RODOLFO G. NAVARRO et al. Vs.

ERMITA
G.R. No. 180050 February 10, 2010

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO

FACTS:
Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition for certiorari
under Rule65 to nullify Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands , for being unconstitutional. Based on the NSO
2000 Census of Population, the population of the Province of Dinagat
Islands is 106,951. A special census was afterwards conducted by the
Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte which yielded a population
count of 371,576 inhabitants with average annual income for calendar
year 2002-2003 of P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of 802.12 square
km. as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance. Under
Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, The Local Government Code , a province
may be created if it has an average annual income of not less than P20
million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of
Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000inhabitants as certified
by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers
as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of the
province. Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was
enacted into law and a plebiscite was held subsequently yielding to
69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative. With the approval of the
people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the
Province of Dinagat Islands, Dinagat Islands was created into a separate
and distinct province. Respondents argued that exemption from the land
area requirement is germane to the purpose of the Local Government
Code to develop self-reliant political and territorial subdivisions. Thus, the
rules and regulations have the force and effect of law as long as they are
germane to the objects and purposes of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR) valid.
RULING: No.
The rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of
the basic law. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of
a province, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written
in the Local Government Code. The IRR went beyond the criteria
prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it added
the italicized portion The land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.
The extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to the
purpose of the law a sit already conflicts with the criteria prescribed by
the law in creating a territorial subdivision. Thus, there is no dispute that

in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and
regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails

G.R. No. 150270 November 26, 2008

CITY ENGINEER OF BAGUIO and HON. MAURICIO DOMOGAN
BANIQUED

vs.

Facts:
Generoso Bonifacio, acting as the attorney-in-fact of Purificacion de Joya,
Milagros Villar, Minerva Baluyut and Israel de Leon filed a complaint with
the Office of the Mayor of Baguio City seeking the demolition of a house
built on a parcel of land
located at Upper Quezon Hill, Baguio City. On May 19, 1999, Domogan, the
then city mayor of Baguio City, issued Notice of Demolition No. 55, Series
of 1999, against spouses Rolando and Fidela Baniqued. Aggrieved,
Rolando Baniqued filed a complaint for prohibition with TRO/injunction.
Baniqued alleged that the intended demolition of his house was done
without due process of law and "was arrived at arbitrarily and in a martiallaw like fashion. He contends that there should be a court proceeding
before he can be ousted from the lot. And he also attack the power of the
mayor to order the demolition of anything unless the interested party was
afforded prior hearing and unless the provisions of law pertaining to
demolition are satisfied.
Issue:
WON the act of the mayor in issuing a notice of demolition a quasi judicial
function which may be corrected by prohibition.
Ruling:
Yes. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a
superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from
usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested
by law. As its name indicates, the writ is one that commands the person or
tribunal to whom it is directed not to do something which he or she is
about to do.
The Mayor, although performing executive functions, also exercises quasijudicial function which may be corrected by prohibition. As a parting
argument, petitioners contend that the complaint of Baniqued is outside
the scope of the rule on prohibition which covers the proceedings of any
"tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions." The issuance of the notice of
demolition by the City Mayor is never a judicial, ministerial or rule-making
function. It is strictly an act of law enforcement and implementation,

which is purely an executive function. Neither is the Office of the City

Mayor a quasi-judicial body

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. (CORN

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
[G.R. NO. 191427, MAY 30, 2011]

DIVISION),

VS.

LAGUNA

LAKE

Doctrines:

The thrust of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is that

courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and
discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their
respective competence.

Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in

its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance
to be heard before the case against him is decided.
Facts:
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, found that
Universal Robina Corp. failed to comply with government standards
provided under Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. After
conducting hearings, the LLDA resolved that respondent is found to be
discharging pollutive wastewater. Petitioner moved to reconsider however
the LLDA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and reiterated its
order to pay the penalties. Petitioner challenged by certiorari the orders
before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court went on to chide
petitioners petition for certiorari as premature since the law provides for
an appeal from decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or
the Office of the President, a remedy which should have first been
exhausted before invoking judicial intervention.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was deprived of due process and lack of any plain,
speedy or adequate remedy as grounds which exempted it from
complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Held:

No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone

of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser
expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies.
Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.
Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR
Secretary. Its contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR
Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the
LLDAs findings is at best, speculative and presumptuous. The essence of
due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its
strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to
be heard before the case against him is decided.
GSIS vs. Velasco and Molina
GR. No. 170463
Feb. 2, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave misconduct
and placed them under preventive suspension for 90 days, for their
alleged participation in a demonstration held by GSIS employees. In a
letter, respondent Molina requested the GSIS Senior Vice President for the
implementation of his step increment. The SVP denied the request citing
GSIS Board Resolution No. 372 issued by petitioner GSIS Board which
approved the new GSIS salary structure, its implementing rules and
regulations, and the adoption of the supplemental guidelines on step
increment and promotion.
Respondents also asked that they be allowed to avail of the employee
privileges under GSIS Board Resolution No. 306 approving Christmas raffle
benefits for all GSIS officials and employees. Respondents request was
again denied because of their pending administrative case.
Later, petitioner GSIS Board issued Resolution No. 197 approving the
following policy recommendations:
B. On the disqualification from promotion of an employee with a pending
administrative case
To adopt the policy that an employee with pending administrative case
shall be disqualified from the following during the pendency of the case:
a) Promotion;
b) Step Increment;
xx
Respondents filed before the trial court a petition for prohibition with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 03108389). Respondents claimed that they were denied the benefits which

GSIS employees were entitled under Resolution No. 306. Respondents also
sought to restrain and prohibit petitioners from implementing Resolution
Nos. 197 and 372.
The trial court granted respondents petition for prohibition. Petitioners
filed an MR. The trial court denied petitioners motion, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. 1.
Whether the jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil
Case No. 03-108389 (lies with the CSC and not with the RTC of
Manila, Branch 19.
2. 2.
Whether a Special Civil Action for Prohibition against the
GSIS Board or its President and General Manager exercising quasilegislative and administrative functions in Pasay City is outside the
territorial jurisdiction of RTC-Manila, Branch 19.
HELD: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition
Petitioners argue that the CSC, not the trial court, has jurisdiction over
Civil Case No. 03-108389 because it involves claims of employee benefits.
Petitioners point out that the trial court should have dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction.
Sections 2 and 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or
matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.
Sec. 4. Where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
assailed in the SC or, if it related to acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person in the RTC
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
SC. It may also be filed in the CA whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency,
and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the CA. (Emphasis supplied)
Civil Case No. 03-108389 is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents prayed that the
trial court declare all acts emanating from Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and
306 void and to prohibit petitioners from further enforcing the said
resolutions. Therefore, the trial court, not the CSC, has jurisdiction over
respondents petition for prohibition.
1. Petitioners also claim that the petition for prohibition was filed in the
wrong territorial jurisdiction because the acts sought to be

prohibited are the acts of petitioners who hold their principal office
in Pasay City, while the petition for prohibition was filed in Manila.
Section 18 of BP 129 provides:
SEC. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The
Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of
the RTC shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined
shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned
for purposes of determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or
actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as determining the MeTCs,
MTCs, and MCTCs over which the said branch may exercise appellate
jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be exercised with a view to
making the courts readily accessible to the people of the different parts of
the region and making attendance of litigants and witnesses as
inexpensive as possible. (Emphasis supplied)
In line with this, the SC issued Administrative Order No. 3 defining the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTCs in the National Capital Judicial Region, as
follows:
a. Branches I to LXXXII, inclusive, with seats at Manila over the City of
Manila only.
b. Branches LXXXIII to CVII, inclusive, with seats at Quezon City over
Quezon City only.
c. Branches CVIII to CXIX, inclusive, with seats at Pasay City over Pasay
City only.
xx
The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action
which may be filed in the SC, the CA, the Sandiganbayan or the RTC, as
the case may be. It is also a personal action because it does not affect the
title to, or possession of real property, or interest therein. Thus, it may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,
at the election of the plaintiff. Since respondent Velasco, plaintiff before
the trial court, is a resident of the City of Manila, the petition could
properly be filed in the City of Manila. The choice of venue is sanctioned
by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, Section 21(1) of BP 129 provides:
Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. RTCs shall exercise original
jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, which may be enforced in
any part of their respective regions; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Since the National Capital Judicial Region is comprised of the cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasig,
Marikina, Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela and the
municipalities of Navotas, San Juan, Pateros, and Taguig, a writ of
prohibition issued by the RTC sitting in the City of Manila, is enforceable in
Pasay City. Clearly, the RTC did not err when it took cognizance of
respondents petition for prohibition because it had jurisdiction over the
action and the venue was properly laid before it.

G.R. No. 166471 March 22, 2011

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE Petitioner, vs. LA TRINIDAD
WATER DISTRICT, Respondent.
Facts
Petitioner Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC), a registered
cooperative established by Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad residents for the
purpose of operating a domestic drinking water service, applied with the
National Water Resources Board (the Board) for a Certificate of Public
Convenience (CPC) to maintain and operate a waterworks system within
its
barangay. But respondent La Trinidad Water District (LTWD), a

government-owned corporation that supplied water within La Trinidad for

domestic, industrial, and commercial purposes, opposed the application.
LTWD claimed that its franchise was exclusive in that its charter provides
that no separate franchise can be granted within its area of operation
without its prior written consent. Still, the Board granted TMPCs
application.
Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other
person or agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water service
within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent
that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution
duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be subject to review by the
Administration.
LTWD contested the grant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La
Trinidad which, after hearing, rendered judgment setting aside the Boards
decision and cancelling the CPC it issued to TMPC. The RTC denied TMPCs
motion for reconsideration, prompting the latter to come to this Court on
petition for review.
Issue
Whether or not Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, is valid to be the
foundation of the rulings of RTC.
Rulings
The court ruled on the negative. Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution and Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states
that: No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of
the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be
exclusive in character
or for a longer period than fifty years.
Plain words do not require explanation. The constitution is clear that
franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in
character. There is no exception. In case of conflict between the
Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the
Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The
duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws
that do not conform to it. Since the Court, exercising its Constitutional
power of judicial review, has declared Section 47 of P.D. 198 void and
unconstitutional, such section ceased to become law from the beginning.
Thus, the decision of the RTC was set aside and the decision of the NWRB
was reinstated
GANNAPAO VS. CSC
[GR NO. 180141, MAY 31, 2011]

Doctrines:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is
sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of
the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity
to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process.
Facts:
Private respondents Barien, et al are stockholders and board members of
United Workers Transport Corp. which took over the defunct Metro Manila
Transit Corp. They allege that upon orders of UWTCs general manager,
the buses regularly driven by them were confiscated by a task force
composed of former drivers, conductors and mechanics led by petitioner.
Armed with deadly weapons, petitioner and his group intimidated and
harassed the regular bus drivers and conductors, and took over the buses.
Petitioner is not authorized to use his firearm or his authority as police
officer to act as bodyguard of Atty. Gironella and to intimidate and coerce
the drivers/stockholders and the bus passengers. Barien, et al. thus
prayed for the preventive suspension of petitioner, the confiscation of his
firearm and his termination after due hearing. He was sentenced the
penalty of 3 mos. suspension from service without pay. Petitioner
appealed his case with the DILG but Sec. Alfredo Lim denied it and
affirmed the suspension. He then appealed to the CSC claiming that he
was denied due process but was again denied and modified the decision
to dismissal from service.
Issues:
(1)Whether the petitioner was denied due process in the proceedings
before the Office of the Legal Service of the PNP(2) Whether the CA
correctly affirmed the CSC decision modifying the penalty of petitioner
from three months suspension to dismissal from the service.
Held:
(1)No. The records of the case show that petitioner was adequately
apprised of the charges filed against him and he submitted his answer to
the complaint while the case was still under a pre-charge investigation.
When the Office of the Legal Service conducted a summary hearing on the
complaint, petitioner was again duly notified of the proceedings and was
given an opportunity to explain his side but failed to do so.(2) Yes.
Petitioner, acting as private bodyguard without approval of the proper
authorities is classified as a grave offense punishable with dismissal from
service as provided in Memorandum Circular No. 93-024 (Guidelines in the
Application of Penalties in Police Administrative Case)

IMPERIAL, JR. V. GSIS

[GR NO. 191224, OCTOBER 4, 2011]
Doctrine:
Procedural due process is the constitutional standard demanding that
notice and an opportunity to be heard be given before judgment is
rendered. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his
interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain; the essence
of due process is in the opportunity to be heard. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not always necessary.
Facts:
Petitioner, then Branch Manager of GSIS Naga Field Office was
administratively charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for approving salary loan
requests of 8 employees who lacked contribution requirements. He was
preventively suspended for 90 days. The counsel of the petitioner
explained that his client granted the loan applications under an existing
board resolution, with the approval of the GSIS Vice President; the loans
were fully paid, without causing any prejudice to the service. The GSIS
President found him guilty of the said charges. This being petitioners
second administrative offense, the penalty of dismissal was imposed upon
him with accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits,
cancellation
of
eligibility
and
perpetual
disqualification
from
reemployment in the government.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner was denied due process
Held:
No. What negates any due process infirmity is the petitioners subsequent
motion for reconsideration which cured whatever defect the Hearing
Officer might have committed in the course of hearing the petitioners
case. Again, the GSIS President duly considered the arguments presented
in the petitioners motion for reconsideration when he denied the same.
Thus, the petitioner was actually heard through his pleadings.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. REYES

[GR NO. 170512, OCTOBER 5, 2011]
Doctrine:
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all
situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a
person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements
of due process.
Facts:
Respondent Antonio Reyes being then the Head Office LTO was found
guilty of grave abuse of misconduct by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Based on the affidavits and testimonies of several witnesses (Penaloza,
Amper and Valdehueza) it was said that Reyes would give the flunkers of
the drivers license examination the option of retaking the examination or
to simply pay an additional cost to have a passing grade without actually
re-taking the same. It is alleged that he illegally exacted money from
Acero in exchange for the issuance of a driver's license to the latter,
notwithstanding that Acero did not pass the requisite written examination
therefor. On appeal, the CA reversed the said judgment and exonerated
him from the administrative charge for insufficiency of evidence.
Issue:
Whether Reyes was denied due process
Held:
Yes. The 5th requirement (the decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected)
on the cardinal principles on due process in administrative proceedings as
laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v CIR was not complied with. Reyes was
not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were
eventually made the bases of petitioner's decision that found him guilty of
grave misconduct. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was
furnished with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of
Pealoza, Amper and Valdehueza, whether before or after the petitioner
issued its Decision.

SORIANO VS LA GUARDIA
G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009
FACTS
The Minister of INC felt directly alluded by an offending remark made by
Soriano in one of his episode in his regular program aired on UNTV 37,
Ang Dating Daan. This ensued 8 private complainants who are members
of INC to file an affidavit-complaint against herein petition (Soriano) before
the MTRCB. Forthwith, the MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing in
relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the said episode. After a
preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB ordered
preventive suspension of his program for 20 days, in accordance with
Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in
relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of
Procedure. The petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive
suspension order, praying that Laguardia and two other members of the
adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the case, but
withdrew the same two days after, and, instead filed with the SC of a
petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the preventive suspension
order thus issued. Meanwhile, in the administrative case filed against the
respondent with the MTRCB, it was held that the respondent is liable for
his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months
suspension from said program. He then filed petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief on the ground that the
preventive suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR provision
authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly
authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE MTRCB IS ENTITLED TO ISSUE PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION
RULING
YES. Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be
administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasijudicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by
statute. They have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or
delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an
agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But

once ascertained as existing, the authority given should be liberally

construed. The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the
scope of the MTRCBs authority and functions expressly set forth in PD
1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), which empowers the MTRCB to
supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x
exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures,
programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be
objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x
exhibited and/or broadcast by television. The power to issue preventive
suspension forms part of the MTRCBs express regulatory and supervisory
statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority
subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any other construal would
render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.
Preventive suspension is not a penalty by itself, but merely a preliminary
step in an administrative investigation. And the power to discipline and
impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate
administrative complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively
suspend the person subject of the complaint. The mere absence of a
provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986 would not work to deprive
the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension. It is
expressly empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television
programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others,
indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions for violations and,
corollarily, to prevent further violations as it investigates. Contrary to
petitioners assertion, the afore quoted
Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the
law. Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive
suspension, outrun its authority under the law. The preventive suspension
was actually done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant to the
MTRCBs duty of regulating or supervising television programs, pending a
determination of whether or not there has actually been a violation. In the
final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a
power which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB

G.R. No. 164242 November 28, 2008

DESTILERIA LIMTUACO & CO., INC.
CORPORATION
vs.
ADVERTISING BOARD OF THE PHILIPPINES

and

CONVOY

MARKETING

Facts:
Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation (Convoy), through its
advertising agency, SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of the 4As, applied
with the Ad Board for a clearance of the airing of a radio advertisement
entitled, "Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba ng Kinse Anyos)." Ad Board
issued a clearance for said advertisement but was swept with complaints
from the public. This prompted Ad Board to ask SLG for a replacement but
there was no response. With the continued complaints from the public, Ad
Board, this time, asked SLG to withdraw its advertisement, to no avail. Ad
Board decided to recall the clearance previously issued, effective
immediately. Petitioners argue that their right to advertise is a
constitutionally protected right, as well as a property right. Petitioners
believe that requiring a clearance from Ad Board before advertisements
can be aired amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of
law. They also argue that Ad Board's regulation is an exercise of police
power which must be subject to constitutional proscriptions.
Issue:
WON the writ of prohibition will lie on this case.
Ruling:

No. Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be

entitled to such recourse, it must establish the following requisites:
(a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person
exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial;
(b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in
excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and
(c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal,
board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions. What is at contest here is the power and authority of a private
organization, composed of several members-organizations, which power
and authority were vested to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition
will not lie in this case. The definition and purpose of a writ of prohibition
excludes the use of the writ against any person or group of persons acting
in a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against private
individuals or corporations so acting

GOV.
ORLANDO
A.
FUA,
JR.,
In
Representation
of
the
PROVINCIALGOVERNMENT OF SIQUIJOR and all its OFFICIALS and
EMPLOYEES, Petitioners,
-versus
The COMMISSION ON AUDIT and ELIZABETH S.ZOSA, Dir. IV, LEGAL and
ADJUDICATION OFFICE-LOCALCOMMISSION OF AUDIT, QUEZON CITY,
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
(G.R. No. 175803 December 4, 2009)
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 64 in relation to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision of the Commission on
Audit (COA) dated October 19, 2006, denying petitioner's appeal, be
declared null and void.
FACTS:
On November 14, 2003, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Siquijor adopted Resolution No. 2003-247 segregating the sum of
P8,600,000.00 as payment for the grant of extra Christmas bonus at
P20,000.00 each to all its officials and employees. On the same date,
corresponding Appropriation Ordinance No. 029 was passed. Thereafter,
Resolution No. 2003-239 was adopted requesting President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo for an authority to the Provincial Government of Siquijor

to grant such bonus. On even date, petitioner wrote aletter to the

President reiterating said request. On said letter, the President then wrote
a marginal note reading, NO OBJECTION.
The provincial government, relying on the aforementioned resolutions
and the Presidents marginal note, then proceeded to release the extra
Christmas bonus to its officials and employees. However, a post-audit was
conducted by Ms. Eufemia C. Jaugan, Audit Team Leader (ATL), Province of
Siquijor, and thereafter, she issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM)
Nos. 2004-011 and 2004-022, dated June 28,2004 and October 27, 2004,
respectively. In AOM Nos. 2004-011 and 2004-022, Ms. Jaugan questioned
the legality of the payment of said bonuses, citing Section 4.1 of Budget
Circular No. 2003-7 dated December 5,2003, limiting the grant of Extra
Christmas Bonus to P5,000.00, and Section 325 (a) of the Local
GovernmentCode imposing a 55% limitation on Personal Services
expenditures. AOM Nos. 2004-011 and 2004-022 were then reviewed by
Atty. Roy L. Ursal, Regional Cluster Director, Legal and Adjudication Sector,
Commission on Audit Region VII. Atty. Ursal disallowed the payments and
issued Notices of Disallowance Nos. 2004-001-100 (2003) L3-05-164-00018-A and 2004-002-100 (2003) L3-05-164-00-019-A, both dated October
28, 2005 in the total amount of P6,345,000.00 on the following grounds:
1. Violation of item 8.0 of Budget Circular No. 2002-A dated November 28,
2002 on the prohibition of any increase in compensation not in
accordance with the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) andthe grant of
other additional incentives, bonuses, cash gifts and similar benefits
outside of those authorized in said Circular and Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6686, without the prior approval of the President. The Presidents marginal
note of No Objection cannot be considered an approval; and2. Based on
the computation submitted by the Provincial Budget Officer for the
Province of Siquijor, Personal Services of the local government unit has
exceeded the limitation for Budget Year 2003.Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration dated October 28, 2005, but in the 1 st Indorsement
datedFebruary 1, 2006, the same was denied by the Regional Cluster
Director. From said denial, petitioner appealed to the Commission on
Audit-Legal and Adjudication Office(COA-LAO-Local), headed by
respondent Director IV, Elizabeth S. Zosa. Petitioner raised the issues of
(1)whether the Presidents marginal note of No Objection on the letterrequest of Gov. Orlando B. Fua to grant extra Christmas bonus to the
provincial governments employees should be a ground to lift the
disallowance, and (2) whether the Province, in granting the extra
Christmas bonus, has complied with the 55% Personal Service limitation
under Section 325 of the Local Government Code.
On October 19, 2006, the COA-LAO-Local issued a Decision affirming the
Regional Cluster Directors Notice of Disallowance,
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Resolution 2003-247 and Appropriation 029 which gives
the Local Government of Siquijors employees an extra bonus with the
consent of the President is valid.

HELD:
The petition is doomed to fail. The 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the
COA states that, Rule VI, Section 1. Who May Appeal and Where to Appeal.

The party aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Director may

appeal to the Commission Proper. Rule XI. Section 1. Petition for Certiorari.

Any decision, order or resolution of the Commission may be brought to the

Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days
from receipt of a copy thereof in the manner provided by law, the Rules of
Court and these Rules. Clearly, by immediately filing the present petition
for certiorari, petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
available to him. The general rule is that before a party may seek the
intervention of the court, he should first avail himself of all the means
afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative
agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from
them and submitted to the court without first giving such administrative
agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation. The
non-observance of the doctrine results in the petition having no cause of
action, thus, justifying its dismissal. In this case, the necessary
consequence of the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is obvious:
the disallowance as ruled by the LAO-C has now become final and
executory. There is nothing in this case to convince us that it should be
considered as an exception to the aforementioned general rule. The issue
presented is not a purely legal one. The Commission Proper, which is the
tribunal possessing special knowledge, experience and tools to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact involved in the conduct of the audit,
would still be the best body to determine whether the marginal note of No
Objection on petitioners letter-request to the President is indeed
authentic and tantamount to the required approval. Petitioner having
failed to pursue an appeal with the Commission Proper, the Decision
issued by the COA-LAO-Local has become final and
executory.
Consequently, the Decision of the COA-LAO-Local cannot longer be altered
or modified

MUNICIPALITY OF PATEROS VS. CA

G.R. No. 157714; June 16, 2009
FACTS:
The property subject of this case consists of portions of then Fort William
McKinley, now known as Fort Bonifacio, comprising of several Barangays.
The subject property is allegedly situated within the territorial jurisdiction
of respondent City of Makati per Proclamation No. 2475 by former
President Marcos. Subsequently, former President Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 518, amending Proclamation No. 2475. Parenthetically, it
may be noted that a similar boundary dispute over the entire property

exists between the City of Taguig and Makati, docketed and pending
before the RTC of Pasig City. As Proclamation Nos. 2475 and 518
respectively stated that the entire property is situated in Makati, Pateros,
filed an action for Judicial Declaration of the Territorial Boundaries of
Pateros against Makati before the RTC of Pasig City. The case was,
however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction inasmuch as the subject
property is located in Makati and it should have been filed before the
Makati RTC. Heeding the directive of the Pasig RTC, Pateros, filed with the
RTC of Makati a Complaint against Makati and co-respondents, Director of
Lands and the DENR, for the Judicial Declaration of the Territorial
Boundaries of Pateros. Pateros claimed that, based on historical and
official records, it had an original area of 1,038 hectares, more or less.
However, when a cadastral mapping was conducted, Pateros learned that
its territorial boundaries had been substantially reduced to merely 166
hectares. Pateros opined that this disparity was brought about by the
issuance of Proclamation Nos. 2475 and 518. It prayed that it judicially
declare the territorial boundaries of Pateros, and that it nullify
Proclamation No. 2475. Makati filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action because
original jurisdiction to resolve boundary disputes among municipalities
situated in Metro Manila is vested in the Metropolitan Manila Authority
(MMA) and that the RTC's jurisdiction is merely appellate. Upon suspension
of the proceedings RA No. 7854 was enacted into law, converting Makati
into a highly urbanized city. Pateros then moved for the revival of the
proceedings upon its revival, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, it held that Proclamation No. 2475 specifically declared
that the subject property is within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati and,
inasmuch as the Proclamation was not declared unconstitutional, the
same is a valid and subsisting law. In the main, the RTC held that the
modification or substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities can
be done only through a law enacted by Congress which shall be subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected. Hence, the RTC opined that it is without jurisdiction to fix
the territorial boundaries of the parties. Pateros filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was, however, denied. Aggrieved, Pateros appealed
to the CA, which denied Pateros' appeal. The CA held that the RTC did not
make any findings of fact but merely applied various provisions of law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the case presented a pure question of law, which
Pateros should have brought directly to the Supreme Court, thus by
undertaking a wrong mode of appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case.
RULING:
We agree that Pateros indeed committed a procedural infraction. The
jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of
law; it is conferred by the Constitution or by law. Consequently, issues

which deal with the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a
case are pure questions of law. As Pateros' appeal solely involves a
question of law, it should have directly taken its appeal to this Court by
filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not an ordinary
appeal with the CA under Rule 41. The CA did not err in holding that
Pateros pursued the wrong mode of appeal. However, in the interest of
justice and in order to write finish to this controversy, we opt to relax the
rules. Now on the issue of jurisdiction -Apart from the doctrine that the jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject
matter of an action is conferred by law, it is also the rule that the courts
exercise of jurisdiction is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint or information and the law applicable at the time the action was
commenced. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject
matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, by acquiescence, or
even by express consent of the parties. Thus, the jurisdiction of a court
over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be
made to depend upon the defenses set up in court or upon a motion to
dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost
entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained
up to the end of the litigation. It is worth stressing that, at the time the
instant case was filed, the 1987 Constitution and the LGC of 1991 were
already in effect. Thus, the law in point is Section 118 of the LGC. Notably,
when Pateros filed its complaint with the RTC of Makati, Makati was still a
municipality. We take judicial notice of the fact that there was no
Sangguniang Panlalawigan that could take cognizance of the boundary
dispute, as provided in Section 118(b) of the LGC. Neither was it feasible
to apply Section 118(c) or Section 118(d), because these two provisions
clearly refer to situations different from that obtaining in this case. Also,
contrary to Makati's postulation, the former MMA did not also have the
authority to take the place of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan because the
MMA's power was limited to the delivery of basic urban services requiring
coordination in Metropolitan Manila. The MMA's governing body, the
Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the
component cities and municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1)
formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring
coordination and consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and
other issuances, approval of a code of basic services, and exercise of its
rule-making power.[34]
Thus, there is no merit in Makatis argument that Pateros failed to exhaust
administrative remedies inasmuch as the LGC is silent as to the governing
body in charge of boundary disputes involving municipalities located in
the Metropolitan Manila area. However, now that Makati is already a
highly urbanized city, the parties should follow Section 118(d) of the LGC
and should opt to amicably settle this dispute by joint referral to the
respective sanggunians of the parties. This has become imperative
because, after all, no attempt had been made earlier to settle the dispute
amicably under the aegis of the LGC. The specific provision of the LGC,
now made applicable because of the altered status of Makati, must be
complied with. In the event that no amicable settlement is reached, as

envisioned under Section 118(e) of the LGC, a certification shall be issued

to that effect, and the dispute shall be formally tried by the Sanggunian
concerned within sixty (60) days from the date of the aforementioned
certification. In this regard, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the LGC shall govern. Only upon failure of these
intermediary steps will resort to the RTC follow, as specifically provided in
Section 119 of the LGC. On this score, the jurisdiction of the RTC over
boundary disputes among LGUs was settled in National Housing Authority
v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, where this Court
recognized the appellate jurisdiction of the proper RTC. The jurisdiction of
the RTC was clarified in
Municipality of Kananga v. Judge Madrona, where this Court held that,
even in the absence of any specific provision of law, RTCs have general
jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld
from their plenary powers. They have the power not only to take judicial
cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but
also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the
power is not only original, but also exclusive.

DR. CASTOR C. DE JESUS, Petitioner,

- versus RAFAEL D. GUERRERO III, CESARIO R. PAGDILAO, AND FORTUNATA B.
AQUINO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 171491
Before us is a petition for review seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated September 30, 2005 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 83779, and its Resolution[2] dated February 9, 2006 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Culled from the records are the following facts:
Nilo A. Bareza, Records Officer III of the Philippine Council for Aquatic and
Marine Research and Development (PCAMRD), made out a check payable
to himself and drawn against the Asean-Canada Project Fund, a foreignassisted project being implemented by PCAMRD. To avoid being caught,
Bareza stole Land Bank Check No. 070343 from the trust fund of the
PCAMRD from the desk of Arminda S. Atienza, PCAMRD Cashier III. He

filled out the check for the amount of P385,000.00, forged the signatures
of the authorized signatories, made it appear that the check was endorsed
to Atienza, and with him as the endorsee, encashed the check that was
drawn against the PCAMRD Trust Fund. Then, he deposited part of the
money to the Asean-Canada Project Fund and pocketed the difference.[3]
Atienza discovered that the check in question was missing on the third
week of February 1999 while preparing the Report of Checks Issued and
Cancelled for the Trust Fund for the month of January. Not finding the
check anywhere in her office, Atienza called the bank to look for the same.
She was shocked to learn from a bank employee that the check had been
issued payable in her name. When Atienza went to the bank to examine
the check, she noticed that her signature and the signature of Dir. Rafael
D. Guerrero III (Guerrero), PCAMRD Executive Director, were forged. She
also found out that Bareza appeared to be the person who encashed the
check.[4]
Bareza admitted his wrongdoings when he was confronted by Atienza
about the incident, but begged that he be not reported to the
management. Bareza also promised to return the money in a few days.
Against her good judgment, Atienza acquiesced to Barezas request,
seeing Barezas remorse over his transgressions. But Atienza also felt
uneasy over her decision to keep silent about the whole thing, so Atienza
persuaded Bareza to inform Fortunata B. Aquino (Aquino), PCAMRD
Director of Finance and Administrative Division, about what he did.
Bareza, however, decided to confess to Carolina T. Bosque, PCAMRD
Accountant III, instead.[5]
When Bareza revealed to Bosque what he had done, he was also advised
to report the matter to Aquino, but, Bareza became hysterical and
threatened to commit suicide if his misdeeds were ever exposed. Due to
his fervent pleading and his promise to repay the amount he took,
Bosque, like Atienza, assented to his plea for her to remain silent.[6]
True to his word, Bareza deposited back P385,000.00 to the PCAMRD
account on February 25, 1999.[7]
On July 27, 2001, following rumors that an investigation will be conducted
concerning irregularities in the said project, Bareza set fire to the PCAMRD
Records Section in order to clear his tracks.[8]
A fact-finding committee was thus created by virtue of PCAMRD
Memorandum Circular No. 30[9] to investigate the burning incident and
forgery of checks by Bareza. After investigation, the fact-finding
committee found sufficient evidence to charge Bareza with dishonesty,
grave misconduct and falsification of official document.[10] The factfinding committee likewise found sufficient evidence to charge Atienza
with inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
duties[11] and Bosque with simple neglect of duty.[12]

Concomitant to the above findings, Guerrero formed an investigation

committee to conduct formal investigations on the charges filed against
Bareza, Atienza and Bosque.[13] The investigation committee found
Bareza guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and recommended his
dismissal from the service. It also found sufficient basis to uphold the
charge filed against Atienza and Bosque, and recommended a minimum
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day suspension for Atienza, and a
maximum penalty of six (6) months suspension for Bosque.[14]
On September 10, 2001 the PCAMRD adopted the findings of the
investigation committee but imposed only the penalty of six (6) months
suspension on Atienza and only three (3) months suspension on Bosque.
[15]
Not convinced with the results of the investigation and the penalties
imposed on Bareza, Atienza and Bosque, petitioner exerted efforts to
obtain a copy of the complete records of the proceedings had. Upon
reading the same, petitioner was of the opinion that the investigation
conducted by the fact-finding committee and investigation committee was
perfunctorily and superficially done, and made only to whitewash and
cover-up the real issues because the report exonerated other persons
involved in the crimes and omitted other erroneous acts. According to
him, these circumstances led to partiality in deciding the charges. Hence,
petitioner filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
(Ombudsman) a complaint against Guerrero, Cesario R. Pagdilao
(Pagdilao), PCAMRD Deputy Executive Director, and Aquino, among
others, for incompetence and gross negligence.[16] The case was
docketed as OMB Case No. L-A-02-0209-D.
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit and Complaint for Malicious Prosecution[17]
dated July 9, 2002, the respondents argued that the complaint is wanting
in material, relevant and substantive allegations and is clearly intended
only to harass them. Furthermore, they contended that petitioner failed to
identify the persons he claims were exonerated, and worse, petitioner
failed to state with particularity their participation in the crimes.[18]
In his Consolidated Reply and Counter-Affidavit[19] dated July 25, 2002,
petitioner belied the allegation of the respondents that his complaint was
lacking in substance. He stressed that the report of the investigation
committee that was submitted by the respondents reinforced his claim
that the investigation relative to the forgery and arson case was indeed
perfunctory and superficial, designed only to whitewash and cover-up the
real issues. To bolster his contention, he pointed out that the sworn
affidavit of Bareza revealed that the latter was able to use certain funds of
the Asean-Canada Project by encashing blank checks that were previously
signed by Pagdilao. Thus, he averred that the failure to implicate Pagdilao
as a conspirator to the crime of forgery shows that the investigation was
just a farce. Petitioner also claimed that Atienza and Bosque were not

charged with the proper administrative offense to avoid their dismissal

from the service. Petitioner pointed to the command responsibility of
respondents over Bareza, Atienza and Bosque. He maintained that had
they been prudent enough in handling PCAMRDs finances, the forgery of
checks and the arson incident could have been avoided. Furthermore,
petitioner alleged that being the head of PCAMRD, Guerrero should have
pursued investigations on the criminal aspect of the cases of forgery and
arson because a huge amount of government money was involved
therein. His act, therefore, of declaring the cases closed after the conduct
of the investigations in the administrative aspect only is contrary to the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) because its
object is to conceal more big anomalies and issues.[20]
In a Decision[21] dated August 5, 2002, the Ombudsman recommended
the dismissal of the administrative case filed against the respondents for
lack of merit. It agreed with the respondents that the complaint was
couched in general terms that contains no material, relevant and
substantial allegation to support the theory of cover-up or whitewash. The
Ombudsman also held that there is nothing to sustain petitioners
allegation that Pagdilao should be implicated in the forgery because
petitioner failed to sufficiently prove that the check that was signed in
blank by Pagdilao was Land Bank Check No. 070343, or the subject check
encashed by Bareza. Even assuming that the forged check was the one
signed in blank by Pagdilao, the Ombudsman opined that the latter still
cannot be said to have participated in the forgery because the check was
in the custody and safekeeping of Atienza, the cashier, when it was stolen.
In the same vein, the Ombudsman found no adequate basis in the
petitioners allegation that Guerrero charged Atienza and Bosque with
erroneous administrative infractions to lessen their liability, noting that
Guerrero merely adopted the recommendation of the fact-finding and
investigation committees as to what they should be charged with. The
Ombudsman added that Guerrero cannot be indicted for violation of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 or be held administratively liable for his
failure to initiate criminal cases against Bareza, Atienza and Bosque
because he had no personal knowledge of the commission of the crimes
allegedly committed by them.[22]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it in an
Order[23] dated November 25, 2003. According to the Ombudsman,
nowhere in petitioners complaint did he allege that respondents should be
blamed for arson and forgery because of command responsibility. It held
that petitioners averment of the same only in his reply-affidavit and in his
motion for reconsideration should be disregarded altogether since it
materially and belatedly alters his original cause of action against the
respondents, which cannot be allowed.[24]
Not accepting defeat, petitioner elevated the matter by way of a petition
for review[25] under Rule 43 before the appellate court. Petitioner claimed
that the Ombudsman gravely erred when it recommended the dismissal of

the charges against the respondents and denied his motion for
reconsideration despite the existence of a prima facie case against them
for incompetence and gross negligence.
On September 30, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
affirming the August 5, 2002 Decision and November 25, 2003 Order of
the Ombudsman in OMB Case No. L-A-02-0209-D. The appellate court
found that the Ombudsman correctly dismissed the complaint against the
respondents. The appellate court held that petitioner questioned the
handling of the PCAMRD finances without specifying the particular acts or
omissions constituting the gross negligence of the respondents. The
charges, being broad, sweeping, general and purely speculative, cannot,
by their nature, constitute a prima facie case against the respondents.[26]
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said Decision but it was
denied by the appellate court in the Resolution dated February 9, 2006.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED IN ITS DECISION
PETITIONERS PETITION AND AFFIRMED THE OMBUDSMANS DECISION OF
AUGUST 5, 2002 IN OMB-L[-A]-02-020[9]-D, RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL
OF THE CASE BY RELYING SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY ON THE GENERAL
RULE/PRINCIPLE THAT THE COURTS WILL NOT INTERFERE IN THE
INVESTIGATORY AND PROSECUTORY POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
IGNORING THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE PRESENCE OF COMPELLING
REASONS AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE EXERCISE THEREOF.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR AND A GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS
AND MISAPPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS
NO PRIMA FACIE OR PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST RESPONDENTS, [THAT] IF
CONSIDERED, WILL ALTER THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENTS ARE
NOT ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE.[27]
Simply put, we are asked to resolve whether the appellate court erred in
affirming the dismissal of the complaint. We hold that it did not.

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a

finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that
mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges
based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given
credence. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and
suppositions, and fails to substantiate his allegations, the administrative
complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.[28]
Mainly, petitioner ascribes incompetence and gross negligence to
respondents because according to him, the fraudulent use of PCAMRD
funds and arson would not have happened had they not been remiss in
the performance of their duties. Specifically, he averred that Guerrero,
being the head of PCAMRD, should have seen to it that all the resources of
the government are managed and expended in accordance with laws and
regulations, and safeguarded against loss and waste; Pagdilao should
have ensured that the signed blank checks were used for what they were
intended; and that anomalies would have been avoided had Aquino
supervised Bareza, Atienza and Bosque, her subordinates, properly and
efficiently. In sum, petitioner argues that they are accountable because of
command responsibility.[29]
We agree with the appellate court and the Ombudsman that the complaint
against the respondents should be dismissed. A perusal of petitioners
allegations clearly shows that they are mere general statements or
conclusions of law, wanting in evidentiary support and substantiation. It is
not enough for petitioner to simply aver that respondents had been
derelict in their duties; he must show the specific acts or omissions
committed by them which amount to incompetence and gross negligence.
This, he failed to do. Hence, the complaint was correctly dismissed for lack
of merit.
Petitioners allegation that he has specified the acts and omissions of
respondents which show that they are guilty of dishonesty and falsification
lacks merit. Aside from the fact that nowhere in the records does it appear
that he has indeed shown the particular acts or omissions of respondents
constituting dishonesty or which amounted to falsification of whatever
nature, it must be emphasized that the case he filed before the
Ombudsman was an administrative complaint for incompetence and gross
negligence. Hence, these are the two charges he needed to prove by
substantial evidence, not any other crime or administrative infraction. At
the very least, petitioner should have shown how his accusations of
dishonesty and falsification constituted incompetence and gross
negligence on the part of the respondents.
To further persuade us that his complaint was wrongly dismissed,
petitioner argues that he had in his petition established the existence of

probable cause to hold respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of

Rep. Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.[30] He then
concludes that if there is sufficient basis to indict the respondents of a
criminal offense then with more reason that they should be made
accountable administratively considering the fact that the quantum of
evidence required in administrative proceedings is merely substantial
evidence.[31]
This argument likewise has no merit. It is worthy to note that petitioner is
merely proceeding from his own belief that there exists sufficient basis to
charge respondents criminally. This is not within his province to decide. He
could not arrogate unto himself the power that pertains to the proper
authorities enjoined by law to determine the absence or existence of
probable cause to indict one of a criminal offense.
More importantly, an administrative proceeding is different from a criminal
case and may proceed independently thereof.[32] Even if respondents
would subsequently be found guilty of a crime based on the same set of
facts obtaining in the present administrative complaint, the same will not
automatically mean that they are also administratively liable.
As we have said in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza[33]
and which we have reiterated in a host of cases,[34] a finding of guilt in
the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal will not necessarily
exculpate them administratively. The basic premise is that criminal and
civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that
the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice
versa.[35]
It must be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from
criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to
protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a
public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of criminal
prosecution is the punishment of crime.[36] To state it simply, petitioner
erroneously equated criminal liability to administrative liability.
Neither will the allegation of the principle of command responsibility make
the respondents liable. In the absence of substantial evidence of gross
negligence of the respondents, administrative liability could not be based
on the principle of command responsibility.[37] Without proof that the
head of office was negligent, no administrative liability may attach.
Indeed, the negligence of subordinates cannot always be ascribed to their
superior in the absence of evidence of the latters own negligence.[38]
While it may be true that certain PCAMRD employees were sanctioned for
negligence and some other administrative infractions, it does not follow
that those holding responsible positions, like the respondents in this case,
are likewise negligent, especially so when the contentions of petitioner
remain unsubstantiated.

WHEREFORE, there being no sufficient showing of grave and reversible

error in the assailed decision and resolution, the petition is DENIED. Said
Decision dated September 30, 2005 and Resolution dated February 9,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83779 are hereby
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.