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explanation the judge resumed hearing the verbally dismissed case, will
there be double jeopardy?
No. The verbal dismissal is not final until written and signed by the judge. (Rivera,
Jr. v. People, G.R, No. 93219, 1990)
There were delays in the trial which were beyond the control of the accused
and the prosecution. Subsequently, the case was dismissed with the
consent of the accused. Later, the case was reinstated. Was there double
jeopardy?
No. First, the delays were not unreasonable; hence, there was no denial of the right
to speedy trial. Second, the dismissal was with the consent of the accused.
Therefore, the reinstatement did not violate the right against double jeopardy.
(Almaria v. CA, G.R. No. 127772, 2001)
The accused move to dismiss the case before the start of the trial on the
ground that the facts alleged in the information did not constitute an
offense. Dismissal was granted but subsequently reversed by the Supreme
Court. May the accused invoke double jeopardy upon reinstatement of the
case?
No. The dismissal was not on the merits because no evidence had yet been
presented and it was with the consent of the accused upon its motion. (People v.
Cuevo, G.R. No. L-27607, 1981)
May the prosecution appeal a judgement of acquittal?
No. No error, however flagrant, committed by the court against the State, can be
reserved by it for decision by the Supreme Court when the defendant has once been
placed in jeopardy and discharged even though the discharge was the result of the
error committed. (People v. Pomeroy, G.R. No. L-8229, 1955)
To avail of the defense of double jeopardy must the second offense charged
in every case be the same as the first offense?
The second sentence of Section 22 says: If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act. Therefore, the offenses need not be the same,
provided, however, that they flow from the same act. (Yap v. Lutero, G.R. No. L12669, 1956)
What is the doctrine of supervening events?
Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense
and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to
be in second jeopardy if indicted for the second offense. (Melo v. People,
G.R. No. L-3580, 1950)