CIVIL LIABILITY

that said Lydia C. Hao was never present during the Annual Stockholders Meeting
held on April 30, 1994 and neither has participated in the proceedings thereof to the

[G.R. NO. 150793 : November 19, 2004]

prejudice of public interest and in violation of public faith and destruction of truth as

FRANCIS CHUA, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA C.

HAO, Respondents.

therein proclaimed.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner assails the Decision,1 dated June 14, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 57070, affirming the Order, dated October 5, 1999, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19. The RTC reversed the Order, dated April 26,
1999, of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 22. Also challenged
by herein petitioner is the CA Resolution,2 dated November 20, 2001, denying his
Motion for Reconsideration.

Thereafter, the City Prosecutor filed the Information docketed as Criminal Case No.
2857216 for falsification of public document, before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila, Branch 22, against Francis Chua but dismissed the accusation
against Elsa Chua.
Herein petitioner, Francis Chua, was arraigned and trial ensued thereafter.
During the trial in the MeTC, private prosecutors Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Atty.
Ariel Bruno Rivera appeared as private prosecutors and presented Hao as their first
witness.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On February 28, 1996, private respondent Lydia Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty
Corporation, filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of Manila charging
Francis Chua and his wife, Elsa Chua, of four counts of falsification of public
documents pursuant to Article 1723 in relation to Article 1714 of the Revised Penal
Code. The charge reads:
That on or about May 13, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
being then a private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of falsification upon a public document, to wit: the said
accused prepared, certified, and falsified the Minutes of the Annual Stockholders
meeting of the Board of Directors of the Siena Realty Corporation, duly notarized
before a Notary Public, Atty. Juanito G. Garcia and entered in his Notarial Registry

After Hao's testimony, Chua moved to exclude complainant's counsels as private

prosecutors in the case on the ground that Hao failed to allege and prove any civil
liability in the case.
In an Order, dated April 26, 1999, the MeTC granted Chua's motion and ordered the
complainant's counsels to be excluded from actively prosecuting Criminal Case No.
285721. Hao moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, Hao filed a petition for certiorari docketed as SCA No. 99-94846,7 entitled
Lydia C. Hao, in her own behalf and for the benefit of Siena Realty Corporation v.
Francis Chua, and the Honorable Hipolito dela Vega, Presiding Judge, Branch 22,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 19.
The RTC gave due course to the petition and on October 5, 1999, the RTC in an
order reversed the MeTC Order. The dispositive portion reads:

as Doc No. 109, Page 22, Book No. IV and Series of 1994, and therefore, a public
document, by making or causing it to appear in said Minutes of the Annual

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent Court is ordered to allow

Stockholders Meeting that one LYDIA HAO CHUA was present and has participated

the intervention of the private prosecutors in behalf of petitioner Lydia C. Hao in the

in said proceedings, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused fully well knew

prosecution of the civil aspect of Crim. Case No. 285721, before Br. 22 [MeTC],

Manila, allowing Attys. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Ariel Bruno Rivera to actively

act should not divest the Corporation of its right to be a party and present its own
claim for damages.

participate in the proceedings.

SO ORDERED.8
Chua moved for reconsideration which was denied.
Dissatisfied, Chua filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari . The
petition alleged that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in: (1)
refusing to consider material facts; (2) allowing Siena Realty Corporation to be
impleaded as co-petitioner in SCA No. 99-94846 although it was not a party to the
criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 285721; and (3) effectively amending the
information against the accused in violation of his constitutional rights.
On June 14, 2001, the appellate court promulgated its assailed Decision denying the
petition, thus:

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated

November 20, 2001.
Hence, this petition alleging that the Court of Appeals committed reversible errors:
I. - IN RULING THAT LYDIA HAO'S FILING OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 285721
WAS IN THE NATURE OF A DERIVATIVE SUIT
II. - IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF JUDGE DAGUNA THAT SIENA
REALTY WAS A PROPER PETITIONER IN SCA NO. [99-94846]
III. - IN UPHOLDING JUDGE DAGUNA'S DECISION ALLOWING LYDIA
HAO'S COUNSEL TO CONTINUE AS PRIVATE PROSECUTORS IN CRIMINAL

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE

CASE NO. 285721

and DISMISSED. The Order, dated October 5, 1999 as well as the Order, dated
December 3, 1999, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

IV. - IN [OMITTING] TO CONSIDER AND RULE UPON THE ISSUE THAT

JUDGE DAGUNA ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT

SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner had argued before the Court of Appeals that respondent had no authority
whatsoever to bring a suit in behalf of the Corporation since there was no Board
Resolution authorizing her to file the suit.
For her part, respondent Hao claimed that the suit was brought under the concept of a
derivative suit. Respondent maintained that when the directors or trustees refused to
file a suit even when there was a demand from stockholders, a derivative suit was
allowed.
The Court of Appeals held that the action was indeed a derivative suit, for it alleged
that petitioner falsified documents pertaining to projects of the corporation and made
it appear that the petitioner was a stockholder and a director of the corporation.
According to the appellate court, the corporation was a necessary party to the
petition filed with the RTC and even if private respondent filed the criminal case, her

DISMISSING THE PETITION IN SCA NO. [99-94846] FOR BEING A SHAM

PLEADING.10
The pertinent issues in this petition are the following: (1) Is the criminal complaint in
the nature of a derivative suit? (2) Is Siena Realty Corporation a proper petitioner in
SCA No. 99-94846? and (3) Should private prosecutors be allowed to actively
participate in the trial of Criminal Case No. 285721.
On the first issue, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred when (1) it
sustained the lower court in giving due course to respondent's petition in SCA No.
99-94846 despite the fact that the Corporation was not the private complainant in
Criminal Case No. 285721, and (2) when it ruled that Criminal Case No. 285721 was
in the nature of a derivative suit.
Petitioner avers that a derivative suit is by nature peculiar only to intra-corporate
proceedings and cannot be made part of a criminal action. He cites the case of

Western Institute of Technology, Inc. v. Salas,11 where the court said that an appeal
on the civil aspect of a criminal case cannot be treated as a derivative suit. Petitioner
asserts that in this case, the civil aspect of a criminal case cannot be treated as a
derivative suit, considering that Siena Realty Corporation was not the private
complainant.
Petitioner misapprehends our ruling in Western Institute. In that case, we said:
Here, however, the case is not a derivative suit but is merely an appeal on the civil
aspect of Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 filed with the RTC of Iloilo for
estafa and falsification of public document. Among the basic requirements for a
derivative suit to prosper is that the minority shareholder who is suing for and on
behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint before the proper forum that
he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all other
shareholders similarly situated who wish to join. . . .This was not complied with by
the petitioners either in their complaint before the court a quo nor in the instant
petition which, in part, merely states that "this is a Petition for Review
onCertiorari on pure questions of law to set aside a portion of the RTC decision in
Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098" since the trial court's judgment of acquittal
failed to impose civil liability against the private respondents. By no amount of
equity considerations, if at all deserved, can a mere appeal on the civil aspect of a
criminal case be treated as a derivative suit.12
Moreover, in Western Institute, we said that a mere appeal in the civil aspect cannot
be treated as a derivative suit because the appeal lacked the basic requirement that it
must be alleged in the complaint that the shareholder is suing on a derivative cause
of action for and in behalf of the corporation and other shareholders who wish to
join.
Under Section 3613 of the Corporation Code, read in relation to Section 23,14 where a
corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its board of directors
or trustees.15 An individual stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative suit on
behalf of the corporation wherein he holds stocks in order to protect or vindicate
corporate rights, whenever the officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the
ones to be sued, or hold the control of the corporation. In such actions, the suing

stockholder is regarded as a nominal party, with the corporation as the real party in
interest.16
A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action.
The corporation is a necessary party to the suit. And the relief which is granted is a
judgment against a third person in favor of the corporation. Similarly, if a
corporation has a defense to an action against it and is not asserting it, a stockholder
may intervene and defend on behalf of the corporation.17
Under the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.18 When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. 19
In Criminal Case No. 285721, the complaint was instituted by respondent against
petitioner for falsifying corporate documents whose subject concerns corporate
projects of Siena Realty Corporation. Clearly, Siena Realty Corporation is an
offended party. Hence, Siena Realty Corporation has a cause of action. And the civil
case for the corporate cause of action is deemed instituted in the criminal action.
However, the board of directors of the corporation in this case did not institute the
action against petitioner. Private respondent was the one who instituted the action.
Private respondent asserts that she filed a derivative suit in behalf of the corporation.
This assertion is inaccurate. Not every suit filed in behalf of the corporation is a
derivative suit. For a derivative suit to prosper, it is required that the minority
stockholder suing for and on behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint
that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all
other stockholders similarly situated who may wish to join him in the suit.20 It is a
condition sine qua non that the corporation be impleaded as a party because not only
is the corporation an indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it must be
served with process. The judgment must be made binding upon the corporation in
order that the corporation may get the benefit of the suit and may not bring
subsequent suit against the same defendants for the same cause of action. In other
words, the corporation must be joined as party because it is its cause of action that is
being litigated and because judgment must be a res adjudicata against it.21
In the criminal complaint filed by herein respondent, nowhere is it stated that she is
filing the same in behalf and for the benefit of the corporation. Thus, the criminal
complaint including the civil aspect thereof could not be deemed in the nature of a
derivative suit.

We turn now to the second issue, is the corporation a proper party in the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC? Note that the case was titled "Lydia C.
Hao, in her own behalf and for the benefit of Siena Realty Corporation v. Francis
Chua, and the Honorable Hipolito dela Vega, Presiding Judge, Branch 22,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila." Petitioner before us now claims that the
corporation is not a private complainant in Criminal Case No. 285721, and thus
cannot be included as appellant in SCA No. 99-94846.

In the instant case, we find that the recourse of the complainant to the respondent
Court of Appeals was proper. The petition was brought in her own name and in
behalf of the Corporation. Although, the corporation was not a complainant in the
criminal action, the subject of the falsification was the corporation's project and the
falsified documents were corporate documents. Therefore, the corporation is a proper
party in the petition for certiorari because the proceedings in the criminal case
directly and adversely affected the corporation.

Petitioner invokes the case of Ciudad Real & Dev't. Corporation v. Court of
Appeals.22 In Ciudad Real, it was ruled that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion when it upheld the standing of Magdiwang Realty Corporation as
a party to the petition for certiorari , even though it was not a party-in-interest in the
civil case before the lower court.

We turn now to the third issue. Did the Court of Appeals and the lower court err in
allowing private prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of Criminal Case No.
285721?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In the present case, respondent claims that the complaint was filed by her not only in
her personal capacity, but likewise for the benefit of the corporation. Additionally,
she avers that she has exhausted all remedies available to her before she instituted
the case, not only to claim damages for herself but also to recover the damages
caused to the company.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,23 when a trial court commits a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the person aggrieved
can file a special civil action for certiorari . The aggrieved parties in such a case are
the State and the private offended party or complainant.24
In a string of cases, we consistently ruled that only a party-in-interest or those
aggrieved may file certiorari cases. It is settled that the offended parties in criminal
cases have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file special
civil action of prohibition and certiorari .25
In Ciudad Real, cited by petitioner, we held that the appellate court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it sanctioned the standing of a corporation to join said
petition for certiorari , despite the finality of the trial court's denial of its Motion for
Intervention and the subsequent Motion to Substitute and/or Join as Party/Plaintiff.
26

Note, however, that in Pastor, Jr. v. Court of Appeals we held that if aggrieved, even
a non-party may institute a petition for certiorari . In that case, petitioner was the
holder in her own right of three mining claims and could file a petition
for certiorari , the fastest and most feasible remedy since she could not intervene in
the probate of her father-in-law's estate.27

Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo,28 holding that where from the nature
of the offense or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not
provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of
the offense.
Petitioner's contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from
crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly
liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society
in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated;
and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or
property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act
or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives
rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage
to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation
and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to
another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part
of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime.29 The civil action
involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes
restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential
damages.30
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in
the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by
counsel in the prosecution of the offense.31 Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."

Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to
institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the
offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial
of the criminal action.
Petitioner avers, however, that respondent's testimony in the inferior court did not
establish nor prove any damages personally sustained by her as a result of
petitioner's alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that since no personal
damages were proven therein, then the participation of her counsel as private
prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is not
necessary and is without basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken
of the damages claimed and the court should determine who are the persons entitled
to such indemnity. The civil liability arising from the crime may be determined in the
criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does
not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant.
Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be
allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.32
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the
offended party institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be
allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the
offense committed, and the private offended party has the right to intervene through
the private prosecutors.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision, dated June 14, 2001,
and the Resolution, dated November 20, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 57070, affirming the Order, dated October 5, 1999, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, are AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the private
prosecutors are hereby allowed to intervene in behalf of private respondent Lydia
Hao in the prosecution of the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 285721 before
Branch 22, of Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

employees civil liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the
employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed
the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing
Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the employer, however,
arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these
requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the
employees conviction and upon proof of the latters insolvency. Needless to say, the
case at bar satisfies all these requirements.
2. ID.; ID.; MAY BE DETERMINED AND ENFORCED IN THE CRIMINAL
CASE AS PART OF THE EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS. We are not convinced
that the owner-operator has been deprived of his day in court, because the case
before us is not one wherein the operator is sued for a primary liability under the
Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent
upon his employees criminal negligence is sought to be enforced. Considering the
subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in
effect a party to the criminal case. Ergo, the employers subsidiary liability may be
determined and enforced in the criminal case as part of the execution proceedings
against the employee.

CIVIL LIABILITY; PERSONS CIVILLY LIABLE

[G.R. No. 84516. December 5, 1989.]
DIONISIO CARPIO, Petitioner, v. HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge,
MTC Branch IV, Zamboanga City) and EDWIN RAMIREZ Y
WEE, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY OF AN EMPLOYER;
REQUISITES. In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRANT OF A MOTION FOR A SUBSIDIARY WRIT OF

EXECUTION INCUMBENT UPON THE COURT UPON CONVICTION OF THE
EMPLOYEE. The position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant
the motion for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend its decision
which has already become final and executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the
owner-operator to pay on the basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute an
amendment of the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso
facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such being the case, the
subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the award was given, and
this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon
the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the
employer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is
returned unsatisfied due to the employees insolvency.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS;
GENERAL SUPERVISION OF COURTS OVER ITS PROCESS OF EXECUTION;
CARRIES WITH IT THE RIGHT DETERMINE TO EVERY QUESTION OF
FACT AND LAW. This Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v. Seeris, supra,
that "The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be
considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in
which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all
proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that
the court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its
process of execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine every
question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution."cralaw virtua1aw

library

365 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the decision handed down
on May 27, 1987 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

5. CRIMINAL LAW; SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYEE;

SEPARATE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE EMPLOYER NOT NECESSARY.
The filing of a separate complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary
liability is not necessary since his liability is clear from the decision against the
accused. Such being the case, it is not indispensable for the question of subsidiary
liability to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary liability is already
implied from the appellate courts decision. In the recent case of Vda. de Paman v.
Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the following pronouncement: "A
judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the
absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive
upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latters subsidiary liability
not only with regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to its amount." This
being the case, this Court stated in Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, that the court has
no other function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the
criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error
has been committed in the decision. A separate and independent action is, therefore,
unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim."
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition to review by certiorari the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV, which denied petitioners motion for
subsidiary writ of execution against the owner-operator of the vehicle which figured
in the accident.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Sometime on October 23, 1985, Accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while driving a
passenger Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio
Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as a consequence of which the latter suffered
from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the medico-legal certificate and sustained
injuries which required medical attention for a period of (3) three months.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries was
filed against Edwin Ramirez with the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City,
Branch IV. On January 14, 1987, the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser
offense and was accordingly convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less
Serious Physical Injuries under an amended information punishable under Article

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE guilty as a

principal beyond reasonable doubt of the Amended Information to which he
voluntarily pleaded guilty and appreciating this mitigating circumstance in his favor,
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of One (1) month and One (1) day to Two
(2) months of Arresto Mayor in its minimum period. The accused is likewise ordered
to indemnify the complainant Dionisio A. Carpio the amount of P45.00 representing
the value of the 1/2 can of tomatoes lost; the amount of P200.00 which complainant
paid to the Zamboanga General Hospital, to pay complainant the amount of
P1,500.00 as attorneys fees and to pay the cost of this suit.
"SO ORDERED." (p. 7, Rollo)
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation.
At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor manifested his desire to present
evidence to establish the civil liability of either the accused driver or the owneroperator of the vehicle. Accuseds counsel moved that the court summon the owner
of the vehicle to afford the latter a day in court, on the ground that the accused is not
only indigent but also jobless and thus cannot answer any civil liability that may be
imposed upon him by the court. The private prosecutor, however, did not move for
the appearance of Eduardo Toribio.
The civil aspect of the above-quoted decision was appealed by the private prosecutor
to the Regional Trial Court Branch XVI, appellant praying for moral damages in the
amount of P10,000.00, compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and attorneys fees of
P5,000.00. The appellate court, on January 20, 1988, modified the trial courts
decision, granting the appellant moral damages in the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00), while affirming all other civil liabilities.
Thereafter, a writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly served upon the
accused but was, however, returned unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused
as shown by the sheriffs return. Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of
execution against the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of the vehicle. The
same was denied by the trial court on two grounds, namely, the decision of the
appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo Toribio, and
the nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not "culpa-contractual."
A motion for reconsideration of the said order was disallowed for the reason that
complainant having failed to raise the matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate
court, said court rendered its decision which has become final and executory and the
trial court has no power to alter or modify such decision.
Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v. Seeris, 87 SCRA 275, which
enunciates that "the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator is fixed by the
judgment, because if a case were to be filed against said operator, the court called
upon to act thereto has no other function than to render a decision based on the
indemnity award in the criminal case without power to amend or modify it even if in
his opinion an error has been committed in the decision." Petitioner maintains that
the tenor of the aforesaid decision implies that the subsidiary liability of the owneroperator may be enforced in the same proceeding and a separate action is no longer
necessary in order to avoid undue delay, notwithstanding the fact that said employer
was not made a party in the criminal action.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator cannot be validly held
subsidiarily liable for the following reasons, namely: (a) the matter of subsidiary
liability was not raised on appeal; (b) contrary to the case of Pajarito v. Seeris, the
injuries sustained by the complainant did not arise from the so-called "culpacontractual" but from "culpa-aquiliana" ; (c) the judgments of appellate courts may
not be altered, modified, or changed by the court of origin; and (d) said owner was
never made a party to the criminal proceedings.
Thus, the underlying issue raised in this case is; whether or not the subsidiary
liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding
against the driver where the award was given, or in a separate civil action.
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of
the Revised Penal Code, which reads thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the net preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers, persons,
and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their
duties."cralaw virtua1aw library
Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seeris cannot be applied to the
present case, the former being an action involving culpa-contractual, while the latter
being one of culpa-aquiliana. Such a declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary liability
in Art. 103 should be distinguished from the primary liability of employers, which is
quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code. Under
Art. 103, the liability emanated from a delict. On the other hand, the liability under
Art. 2180 is founded on culpa- aquiliana. The present case is neither an action for
culpa-contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no
case can this be regarded as a civil action for the primary liability of the employer
under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa aquiliana.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employees civil
liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is

engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao,
117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after
conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employees conviction and
upon proof of the latters insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all
these requirements.
Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been deprived of his
day in court, because the case before us is not one wherein the operator is sued for a
primary liability under the Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability
incident to and dependent upon his employees criminal negligence is sought to be
enforced. Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he
is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case. Ergo, the employers
subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as part of
the execution proceedings against the employee. This Court held in the earlier case
of Pajarito v. Seeris, supra, that "The proceeding for the enforcement of the
subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the
execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded
as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit.
There is no question that the court which rendered the judgment has a general
supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries with it the
right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the
execution."cralaw virtua1aw library
The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable because the
matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in like manner, the
appellate courts decision made no mention of such subsidiary liability is of no
moment. As already discussed, the filing of a separate complaint against the operator
for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since his liability is clear from the
decision against the accused. Such being the case, it is not indispensable for the
question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such
subsidiary liability is already implied from the appellate courts decision. In the
recent case of Vda. de Paman v. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the
following pronouncement: "A judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant
employer to pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the defendant
and the offended party, is conclusive upon the employer in an action for the
enforcement of the latters subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil
liability, but also with regard to its amount." This being the case, this Court stated in
Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, that the court has no other function than to render
decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to
amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the decision.
A separate and independent action is, therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly
prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim."cralaw virtua1aw library
Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the motion

for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend its decision which has
already become final and executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owneroperator to pay on the basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute an
amendment of the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso
facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such being the case, the
subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the award was given, and
this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon
the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the
employer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is
returned unsatisfied due to the employees insolvency.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court disallowing the motion for subsidiary
writ of execution is hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is directed to hear and
decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-operator
of the passenger jitney. Costs against private Respondent.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a
review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accusedemployee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single
decision that has become final and executory. cra
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the March 29, 20002 and the March 27, 20013 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535
was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTEDand the
appeal is ordered DISMISSED.4
The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.5

SO ORDERED.

The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman yMacadangdang] was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple
physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay
damages as follows:
a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000. 00 as indemnity for
his death, plus the sum of P25,383. 00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for
one year atP2,500. 00 a month, P50,000. 00 as indemnity for the support of Renato
Torres, and the further sum of P300,000. 00 as moral damages;

[G.R. NO. 147703 : April 14, 2004]

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out
becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the

b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000. 00 as indemnity for her
death, the sum of P237,323. 75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income for three
years atP45,000. 00 per annum, and the further sum of P1,000,000. 00 as moral
damages and P200,000. 00 as attorneys fees[;]
c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum ofP50,000. 00 as indemnity for her
death, the sum of P22,838. 00 as funeral expenses, the sum of P20,544. 94 as
medical expenses and her loss of income for 30 years at P1,000. 00 per month, and
the further sum of P100,000. 00 for moral damages;

d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654. 00 as hospital expenses, doctors

fees of P170,000. 00 for the orthopedic surgeon, P22,500. 00 for the [n]eurologist, an
additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000. 00 to cover future correction of
deformity of her limbs, and moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000. 00;
e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561. 46 as medical expenses, P2,000. 00 as
loss of income, and P25,000. 00 as moral damages;

December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of
[petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing
[respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to represent People is
confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our
resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed
the instant motion to dismiss.6 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800. 47 as medical expenses, P800.

00 for loss of income, and P25,000. 00 as moral damages;
g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580. 81 as medical expenses, P4,600. 00
as actual damages and her loss earnings of P1,400. 00 as well as moral damages in
the amount ofP10,000. 00;
h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473. 82 as hospital expenses, P14,530.
00 as doctors fees, P1,000. 00 for medicines and P50,000. 00 as moral damages;
i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155. 00 for medical expenses, P87. 00 for
medicines, P1,710. 00 as actual damages and P5,000. 00 as moral damages;

The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the
civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case
against the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently
the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to
amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the
accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and
the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included in the civil liability
of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability.

j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395. 00 for hospital bills, P500. 00 for
medicine, P2,100. 00 as actual damages, P1,200. 00 for loss of income and P5,000.
00 as moral damages;

Hence, this Petition.7

k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van,
the amount of P250,000. 00 as actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked
vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698. 38 as actual damages;

Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:

The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused,
shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against
accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing]
that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal
when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided
by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We
affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the
judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to
[petitioners] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On

The Issues

A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its

accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the
accused.
B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57)
and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case.
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:

Propriety of Appeal by the Employer

Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision,
petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee
has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal stayed the finality,
notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues
that its appeal takes the place of that of the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be
placed in double jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the
government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double
jeopardy.9Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused
should have been given a more severe penalty.10 On the other hand, the offended
parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If
the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties
should have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to
them.11
Appeal by the Accused
Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon
motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps
bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:

Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the
appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado
succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the
trial, but the trial in absentiaproceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment
against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his
appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule
124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x14 rll
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to
the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of
the judgment against them.15 While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as
they are deemed to have waived the appeal.16 rll
Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule
120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside
before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty
is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when
the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to
the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal.
Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executory.17 rll
Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt

The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.12

Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of
innkeepers, as follows:

This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when
they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts jurisdiction, they are
deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.13

In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other
persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some

general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the
person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative
may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees.
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to
Article 103 which reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in
the discharge of their duties.

criminal action.18 Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the
judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.19 rll
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil
actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil
actions referred to in Articles 32,[20 33,[21 3422 and 217623 of the Civil Code shall
remain separate, distinct and independent of any criminal prosecution based on the
same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be
reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from
the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for
the same act or omission.24

in the Criminal Prosecution

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising
from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities
arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action
is filed separately, the ex delictocivil liability in the criminal prosecution remains,
and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still
intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest
therein.25 rll

At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has
clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.

This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states
that [e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.26

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case

and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be
accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.

Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised
by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted

When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
xxx
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed
impliedly instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the

The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the
criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the
subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it,
because in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not interpose an
appeal.27 Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in which the employer
appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is not possible.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that,
strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees.28Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this
fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist
their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case,
the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the
accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard

made the judgment of the court below final.35 Having been a fugitive from justice for
a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived his right to appeal. Thus, his
conviction is now final and executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc36 ruled:
There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused
himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the
benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it
either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been
submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to
appeal from the judgment rendered against him. x x x.37

Against Double Jeopardy

Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his
criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are
apparent from its Appellants Brief29 filed with the CA and from its Petition30 before
us, both of which claim that the trial courts finding of guilt is not supported by
competent evidence.31
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the
appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.32 This is the risk involved
when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction.33 Indeed, appellate
courts have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court
and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.34
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee
becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has
already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal
would thus violate his right against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him
could become subject to modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively
waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner may not
appeal without violating his right against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding

By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and
placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process,
he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment
nugatory at his option.38 Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on
the part of the appellate court.39
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to
surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and executory.40
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case
against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to
appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability
Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner
argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab,
Inc.,41 Alvarez v. CA42 and Yusay v. Adil43 do not apply to the present case, because it
has followed the Courts directive to the employers in these cases to take part in the
criminal cases against their employees. By participating in the defense of its
employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed rulings laid
down in these leading cases.

on the Appeal Process

Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability,

petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an employers
liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is subsidiary.

Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal
procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby

Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for
the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters

insolvency.44 The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability -Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which
they are applicable.45 Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court
need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended
party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily
liable.46 In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere
civil liability.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable
them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent
court.48 By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of
their employees without the latters consent would also result in improperly
amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive
upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with
regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of
the employee.49
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate
evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted
employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the
crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that
the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.50 rll
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the
determination must be based on the evidence that the offended party and the
employer may fully and freely present. Such determination may be done in the same
criminal action in which the employees liability, criminal and civil, has been
pronounced;51 and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the
employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accusedemployee does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability
remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary liability. The
fact remains that since the accused-employees conviction has attained finality, then
the subsidiary liability of the employeripso factoattaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of
conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping

bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this
case into two: first, for itself; andsecond, for its accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case
against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects.
It is the height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who
jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is dependent upon the conviction
of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary
civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has
become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary
civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in
arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition
of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation
of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what
is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent
upon the employees criminal negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso
factosubsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the employee and upon proof of the
latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil
liability, but also his employers subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence. 52
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process.53 It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such
exercise.54 Hence, the legal requirements must be strictly complied with.55 rll
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely
harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded. 56 Indeed, deviations from the
rules cannot be tolerated.57 In these times when court dockets are clogged with
numerous litigations, such rules have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity,
so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases. 58
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party.
If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period,
then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the
case.59 rll

In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the

proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived
of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in
court.60 In fact, it can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the
court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It
should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of
petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that there exists an employeremployee relationship; that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; and
that the employee has been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the
admissions of petitioner that [o]n 26 August 1990,while on its regular trip from
Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by
petitioners driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x
x x.61 Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against
the accused while he was in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 155791. March 16, 2005]

MELBA QUINTO, Petitioners, v. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER
PACHECO, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a Grade
4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about
eleven years old, were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents
Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and

Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage culvert.1 Wilson
assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he opted to remain seated in a
grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the drainage system.2

Lungs - hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure; section contains bloody
froth.
Brain - autolyzed and liquefied.

Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and Wilson,
entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter
high and a meter wide, with water about a foot deep.3 After a while, respondent
Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left4 without
saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged
again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent Andres laid the
boy's lifeless body down in the grassy area.5 Shocked at the sudden turn of events,
Garcia fled from the scene.6 For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of
petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson's mother, and informed her that her son had died.
Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her.7
The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having been
conducted. The police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal
complaint against the respondents for Wilson's death.
Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) investigators took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia and
petitioner Quinto.8Respondent Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the
drainage system catching fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared
that he saw Wilson already dead when he passed by the drainage system while riding
on his carabao.
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic Aguda of
the NBI performed an autopsy thereon at the cemetery and submitted his autopsy
report containing the following postmortem findings:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition, attired with white long
sleeves and dark pants and placed inside a wooden coffin in a niche-apartment style.
Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region.
Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left forearm.
Laryngo - tracheal lumina - congested and edematous containing muddy particles
with bloody path.

Stomach - partly autolyzed.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries, contributory.9
The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres and
Pacheco in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause for
homicide by dolo against the two.
An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac,
charging the respondents with homicide. The accusatory portion reads:
That at around 8 o'clock in the morning of November 13, 1995, in the Municipality
of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @
Randy, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside
a culvert where the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr. Dominic Aguda, who testified
on direct examination that the hematoma at the back of the victim's head and the
abrasion on the latter's left forearm could have been caused by a strong force coming
from a blunt instrument or object. The injuries in the larynx and trachea also
indicated that the victim died of drowning, as some muddy particles were also found
on the lumina of the larynx and trachea ("Nakahigop ng putik"). Dr. Aguda stated
that such injury could be caused when a person is put under water by pressure or by
force.11 On cross-examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the hematoma on the scalp
was caused by a strong pressure or a strong force applied to the scalp coming from a
blunt instrument. He also stated that the victim could have fallen, and that the
occipital portion of his head could have hit a blunt object.
Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilson's
head could have rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he was thrown in a body of
water, the boy could have died by drowning.

In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the doctor declared that the
4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side of Wilson's face could have also been
caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a rough
surface. He also stated that the trachea region was full of mud, but that there was no
sign of strangulation.12
After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the respondents had admitted
the pictures showing the drainage system including the inside portions thereof,13 the
prosecution rested its case.
The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence, per its Order dated January 28, 1998. It also
held that it could not hold the respondents liable for damages because of the absence
of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilson's death.
The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as the civil
aspect of the case was concerned. In her brief, she averred that THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN RULING
THAT NO PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD ACCUSEDAPPELLEES CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM WILSON
QUINTO.14
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the RTC on December 21,
2001. It ruled as follows:

WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD

RESPONDENTS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON QUINTO.16
The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere possibilities, surmises and
speculations when it held that Wilson died because (a) he could have fallen, his head
hitting the stones in the drainage system since the culvert was slippery; or (b) he
might have been bitten by a snake which he thought was the prick of a fish fin,
causing his head to hit hard on the top of the culvert; or (c) he could have lost
consciousness due to some ailment, such as epilepsy. The petitioner also alleges that
the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution failed to prove any ill motive on the
part of the respondents to kill the victim, and in considering that respondent Andres
even informed her of Wilson's death.
The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the testimony of the Medico-Legal
Expert, Dr. Aguda; the nature, location and number of the injuries sustained by the
victim which caused his death; as well as the locus criminis. The petitioner insists
that the behavior of the respondents after the commission of the crime betrayed their
guilt, considering that respondent Pacheco left the scene, leaving respondent Andres
to bring out Wilson's cadaver, while respondent Andres returned inside the drainage
system only when he saw Garcia seated in the grassy area waiting for his friend
Wilson to come out.
The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence on record to show that
either or both the respondents caused the death of her son and, as such, are jointly
and severally liable therefor.

The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a
finding that the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of.
Thus, pursuant to the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex
delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil action arising
therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the
criminal acts imputed to them. (Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672)15

In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that since the prosecution
failed to adduce any evidence to prove that they committed the crime of homicide
and caused the death of Wilson, they are not criminally and civilly liable for the
latter's death.

The petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review and raised the following issues:

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.17 The civil liability
of such person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code
includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.18 When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.19 With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two

I
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS' CRIMINAL
LIABILITY, LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF THEIR
CIVIL LIABILITY.
II

The petition has no merit.

actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil.20
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter
him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from
society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.21 The
sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the
private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the
delictual or felonious act of the accused.22 While the prosecution must prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is required to prove
the cause of action of the private complainant against the accused for damages and/or
restitution.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from
where the civil liability may arise does not exist.23
Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended.24 "Natural" refers to an occurrence in the ordinary
course of human life or events, while "logical" means that there is a rational
connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The
felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate
cause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor.25
There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the felonious act of
the offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The
"cause and effect" relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre-existing
conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim (las condiciones
patologica del lesionado); the predisposition of the offended party (la predisposicion
del ofendido); the physical condition of the offended party (la constitucion fisica del
herido); or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the negligence or fault
of the doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al herido); or the conditions
supervening the felonious act such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene. 26
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:

(a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the
resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from
the felonious act of the accused; or
(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.27
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in
jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter
its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in
producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the
victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the
victim.28 A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away
from human life a salutary and essential safeguard.29This Court has emphasized that:
'Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon
the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of
homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a
wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and
punishment. '30
In People v. Quianzon,31 the Supreme Court held:
'The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3, 1879, said in a case similar to
the present, the following: Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of
his act - and in this case, the physical condition and temperament of the offended
party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the
violence of the means employed, but by the result actually produced; and as the
wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which
determined his death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that
the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc.32
In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by dolo. In People
v. Delim,33 the Court delineated the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused for homicide or murder:
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which
consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the
commission of the act. Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: first, the
objective; second, the subjective element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in
murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged
to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the
deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that

defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for
the act which produced the death. To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there
must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was
deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such
evidence may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the
malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the
victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed.34
Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the private
complainant is burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or superior weight of
evidence. Although the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is stronger than that
presented by the defendant, he is not entitled to a judgment if his evidence is not
sufficient to sustain his cause of action. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of the defendants'.35
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides how preponderance
of evidence is determined:
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. 'In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the
witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial.
The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is
not necessarily with the greater number.36
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the
prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the
civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action
against the respondents for damages.
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the collective testimonies of
Garcia, who was not an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda.

presented two possibilities: (a) that the deceased could have been hit by a blunt
object or instrument applied with full force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped,
fell hard and his head hit a hard object:
COURT:
The Court would ask questions.
Q So it is possible that the injury, that is - the hematoma, caused on the back of the
head might be due to the victim's falling on his back and his head hitting a
pavement?cralawlibrary
A Well, the 14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite extensive, so if the fall is strong
enough and would fall from a high place and hit a concrete pavement, then it is
possible.
Q Is it possible that if the victim slipped on a concrete pavement and the head hit the
pavement, the injury might be caused by that slipping?cralawlibrary
A It is also possible.
Q So when the victim was submerged under water while unconscious, it is possible
that he might have taken in some mud or what?cralawlibrary
A Yes, Sir.
Q So it is your finding that the victim was submerged while still breathing?
A Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the lung also would indicate that
the victim was still alive when he was placed under water.37
The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side of the victim's face could
have been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement:
Q The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of the] face, would it be caused by
the face rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement?cralawlibrary
A Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a skin to a rough surface.

We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy Report of Dr.
Dominic Aguda, the deceased sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma on the scalp.
But as to how the deceased sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda was equivocal. He

Q Rough surface?cralawlibrary

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q When you say that the trachea region was full of mud, were there no signs that the
victim was strangled?cralawlibrary
A There was no sign of strangulation, Your Honor.38
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda that the deceased might
have slipped, causing the latter to fall hard and hit his head on the pavement, thus:
Q -Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury might have been caused when the
victim fell down and that portion of the body or occipital portion hit a blunt object
and might have been inflicted as a result of falling down?cralawlibrary
A - If the fall - if the victim fell and he hit a hard object, well, it is also possible. 39
The trial court took into account the following facts:
Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the prosecution that there were
stones inside the culvert. (See Exhibit "D" to "D-3"). The stones could have caused
the victim to slip and hit his head on the pavement. Since there was water on the
culvert, the portion soaked with water must be very slippery, aside from the fact that
the culvert is round. If the victim hit his head and lost consciousness, he will
naturally take in some amount of water and drown.40
The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial court, as well as its conclusion
based on the said findings.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general rule is that the findings of
facts of the trial court, its assessment of probative weight of the evidence of the
parties, and its conclusion anchored on such findings, affirmed no less by the CA, are
given conclusive effect by this Court, unless the trial court ignored, misapplied or
misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would change the
outcome of the case. The petitioner failed to show any justification to warrant a
reversal of the findings or conclusions of the trial and appellate courts.
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even Garcia
testified that the drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid that he
refused to join respondents Andres and Pacheco inside.41 Respondent Andres had no
flashlight; only respondent Pacheco had one.

Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might have caused the
abrasion on the left forearm of the deceased. He, likewise, failed to testify whether
the abrasions on the face and left forearm of the victim were made ante
mortem or post mortem.
The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either or both
the respondents hit the deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and, consequently,
any blunt object or instrument that might have been used by any or both of the
respondents in hitting the deceased.
It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes
for no reason at all.42 However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is
relevant and admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was perpetrated on the
person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any illmotive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter
was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent
Andres used to go to their house and play with her son before the latter's death:
Q Do you know this Dante Andres personally?cralawlibrary
A Not much but he used to go to our house and play with my son after going from
her mother who is gambling, Sir.
Q But you are acquainted with him, you know his face?cralawlibrary
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you please look around this courtroom and see if he is around?cralawlibrary
A (Witness is pointing to Dante Andres, who is inside the courtroom.)43
When the petitioner's son died inside the drainage culvert, it was respondent Andres
who brought out the deceased. He then informed the petitioner of her son's death.
Even after informing the petitioner of the death of her son, respondent Andres
followed the petitioner on her way to the grassy area where the deceased was:
Q Did not Dante Andres follow you?cralawlibrary
A He went with me, Sir.
Q So when you went to the place where your son was lying, Dante Andres was with
you?cralawlibrary

A No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres that my son was there at the
culvert, I ran immediately. He [was] just left behind and he just followed, Sir.
Q So when you reached the place where your son was lying down, Dante Andres
also came or arrived?cralawlibrary
A It was only when we boarded the jeep that he arrived, Sir.44
In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to prove a cause of
action for damages based on the deliberate acts alleged in the Information.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Appeal from the Court of Appeals.

Respondent Apolonio Bustos was charged in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
on October 26, 1962 with the crime of murder for the killing of Raymundo Castro
whose heirs are now the petitioners. The trial court found Bustos guilty only of
homicide and, crediting him with two mitigating circumstances, namely, passion or
obfuscation and voluntary surrender, sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term
of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1
day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the petitioners, who were
represented in the case by a private prosecutor, in the sum of six thousand pesos
(P6,000) "without prejudice to whatever the accused (respondent) is entitled from the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for his services of around twenty-six
(26) years as a public school teacher, prior to October 20, 1962." Both respondent
and petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, respondent asking that appellate,
court acquit him and petitioners praying, on the other hand, that respondent be
convicted of murder, that the portion regarding what said respondent will receive
from the GSIS be deleted and that he be ordered to pay petitioners "the aggregate
sum of P50,764.00 as indemnity and actual, moral, temperate and exemplary
damages." For the purposes of their appeal, petitioners even filed unnecessarily a
printed record on appeal. On October 18, 1965, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment modifying that of the trial court insofar as it concerned (1) the amount of
damages to be awarded petitioners thus:
... Aside from the P6,000 indemnity awarded by the trial court, which we
uphold, we feel justified, in the exercise of our discretion, to award to the
heirs of the deceased moral damages in the amount of P6,000 plus
P13,380.00 to compensate for the loss of earning of the decedent at the
annual salary of P2,676.00 ....

CIVIL LIABILITY; WHAT CIVIL INCLUDES

[G.R. No. L-25913

February 29, 1969]

HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO CASTRO, petitioners,

vs.
APOLONIO BUSTOS, respondent.
Sotto, Consengco and Dizon for petitioners.
Sipin, Abarcar and Baluyot for respondent.
BARREDO, J.:

and (2) the mitigating circumstance of "obfuscation", appreciated as such by the trial
court, which was changed to "vindication of a grave offense", but affirming it in all
other respects. Upon motion, however, of respondent for the reconsideration of said
decision, reiterating his plea for acquittal, or, in the alternative, praying for the
elimination of the award of moral and compensatory damages, the Court of Appeals
promulgated on November 13, 1965, an amended decision, the pertinent portions of
which are:
The arguments interposed by the appellant in his Motion for consideration
to support the complete reversal of the judgment appealed from, have been
considered and passed upon in our decision, and we see no reason to alter
the same in so far as the appellant's guilt of the crime is concerned. On the
other hand, we agree with the appellant that in the interest of justice and
equity and in view of the presence of two mitigating circumstances, without
any aggravating one to offset them, the award of moral and compensatory
damages should be eliminated.

WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated October 18, 1965, is hereby

amended by eliminating therefrom the award of P6,000.00 representing
moral damages, and of P13,380.00 representing the decedent's loss of
earnings.
From this amended decision, only petitioners have appealed to Us. The prayer in
their petition for certiorari asks for nothing more than that the amended decision of
the Court of Appeals be revoked and reversed, and its original decision be
affirmed in toto insofar as the award of indemnity and damages is concerned. Since
We find the grounds of the appeal meritorious, We grant fully the prayer in the
petition.
This case affords this Court as appropriate an opportunity, as any other, to restate, in
a more comprehensive way, the law regarding the items of damages that are
recoverable in cases of death caused by a crime, whether the claim therefor is made
in the criminal proceedings itself or in a separate civil action. In the instant case,
recovery of such damages is being sought in the criminal proceedings but even if it
were claimed otherwise, the indemnity and damages would be the same, for
generally, the items of damages are identical in both procedures, except with respect
to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which can be awarded only when a
separate civil action is instituted. (Art. 2208, Civil Code) With the clarifications We
are making herein, at least the writer of this opinion expects that litigations regarding
the aspects of the law herein passed upon may be minimized.
As a start, it is to be noted that in the matter of damages, the original decision of the
Court of Appeals, while correct in making a particularization in the award of
indemnity and damages, nonetheless, still failed to comply strictly with the
constitutional requirement that all decisions of courts of record must state both
the facts and thelaw on which they are based. (Sec. 12, Art. VIII, Constitution) In
said original decision, the Court of Appeals held:
Coming now to the damages asked by the heirs of the deceased: Aside from
the P6,000.00 indemnity awarded by the trial court which we uphold, we
feel justified, in the exercise of our discretion, to award to the heirs of the
deceased moral damages in the amount of P6,000 plus P13,380.00 to
compensate for the loss of earning of the decedent at the annual salary of
P2,676.00 (Exh. V; p. 42 t.s.n. Vergara).
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified as above indicated in so
far as it concerns the amount of indemnity and damages to be awarded to
the heirs of the deceased, and the mitigating circumstance of vindication of
a grave offense which takes the place of the circumstance of obfuscation
appreciated by the trial court; and affirmed in all other respects. Costs
against the appellant.

As can be seen, no legal or factual basis is stated therein for the award of indemnity
and damages to petitioners; worse, the impression is given that the said award is
purely a matter of discretion on the part of the court. Clearly, this is not in
accordance with the law. Indeed, it must have been this failure to refer to the
pertinent legal provisions which induced the appellate court, at the mere invocation
by respondent of Art. 2204 of the Civil Code, to commit the error of readily
eliminating in the amended decision the items on moral damages and compensation
for loss of earning of the decedent which its original decision had correctly
contained. Having held that it had discretion in the premises, the court easily yielded
to the argument that simply because it had credited the respondent with two
mitigating circumstances, it was already justified in eliminating the items of damages
already adverted to, presumably having in mind said Art. 2204 which provides that:
In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or
lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Of course, this was clear error, inasmuch as construed literally or otherwise, the
quoted provision does not warrant a complete deletion of said items of damages. In
any event the court evidently failed to take into account that several other provisions
can come into play considering the circumstances in this case.
When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations arising
therefrom are governed by the penal laws, "... subject to the provisions of Art. 2177,
and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations,
and of Title XVIII of this Book (Book IV) regulating damages." (Art. 1161, Civil
Code)
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civily liable." (Art. 100,
Revised Penal Code). This civil liability, in case the felony involves death, includes
indemnification for consequential damages (Art. 104, id.) and said consequential
damages in turn include "... those suffered by his family or by a third person by
reason of the crime." (Art. 107, id.) Since these provisions are subject, however, as
above indicated, to certain provisions of the Civil Code, We will now turn to said
provisions.
The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or
could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. (Art. 2202)
When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206 which
provides thus:

The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be

at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless
the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions
of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's
inheritance by law of testate or intestate succession may demand support
from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the
exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased.
The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been increased by
this Court first, to P6,000.00 in People v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to
P12,000.00 in the case of People v. Pantoja, G. R. No. L-18793, promulgated
October 11, 1968, and it must be stressed that this amount, as well as the amount of
moral damages, may be adjudicated even without proof of pecuniary loss, the
assessment of the moral damages being "left to the discretion of the court, according
to the circumstances of each case." (Art. 2216)
Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability when the
crime has been committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, such
damages being "separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended
party," (Art. 2230). Exemplary damages cannot however be recovered as a matter of
right; the court will decide whether or not they should be given. (Art. 2233)
In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the indemnity for the
sole fact of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and in cases wherein exemplary damages are
awarded precisely because of the attendance of aggravating circumstances, (Art.
2230) "... damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened
according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances," (Art. 2204) but "the party
suffering the loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to
minimize the damages resulting from the act or omisson in question." (Art. 2203)
"Interest as a part of the damages, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the
discretion of the Court." (Art. 2211) As to attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation,
the same may be recovered only when exemplary damages have been granted (Art.
2208, par. 1) or, as We have already stated, when there is a separate civil action.

Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased
are entitled to the following items of damages:
1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense P12,000.00,
without the need of any evidence or proof of damages, and even though
there may have been mitigating circumstances attending the commission of
the offense.
2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased an amount
to be fixed by the Court according to the circumstances of the deceased
related to his actual income at the time of death and his probable life
expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed and awarded by the court as a
matter of duty, unless the deceased had no earning capacity at said time on
account of permanent disability not caused by the accused. If the deceased
was obliged to give support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who is
not an heir, may demand support from the accused for not more than five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court.
3. As moral damages for mental anguish, an amount to be fixed by the
court. This may be recovered even by the illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased.
4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or more
aggravating circumstances, an amount to be fixed in the discretion of the
court, the same to be considered separate from fines.
5. As attorney's fees and expresses of litigation, the actual amount
thereof, (but only when a separate civil action to recover civil liability has
been filed or when exemplary damages are awarded).
6. Interests in the proper cases.
7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning capacity of
the deceased and for moral damages are recoverable separately from and in
addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00 corresponding to the indemnity for
the sole fact of death, and that these damages may, however, be respectively
increased or lessened according to the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, except items 1 and 4 above, for obvious reasons.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the Court of Appeals erred in
eliminating in its amended decision, the items of moral damages and compensation
for loss of earning capacity of the deceased. Indeed, as to the award of moral
damages in case of death, this Court has already held in Mercado v. Lira, etc., G. R.
Nos. L-13328-29, September 29, 1961, that once the heirs of the deceased claim

moral damages and are able to prove they are entitled thereto, it becomes the duty of
the court to make the award. We held:
Art. 2206 states further that "In addition" to the amount of at least
P3,000.00 to be awarded for the death of a passenger, the spouse, legitimate
and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages as a consequence of the death of their deceased kin, which
simply means that once the above-mentioned heirs of the deceased claim
compensation for moral damages and are able to prove that they are entitled
to such award, it becomes the duty of the court to award moral damages to
the claimant in an amount commensurate with the mental anguish suffered
by them.
This doctrine was reiterated in Maranan v. Perez, G. R. No. L-22272, June 26, 1967:
In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only
P3,000 to plaintiff-appellant. This is the minimum compensatory damages
amount recoverable under Art. 1764 in connection with Art. 2206 of the
Civil Code when a breach of contract results in the passenger's death. As
has been the policy followed by this Court, this minimal award should be
increased to P6,000 .... Still, Art. 2206 and 1764 award moral damages in
addition to compensatory damages, to the parents of the passenger killed to
compensate for the mental anguish they suffered. A claim therefor, having
been properly made, it becomes the court's duty to award moral damages.
Plaintiff demands P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the circumstances,
We consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition to the P6,000 damages
aforestated, as sufficient. Interest upon such damages are also due to
plaintiff-appellant.
Likewise, in the matter of the compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity
of the deceased, We also held in the case of Daniel Bulante v. Chu Liante, G.R. Nos.
L- 21583 and L-21591-92, May 20, 1968 that:
The next item objected to refers to the damages awarded to the heirs of the
deceased passengers for loss of earning capacity, separately from the
indemnities by reason of death. The ground for the objection is that loss of
earning capacity was not specifically pleaded or claimed in the complaint.
This item, however, may be considered included in the prayer for "actual
damages" and for other "just and equitable reliefs", especially if taken in the
light of Art. 2206, in connection with Art. 1764, of the Civil Code, which
allows, in addition to an indemnity of at least P3,000 by reason of death,
recovery for loss of earning capacity on the part of the deceased, the same
to be paid to his heirs "in every case ... unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning
capacity at the time of his death."

To be sure, these cases of Mercado v. Lira, Maranan v. Perez and Bulante v. Chu
Liante from which We have quoted, were actions based on contracts of common
carriers. But the above-mentioned doctrines are equally applicable to civil liability ex
delicto because, after all, Art. 2206 of the Civil Code which was applied in said cases
is precisely the provision pertinent to liability arising from crimes (and quasidelicts). No doubt, said Article must have been relied upon by the court in the above
cases only because Art. 1764 of the Civil Code provides that said "Art. 2206 shall
also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common
carrier." Accordingly, the interpretation given to said article in those cases are
applicable to the case at bar. In other words, this must be so because under the Civil
Code, the same rules on damages are generally to be observed, whether death results
from a crime or a quasi-delict or a breach of the contract of common carriage.
As to the amount of the indemnity for moral damages and loss of earning capacity of
the deceased in the present case, the original decision of the Court of Appeals
awarding them, does not afford sufficient basis for Us to increase the amounts fixed
by said court, as prayed for by appellants. As has already been stated, the said
decision failed to follow the Constitution, not only in not stating the law on which it
is based but also in not making the necessary findings of fact on which it based its
discretion in fixing the respective amounts it awarded for moral and compensatory
damages. Legally, therefore, We can, if We wish to, return this case to that court for
it to supply these constitutional omissions. We opt however, to save time and further
difficulties for and damages to, the petitioners. Extant in the records before Us is the
fact that the respondent has never disputed that petitioners are the widow and seven
children of the deceased, three of whom were still minors at the time of his death,
nor that the said deceased was a public school teacher, 56 years old, and earning
P2,276.00 a year. These facts appear to have been repeatedly asserted in the briefs of
petitioners in the Court of Appeals and in this Court. No denial was ever made by the
respondent. When respondent moved for the reconsideration of the original decision
of the Court of Appeals, (Annex E of Petition for Certiorari) he only argued that in
view of the mitigating circumstances credited to him by said court, petitioners were
not entitled to moral damages and to indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased; the amounts fixed therefor by said court he never questioned. When
petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the amended decision of the
Court of Appeals, these facts (relationship, earnings, etc.) were reiterated. (Annex
G, id.) Respondent did not file any answer to said motion despite the resolution
requiring him to do so. (Par. 12, Petition for Certiorari) Neither has respondent filed
any brief in the present instance, notwithstanding repeated requests on his part for
extension to file the same, which, incidentally, were all granted. Under these
circumstances, We feel justified in brushing aside strict technicalities of procedure in
order to accomplish substantial justice more expeditiously. Anyway, as We said at the
outset, petitioners are asking Us, in the prayer of their petition for certiorari, for
nothing more than to affirm "in toto" the original decision of the Court of Appeals,
and in their lone assignment of error in the present instance, their only claim is that
"the Court of Appeals erred when it issued the amended decision eliminating the
award of P6,000 moral damages and the award of P13,380.00 loss of earnings of the

deceased Raymundo Castro." In these circumstances, even if We should award the

amounts of damages just mentioned, inspite of the absence of the pertinent findings
of fact by the Court of Appeals, We would not have to reach beyond amounts that are
undisputed by the respondent.

Separate Opinions

We, therefore, overrule the prayer for additional damages in petitioners' brief and We
hold that, on the basis of the facts not questioned by respondent, they are entitled
only to the P6,000.00 as moral damages and the P13,380.00 as compensatory
damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased awarded in the original
decision of the Court of Appeals in addition, of course, to the indemnity for death
fixed also by said court at P6,000.00. This amount of P6,000.00 We cannot increase
to P12,000.00, as allowed in People v. Pantoja, supra, and the subsequent cases,
(People v. Mongaya G. R. No. L-23708, October 31, 1968, and People v. Ramos, G.
R. No. L-19143, November 29, 1968) because in the instant suit, neither party has
appealed in relation thereto. This case is now before Us on appeal by the offended
party only as to specific portions of the civil indemnity to be paid by the respondent.
It would have been different if the whole criminal case were up for our review
because then, even without any appeal on the part of the offended party, We could
have still increased the said liability of the accused, here-in respondent. (See
Mercado v. Lira, supra.)

CAPISTRANO, J., concurring:

At this juncture, for the guidance of parties similarly situated as petitioners herein,
and so that there may be no useless expenses in appeals by offended parties in regard
to the civil aspect of a criminal case when no separate civil action has been filed by
them, it should be made clear that when there is no such separate civil action and the
claim for civil indemnity is joined with the criminal case, no record on appeal,
whether printed, typewritten or mimeographed, is necessary, except perhaps when
formal pleading raising complicated questions are filed in connection therewith, and
still, this would be purely optional on the appellant because anyway the whole
original record of the case is elevated in appeals in criminal cases. It is already
settled that appeals relating to the civil aspects of a criminal case should follow the
procedure for appeal required by rules of criminal procedure. (People vs. Lorredo, 50
Phil. 209, 220-221; People v. ViIlanueva, G.R. No. L-18769, May 27,
1966)lawphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals is modified as
hereinabove indicated, in so far as the civil liability of respondent is concerned, with
costs against him in this instance.
Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L. and Sanchez, JJ., concur in the result.
Castro, J., reserves his vote.

I concur, and take this opportunity to express my views on certain points not covered
by the majority opinion.
1. In the criminal action for death by crime, as murder, homicide, and
homicide through reckless imprudence it is the duty of the Fiscal, unless the
heirs reserve their right to file a separate civil action, to demand payment,
for the benefit of the heirs of the deceased, of the damages ordained in
Article 2206 and 2230 of the Civil Code. This duty is apparent from the
following considerations: (a) A crime is an offense against both the State
and the offended party. This is so because before the State intervened in its
punishment, a crime was an offense purely against the injured party calling
for private vengeance. It was only after "the period of private vengeance" in
the history of criminal law that the State decided to intervene in the
punishment of crime for reasons of social defense. (b) The civil liability in
crime is generally determined in the criminal action pursuant to the basic
principle that "every person criminally liable is civilly liable." Since the
Fiscal has full control of the criminal action, he is the only one who may
demand payment therein of the civil indemnity for the benefit of the heirs of
the deceased. (c) In case the Fiscal does not demand payment of the civil
indemnity in the criminal action and the judgment does not order its
payment, said judgment will constitute a bar to a future civil action to
recover the civil indemnity. (d) Most of the injured parties in crime are poor
or ignorant. For this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor, hired
by the heirs of the deceased, in the criminal action, is rare. (e) The trial
court usually awards only the amount of P12,000 as damages for the death
unless the other items of damages specified in Articles 2206 and 2230 of the
Civil Code are demanded by the Fiscal. The failure of the Fiscals
throughout the country to make such demand in the criminal actions has
resulted in the law (Art. 2206, except par. 1, and Art. 2230) having fallen
into disuse for a period of more than 18 years (from 1950 when the New
Civil Code took effect, until now), contrary to the great expectations of the
Code Commission and the Legislature. Said failure has also resulted in
great injustice to the countless heirs of the victims of murder, homicide and
homicide through reckless imprudence during said period of 18 years.
2. Accordingly, unless the heirs reserve their right to file a separate civil
action, the Fiscal should also allege in the information all the items of
damages recoverable for the benefit of the heirs of the deceased as follows:

(a) P12,000 for the death of the victim; (b) the amount constituting loss of
the earning capacity of the deceased; (e) the amount of monthly support to
be given by the accused for the period not exceeding five years in case the
deceased was obligated to give support under Article 291 of the Civil Code
to a recipient who is not an intestate heir of the deceased; (d) that moral
damages are demanded by and on behalf of the surviving spouse, legitimate
and illegitimate descendants, and ascendants of the deceased for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased, the amount of award to each
of them individually to be determined in the discretion of the court on proof
of mental anguish and the depth or intensity of the same; and (e) exemplary
damages in the amount to be determined by the court to be paid to the heirs
of the deceased in case of the presence of one or more aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the crime.
3. Where a private prosecutor, hired by the heirs of the deceased, intervenes
in the criminal action, as in the case at bar, the heirs may also demand and
recover reasonable attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. This is just.
From the provision of Article 2208(9) of the Civil Code which allows
recovery of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in case of a separate
civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime, it does not follow
that the converse is true. Whether the heirs recover the civil liability through

a private prosecutor in criminal action or through counsel in a separate civil

action, they are entitled to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. What is
important is not in what action the civil liability is recovered, but the fact
that in either action the heirs have paid attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation.
4. Those heirs entitled to the civil indemnity are the intestate heirs of the
deceased in the order of intestate succession. The Fiscal should therefore
give in the information the names and personal circumstances of the heirs
entitled to the civil indemnity in accordance with the law of intestate
succession so that the trial court may make the award in their names. This
will avoid further or subsequent litigation on who, among several claimants,
are really the heirs entitled to the civil indemnity. The practice of the trial
courts in awarding the civil indemnity to "the heirs of the deceased," does
not satisfy the law and should be abandoned.
Does the term "heirs" include testamentary heirs? An affirmative answer is proper.
According to Manresa "Donde la ley no distingue, no debemos distinguir." The heirs,
whether testate or intestate, are a continuation of the juridical personality of the
decedent. The law has a tender regard for the