanding of the problem and
generation of possible solutions occurs in parallel. Creative ideas are explored and
examined in order to find the best possible solution to the identified problem.
Whilst Figure 1 summarises key elements of the creativity and innovation process,
it also oversimplifies it. It is important to note that the process is cyclical and dynamic,
and contains a number of feedback loops. Individuals or groups move back and forth
between stages in order to generate and develop ideas and formulate an innovative
product or outcome. Additionally, creativity and innovation involves the iteration
of prototyping and testing, and learning as a problem and possible outcomes are
explored and reframed. When innovation occurs and is successful, that innovation
gradually becomes convention,12 and although convention may be refined, it is likely
to remain as it is until a misfit, obstacle, or problem is identified with it.

Malevolent Creativity and Innovation (MC&I)

It is the intent to cause harm and=or negative consequences to another person,
people, or system that distinguishes MC&I from benevolent creativity and innovation. MC&I can be categorised as either: a) tactical (adopting new methods or
technologies); b) strategic (formulating and adopting new objectives, identifying
new targets and technologies to advance these objectives), or c) organisational
(new ways of structuring groups and recruitment processes).13 In order to

Figure 1. Stages in the creativity and innovation process.

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S. E. Knight et al.

understand how AGDM leads to conventional or innovative attack methods being

chosen, the present study focuses on how MC&I does or does not occur at the tactical level. Further distinctions have been made between MC&I that is incremental
(novel ways of building on existing ideas or products), and radical (a revolutionary, fundamental change in ideas, products, and tactics). Radical innovation is rarely
anticipated and is hard to plan for or compete with, and as such it provides
a competitive advantage for terrorists over their adversaries. Terrorist innovation
is often a response to a need to overcome security constraints and is said to be mainly
incremental rather than a radical leap in tactics or technologies.14
Despite well-grounded scientific research on MC&I being scarce, the ample
literature on the topic of terrorism can be drawn upon to understand the malevolent
component of AGDM.15 The literature proposes that acts of terrorism are
influenced by a range of internal and external factors that can be categorised under
three key headings: motivation,16 capability,17 and opportunity.18 Motivation can be
defined as all those brain processes that energise and direct behaviour, not just
goals and conscious decision-making . . . a broad conceptualisation covering basic
drives and automatic processes as well as choice and intention.19 As such,
motivation includes for example factors such as malevolent intent, aims and objectives, ideology, and emotions. For example, frustration due to perceived grievances
and an inability to address these via legitimate routes may lead to violence being
perceived as the only, or best method to achieve goals and address grievances.
Capability refers to the individual or groups physical and psychological capacity
to conduct the behaviour (e.g., skills and knowledge). Finally, opportunity refers
to all those factors that exist outside of the individual or group that make the
behaviour possible or prompt it. These include social opportunities such as cultural
norms and values, and physical opportunities such as a lack of counterterrorism
measures. Further, an act of terrorism is made possible when there is a lack of other
environmental constraints (e.g., when groups can access resources needed for an
attack without fear of detection) that could prevent the attack being committed.
The perceived costs and benefits of performing that behaviour (e.g., loss of life versus
achieving objectives), the level or type of risk(s) involved (e.g., backlash from public,
risk of failure), and resources required (e.g., human, material) can also influence
choice of attack method.20 AGDM will be influenced by all these factors.

Stages in the AGDM Process: Developing a Model

The aim of the present study was to develop an understanding of the AGDM process
in terms of the stages that precede execution of an attack and the factors
that influence choice of attack method during this process. Building on the model
presented in Figure 1, relevant literature was applied to identify key stages in the
AGDM process (Figure 2). This model was conceptualised as a cycle comprising three
stages that precede an attack: Stage 1, strategic direction; Stage 2, incubation
(which encompasses stages 2 and 3 of creativity and innovation process outlined
in Figure 1), and Stage 3, planning and preparation. The end result of the three
stages is the execution of an attack using either conventional or innovative attack
methods.
For some adversary groups and organisations, their aims and objectives are
malevolent from the outset, in that their goal is to cause harm to others. For other
terrorist groups and organisations, however, their aims and objectives may be benign

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Figure 2. Stages in the Adversary Group Decision-Making process.

in that their goal is not to cause harm to others, however they choose to use malevolent means in order to achieve their aims and objectives. According to the model
proposed here, regardless of a group or organisations intent in terms of their aims
and objectives, it is at the strategic direction stage of the AGDM process that the
group will decide to either achieve its aims and objectives through benevolent or
malevolent means. Then, during the incubation stage, understanding (of barriers
to achieving goals, problems, or a misfit) evolves, and ideas for possible solutions
emerge, which are then developed, refined, and evaluated. As a result, one or a small
number of options may be selected for further consideration and development. These
will be evaluated in terms of achievability and costs and benefits, and depending on this,
may result in the group returning to conventional methods, further exploring ideas, or
progressing to the next stage of the AGDM process (referred to as planning and
preparation). This is the stage when planning and preparation for the execution
of an attack occurs, outcomes of which lead to a decision to revert to conventional
methods, a decision to further explore ideas (i.e., a return to the incubation stage),
or a decision to execute an innovative attack. Execution refers to the actual attack,
the outcomes of which (e.g., perceived success or failure) feed back into and influence
subsequent aims and objectives, as well as future AGDM.

Factors Influencing the AGDM Process

Once stages in the AGDM process were identified (Figure 2), our understanding of
creativity and innovation, and terrorism was used to: a) identify factors that underlie
the AGDM process in terms of facilitating or hindering MC&I; b) develop understanding of how these relate to the AGDM process and map them on to the model
accordingly; and c) develop supporting guidance to explain how these factors can
influence when, why, and how MC&I or conventional attack methods prevail.
Figure 3 presents our final model that captures stages in the AGDM process and
its underlying factors.
Factors that can influence the AGDM process are categorised here as either
overarching or contextual. Overarching factors influence the process throughout (e.g., ideology, organisational culture) while contextual factors influence specific
stages of the process, to varying degrees (e.g., leadership, resource availability)
(Figure 3). At every stage in the process, the decision to use innovative or conventional attack methods can change; it is the factors that are present or absent and
how these factors influence decision-making that determine whether innovation
occurs or convention prevails. Moreover, AGDM is an ongoing cycle in that the outcome of one attack (e.g., media coverage, public reaction) can influence future
choices and methods of attack.

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Figure 3. Model representing the Adversary Group Decision-Making process.

Overarching Factors
Overarching factors are termed as such because they are those variables that can
affect AGDM in general and at any stage in the process. Overarching factors identified here are: aims and objectives, ideology, learning, operating environment, organisational climate and culture, and networking. These are
outlined below with a brief description of how they relate to the AGDM process.
Aims can be defined as directing ones efforts towards something, and objectives can be conceptualised as the object of ones endeavours.21 Accordingly, it is
the aims and objectives of a group that underpin decision-making processes. Groups
with a clearly defined and shared vision of goal attainment are more likely to be
innovative because their efforts are focused, have direction, and are viewed as being
attainable.22
The second overarching factor is ideology, which is defined here as a set of
beliefs, values, and prejudices that can be used to guide, rationalise, legitimise,
motivate, and justify behaviour. An extremist groups ideology identifies and defines
the enemy, and justifies and explains choice of target and methods of attack.
It also dictates aims, objectives, and courses of action necessary to achieve these.23
It is a groups ideology that underpins its strategies, its justification and=or encouragement of violence, and its choice of tactics. This is demonstrated in a case study
analysis of six terrorist groups which found that a key motivation driving all of these
groups was a violent ideology.24 For terrorist groups, violence may be seen as a means
of communication and a public demonstration of their fervour, drive and determination, and sincere adherence to their ideology.25 Although terrorist ideologies
may take on many forms including religious, social, and=or political ideologies, they
all serve the same purpose: to guide and unify members, to motivate action, and to
link their group or organisation to a community or subset of the population for
which it purports to fight.26

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Adversary Group Decision-Making

The third overarching factor is organisational learning, which is closely related

to MC&I. Learning occurs when existing methods of operation allow problem
solution, whilst innovation occurs when new methods are tested and solutions
evolve.27 Creativity and innovation requires learning, and learning will also result
from the process. Organisations learn when members learn: by acquiring, interpreting, and applying knowledge and experience. Knowledge becomes embedded
in routines held by individuals and shared by communities of practice, networks,
and apprenticeships.28 Learning is affected by systems of reward and reprimand,
tolerance of risk, value placed on novelty, freedom to act independently, and therefore cannot be separated from an organisations culture, its ideology, its networks,
and its willingness and ability to innovate. The leadership of a group can encourage
innovation by rewarding individuals for participating in learning activities, by
providing resources needed for innovative efforts, and by reacting to failed innovation in a positive and constructive way.29 Researchers agree that organisations
that are ambidextrous are more likely to innovate, meaning that groups that
are able to simultaneously pursue exploration (e.g., research, experimentation) and
exploitation (e.g., stakeholder engagement, improvement) are more likely to innovate than those that focus solely on exploration or exploitation.30
Organisational memory is another key component of learning and relates to
whether organisations learn from the past. This will depend on whether there are
mechanisms in place that enable information to be passed on despite a turnover
of members and the passage of time.31 In terms of the exploitation dimension of
the learning framework, a decentralised, improvised pattern of learning could result
in a fragmented, unstable source of organisational memory, one that hinders innovation. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) built its expertise and success
as a group on organisational memory. As a result, they avoided loss of technical
knowledge and skills over time that may otherwise have resulted from reduced group
cohesion and members being captured or killed.32
The next overarching factor is operating environment, defined here as the context of an organisation or group: the real and metaphorical time and space (including
geographical location) within which an organisation is operating.33 For example,
a terrorist group that enjoys a safe haven or some territorial security is more likely
to innovate than a group that must operate in urban environments, and on a clandestine basis.34 The operating environment can directly influence terrorist capability
and intent, both of which are key to AGDM. For example, in the border areas of
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen, as well as in Southern Indonesia and the Sahel,
ungoverned spaces provided safe havens and organisational support for the Al
Qaeda network.35 In Mindanao, terrorists (e.g., Abu Sayyaf Group and Moro
Islamic Liberation Front) cross illegally from Malaysia and Indonesia with little risk
of detection or interception. Mindanao and the southern Philippines region is
a highly conducive environment in which terrorist groups can conduct research,
network, and train. Unlike Malaysia, in Mindanao the security forces do not have
at their disposal special arrest, detention, and surveillance powers that can be used
for preemptive and CT purposes.36 Available resources and existing constraints
within the operating environment can contribute to AGDM, in terms of how they
can affect MC&I.37 For instance, research and training facilities are required to
develop and test ideas, methods, and products, and the availability of such facilities
has been shown to facilitate MC&I, whereas a lack of these can constrain or deter
it.38 A permissive security environment can provide terrorist organisations with

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S. E. Knight et al.

the time and space required to research and develop innovative ideas and train
operatives. However, a change to the environment that aims to tighten security
can also influence the AGDM process, in that MC&I may be driven by the challenge
and=or need to overcome an existing or new counterterrorism measure.39
The next overarching factor identified here is organisational climate and culture:
important antecedents to AGDM with regard to the extent to which risk-taking and
idea generation are encouraged and supported.40 An organisational climate in which
members are supported and feel safe to suggest ideas can encourage innovation,
whereas environments characterised by distrust, personal hostilities, limited autonomy, and unclear goals inhibit innovation.41 The wider culture within which the
individual, group, or organisation is operating is also an important factor. Culture
can influence preferences for risk and uncertainty, values that influence emotions
and goals, and the acceptability of certain tactics and methods of attack. For
example, Al Qaedas receptivity to innovative ideas paved the way for their suicide
attack against the USS Cole in October 2000, as well as their coordinated airplane
attack on 9=11 less than a year later.42 Creativity and innovation requires a degree
of risk-taking since they involve investment in novel, and therefore as yet untested,
ideas. The potential benefits of innovation can be high, but so too can the potential
costs, such as risk of failure.43 The likelihood of creativity evolving and innovation
occurring depends on how risk-taking is regarded by a group or organisation and the
individuals involved.44 For example, when the risk to the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) operations increased, rather than adopt innovative
attack strategies, they relied on low-risk guerrilla warfare. The risk-averse nature
of FARC is likely to have contributed to their aversion to innovation.45 Cost-benefit
analysis will involve weighing up the costs of proceeding with innovation, including
time, resources, and risk of failure; or staying with convention, which may be easier
and require no extra resources.46
In addition, when learning is supported within an organisations culture, MC&I
is more likely to occur. A pro-learning organisation is likely to have leadership that
supports training and learning and demonstrates a tolerance for risk and possible
failure. Where risks are taken and innovation succeeds, the group benefits through
increased group cohesion and a sense of accomplishment. Where risks are taken
and innovation fails, an organisation that accepts failure and perceives it as an
opportunity to learn can be seen as having a culture that encourages risk-taking: this
is conducive to creativity and innovation.47 The 9=11 attacks provide an example of
the learning process and how the culmination of previous successful and unsuccessful terrorist attacks supported innovation. According to the 9=11 Commission
Report, Khaled Sheikh Muhammad stated during an interview that the idea for this
attack was devised and revised for almost a decade. He claimed that he and Ramzi
Youssefs 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center taught them a lot about explosives, and that a more novel form of attack was necessary. Muhammad also stated
that it was Youssef who contemplated using aircrafts as weapons while working on
the Bojinka plot. Although the Bojinka plot failed, it was the first step in a sustained
effort to refine the use of aircrafts as weapons. As part of the learning process, and in
preparation for the Bojinka plot, Youssef and Muhammad detonated a practice
bomb at a Manila theatre in 1994 and concealed another bomb onboard Philippines
Airline Flight 434 from Manila to Tokyo in 1994.48
The final overarching factor identified here is networking, both within and
between groups and organisations. An organisations absorptive capacity is critical

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to the innovation process: this is the ability to acquire, assimilate, transform, and
exploit external knowledge.49 Linked to this are an organisations internal communication networks. These are necessary for knowledge, technical skills, and expertise to
be shared within organisations.50 The Internet and social networks online have
become a crucial means by which terrorists communicate and distribute propaganda,51 as well as being a means to access knowledge and materials. For example,
in a case study analysis of all the attacks that were executed, attempted, or planned
in the UK since 9=11, the Internet was found to be a crucial tool in networking
and learning. In all twelve of the cases, the Internet played a partwhether for
indoctrination, research, communication between attackers, to spread ideology,
and=or to broadcast suicide videos and propaganda.52
In essence, contact and communications with heterogeneous social networks can
facilitate innovation.53 The notoriety of Anwar Al-Awlaki of Al Qaeda, for example,
came from his exploitation of the World Wide Web in recruiting mujahedeen. An
analysis of YouTube in 2009 found that Al-Awlaki had 1910 videos on the site, one
of which had been viewed over 164,000 times. His effectiveness and following comes
from his networking abilities. He has, amongst others, officially been linked to
Mohammed Hamid, the recruiter for the failed 21=7 bombings, and Major Nidal
Hasan, who killed 13 people at the Fort Hood military base in Texas in 2009.54
Contextual Factors
Contextual factors are termed as such because they have been found to influence
(one or more) specific stages of the AGDM process. Contextual factors are described
here in terms of their relationship with each of the three stages of the process.
Strategic Direction
Strategic direction is the stage at which a strategy is defined by a group in an effort
to achieve some or all of its aims and objectives. If terrorists have a very narrow
strategic direction (e.g., to attack a very specific target in a specific context), then
methods of operation may be situation-specific and are therefore more likely to be
conventional. Conversely, a broader strategic direction (e.g., more indiscriminate
targeting and methods) will be more conducive to MC&I.55 The following contextual
factors can affect the strategic direction of a group, and the AGDM process in terms
of their choice of conventional or innovative attack method.
Ideology and related grievances influence a groups strategic direction in that
ideological grievances can motivate, rationalise, and justify action (e.g., a strategy
that condones mass casualties). Ideologies that comprise malevolent grievances
can inspire and legitimise violence, and groups with grandiose views, extremist ideologies, and deep felt humiliation are more likely to consider a strategic direction that
condones and encourages violence and spectacular attacks.56 In this way, ideological
grievances can influence AGDM towards MC&I by directing strategy towards novel
and surprising methods of attack. It is Al Qaedas ideology in relation to martyrdom
that in part influences their tactics, techniques, and procedures, as it sanctions
the mass killing of Western civilians and provides greater justification to launch
innovative and mass-scale attacks against civilian targets. Similarly, nationalist
terrorist organisations such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) have in a sense been
constrained by their ideology. Their focus is on opposition forces and government,

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S. E. Knight et al.

and the specific targeting operations required, and their need to maintain popular
support makes spectacular attacks less likely.57
The behaviour and dispositional characteristics of a groups leadership also play
an important role in the AGDM process;58 for example, organisational innovation
is influenced by a leaders vision and creative goal-setting.59 For example, in the case
of Peruvian terrorist organisation Shining Path, and their leader Abimael Guzman,
it was during Guzmans decade of leadership that all of the examples of MC&I
perpetrated by Shining Path were planned and implemented. Since Guzman was
captured and imprisoned in 1992, there have been no recorded instances of MC&I
by Shining Path.60 Leadership is a contextual factor as it can influence AGDM
at different stages that precede the execution of an attack. Research indicates that
leaders need to be flexible in their approach and employ different leadership styles
according to the different stages of the innovation process: coordinating and
integrating different styles in order to support the discovery, definition, and
exploration of new ideas and solutions, and the implementation of those ideas.
Generally, the characteristics of leaders that facilitate creativity and innovation
include encouragement of risk-taking, giving autonomy, an open style of communication, a participative and collaborative style, providing constructive feedback, and
being supportive, in general, and of innovation.61 In the case of the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC), Wadia Haddad,
a creative and ambitious operative, was a key driver of innovation in the group. His
innovative ideas required PFLP-GCs leader, Habash, to be open, allowing Haddad
time and autonomy to create new attack plans.62 A leader who espouses malevolent
intent and supports the use of novel methods and tactics will influence the AGDM process by directing strategy that supports MC&I. Conversely, some leaders may espouse
convention because, for example, innovation is seen as a threat to the groups existence
or longevity, or because innovation is seen as a threat to the leaders position or status.63
Other groups, however, exhibit a preference for innovation (novel tactics) and
display an organisational drive to innovate, without needing a specific requirement
to do something new or unexpected. For example, PIRA, by their very nature constantly updated, rethought, and adapted tactics in pursuit of new and more effective
means of achieving their goals.64 A groups strategic direction may therefore affect
their decision to opt for MC&I over convention due to preference, rather than being
a result of a need to do something novel.
There is a complex relationship between intergroup cooperation and competition and how these might influence the AGDM process. In some cases, cooperation
and competition between groups can facilitate MC&I, whilst in other cases it can
hinder this. Some researchers have reported that cooperation amongst terrorist
groups leads to innovation in the form of technology and technique diffusion and
adoption.65 For example, Hezbollah learned innovative techniques from Iranian
Revolutionary Guards in Lebanons Bekaa Valley in 1984 and 1985, which were
later adopted by Hamas.66 In other cases, however, cooperation has been evident
yet MC&I has not occurred. The same applies to competition amongst terrorist
groups. Terrorist groups operating in a similar space can lead to competition
between groups:67 for example, for public support or resources. Competition among
Palestinian groups led the otherwise secular Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade to adopt the
suicide bombing technique of the religiously inspired Hamas and Palestinian Islamic
Jihad.68 As such, a group may strategically opt to conduct an innovative attack
in order to gain advantage over other terrorist groups by gaining exposure, public

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11

support, and prestige. In other cases, however, where competition between groups
has existed, MC&I has not occurred.

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Incubation
If, at the strategic direction stage of the process, there are factors that hinder MC&I,
then a group or organisation may opt for a strategic direction that can be achieved
using conventional methods of attack and tactics. If, however, factors that facilitate
MC&I exist for a group in a particular environment, then they are likely to proceed
from strategic direction to the next stage in the AGDM process: the incubation
stage. This stage of the AGDM process is when ideas and options regarding methods
of attack are explored, developed, refined, and evaluated. The outcome from this
stage will be a decision regarding the tactic to be used for an attackthis will either
be an innovative method or a conventional one. The following contextual factors
affect the incubation stage, and can influence what happens at the next stage
(planning and preparation stage) when attack planning and preparation occurs.
At the incubation stage when methods of attack are being considered and
chosen, attachment to certain tactics and weapons can play a role in decision-making.
The relationship between attachment to certain methods of attack and MC&I is
complex, in that attachment can hinder or facilitate innovation depending upon
the tactics that the group is attached to. In some instances, it is likely that the
importance placed on certain tactics hinders innovation. Terrorist groups that
benefit from the utilisation of existing conventional tactics are unlikely to change
to novel ways of operating without good reason. There is, however, evidence
that in particular cases where a terrorist group has exhibited attachment to particular tactics or weapons, this attachment has facilitated MC&I:69 for example,
Aum Shinrikyos determination to use chemical weapons to cause mass effect. This
attachment stemmed from the leader Asaharas obsession with weapons capable of
apocalyptic destruction, which facilitated the groups ongoing efforts to acquire and
use chemical and biological weapons rather than opt for more conventional tactics,
techniques, and procedures.70 However conversely, terrorist groups that have no
preference for particular tactics or weapons may be more innovative because they
are open to ideas regarding tactics that they may not have previously considered.
Clearly, a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between attachment to
weaponry and AGDM is needed.
The group structure can influence AGDM at the incubation stage by facilitating
or constraining group members to be creative and innovative.71 Research suggests
that a decentralised group structure (the extent to which authority and decisionmaking lies at all levels of the organisation) may promote the propensity to generate
ideas and innovate. Groups with an inclination to work as a team rather than as
individuals, with freedom to explore and discuss creative ideas, tends to facilitate
innovation, whilst organisational rules and processes can hinder creativity.72
Bureaucracy constrains creative thinking and innovative solutions, whereas more
flexible dynamics that encourage creative consensus and decision-making through
discussion and interaction tend to facilitate MC&I.
Group structure and how this relates to type of decision-making is also important to AGDM. Both top-down and bottom-up decision-making can facilitate
MC&Ithe former when leadership supports and motivates members to be creative
and innovative, and the latter through variety and sharing of ideas and expertise.73

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For example, a bottom-up structure is evidenced by the fact that Khaled Sheikh
Muhammad (said to have mastermind[ed] the 9=11 attack) initially refused to
become a formal member of Al Qaeda. At the time of the meeting to broach the
subject of the planes plot, he stated that he wanted to protect his independence by
retaining the option to work with other jihadist groups. Despite Muhammad being
a low-level operative who had not sworn allegiance to Al Qaeda, in early 1999 bin
Laden informed Muhammad of Al Qaedas acceptance of his planes plot proposal.74
Complexity, defined as the degree of skill and knowledge specialisation within an
organisation, is also believed to enhance idea generation as it is linked to diverse
sources of information. Further, autonomy is important, as organisational rules
can hinder creativity, although some structure is necessary for considering and
evaluating ideas.75
Creative leadership involves leading others to think creatively and be innovative
together, especially at the incubation stage of the AGDM process. Leadership will
direct how ideas are generated, shared, and responded to in a group. Leaders who
manage and bring together individuals with different problem-solving styles are
more likely to facilitate innovation within their group or organisation.76 During
the incubation stage, a leader most likely to facilitate creativity and innovation is
one characterised as open-minded, supportive, and encouraging of ideas and of
risk-taking.77 Leaders can reward individuals for being creative and innovative,
and the literature suggests that creativity-related feedback may have a profound
impact on the propensity to innovate. Research also indicates that simply instructing
people to be creative can help, and that feedback on a creative effort (even if unsuccessful) will inspire future creative efforts.78 A leaders role is also to ensure that any
conflict that emerges within the group remains task-focused, since task-related conflict (as opposed to relationship-related conflict), can be a driver for creativity and
innovation.79
At the incubation stage of the AGDM process, a certain degree of flexibility of
ideology is required to facilitate MC&I. Very fixed, fundamentalist ideologies may
constrain creativity and innovation by being too directive in terms of methods and
tactics to be used and targets of choice, whereas a more flexible ideology may allow
various interpretations that may incorporate new and novel ideas, as well as condone
the malevolence of any planned innovation.80
The likelihood of MC&I prevailing over conventional methods is largely
determined by the individuals and key players involved in the process. During the
incubation stage of the AGDM process, individual creativity, expertise, and
domain-specific knowledge play an important role. A number of individual characteristics influence an individuals inclination to be creative and innovative. Creative
individuals have been found to exhibit certain personality traits; for example, they
are more likely to be open-minded, flexible, possess a high degree of achievement
motivation, whilst they may also be domineering and critical.81 Other personality
traits linked to creativity and innovation include risk-taking, autonomy, social rule
independence,82 openness to experience,83 and specific to MC&Itrait aggression.84
Cognitive factors conducive to creativity include intelligence,85 divergent thinking,86
cognitive flexibility,87 and intrinsic motivation.88 Elements of affect such as positive
mood states,89 dissatisfaction and feelings of anger and fear,90 and negative affect91
have also been linked to an individuals propensity for creativity. Moreover, individuals differ in the degree to which they are extrinsically or intrinsically motivated to
be creative and innovative.92 Recent research has also linked individual emotional

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intelligence to MC&I.93 A decreased ability to manage ones own and others

emotions is said to be associated with increased malevolent creativity. Emotion
and motivation are important because these factors may in part determine whether
the aims and objectives of individual creativity are benevolent or malevolent.94
Research also reveals that creativity is domain-specific; for example, it has been
reported that criminals can be creative, but only in their particular area of crime. For
example, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad was a key instigator of the 9=11 attacks and the
operational planner behind the coordinated attacks against two United States (US)
embassies in August 1998 and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Mohammeds
other innovations include the idea to use modular IEDs concealed in baby dolls to
attack ten aircrafts in a coordinated attack, and the shoe bomb plot.95 Muhammad
possessed a number of skills valuable to Al Qaedas creative potential including the
ability to generate ideas, practicality, and persistence.96 Expertise promotes more
rapid acquisition of relevant knowledge, systematic solutions rather than trial and
error, application of principles, associations, and the ability to apply novel prototypic
cases to problems. Both experience and expertise provide a framework for interpreting, gathering, and acting upon information.97 MC&I, therefore, is influenced in
part by those involved in the process in terms of their individual personality traits,
preferences, experiences, domain-specific knowledge, and expertise. Indeed, a variety
of individuals with different skills, knowledge, experience, and expertise can greatly
facilitate MC&I; diversity within a group is key in that it can provide a pool of
information and knowledge for idea generation, enable articulation of the problem,
provide feedback on ideas, and provide role models that support MC&I.98 A variety
of individuals, especially during the incubation stage of the AGDM process, can bring
different perspectives on issues, and a divergence of views can offer multiple
perspectives and the potential for constructive controversy.99 Groups with more
heterogeneous preferences are therefore more innovative than homogeneous groups.
Too much diversity, however, may increase the likelihood of conflict which, if related
to relationships within the group, can hinder the innovation process.100 As stated
previously though, task-related conflict actually facilitates creativity and innovation.101
Moreover, individuals differ in their preferences and abilities regarding creativity versus
innovation. Some individuals may prefer, and be especially good at, coming up with
ideas, whilst others may excel at turning ideas into products or action.
Newcomers to a group can also facilitate MC&I at the incubation stage of
AGDM by contributing to discussions and the development of ideas regarding novel
methods and tactics. New recruits to a group are less likely to be constrained by the
rules and accepted ways of thinking of that group or organisation; they may bring
with them new ideas, thoughts, and problem-solving skills.102 Recruit availability
is linked to key players and in the incubation stage refers to the availability of
creative individuals, as well as those with domain-specific knowledge and expertise.
The availability of recruits is also key; if those individuals available are able to
generate, evaluate, and refine ideas, this will facilitate MC&I.
The relationship between resources and AGDM is complex. Successful innovation has been linked to whether there are sufficient resources to allow members
to develop ideas and implement these. For example, without the funding Babbar
Khalsa International (BKI) received in Canada in the early 1980s, it is unlikely that
the planning and implementation of the coordinated bombings of 1985 Air India
Flight 182 (a plane exploded off the coast of Ireland killing all 329 people on board)
and Narita International Airport would have materialised. It is believed that in

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addition to the government funding (as a result of attaining charitable status in

Canada) BKI received in the 1980s and 1990s, an Indo-Canadian businessman worth
in excess of $10 million also helped fund the 1985 plot.103 Those groups or organisations that have devotees and support the right people and knowledge to develop
tactics are more likely to be innovative in their operations, and resources (such
as funding, expertise, skills, and materials) can facilitate a group to develop novel
attack methods. Some research has however indicated that lack of resources can
force a group to do something novel because they do not have the resources to
operate as normal. However, in general it seems that the availability of resources
at an organisational level is related to innovation since resources are required
to develop ideas. Whilst a few researchers believe that funding is not a sufficient
condition for the pursuit of innovation, it is argued that it is a facilitative
conditionin terms of the acquisition of skills, expertise, and materials.104
During the incubation stage of the AGDM process, when ideas are being generated, considered, and evaluated, anticipated reactions from adversaries, supporters,
and the public influence decision-making. Some methods of attack or tactics may be
rejected due to anticipated public backlash, or may be chosen because they are
considered likely to gain support. Similarly, the anticipated reactions of the adversary
will influence evaluations of potential tactics and methods.
Planning and Preparation
The outcome of the incubation stage is a decision regarding which tactic a group
intends to use to execute an attack. If, at this stage in the process, there are factors
that hinder MC&I, a group may choose one of their usual tactics to execute an
attack. If, however, factors that facilitate MC&I exist for a group in a particular context, then the group is likely to proceed with the planning and preparation needed to
implement an innovative attack. This stage involves those planning and preparatory
actions (e.g., hostile reconnaissance, intelligence gathering) needed to execute an
attack. The following contextual factors can affect the planning and preparation
stage, and can influence whether a group chooses to execute an attack using conventional or innovative methods.
At this stage, some group structure is necessary for implementing and evaluating
innovative ideas. Mechanistic group structures refer to organisations that are rule
bound, hierarchical, and formal in operation and have been found to play a role in
the implementation of ideas in the creativity and innovation process.105 Formalisation is also linked to group structure and this also has an influence on innovation.
Formalisation refers to the degree of emphasis placed on rules and procedures.106
High formalisation, for example, may inhibit idea generation as it prevents organisational decision makers from seeking new sources of information, while it may facilitate planning and preparation through rules and processes.
Research suggests that the extent to which authority and decision-making lies at
the top of a hierarchy may also be necessary for the effective implementation of
innovative ideas.107 Leadership most likely enables MC&I at the planning and preparation stage of AGDM when the leader is able to a) promote the innovative idea
in order to persuade group members and other stakeholders, b) ensure that planning
and preparation includes participation by group members and stakeholders, and c)
gain commitment to the planning and preparation of the idea.108 For example, Bin
Ladens input in planning the 9=11 attacks included selecting the operatives for the

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attack, funding the operation, and most critically, insisting that the operation go
forward despite dissent voiced by several senior members of Al Qaeda.109 Bin Laden
also personally chose field commander Muhammad Atta, and allowed him considerable autonomy. According to the 9=11 Commission Report, Atta had the required
skills to lead and execute the planan orientation for detail, unwavering
determination, and a capability for on the ground improvisation. He was given
responsibility for target selection, date selection, and the weapons to be used. He also
selected specific pilots for specific flights and oversaw contingency planning.110
During the planning and preparation stage, individuals with skills, experience,
knowledge, and expertise required to plan and prepare for the attack are needed,
as well as individuals on the ground who are required to successfully execute
the attack. The availability of recruits who are able to prepare and implement ideas
are therefore key to this stage in terms of whether the group continues to proceed
with a conventional or innovative attack method. Heterogeneous groups are associated with the ability to implement new ideas.111 Therefore groups composed of people
with different knowledge, skills and abilities, alternative views, and professional
backgrounds are more likely to successfully manage innovation processes than those
groups whose members are similar. Evidence indicates that out of twelve planned
terrorist attacks in the UK since 2001, six of these failed or were foiled due to lack
of expertise=skill in relation to the groups chosen tactics or methods of attack.112
Conversely, where terrorist training was undertaken by members of terrorist groups
that planned and prepared to carry out attacks in the UK between 2004 and 2007,
the training received in Pakistan appeared catalytic to the commencement of the
implementation phase of MC&I.113 Diversity in a group contributes to a groups
total pool of task-related skills, access to necessary knowledge and materials, and
its potential for more comprehensive or creative decision-making about the
innovation process.114 Conversely, homogenous groups are more likely to stick with
what they know and continue to use their usual method of attack. Moreover, since
different individuals have different preferences regarding creativity and innovation,
a group that has people who are good at implementing ideas will be more likely to
proceed through this stage and execute an innovative attack. Newcomers in this stage
of the AGDM process may also help a group implement an idea. For example, a group
may come up with an idea for a novel tactic but may not have the knowledge or skill to
implement this. Some groups may therefore actively seek to recruit individuals with
specific knowledge, expertise, or experience in order to overcome this problem.
At the planning and preparation stage, key players, individual expertise,
domain-specific knowledge, and an individuals personal initiative are key. AGDM
is most likely to favour MC&I when individuals involved demonstrate initiative.
Personal initiative is defined by three facets:115 a) self-starting, which requires setting
context-specific goals and going beyond formal role requirements; b) proactivity,
whereby opportunities and problems are anticipated rather than reacted to; and
c) persistence, which is required to overcome barriers in reaching personal goals.
Individuals and groups characterised as having strong personal initiative are
more likely to successfully implement creative ideas. In terms of domain-specific
knowledge, individuals require a level of relevant expertise in the area in order to
contribute to MC&I during the planning and preparation stage. Both experience
and knowledge are useful for gathering, interpreting, and acting upon information.116
In a terrorist organisation, group doctrine or tendencies related to how resources (i.e.,
how many people, how much time, and how much material) are allocated to a novel

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activity can shape their chances of succeeding when they aim to conduct an innovative
attack.117 Similar to the previous stage when ideas are being generated and explored,
during the planning and preparation stage, resources can facilitate innovationin
terms of supporting the acquisition of skills, expertise, and materials in planning
and preparing for an attack.118 Here, an organisations investment in human capital
may influence AGDM by enabling MC&I, as can the provision for specialists, experts,
and on the ground terrorists, which makes training an important resource that may
facilitate innovation.
For an innovative attack to be successful, intelligence is required. Here
intelligence refers to the information needed to successfully plan and prepare
for an eventthe information required by terrorists to identify potential targets,
plan methods of attack, and correctly understand the response such an attack would
garner. All terrorist innovation requires basic intelligence-gathering to successfully
implement attacks, including an accurate understanding of the local environment
and the effect such an attack would have on their adversaries and supporters alike.119
In a case study analysis, in four of the six groups studied, at some stage prior to the
planned attacks, the groups became actively engaged in external information and
intelligence-gathering activities in relation to topics of direct relevance to committing
terrorist attacks.120 These efforts included surveillance, reconnaissance, and
dry-runs. Intelligence available is likely to influence whether MC&I is perceived
as achievable, which if not may lead the group to revert to their usual, conventional
methods.
Also, because MC&I is often the result of a perceived problem or misfit, counterterrorism measures may actually be the catalyst that forces a group to opt for new,
unexpected methods of attack. For example, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad (PIJ) had to survive intense Israeli counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
operations and as a result, Hamas and PIJ collaborated (through technology
diffusion) in order to innovate.121
MC&I may therefore occur out of necessity, because conventional methods
are no longer successful,122 although counterterrorism efforts and measures may
actually hinder MC&I by, for example, removing leaders who facilitate innovation,
disrupting an operating environment and=or group structure that supports MC&I,
or restricting resource availability and accessibility. For example, with a marked
rise in counterterrorism efforts in 1992 and 1993, not only were leaders of BKI
killed but terrorists surrendered and those that did not fled from India to Pakistan.
There was a marked decline in terrorist activity and little evidence of MC&I in the
subsequent years, which was largely a result of Indian army, paramilitary, and police
successes against BKI in 1991 and 1992.123
Execution of the Planned and Subsequent Attacks
The presence or absence of the factors discussed above can affect AGDM at the
planning and preparation stage, and these will determine whether the group reverts
to conventional methods or to a previous stage in their decision-making process, or
proceeds and executes an attack using innovative tactics and methods. Moreover,
the outcome of an executed attack can influence subsequent AGDM in various ways.
Whether the attack is deemed a success or failure, how the group tolerates
failure, and whether they are prepared to learn from either success or failure
will influence the likelihood of that group being open to creativity and choosing

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innovative attack methods in the future. Success and failure is largely determined
by group perception regarding what constitutes these concepts. This perception may
vary depending on how the effect of the attack contributed to the groups aims
and objectives, whether other inadvertent effects make it a success or failure, and
how success and failure are framed by the group and its leadership. Following
the execution of an attack, a group may start the process again, revert to any of
the intermediate stages (incubation and planning and preparation), revert to
previously used tactics and=or methods, or attempt to further develop and improve
the innovative method. If it is the latter, the innovative idea will over time lose its novelty
and gradually become convention.
AGDM does not take place in isolation of the environment; the totality of
circumstances or conditions surrounding a group or organisation will play a key role
in this. Environmental factors can be; a) Distal (such as religious, social, political,
national, cultural, or economic factors),124 or b) Proximal (factors directly affecting
groups such as counterterrorism policies).125 Both distal and proximal factors can
influence AGDM towards choosing conventional or innovative methods of attack.
For example, some distal and proximal factors such as political or social change,
or a new security measure, can act as a catalyst for MC&Iforcing a group to move
away from conventional attack methods. Another factor that is linked to the
environment is opportunity, and AGDM will be influenced by opportunities that
arise and are available to a group, and their propensity to take such opportunities.
If conventional methods are perceived as failing and an opportunity presents itself
to do something new, then MC&I may evolve due to opportunity alone. Certain
environments are more permissive of terrorist activity compared to others, facilitating a groups capacity to be innovative by providing opportunities that support
MC&I at different stages in the AGDM process.

Future Directions in this Area

The present research has relied on existing well-grounded scientific literature in the
fields of terrorism and creativity and innovation, in order to develop a conceptual
model that describes how AGDM leads to conventional or innovative attack
methods. This is the first attempt in the published literature to do so, and findings
should therefore be treated with caution. It is acknowledged that further research
is required to test and validate the findings from this study and to better understand
the relative importance of factors identified, their impact on specific stages of the
AGDM process, and the interrelationships between factors.
Identified here are a range of factors that can contribute to thinking and
behaviour in this particular context, but little is known about their relative impact,
mediating and moderating effects, and whether a deadly combination that might
represent the perfect storm exists. This problem exists for all empirical research
seeking to understand terrorism and extremism and is a difficult one to address.
Preliminary attempts to identify those factors of most importance126 have indicated
that operating environment, ideology, leadership, and individual creativity and
expertise may have more impact than other factors. However, further empirical
research is needed to test these findings. Future work may also build on the findings
from the present research to explore how different interventions might influence
the AGDM process in terms of attack methods chosen, at a general level and also
at specific stages in the process.

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Conclusions
Whilst acknowledging important caveats and despite the need for further research
in this area, there are various applications for the findings from the present study.
The model and supporting guidance can be used by counterterrorism practitioners
and policy makers, for example, to a) identify what stage a group is at, b) determine
how a new CT measure might influence an AGDM, c) tailor interventions depending
on the risk a group poses and=or the stage that they are at, and d) anticipate how
adversary group attack methods might evolve in the future, based on the factors
that are likely to exist within an environment.
Previously it has been suggested that terrorists are rooted in conventional
methods of operating; however, it now seems that such adversaries can be highly
innovative. There are few empirical studies examining the AGDM process to explore
its relationship with what is referred to here as MC&I. The present study goes
some way to developing what we know about this process by drawing on literature
from Organisational Psychology, and other research on creativity and innovation,
and terrorism, and applying this to better understand how AGDM can result
in either conventional or innovative attack methods being executed. This attempt to
develop understanding of a difficult problem has resulted in a model and supporting
guidance that now needs further testing and validation. The long-term goal is that
knowledge of the AGDM process and how it relates to choice of attack methods
can be used by counterterrorism practitioners and policy makers to assess current
threats posed by various adversaries, as well as to anticipate possible future threats.

Notes
1. Meaning here those groups that pose a threat to Defence and Security, in the UK
and overseas.
2. Martha Crenshaw, How Terrorism Declines, Terrorism and Political Violence
3, no. 1 (1991): 6987.
3. Paul Gill, John Horgan, Samuel T. Hunter, and Lily D Cushenbery, Malevolent
Creativity in Terrorist Organizations, The Journal of Creative Behaviour 47, no. 2 (2013):
125151.
4. Bruce Hoffman, Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities,
Terrorism and Political Violence 5, no. 2 (1993): 1229; Ariel Merari, Terrorism as a Strategy
of Struggle: Past and Future, Terrorism and Political Violence 11, no. 4 (1999): 5265.
5. Adam Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global
Trends (London and New York: Routledge, 2007); Maria J. Rasmussen and Mohammed
M. Hafez, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: Preconditions, Causes,
and Predictive Indicators, Workshop Report, The Defence Threat Reduction Agency (2010).
6. Dolnik (see note 5 above); Gill et al. (see note 3 above); Brian Jackson, John Baker,
Kim Cragin, John Parachini, Horacio Trujillo, and Peter Chalk, Aptitude for Destruction:
Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism
(RAND Report, prepared for the National Institute of Justice, 2005).
7. David Cropley, James C. Kaufman, and Arthur J. Cropley, Malevolent Creativity:
A Functional Model of Creativity in Terrorism and Crime, Creativity Research Journal
20, no. 2 (2008): 105115; Arthur Cropley, James C. Kaufman, and Mark A. Runco, The Dark
Side of Creativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
8. Teresa M. Amabile, Creativity in Context (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).
9. Gill et al. (see note 3 above); Jackson et al. (see note 6 above).
10. See Gill et al. (see note 3 above) for a thorough overview of creativity and
innovation in a non-malevolent context.
11. Graham Wallas, The Art of Thought (London: Solis Press, 1926); Michael D.
Mumford, Michele I. Mobley, Roni Reiter-Palmon, Charles E. Uhlman, and Lesli M. Doares,

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Process Analytic Models of Creative Capacities, Creativity Research Journal 4, no. 2 (1991):
91122; Hugh Dubberly, Cover Story: Toward a Model of Innovation, Interactions 15, no. 1
(2008): 2836.
12. Michael D. Mumford, ed., Handbook of Organizational Creativity (London:
Academic Press, 2012).
13. Dolnik (see note 5 above).
14. Ibid.
15. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).
16. Gill et al. (see note 3 above).
17. Dolnik (see note 5 above); Calvert Jones, Al-Qaedas Innovative Improvisers:
Learning in a Diffuse Transnational Network, Cambridge Review of International Affairs
19 (2006): 555569; Assaf Moghadam, How Al Qaeda Innovates, Security Studies 22,
no. 3 (2013): 466497.
18. Lindsay Clutterbuck and Richard Warnes, Exploring Patterns of Behaviour in
Violent Jihadist Terrorists (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011); Rasmussen and Hafez (see note
5 above).
19. Susan Michie and Charles Abraham, Interventions to Change Health Behaviours:
Evidence-based or Evidence-inspired? Psychology & Health 19, no. 1 (2004): 2949.
20. Mia Bloom, and John Horgan, Missing Their Mark: The IRAs Proxy Bomb
Campaign, Social Research 75 (2008): 579614.
21. Collins English Dictionary (Glasgow: HarperCollins, 2008).
22. Onne Janssen, Evert Van de Vliert, and Michael West, The Bright and Dark Sides
of Individual and Group Innovation: A Special Issue Introduction, Journal of Organizational
Behaviour 25, no. 2 (2004): 129145.
23. Dolnik (see note 5 above).
24. Clutterbuck and Warnes (see note 16 above).
25. James A. Piazza, Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous?: An Empirical Study of
Group Ideology, Organisation and Goal Structure, Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 1
(2009): 6288.
26. Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly, The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of
Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004).
27. Dubberly (see note 10 above).
28. Keith James and Damon Drown, Whether Malevolent or Negative Creativity Is
Relevant to Terrorism Prevention: Lessons from 9=11 and Hazardous Material Trucking,
Creativity Research Journal 20 (2008): 120127.
29. Raanan Lipshitz, Micha Popper, and Victor J. Friedman, A Multifaceted Model of
Organizational Learning, The Journal of Applied Behavioural Science 38, no. 1 (2002): 7898.
30. Jones (see note 17 above).
31. Ibid.
32. Kim Cragin, Peter Chalk, Sara A. Daly, and Brian Jackson, Sharing the Dragons
Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
2007).
33. Ibid.
34. Brian A. Jackson, Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption, Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism 24, no. 3 (2001): 183213.
35. Michael Clarke and Valentina Soria, Terrorism: The New Wave, RUSI Journal
155 (2010): 2431; Cragin et al. (see note 32 above).
36. Ibid.
37. Gill et al. (see note 3 above).
38. Clutterbuck and Warnes (see note 18 above).
39. Brian A. Jackson and Bryce Loidolt, Considering Al-Qaidas Innovation Doctrine:
From Strategic Texts to Innovation in Practice, Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 2
(2013): 284310.
40. Victor H. Asal, Gary A. Ackerman, and R. Karl Rethemeyer, Connections Can Be
Toxic: Terrorist Organisational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Weapons, Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism 35 (2012): 229254; Dubberly (see note 9 above); Fiona Patterson,
Maire Kerrin, and Geraldine Gatto-Roissard, Characteristics and Behaviours of Innovative

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People in Organisations (Literature Review, NESTA Policy Research Unit, London, United
Kingdom, 2009), http://www.nesta.org.uk/publications/characteristics-and-behaviours-innovativepeople-organisations; Michael A. West and Andreas W. Richter, Climates and Cultures
for Innovation and Creativity at Work, ed. Jing Zhou and Christina E. Shalley, Handbook
of Organizational Creativity (New York: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2008), 211236.
41. Patterson et al. (see note 40 above).
42. Moghadam (see note 17 above).
43. Pier A. Abetti, Critical Success Factors for Radical Technological Innovation:
A Five Case Study, Creativity and Innovation Management 9 (2000): 208221.
44. Shirley D. Brennen and David J. Llewelyn, A Model of Cultural Factors in Risk
Taking (2008, unpublished report).
45. Neil Shortland and Sarah Knight, Malevolent Creativity and Innovation: A Case
Study Analysis of Terrorist Organisations Attack Behaviour (Defence Science and Technology
Laboratory, 2012, unpublished report).
46. Cragin et al. (see note 32 above).
47. Lipshitz et al. (see note 29 above).
48. Moghadam (see note 17 above).
49. Sami Mahroum, Robert Huggins, Naomi Clayton, Kathy Pain, and Peter Taylor,
Innovation by Adoption, Measuring and Mapping Absorptive Capacity in UK Nations and
Regions (London: NESTA, 2008).
50. Jackson and Loidolt (see note 39 above).
51. Leonard Weinberg, Two Neglected Areas of Terrorism Research: Careers after
Terrorism and How Terrorists Innovate, Perspectives on Terrorism 2, no. 9 (2008): 1118.
52. Jay Edwards and Benoit Gomis, Islamic Terrorism in the UK since 9=11: Reassessing
the Soft Response, International Security Programme Paper ISP PP 2011=03 (2011).
53. Prasad Balkundi and David A. Harrison, Ties, Leaders, and Time in Teams:
Strong Inference about Network Structures Effects on Team Viability and Performance,
Academy of Management Journal 49, no. 1 (2006): 4968.
54. Clarke and Soria (see note 35 above).
55. Dolnik (see note 5 above).
56. Rasmussen and Hafez (see note 5 above).
57. Carys Hamilton, Sarah Knight, and Martha Williams, Factors Underlying the
Malevolent Creativity and Innovation Process: Examining the Evidence Using Case Study
Analysis (Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, 2013, unpublished report).
58. Dolnik (see note 5 above); Patterson et al. (see note 40 above).
59. Jing Zhou, Feedback Valence, Feedback Style, Task Autonomy, and Achievement
Orientation: Interactive Effects on Creative Performance, Journal of Applied Psychology 83,
no. 2 (1998): 261276.
60. Hamilton et al. (see note 57 above).
61. Teresa M. Amabile, Sigal G. Barsade, Jennifer S. Mueller, and Barry M. Staw,
Affect and Creativity at Work, Administrative Science Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2005): 367403;
Scott Stewart, Terrorism and the Exceptional Individual, Security Weekly (May 17, 2012).
62. Rasmussen and Hafez (see note 5 above).
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Cragin et al. (see note 32 above).
66. Weinberg (see note 51 above).
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Dolnik (see note 5 above).
70. Hamilton et al. (see note 57 above).
71. Amabile (see note 14 above); Stewart (see note 61 above).
72. West and Richter (see note 40 above); Nigel King and Neil Anderson, Managing
Innovation and Change (Andover, UK: Cengage Learning EMEA, 2002); Patterson et al.
(see note 40 above).
73. Keith James, Karla Clark, and Russell Cropanzano, Positive and Negative
Creativity in Groups, Institutions, and Organizations: A Model and Theoretical Extension,
Creativity Research Journal 12, no. 3 (1999): 211226; Moghadam (see note 17 above).

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74. Ibid.
75. King and Anderson (see note 72 above).
76. Min Basadur, Leading Others to Think Innovatively Together: Creative Leadership,
The Leadership Quarterly 15, no. 1 (2004): 103121.
77. King and Anderson (see note 72 above).
78. Patterson et al. (see note 40 above).
79. Basadur (see note 76 above).
80. Brennen and Llewelyn (see note 44 above).
81. Jennifer M. George and Jing Zhou, When Openness to Experience and
Conscientiousness Are Related to Creative Behaviour: An Interactional Approach, Journal
of Applied Psychology 86, no. 3 (2001): 513524; Sherman G. Lee and Gayle T. Dow,
Malevolent Creativity: Does Personality Influence Malicious Divergent Thinking? Creativity
Research Journal 23, no. 2 (2011): 7382.
82. Patterson et al. (see note 40 above).
83. Trait aggressiveness can be described as the propensity to engage in physical and
verbal aggression, to hold hostile cognitions, and to express anger easily. George and Zhou
(see note 81 above).
84. Lee and Dow (see note 81 above).
85. Patterson et al. (see note 40 above).
86. Divergent thinking can be described as a thought process or method used to generate
creative ideas by exploring many possible solutions (it is often referred to as out of the box
thinking).
87. Cognitive flexibility has been described as the mental ability to switch between
thinking about two different concepts, and to think about multiple concepts
simultaneously. Francesca Gino and Dan Ariely, The Dark Side of Creativity: Original
Thinkers Can Be More Dishonest, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 102,
no. 3 (2012): 445.
88. Intrinsic motivation refers to behaviour that is driven by internal rewards (i.e.,
taking pleasure in activities rather than completing a task in order to receive an external
reward). Teresa Amabile, Elizabeth A. Schatzel, Giovanni B. Moneta, and Steven J. Kramer,
Leader Behaviours and the Work Environment for Creativity: Perceived Leader Support,
The Leadership Quarterly 15, no. 1 (2004): 532.
89. Amabile et al. (see note 61 above).
90. Patterson et al. (see note 40 above).
91. Affect refers to the experience of feeling or emotion. George and Zhou (see note 79
above).
92. Amabile et al. (see note 87 above).
93. Daniel J. Harris, Roni Reiter-Palmon, and James C. Kaufman, The Effect of
Emotional Intelligence and Task Type on Malevolent Creativity, Psychology of Aesthetics,
Creativity, and the Arts 7, no. 3 (2013): 237244.
94. James et al. (see note 73 above).
95. Stewart (see note 61 above).
96. Moghadam (see note 17 above).
97. Gill et al. (see note 3 above).
98. James et al. (see note 73 above).
99. Paul B. Paulus and Bernard A. Nijstad, Group Creativity: Innovation through
Collaboration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
100. Patterson et al. (see note 40 above).
101. Basadur (see note 76 above).
102. Gill et al. (see note 3 above).
103. Hamilton et al. (see note 57 above).
104. Asal et al. (see note 40 above).
105. Patterson et al. (see note 40 above).
106. King and Anderson (see note 72 above).
107. Patterson et al. (see note 40 above).
108. King and Anderson (see note 72 above).
109. Moghadam (see note 17 above).
110. Ibid.

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S. E. Knight et al.

111. Robert D. Dewar and Jane E. Dutton, The Adoption of Radical and Incremental
Innovations: An Empirical Analysis, Management Science 32, no. 11 (1986): 14221433.
112. Edwards and Gomis (see note 52 above).
113. Clutterbuck and Warnes (see note 18 above).
114. Tony Simons, Lisa Hope Pelled, and Ken A. Smith, Making Use of Difference:
Diversity, Debate, and Decision Comprehensiveness in Top Management Teams, Academy
of Management Journal 42, no. 6 (1999): 662673.
115. Patterson et al. (see note 40 above).
116. Gill et al. (see note 3 above).
117. Jackson and Loidolt (see note 39 above).
118. Asal et al. (see note 40 above).
119. Cragin et al. (see note 32 above).
120. Clutterbuck and Warnes (see note 18 above).
121. Cragin et al. (see note 32 above).
122. Janssen et al. (see note 22 above).
123. Hamilton et al. (see note 57 above).
124. An example of a distal environmental factor influencing MC&I comes from Al
Qaeda-influenced groups that state that one of the main motives for plotting terrorist attacks
in the UK was anger over British foreign policy (Clarke and Soria [see note 35 above];
Edwards and Gomis [see note 52 above]).
125. An example of a proximal environmental factor affecting the MC&I process comes
from the Provisional Irish Republican Armys (PIRAs) early IEDs. The British Government
introduced legislation requiring producers to place markings on their explosives in order to
trace PIRAs supply route of commercial explosives. This unmasked their supply route and
forced PIRAs hand to build homemade explosives (Gill et al. [see note 3 above]).
126. Unpublished research by the authors of the present article.