Muoz vs. Del Barrio Felicidad P. Muoz, petitioner and appellant, vs.

Jose del
Barrio, respondent and appellee April 15, 1955 Ponente: Felix, J.
Facts: Muoz and del Barrio were married civilly on September 24, 1942 and canonically on
October 24 of the same year.
Since then, the couple lived together as husband and wife for six months in the husband s
father s house in Manila and then moved to Bulacan.
Felix Luis del Barrio, 11, and Maria Teresa del Barrio, 9, were born. y The couple had
frequent quarrels (husband maltreated wife, wife couldn t bear it). In 1947, they
unceremoniously separated, the wife in Bulacan and the husband in Manila.
They met each other in Manila and the wife claims that in December 1950 or January and
September 1951, she was again maltreated by her husband.
Procedural: This moved her to institute the present action in CFI Bulacan, among other
things, that:

The system of conjugal partnership of gains governs her marriage to the respondent
No property has been acquired during the marriage except a portion of a residential
land located in Meycawayan, Bulacan, from which no rentals are derived
That the respondent has made several attempts on her life which compelled her to
live separately and apart from the respondent since 1947
That the respondent has not provided support for her and their children

She prays the court:

That a decree be entered for the legal separation of petitioner from respondent o
That petitioner be awarded the custody of their minor children o
That respondent be directed to contribute to the support of said children
That petitioner be allowed costs, plus attorney s fees (P200) charged against
conjugal partnership property (par. 4, Art. 293, CC)
That whatever remains of said conjugal partnership property after deduction of
expenses mentioned in preceding paragraph, be divided and adjudicated in equal
parts to the spouses and the conjugal partnership dissolved and liquidated .
That petitioner be granted such further and complete relief as may be just and
equitable in the premises

Respondent prayed that the petition be denied and dismissed for lack of merit. The Court
took every feasible step for reconciliation (Art. 98, CC), but failed because of refusal of wife.
The case proceeded with the intervention of office of the Provincial Fiscal and Court
rendered a decision dismissing the petition for lack of merits. Muoz appealed from the
judgment.
Issue: W/N the maltreatments that appellant suffered at the hands of the respondent after
their separation of dwelling furnish ground for the legal separation applied for under
paragraph 2 of Article 97 of the Civil Code. Art 97. A legal separation may be filed: (2) An
attempt by one s spouse against the life of the other.
Held: NO. In the maltreatments complained of in this case, the respondent only used at most
his bare fists or hands and desisted from giving further chastisement after the first blows
were given at the spur of the impulse.

Reasoning: y Under Art. 97, par. 2 a petition for legal separation may be filed for an attempt
by one spouse against the life on the other. The case was only brought to court after the
alleged maltreatment of September 1951 and not upon .

Gandionco v. Peflaranda
155 SCRA 725
Facts:
- 29 May 1986 - respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Misamis Oriental complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages
- 13 October 1986 respondent also filed in Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City a
complaint against petitioner for concubinage,
- 14 November 1986 respondent filed for support of pendent lite which was granted on 10
December 1986
- Petitioner contends that civil action for legal separation and its consequences should be
suspended in light of criminal charge of concubinage under Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure
o After a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil action arising from the
same offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been rendered
ISSUE: WON other actions should be suspended due to criminal action of concubinage
HELD: NO
- On Separation: civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead
of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not
one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense
o governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
o refers to civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged.
Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply referred to "Civil action arising from the
offense."
o action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, but is aimed at the conjugal rights
of the spouses and their relations to each other
o decree of legal separation on ground of concubinage may be issued without criminal
conviction of concubinage thus no need to wait
- On support
o can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the
judge
RESULT: petition is dismissed
Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz
GR 19565, January 30, 1968
FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and begotten 6
children. During their coverture, they acquired several parcels of land and were engage in
various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for the separation of
their properties. She further alleged that her husband aside from abandoning her, also
mismanaged their conjugal properties. On the other hand, Severino contended that he had
always visited the conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite his
frequent absences when he was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their business.
Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard
Factory although he paid short visits in the conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella.
The latter suspected that her husband had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the
urgency of the separation of property for the fear that her husband might squander and
dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.

ISSUE: WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON there has
been an abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and support of
the family. To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must have
willfully and with intention of not coming back and perpetual separation. There must be real
abandonment and not mere separation. In fact, the husband never failed to give monthly
financial support as admitted by the wife. This negates the intention of coming home to the
conjugal abode. The plaintiff even testified that the husband paid short visits implying
more than one visit. Likewise, as testified by the manager of one of their businesses, the
wife has been drawing a monthly allowance of P1,000-1,500 that was given personally by
the defendant or the witness himself.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as
administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the business
constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to exist, there must be a willful and
utter disregard of the interest of the partnership evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts
or omissions prejudicial to the latter.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. URSULA SENSANO G.R. No. L-37720
March 27, 1933 .
Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. They had one child.
Shortly after the birth of his child, the husband left his wife to go to the Province of Cagayan
where he remained for three years without writing to his wife or sending her anything for the
support of herself and their son. Poor and illiterate, without relatives upon whom she could
call, she struggled for an existence for herself and her son until a fatal day when she met
the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child to live with him. On the return of
the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery
and both were sentenced to four months and one day. The court, in its decision, stated the
following: "In the opinion of the court, the husband of the accused has been somewhat cruel
in his treatment of his wife having abandoned her as he did." After completing her sentence,
the accused left her wife. She thereupon appealed to this municipal president and the
justice of the peace to send for her husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him
to take her back. At the house of the president she begged his pardon and promised to be a
faithful wife if he would take her back. He refused to pardon her to live with her and said she
could go where she wished, that he would have nothing more to do with her, and she could
do as she pleased. Abandoned for the second time, she and her child went back to her coaccused Marcelo Ramos (this was in the year 1924) and they have lived with him ever since.
The husband, knowing that she resumed living with her codefendant in 1924, did nothing to
interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as husband. Shortly thereafter he left for
the Territory of Hawaii where she remained for seven years completely abandoning his said
wife and child. On his return to these Islands, he presented the second charge of adultery
here involved with the sole purpose, as he declared, of being able to obtain a divorce.
Issue:
Whether or not the husband is still entitled to his relief
Ruling:
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders. Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose
when he signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to the conclusion
that the evidence in this case and his conduct warrant the inference that he consented to
the adulterous relations existing between the accused and therefore he is not authorized by
law to institute this criminal proceeding.We cannot accept the argument of the AttorneyGeneral that the seven years of acquiescence on his part in the adultery of his wife is
explained by his absence from the Philippine Islands during which period it was impossible
for him to take any action against the accused. There is no merit in the argument that it was

impossible for the husband to take any action against the accused during the said seven
years.

BUGAYONG V GINEZ
FACTS:
August 27, 1949: Bugayong married Ginez
Bugayong serviceman in the US Navy
Bugayong began receiving letters from his sister-in-law informing him of alleged acts of
infidelity of his wife
October 1951: Bugayong sought the advice of Navy chaplain as to the propriety of a legal
separation
August 1952: Bugayong went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife
Bugayong and Geniz proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong (cousin) and stayed and
lived together for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife.
They repaired Bugayongs house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife.
2nd day: Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that
she had committed adultery. Instead of answering, Geniz packed up and left, which
Bugayong took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her
November 18, 1952: Bugayong filed a complaint for legal separation against Geniz
Geniz vehemently denied the averments of the complaint
Motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(1) Assuming arguendo the truth of the allegations of the commission of "acts of rank
infidelity amounting to adultery", the cause of action, if any, is barred by the statute of
limitations;
(2) That under the same assumption, the act charged have been condoned by the
plaintiff-husband; and
(3) That the complaint failed to state a cause of action sufficient for this court to render a
valid judgment.
Court ordered the dismissal of the case on the 2nd ground (condonation)
Assignment of errors brought to CA:
Premature dismissal of case; In finding that there were condonation on Bugayongs part; and
in entertaining condonation as a ground for dismissal inasmuch as same was not raised in
the answer or in a motion to dismiss.
Case lifted to SC Question of law
ISSUE: WON Act of sleeping with wife for two days was already a sign of condonation to the
infidelity she allegedly committed
HELD: YES
- definition: conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial
offense which the latter has committed; forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a
ground for legal separation
o may be express or implied
o US jurisprudence shows that one single act of sexual intercourse implies condonation
condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other infidelity.
such acts necessary implied forgiveness. It is entirely consonant with reason and justice that
if the wife freely consents to sexual intercourse after she has full knowledge of the
husband's guilt, her consent should operate as a pardon of his wrong."
- In this case slept with her for 2 nights and 1 day after almost ten months after he came to
know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.
Thus falls under exemptions in Article 100 of NCC: The legal separation may be claimed only
by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage
Matubis v. Praxedes
109 Phil 789
Facts: Socorro MatubisZoilo Praxedes (1/10/43). But from 5/30/44 they lived separately
from each other. They had an agreement on4/3/48 where:
They relinquish their rights over each other as h & w

 That they cannot prosecute each other for concubinage or adultery (condonation)
That each is no longer entitled to support from the other spouse
Neither can claim anything from each other
On Jan 1955, Zoilo cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado who gave birth on Sept. 1955 and
recorded as Zoilos. they also publicly appeared as h&w.
Socorro then filed on 4/24/56 @CFI CamSur for legsep and change of surname against
husband due to abandonment and concubinage.
TC declared that Zoilos acts constitutes concubinage but dismissed complaint due to:
CC 102 said action for legsep can only be filed a year after such grounds have arisen.
Socorro said to have known cohab of Zoilo since Jan 1955 but action was filed on
4/24/56 which was outside reglementary period
CC 100 legsep can be invoked by innocent spouse, i.e. that there was no condonation.
But agreement b/w Zoilo and Socorro showed that there was condonation (Exhibit B of their
agreement)
Therefore this petition.
ISSUE: WON TC erred in saying that petitioner filed her case for legal separation out of time
and cannot claim it since she is not an innocent spouse
HELD: YES
- knew of legal separation on Jan 1955 but only made the complaint on April 24, 1956
o Art 102 of NCC provides for time one can file for legal separation
- As shown in the agreement she condoned and consented to (1) living separately (2) can
commit grounds for legal separation ie concubinage
Condonation and consent are expressed thus cannot claim to be innocent spouse which law
provides for (NCC 100)

BROWN V YAMBAO
FACTS:
July 14, 1955: Brown filed suit for legal separation from Yambao
Alleged under oath:
While he interned by the Japanese invaders from 1942 5o 1945 at UST interment camp,
Yambao engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl
that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment
that thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a document liquidating their
conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share.
Complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children;
that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as
might be just and equitable.
Court directed City Fiscal or his representatives to investigate (CC101)
Through the City Fiscals questioning, it was revealed that after liberation, Brown lived
maritally with another woman and had begotten children by her
Court denied petition for legal separation on the ground
that while the wifes adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar
nature that barred his right of action under CC100 (Where both spouses are offenders, a
legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them)
that there had been consent and connivance
Browns action had prescribed under CC 102 (An action for legal separation cannot be filed
within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause
and within 5 years from and after date when such cause occurred.
ISSUE: WON findings of City Fiscal Rafael Jose that Brown lived with another woman after
war and had children with her can stop him from legal separation proceedings
HELD: YES
Define collusion: the act of married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual consent,
whether by preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in
pursuance of agreement to defend divorce proceedings"

- legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the
inference that the wife's default was calculated (emphasis of marriage as more than mere
contract)
o NCC Art 100 now bars him from filing legal separation since he is also guilty of
concubinage
o NCC Article 102 also bars him since he filed out of time.
Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of
his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945
can not be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of
the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.
Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio
43 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August
1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days.
They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943
when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage.
Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go
Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which
among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of
the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties
adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed,
respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular
accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to
dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition
was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the
death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel moved to
substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal
separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights
are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes
during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more
radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be
no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for
partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

ELENA CONTRERAS vs. CESAR J. MACARAIG

G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952. Out of their Marriage, three
children were born. All the children are in the care of plaintiff wife.In September, 1962,

Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong
with one Lily Ann Alcala. Defendant would be away for a month, and would be home for
three days. During
these times defendant was home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos report in her
desire not to
anger defendant. Plaintiff also heard rumors that Lily Ann Alcala gave birth to a baby.
Plaintiff then entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to
convince him to return to his family. Defendant however told his father that he could not do
anything. Thereafter, plaintiff met with Lili Ann Alcala. The latter informed that former that
she was willing to give defendant but it was defendant who refused to break relationship
with her. In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff went to talk to defendant at his place
of work where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to
the conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed
plaintiff that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate
family.On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not prescription has already set in
Ruling:
The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year
after the date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of
the essence of the cause of action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an
inviolable social institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a
disruption of its status.The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year
provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should be counted, as far as the instant case is
concerned from September 1962 or from December 1963. After a careful review of the
record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only time when appellant really
became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of December 1963
when plaintiff pleaded the defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala. From all the foregoing We
conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the preceding paragraph when her
husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann to return
to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to decide
whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the legal period
of one year must be deemed to have commenced. The one year prescriptive period is thus
followed in this case.
SAMOSA RAMOS V VAMENTA
FACTS:
on 6/18/71 petitioner Lucy Samosa filed for legsep for concubinage and attempt against her
life. She also sought for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of
what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property (under admin and
management of priv resp). Clemente Ramos (priv resp) opposed such saying that hearing
the pet for injunction would only make the prospect of reconciliation dim.
CFI Judge Vamenta Jr granted such motion to suspend hearing on the injunction. And thus
this certiorari
ISSUE: WON preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy on
exclusive property of wife that is currently being administered by her husband can be tried
in court even before the 6-month period allotted in cases of legal separation
HELD: YES
- Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary
injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period.
- Art 103 provides that in cases where court deems proper, it can appoint another to
manage property between husband and wife.
o In this case her paraphernal property
o Would show that it is not an aggravating circumstacnce to the prescribed 6-month period
deemed as the cooling off period

In any case, more than 6 months have already passed thus court can hear both legal
separtion and mandatory injunction.

De la Vina v. VillarealJuly 31, 1920, Johnson, J.

Facts:Geopano, wife, filed a complaint of divorce (Sept. 17, 1917) in RTC Iloilo against her
husband de la Vinaon the ground of concubinage (which was allegedly occurring since
1913). When she learned of the illicitrelationship, she was ejected from the conjugal home.
She prayed for a decree of divorce, partition of conjugal property, and alimony pendente.
After filing the complaint, she presented a motion forpreliminary injunction to restrain her
husband from alienating or encumbering the conjugal property.Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007
Persons Digests v1.0 Page No. 34 Respondent Judge Villareal granted themotion. Husband
filed present case of petition for certiorari on the ground that judge had no jurisdictionto
take cognizance of the action and exceeded his power and authority in issuing preliminary
injunction.
Issue/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON a married woman may ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of
her husbandduring the existence of a subsisting marriage.
Yes. The general rule of law that the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband is not
an absoluterule. The husband unlawfully ejected the wife from the conjugal home to have
illicit relations with another woman. Continued cohabitation would give the impression of the
wifes condonation. A wife may acquire a separate residence where the husband has given
cause for divorce.
(2) WON in an action for divorce, where conjugal property is concerned, a preliminary
injunction may beissued to restrain a spouse from alienating/encumbering conjugal property
during the pendency of theaction.
Yes. Plaintiff contends that husband is granted power to alienate and encumber the conjugal
propertywithout the consent of the wife. This only holds true as long as a harmonious
relationship exists. When such relation ceases, the husbands powers of administration
should be curtailed during the pendency of action to protect the interests of the wife.

Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
88 SCRA 803
Facts:
1. January 18, 1958: Manuel J. C. Reyes m Celia Ilustre-Reyes
2. They had children
3. March 10, 1976: Manuel attacked Celia by
a. fist blows
b. bumping her head against the cement floor
c. pushing her down the 13-flight stairs
d. hitting her in the abdomen that floored her half unconscious
4. May 11, 1976: She left their office
5. May 26, 1976: She returned to get her overnight bag
a. Manuel demanded that she get out but she ignored him
b. Hence, he
i. doused her with grape juice
ii. kicked her
iii. attempted to hit her with a steel tray but was stopped by her driver
6. June 3, 1976: By Celia Ilustre-Reyes against Manuel J. C. Reyes

a. Action for support pendente lite

b. Legal separation he had attempted to kill her
7. Contentions of Manuel
a. Celia committed adultery with her physician
b. She is thus not entitled to support and if she was, the assigned amount of P4000 by the
Court was excessive
Issue/s: WON Celia is entitled to support pendent lite
Held: Yep
1. Adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support BUT only if proven
a. In fact, adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the
action
b. BUT it must be established by competent evidence and not merely alleged
i. During hearing of the application for support pendente lite, Manuel did not present any
evidence to prove his allegation
ii. During hearing of the application for action for legal separation, Manuel did not present
any evidence to prove his allegation
c. YET Celia asked for support pending litigation from their conjugal partnership and not
necessarily from Manuels private funds
2. Determination of Amount
a. Celia was unemployed and without funds
b. All their conjugal properties, including corporations where Manuel is President, Manager
and Treasurer, are in the possession of Manuel
i. Standard Mineral Products earning P85,654.61
ii. Development and Technology Consultant Inc. earning P98,879.84
iii. The Contra-Prop Marine Philippines, Inc.
iv. That these companies have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of the Ministry
of Public Highways
c. The amount was reduced from P5000 since their children are in the custody of Manuel
d. In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite
i. not necessary to go fully into the merits of the case
ii. sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem
sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application
iii. in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered
mere affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record may satisfy the court
to pass upon the application for support pendente lite.
AIDA P. BAEZ vs. GABRIEL B. BAEZ
G.R. No. 132592 January 23, 2002
Facts:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, decided Civil Case No.
CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Baez
and
respondent Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual infidelity; the dissolution of
their conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of
respondents
one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children. Defendant then
filed a Notice of Appeal before the appellate court. Petitioner however contends that an
action for legal separation is among the cases where multiple appeals may be taken.
She concludes that respondents appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to file the
record
on appeal within the reglementary period.
.
Issue:
Whether or not multiple appeals form part of the procedure for legal separation cases.
Ruling:

In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of
multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to
the same lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that
case would only be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals. The same holds true
in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to the
same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as
entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal
separation. They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and
become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere
incidents of legal separation. Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals..
Cervantes v. Fajardo
169 SCRA 575
FACTS:
Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with this court over the person of the minor Angelie
Anne Cervantes.
Mino was born on Feb. 14, 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who
are common-law husband and wife.
Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreons sister and brother in law,
the petitioners.
Petitioner spouses took care and custody of the child when she was barely 2 weeks old.
An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners was also
executed by respondent Gina
The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioenrs over the child
RTC rendered a decision granting the petition
Angelie Anne Fajardo Cervantes
Sometime in March or April 1987, petitioners received a letter from respondents
demanding to be paid P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child.
Petitioners refused to accede to the demand
Sept. 11, 1987: respondent Gina took the child from her yaya at the petitioners
residence on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Gino brought the
child to her house
Petitioners demanded the return of the child but Gina refused

ISSUES:
WON the writ should be granted.
HELD:
YES
o Respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina
his open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor that desireable atmosphere
o Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with full knowledge and consent of
respondents
A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in
natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of
the natural parent of the adopted

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA
MASAUDING G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
Facts:

Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City
where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed
as a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse.
Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a
common law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese,
was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got
married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and
given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988. The relationship of the couple
deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving their marriage a second
chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went
back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his
assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to
Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting
the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for
habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and
declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to
be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be
granted.
Ruling:
The SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the custody
of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already
caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral
values against the children. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of
the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications,
Reynaldo is a fit person. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their
mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.

PABLO-GUALBERTO VS. GUALBERTO V

Facts:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendent lite of their almost 4
year old son, Rafaello, whom herwife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his
school when she left him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to
appear despitenotice.

A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child as
shevery often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child
Another witness testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife ishaving
lesbian relations.

Court of Appeals - The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this
time awarded the custody of the child to the mother.

Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as provided
in Art 213 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother. (Yes,
Crisanto did not present sufficient evidence against the fitness of the mother that will
compel the court to rule against the mandatory character of Art. 213)
Held:
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court shall take into
account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of
age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise, This Court
has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision
governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil
Code, w/c reads:
Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property of children, the
latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under
seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling
reason for such measure.

Order of the RTC only temporary custody

Provisional & subject to change as circumstance may warrant

Art. 213 mandatory in character

No evidence that the son was exposed to the mothers alleged sexual proclivities
(lesbian) or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result

David vs. Court of Appeals

250 SCRA 82, November 16, 1995
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a
rich businessman.
2. Private respondent is a married man and a father.
3. However, despite this, Daisie and Ramon cohabited
4. Out of this union, Christopher J., was born (on March 9, 1985).
5. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on
June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
6. The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher
J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to
Villar's legal wife.
7. the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually
accepted by his legal family.
8. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to
go with his family to Boracay.
9. Daisie agreed.
10. but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child.
11. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus.
Respondents:
a. Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may be decided
in a habeas corpus case contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each
other but are separated
b. respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he being a very rich businessman; whereas,
petitioner-appellee depends upon her sisters and parents for support. In fact, he financially
supported petitioner-appellee and her three minor children. It is, therefore, for the best
interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondentappellant
ISSUE:

Whether or not the child should be given back to Daisie.

HELD:
YES.

REASON 1:
Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private
respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As
such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of
his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have
custody of him.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering
him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child.
REASON 2:
Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." 3
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years
of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC (reckoning time), cannot
be taken from the mother's custody.
Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to
be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under
Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of
age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in
any way `unfit to have custody of her child.
Rebuttals of respondnets arguments
On A. Rule 1021 1 (the rule on habeas corpus) makes no distinction between the case of a
mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that
of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is
deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
On B. Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the
custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support
them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to
P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She augments her income by
working as secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of
P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally attend to
her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during the
day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is
not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the
family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it
what it is

LAXAMANA V LAXAMANA
Facts:
- 1984 Raymond Laxamana and Lourdes Laxamana got married. Their marriage blessed them with three
children
- 1991-1996 Raymond became drug-dependent and was in and out of facilities
- 1997 Raymond was declared drug-free by the court. However he allegedly became violent and irritable
leading to Lourdes leaving him on 1999 along with her three children
- Aug 1999 Raymond filed a writ of habeas corpus for custody his three children while Lourdes filed for
the annulment of their marriage
- Sept 27 1999 Raymond amended the petition to visitation rights instead. TC granted this. They also
asked both to undergo a psych evaluation, which TC would then use to resolve the case as agreed upon by
both parties. Psych evaluations showed that he was still not completely cured of his drug addiction even if
his drug urine test was negative. However, TC still granted him visitation rights and gave custody to
Lourdes.
ISSUE: WON TCs decision that is based on the psych evaluations considered the paramount interest and
welfare of the children
HELD: NO
- TC should have still conducted a trial after the psych evaluations even if both Raymond and Lourdes
agreed that such tests would resolve the issue of custody. To base it solely on the psych evaluations is
insufficient to justify the TCs decision as seen in the ff:
o History of drug dependence presented does not show his moral, financial, and social well-being
o Fact that psych evaluation said he was not completely cured is not corroborated with other evidence that
he is unfit to provide for and support the children.
o TC also did not ask children who they wanted to live with since as they are above 7 years, they are
permitted to choose which parent they want to stay with at the discretion of the court.
Only said there was indications of fear of his drug-dependency
RESULT: case is remanded to RTC for proper trial.
Matute v. Macadaeg
99 Phil 340
Facts:
- Armado Medel filed legal separation form Rosario Matute after finding out her relationship with his
brother, Ernesto Medel. Custody of children was granted to him
- When he left for US, he left children to care of sister. Rosario also lived there too.
- March 1955 children moved to Cebu to live with Father
- April 1955 Rosario asked for permission to bring children to Manila to attend her fathers funeral.
Armado said okay as long as they come back after two weeks
- Rosario filed for custody of children and support for them.
Court of First Instance denied her request and ordered her to give back children
o Asked for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to to cease and desist from enforcing in
any way the order of the respondent Court dated June 19, 1965, and after hearing, to annul the said Order
and to award the custody of the children to your petitioner.
ISSUE: WON she can be granted custody of children
HELD: NO
- Reasons given: 1) she is their legitimate mother and they wish to stay with her, not their father Armando
Medel; (2) three (3) of the children are over ten (10) years of age, and, hence, their aforementioned wish
must, pursuant to Rule 100, section 6, of the Rules of Court, be heeded, unless "the parent so chosen be
unfit to take charge" of them "by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity or poverty";
(3) the act of infidelity of which she had been found guilty in the decision of November 6, 1952, does not
involve "moral depravity"; (4) in any event, it is a thing of the past, not a present reality; (5) respondent
Armando Medel is now unfit to have the children under his care, for he is living maritally with a woman by
the name of Paz Jesusa Concepcion; and (6) although he had married the latter, after securing in the
United States a decree of divorce dissolving his marriage with petitioner herein, said decree is null and
void and, accordingly, he is guilty of bigamy.

- Custody of children she has now was only given by Armado thus he is free to ask for them back. The
abuse of discretion given is not a very grave one and she is poor and as said living under the charity of her
brothers.
- sections 1 and 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, reading:
- "SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy, end adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board, or officer as the law requires,
with costs.
- "SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal corporation board, or person,
whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from
further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, with costs."
Petition is denied.
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner v. SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN,Respondent
.
G.R. No. 168785 : February 5, 2010CARPIO,
J.:
Facts:

Herald, American, and Sharon, Filipino, were

married in Manila in April 1994.
They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on September 21, 1995.

In June 1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree

from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court). In its ruling, the Illinois
court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of
Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.

On January 28, 2002,

both executed in Manila a contract for joint custody over Stephanie.

In 2004,
Herald filed a case against Sharon alleging that Sharon had exercised sole custody over Stephanie contrary
to their agreement.
o
The trial court held that (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois
courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of
Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the nationality rule
prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of
the Civil Code prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction and dismissed the case.
Issue:
WON the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit and enforce the Agreement on
the joint custody of the parties child
Held/ Rationale:
The trial courts refusal to entertain petitioners suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on
its thinking that the Illinois courts divorce decree stripped itof jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded.
What the Illinois court retained was jurisdictionx x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the
various provisions of [its] Judgment forDissolution. Petitioners suit seeks the enforcement not of the
various provisions of thedivorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus,
the actionlies beyond the zone of the Illinois courts so-called retained jurisdiction.
Laperal vs. Republic
GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962
FACTS:

The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March
1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she
ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this
petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City
Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that
continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual
liquidation of the conjugal assets.
ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision
of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband.
HELD:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the
vinculum. The finding that petitioners continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion
in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal
separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically
been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to
hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
Petition was dismissed.

SANTOS, SR V CA
242 SCRA 407
Leouel and Julia had placed their child into the care of the lattersparents ever since the child was born.
The grandparents were the oneswho provided support for the child, since Leouel cannot afford to do
so.Julia then left for the States to work but louelle does not know where.The grandparents claim that Julia
has been sending financial support toher son.
On September 1990, Leouel abducted the child from his grandparents.The grandparents then filed for
custody of the boy, which the trial courtgranted.
Leouel appealed, stating that the respondents have failed to show thehe is unfit to be the father and that
the substitute parental authoritygranted to the boys grandparents was inappropriate.
The respondents claim that they are financially well-off to take care of the son, while Leouel is not. They
can provide the child with an air-conditioned room since he is asthmatic.
Also, Julia has entrusted the boy to them. Leouels use of trickery toabduct the child also is a sign of his
unfitness. They likewise claim thatthey are in the best position to take care of the child, and this should
bethe primary consideration of the court
.ISSUE: WON Leouel should be awarded proper custody
HELD:
Yes. The father, Leouel was not shown to be an unfit parent. The factthat he kidnapped his son from the
latters maternal grandparents does notrender him unfit. Also, disqualifying him as custodian because of
the natureof his work (soldier) would mean depriving all soldiers of their childscompany. Only in cases of
death, absence or unsuitability of parents maysubstitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparents.

Theright of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority
or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and
protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter' s needs.
7
It is a mass of rights and obligations which thelaw grants to parents for the purpose of the children's
physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of
their heart and senses.
8
As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty but a sacred trust for thewelfare of the minor."