Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
RA
M
MA
NO
HA
R
LO
HIY
A
NA
TIO
NA
L
LA
W
UNI
VE
RSI
TY
PRO
JEC
T
OF
CO
NS
TIT
UTI
ON
AL
LA
W- I
SUP
PRE
SSI
ON
OF
FUN
DA
ME
NTA
L
RIG
HTS
DU
RIN
G
EM
ERG
ENC
Y:
JUDICIA
L AND
LEGISL
ATIVE
RESPON
SE.
Sub
mitte
d
to
Sub
mitte
d by
Ms.
Ankit
a
Yada
v
Avina
sh
Maur
ya
(Assi
stant
profe
ssor)
Roll
no.35
RML
NLU,
Luck
now
sec(A
)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
First of all, I would like to thank Ms. Ankita Yadav for giving me this opportunity
to make the project on such an immense topic and all the support and guidance that
I have received from her, without which this project could not have turned into a
reality. I would also like to thank all my colleagues and seniors for providing me
support and material facts and figures related to this topic. Last but not the least, I
would like to thank my parents for providing me appropriate guidance and support
to prepare the project. All the above-mentioned people have very whole-heartedly
helped me to make this project in the present shape.
THANK YOU!
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1. -INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 2. -SUPPRESSION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT DURING
EMERGENCY.
CHAPTER 3.- JUDICIAL RESPONSE
CHAPTER 4.- LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
CHAPTER 5.- CONCLUSION
CHAPTE
R 1
GENER
AL
INTROD
UCTION
INT
RO
DU
CTI
ON:
A state
of
emerge
ncy
in
India
refers to
a period
of
governa
nce
under
an
altered
constitu
tional
setup
that can
be
proclai
med by
the
Preside
nt
of
India,
when
he
perceiv
es grave
threats
to
the
nation
from
internal
and
external
sources
or from
financia
l
situatio
ns
of
crisis.
Under
the
advice
of
the
cabinet
of
minister
s
and
using
the
powers
vested
in
him/her
largely
by Part
XVIII
of
the
Constit
ution of
India,
the
Preside
nt
can
overrule
many
provisio
ns
of
the
constitu
tion,
which
guarant
ee
fundam
ental
rights to
the
citizens
of India
and acts
governi
ng
devoluti
on
of
powers
to
the
states
which
form
the
federati
on.
The
Presiden
t
can
declare
three
types of
emergen
cies:
N
at
io
n
al
e
m
er
g
e
n
c
y
St
at
e
e
m
er
g
e
n
c
y
Fi
n
a
n
ci
al
e
m
er
g
e
n
c
y
Proclam
ation
of
Emergen
cy
means
Proclama
tion
issued
under
clause (1)
of Article
352.
Accordin
gly,
wherever
the
expressio
n
Proclam
ation
of
emergenc
y
occurs, it
should
not
include
the
two
other
emergenc
ies,
namely,
the
emergenc
y arising
out of the
failure of
the
constituti
onal
machiner
y
in
state
a
or
the
financial
emergenc
y.
Proclama
tions
of
Emergen
cy under
Article
352 have
been
issued
thrice- In
October,
1962
during
Chinese
aggressio
n which
was
revoked
in
January
1968,
Decembe
r 1971 in
connectio
n
with
external
aggressio
n
from
Pakistan
and while
this was
in
operation
another
in
June
1975 on
ground of
internal
disturban
ces both
of which
were
revoked
in March
1977.
While the
provision
s on the
breakdo
wn of the
constituti
onal
machiner
y in the
states
have
been
invoked
over
hundred
times, the
provision
s
on
financial
emergenc
y
have
never
been
invoked
1
so far.
V. N.
Shuklas
Constituti
on
of
India
Eastern
Book
Company
Eleventh
Edition.
Pg. 952.
CHAP
TER 2
SUPP
RESS
ION
OF
FUN
DAM
ENT
AL
RIG
HTS
DURI
NG
EME
RGE
NCY
Backgro
und:
In
the
Elections
held
the
to
Lok
Sabha in
1971
from the
Rai
Bareily
Constitue
ncy Smt.
Indira
Gandhi
was
declared
elected,
defeating
Shri Raj
narain
and other
who had
contested
the
election.
Shri Raj
narain
then filed
a petition
in
the
High
Court of
Allahaba
d
challengi
ng
the
election
of
Smt.
Indira
Nehru
Gandhi
on
number
of
grounds,
inter
alia,
alleging
miscondu
ct against
her. The
High
Court of
Allahaba
d
pronounc
ed
its
judgment
on
June
12, 1975.
Shri
J.
M.
L.
Sinha of
Allahaba
d
High
Court
ordered:
In view
of
findings,
this
petition
is
allowed
and the
election
of Smt.
Indira
Nehru
Gandhi
to
the
Lok
Sabha is
declared
void.
Accordi
ngly, the
respond
ent
stands
disquali
fied for
a period
of
six
years
from the
date of
this
order.
Prime
Minister
Indira
Gandhi
subseque
ntly
made an
appeal to
the
Supreme
Court.
Justice
Krishna
Iyer
on
24h June,
1975
passed
an
interim
order in
which he
suspende
d right of
Mrs
Gandhi
to
take
part
in
the
proceedi
ngs
in
the
Lok
Sabha
nor vote,
nor draw
a
remunera
tion
in
her
capacity
as
Member
of
the
Lok
Sabha.
Proclam
ation of
Emergen
cy:
Thereaft
er,
on
June 26,
1975,
Presiden
t
Fakhrud
din Ali
Ahmed
proclai
med an
emergen
cy under
Article
352(1)
of
the
Constitu
tion on
the
advice
of Prime
Minister
Indira
Gandhi.
Later,
he
issued a
proclam
ation
suspendi
ng
the
right to
approac
h
the
courts
for
the
enforce
ment of
the
fundame
ntal
rights
guarante
ed under
Articles
14,
21
and 22.
The
impositi
on
of
emergen
cy was
necessit
ated,
accordin
g
to
Mrs.
Gandhi,
because
of
the
turmoil
and
incipient
rebellio
n in the
country.
Besides
the
mainten
ance of
order
justificat
ion, the
govern
ment
pointed
to
the
imperati
ves
saving
of
democra
cy,
protecti
ng
the
social
revoluti
on
and
preservi
ng
national
integrity
- all of
which
together
compell
ed
the
resort to
such
drastic
step. On
the
contrary
, for the
critics,
the
emergen
cy was
nothing
short of
a
scandal
on
the
Constitu
tion, and
smacked
of Mrs.
Gandhi'
s
dictatori
al
ambitio
ns. The
justificat
ions
notwiths
tanding,
some of
its
tangible
consequ
ences on
the
ground
were the
followin
g:
detentio
n
of
nearly
1,11,000
persons,
a
significa
nt
number
of
whom
belonge
d to the
oppositi
on,
under
the
Mainten
ance of
Internal
Security
Act,
1971
and the
Defense
of India
Act/
Rules,
1961;
inflictio
n
of
torture
on many
of these
detenues
;
press
censorsh
ip
and
curbs on
the
freedom
of
speech
and
expressi
on;
demoliti
on
of
shanty
towns in
and
around
Delhi;
and the
subjecti
on
of
rural
and
urban
poor,
and the
lower
middle
class in
North
India to
forced
sterilizat
ion
program
s.
Fortunat
ely
for
those
who
suffered
,
the
emergen
cy was
revoked
and
normalc
y
restored
in
eighteen
months
and for
the first
time in
the
history
of
indepen
dent
India, a
nonCongres
s
govern
ment
came to
power at
the
centre
after the
Parliam
entary
election
s
in
1977.
What
happens
when
the
state,
enjoyin
g
monopo
ly over
coercio
n,
suspend
s
the
regular
constitu
tion and
decides
to
express
its force
and
might,
if
its
own
security
is under
threat?
Is
the
rule of
law
powerfu
l
enough
check
under
such
circums
tances
when
all other
protecti
ve
mechan
isms are
slowly
taken
away?
And
what
exactly
can we
expect
it to do
as
final
bastion
for
actual
or
potentia
l
victims
of state
violenc
e under
emerge
ncy?
W
hi
le
th
e
N
ati
on
al
E
m
er
ge
nc
y
of
19
75
w
as
in
op
er
ati
on
,
th
e
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
m
ad
e
fo
ll
o
wi
ng
att
e
m
pt
s
to
su
pp
re
ss
F
un
da
m
en
tal
ri
gh
ts
th
ro
ug
h
va
ri
ou
s
st
at
ut
or
y
pr
ov
isi
on
s
:
a. T
h
e
D
ef
e
n
se
of
I
n
di
a
(
A
m
e
n
d
m
e
nt
)
A
ct
,
1
9
7
5
T
h
e
A
ct
e
xt
e
n
d
e
d
th
e
pr
o
vi
si
o
ns
of
th
e
D
ef
e
ns
e
of
In
di
a
A
ct
,
1
9
7
1,
til
l
th
e
pr
o
cl
a
m
at
io
n
of
In
te
rn
al
E
m
er
g
e
n
c
y
la
st
e
d
a
n
d
fo
r
a
p
er
io
d
of
si
x
m
o
nt
hs
th
er
ea
ft
er
.
It
al
so
a
d
d
e
d
w
or
ds
li
k
e
in
te
rn
al
se
c
ur
it
y
a
n
d
in
te
rn
al
di
st
ur
b
a
n
ce
s
in
th
e
pr
ea
m
bl
e
of
th
e
pr
in
ci
pl
e
A
ct
.
b. Th
e
M
ai
nte
na
nc
e
of
Int
er
na
l
Se
cu
rit
y
(A
me
nd
me
nt)
Ac
t,
19
75
Th
is
A
me
nd
me
nt
pro
vid
ed
for
(i)
Re
vo
cat
ion
of
a
det
ent
ion
ord
er
sha
ll
not
bar
ma
kin
g
an
oth
er
det
ent
ion
ag
ain
st
the
sa
me
per
so
n;
(ii)
Per
so
n
det
ain
ed
un
der
Se
cti
on
15
sha
ll
not
be
rel
eas
ed
on
bai
l,
bai
lbo
nd
or
oth
er
wi
se,
(iii
) a
ne
w
Se
cti
on
16
A
wa
s
ad
de
d
bar
rin
g
pro
vis
ion
s
of
gro
un
ds
an
d
ap
pro
ac
h
to
a
la
w
Co
urt
an
d
(iv
)
ma
kin
g
the
gro
un
ds
of
det
ent
ion
as
On
Indias
PostColonial
Engage
ment
with the
Rule of
Law
Moiz
Tundaw
ala
NUJS
Law
Review,
2013.
S
hah
Commis
sion
Interim
Report1, Pg. 4,
5.
confid
ential
and
barring
its
disclos
ure to
anyone
.
c. The
Const
itutio
n
(Thirt
yeighth
Amen
dment
) Act,
1975
By
this
Amen
dment
Act
power
to
issue
Ordin
ances
by the
Presid
ent,
the
Gover
nor
and
the
Admi
nistrat
or
under
the
releva
nt
provis
ions of
the
Consti
tution
was
confer
red,
laying
down
that
their
satisfa
ction
as
to
the
necess
ity of
imme
diate
action
shall
be
final
and
conclu
sive
and
shall
not be
questi
oned
in any
Court
on any
groun
d.
It
also
entitle
d
the
Presid
ent to
issue
differe
nt
procla
matio
ns on
differe
nt
groun
ds and
to
make
satisfa
ction
of the
Presid
ent as
to the
emerg
ency
final
and
conclu
sive.
Durin
g
the
Emerg
ency
the
satisfa
ction
and
the
declar
ation
of the
Emerg
ency
could
not be
questi
oned
in any
court
on any
groun
d.
d. The
Consti
tution
(Thirt
yninth
Amen
dment
) Act,
1975
This
Amen
dment
inter
alia
provid
ed
for:(a) the
electio
n
of
Presid
ent
and
VicePresid
ent
shall
not be
questi
oned
in any
court;
(b)
similar
ly,
electio
ns
of
the
Prime
Minist
er and
the
Speak
er
of
the
House
were
placed
above
the
law
Courts
and
were
to
be
judged
by
Body/
Author
ity to
be
constit
uted
by the
Parlia
ment.
This
amend
ment
preven
ted
even
filing
of
electio
n
petitio
ns
against
the
named
person
s
and
even
pendin
g
petitio
ns
abated
.
e. The
Press
Coun
cil
(Repe
al)
Act,
1976
The
Press
Coun
cil
Act,
1965
was
repeal
ed
dissol
ving
the
Press
Coun
cil of
India
and
also
abatin
g
of
cases,
suit,
appea
ls etc.
pendi
ng
befor
e
Court
in
which
Press
Coun
cil
was a
party.
f. The
Preven
tion of
Public
ation
of
Object
ionabl
e
Matter
act,
1976
The
Act
provid
ed for
(i)
inclusi
on
in
the
express
ion
object
ionable
matter
any
words,
signs
or
visible
represe
ntation
s
which
are
defama
tory of
the
Preside
nt
of
India,
the
VicePreside
nt
of
India,
the
Prime
Minist
er
or
the
Speake
r of the
House
of the
People
or the
Govern
or of a
State;
(ii)
Seizure
of
copies
of the
publica
tion
made
in
disobe
dience
of the
Central
Govern
ment
Order
prohibi
ting the
printin
g
or
publica
tion,
closure
of any
printin
g press
or
other
instru
ment
or
apparat
us used
in
the
publica
tion;
(iii)
power
to
deman
d
securit
y from
the
presses
,
publish
ers and
editors
of
newspa
pers
and
news
sheets,
when it
spears
to
the
compet
ent
authori
ty that
the
publica
tion
contain
s
any
objecti
onable
matter;
(iv)
power
of
the
Ce
ntr
al
Go
ver
nm
ent
to
dec
lar
e
cer
tai
n
pu
bli
cat
ion
s
for
feit
ed.
g. P
a
rl
i
a
m
e
n
t
a
r
y
P
r
o
c
e
e
d
i
n
g
s
(
P
r
o
t
e
c
ti
o
n
o
f
P
u
b
li
c
a
ti
o
n
)
R
e
p
e
a
l
A
c
t,
1
9
7
6
B
y
t
h
is
A
ct
t
h
e
P
a
rl
ia
m
e
n
ta
r
y
p
r
o
c
e
e
d
i
n
g
s
(
P
r
o
te
ct
i
o
n
o
f
P
u
b
li
c
at
i
o
n
)
A
ct
,
1
9
6
5
w
a
s
r
e
p
e
al
e
d.
h. T
h
e
C
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
(
F
o
r
t
y
S
e
c
o
n
d
A
m
e
n
d
m
e
n
t
)
A
c
t,
1
9
7
6
T
h
e
c
o
n
s
ti
t
u
ti
o
n
w
a
s
e
x
t
e
n
s
i
v
e
l
y
a
m
e
n
d
e
d
b
y
5
9
c
l
a
u
s
e
s
.
Some of
the
Instance
s
of
Abuse of
Executiv
e Power
during
National
Emerge
ncy
included
:a. Wr
on
gfu
l
arr
est
s:
Inv
oki
ng
arti
cle
35
2
of
the
Ind
ian
Co
nst
itut
ion
,
Mr
s.
Ga
nd
hi
gra
nte
d
her
sel
f
ext
rao
rdi
nar
y
po
we
rs
an
d
lau
nc
he
d a
ma
ssi
ve
cra
ck
do
wn
on
civ
il
lib
erti
es
an
d
pol
itic
al
op
pos
itio
n.
Th
e
Go
ver
nm
ent
use
d
pol
ice
for
ces
acr
oss
the
co
unt
ry
to
pla
ce
tho
usa
nds
of
pro
test
ors
an
d
stri
ke
lea
der
s
un
der
pre
ve
nti
ve
det
ent
ion
.
Cri
tics
we
re
det
ain
ed
by
pol
ice
wit
ho
ut
cha
rge
or
not
ific
ati
on
to
fa
mil
ies
an
d
the
y
we
re
ab
use
d
an
d
tort
ure
d
in
cus
tod
y.
b. Fa
mil
y
Pla
nni
ng
an
d
Fo
rce
d
Ste
rili
zat
ion
s:
Sa
nja
y
Ga
nd
hi
init
iat
ed
a
birt
h
co
ntr
ol
pro
gra
m,
chi
efl
y
em
plo
yin
g
ste
rili
zat
ion
,
pri
ma
rily
vas
ect
om
ies.
Qu
ota
s
we
re
set
up
an
d
the
pro
gra
m
co
unt
ed
as
ma
ny
as
8.3
mil
lio
n
for
cef
ul
ste
rili
zat
ion
s,
up
fro
m
2.7
mil
lio
n
the
pre
vio
us
yea
r.
c. U
s
e
o
f
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
n
d
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
e
d
i
a
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
,
l
i
k
e
t
h
e
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
t
e
l
e
v
i
s
i
o
n
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
D
o
o
r
d
a
r
s
h
a
n
,
f
o
r
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
p
a
r
t
y
p
r
o
p
a
g
a
n
d
a
,
d. De
str
uct
io
n
of
the
slu
m
an
d
lo
winc
o
me
ho
usi
ng
in
the
Tu
rk
me
n
Ga
te
an
d
Ja
ma
M
asj
id
are
a
of
ol
d
De
lhi
.
CHAPTER 3
JUDICIAL
RESPONSE
The
discussion
of cases
falls into
two parts:
Cases
decided
during the
emergenc
y created
by war or
external
aggressio
n
and
cases
decided
during the
Emergenc
y
proclaime
th
d on 25
June 1975
on
the
ground of
internal
disturbanc
e.
During
first
two
emergenci
es
which
were
declared
in October
1962 and
December
1971
on
ground of
External
Aggressio
n,
no
attempt
had
been
made
to
impair
permanent
ly
the
fundament
al
rights
embodied
in
our
Constituti
on. Under
the
circumsta
nces,
the
courts
considered
the effect
of
proclamati
on
of
emergenc
y
in
number of
cases: (1)
On
Preventive
Detention,
(2)
On
the
effect of
the
suspensio
n
of
Article 19
following
on
a
proclamati
on
of
emergency
and
(3) on the
effect of
the
President
s
Order
under
Article
359.
On
26
th
October
1962, the
President
issued a
Proclama
tion
of
Emergen
cy under
Article
352. As
the
Parliame
nt
was
not
in
session,
the
President
promulga
ted the
Defense
of India
Ordinanc
e, 1962.
On
rd
Novembe
r 1962,
the
President
issued an
order
under
Article
359,
declaring
that the
right of
any
person to
move any
court for
the
enforcem
ent of the
rights
conferred
by
Article
14,
21
and 22
was
suspende
d during
the time
the
proclama
tion was
in force.
In Mohan
Chowdha
ry
v.
Chief
Commr.
Tripura
the
Defense of
India
Ordinance
and
the
rules made
there
under
were
challenged
.
On
preliminar
y
objection
being
taken that
in view of
the
President
s
Order
made
under
Article
359,
the
petitioner
was
not
entitled to
move the
court
or
the
enforceme
nt of his
fundament
al
rights,
the
petitioner
contended
that
as
Article 32
itself
conferred
a
fundament
al
right
and as the
President
s
Order
had
not
suspended
that rights,
the
petitioner
was
entitled to
move the
court
under
Article 32.
The
Supreme
Court held
that
the
right
to
move that
court
under
Article 32
was
subject to
Article
32(4)
under
which the
right could
be
suspended
in
accordanc
e with the
provisions
of
the
Constituti
on. Article
359
enabled
the
President
to suspend
the right to
move any
court
for
the
enforceme
nt of the
fundament
al rights
4
(1964) 3
S.C.R. 442
which
may
be
named by
the
President.
The
President
s Order
did
not
suspend
all rights
vested in
a citizen
to
move
the
Supreme
Court but
only
his
right
to
enforce
the
provision
s
of
Articles
21 and 22
in respect
of
anything
done
under the
Defense
of
Act:
India
As
result
of
the
Presidents
Order, the
petitioner
s right to
move this
court,
but
not
this
courts
power
under
Article 32
has
been
suspended
during the
operation
of
the
emergency
with
the
result that
the
petitioner
has
no
locus
standi
to
enforce his
right,
if
any, during
the
emergency.
Thus, the
validity of
the
statutory
provisions
authorizin
g
the
detention
could not
be
challenge
d in view
of
the
Presidenti
al Order.
The
Court,
however,
held that
the pleas
which
were open
to
detenu
were that
the
mandator
y
provisions
of
the
Defense
of
Act
India
and
rules had
not
been
observed
and
the
plea
not
merely
alleged
but
proved
that
the
detention
was mala
fide.
Makhan
Singh
v.
State
of
Punjab
showed
that
even
when
the
President
s
Order
suspended
the
right
of
the
detenu to
move the
Courts for
the
enforceme
nt of his
fundament
al
rights
under
Articles 21
and 22, his
right
to
challenge
his
detention
on several
other
grounds
was
not
taken
away
These
grounds
were
the
(i)
law
authorizin
g
detention
was
colorable
or
was
passed by
a
legislature
which had
no
legislative
competenc
e, (ii) the
detention
was
in
violation
of
the
mandatory
provisions
of the law
authorizin
g
detention,
(iii)
the
detention
was
in
excess off
the powers
conferred
by the Act
and
the
Rules, (v)
the
order
of
detention
was
passed
mala fide.
The court
has
reiterated
this
position in
Attorney
General v.
Amratlal
Prajivand
as.
In
Ram
Manohar
Lohia v.
State
Bihar
of
7
it
was held
unanimou
sly
that
the
President
s
Order
suspended
the
enforcem
ent of a
persons
rights
under
Articles
21 and 22
if he had
been
deprived
of
those
rights by
an
order
passed
under the
Defense
of
India
Act, 1962
or
the
rules
made
there
under. But
it
was
open
to
him
to
show that
the order
under the
said
Act
and rules
was
mala fide,
or
an
invalid,
order, and
in
either
event, he
was
entitled to
move
court for
the for the
AIR
1964 SC
381
:
(1964) 4
SCR 797
(19
94)
5
SCC 54 :
AIR 1994
SC 2179
66)
S.C.R.
709
(19
1
enforceme
nt of his
rights
under
Articles 21
and 22.
What
constitutes
Mala fide
has
been
interpreted
in case of
Jaichand
Lal
v.
State
of
West
8
Bengal
in this
context
a
mala
fide
exercise
of
power
does
not
necessaril
y
imply
any moral
turpitude
as a matter
of law. It
only
means that
the
statutory
power
is
exercised
for
purposes
foreign to
those
for
which it is
in
law
intended
i.e. for
some
indirect
purposes
not
connected
with
the
object
of
the statute
or
the
mischief it
seeks
to
remedy.
In
Ghulam
Sarwar
v. Union
of India
Subba
Rao C.J.
delivering
the
majority
judgment
held that
an
order
passed by
the
President
suspendin
g
the
right
to
move the
court for
the
enforcem
ent
of
rights
under
Article 14
was itself
subject to
a
challenge
that
it
violated
Article
14.
In this, the
court
made
a
distinction
between
the order
made by
the
President
and
the
effect of
the order.
Only
a
valid order
could take
away the
rights
under
Article 14
therefore
if
the
President
s
Order
violated
Article 14,
the order
would be
void from
its
inception.
The
real
import of
the words
used
in
Article
359 came
up
for
considerat
ion
in
Mohd
Yaqub v.
State
of
J&K
10
which
overruled
Ghulam
Sarwar v.
Union of
India.
It
was
concerned
with
number of
habeas
corpus
writ
petitions
to test the
validity of
arrests
made
under
Rule 30(1)
of
the
Defense
of
India
Rules,
1962 and
the
President
s
Order
issued
under
Article
359(1)
suspendin
g
the
enforceme
nt
of
fundament
al
rights
under
Articles
14, 21 and
22 during
the period
of
emergenc
y. Among
other
grounds, it
was
contented
firstly, that
the
President
being
an
authority
under
Article 12,
the
order
passed by
him under
Article
359 was a
law within
the
meaning
of Article
13(2) and
was,
therefore,
liable
to
be
tested
on
the
anvil
of
fundament
al
rights,
and
secondly,
that
the
enforceme
nt of only
such
fundament
al
rights
could
be
suspended
which had
nexus
with
the
reasons
which led
to
the
proclamati
on
of
emergenc
y.
The
Supreme
Court
rejected
both
the
arguments
.
Firstly,
because
Article
13(2) and
Article
359 being
parts of
8
A.S
C. 483,
485
67)
S.C.R.
271
10
(19
2
AIR
1968 SC
765
the
same
Constit
ution
stand
on an
equal
footing
and the
two
provisi
ons
must
be read
harmo
niousl
y
in
order
that
the
intenti
on
behind
Article
359
was
carried
out
and
not
destro
yed
altoget
her.
Thus
though an
order
under
Article
359
may
be
assumed
to be law
in
the
widest
sense,
it
cannot be
law within
the
meaning
of Article
13(2) for,
if
were
that
so,
Article
359 would
be
nugatory.
If
the
order is a
law within
the
meaning
of Article
13(2), the
result
would be
that
though the
order says
that
the
enforceme
nt
of
particular
fundament
al right is
suspended
during the
period
of
Emergenc
y,
the
order can
still
be
tested with
the aid of
Article
13(2)
the
on
anvil
of
the
same
fundament
al right the
enforceme
nt
of
which
it
suspends
and
declaratio
n
there
made
under has
no
meaning
whatsoeve
r.
Secondly,
it
is
implicit
that
the
enforceme
nt
of
particular
fundament
al
right
suspended
by
the
President
is for the
sake of the
security of
India, for
which the
Emergenc
y has been
declared
under
Article
352,
and
no further
proof of it
is
necessary.
Declaratio
n
of
Emergenc
y is for the
subjective
determinat
ion of the
President,
and
he
cannot be
called
upon
to
justify his
action in a
court
of
law.
Hidaytulla
h, J, in his
dissenting
judgment
suggested
that
Article
359 must
be
circumscri
bed in at
least those
theoretical
ly possible
cases
where the
power
may
be
misused or
exercised
mala fide,
and
for
that
purpose
room must
be let for
the
operation
of Article
14.
However,
it
is
submitted
that
once
this
suggestion
is
accepted,
it
would
unduly
circumven
t the ambit
of Article
359.
Moreover,
there
has
always
been
remedy
available
in a court
of
law
against
misuse of
power
or
mala fides
as
an
independe
nt ground.
While
considerin
g
the
Right to
Freedom
guaranteed
under
Article 19,
Supreme
Court in
Makhan
Singh v.
State of
11
Punjab
said that,
The
suspensio
n
of
Article 19
during the
pendency
of
the
Proclamat
ion
of
emergenc
y removes
the fetters
created on
the
legislative
and
executive
powers by
Article 19
and if the
legislature
s
make
laws
or
the
executive
commits
acts
which are
inconsiste
nt
with
the rights
guarantee
d
by
Article
19,
their
validity is
not open
to
challenge
either
during the
continuan
ce of the
emergenc
y or even
thereafter.
11
(1964) 4
S.C.R. 797
Before
1975,
the
impact
of
Article
359
on
the
fundame
ntal
rights
conferre
d
by
Part III
had not
been
fully
realized,
partly
because
the
power of
preventi
ve
detentio
n
was
not
as
grossly
abused
as it was
during
Emerge
ncy
of
1975.
In
1975,
for
the
first
time
after
the
constitutio
n
came
into force,
the
Emergenc
y
was
proclaime
d on the
ground of
internal
disturbanc
e, and it
was made
a cloak for
gross
abuse
of
political
power.
After
the
declaratio
n
of
Emergenc
y,
the
President
of
India
issued an
order
under
Article
359 of the
Constituti
on on June
27,
1975
suspendin
g the right
to
move
any court
for
the
enforceme
nt
of
fundament
al
rights
conferred
by Article
14, 19, 21
and 22 of
the
Constituti
on.
ADM
Jabalpur
vs.
Shivkant
12
Shukla ,
famously
known as
the
Habeas
Corpus
Case,
The
appeals
decide by
the
Supreme
Court
in
the
Habeas
Corpus
case arose
out
of
habeas
corpus
applicatio
ns
filed
by several
detenues
who
prayed for
their
release
from
illegal
preventiv
e
detention.
A
preliminar
y
objection
was
raised by
the Union
that
in
view
of
the
President
s
Order
under
Article
359
suspendin
g the right
of
any
person
(including
a
foreigner)
to
move
any court
for
the
enforcem
ent of his
fundamen
tal rights
under
Articles
14, 19, 21
and
22,
the
petitioner
s had no
locus
standi
to
maintain
the
petition,
because,
in
substance,
the
detenues
were
seeking to
enforce
their
fundamen
tal
right
under
Article
21,
namely,
that they
should
not
be
deprived
of
their
personal
liberty
except by
procedure
establishe
d by law.
The High
Court
of
Allahabad
, Andhra
Pradesh,
Bombay,
Delhi,
Karnataka
, Madras,
Madhya
Pradesh,
Punjab
and
Haryana
and
Rajasthan
, rejected
this
contentio
n and held
that
though
the
petitioner
s
could
not move
the court
to enforce
their
fundamen
tal
right
under
Article
21,
they
were
entitled to
show that
the order
of
detention
was
under
not
or
in
complianc
e with the
law
or
was mala
fide.
However,
the
Supreme
Court held
that:
In view
of
the
Presidenti
al
Order
dated 27
th
June
1975, no
person
has
any
locus
standi to
move the
High
Court for
habeas
corpus or
any other
writ order
or
direction
to
challenge
the
legality of
an
order
of
detention
on
the
ground
that
order
the
is
not under
or
in
complianc
e with the
Act
12
A.SC
1325
(76)
Pg
(Mainte
nance of
Internal
Security
Act,
1971) or
is illegal
or
is
vitiated
by mala
fides
factual
or legal
or
is
based
on
extraneo
us
consider
ation.
The
Ord
er
was
pass
ed
as
the
resu
lt of
four
maj
orit
y
jud
gme
nts
deli
vere
d by
Ray
C.J.
,
Beg
,
Cha
ndr
ach
ud
and
Bha
gwa
ti
JJ.
Just
ice
Kha
nna
gav
e
diss
enti
ng
jud
gme
nt
but
he
sign
ed
the
Courts
order.
The
Supreme
Court
inflicted
a
deep
wound
on itself
when
four
judges
passed
this
misleadin
g
order
which
barred
and
bolted
the
prison
doors
behind
which
helpless
and
innocent
persons
were
illegally
detained
and
ill
treated.
Dissentin
g
judgment
of Justice
Khanna
in Habeas
Corpus
case:
Justice
Khanna
dissented
as in his
opinion it
takes
us
back to the
pre
constitutio
nal British
period.
The most
salient
feature of
Justice
Khanna's
decision
was
that
Article 21
could not
be viewed
as the sole
repository
of
the
right
life
to
and
personal
liberty,
and
that
therefore
its
suspension
did
not
give
executive
officers of
the
governme
nt
carte
blanche
powers to
detain
persons
without
the
authority
of law. For
him,
this
right was
not the gift
of
the
Constituti
on; it had
existed
long
before the
Constituti
on
came
into force.
Merely
because an
aspect
the
was
of
right
incorporat
ed in the
fundament
al
rights
chapter
did
not
mean that
its
independe
nt identity
had
been
exterminat
ed.
In
effect
Article 21
required a
proper
procedure
under
valid law
before
person
could
be
deprived
of his or
her
right.
So at the
most,
its
suspension
meant the
deprivatio
n of the
right to a
procedure,
and
not
the denial
of
the
right in the
absence of
authority
of law.
CHAPTER 4
LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSE
Emergen
cy
provision
s under
Indian
Constitut
ion prior
to
passing
th
of
44
Amendm
ent Act:
P
ar
t
X
V
II
I
of
th
e
In
di
a
n
C
o
ns
tit
ut
io
n
d
ea
ls
w
it
h
th
e
E
m
er
g
e
n
c
y
pr
o
vi
si
o
ns
.
T
h
e
re
le
v
a
nt
pr
o
vi
si
o
ns
pr
io
r
to
p
as
si
n
g
of
4
t
4
h
A
m
e
n
d
m
e
nt
A
ct
ar
e
as
fo
ll
o
w
in
g:
Article
352:
Proclamati
on
of
Emergenc
y.
(1) If the
President
is satisfied
that
grave
emergency
exists
whereby
the
security of
India or of
any part of
the
territory
thereof is
threatened,
whether
by war or
external
aggression
or internal
disturbanc
e, he may,
by
Proclamati
on, make a
declaratio
n to that
effect
in
respect of
the whole
of India or
of
such
part of the
territory
thereof as
may
be
specified
in
the
Proclamati
on.
Article
353:
Effect of
Proclamati
on
of
Emergenc
y.
While
a
Proclamati
on
of
Emergenc
y is in
operation,
then
(a) Notwi
thstandin
g
anything
in
this
Constituti
on,
the
executive
power of
the Union
shall
extend to
the giving
of
directions
to
State
to
any
as
the
manner in
which the
executive
power
thereof is
to
be
exercised;
(b) the
power of
Parliamen
t to make
laws with
respect to
any matter
shall
include
power to
make laws
conferring
powers
and
imposing
duties, or
authorizin
g
the
conferring
of powers
and
the
impositio
n
of
duties,
upon
the
Union or
officers
and
authorities
of
the
Union as
respects
that
matter,
notwithsta
nding that
it is one
which
is
not
enumerate
d in the
Union
List;
Provided
that where
a
Proclamati
on
of
Emergenc
y is in
operation
only
in
any part of
the
territory
of India,
(i) the
executi
ve
power
of the
Union
to give
directio
ns
under
clause
(a), and
(ii) the
power
of
Parliam
ent
to
make
laws
under
clause
(b),
shall
also
extend
to
any
State
other
than
State in
which
or
in
any part
of
which
the
Proclam
ation of
Emerge
ncy is in
operatio
n if
and in so
far as the
security
of
India
or
any
part
of
the
territory
thereof is
threatene
d
by
activities
in or in
relation
to
part
the
of
the
territory
of
India
in which
the
Proclama
tion
of
Emergen
cy is in
operation
Article
358:
Suspensio
n
of
provisions
of Article
19 during
emergenci
es.
(1)
While
Proclamat
ion
of
Emergenc
y
is
in
operation,
nothing in
Article 19
shall
restrict
the power
of
State
the
as
defined in
Part III to
make any
law or to
take any
executive
action
which the
State
would but
for
the
provision
s
contained
in
Part
that
be
competen
t to make
or to take,
but
any
law
so
made
shall,
to
the extent
of the in
competen
cy, cease
to
have
effect as
soon
as
the
Proclamat
ion ceases
to
operate,
except as
respects
things
done
or
omitted to
be
done
before the
law
so
ceases to
have
effect:
Provided
that where
a
Proclamati
on
of
Emergenc
y
is
in
operation
only
in
any part of
the
territory of
India, any
such
law
may
be
made,
or
any
such
executive
action may
be
taken,
under this
article
in
relation to
or in any
State
or
Union
territory in
which
or
in any part
of
which
the
Proclamati
on
of
Emergenc
y is not in
operation,
if and in
so far as
the
security of
India
or
any part of
the
territory
thereof is
threatened
by
activities
in
or
in
relation to
the part of
the
territory of
India
in
which the
Proclamati
on
of
Emergenc
y
is
in
operation
A
r
t
i
c
l
e
3
5
9
:
S
u
s
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
r
i
g
h
t
s
c
o
n
f
e
r
r
e
d
b
y
P
a
r
t
I
I
I
d
u
r
i
n
g
e
m
e
r
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
.
(1)
Where
Proclamat
ion
of
Emergenc
y
is
in
operation,
the
President
may
by
order
declare
that
the
right
to
move any
court for
the
enforcem
ent
of
such
of
the rights
conferred
by Part III
as may be
mentione
d in the
order and
all
proceedin
gs
pending
in
any
court for
the
enforcem
ent of the
rights
so
mentione
d
shall
remain
suspended
for
the
period
during
which the
Proclamat
ion is in
force
for
or
such
shorter
period as
may
be
specified
in
the
order
(1A)
While an
order
made
under
clause
(
mentionin
g any of
the rights
conferred
by Part III
is
in
operation,
nothing in
that
Part
conferring
those
rights
shall
restrict the
power of
the
State
as defined
in the said
Part
to
make any
law or to
take
any
executive
action
which the
State
would but
for
the
provisions
containing
in
that
Part
be
competent
to
make
or to take,
but
any
law
so
made
shall,
to
the extent
of the in
competen
cy, cease
to
have
effect
as
soon
as
the order
aforesaid
ceases
to
operate,
except
as
respects
things
done or
omitted
to
be
done
before
the law
so
ceases
to have
effect.
Provided
that where
a
Proclamati
on
of
Emergenc
y
is
in
operation
only
in
any part of
the
territory of
India, any
such
law
may
be
made,
or
any
such
executive
action may
be
taken,
under this
article
in
relation to
or in any
State
or
Union
territory in
which
or
in any part
of
which
the
Proclamati
on
of
Emergenc
y is not in
operation,
if and in
so far as
the
security of
India
or
any part of
the
territory
thereof is
threatened
by
activities
in
or
in
relation to
the part of
the
territory of
India
in
which the
Proclamati
on
of
Emergenc
y
is
in
operation
(2) An
order
made as
aforesaid
may
extend to
the whole
or
any
part of the
territory
of India:
Provided
that where
a
Proclamati
on
of
Emergenc
y
is
in
operation
only in a
part of the
territory
of
any
India,
such
order shall
not extend
to
any
other part
of
the
territory
of
India
unless the
President,
being
satisfied
that
the
security of
India
or
any part of
the
territory
thereof is
threatened
by
activities
in or in
relation to
the part of
the
territory
of India in
which the
Proclamati
on
of
Emergenc
y
is
in
operation,
considers
such
extension
to
be
necessary
(3)
Every
order
made
under
clause
(1) shall,
as soon
may be
after it is
made, be
laid
before
each
House of
Parliame
nt
Justice
Khanna
dissentin
g
in
ADM
Jabalpur
v.
Shivkant
Shukla
(Habeas
Corpus
case),
ended his
judgment
with this
note:
A
dissent
in
Court of
last
resort is
an
appeal
to
the
broodin
g spirit
of
the
law,
to
the
intellige
nce of a
future
day,
when a
later
decision
may
possible
correct
the
error
into
which
the
dissenti
ng
Judge
believes
the
court to
have
been
betraye
d."
On
th
18
Jan
uar
y
197
7,
19
mo
nths
afte
r
Em
erg
enc
y
was
decl
are
d,
Indi
ra
Gan
dhi
ann
oun
ced
diss
olut
ion
of
Parl
iam
ent,
call
ed
fres
h
elec
tion
s
and
rele
ase
d
all
poli
tica
l
pris
one
rs.
The
eme
rge
ncy
offi
cial
ly
end
ed
on
rd
23
Mar
ch
197
7.
Recen
t
experi
ence
had
show
n that
the
funda
menta
l
rights
,
includ
ing
those
of life
and
libert
y,
grante
d
to
citize
ns by
the
Const
itutio
n
were
capab
le of
being
taken
away
by
transi
ent
majorit
y.
It
was,
therefor
e,
necessa
ry
to
provide
adequat
e
safegua
rds
against
the
recurren
ce
of
such a
conting
ency in
the
future
and to
ensure
to the
people
themsel
ves an
effectiv
e voice
in
determi
ning the
form of
govern
ment
under
which
they
were to
live.
13
Thus,
newly
formed
Janata
Party
governme
nt
appointed
the
Shah
Commissi
on on 28
th
May 1977
under
Section 3
of
the
Commissi
ons
of
Inquiry
Act, 1952
to inquire
into all the
excesses
committed
during
Indian
Emergenc
y
(1975-
77). It was
headed by
Justice
J.C.Shah,
a
former
Chief
Justice of
India. The
commissio
n
published
its
report
on
the
illegal
events
during the
emergency
and
the
persons
responsibl
e in three
volumes
totaling
525 pages.
The
first
interim
report was
submitted
on
11
March
1978,
dealing
with
the
lead-up to
the
declaratio
n of the
Emergenc
y and the
way
in
which the
press was
prevented
from
speaking
out.
The
second
interim
report
discussed
police
actions
and
the
role
of
Sanjay
Gandhi at
the
Turkman
Gate
incident in
which
police
fired on a
crowd
of
people
protesting
against
demolition
of
their
houses.
The
final
report was
issued on
6
August
1978 and
covered
prison
conditions,
torture and
family
planning
atrocities.
In
May
1978, after
the second
interim
report
of
the
commissio
n had been
issued,
some
leaders of
the Janata
party
began
demandin
g
that
special
courts be
set up to
ensure
speedy
trial
of
cases
related to
the
emergenc
y.
Parliament
eventually
passed an
act
establishin
g
two
special
courts on
8
May
1979.
However,
it was too
late.
The
governme
nt fell on
16
July
1979.
After
Indira
Gandhi
returned
to
power
in January
1980
the
Supreme
Court
found that
the special
courts
were
not
legally
constitute
d, so no
trials were
conducted
.
Janata
Party
led
govern
ment,
howeve
r,
passed
th
44
Constit
utional
Amend
ment
act
which
made
major
changes
in
Emerge
ncy
provisio
ns.
The
Emergen
cy
Provision
s of our
constituti
on
as
embodie
d
in
Articles
352, 358
and 359
raise
three
different
questions
:
First,
are they
necessary
at
all?
Secondly,
what
changes
must
be
made in
these
provision
s
to
prevent
abuse?
Thirdly,
how
far
has
the
th
44
Amendm
ent gone
to
prevent
the abuse
of
these
provision
s?
The
first two
questions
are
outside
the scope
of
this
research.
The third
question
has been
answered
here
under.
13
The
Constitutio
n
(Forty
Fourth
Amendme
nt)
Act,
1978
Statement
of Object
and
Reasons.
After the
Proclama
tion of
Emergen
cy,
39
th
Amendm
ent Act
inserted
a law of
preventiv
e
detention
into
Schedule
9
namely,
the
Maintena
nce
of
Internal
Security
Act
(MISA)
thus
excludin
g
all
challenge
to
the
Act on
the
ground
that
it
violated
fundame
ntal
rights, as
Schedule
9
had
been
interprete
d by the
Supreme
Court at
that time.
th
44
Amendm
ent Act
took
away the
President
s power,
under
Article
359, to
suspend
by
an
order the
right to
move any
Court for
the
enforcem
ent of the
fundamen
tal rights
conferred
by
Articles
20
and
21. Also,
the
iniquity
of
inserting
MISA in
Schedule
9
was
realized
and
the
th
44
Amendm
ent
removed
MISA
from
Schedule
9.
Article
352
has
been
amended
in several
respects
by
the
FortyFourth
Amendme
nt Act so
as
to
minimize
the
chances of
abuse of
power to
declare
Emergenc
y.
Firstly,
the
expressi
on
internal
disturba
nce has
been
replaced
by
armed
rebellion
in
order to
delimit
internal
disturba
nce
which
has wide
connotat
ion.
Secon
dly, a
Procla
mation
of
Emerg
ency
will
not be
issued
by the
Presid
ent
unless
a
recom
menda
tion of
the
Counci
l
of
Minist
ers to
that
effect
is
comm
unicate
d
to
him in
writing
. This
is done
to
elimin
ate any
possibi
lity of
the
Prime
Minist
er
alone
taking
a
decisio
n
for
the
imposi
tion of
Emerg
ency
as
Mrs.
Indira
Gandh
i
is
alleged
to have
done
in June
1975.
Thirdly,
the
Proclamati
on
of
Emergenc
y must be
approved
within one
month
instead of
two
months as
provided
earlier, by
resolution
s of both
Houses of
Parliament
and such a
resolution
has to be
passed by
a majority
of the total
membersh
ip of the
House and
a majority
of not less
than
two
thirds
of
the
members
present
and
voting.
Before the
Amendme
nt
such
resolution
could
be
passed by
simple
majority.
Fourthly,
a
Proclamati
on
of
Emergenc
y ceases to
operate
automatica
lly at the
expiry
of
six months
and can be
continued
beyond
that period
only
on
approval
by
resolution
of
both
Houses of
Parliament
every
six
months.
Fifthly,
the
President
shall
revoke a
Proclama
tion
of
Emergen
cy on a
resolution
of
the
House of
the
People to
that
effect and
for
that
purpose a
special
sitting of
the
House
can
be
called at
a
14
days
notice by
one-tenth
of
the
total
members
of
that
House.
Before
the
Amendm
ent once
a
Proclamat
ion was
made and
approved
by
Parliamen
t it could
be
continued
indefinitel
y unless
the
President
revoked it
on
his
own.
Sixthly,
Article 19
which
used
to
get
suspended
automatic
ally on a
Proclamat
ion
of
Emergenc
y
will
now
remain
unaffecte
d if the
ground of
Proclamat
ion
is
only
armed
rebellion
and
not
war
or
external
aggressio
n.
Moreover
special
conditions
have been
added
to
the
suspensio
n
of
Article 19
even
when the
proclamat
ion is on
the
ground of
war
or
external
aggressio
n.
Interpretin
g
the
changes
made
through
th
44
Amendme
nt
Act,
Supreme
Court in
Naga
Peoples
Movemen
t
of
Human
Rights v.
Union of
14
India
observed
The
expression
internal
disturbanc
e
has
wider
connotatio
n
than
armed
rebellion
in
the
sense that
armed
rebellion
is likely to
pose
threat
to
the
security of
the
country or
a
pert
thereof,
while
internal
disturbanc
e, though
serious in
nature,
would not
pose
threat
to
the
security of
the
Country or
a
part
thereof.
The
intention
underlying
the
substitutio
n of the
word
internal
disturbanc
e by the
word
armed
rebellion
in Article
352 is to
limit
the
invocation
of
the
emergency
powers
under
Article
352
only
to
more
serious
situation
where
there is a
threat
to
the
security of
the
country or
a
part
thereof on
account of
war
or
external
aggression
or
armed
rebellion
and
to
exclude
the
invocation
of
emergency
powers in
situations
of internal
disturbanc
e
which
are
lesser
gravity.
of
After the
FortyFourth
Amendm
ent
the
only
differenc
e
left
between
Articles
358 and
359
is
that
firstly,
while the
former is
confined
to Article
19,
the
latter
extends
to
all
fundame
ntal
rights
except
those
in
Articles
20
and
21.
Secondly,
the
former
suspends
the rights
while the
latter
suspends
only the
remedy.
Thirdly,
because
of
the
precedin
g
differenc
e
until
the
Thirtyeighth
Amendm
ent,
which
introduce
d clause
(1-A) in
Article
359,
while no
actions
could be
initiated
against
the
violation
of Article
19 either
during or
after the
Emergen
cy,
actions
could be
taken
against
the
violation
of
other
fundame
ntal
rights
whose
enforcem
ent
was
suspende
d by the
President
under
Article
359.
14
(1998) 2
SCC 109 :
AIR 1998
SC 431
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The
history of
the
1975
Emergenc
y and its
aftermath
has taught
us
the
lesson:
that
if
need
be,
the peace
loving
masses in
India will
rise
from
their
slumber to
exercise
their
political
sovereignt
y, to take
back from
their
representat
ives their
solemn
trust.
With
the
imposit
ion of
Emerg
ency
the
executi
ve had
set up
an
aggress
ive
front.
In the
face of
this
aggress
ion, the
Court
under
the
leaders
hip of
Chief
Justice
s
Ray
and
Beg,
abdicat
ed
its
power
of
judicial
review.
Subsequ
ently
during
the
tenure of
the
Janata
Govern
ment in
19771980, it
bounced
in
with
vengean
ce
against
the
emergen
cy
and
with
massive
public
support,
the
Court
under
the
leadershi
p of the
Chief
Justice
Chandra
chud
endorsed
the
policy
decision
of
the
new
Govern
ment.
The
relaxed
political
atmosph
ere made
the
executiv
e
more
liberal in
its
approach
,
providin
g
an
opportun
ity
for
the
Court to
retrieve
its
lost
judicial
territory.
It
extended
its
jurisdicti
on
and
acquired
immense
power of
administ
ration,
becomin
g
the
most
powerful
judiciary
in
the
world. It
extended
the
meaning
of
'State',
prescribe
d limits
to
executiv
e
discretio
n,
and
redefine
d
the
scope of
judicial
interfere
nce,
which
was
in
fact
unbound
ed
and
limitless.
The
Court
and
Executiv
e shared
the glory
of
this
brief but
significa
nt period
in
the
history
of
the
country.
These
were the
Court's
finest
years.
There has
been
vacillation
between
hope and
disappoint
ment, but
ultimately
hope
has
survived;
the Court
is
indeed
the forum
for
legitimizin
g
the
establishm
ent as well
as
the
dissent.
There is a
general
feeling
that
whatever
the
failures
and
disappoint
ments, the
Court has
inspired
an
anti-
establishm
ent
force
to seek its
interventio
n
in
defense of
democrac
y and the
rule
of
law,
and
thus
the
Court
remains
the
main
bulwark
of Indian
democrac
y because
other
organs of
the
state
have
not
shown any
promise of
rejuvenati
15
on.
The
judiciary
plays
important
role
throughou
t a state of
emergenc
y,
from
the
inception
of
the
declaratio
n of the
state
of
emergenc
y
to
its
terminatio
n.
The
rising
skepticism
about the
role of the
judiciary
in times of
crises
is
based
on
an
unbalance
d
evaluation
of the past
experience
of
the
judiciary
and
fails
to
take
into
account
the
resultant
lessons
and
developm
ents from
these
15
Contributi
on of the
Supreme
Court
to
the Growth
of
Democrac
y in India
NUJS Law
Review,
2013
experie
nces.
The
judiciar
y
is
reinvig
orated
by
these
experie
nces
and
more
fortifie
d for an
ever
more
audacio
us
protecti
on of
human
rights.
Dr.
Babas
aheb
Ambe
dkar
speaki
ng in
Const
ituent
Asse
mbly
on
th
25
Nove
mber
1949
rightl
y
concl
uded
thus-:
However
good
Constituti
on may be,
it is sure to
turn
out
bad
because
those who
are called
to work it,
happen to
be a bad
lot.
However
bad
Constituti
on may be,
it may turn
out to be
good
if
those who
are called
to work it,
happen to
be a good
lot.
The
working of
a
Constituti
on
does
not depend
wholly
upon
the
nature
of
the
Constituti
on.
The
Constituti
on
can
provide
only
the
organs of
State such
as
the
Legislatur
e,
the
Executive
and
the
Judiciary.
The
factors on
which the
workings
of
those
organs of
the
State
depend are
the people
and
the
political
parties
they
will
set up as
their
instrument
s to carry
out
their
wishes and
their
politics.
16
Bibliogr
aphy
Books:
-
H.
M.
Se
erv
ai,
th
4
Edi
tio
n,
Vol
2
&
3.
Int
rod
uct
ion
to
the
Co
nst
itut
ion
of
Ind
ia
Dr.
Du
rga
Da
s
Ba
su.
Th
e
Co
nst
itut
ion
of
Ind
ia
P
M
Ba
ksh
i.
-
Wo
rki
ng
of
a
De
mo
cra
tic
Co
nst
itut
ion
A
his
tor
y
of
the
Ind
ian
Ex
per
ien
ce
by
Gr
an
vill
e
Au
sti
n,
Ox
for
d
Ind
ia
Pu
bli
cat
ion
s
-
V
.
N
.
S
h
u
kl
a
s
C
o
n
st
it
ut
io
n
of
In
di
a
b
y
M
a
h
e
n
dr
a
P.
S
in
g
h,
E
le
v
e
nt
h
E
di
ti
o
n
E
as
te
rn
B
o
o
k
C
o
m
p
a
n
y.
Acts:
-
Co
nst
itut
ion
of
Ind
ia,
19
50
44
Co
nst
itut
ion
al
A
me
nd
me
nt
Ac
t
Ma
int
ena
nce
of
Int
ern
al
Se
cur
ity
Ac
t,
19
71.
(M
IS
A)
De
fen
se
of
Ind
ia
Ac
t,
19
62.
Web
Bibliograp
hy:
-
htt
p://
jst
or.
org
htt
p://
w
ww
.en
.wi
kip
edi
a.o
rg
htt
p://
par
lia
me
nto
fin
dia
.ni
c.i
n/l
s/d
eba
tes/
vol
11
p1
1.h
tm