A HISTORY OF POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN TIVLAND SINCE

1979

By

GBAMWUAN ASOR
(BSU/AR/MA/09/1270)

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BENUE STATE UNIVERISTY, MAKURDI.

MARCH, 2013

A HISTORY OF POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN TIVLAND SINCE 1979

By

GBAMWUAN ASOR
(BSU/AR/MA/09/1270)

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE POST-GRADUATE SCHOOL,

BENUE STATE UNIVERSITY, MAKURDI IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF
A MASTERS DEGREE IN HISTORY

MARCH, 2013.

CERTIFICATION
We certify that this Dissertation titled: A History of Post-Election Violence in
Tivland since 1979 has been presented by Gbamwuan Asor of the Department of History,
Faculty of Arts, Benue State University, Makurdi and has been approved by the Examiners.

Supervisor
Signature:

Head of Department
Signature:

Professor Okpeh O. Okpeh, Jr.

Professor Okpeh O. Okpeh, Jr.

Date:

Date:

Having met the stipulated requirements, the dissertation has been accepted by Postgraduate
School.

..
Dean
Postgraduate School

.
Date

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that, this dissertation was written by me and that, it is a record of my
own research work undertaken under the supervision of Professor Okpeh O. Okpeh Jr. It has
not been presented in any form whatsoever in any previous application for the award of
Masters Degree. All sources and information have been duly distinguished and appropriately
acknowledged by endnotes and quotation marks.

GBAMWUAN ASOR

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my late parents Evangelist Gbamwuan Ajio and Mrs. Mary
Gbamwuan, both of who toiled tirelessly during their life time towards making me achieve
this academic height, May your gentle souls rest in perfect peace amen.

ACKNOWLEDMENTS

In the course of carrying out this research work, I have relied and benefited
immensely from the invaluable assistance, encouragement, kindness and magnanimity of so
many people, without whom this work would not have been successfully completed.
Although they are too numerous but it is necessary to put some of these names on record for
posterity sake, by acknowledging their contributions towards the realization of this noble
academic pursuit.
I am particularly very grateful to my supervisor Professor Okpeh O. Okpeh Jr. who
painstakingly and meticulously perused through this work and made very critical but useful
comments which helped in no small way in strengthening and improving the quality of this
Dissertation. Despite his very tight schedule, Professor Okpeh was always available to make
invaluable inputs whenever the need arises. He particularly gave me fatherly encouragement
to vigorously work towards completing this research on time. I must also appreciate the
scholarly contributions of my Internal Reader Dr. Ugbegili I. Sylvester for being kind and
patient in making useful corrections and suggestions to my scripts. Furthermore, I must
appreciate the entire lecturers in the Department of History, Benue State University Makurdi
for their unquantifiable contributions to the success of this work. To be specific, the
constructive criticisms of Professor Mike Odey, Former Head of Department History,
Professor Armstrong Adejo, Associate Professor Varvar, Dr. Nyityo, Dr. Chris Orngu, Dr.
Agaba J.E, Mr. Ikpanor and all those whose names have not been mentioned here. I pray that
may God spear your lives to continue excelling in this noble profession.
I preserved this special space for the Federal Government of Nigeria, through the
Federal Ministry of Education for granting me Federal Government Scholarship Award for
actualization of this programme. Honestly, this Award contributed 100% for the success of

my academic excellence. May the Federal Government continue to extend her assistance to
all citizens who are ready to develop intellectually through such initiatives.
I must not fail to acknowledge the contribution of my Uncle Barrister Terhemba Shior
with his wife Mrs. Helen Shior who accommodated me throughout my stay in Makurdi for
the actualization of this programme. I am also so much indebted to my Elder brother Mr.
Bem Gbamwuan with his wife Mrs. Blessing Bem for their prayers and financial assistance. I
cannot forget the financial support from Mr. Manasseh Gbamwuan, Mr. Joseph Targuma, Mr.
Terlumun Shie, Mrs. Maji Terlumun, Barrister Levi Shaapera, Jerome Shinyi and Mfe
Emmanuel during the hard times of my academic pursuit, may God Almighty reward you
greatly for your magnanimity.
Finally, I am so much indebted to all those Authors whose works, ideas and
experiences I have found useful in the course of my research work. My acknowledgement
will be certainly incomplete if I do not dedicate specially this space to God Almighty for his
mercies and divine protection as well as for making my dreams a reality.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page

Certification -

ii

Declaration

iii

Dedication

iv

Acknowledgements

Table of Content

vii

Abbreviations -

List of map and Tables

xii

Abstract

xiii

CHAPTER ONE: General Introduction

1.1

Background to the Study

1.2

Statement of the Research Problem -

1.3

Aim and Objectives of the Study

1.4

Significance of the Study

1.5

Scope and Limitations of the study

1.6

Research Methodology

1.7

Conclusion

11

Endnote

11

CHAPTER TWO: Review of Related Literature and Conceptual/Theoretical

Framework
2.1

Introduction

12

2.2

Review of Related Literature -

13

2.3

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

30

2.4

Conclusion

37

Endnotes

38

CHAPTER THREE: Pre-Colonial History and Socio-Political Setting of Tivland

3.1

Introduction

43

3.2

The Geographical Location of Tivland

43

3.3

The Origin, Early Migration and Settlement of Tiv People -

45

3.4

The Economic Organisation of Tiv People

3.5
3.6

50

The Socio-Political Organisation of Tiv People

52

Conclusion

57

Endnotes

58

CHAPTER FOUR: Partisan Politics and Political Violence in Tivland, 1960 to 1992
4.1

Introduction

61

4.2

The Emergence of Political Parties in Tivland

61

4.3

The UMBC/NPC Political Tussle in Tivland, 1960-1964

64

4.4

The Politics of Abuses in the 1979 and 1983 Campaigns in Tivland -

69

4.5

Politics in Tivland during the Aborted Third Republic, 1992-1993 -

74

4.6

Conclusion

76

Endnotes

77

CHAPTER FIVE: Democratic Restoration and the Resurgence of Political Violence in

1999-2007
5.1

Introduction

80

5.2

The 2002 Political Violence in Wannune, Tarka L.G.A.

80

5.3

The 2003/2004 Post-Election Violence in Kwande L.G.A. -

85

5.4

The 2006 Post- Election Violence in Aliade, Gwer L.G.A. -

94

5.5

The Role of the Government in Resolving Electoral Violence in Tivland

99

5.5.1 Deploy Security Agencies

99

5.5.2

Peace and Security Dialogue -

100

5.5.3

Commissions of Inquiry

101

5.6

The Role of the Stakeholders in the Management of Electoral Violence

5.7

in Tivland

103

Conclusion

105

Endnotes

107

CHAPTER SIX: Post-Election Violence: Implications for Development

6.1

Introduction

111

6.2

The Economic Repercussion of Political Violence in Tivland

111

6.3

The Political Implication of Electoral Violence in Tivland -

117

6.4

The Socio-cultural Impact of Political Violence in Tivland -

118

6.5

The Effect of Political Violence on Women and Children in Tivland -

121

6.6

Conclusion

122

Endnote

124

126

CHAPTER SEVEN: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

7.1

Summary and Conclusion

7.2

Recommendations

7.3

Contribution to Knowledge
Bibliography -

- -

130

- - 134

136

ABBREVIATIONS
ACNAction Congress of Nigeria
AG..Action Group
AIG. Assistant Inspector General of Police
ANPP..All Nigeria Peoples Party
BSIEC.Benue State Independent Electoral Commission
CNC.Congress for National Consensus
CSK.Concerned Sons of Kwande
CPC..Congress for Progressive Change
DODivisional Officer
DPO..Divisional Police Officer
EO.Electoral Officer
FEDECO..Federal Electoral Commission
GNPPGreat Nigeria Peoples Party
HRH..His Royal Highness
ING...Interim National Government
IGP....Inspector General of Police
KPC..Kwande Peace Summit
LGA..Local Government Area
MBZL...Middle Belt Zone League
MBPPMiddle Belt Peoples Party
NPC.Northern Peoples Congress
NEPU..Northern Element Progressive Union
NPN.National Party of Nigeria
NPP..Nigeria Peoples Party

NRC.National Republican Convention

NCNC..National Congress of Nigeria Citizens
NNDP..Nigeria National Democratic Party
NA...Native Authority
NEC.National Electoral Commission
POPresiding Officer
PRD.Peoples Redemptions Party
PDP..Peoples Democratic Party
ROReturning Officer
SDP..Social Democratic Party
TDC.Tiv Defense Corp
TTC..Tiv Traditional Council
TPU..Tiv Progressive Union
UMBC..United Middle Belt Congress
UPN..Unity Party of Nigeria
UNPPUnited Nigeria Peoples Party

LIST OF MAP AND TABLES

MAP 1: Map of Tivland Showing the14 LGAs TABLE 1:

44

List of People Killed during the Kwande Crises of 2003/2004

112

TABLE 2: List of People Killed during the 2006 Political Violence in Gwer Local
Government - -

--

113

TABLE 3: People whose Properties Were Destroyed during the 2002 Political Violence in
Wannune, Tarka Local Government -

114

TABLE 4: Properties Destroyed in Aliade Town in the 2006 Electoral Violence in

Gwer Local Government

115

116

TABLE 5: Summary of Estimated Cost of Destruction during the Kwande

Crises of 2003/2004. -

ABSTRACT
Immediately Nigeria got her independence in 1960, all the existing geo-political
regions witnessed political violence arising from contradictions left behind by
the British imperialist government. The manifestation of these political
problems in the Middle Belt Region especially to present day Benue State were
the Tiv riots of 1960 and 1964, which was the earliest sign of an impending
turbulent political system witnessed in this part of the country. The 1960s riots
were sequel to the bitterness engendered by the NPC and UMBC in the 1959
post-elections. Others include NPN/NPP conflicts between 1979 and 1983, the
2002 Wannune violence, the Kwande Local Government crises of 2003/2004
and the recent on-going PDP/ACN conflicts all associated with elections. For
proper investigation of these violent conflicts, the research made use of both
primary and secondary sources. Primary sources were collected through
interviews with informants across the 14 local government areas of Tivland.
Secondary sources on the other hand where sourced from libraries, archives,
internet, government ministries, and local government headquarters. These
informations were carefully analysed to achieve objectivity. Using frustrationaggression and systemic hypotheses as parameter for elaborate analyses, the
research unveils that most electoral violence in Tivland since 1979 has being
caused by the imposition of unpopular candidates on the electorates. In the final
analysis, the work recommends the Tiv intelligentsia to discourage politics of
god-fatherism and advocates proper institutionalization of democracy in
Nigeria. It also encourages the youths, the civil society groups, stakeholders and
traditional leaders to uplift our fragile democracy by fighting corruption that has
contributed to the failure of our democratic governance. The work is segmented
into seven elaborate chapters, which it is hoped might contribute immensely in
the area of research, policy making and would form part of conflict resolution
historiography.

CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Political violence has not been uncommon phenomena in most of the worlds
political systems. This phenomenon is however more pronounced in developing
countries where the political office is also regarded as an industry. Nigeria as an entity
belongs to this class of countries. In Nigeria, political violence has been a constant
feature of the countrys political history: this plague particularly becomes rampant
after independence for example, the 1964 Federal elections and the 1965 Parliamentary
election violence in the Western Region. In the Northern Region where Tivland was/is
located, there was fierce political violence termed the Nande Nande (House Burning)
and Atemityou (Head breaking) of 1960 and 1964 respectively. These incidences of
violence had their roots in the stiff opposition against the ruling Northern Peoples
Congress (NPC) as captured by Jibo thus:
The Tiv were active participants in the 1959 election. They had in the
main pitched their camp with the United Middle Belt Congress which
was led by a fellow Tiv, J. S. Tarka; it was in alliance with the Action
Group led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo. The two political parties
together with NEPU, were probably the greatest opponents which the
NPC faced in the 1959 elections particularly in its home base, the
Northern region.1
The opposition arose from the fact that the Tiv felt left out of the allocations of the
regional government such as high level appointment, the sitting of industries and the
distribution of the government patronage generally. The creation of Benue-Plateau in
1967 and Benue state in 1976 did not tackle election violence hence 1979 and 1983
elections were characterized by abusive songs as noted by Hagher:
Often times at the electioneering campaigns the emphasis was on
dancing rather than manifesto or speeches. This was clearly a
diversionary tactic that mesmerized the Tiv by winning their approval
to the NPN on the dance rather than on the manifesto. To make matters
worse, not even the text of the dance had any serious content. Instead

of concrete issues and positions, aspersions were cast at the personality

and personal habits of the NPP and its gubernatorial candidate. The
dance was infectious, appealing and irresistible.2
Apart from abusive songs, Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP) supporters were brutally
molested especially in the 1983 gubernatorial election. The height of the brutality
against the NPP gubernatorial candidate was the killing of his nephew near Unongu
Village in the heat of the 1983 campaigns.3 Generally speaking, 1983 campaigns
created a great deal of insecurity in Benue state in general, and particularly in Tivland
lives and property were unsafe as were personal reputations.
However, the aborted Third Republic marked the free and fair elections ever
conducted in the history of the nation. In Benue State as well the peoples aspirations
were reflected to the mandate given to Rev. Father Moses Adasu of Social
Democratic Party (SDP). Although at national level, the annulment of Chief MKO
Abiolas election by the General Ibrahim Babangidas regime created upraising and
violence especially from the Yoruba axis. Some renowned Yoruba people who
championed the curse were killed or sentenced to different jail terms by the duo of
General Babangida and General Sani Abacha regimes, thus the journey to democracy
was truncated.4
The resurgence of democracy in 1999 did not defer from the 1960 and 1964
political massacre in Tivland, hence the seed of political discord was sown during this
time as Andrew Amee rightly observes:
When you plant a seed in the soil the tendency is that it will germinate,
grow, mature and produce many seeds. It is no wonder therefore that
the level of political violence witnessed in the Tiv politics since 1979
during the second republic to date is nothing other than the fact that we
are leaping from the dividends of democracy sowed to us by the great
Tiv political leader of blessed memory chief JS Tarka.5

The germination of this seed of political discord in the fourth republic in Tivland was
the 2002 Chairmanship election violence in Wannune, the 2003 gubernatorial and
2004 Chairmanship election violence in Kwande, the 2006 PDP primary election
violence in Gwer and the 2007 election violence in Buruku.
Finally, the outcome of 2011 gubernatorial elections in Benue State between
Governor Gabriel Suswam of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and Professor
Stephen Ugbah of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) contradicted the peoples
aspirations of Shor Changi (meaning the trend has changed) and the public opinion
poll carried out by THISDAY Newspaper of April 7 2011, which indicated that
Suswam PDP had 20%, Ugbah ACN 76%, Saror All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP)
1% and 3% undecided.6 This simple calculation as it is done in America and Britain
clearly indicates that Professor Ugbah might have likely won 26th April 2011
gubernatorial polls. The declaration of Governor Gabriel Suswan as the winner of the
April polls with 590,756 votes against 499,319 votes of Professor Stephen Ugbah
generated tension leading to violent demonstration by the youths in Makurdi and other
parts of Benue State.7 However, in Kwande local government violence became
inevitable at Ajio following the assassination of Mr. Charles Ayede, senior media
advisor to Professor Stephen Ugbah near Kadarko on 13th May, 2011 on his way from
Abuja to Benue State.8 Apart from the above mentioned instances, incidences of
violence were witnessed in Konshisha, Logo and other places in the State. It is against
this backdrop that the researcher embarked on scholarly articulation of these events
with a view to understanding its basis, nature and character as well as proffering
solutions.

1.2

STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Elections in Tivland are often characterized by a lot of contradictions spanning
from manipulation of voters register, gerrymandering of constituencies, stuffing of
ballot boxes, harassment, intimidation, abduction as well as the imposition of
unpopular candidates on the electorates. These contradictions often result to violence
as epitomized in case of the Nande Nande of 1960 and the Atemityou turbulent
violence of 1964. Others include, the 1979 and the 1983 abusive campaigns, the
Wannune Chairmanship tussle of 2002 in Tarka, Kwande in 2003/2004, the 2006
State House of Assembly tussle in Gwer, Buruku in 2007, as well as the Logo
gubernatorial electoral violence in 2011. Against this backdrop, the study set to
address the following questions:
i.

What are the reasons for electoral violence in Tivland?

ii.

Are those reasons causing electoral violence in Tivland the same?

iii.

Who are the perpetrators of those electoral violence in Tivland?

iv.

Why do those perpetrators choose to engage in electoral violence at the expense

of meaningful development?

v.

Are the Tiv intelligentsia aiding and abeting electoral violence in Tivland?

vi.

Why do the Tiv intelligentsia see politics as a do or die game at the expense
of the Tiv philosophy of Ya Na Angbian (let your brother has his turn)

vii.

And finally, Suggest ways that would reduce rampant cases of post-election
violence in Tivland and Nigeria at a broader perspective.

The above and related questions are the problems which motivated this study.
The study also attempts to prove that, those electoral violence distorted the efforts
towards unity and development in Tivland. Danchev and Halversons warning to the

UNO, though regarding conflicts of greater magnitude provides lessons for the
management of political violence in Tivland. According to them, the UNOs
lukewarm attitudes towards some conflicts it tags internal or communal which
implies that such conflicts do not threaten international security is erroneous and to
them such conflicts threatens world peace9. The implication of the foregoing
discussion lies in the need for the Government to redirect attention to electoral
violence in Tivland in a bid to achieving cohesion of the Nigerian society.

1.3

AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The aim and objectives of this study is to critically analyze a history of postelection violence in Tivland since 1979. The broad objectives of the study revolve
around the following:
i.

To understand the nature, causes and dynamics of post-election violence in

Tivland.

ii.

To appraise the rationale behind frequent occurrence of post-election violence

in the Tiv axis of Benue State.

iii.

To assess the impact of post-election violence on the people, their economy

and society.

iv.

To advance some alternative approaches to conflict management and

resolution on the basis of the glaring inadequacies of the existing mechanism.

v.

To fulfill part of the requirements for the award of an M.A. degree in history
of the Benue State University.
In working out the above listed objectives, the research therefore unveils the

multi-dimensional and inter-connectivity of factors causing electoral violence in

Tivland. It contends that, electoral violence has seriously deepens primordial feuds
betwixt and between social segments of Tiv society at the expense of meaningful

development as experienced in other parts of the world. On this basis, it calls the
attention of policy makers, Tiv intelligentsia, traditional rulers and the youths to
collectively work towards achieving better democracy for speedy development of
Tivland.

1.4

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Nigerian democracy requires political stability for rapid socio-economic
growth and development. However, this expected stability has been thwarted arising
from irregularities in the electoral process which have been generating violence as
seen in Tivland since 1979. Instead of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary
to take urgent measures towards alleviating these problems, they rather compounded
them by aiding and abetting electoral fraud. This research is therefore of immense
importance in diverse ways:
Firstly, it re-examines some electoral violence in Tivland that occurred arising
from irregularities in the electoral process putting into consideration the diverse ways
in which the executive, the legislature and the judiciary contributed.
Secondly, the study is significant in the sense that it has presented some data
on the destruction caused as a result of electoral violence in Tivland at the expense of
socio-economic development that are actually lacking in this part of the country since
1979.
Thirdly, the study would help to expand our intellectual and philosophical
horizon in the area of conflict management in Tivland. In doing this, the study has
succeeded in opening new vistas for scholarly attention for researchers intending to
delve further in this area of study and would also be of immense importance to policy
makers both at state and federal level especially when it comes to area of electoral
violence resolution.

Finally, the work forms part of the researchers contribution to academic

knowledge by sparking off a new area of discourse and generating fresh ideas capable
of addressing electoral violence and rampant communal feuds in Tivland.

1.5

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This dissertation is the study of post-election violence in Tivland beginning
from 1979 to 2011. The periodization of this study is predicated on the fact that 1979
marked the first electoral process in history of Benue State which was created in
1976. While the terminating point of 2011 marked a political landmark in the
transition of one civilian democratic government to another democratic government in
the history of Nigeria. Putting into consideration the numerous cases of electoral
violence within the study area, it became only possible to make a representation of the
situation with some selected cases in both Zone A and B that made up the 14 Local
Government Areas of Tivland in Benue State. This is done in order to ensure adequate
and detailed investigation.
Though Tiv people are found in three main States of the Federation of Nigeria
such as Benue, Taraba and Nasarawa, the researcher however concentrated his
findings on the Tiv people living within Benue State10. The population of this people
covers about 72% of the total population of the State which is more reasonable than
Tiv people living in Nasarawa and Taraba States11. Furthermore, Tiv people living in
Taraba and Nasarawa States fell under different government administrations, it is
quite obvious that leadership can cause, aggravate or reduce violence. Therefore, to
study Tiv political violence under Benue State administration and bring in the Tiv
people of Taraba and Nasarawa States may result to incoherent findings and analysis,
besides being 100% broad for a study of this nature.

1.6

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The basic approach which the researcher has employed in the course of this
assignment is the multi-disciplinary approach. In other words, relevant concepts from
other disciplines, for example, anthropology, sociology, political science and
geography have been used. Therefore, the materials for this dissertation are derived
from both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include oral
testimonies, colonial monographs, reports and records which have been kept in the
national archives in Kaduna, Enugu and Ibadan. What has informed this approach is
that primary or secondary sources alone do not give the researcher sufficient
information needed. Furthermore neither of these sources could be considered inferior
or subordinate to the other, but rather complement each other.
Therefore, oral information was collected through interviews and discussions
with eye witnesses or actors of the violence. To achieve this, the researcher travelled
across the length and breadth of some selected local government areas in Tivland,
conducting face to face interviews with informants. Though the trips were successful,
however the basic problem encountered by the researcher during the oral interviews
was the failure of some of the people interviewed to properly establish and articulate
the chronology of the events they were reporting. Though the researcher was able to
conduct dating of the events under discussion with the degree of accuracy, this was
done by asking the informants to associate the events they were reporting to other
important events of the time that they could remember. The researcher also helped
them to mention such events, and any time this was done; the researcher was able to
derive the dates of such events based on that association. More so, many of the
interviewees were still engulfed in the sentiments of the various political parties they
supported by the way they treated the researcher with suspicion and in their kind of

responses. Many of them unduly expanded or over reacted to issues raised especially
when such issues placed their political parties on advantage. When a question was
raised on any issue that did not favor them they narrowed it extremely. In this way,
many of them provided records to justify the existing status-quo at the time, especially
if such status-quo favored them. However, the researcher being a historian knew well
that the essence of history is never fulfilled by mere shifting of evidence for facts.
Therefore, the oral evidence collected was compiled and analyzed against the
backdrop of their authenticity and merit. In this way, the researcher could not accept
the evidence based on their face value.
The researcher also made use of secondary sources. This sources include;
textbooks, journals, articles, magazines, newspapers, theses, dissertations, projects,
seminar papers and workshops proceedings. In order to obtain these materials, the
researcher visited libraries, ministries, internet and local government headquarters to
solicit for the information needed. These records have added great strength to the
work because of their comparatively recent form. Though the secondary source
materials provided the researcher with great degree of accuracy, the reliance on them
was limited by the extent of availability of sources relating to the subject matter,
hence some of the issues discussed in the work were not documented.

1.7

CONCLUSION
This chapter gives a general introduction to the study. It has established the
nature, causes and dynamics of electoral violence in Tivland beginning from 1979 to
2011. To justify the choice of this topic, the chapter elaboratory articulated the
problems of the study and the extent to which these problems are confronting the
corporate existence of Tivland as a homogeneous entity. The chapter also established
the aim and set objectives that would be achieved in the final analyses, therefore
making the work significant to the academia, policy making and researchers.

ENDNOTES
1.

Jibo, M. Tiv Politics since 1959, Mandate International, Katsina-Ala, Benue State,
1993, P.3.

2.

Hagher, I. Popular Theatre and Politics in Tivland since 1960, A Paper Presented at
the Faculty of Arts Seminar, University of Jos, 16th Feb.1988, P. 15.

3.

Jibo, M. Tiv Politics P. 59.

4.

The Nation Newspaper, Sunday June 11 2011, Vol. 05, No.1788, Pp. 4-5.

5.

Amee, A. The History and Party Politics in Ikyurav-Ya, UK Business World

Publishers Makurdi, 2010, P.141.

6.

Thisday/IPSOS Poll of March 20 April 4, 2011, Thisday, April 7 2011, Vol. 16 No

5827, P. 13.

7.

The Alternative, June 14 2011, Vol.1.10 No. 6, P. 13.

8.

The Alternative P.5.

9.

Danchev, A. and Halverson, T. International Perspectives on the Yugoslavia Conflict,

London, Macmillan, 1960, P.36.

10.

Ahokegh, A. Communal Conflicts in Nigeria, 1960-2004: A Study of the Tiv

Experience, A PhD Thesis Submitted to the Department of History, Benue State
University Makurdi, 2008, P.14.

11.

Ahokegh, A. Communal Conflicts P.16.

CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND CONCEPTUAL/THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
2.1

INTRODUCTION
The progress of this work, which is historical, theoretical, and analytical in
outlook, cannot be achieved without attempting to reviewing previously existing
literature, which according to C. Orngu:
Is an excursion which is informed by the desire to know the state of
knowledge on ones chosen topic of research.it may (therefore) be
conceived as a familiarization tour of materials that relate to ones
research effort.1
What is clearly derived from the above submission is that literature review is a
comprehensive survey of existing literature from other sources that relate to a
particular area of research in scholarship. Thus, in reviewing the existing literature
relevant to a chosen area of research, the researcher becomes inevitably and
necessarily engrossed in an intellectual debate involving the positions taken by early
scholars on the issues that are relevant to the researchers area of interest. Usually, as
it is to be expected, this intellectual debate translates to inform the opinions of the
researcher on issues earlier raised by other scholars on a particular subject matter. The
end result of this is the researchers independent submissions on the relevant issues,
which ultimately lead to a significant contribution to a body of existing knowledge. It
is on the premise of this understanding that this chapter undertakes the review of
literature and conceptual/theoretical perspectives relevant to this work.

2.2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

There are a lot of literatures on political dimensions of violence in Nigeria
which will be useful for analyses of this kind. The Tiv Riots and Aftermaths by Tyu
Abeghe traces some of the early political violence in Tivland dwelling on two broad
groups: the internal disputes between lineage groups over the sitting of market places
as well as violent uprising against the people in authority on abuse of power.2 Some of
the violence isolated in this work are the Haakaa of 1929 which was a fight against
witchcraft used negatively by elders in Tivland, the resistance of the Nyambuan
secrete cult in 1939, the resistance of Baba to succeed his father Mallam Audu Afoda
as chief of Makurdi town in 1947 against the backdrop that he was not an indigene.
Tyu Abeghe also points out that the Tiv riots of 1960s were orchestrated on a
lot of contradictions spanning from tribal animosity, hatred on the Tor Tiv, witchcraft,
partisan politics to social discontent. Articulating the dynamics of partisan politics and
its contradictions that subsequently metamorphosed into violence, he asserts that Tiv
people opted out of Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) and formed United Middle
Belt Congress (UMBC) in alliance with the Action Group, (AG) as a result some
political stalwarts were killed or sentenced to prison, their children were neglected
scholarship while their wives were not granted permits to buy Sorghum and Millet to
brew local beer called Tashi. Despite all these frustrations, the people gave massive
support to UMBC/AG alliance. However, the party could not justify its promises to
the people, this become the springboard for violence termed the Nande Nande of
1960. After this violence, the people were compelled to pay heavy taxes but they
could not learn any lesson this led to the Atemityou of 1964. The rioters of the
Atemityou according to Tyu Abeghe: equipped themselves with gberkpugh a
medicine believed to protect one against machete cut or gunshot and were most

wicked cannibalus (Sic) and barbaric in their action on the NPC opponents.3
Government efforts to stop this violence were frustrated when the terror took three
dimensions of Dwem (hyna), Agbacha (rat), and Anchancha (broom).
The book, though a good narrative of the Tiv riots, does not provide an indepth account to meet the present scholarly yearnings for a research work. Modern
studies show that the impacts of these riots were felt and still continue to be felt in
every part of Tivland. However, the work does not consider that direction of thought.
According to the work, only chief Gbargbar and his workers within the Mbalagh clan
were affected by the riots, together with only six policemen on peacekeeping mission
lost their lives in the second riots.
Another book consulted is Tiv Politics Since 1959 by Mvendaga Jibo. It
captures the abusive political campaign experienced in Benue politics since 1983
which Hagher termed disco 83.4 Apart from abusive campaign, Jibo also points out
that the incumbent governor Mr. Aper Aku used state media like the Nigerian Voice
Newspaper and Radio Benue to attack his rival Mr. Paul Unongo with his cohort, this
is hitherto the peculiar nature of Benue and Nigerian politics at large. Jibo also
credited Mr. Paul Unongo for his diplomatic approach in quelling serious tension that
would have resulted to violence when Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO)
returned Mr. Aper Aku as the winner of the 1983 gubernatorial elections. The work
also captures the Third Republic political campaigns between Rev. Father Moses
Adasu of the SDP and Professor Ayua of the NRC and the rationale behind the
success of Rev. Adasu at the polls. The work further points out the benefits Tiv
people enjoyed in active politics like the creation of Benue State in 1976, the
emergence of Hon. B.A. Chaha as the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
election of Dr. Iyorchia Ayu as the Senate President and so forth. While the

fundamental question of harassment and humiliation as the results of active

participation in politics seem not to be recognized in this work. Furthermore, Jibo
genalisation of issues is another source of great worry. He argues that Atoatiev (NonTiv) were untounched during the Nande Nande and the Atemityo upheavals in
Tivland. This assertion is untrue on the basis that Gidan-Uga settlement in Tombo
Mbalagh was a Non-Tiv settlement but seriously suffers massive burning.
Godwin Hembes book, J.S. Tarka: The Dilemma of Ethnic Minorities Politics
in Nigeria,5 gives a background of ethnic minority politics in Nigeria. The work
blames the British colonial administration for advocating politics of ethnicity. He
points out colonial administrative units, which were created out of enclaves of the
people of the same linguistics groups and demonstrates how these become political
constituencies or the power bases of such groups. The work also discusses the general
political scene of Nigeria after independence, maintaining that at the exit of British
colonialism; there was a great rush to fill the political vacuum which the author
believes put those ethnic groups on advantage to control the available resources. Very
fundamental to this research, the book explains how political parties were formed on
regional and ethnic basis immediately after independence. The regional political
parties were the AG for the Yorubas, the NPC for the Hausa/Fulani while the NCNC
for the Igbos. Hembe gives an account of how each of the regional political party
tries to woo/coerce the Tiv into alliance with them. This means any of these political
parties that got the nod of the Tiv would control the Middle Belt and its resources.
The Tiv in rejecting this inferior role decided to rally round their leader Chief J.S.
Tarka and their party the UMBC. Their rejection of the NPC controlled government
was symbolic as rejecting the Hausa/Fulani dominion. The rejection of the NPC as
external aggressors, and that entire associate led to the bitter and violent political

upheavals in Tivland during the First Republic. These political disturbances are
believed to have been one of the principal factors that led to the demise of the First
Republic as Hembe notes:
it was the Tiv support for Tarka that the attempt by the NPC to
detach the Tiv from Tarka led to the devastating Tiv revolts of the
1960 and 1964.These revolts are widely believed to be one of the
immediate causes of the military intervention in Nigerian politics in
1966. 6

The work even though focused on the political career of Chief J.S. Tarka, is found to
be relevant to our analyses; this is because it discusses the fundamental factor
underpinning political violence in Tivland during the First Republic. However,
Hembes inability to discuss political crisis in other parts of Tivland is challenged for
confining itself within Buruku, Gboko and Gwer Local Government Areas of Benue
State.
Also relevant to this study is the work of Terhemba Shija, et al (eds.) Paul
Unongo, the Intelligentsia and the Politics of Development. The work discuses the
nature and dynamics of Benue politics since 1960s.7 In a well researched article of
the work captioned Core Issues in the Nature of Political Participation among
Contemporary Tiv, Orngu establishes that Tiv people right from the onset viewed
politics essentially from the lenses of struggle against oppression and marginalization
as well as a means of influencing political direction in the determination of political
outcomes, he argues inter-alia that:
Democratic politics in Nigeria centres on electoral competition to
decide who controls state power, disenfranchisement of the rural
populance, the character of the active and organized political and
social
forces,
political
witch-hunting, party domination,
marginalization of the opposition faction and maintenance of state
clientelism in favour of support groups.8

Orngu discourages the idea of intolerance of the opposition party as well as

godfatherism on the basis that such contravenes the virtues of true democracy. He
pointed out that the intolerance of the opposition politics caused much turmoil in
Kwande, Tarka and Gwer local government areas. The work encourages the Tiv
intellectuals to actively participate in political process so as to enhance the values of
democratic politics. However as the Benue experience indicates, the intelligentsia
which Orngu advocates rather aid and abet political violence, for example Paul
Unongo and Aper Aku who were early intellectuals in Benue politics turned down the
real values of democracy for abusive campaign in 1983. It is against this backdrop
that the need for intellectuals in Benue politics to do away with Pull Down
Syndrome is highly encouraged.
In his conceptual analysis of Prebendal Politics and the State of Development
in Tivland since 1960, Uji made an analogy of Nigeria-cum-European dark and
mediaeval politics emphasizing especially on politics of sectionalism which crippled
the Nigerian nascent democracy in 1960 and 1964 as the Tiv experience indicates.9
He argues that the resurgence of political feuds in the Second Republic between the
National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) was streamlined
along those primordial lines pointing out clearly the nexus between the contemporary
Benue politics especially on the imposition of candidates and political appointments
without consultation for collective acceptance as a necessary factor for post-election
violence. Ujis view hit a major issue that has been confronting the sustainability of
democracy in Nigeria and Africa at large. As good as this gesture stands; the work
fundamentally fails to suggest a way out of this menace.
Another work consulted is Ukases article titled, Assessment of the Role and
Participation of the Tiv in Nigerias Post-Colonial Politics: Issues and Challenges.

The work asserts that political parties in Nigeria from the onset were streamlined
along three major ethnic groups abet marginalization. Ukase contends that the outcry
of smaller ethnicities called the attention of Willink Commission of inquiry; however
the central question which anchors on the creation of more regions to emancipate
marginalization was not enforced. Against this background, J.S. Tarka in the Middle
Belt Region championed UMBC to agitate against NPC hegemony resulted to serious
revolts of 1960 and 1964 in the Middle Belt.10 Ukase also argues that, the creation of
Benue-Plateau in 1967 by Gen. Gawons administration and the elevation of J.S.
Tarka as the Federal Commissioner and Member of the Federal Executive Council
(FEC) satisfied Tiv ambition. The work also pointed out that, Tarka did not recognize
his own constituency (the Tiv) but rather help to develope other parts of the nation for
his selfish presidential ambition. Against this backdrop, Unongu lamented that:
When I see the hospitals in Lagos, the fantastic industrial
establishments which...have added to the advancement of Nigerians
living there, and when I contemplate the simple social amenities
whichare taken for granted such as pipe born water, electricity, good
roads, durable houses, and so onamenities which are totally absent
in Tivland, but numerous in other places in Nigeria, Im disturbed
about back home, 11
Thus Unongos indepth analysis on the underdevelopment of Tivland spark animosity
and antagonism between the Tiv intelligentsia and J.S Tarka, this explains the
rationale behind the 28 points affidavit sworn by Dabo at the Lagos High Court
averring serious allegations of wrong doings against Tarka forcing him to resign as a
member of FEC. The work also cited key positions Tiv sons occupied at both State
and National level since 1976-2007 but lamented the underdevelopment of this area.
Quite interesting to our study, the work pointed out contradictions over supremacy,
leadership tussle and self interest amongst our intellectual politicians which gives us

an insight why electoral process in Tivland is always characterized by violent

conflicts amidst poverty and underdevelopment.
Another relevant article for this research work is Party Political Struggle and
Conflict in Benue Province, 1955-1965 by S.Nyityo

12

. The work establishes the

emergence of NPC, UMBC and NEPU as political parties in Tivland. According to

Nyityo, this marked the beginning of political rivalry that now occupies the centre
stage in Benue politics. The work argues further that AG alliance with the UMBC
reinforced this opposition as observed by Alhaji Ahmadu Bello:
the agitation for division and dismemberment of the Northern Region
(arose) not from the desires of the people themselves, but from the
thoughts implanted in them by skilled and crafty agitation inspired
solely from political motives by parties whose main interest and
virtually whose total interest lies outside the region. 13
Isolating some of the factors that occasioned the UMBC/AG alliance, Nyityo
establishes that the Tiv desire to achieved competitive progress through an organized
political platform, the urge of the minority to assert themselves vis--vis the major
ethnic groups as well as the material and legal support gotten from the AG were put
into consideration. Moreover NPC was an elitist party aimed at winning the support of
the emirs, the district heads, alkalis and educated elite. The objective of the UMBC to
create a separate Middle Belt Region free from Northern supremacy created conflict
in Tivland from 1950s to the military coup of January 1966.
The work of O.Akinwunmi, Crises and Conflict in Nigeria: A political History
since 1960 is also relevant to this research work.14 The work explores political
conflicts that rocked Nigeria since 1960 immediately she got her independence.
Akinwunmi therefore blames this ugly trend on the political structure which
colonialism planted and found a flourishing soil in the character of elites which he
describes as been totally selfish. The work also regretted that the emergent elites

failed to bring development but rather employed the ethnic factor in politics; the
manifestation of this is the escalation of violent conflicts with attendant huge lost of
financial, material, human and natural resources. No doubt, this work is an excellent
synthesis of the political crises and conflicts that has undeservedly crippled Nigeria
since independence. However, the work neglected some other fundamental issues
responsible for political turbulence in the plural society like Nigeria but rather shifted
the blames on the dubious nature and character of political elites.
Another book that was consulted by this study is Violence and Politics in
Nigeria: the Tiv and Yoruba Experience by Anifowose. The book attributes violence
as a peculiar character of developing countries and establishes the root causes of
violence in Nigeria to colonialism; the manifestation of this is hitherto the
regionalization of political parties which Luckhan asserts are meant to struggle for
federal allocation. This basis explains the determination of each regional dominant
party to use all means of coercion and persuasion at its disposal to subjugate or
eliminate the opposing party. The work emphasized that in the Middle Belt Region,
NPC humiliated UMBC sympathizers through the native authorities and native court,
the inability of Tarka to revolutionize this ugly trend led to 1960s violence in Tivland
as Corser aptly notes: violence comes about when some groups cannot get heard or
when some groups feel that they have vested interests in suppressing voices being
raised15 The UMBC revolts were expression of the Tiv anger against the oppressive
government of the NPC. The rebels assumed the name of Adzov (spirits) a
traditional form of protest among the Tiv which Akiga explain that:
it (the ijov) does good and evil.sometimes if a man does a wrong
which angers the Ijov, it beats him and raises wheals all over his
body.when he is asked how he got his marks, he does not answer
and every one concludes that he has been beaten by the Ijov in the
wood.16

This rebellion became an avenue of settling the existing scores between the Ichongo
(circumcised Tiv) and Ipusu (uncircumcised Tiv), Kunav and Kwande. After the
1960 violence, the Coomassie Commission of inquiry was set and it condemns the
abuse of power by the native authority. Anifowoses work establishes the bases and
dynamics of 1960s violence in Tivland which is useful for analyses of this kind.
However, the work is deficient on the basis that it was restricted in the Northern part
of Tivland, an area that now constitutes Gwer-West, Gwer, Gboko, Guma and
Makurdi LG to the partial neglect of Kwande and other areas of Tivland. Findings
within this zone were unjustifiably generalized on the entire Tivland.
Anifowose also traces post-election violence in Yoruba land to incessant
rivalries of the 18th and 19th centuries between Ibadan and her neighbors (Egba, Ijebu,
Ijesha, and Ekiti). The work establishes that 1964/1965 Western Regional elections
were marked by intimidation by the dominant party, the Nigeria National Democratic
Party (NNDP). The NNDP slogan was whether the people voted for them or not, they
must be returned to power as one source has it: the NNDP is a legitimate and
democratic party.and it has to win the Regional election.17 With this perception,
the NNDP manipulated some electoral clauses to their own advantage while the
electoral commissioner and electoral officers gave their royalty and support to the
NNDP government. This injustice led to operation wet it by the opposition party. It
was an operation which required the spraying of houses, cars, and persons with petrol
and setting fire. The demonstration involves angry market women, farmers, students,
university dons, and other groups in most towns and villages throughout the Region,
and these were accompanied by looting, arson and killing on unprecedented scale.
Women sang war songs and performed special traditional rites symbolizing the
sweeping away of Akintola and his supporters.

In the post-script of the book, Anifowose also discusses the 1983 Election
Violence in Oyo and Ondo States which he established were occasioned by fierce
battles between the NPN and the UPN. The work argues that the remote causes of
election violence in Ondo State was the declaration of Omoboriowo of the NPN as the
winner of the 1983 gubernatorial polls over his rival Ajasin. By implication
Omoboriowo was not the popular candidate but was rather imposed on the people.
This strongly captures the main issue that has been causing electoral violence in
Tivland since 1979. The work has succeded explaining an aspect of frustrationaggression hypotheses which we examined for the purpose of this study. Similarly, in
Oyo State Chief Olunloyo of the NPN was declared the winner of the gubernatorial
polls over Chief Bola Ige, an explanation of the NPN victory could be x-rays through
ethnic sentiments. The Ibadans who were the largest electoral population in the state
were determined to have one of their own son-of-the-soil as the governor of the
state in the 1983 election; as a result they went out all to ensure that their target was
accomplished.18
Another crisis discussed under the post-script of the book is the June 12,
1993 Presidential Election Crises/violence. It was occasioned by the annulment of
the presidential election believed to have won by Chief Moshood Abiola by Gen.
Babangida. According to Anifowose, before the conduct of the election, there were
several agonizing twists and turns in the political process including the indiscriminate
disqualification of candidates and several postponements of the hand over dates. In
protest of the annulment, violence erupted in many parts of the country especially in
the Western Region culminating to lost of lives and property and the emergence of
Oodua Peoples Congress, which Orngu asserts practically metamorphosed into a

consolidated ethnic militia movement in the 1999 with a profile of several conflicts
against the Nigerian State.19
Furthermore, A. Lyam in Kwande Crisis: A Community Conflict of Many
Interests, analyses the root causes of post-election violence of 2004 in Kwande
Local Government Area. The work points out the immediate causes of this conflict to
include: the dichotomy among the four clans especially in terms of developmental
projects, the negligence of the Ya Na Anigbian political principle amidst jobless
youths and poverty. It also points out the boastful altitude of politicians in the locality
and the visionless and planlessness of the local government administrators. Lyam
therefore argues that these issues needed immediate response by any responsible
government however; no attempt was made towards this direction. Lyam also
establishes that, the remote factor to this conflict was the cancellation of the 2004
L.G. election believed to have been won by the ANPP candidate.20
Commenting on the impact of post-election violence in Kwande, Utor in his
monograph, The Dynamics of Political Violence in Nigeria points out that after this
violence, primary and post-primary schools in Adikpo, Jato-Aka and the surrounding
towns were closed for several months. These caused the final year students who were
to sit for WASC or NECO Examination abandoning them. Utor imagines the fate of
these students whose hope and aspiration of gaining admission into higher institutions
automatically fizzled out. He lamented that married women became widows while
some children automatically became orphans contrary to the rights of a Nigerian child
as provided by section 33 (1) and (2) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria, as well as Article 5 of the African Charter on the rights and welfare of the
child and Article 6 of the child right convention.21 The author humbly appealed to
both the state and stakeholders in Kwande to ensure reduction of death and other

dehumanizing conditions these students were engaged in. Utor also establishes that
men who before these senseless destructions were traders, farmers, artisans and public
servants became beggars and refugees in their home town. Some of them became
incapacitated in one form or the other as a result of gun shots. The work also lamented
the death of Mama Esther Adooashe Yaku who even at 71 was attacked and killed by
senseless militia. More so Adikpo and Jato-Aka markets which hitherto known as
commercial centers that attracted traders from neighboring states like Cross River,
Taraba, and Ebonyi became ghost town. Utors work is of immense significance to
our study. This is because the work elaborately pointed out the implication of
electoral violence on the development of the Tiv society over the years, an issue
which this research set to address.
The work of A. Adejo, History; Conflict Resolution and National Unity in
Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria Vol.1 No.1 is another useful piece of work
which gives an insight in understanding conflict situation in Nigeria22. Adejo opines
that it is out of sheer ignorance of nation building that Nigeria and Africa at broad
perspective has gone through numerous political crises. Adejo therefore isolates
marginalization, leadership failure, corruption, nepotism and lack of accountability as
sources of conflict in Nigeria and advocates sound knowledge of history as an
instrument of conflict resolution. The work is no doubt an excellent attempt at
understanding the central bases of conflict in Nigeria. There is every justification that
lack of accountability and the embezzlement of public funds in Nigerian political
system makes people to see politics as an avenue for making money, this is a
fundamental reason why politics becomes a do or die affairs.
An article by A. Bur, Communal Crises and its Impact on Community
Development in Communal Relations and Crisis Management asserts that: There

are three theories associated with causes and sources of conflict in Africa: these are
the state violence theory, the theory of political violence and that of communal
conflict theory 23. Arguing on the aspect of State violence theory, Bur lamented poor
economic conditions, high level of illiteracy, poverty, bad governance and poor
distribution of economic and social resources as being responsible for violence. He
describes this as deep rooted historical, structural and situational changes.
Fundamentally to this work is the theory of political violence which Bur maintains
that in any democratic set up, there is permanent interest in those various groups that
seek favour, once their interest is being truncated by any other group, there is bound
to be violent political conflict. This theory captures the picture of incessant political
violence in Benue politics.
Another article consulted for this dissertation is the work of Chima Akukwe,
Nigeria April 2011 Election: Moral and Enlightened Self Interest Responsibilities of
Politicians. It points out the dark clouds that continue to hang over the April 2011
elections in Nigeria which inter-alia includes; political motivated violence,
assassinations, bombings, maiming and destruction of public and private property. the
work establishes that at least 70 Nigerians lost their lives in the run up to the election;
while 16 bombings were recorded in the various parts of the country and 12 out of 36
states were prone to violence. Akukwe therefore vehemently attack Nigerian
politicians for unduly inter-fairing with the conduct of elections and also blames law
enforcement agencies for failing to convict prominent politicians for scandalous and
blatantly rigging elections.24
Similarly, O. Sebella in her article titled Post-Election Violence and the
Failure of Intelligence, articulates the negative effect of post-election violence
following the declaration of President Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP as the winner of

April, 2011 presidential elections. He contested with General Muhammadu Buhari of

the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). Sebella points out that after this election;
there was a loss that cannot be quantified: the loss of time and wages, the physical and
mental injuries, and the social dislocations that associated with such strife. The work
also posits that post-election violence diminishes collective humility, contributes to
the fragmentation of the state, widen primordial suspicions, and also help to frame
mutual hatred.25 The work vehemently blames the Intelligence Agencies (Defense
Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Agency, and the State Security Service) for
their failure to fish out those culprit behind electoral violence. Apart from the
Intelligence Agencies, the work also accuses government administrators for decisively
contributing to numerous lost of lives while struggling to enthrone themselves to
power. However, Sebella fails to acknowledge that Nigerian Intelligence Agencies
rather aid and abet politicians in creating havoc during elections as recent evidence
indicates.
O. Okpeh in his paper Explaining Why Violence Persist in Nigerias
Elections points out the fundamental issues that hitherto occasioned post-election
violence in Nigeria which inter-alia includes; the intensification of ethnic
consciousness and inexperienced leadership, as well as weak leadership structure of
colonialism.26 The work isolates some of the violent regional and federal elections in
Nigeria from 1925 to 2007. Okpeh blames colonialism for sowing the seed of
inequality existing today in our society. The work also establishes the regionalization
of political parties to the Richard constitution of 1947 and the McPherson constitution
of 1951, this serves as a breeding ground for ethnic militias who encourages violence
during and after elections. Fundamental to our analysis in this work, Okpeh points out
some strategies of resolving post-election violence to include; the democratization

project on the empowerment of the masses who are the real producers of the nations
wealth. He also advocates the reorganization of the nations political economy and the
entrenchment of good governance. However, the researcher wonders if these
measures could solve the question of electoral violence in a multi-ethnic and plural
society like Nigeria, so long as the forces of neo-colonialism continue to hold sway.
O. Otites article Community Conflicts in Nigeria, Management, Resolution
and Transformation, isolates three majors for settling conflicts thus; conflict
resolution, transformation and management. According to Otite, 27 conflict resolutions
are taken to mean intervening in order to facilitate the course of the conflict. He
argues that conflict resolution generally provides opportunity to interact with the
parties concerned with the hope of reducing the scope, intensity and effects of
conflict. The work also stresses that, conflict transformation is when conflict has wax,
wane and change or transform themselves after they might have delayed for a
considerable period, it makes the actors continue to react and involves interventions
and mediation through legislative, and judicial or coercive approaches. Otite finally
argues that conflict management involves some adjustments and compromise to the
position held by contending parties in conflicts. He commends that conflict
management is a long term arrangement in dealing with conflicts which are generally
inevitable and has to be managed. It is imperative to note that the three concepts are
interdependent on one another and can be of immense value if used interchangeably
in a plural society like Nigeria.
The work of A. Braimah Culture and Tradition in Conflict Resolution
establishes that the objectives of conflict resolution is not to terminate conflicts but to
remove the fundamental causes of those conflicts to the satisfaction of the parties
involved. Braimah therefore saw conflict resolution not just as a technical task of

making the best changes or just a question of having the right answer and then
convincing the parties in conflict, rather a cultural and political task of generating
support of the parties in conflict to reach agreement and be satisfied with the
outcomes.28 The work points out certain methods which African societies used in
resolving their conflicts to include; citizens diplomacy, joking relationship. On this
basis John Paden illustrates the relevance and function of joking relationship in
former Northern Nigeria as the:
stylized forms of joking relationships (abokane wase) are very
salient to easing inter-ethnic or inter-state reveries and historical
tension. A common meaning of abokane wase Is sons or daughters
of a brother or sistermay become play friends, and such play friends
can say humorous or funny things to each other, and abuse each other
in good humorthe effect seems to be, to ease tension, and provide a
whole genre of humour.29
According to the work, other traditional ways of conflict resolution are; avoidance
relationship, oaths and symbolic diplomacy. Braimah classifies those methods as
peaceful traditional ways of conflict resolution in African societies. Furthermore,
Braimah also establishes that when those peaceful ways of conflict resolution proved
ineffective, then traditional violent ways are adopted. The author listed some of the
traditional violent ways to include; raiding, blood feuding and warfare. Although
these strategies may have worked in pre-colonial times, they seem not to fit in our
contemporary society where conflicts had taken different dimension. The elders
forum suggested by Braimah has no relevance especially in politically motivated
violence, the fact that elders themselves take active roles in partisan politics.
In his Confidence Building Mechanism for Crisis Management, Akande
points out the roles of confidence building measures in managing conflicts. The work
emphasizes that confidence building measures reduce mistrust, and improve
conditions for peace, mitigate confrontation, and prevent armed conflict. 30 Akande

laments lack of confidence building mechanism among African leaders on

colonialism, a view held also by Olu Adeniji thus:
the legacy of colonialism was such that neighboring countries that
were colonies of different colonial powers had little contact with each
other. The barrier of language, especially between Anglophone and
Francophone, created a deep gulf. Several confidence building
measures which could have arisen out of knowledge of and familiarity
among leaders were not possible.31

However, confidence building mechanism advocates by Akande looks international in

totality and one wonder about the efficiency or it applicability in local African
societies.
Lastly and fundamental to our analysis is the work of Dave Enahoros article
Crisis Respond Procedure: An African Military Perspective. It establishes that
crisis management situation is predicated on high degree of rationality arising from
fear of war, protagonist understanding of each other and the limit of permissible
behavior, the existence of asymmetries of interests between participants.32 The work
posits that when responding to conflict situation, there is the need to comprehend the
nature and causes of those conflicts, the occurrence environment and the personality
profile of dramatist personae. Whatever hinders such understanding would have effect
on both the strategies and the solutions proposed for responding to the conflict.
Enahoro therefore suggests the use of armed forces in responding to conflict
situations. This suggestion fails to acknowledge the obvious fact that the use of arms
in quelling civil upheavals always compounded violence especially when a party in
conflict suspects lack of neutrality from armed peace keepers. It is from this stand
point that Charles Tilley condemned the use of the police and the army in civil
violence as the initiators and performance of collective violence33.

2.3

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The conceptualization of the key concepts is necessarily germane to the
progress of this work. Election and violence are conspicuously the key concepts on
which the analyses of this work will progress. An election is a process of choice
agreed upon by a group of people. It enables them to select one or few people out of
many to occupy one or a number of authority positions. This process of choice usually
involves rules and regulations designed to ensure a certain degree of fairness and
justice to all concerned. Therefore it is the modern form of recruitment of personnel
into offices and it is deemed to be a very crucial aspect of the democratic process
irrespective of the type of democracy that is practiced. 34 It is in light of this argument
that Festus affirms that Election provides the medium, by which the different interest
groups within the modern nation state can take and resolve their claims to power
through peaceful means.35 Elections therefore determine the manner and methods by
which changes in the social order may be brought about. It is important that we do not
reduce the process of election to the act of voting alone as Akoye has pointed out in
Do the Votes Count? Final Report Of the 2003 General Election in Nigeria thus:
elections are complex set of activities with different variables that
act and feed one another. It can be defined as a formal act of collective
decision that occurs in a stream of concerned antecedent and
subsequent behavior. It involves the participation of the people in the
act of electing their leaders and their own participation in governance.
Elections are not necessarily about Election Day activities although it
forms an important component. It encompasses activities before,
during and after elections. It includes the legal and constitutional
framework of elections, the registration of political parties, party
campaigns, the activities of the electronic and print media in terms of
access, it includes campaign financing, the activities of security
agencies and government in power. It includes the authenticity and
genuineness of the voters register; it includes the independence or lack
of electoral agencies and organs. It includes the liberalism or otherwise
of the political process in the country and independence of the
adjudicating bodies of elections.36

However, in Nigeria elections have become a do or die affair, as Olusegun

Obasanjo asserts: We fight, and sometimes shed blood to achieve and retain political
power since for us in Nigeria, the political kingdom has for long been the gateway to
economic kingdom.37 The foregoing statement captures the content and context of
political thuggery, and violence in Tivland. The statement demonstrates how blood is
being spilled for political power in this area against the tenets of democracy. The use
of thugs in Tiv politics has not only led to the waste of human resources, but has also
resulted in death of able-bodied men who may be useful in the future, and political
apathy. Elections should therefore embody the ethos of a true democracy. There
should be the legal equality of all the electorates existing side by side with their
freedom to choose which of the political aspirants to represent them, while the
candidates as well should exercise their freedom of speech to represent their views to
the electorates. There should be the freedom of the press to disseminate information.
This is because of the divergent views they expressed on electoral issues especially on
the qualities of the political aspirants and the breadth of the news they reported at this
time. Election in essence typifies the democratic process, hence the abolitions is often
interpreted as the abolition of democracy.
Violence on the other hand is considered as very great force in action or
feeling-rough treatment, use of bodily force on others especially to hurt or harm.38 It
is on this basis that Anifowose defined political violence as:
The use or threat of physical act carried out by an individualwithin a
political system against another individual or individuals, and or
damage or destruction to property and whose objective, choice of
target or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation and
effects have political significance, that is tended to modify the
behavior of others in existing arrangement of power structure that has
some consequences for the political system.39

Put differently, political violence involves the use of force or raw power against an
opponent, or co-competitor over resources, political power, authority and values. It
manifests in such acts like thuggery, destruction of property, killing or assassination
of political opponents. Political violence has been used by groups seeking power, by
groups holding power and by groups in process of losing power. It has been pursued
in defense of order by the privileged, in the name of justice by the oppressed, and in
fear of displacement by the threatened, thus Deng asserts that: Violence depicts a
situation of interaction involving two or more parties in which action in pursuit of
incompatible objectives or interests result in discord of varying degrees.40 Reasoning
from the same vein, Charles Tilly posits that violence is every forms of overt
behavior such as protest, militancy, coercion, destruction or muscle flexing which
makes the observer to apprehend fear. 41
The frequent conceptualization of force and violence tends to confuse the
distinction between legality, legitimacy and specific acts. Often, force is taken to
mean legal and legitimate use of violence by a government for protection of the state
while violence is interpreted as illegal and illegitimate acts carried out by nongovernmental individuals and groups. Violence as Henry Bienen comments carries
overtones of violating and we often use violence to refer to illegitimate force.42 The
state, according to Marx Waber, is the exclusive source of the right to use violence
all other individuals or associations may use it only to the degree permitted by the
authorities.
These views of violence are deficient on two grounds, first: the definition of
violence as illegitimate force introduces the debate about the proper scope of the
authorities into the very delineation of the phenomenon to be investigated. Second, it
also suggest that the states use of violence will always be used to the benefit of all

concerned, and that it will be regarded as legitimate by citizens especially if carried

out through recognized and accepted channels. But still a problem intrudes; how
many of the citizens must consider the violence of the state as legitimate? There is
rarely total agreement on the assessment of any act of government as legitimate or
illegitimate. It is methodologically difficult to determine the point when the states
use of violence has moved from the legitimate to illegitimate. Because of this problem
of the conflicting conception of violence, our analysis will treat state violence only as
a causal explanation for the individual or the groups use of violence. Peoples
disagreement on what they will call violent, springs to an important extent from
differences in political perspectives. In most cases of civil violence, there is always a
heavy involvement of the police and soldiers which Charles Tilley describes as the
most consistent initiators and performance of collective violence. He notes that
repressive forces do the largest part of the killing and wounding, while the groups
they are seeking to control do most of the damage to property. 43
Extrapolating from the above conceptual underpinnings, we arrive at the
working definition of post-election violence thus; it is a state of instability or chaos
often characterized by destruction of lives and property after elections has been
conducted as a result of dissatisfaction with the conduct, and the outcome of the
election result. Having examined the conceptual underpinnings, it is pertinent to
establish theoretical bases for the purpose of critical appraisal of the causes and
dimensions of post-election violence in Tivland. Two theories will be considered for
analyses here. These are; (a) The Relative Deprivation, Rising Expectations and
Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis; and (b) The Systemic Hypothesis. 44
The frustration-aggression hypothesis originally developed by Dollard and his
research associate and later expanded and modified by other scholars including Yates

and Berkowitz.45 The central premise of this theory put simply is that aggression is
always the result of frustration. Given the requisite conditions, an individual whose
basic desires are thwarted and who consequently experiences profound sense of
dissatisfaction and anger is likely to react to this condition by directing aggressive
behavior at what is perceived as been responsible for thwarting those desires, or at a
substitute. The greater the perceived importance of the desires and the more
comprehensive the checking, the more vigorous the aggressive response.46
The second variant of the frustration-aggression theses is the notion of relative
deprivation, interpreted to mean a state of mind where there is discrepancy between
what men seek and what seems attainable. The greater this discrepancy, the greater
their anger and their propensity toward violence, for Gurr relative deprivation is a
perception of thwarting circumstances. According to him: When we feel thwarted in
an attempt to get something we want, we are likely to become angry, and when we
become angry the most satisfying inherent response is to strike out at the source of
frustration.47 This in effect means that frustration is no longer seen as the blockage of
present goal directed activity but as anticipated frustration engendered by
discrepancies between what is realistically attainable, given the social context and
what is sought. The third phase of this theory is anchored on revolution of rising
expectations which locates the genesis of violence in the feeling of dissatisfaction
arising from the comparison between what one expects, what one thinks and out to
have or what one regards as ideal. According to the expectation theory, it is hope not
despair which instigates violent political behavior.
Arising from the frustration-aggression thesis, the researcher argues that, the
frequent occurrence of post-election violence in Tivland is due to the dissatisfaction
of the people over the conduct of elections and electoral processes in the area as seen

from 1979 to present. However this thesis has been challenged by psychologists in
good number of ways: For example, they have shown that frustration does not
necessarily lead to aggression and that aggression can occur without the
accompanying necessity of frustrating situation. In other words, while frustration and
aggression are often linked in some stimulus-response relationship, they can be
independent of one another. Some experimental evidence have shown that a number
of factors may work to inhabit or prevent aggression in even highly frustrating
situation.48 Some studies for example have found that college students may engaged
in aggressive, even violent acts on the command of an authority figure without been
frustrated.
Psychologists also argue that the frustration-aggression approaches tend to
discourage the systematic investigation of fundamental questions about the social
context that shapes the situations of individuals. The political scientist employing
frustration-aggression as an explanatory concept at the macro-level, leaping the
individuals and applying it to an aggregate analysis of the political system, have
equally been criticized by scholars. Lupsha, for example, admits that generalizing
from micro-concept to macro-analysis is possible, but contends that it is difficult,
requiring a number of intervening steps and operationalisations. Whether these
scholars have succeeded in justifying this leap is an open debatable question.49
Finally, is the difficulty of operationalising and testing. It limits the empirical
utility of the notion of relative deprivation and rising expectations. It is difficult to
measure the levels of actual satisfaction of individuals. It has been shown, for
example that the satisfaction priorities of individual vary. One mans utility function
may be a disutility for another. Ones expectations or anticipated gratifications are
next to impossible measure or test because of the dynamic nature of expectation.50 As

the researcher intends to demonstrate in the subsequent analyses, psychological

explanation appears on close examination to be not so much an explanation as a
heuristic device. It is against this backdrop that we switch on our search light of
analysis to the systemic variables.
Scholars of systemic hypothesis like Pothelm51 assumed that there is a
paradoxical relationship between modernization and political disorder, in which
modernity produces stability and modernization instability. On this view, nations are
classified into three groups: modern societies, traditional societies and modernizing
ones. The latter are said to be passing through the traditional stage to modernity.
Generally, this period of transition is regarded as one that entails an inordinate amount
of strains, tension and crisis. It is suggested that modernization produces a revolution
of rising expectations and that since these expectations cannot be consistently
satisfied, the frustrated will scapegoat or transfer their aggression into violence
against perceived sources of frustration. Importantly, modernization intensifies
conflict especially over the distribution of scarce resources between groups and
produces political violence.52
The systemic hypothesis fit our area of research work. This is because Tivland
is within the bracket of the traditional and the modernization stages. As Pothelm
rightly observes, this stage is characterized by numerous economic, social and
political problems. From socio-economic dimension, there is high level of land
dispute among the people, from 1991-2004 alone; C.Utov recorded over 33 cases of
land disputes53. From political dimension, partisan politics in this study area has been
characterized by serious contradictions spanning from official manipulation of the
electoral system by the political party in power, to open harassment, intimidation,
abduction and in some instances imprisonment of opposition citizens and candidate,

gerrymandering of constituencies so as to create an uneven playing ground for the

opposition, deliberate omissions of names from the voters register as well as stuffing
of ballot boxes. There are also numerous cases of imposition of candidates by the
government in power against the wishes of the people. The Wannune instance in 2002
serves as a good illustration of this54. Finally the study area has recorded high level of
politics of abuses especially in their campaign songs. Here too a lot of examples
surface, some of which includes the 1983 campaign songs tagged Disco 8355 and
Shor Changi in 201156. These contradictions are necessary springboards for postelection violence as will be seem in course of our subsequent analyses.

2.4

CONCLUSION
From the attempts at a critical review of available literatures on electoral
violence in Tivland, it is fairly accurate to state that up to 2011, there is inadequate
research work on this aspect of history in Tivland. Scholars have devoted their time
and resources on the study of land conflicts, inter-group relations and so forth. This
frame of mind explains why there are several literatures on the Tiv and their
neighbors as well as land conflict resolutions and just a few on political conflicts. This
obvious short coming has thus created gaps which the present research intends to fill.
As would be seen in the subsequent chapters of this work, this is equally as important
as other aspects of Tiv history.

ENDNOTES
1.

Orngu, C. A History of Socio-Political Conflicts in Nigeria, 1953-2005: Implications

for External Relations, Ph.D Thesis, Post-Graduate School, Benue State University
Makurdi, March 2009, p.49.

2.

Abeghe, T. Tiv Riots and the Aftermaths, Oracle Business Limited Makurdi, 2005, Pp.
2-211.

3.

Abeghe, T. Tiv Riotsp.107.

4.

Jibo, M. Tiv Politics since 1959, Mandate International, Katsina-Ala, 1993, Pp. 1-208.

5.

Hembe, G. J. S. Tarka: The Dilemma of Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Aboki Publishers

Makurdi, 2003.

6.
7.

Hembe, G. J. S. Tarka: Thep xiii.

Shija, T. et al (eds.), Paul Unongu the Intelligentsia and the Politics of Development,
Aboki Publishers Makurdi, 2010.

8.

Orngu, C. Core Issues in the Nature of Political Participation among Contemporary

Tiv in Shija, T. et al (eds.), Paul Unongu the Pp.288-245.

9.

Uji, O. Pre-benda Politics and the State of Development in Tivland Since 1960 in
Shija, T. et al (eds.), Paul Unongu the Pp.188-205.

10.

Ukase, P. An Assessment of the Role and Participation of the Tiv in Nigerias PostColonial Politics: Issues and Challenges in Shija, T. et al (eds.), Paul Unongu the
Pp.246-269.

11.

Paul Unongu Position in an Open Letter to the Tiv People Were Do We Go From
Here.

12.

Nyityo, S. Party Political Struggle and Conflict in Benue Province, 1955-1965 in

Shija, T. et al, (eds.) Paul Unongu thePp.270-285.

13.

C. O. 957/14 Speech by the Hon. Alhaji C. B. E, MHA, Sardauna of Sokoto, Premier

of the Northern Region: Speech Delivered at Kaduna, 1st Feb. 1958.

14.

Akinwumi, O. Crises and Conflicts in Nigeria A Political History Since 1960, Munster
Germany 2004.

15.

Bienen, H. Violence and Social Change, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968,
p.24.

16.

Anifowose, R. Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba Experience, Nok
Publishers Enugu, 1982, p.117.

17.

House of Representative Debate, vol.19 1965-1966.

18.

Anifowose, R. Violence and Politics in Nigeria: thePp315-321.

19.

Orngu, C. The Incidences of Irredentism in Nigeria since 1999: Echoes of the Nigerian
Civil War in Adejo, A. (eds.), The Nigerian Civil War Forty Years After What
Lessons? Aboki Publishers Makurdi, p.383.

20.

Lyam, A. Kwande Crisis: A Community Conflict of Many Interests in Gyuse, T. et

al (eds.), Conflicts in the Benue Valley, Benue State University Press Makurdi, 2006,
Pp.41-59.

21.

Utor, J. The Dynamics of Political Violence in Nigeria, Achimajo Nigeria Enterprises

Limited Lagos, 2004.

22.

Adejo, A. History: Conflict Resolution and National Unity in Nigeria in Journal of

Historical Society of Nigeria Vol.1 No. 1, Aboki Publishers Makurdi, 2004.

23.

Bur, A. Communal Crises and its Impact on Community Development in Bur, A.

(eds), Communal Relations and Crisis Management, Aboki Publishers Makurdi,
2002, Pp.30-56.

24.

Akukwe, C. Nigerian April 2011 Election: Moral and Enlightened Self Interest
Responsibilities of Politicians.

25.

Sebella, O. Post-Election Violence and the Failure of Intelligence, Wednesday, 27

April, 2011.

26.

Okpeh, O. Why Violence Persist in Nigerias Election A Research Paper for the
National Assembly Database Research Group Abuja, September 2007.

27. Otite, O. Community Conflicts in Nigeria, Management, Resolution and Transformation,

Spectrum Books, Ibadan, 1999.
28.

Braimah, A. Culture and Tradition in Conflict Resolution in Garuba, C. Capacity

Building for Crisis Management in Africa, Gabuma Publishers Lagos, 1998, Pp.149174.

29.
30.

Paden, J. Ahmadu Bello: Sardauna of Sokoto, Zaria: Hudaluda Publishers, 1986, p.57.
Akande, T. Confidence Building Mechanism for Crisis Management in Garuba, C.
Capacity BuildingPp.91-104.

31.

Adeniji, O. African Political, Military and Economic Affairs in their Relationship to

Security, Disarmament and Confidence Building in Africa, New York: UN
Secretariat, 1991, p.54.

32. Enahoro, D. Crisis Response Procedure: An African Military Perspective in Garuba,

C. Capacity BuildingPp.105-134.
33.
34.

Tilley, C. From MobilizationP.176.

Nnoli, O. Introduction to Politics, Revised Second Edition, Pan African Centre for
Research on Peace and Conflict Resolution Enugu, P. 220.

35.

Iyayi, F. The Conduct of Elections and Electoral Practices in Nigeria, A Paper

Delivered at the MBA Conference in Abuja on 24th August 2004.

36.

Do The Votes Count? Final Report of the 2003 General Elections in Nigeria, Abuja
Transition Monitoring Group, 2003.

37.

Obasanjo, O. 42nd Nigeria Independence Anniversary National Broadcast in Tell

Magazine, October 14, No 41, 2002, Pp. 50-51.

38.

Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, 1978:1226.

39.

Terkula, G. Political Violence and the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in

Nigeria in Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol.1 Number 6, March
2007, P.23.

40.

Deng, F. Anatomy of Conflict in Africa, in Goor, L. et al, (eds.), Between

Development and Destruction: An Inquiry into the Causes of Conflict in PostColonial State, The Netherlands: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Netherlands
Institute of International Relations, 1996, P.136.

41.

Tilley, C. Collective Violence in European Perspective, in Graham, H. et al (eds.)

Violence in America, New York: Bantam, 1969, P. 174.

42.

Bienem, H. Violence and Social Changes: A Review of Current Literature, Chicago:

University of Chicago press, 1968, P.4.

43.

Tilley, C. From Mobilization to Revolution, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley

Publishers Co. 1978, P.176.

44.

Anifowose, R. Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba Experience, Nok
Publishers Enugu, 1982, P.5.

45.

Yates, A. Frustration and Conflict, London Methuen, 1962, P.192.

46.

Hann, H. et al, Perspective on Collective Violence: A Critical Review, in Hirsch,

H. et al, (eds.), Violence and Politics, New York; Harpre and Row, 1973, P.133.

47.

Gurr, T. Why Men Rebel, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, P.24.

48.

Milgram, S. Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, Human

Relations, 18 1965, Pp. 214-228.

49.

Luspha, P. Explanation of Political Violence: Some Psychological Theories versus

Indigration Politics and Society 2, 1971, P.91.

50.

Luspha, P. Explanation of Political P. 9.

51.

Potholm, C. The Theory and Practice of African Politics, Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1979, P.149.

52.

OConnell, J. Competitive Struggle for Modernization between Ethnic Groups in

Hazzlewood, A. (eds), Political Integration: The Nigerian Case, African Integration
and Disintegration, London: OUD, 1964, P.181.

53.

Utov, C. The Underdevelopment of Tivland through Land Disputes and Communal

Clashes, Calabar: Rapid Educational Publishers 1995, Pp.102-103.

54.

Newsmate Magazine of 26th October, 2002, Vol.1 No.6 ISSN 1118-4354. Pp. 41-48.

55.

Jibo, M. Tiv Politics Pp. 51-53.

56.

New Era Newspaper of 5th June, 2011, Vol. 1 No. 004, Pp. 1-2.

CHAPTER THREE
PRE-COLONIAL HISTORY AND SOCIO-POLITICAL SETTING OF TIVLAND

3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter attempts a survey of an area occupies by the Tiv people of Benue
State. In doing so attempt has been made at finding where they come from, and why
they have settled in their present abode. In line with the above, the socio-economic
and political organization which shapes the nature and character of an individual or
group of people has been also closely examined. This in essence will give us detail
background of the Tiv people that forms the bases of our discussion in the proceeding
chapters.

3.2 THE GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF TIVLAND

Tiv area of Benue State is located between lat. 60 35 and 80 10 N and long.80
04 and 100 E, in the Benue plains of the East Central Nigeria1, occupying an
estimated landmass of about 29,300 square kilometers. The area is made up of 14
Local Governments with an estimated total population of 2,920,481 as 2006 census
indicates. The major towns in Tivland are: Makurdi, Gboko, Katsina-Ala, Zaki-Biam,
Vandeikya, Adikpo, and Aliade2. The area is boarded in the North by Nasarawa State,
in the North-East by Igalaland of Kogi, in the South-West and East by Obudu LGA of
Cross Rivers State and in the West by the Idoma. It is further reveals that the NorthEastern part of Tivland shared border with Taraba State as clearly captures by the
below map. (Fig.1)

FIG 1: Map of Tivland Showing the 14 Local Government Areas.

NASAR AWA STATE

G U M A

AG AT U

T AR A BA
ST AT E

MAKURDI

G W E R
W E S T

A P A

L OG O

U KU M

U
G W E R
E A S T

OTUKPO

G B O K O
KAT SI N A -A LA

KO N SH I SHA

OBI

U SH O N G O
VA N D E

O JU

I KYA

K W AN D E

C R OSS R IVER STATE

CAMER OO N
REPU BLIC

K ilo me te r
0

15

30

N a ti o n a l B o u n d a r y

45

S ta te B o u n d a r y

L G B o un d a ry

Wa te r w a ys

Fig 1: Map of Tivland Showing the 14 Local Government Areas.

Source: Ministry of Lands and Survey Makurdi (2012)

The area is drained by two sets of Rivers: River Konshisha, Ambir and Aya of
Cross River Basin and River Katsina-Ala, Guma, Nagi, Gwer and Mu of River Benue
Basin. The Relief is generally low lying except around the South-Eastern part where
mountainous ridges are found. The study area falls within the tropical wet and dry
climate according to Koppens classification. The climate is primarily influenced by
the seasonal migration of the inter-tropical discontinuity which also related to the
annual movement of the Sun. the dominant soil in Tivland is the tropical ferruginous
which is generally low in the organic matter, bases and cation exchange capacity.
Tivland also falls within the Guinea Savannah vegetation characterized by varying
proportion of trees and grasses. The natural vegetation is under threat by deforestation
through farming, logging, road construction, settlement and fuel wood harvest3.

For the purpose of this study, Tivland is divided based on the relief into
lowland and upland. The lowland Tivland covers Guma, Makurdi, Gwer-West, Tarka,
Buruku and some parts of Ushongo, Konshisha, Katsina-Ala and Logo. Upland in
Tivland comprises of Kwande, Vandeikya, Ukum, Gboko and parts of Ushongo,
Konshisha, Katsina-Ala, and Logo respectively. Rainfall and temperature influences
the socio-economic life in Tivland, much of the rain occurs between April and
October. In addition, lowland areas have monomodal distribution of rainfall while
upland areas have bimodal rainfall which can be attributed to the topographical effect.
Mean annual rainfall also varies from 1190mm in lowland areas to 1250mm in upland
areas. The rainiest month in lowland areas is August while in the upland areas is July
and September4.
Due to inter-tropical discontinuity and topography, the temperature of the study
area also varies. For example, lowland regions are 280C while upland regions are
240C. Seasonly temperature is generally higher during February to April especially in
the low laying areas of the region. Thus agriculture is the main economic activity of
the people while other primary activities like fishing, hunting, blacksmithing and
wood carving are still practiced. Livestock are also reared but on small and subsistent
levels. Crop production takes place within the raining season which occurs between
April to October. Crop harvest on the other hand occurs immediately after the
cessation of the rains and by January, most of the crops are harvested for
consumption, sale and storage. During the hot dry season, farmers usally rest and
prepares for the next commencement of farming season5.

3.3

THE ORIGIN, EARLY MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT OF TIV PEOPLE

The problems of studying the origin, character and development of ethnicity
in Nigeria have been and shall continue to be the vexation tasks of historians,

anthropologist,

ethnographers,

ethnomusicologist,

ethnologist,

administrators,

academics and leaders. Early leaders have contradicted themselves about the origin of
the Tiv people. Many recent accounts also lack archaeological evidence to support the
actual origin of Tiv people, such accounts are based on oral evidence as rightly stated
by Denga, they are shrouded in a plethora of versions each making its claims of
authenticity such that only students of history can settle the dispute through
research6. Therefore there is a need to examine the various versions in this work.
According to Moti and Wegh, one source of the origin identifies a certain
Shon as the ancestral father of the Tiv people. Shon is said to have two sons Orinyian
(whiteman) and orii (blackman). Orii the most favoured son had the duty of fetching
firewood to warm his father. When Shon had become very old and blind, he called
Orii to bless him and give him an inheritance. Orinyian who hanged around and heard
the content of the discussion disguised himself Orii, at this point Shon blessed
Orinyian and gave him the technological wisdom, while Orii returned moment later to
realize that Orinyian had taken the inheritance meant for him. Shon however blessed
Orii and bequeathed to him the farming skills.The Tiv who are the descendants of Orii
have therefore acquired the knowledge of farming.7 This version goes in line with the
story of Jacob and Esau in the Bible. The Bible established that Jacob out smarted his
brother Esau and collected his blessing from thier father Isaac who was old and
blind.8 It is conflicting whether Tiv borrowed this version from the Holy Bible.
Another version of the story introduces Takuruku as the ancestral father of Tiv
people. This account posits that, Takuruku was the son of Aondo. The view that
Aondo was indeed the Supreme Being and the creator of everything seems to be
supported by the Tiv world Gba-aondo meaning Gods creation. This compound word
shows that it was God who created Takuruku. The tradition also holds that Takuruku

and his wife Aliwe then gave birth to Tiv and Uke (non-Tiv) 9. Tiv may have had
other children; however only two seem to have survived and are clearly known. The
first son was called the Ipusu who gave birth to Ukum, Shitire, Kparev, Tongov,
Nanev and Utange. The second son was Ichongo, he had the following sons: Iharev,
Masev, Turan, Nongov, Ikyurav and Ugondu. Both Ipusu and Ichongo lived together;
their decendants combined are now the entire Tiv people who occupied the 14 local
government of Benue state10.
The third tradition has it that, Tiv was one of the two sons of Takuruku
Anyamazenga brother to Aondo, the other being Uke. Takuruku came to live in the
world with his wife Aliwe and for long lived on a fish diet until his brother Aondo
came down from the sky, on a visit and introduced Tiv to grains. Tiv himself had two
sons Ipusu and and Ichongo, who had children of their own.
These traditions analyzed

above fails to outline the precise roles the

characters mentioned in the traditions play in the group history. Some accounts accept
Takuruku as the progenitor of all Tiv while others points to Awange the son of
Takuruku as the father of Tiv. There is another that sees Takuruku rather than Aondo
as the creator of man. The traditions are thus intriguing and not very explicit, they
pose more questions than they seek to provide answers to one looking into Tiv
traditions. They appear to be a lot of speculation about the groups early history as
Makar remarks this (early) period is rather speculative and wrapped into myths
instead of facts11.
The traditions are also not unanimous on the issue of the descendants of Tiv,
there are accounts of Tiv having three children in one Ipusu, Ichongo and Gbe. Gbe is
alleged to have separated from the others to found his own settlement. In another, the
children are Poo, Ipusu and Ichongo. Poo, allegedly died leaving no issue and his

brothers severed his head which they preserved for certain rites and rituals. When Tiv
eventually died, the surviving children and their descendants became known as the
children of Tiv.
There is a hypothesis that Takuruku may not be the father of Tiv at all. He
could be one amongst a number of elders in Tivland. He is invoked at the death of an
important elder just as another departed elder, not as a father figure. In the
circumstance, the traditional ceremonial gong, the Ilyu is sounded to inform Takuruku
and other departed elders to expect to receive one of their brothers (not son) who is
coming to join them in the great above.
Takuruku Takuruku
Takuruku Anyamazenga
Stand up straight, stand up straight
Takuruku stand up and await your brother,
He is coming to the heaven of the great above12

Orkar considered

Anyamazenga, Takuruku, Awange, and even Tiv as

mythical figures rather than ancestral figures. To him, they represent phrases in
development of Tiv history. Anyamazenga (bush rat) represent the hunting and food
gathering phrase. Takuruku (gone to mould) represent introduction of food production
while Awange (spears) represent a major technological advance, the metallugical age
when the Tiv use spears, hoes, and other implements of iron. The above
contradictions in these traditions of origin pose the question of exaggeration and
forgotten parts of Tiv oral tradition.
Apart from the difficulty in tracing precisely the Tiv origin, there is also a
serious problem of pricisely tracing where they migrated from to their present abode.
However, we can attempt this through linguistic evidence. Linguists assert that, the
Tiv are of semi-Bantu linguistic affinity which is classified under the Benue-Congo.
Many Tiv words are similar to Bantu languages of East and southern Africa. For

example the Tiv language similarity to the language of the Bantu Nyanza who live in
the present day Malawi is an evidence used to show that Tiv language is Bantu
related. In addition to the linguistic evidence, Abraham contends that the Tiv share
certain cultural and physical traits with some central African groups. These trait are
said to include physique, dance, arts, worship forms and marriage. However, Andah
warns that:
Giventhe dearth of an authoritative study of the Tiv language, the
general linguistic confusion in the study of Bantu languages, it does
seem to us unsatisfactory to claim a Tiv-Bantu relationship both
linguistic and ethnographic data used to derive Tiv origin from the
Congo are clearly limited13.

It is assumed that, economic and population growth might have caused the
migration of the Bantu speaking peoples such as the Tiv of central Nigeria. Fubingh
estimates that the real general migration into the present tribal area began around 18th
century and the Tiv were present south of the Benue river in large number in the mid
18th century. The various clans shifted position until late 18th century when the
boundaries where rather well established and permanent settlement undertaken. There
is however some agreement regarding the Tiv place of settlement prior to migration to
the present Tivland. Accounts points to South-East of the Republic of Cameroon. The
Tiv identify their home there by the name of Swem which has been recognized as a
hill on which the Tiv lived.
Swem is a mythical place located in the South-Eastern Tivland where Akiga
said : the elders of Tivland came together from all parts of the country(sic), changed
into birds and set off to Swem to set right the land.14 According to R.M Downes,
Swem is a mythical place similar to the biblical garden of Eden.15 Benjamin Akiga
suggested that, Swem is located in the area of Turan-Ikyurav-Ya.16 For Tesemchi
Makar, swem is a hill located about thirty eight kilometers South-West of Nyiev in

Tivland17. With these testimonies, we cannot doubt the existence of Swem, what is the
issue is it actual geographical location.
The reason for the migration of the Tiv from Swem to Benue valley is
attributed to the population explosion and lack of fertile land for increased food
production which was necessary to feed the growing population. The Tiv farming
system of shifting cultivation created hunger for land. Other pursuits as hunting and
fishing aggravated the land hunger. The Tiv also came under pressure from the
Chamba which made them feel insecure. They reasoned that even though they
emerged victorious in the first Chamba attack but feared that the event of another
attack they would all be destroyed. These reasons eventually precipitated the dispersal
and colonization of the Benue plains which was by then inhabited by the Idomas.18

3.4

THE ECONOMIC ORGANISATION OF THE TIV PEOPLE

In discussing the economy of the Tiv people, issues such as agriculture and
livestock have to be considered as well as industries such as beer brewing and trade.
Farming for instance, was/is an important occupation in Tivland. Agricultural crops
that were valuable for consumption as well as for commercial purposes were
cultivated. These includes ; yam, cassava, sugarcane, sweet potatoes, millet, maize,
okro, garden egg. Due to average quantity produced, these items were taken from the
villages to the various village markets and towns for sale. The method of cultivation
used was mixed farming which allowed the cultivation of these crops on one plot of
land. The major implements used were the big hoe (Ikyar), small hoe (Abya), cutlas
(Ishom), and axe (Ijembe) for clearing the bush, cutting down trees and tilling of the
land.
Labour was organised along the family level and each family had their plots of
land to cultivate. The Tiv people practised large-scale collective farming called

Ihumbe. This was because farming activities in the villages required more hands
thereby making the hunger for land inevitable in Tiv history19. As the population
continued to grow, land began to be scarce. The reason for population explosion
could be attributed to the improved health care services and the introduction of new
improved breed of food crops like mangoes, citrus, rice.20 The economic necessities
that arose in relation to the ever increasing population made the colonisation of lands
the most pressing demands of the people. Attachment to land is a social necessity
even in animals. It is imperative for human beings to have land attached to them and
the tendency to defend it.
Another important economic activity of the Tiv was hunting. Hunting was
done mainly in the dry season. Makar maintains that, hunting was a part-time venture
which provided extra-food and depopulated the areas dangerous animals21. Hunting
was an interesting venture but involved high risks. For instance, group hunting
known as Ibem was risky because human beings were on some occassions
mistakenly killed instead of animals. Hunting was generally a kind of trainning for
informal militia groups of the Tiv people who often in the course of their hunting met
the Atoatiev (foreigners) with whom they engaged in warfare.
Furthermore, Animal husbandry was also an important feature in Tiv life. It
was a sure investment for the quick realisation of wealth. Animals such as sheeps
(Iyongo), goats (Ivo), pigs (Igo), cows (Ibua) poultry (Ikyegh), doves (Mkungum)
ducks (Ikyeghdam) were reared. While some of the animals like horses (Nyinya) and
cows were brought from the North by the Hausa and Fulani traders22. Livestock
reared among the Tiv was not principally for the purpose of consumption but rather
served as a valuable property for sale when money was needed. In addition, it was

slaughtered for important visitors and ceremonial purposes like marriage and death
ceremonies.
Beer was brewed in Tivland by Tiv women especially on markets days. Beer
brewing (Burukutu) became a popular art in Tivland especially by 1946, when
demobilsed military personnel returned home from Second World War23. Burukutu
or BKT joints as they were popularly called became hanging out joints for military
returnees as well as prostitudes. Drinking joints usually encouraged criminal
activities and gambling which is usually a breeding ground for rebellious activities.

3.5

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF TIV PEOPLE

Politically, Tivland is divided into several lineages (Uipaven) whose
distribution exhibited a degree of correspondence between genealogical, social and
spatial distance. Varvar contends that these lineages were not just kinship units rather;
they were significant political units that were territorially defined24. Against this
backdrop Varvar isolated, two political epochs in the historical development of
Tivland; the Pre-Tor-Agbande and the Tor-Agbande (drum chiefs) respectively.
Varvar further asserts that the Pre-Tor-Agbande era had five levels of political
hierarchy; these were the Compound (Ya), the Family Group (Anterev), the Kindred
(Ityo), the Principal Lineage (Tar), and the Tiv Country (Tar Tiv) 25. It is pertinent to
note that the political administration of Tivland was solely handled by elders at each
level. These elders were people who have attained the status of Orya (Head of the
Househood) in their various compounds. The offices of the elders went with roles and
obligations and the manner in which these were carried out determined their degree of
legitimacy and effectiveness. Those elders were expected to be fair, kind, impartial
and sympathetic. This was because they were the most knowledgeable in the history
and experiences of life.

As a group, the elders apart from the qualities listed above, received the loyalty
of their subjects also as a result of the peoples belief in their possession of
considerable supernatural powers of Tsav and Akombo. They were believed to have
power over the natural forces which could either be used positively in bringing about
a general well-being of the society or used negatively to endanger the well-being of
individuals and groups. This belief to some extent, ensured compliance with the
decision of the elders as it was believed that they could use these forces to mate out
punishment, including death to insubordinate subjects26. There were also various ways
by which the exercise of elders authority was being checked. Firstly, the elders
decision was not personal, but rather consensual in nature. This was a good yardstick
in checking the autocratic tendencies of any elder. It should be noted that, if such an
elder still chose to be autocratic, the system allows for his isolation through legitimate
disintegration of his compound27. Even the whole idea of the possession of the
considerable Tsav and Akombo by the elders still had checks against abuses. For
instance, cases from the aggrieved people against elders in the compound and family
groups could be brought before the eldest person in the kindred who could
counterbalance any negative effect of the most potent Tsav from an individual. In
essence then, the Tsav of the elders was Tsav held in trust for the good of the whole
society. Where it was not properly used, it could be withdrawn28.
The emergence of Tor-Agbande marked the watershed in the history of political
development of this area. Firstly, the office of Tor-Agbande was meant for young
men, it was not exclusively preserved for the elders as we discussed somewhere else
in this work, this could be explained in the light of the authority they were expected to
exercise. They were expected to provide political as well as military leadership.
Secondly, the holders of this position where people of sound economic standing

within their particular societies, this was because its installation involved elaborate
entertainment, the cost of which was borne by the appointees. Thirdly, the TorAgbande enjoyed a wider degree of independence in the exercise of their authority
than any other leaders before them; their decisions could not be challenged by the
elders29. Although his powers where monitored by the elders who had the
responsibility of choosing him. Moreover, he was expected to consult them before
taking decisions.
The advent of colonialism in Tivland added much strength to those
Utormbaagbandev (plural) hence some of them were made district heads, clan heads.
For example, Agaihyande for Ikyurev-Tiev, Abuul Benga for Ukan, Chia Chile for
Mbera and Abagi Kpanju for Shangev-Tiev30. These appointments did not go down
well with the Tiv, who arose in rebellion across the land. In 1932 RM. Downes
proposed what changes should be carried out in Tivland, after conducting an inquiry
in this area, Three Tier Council System

was established. The re-organization

created new administrative districts, establishes kindred councils and the clan native
authorities. There was Ijirtamen (Central Council) charged with powers to check the
possible abuses of power by other organs. This became a supreme council consisting
of the true traditional elders from all over the land and the chiefs appointed by the
administration.
The need for political leaders all over Tivland became imperative and according
to Makar was basically political and nationalistic borne out of the resentment the
Tiv harboured for being placed under alien rulers: the Aku Uka of Wukari and Audu
Afoda the Sarkin Makurdi. The Tiv were fully aware of the respect accorded these
Non-Tiv rulers and desired that a paramount ruler representing the Tiv should earn the
same honour, respect and dignity31.

Those who pioneered these agitations were educated Tiv elites such as Oradi
Ugba, Akiga Sai and Iyorkyaa Ako and the Tiv ex-service men comprising Aemberga
Samu, Igyuse Doki, Ula Lisa, and Makondo Igbon. Clan Heads such as Jato Aka of
Turan, and Mkovur Jagera of Ipav were also said to have being in the forefront of a
demand for a Tor-Tiv32. The first person to raise the matter with the British was Jato
Aka, though for selfish personal reasons at the Ijirtamen held in May 1934. Jato Aka
was said to have claimed that the Governor had approved him being the Tor-Tiv
when the Governor visited Gboko in May 193333. He therefore wanted the D.O. Sir.
J.J. Emberton to confirm it. Though the Ijirtamen welcomed the idea of the Tor-Tiv
but they were taken aback because Jato Aka had not consulted them before raising the
matter. The demand was them dismissed.
Between 1934 and 1936, the issue seemed to have been in limbo and was raised
again in 1938 Ijirtamen but the Colonial Administration turned down the demand on
the basis that it was not a reflection of the majority view of the Tiv people. The
political instability attendant the Inyambuan anti-witchcraft movement of 1939 put a
hold on this agitation. However, this demand was put again in September 1946 during
the visit of Governor Sir Authur Richard to Gboko and was readily accepted34.
As a consequence of the approval, several persons indicated their interest to be
elected into the office. These included Mkovur Jagera, Yough Agera, Tarkumbur Jika,
Gondo Aluor and Makir Dzakpe35. Through series of maneuvers all the other
candidates withdrew leaving only Gondo Aluor of Ichongo and Makir Zakpe of Ipusu.
In consonance with the tradition of Yan Na Angbian, a consensus was reached that
Gondo Aluor of Ichongo should be the first Tor-Tiv since Ichongo was the eldest son
of Tiv. This decision was dully communicated to the D.O. However, the decision
was changed arising from fierce protest of the Tiv ex-servicemen who saw Gondo

Aluor as: Insufficient theoretical and practical education to lead the Tiv neither the
requisite western education nor an adequate exposure such as a service in the army
which should have taken him around to see the world and gather practical experience
36

. The Tiv ex-servicemen considered Makir Dzakpe as better qualified because of his

acquisition of western education and his career in the West African Frontier Force
(WAFF) which terminated at the rank of Regimental Sergent Major. Besides he was
appointed as the head of the combined Tiv NA police and prison forces on retirement.
The following day the D.O. was surprised to learn of the change over Gondo
Aluor to Makir Dzakpe. Agbo Kpire the clan head of Mbakaange, in a bid to
rationalize the change of decision said zwa kaa kwagh mom ga (the mouth is
capable of saying so many things), and thus it is possible to say one thing to day and
change ones mind about it the next day37. It is rather sad to observe that the very first
attempt to apply the principle of ya na angbian in the Tiv political sphere was fraught
with contradictions. The Tiv usually start the sharing process from the eldest son.
According to Jibo, the choice of Makir Dzakpe was the manipulation of sub-ethnic
feelings which was employed by both candidates with Makir Dzakpe having an upper
hand. But to Hembe, the team of the Tiv ex-servicemen who lobbied for Makir
included prominent sons both from the Ichongo and the Ipusu axis of the Tiv
nation38. Apart from that Makir Dzakpe was a strong personality who was shrewd,
frank and outspoken. He was also fearless and was admired by the way he dealt with
the white man. At last, he was sworn into the office of Tor-Tiv on the 3rd of April,
1947 as the first Tor-Tiv. Despite this faulty start the principle of ya na angbian was
applied in the next appointment of the second Tor-Tiv and coincidentally, it was again
Gondo Aluor who lost in the first contest that turned out to be the beneficiary. The
appointment and installation of the first Tor-Tiv in 1947 marked the full centralization

of the Tiv society into the British Colonial Administration. The centralized Tiv
political system was subsequently incorporated into the colonial sub-state of the
Northern Nigeria through the provincial structure. By this structure the Tiv Division
first came under Muri, then Munshi and subsequently Benue Provinces respectively.
Tivland by these developments became an integral part of the Federation of Nigeria
which was itself a part of the larger British Empire.

3.6

CONCLUSION
This chapter has given a background of the Tiv people of central Nigeria. It
has shown that the socio-political and economic organization of the early Tiv society
was influenced by their origin and settlement partern. Although the Tiv lacked an
early central political organization nevertheless, they developed a distinct feeling of
oneness. Their quest for land made them prone to conflicts with other ethnic groups,
this prepared their identity and subsequent development of a seemingly unending
chain of conflicts. A background to this development is necessary for our study of
electoral violence in Tivland in particular and Nigerian societies at large.

ENDNOTES
1

Tyubee, B. Influence of Extreme Climate on Communal Disputes and Violence in

Tiv Area of Benue State, in Gyuse, T. (eds) at al, Conflicts in the Benue Valley,
Benue State University Press, Makurdi, 2006, P.94.

National Bureau of Statistics, www.Nigerianstat.Govt.Ng, 2006 Population Census.

Tyubee, B. Influence of Extreme P.2.

Tyubee, B. Influence of Extreme P.96.

Uza, D. Animal Resources Potential in Benue State Land of Potentials: A

Compendium, Calabar Rapid Educational, 1995, Pp. 126 138.

Bur, A. Who Are the Tiv? A Social- Cultural Inquiry in to Tiv Dynamics in Ahire,
P.T. The Tiv in Contemporary Nigeria, copyright (c) Tiv studies project, 1993, P.12.

Apenda, A. Inter-Group Marriage and Its Implications for Tiv Culture. In

Akinwunmi, O. et al, (eds) Inter Group Relations in Nigeria During the 19th and
20th Centuries, Makurdi Aboki Publishers, 2006, P. 189.

The Reader is Advise to Read a Copy of The Revised Standard Version Bible, Great
Britain, Collins Clear-Type Press, Pp. 22-23.

Engene, R. The Sons of Tiv, Baker Michigan, 1969, P. 59.

10

Utov, I. The Underdevelopment of Tivland through Land Disputes and Communal

Clashes, The Return Press Makurdi, 2000, P.1.

11

Makar, T. A History of Political Change among the Tiv in the 19th and 20th
Centuries, A PhD Thesis, ABU Zaria, 1975, P. 109.

12

Agber, K. Tiv Origin and Migration: A Reconsideration, Pp. 146 147.

13

Utov, I. The Underdevelopment P.1.

14

Apenda, A. Intergroup Marriage P.190.

15

Downes, R. Tiv Religion, Ibadan University Press, 1971, P.11.

16

Akiga, B. The Descent of the Tiv from Ibinda Hill, Translated by Bohannan, P. in
Journal of Africa, Vol. 24 No. 4. 1954.

17

Makar, T. A History of Political Change P. 109.

18

Varvar, T. Conflict Negotiation and Resolution: The Way Out of Communal Crisis
in Tivland, in Bur, A. Communal Relations, Conflict and Crisis Management
Strategies, Aboki Publishers Makurdi 2002, Pp.84-85.

19

Nak/Mak/Prof/1983, Makurdi Census 1932.

20

Olayemi, A. Cases of Conflicts in Nigeria: A Political History since 1960, New

Brunswick: Transaction, Pp. 1970-1979.

21

Makar, T. A History of Political Change P. 14.

22

Mak/Prof 26/158-10/6/1949- Tiv Studies, Bohannan Expedition.

23

Nak/Mak/Prof/1846, Railway Labour Camp, Benue Province 1932.

24

Varvar, T. Pre-Colonial Social and Political Structure in Tivland, in Ochefu, Y.

(eds) et al, A History of The Peoples of Benue State, Aboki Publishers Makurdi,
P.139.

25

Varvar, T. Pre-Colonial Social P. 140.

26

Varvar, T. Pre-Colonial Social Pp. 144-145.

27

Makar, T. A History of Political Change P. 71.

28

Doward, D. A Political and Social History of the Tiv People of the Northern Nigeria
1900-1939, A Ph.D Thesis, University of London, 1971, P. 38.

29

Varvar, T. Pre-Colonial Social Pp. 146-149.

30

Usu, E. The Development of Clan Organization and Political Centralization among

the Tiv, A Ph.D Thesis Submitted to the Department of History, ABU Zaria, P. 343.

31

Makar, T. A Short History of the Tiv People in The Programme for the Burial of
Late Tort-Tiv III, His Highness Ochivirigh Dr. James Akperan Orshi OON, 18th
October-3rd November 1990, P. 70.

32

Jibo, M. The Manipulative of Sub-Ethnic Differences in Tiv Politics since the

Colonial Era in Hembe, G. (eds) Issues in the Development of Tivland, Makurdi
SGIDT 2001, P. 33.

33

Makar, T. A Short History P. 71.

34

Makar, T. A Short History P. 172.

35

Jibo, M. The Manipulative P.174.

36

Jibo, M. The Manipulative P. 176.

37

Jibo, M. Chieftaincy and Politics: The Tor-Tiv in Politics and Administration of

Tivland, Frankfurt Main: Peter Lay JDPC 2003, P.128.

38

Jibo, M. The Manipulative P.175.

CHAPTER FOUR
PARTISAN POLITICS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN TIVLAND,
1960 TO 1992
4.1

INTRODUCTION
This chapter attempts an approach of the emergence of modern politics in Tivland
and the contradictions that accompanied it as seen from 1960, 1964, 1979 and 1983. It
therefore submits that, all subsequent political violence in this area come as a result of
the political orientation the people got immediately Nigeria gain her political
independence.

4.2

THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN TIVLAND

Tivland became part of Nigeria that was amalgamated in 1914, initially, the
imperial British government introduced indirect rule to administer the various nation
states that were put together. In these instances, their chiefs under the supervisions of
the British administrators administered the various territories with their varying sizes.
In places where paramount rulers were absent such as the Tiv nation, warrant chiefs
were instituted.1 In 1922, the imperial government under the leadership of Hugh
Clifford saw the need for Nigerians to participate, to some extent in the governance of
their territories. The only way which this could be achieved was through party
politics. Party politics thus became a forum for electing leaders, this development
gave birth to Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP) in 1922 .2
The division of Nigeria into three Regions (Northern, Eastern and Western
Regions) stimulated the growth of regional politics that was problematic in a good
number of ways:

Firstly, there was general fear of political domination by other

regions in the national political contest. The fear of domination was even aggravated
by the fact that the various Regions were unequal in sizes. Secondly, the Northern

Region was larger and more populous than the Western and Eastern Regions
combined4. Thirdly and worst still, in each of these Regions one ethnic group played a
dominant political role thereby intensifying the exiting tension. In the Northern
Region, the Hausa/Fulani block played the Tiger, while in the Western Region the
Yoruba played the Lion, and in the Eastern Region the Igbo played the Hyena.
Finally, from the above isolated tense situation, there was intra and inter party crises
at National, Regional and Provincial levels. For instance, at the National level, each
Region was eager to control the center, in the same vein there was keen interest for
majority seats by each political segments of the existing Regions.5
In the Northern Region where Tivland was located, there were numerous
nationalities which were clamoring against the Northern Regional hegemony, thus
making possible for the formation of many political parties. Out of these numerous
groups, three major ones emerged either by merger or population of the founders
race. In this way, there was the ruling Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), the United
Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), and the Northern Elements Progressive Union
(NEPU). Apart from the last, the first two were also dominant parties in Tivland. In
line with the political trends of the time, the UMBC was a rival party in the Middle
Belt zone canvassing minority rights an agitation for the creation of the Middle Belt
Region. The UMBC was a merger of the Middle Belt Zone League (MBZL) and
Middle Belt Peoples Party (MBPP) of June 1955 at a meeting in Kafanchan.6
However, the political fraternity between the two was truncated by the
problem of division within the party leadership. This led to the fractionalization of the
party with Moses Rwang leading one division and pastor Lot the other. And even
though the factions came together before the Regional election in 1956, it was
pertinent that the party needed to be reconstituted.7 The reconstitution of the UMBC at

the Lafia conference of January 1957 saw the emergence of a strong leadership in the
party as JS Tarka was elected the President and Dokotri the General Secretary.8 It was
at the Lafia conference that a formal alliance between the UMBC and the AG was
ratified, as according to the UMBC leader JS Tarka, the AG was recognized as the
best organized and most disciplined political party in Nigeria at the period. Terver
suggested that the UMBC was in alliance with the AG with the aim of helping the
party to control the central government with the view of amending constitutional
impediments to the creation of the Middle Belt State that were hinged on population.9
More so, Imadu suggested financial incapacitation on the side of the UMBC and thus
was seeking support from the already established AG that controls the Western
Region.10
In any case, the Tiv nation massively supported the UMBC/AG alliance
because of the fact that the UMBC was led by a Tiv man, JS Tarka. Again, the Tiv
cultural association known as the Tiv Progressive Union (TPU) formed in 1938 was
fused with the UMBC, thus making its members to become pioneers of the UMBC in
their various places. Fundamentally, JS Tarka charisma to appeal to all forms of
people particularly the common man was another added advantage on the side of the
UMBC. His campaign strategy was based on the creation of the Middle Belt State and
the attendant benefits of political autonomy. As a result of these developments,
UMBC gained adherents in Tivland.11 While NPC on the other hand had little impact
in Tivland, few Tiv intelligentsias such as Benjamin Akirga who once worked with
the Gaskiya Corporations Zaria tried to sell the party to his core Tiv friends but to no
avail. The next leader of the party was Mr. Lushaka Anja who also tried to penetrate
the Tivland but never succeed. He was an ex-employee of the Tiv Native Authority.

In any case, the activities of the NPC were dominated by the intelligentsia and
the chiefs. Tyu Abeghe argues that the party was not popular in Tivland because the
poor were snubbed.12 This reasoning is erroneous because NPC was holding rallies in
the remotest part of Tivland where the poor people lived

13

. The most likely reason

why the party was not popular was primordial sentiments since Tarka the leader of the
UMBC was a Tiv man. Again, Tiv people were overwhelmed by the desire for an
autonomous state thus supported UMBC/AG alliance without questioning. However,
during the tenure of Iorfa Kumba as the president of the NPC, everything was done to
ensure the spread of the party to rural areas, this makes many UMBC parliamentarians
to crossed-carpet to the NPC. With this minimal success, the NPC intensified its
efforts to win more seats in Tivland while the UMBC on the other hand wanted to
capture all the electoral seats at the expense of the NPC resulted to violence in 1960
termed the Nande Nande and 1964 termed the Atemityou.

4.3

THE UMBC/NPC POLITICAL TUSSLE IN TIVLAND, 1960-1964

While there was political polarization in Tiv Division between the UMBC and
the NPC came the 1959 general elections in which UMBC/AG alliance won all the 7
seats in Tivland namely; Gaav/Shangev-Tiev, Ihyarev/Nongov, Jemgbar, Kunav,
Kwande and Ukum/Shitile14. This situation ushered in a period of uneasiness which
firstly was characterized by dismissal by the Tiv Native Authority (NA) of its staffs
suspected to have UMBC sympathy15. Also commenting on this issue, Adamu
observes that: The NPC controlled Tiv NA began to offer employment to those who
or their relations have NPC connections16. The consequence of this action of the Tiv
NA was that those denied employment sympathized with the UMBC as it criticized
the NPC discriminatory altitude in the land. The situation greatly troubled the UMBC
leadership and a petition was written to the premier of the Northern Region Sir

Ahmadu Bello and it pointed out all the issues of mal-administration of the Tiv NA.
But the reply portrayed the petitioners to over stating the issues. It stated categorically
that no illegality was committed and that many of the complaints were exaggerated
and many were untrue17.
From the foregoing, it was evident that conflict was by the corner. Shortly
after, an incident that sent signals to the kind of situation ahead occurred in Mbatie
area where chief Agaikpaga who could not hide his hatred for the UMBC was beaten
thoroughly, his property was looted and his houses were burnt. Henceforth, the
bottom line in the crises was the UMBC elite against the chiefs. The UMBC leaders
instructed people not to pay taxes any longer, and any attempt made towards tax
collection by the chiefs were resisted by the elite. But the Tiv NA insisted that taxes
must be paid or the defaulters property be seized with the aid of the police. Thus, in
Yandev area, agents of the chief including the police were beaten up and prevented
from collecting taxes. Exactly what happened in Mbatie occurred, and the chief
abandoned his resident to Gboko for safety18. Similar incidence became rampart in
Tiv society and the police were helpless.
While the riot loomed in Tivland, the colonial government granted independence
to the nation in October 1960 however this did not solve the contending issues, and so
the atmosphere continued to be tensed and any little confusion could transform into
open crises. On the 3rd day of independence, the police under the excuse of quelling
rioting shot and killed a Tiv at Gidan Uga, a Hausa settlement in Tombo clan. The Tiv
concluded that government was against them since the police are part of the
government. Thus, the people burnt the entire settlement and looted property19. The
continued state of anarchy in Tiv society forced government to dissolve the Tiv NA,
in a bid to carry out administrative reforms MJ Dent, a District Officer was made Sole

Administrator of the Tiv NA. His assignment which was clearly defined involved;
restoring law and order and causing meaningful reconciliation. Dent began his
reconciliation by studying the complaints made against the chiefs. Consequently, 14
chiefs were temporary dropped. This action elicited complaints against him to the
federal government on the basis that he took side with the UMBC. Therefore,
attempts at bringing both the UMBC and NPC supporters on the round table for
negotiation failed because NPC supporters concluded that expatriate administrative
officers are against us 20.
Earlier in the attempt at forestalling peace and unity in Tivland, Dent had
constituted Advisory Committee for political and other societal issues. The committee
had the following membership: 3 NPC supporters, 3 UMBC supporters, 3
representatives of the chiefs and TPU members. The committee members
unanimously opposed the independence of the Makurdi Sub-Native Authority. On
reorganization of the districts, the committee created 15 districts councils and began
construction of their headquarters. However, their take-off policy remained paper
work. Other areas of reorganization include the native police, which was henceforth
not to work under the chiefs. Also, the Divisional Officers (D .Os) were given
portfolios in charge of finance and establishment. The last arrangement was however
shortlived, the failure of the above attempts and other expedient measures to yield the
expected peace in Tiv society resulted to the 1964 fresh crises called Atemityou.
Atemityou was not really a crisis independent of the Nande Nande of 1960. It was just
a reincarnation of the old situation and the major actors remained the UMBC and
NPC, backed up by their supporters. The only major difference between the Nande
Nande and Atemityou is that while the former was essentially directed against
property destruction, the later was towards both property and lives21.

The first noticeable Atemityou incident occurred in Mbalagh area of Tombo

where chief Gbargbar, his brother Faga Pinega were slaughtered and his secretarys
wrist cut off in a manner that expresses what the rivals claim was to Wa Or Agogo
(put a watch in ones wrist). The same day and at the same place, Iorfa Aneke and
Anogokor Agaigbe were killed. The confusion surrounding who actually killed
Gbargbar and his people should not detain us here hence it is not too relevant. Suffice
however, to say that chief Mkovul was arrested in the circumstance and dragged to
court, but was acquitted and discharged for want of substantive evidence22. The
situation was unfriendly and the Tiv NPC supporters went into hidings inorder not to
be harmed by the dorminant UMBC population. In response, the federal government
visited Tivland with the military under the guise that police operation had failed to
restore normalcy, and the army bombarded the area killing people and looting
property. This method was also used by the federal government to quell crises in the
Western Region. Critics swept under the carpet the defense of the federal government
for its action in the place, declaring that it was an act of annihilation of the
oppositionist.
In April 1964, a team of administrative management consultants from Ahmadu
Bello University made of G.L.Gunderson, U.Ndayako and G.W. Fairhem arrived Tiv
land. They confirmed the arrogance of the Tiv NA Staff to the sole administration
which invariably led to its failure to achieve positive results. They observed that:

The most obvious problem involves the overall organization of the Tiv
NA structure. There seems to be very little effective control,
coordination and direction from abovenevertheless, the result has been
duplication, disunity and misunderstanding among the departments and
their employeesit seems that all the resources, financial and otherwise,
of distrust, village and clan administration are exclusively devoted to tax
collection23.

Taxes in Tivland had not been collected for a number of years due primarily to the
1960 Nande Nande and the continued mounting troubles thereafter; therefore that
aspect of report was inconsistent with the situation on ground.
After the crises, the federal government had to fulfill its customary obligation of
investigation in order to provide lasting solution by seting up the Commassie
Commission of Enquiry into the Tiv crises which was made up of Ahmadu
Commasie, Peter Achimugu, J.A. Renolds and Silas Daniyan. The constituted
commission commenced sittings in May 1964. After its sittings and submission of
findings, a white paper was released and it made far-reaching revelations and
recommendations. In the first instance, it indicted Tarka for exacerbating the crises
through his speeches. It cited Tarkas address at a political rally in Agasha on
February 6th 1964, where he allegedly exploited the existing tensions in Tivland24.
According to the report, after the UMBC convention in Agasha, mobile Atemityou
groups began operations.
However, our investigation shows that Tarka with his team were responding to
the challenges of the time, occasioned by competition for the social, economic and
political opportunities envisage in the forth coming political arrangement in Nigeria
which the NPC was a key contender. If the UMBC secured advantage over its
opponent, (the NPC) it was still within the orbit of the game competition. The NPC
equally utilized the opportunities it had in the Tiv NA against the UMBC. The white
paper also revealed that modern political parties are completely different from the Tiv
political structure. It therefore recommended modern political system which has come
to stay as a matter of transformation to a modern society, and so it was clear that the
Tiv political structure has to go. Also based on its recommendation, the office of the
deputy Tor-Tiv was abrogated and the office of the Tor-Tiv had some of its overriding

prerogatives scrapped. The Tor-Tiv was to become chief and council and not chief-incouncil.
Every bit of the commissions white paper is not stated here, but it is
necessary to observe that following the white paper, the Tor-Tiv on 1st January, 1966
summoned to his palace all his subordinate chiefs, the Tiv elders, elites and the
leadership of the two political parties to celebrate the New Year. This was indeed the
beginning of reconciliation initiated by the Tiv, but by far the greatest relieve was the
outbreak of the first military coup on 14th January 1966, which took over the NPC
federal and all regional governments in the country. By this, the era of politics was
over and the Tiv potential enemy, the NPC was no more.

4.4 THE POLITICS OF ABUSES IN THE 1979 AND 1983 CAMPAIGNS IN

TIVLAND
Benue State in its present form is a product of the former Benue-Plateau State of
1967 which in itself was created out of the former Northern Region. The creation of
the state therefore was the handwork of General Murtala/Obasanjo administrative five
point transition agenda as captured by John Shagaya thus:
The first stage dealt with the settlement of the continued agitation for
the creation of more states and the setting up of a constitution drafting
committee. Stage twodealt with the re-organization of the local
government system and the conduct of local government elections on a
non-party basisstage three was the lifting of the ban on partisan
politics...stage four dealt with the conduct of elections leading to stage
five, the formal handling over to elected representatives of the people
at the federal and state levels25.
The administration also lifted the ban on partisan politics in September 1978 allowing
politicians to form political parties for the 1979 general elections as enshrined in
section 201 of the 1979 constitution which say that: No association other than a

political party shall canvass for votes for any candidate at any election or contributes to
the election expenses of any candidate at an election 26
To avoid the emergence of parochially based parties as was the case in the
1960s Nigerian experience shows, section 201-209 of the 1979 constitution
established the formation of nationally based political parties that reflects federal
character. Specifically, section 202 out-law any association from functioning as a
political party unless it was duelly registered by the Federal Electoral Commission
(FEDECO) and its membership was also open to every Nigerian citizen irrespective of
the place of origin, sex, religion or ethnic group. Furthermore, it was necessary that
such association must establish its headquarters in the federal capital. In this way, it
was hoped that political parties would be properly registered and their activities be
controlled in such a manner that national interests were placed above party or ethnic
interest at least in the electoral process.
Suffice here to mention that FEDECO registered 35 political parties out of 53;
unfortunately only 19 out of the 35 registered parties were able to complete their forms
before the stipulated dead line of 18th December 1978. However, at the end of the
process FEDECO announced only 5 eligible political parties to include: Unity Party of
Nigeria (UPN), National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Nigerian Peoples Party (NNP), Great
Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP), and Peoples Redemption Party (PRP)

27

These

political parties were plateform for which candidates contested both 1979 and 1983
general elections. According to J. Ukpoju, Mr. Aper Aku contested the 1979
gubernatorial elections on the plateform of the NPN, Mr. Paul Belabo for NPP, Mr.
Simon Bai for GNPP while Mr. Usman Sule Ejembi for PRP and Mr. Chia Surma for
UPN28. The electioneering campaign in Tivland was interesting as it was the home
base of JS Tarka, the veteran political activist who had decided to pitch his camp with

the NPN rather than with the UPN that would have been regarded as normal in the
historical context of the area. Furthermore, it was also the base of Mr. Paul Unongo, a
leading figure in the NPP and Aper Aku of the affidavit fame. Against this backdrop,
the keenest political campaigns were conducted by the NPN and NPP with feeble and
perfunctory shows by the GNPP and UPN. The PRPs campaigns were mainly in the
capital, Makurdi and some towns like Otukpo, Otukpa and at times Gboko even then
its effectiveness was visibly slim.
The main strategies of the parties most especially the NPN was to appoint
people known by the communities as chairmen and secretaries who then organized the
local branches. The contest between the NPN and NPP inevitably resulted in name
callings with NPN supporters describing the NPP as an Igbo party while the supporters
of the later described the NPN as a Hausa party. It will be recalled again that many Tiv
fought the civil war on the federal government side, these soldiers and their families
felt that it was too early in the day to vote an Igbo president having just put down a
rebellion by Ojukwu their kinsman. More so, NPN also went to almost all the
constituencies and appointed a three man committee whose job was to go from house
to house to educate the electorates on how to vote. Party officials also intensified their
campaign efforts especially in areas where support was believed to be shaky. The
electoral candidates themselves also met regularly with local party officials to review
their chances of winning the elections. In the case of the GNPP and the PRP, only their
gubernatorial candidates and running mates were actively involved in the last lap
compaigning29. At the end of the day, Mr. Aper Aku of the NPN emerged victorious
with 75.4% of the total votes cast while Mr. Paul Belabo had 10.76%; other candidates
for GNPP, UPN and PRP shared the rest30.

However, 1979 general elections in Tiv politics was not abusive in terms of
campaign as 1983 experience, records had it that, the political tussle between NPN led
again by Mr. Aper Aku and NPP led by Mr. Unongu become a contest of abuse. Jibo
pointed out that NPN composed a song which derided the lifestyle of the NPP
gubernatorial candidate Mr. Paul Unongu. However the NPP cleverly turned the song
against the NPN gubernatorial candidate Mr. Aper Aku, the songs were termed Disco
83. Jibo established two version of Disco 83 from both NPN and NPP. The NPN
version plays:

Aku Baba Wamoo

Taver a Taver shima helee
Or-apipi ngua gomna ga
Or-apipi una ya gomna ya
Saa jaki a nyor sha ihula a nulaa
Translated
Aku my father
Be steadfast
Before the NPP wins the governorship
The donkey will pass
Through the needles hole.
While the NPP Disco 83 version plays:
Aku Baba Wam-oo
Iin-a-aii udubu helee
Or baja ngu a gomna ga
Or baja una ya gomna ya
Gbangban a mende ahenga genegh
Chorus
Tyo yam Tiv venda iv yum
Aku Kyusa nyanden shuga
Aku Kyusa utema azongo
Translated
Aku my father
Keep stealing the thousands (of naira)
The NPN has no governor

Before he gets governorship

Gbangban will get a new nose
Chorus
Tiv people are against stealing
Aku Kyusa is diabetic
Aku Kyusa is a squatter31.

Apart from abusive songs, the 1983 campaign was also characterized by
intimidation, blackmail, harassment and so forth. At the slightest opportunity, the
incumbent governor made radio broadcast alleging criminal violence, or the threat of it
by the NPP and usually ended the broadcast by warning the NPP that the state security
agencies would deal ruthlessly with criminal acts on their part. The NPP was to be
intimidated by these broadcasts which in some instances were followed up with the
search of the homes of the leading officials of the party including of course, that of its
gubernatorial candidate Paul Unongo32. Jibo also affirms that the state-owned
newspaper, the Nigerian Voice was another instrument used by the incumbent
governor Mr. Aper Aku to intimidate his rival Mr. Paul Unongo, this has been clearly
captured by the editorial of 7th June, 1983 titled Hardly a Good Record in which Mr.
Unongo was condemn as a debtor, the paper points that:
Unongo may be born with a silver spoon in his mouth, but he is not
the best record. As a man entrusted with the responsibility of charting
a path for steel development for Nigeria, Unongo dropped out of that
position for undisclosed reasons. The Juladaco Group which he heads
owns banks about 9 million naira we are dismayed that Unongo
preaches violence and takes to flamboyant and rightist kind of political
lifestyle. That is hardly a good record for a man who wants to be
governor of Benue State33.
No impression should however be left that the NPP members were angels in the 1983
campaigns. They were equally interested in political violence. Although their damage
did not reach the scale of the NPN for the obvious fact that they did not have control of
the mass media and the police. However, they made up for this short coming by

recruiting tough and ruthless agboros (bad boys) who were determined to protect
Unongo and to revenge every attack against the NPP. In the process, they damaged
NPN vehicles, beat up opponents and burnt houses.
To be fair to Mr. Paul Unongo, even though he appeared comfortable with a
violent campaign, he must be commended for the mature way in which he restrained
his supporters after the results of the gubernatorial elections were announced which the
NPP supporters received with disbelief. They believed that Aku had rigged the election
and deprived Unongo of victory. It is to Unongos credit that rather than call out his
teeming supporters to fight, he went to the High Court and filled an election petition,
even though the election petition was given a cavalier treatment at the Makurdi High
Court, Unongo kept it cool and went to the Court of Appeal and to the Supreme Court
which ordered a re-hearing of his petition. The Makurdi High Court was doing this
when the military overthrew the civilian government on 31st December, 1983 thereby
ending both the NPP and the NPN stronghold in Benue politics34.

4.5

POLITICS IN TIVLAND DURING THE ABORTED THIRD REPUBLIC,

1992- 1993
The General Ibrahim Babangida administration of 1985-1993 set up its
mechanism of power transition. As a step forward, the administration lifted the ban on
party formation in October 1989, thirteen political parties applied to the National
Electoral Commission (NEC) for registration but none of them succeeded. Instead, the
military government established two political parties namely: Social Democratic Party
(SDP) and National Republic Convention (NRC)

35

. This was very strange in the

nations politics as government had, prior to this period, not been involved in the
formation of political parties. The government also made it abundantly clear that
nobody was a founder but all were joiners and also regulated each individual

contribution in the party in such a way as not to place such a person at vantage position
over and above other members.
In Benue State the political clouds were gathering even before the Federal Military
Government had formed the two political parties that became the only plateform for
contesting elections. When political parties were announced by the government, Benue
people promptly responded by making their choices between the two parties. Notable
politicians like Mr. Wantaregh Paul Unongo, Mr. Abu King Shuluwa, Engr. Yakubu
Agada, Mrs. Rebecca Apedzan, Rev. Fr. Moses Adasu and a host of others pitched tent
with the SDP while Dr. Tesemchi Makar, Chief Stephen Lawani, Dr. (Mrs.) Enyatu
Ifenne, Prof. Ignatius Ayua amongst others became members of the NRC. One known
fact was that most prominent Tiv sons and daughters were found in the SDP while
NRC harbored more Idoma prominent sons and daughters.
The 1991 campaign was very peaceful without rancor especially when compared
with what was experience in the first and second republics. The reasons behind this are
not hard to locate. First, civilian transition democracies are more fraudulent than
military transitions. Secondly, as argued by Nuhu Aliyu; there were stringent
guidelines and duties which the military government of General Babangida
administration instructed the police to observed during the election process36. This
notwithstanding, Tiv people were of the opinion that NRC was a Hausa/Fulani party
and this became a subject of abuse as even on the eve of the election, SDP was able to
win a lot of supporters on the basis that a vote for Ayua was a vote for Sharia. This
statement was a paradox of what was said in the sense that, the SDP national chairman
Alhaji Babagana Kingibe was a Kanuri Muslim from Brono State while the NRC
national chairman Chief Tom Ikime was a Christian from Edo State. Therefore, NRC
could not have been considered as a Hausa/Fulani party let alone been a Sharia party as

alleged by the SPD supporters in Tivland, rather it is better to reason that the SDP was
a Sharia party based on this simple logic. Besides, within the State both Professor
Ayua and Rev. Fr. Adasu together with their running mates were ardent Christians.
Therefore, SDP however used religion to cajole Benue electorates to vote for their
party. At the end of the electoral process, Rev. Fr. Adasu of SDP emerged victorious
scoring 461,037 votes to beat his rival Professor Ayua of NRC who scored 403,405
votes52. As a matter of fact, the 1991 gubernatorial elections in Benue State was a
watershed in the historical development of politics in the area. At the national level,
Chief M.K.O Abiola emerged victorious but his victory was truncated by the
annulment of the presidential elections Christian June 12 of 1983. The June 12 crisis
in the South-West compelled President Ibrahim Babangida to hand over leadership to
Chief Shonekan who headed the Interim National Government (ING) from August 26
to November 1993. As the June 12 crisis continued to deepen, General Sani Abacha
took over government from Chief Ernest Shonekan in order to quell violence. The
annulment of the June 12 presidential elections precipitated the sudden termination of
the Third Republic37.

4.6

CONCLUSION
This chapter traces the origin of modern political system since 1922 in
Tivland. It also looked at the underpinning factors that created serious political
violence between the NPC/UMBC immediately Nigeria got her independence in
1960, as well as the dynamics of the 1979 and 1983 party campaigns in Tivland.
Putting into consideration the factual analyses arising from the critical issues isolated
and discussed, it becomes obvious that the orientation of violent politics since 1960s
forms the basis of numerous electoral violence and politics of abuses in Tivland.

ENDNOTES
1.

Terve, E. Nande Nande and Atemityou: An Appraisal of the Tiv Upheavals of 19591966, B.A. ICS, Mkar, 1994, P. 20.

2.

Terve, E. Nande Nande and AtemityouP.21.

3.

Isiche, I. A History of Nigeria, (London: Longman) P.409.

4.

Isiche, I. A History P.410.

5.

Isiche, I. A History P.411.

6.

Orgu, C. Core Issues in the Nature of Political Participation among Contemporary

Tiv in Shija, T. et al (eds.) Paul Unongo the Intelligentsia and the Politics of
Development, Aboki Publishers Makurdi, 2010, P. 234.

7.

Anifowose, R. Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba Experience, Nok
Publishers Enugu, 1982, p.86.

8.

Terve, E. Nande Nande and AtemityouP.22.

9.

Imadu, E. Joseph Sarwuan Tarka Leadership Role and Scope 1932-1980, B.A.
University of Jos, 1982, P.27.

10.

Abeghe, T. Tiv and Tiv Riots, Jos Plateau Publishing Company, 1965, P.36.

11.

Abeghe, T. Tiv and Tiv P.38.

12.

Abeghe, T. Tiv Riots and the Aftermaths, Makurdi: Oracle Business Limited, 2005,
Pp.67-68.

13.

Dent, M. A Minority Party: The United Middle Belt Congress in Mackintosh, J.

Nigerian Government and Politics, London, Allen and Unwin. 1960, Pp.473-474.

14.

Adamu, H. Atemityou; The Tiv Revolt of 1960-1964, in The Pan Africanist,

Vol.1,No.1, 1971, P. 7

15.

Greatbatchl, B. Letter No.PM 142/301 Dated 19th August, 1960 MAKPROF,

2/6/0/PLT/5, NAK.

16.

Makar, T. The History of Political Change among the Tiv in the 19th and 20th Centuries,
Enugu Fourth Dimension 1994, P.226.

17.

Letter Written by Isaac Kpum et al to the Northern Nigerian Government against Dent,
M. J. No. NPC. 20/tds. WC/45, dated 24th December 1960, MAKPRF.2/60-PLT/5.
Vol.1 NAK.

18.

Makar, T. The History of Political ChangeP.236.

19.

Anifowose, R. Violence and Politics in Nigeria Pp. 110-135.

20.

Makar, T. The History of Political ChangeP.237.

21.

Gunderson, N. et al, Organizational Survey of the Tiv Native Authority, Zaria 1964,
Pp.3-4.

22.

Makar, T. The History of Political ChangeP.240.

23.

Shagaya, J. Governance in Nigeria: The IBB Era An Insiders View, View Point
Communications Ltd, Jos 2000, Pp.18-19.

24.

Section 201 of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

25.

Ojiaka, J. Nigeria: Yesterday, Today and ?, Onitsha: African Educational Publishers

Nig. Ltd. 1981, P.261.

26.

Ukpoju, J. Benue Politics and the Idoma Question 1968-1993, Makurdi: Aboki
Publishers, 2002, P.17.

27.

Ukpoju, J. Benue Politics and the P.19

28.

Ukpoju, J. Benue Politics and theP.21.

29.

Jibo, M. Tiv Politics Since 1959, Mandate International, Katsina-Ala 1993, P.50.

30.

Jibo, M. Tiv Politics P.55.

31.

The reader is invited to study the Nigerian Voice editions dealing with the campaigns
particularly the gubernatorial elections in 1983 as an example in biased
presentation of news and comments.

32.

Jibo, M. Tiv Politics P.60-62.

33.

Ogenyi, E. The Idoma in Politics, Brains Books Makurdi 2009, P.36.

34.

Aliyu, N. The Police and the Electoral Process in Party Activities during the Transition
Period being a paper presented at a joint workshop organized by NOA/NP on Police
and Social Justice 1997 P.10.

35.

Jibo, M. Tiv PoliticsP.156.

36.

The Voice Newspaper of December 16, 1991. P.1.

37.

Dzurgba, A. Politics and Intellectuals in Benue State: A Democratic Perspective in

Shija, T. et al, (eds.), Paul Unongu the Intelligentsia and the Politics of Development,
Makurdi: Aboki Publishers 2010, P.21.

CHAPTER FIVE
DEMOCRATIC RESTORATION AND THE RESURGENCE OF POLITICAL
VIOLENCE IN 1999-2007
5.1

INTRODUCTION
After protracted period of the military rule, 1983-1999 Nigeria breathed another
fresh air of democratic governance with the inauguration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo
into power in 1999. However, the much expected democracy come with archaic
features of arson, hijacking of election materials, beating up of political opponents,
thuggery, falsification of election figures and all other sort of coercion that can
stimulate frustration and subsequently aggressive violence. Therefore, this chapter
isolates some bitter electoral violence experiences in Tivland since 1999 and the roles
played by both the government and individuals in resolving them.

5.2

THE 2002 POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN WANNUNE, TARKA L.G.A

Tarka Local Government is carved out of Gboko Local Government during the
late General Sani Abacha military administration in 19961. The original inhabitants of
this area are Mbakor, a Tiv ethnic extraction of Jemgbar parental lineage. Very
fundamentally, the Local Government is named after senator (Dr.) JS Tarka, with its
headquarters at Wannune. Wannune is strategically situated on both sides of the
Trunk A Federal High Way which pierces through the town. Specifically, Wannune
is located at kilometer 52 along the busy Makurdi-Gboko road in Benue State with a
land mass of about 60,000 square kilometer2. Furthermore, Tarka Local Government
had three districts wards this includes; Mbajir, Mbalahan and Mbachoughul which
collectively sub-divided into 10 council wards to include; Shitile, Mbaajirakaa,
Mbaayo, Mbanyagber, Mbaigba, Mbaikyaa, Mbaichaveikondo, Ikyo/Yia, Mbakwaken
and Tongov. Shiishi Philip asserts that, these district wards were carved according to

the two patrilineal sons of Mbakor3. (Mbalahan and Mbachoghul) Mbalahan is larger
in population comprising of two district wards, Mbalahan and Mbajir. While
Mbachoughul is smaller in population and had only one district ward, Mbachoughul.
The distribution of political appointments and other dividends of democracy to the
people of Mbakor are therefore based on these factions.
Oral interview with the people of Wannune establishes that since the inception
of Tarka Local Government in 1996, the people unanimously accepted a rotational
system of electing their Local Government Chairman between Mbalahan and
Mbachoughul axis of Mbakor. This political calculation is anchors on the Tiv
principle of Ya Na Igbian, which Wang asserts is a philosophy of fairness and
altruism, equity and responsibility.4 It is against this backdrop that Dr. Alagh John
from Mbachoughul axis of Mbakor emerged as the first Chairman of Tarka Local
Government from December 1996 to March 1997, a period of only 3 months. Shiishi
Philip also affirms that, the second Chairman of the Local Government came from
Mbalahan axis in person of Iortyer Emmanuel. He was elected on the plateform of
Congress for National Consensus (CNC) in March 1997, however his administration
was truncated with the demise of General Sani Abacha in June 1998, a period of just 1
year and 3 months. Based on the existing political calculation, the people of Mbakor
sang in one chorus that it was Mbachoughuls turn. As a result, Mr. Baver Dzeremo
was elected under the plateform of PDP as the third Chairman of the Local
Government from 1999-2002, for a period of 3 good years.
Going through this political calculation, there was no single reason for Mr. Baver
Dzeremo to come for second term. This is obvious because his administration was
longer than any other Chairman in Tarka local Government. Also for him to stage a
come back was a violation of the existing principle of Ya Na Anigbian among the

people. Furthermore, Mbalahan political axis which had two district wards (Mbalahan
and Mbajir) felt cheated even with the principle of power shift; this is quite obvious
for the fact that Mbalahan are more populous and had more council wards than
Mbachoughul. Against these contradictions, Mr. Baver Dzeremo diplomatically
liaised with Governor George Akume (who is also Mbakor son from the Mbalahan
political axis) to achieve his second term ambition. Vembe Emmanuel emphasizes
that, Governor Akume acknowledged the fact that with Mr. Baver Dzeremo he would
hold a firm grip of Tarka Local Government since he was also nursing a second term
agenda in 20035. It is important to point that apart from second term agenda,
Governor Akume also felt that since he is from Mbalahan axis as the Governor of
Benue State it was wise for Mbachoughul to maintain the seat of Chairmanship. The
researcher also believes that Governor Akumes ambition was more than this
especially when it finally come to light after Mr. Baver Dzeremos second term that;
the Governor made his brother Mr. Akoom Dajo to succeeded Mr. Baver Dzeremo as
the executive Chairman while Mr. Idyer Akume was made as Ter Tarka (second class
chief for Tarka) while he himself moves to the national assembly as senator
representing Benue North-West senatorial zone.
It is also obvious that Governor Akume did not openly pronounce the imposition
of Mr. Baver Dzeremos candidature. However, his actions revealed that he was using
state powers to frustrate Mr. Samuel Atsuku who contested with Mr. Baver Dzeremo
on the plateform of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). According to Newsmate, before
Mr. Samuel Atsuku could pronounce his ambition to contest the Chairmanship
election, he voluntarily resigns from work as the paper notes:
he paid his mandatory three months salary in lieu of notice to the
tune of # 73,668.00 on the 15th April, 2002. But even before this, Mr.
Atsuku had by 1st April 2002 tendered his notice of voluntary

retirement, which was also clearly approved by his education secretary

who he was directly answerable to, on the 11th April 20026.

However, instead of receiving a commendation letter alongside his discharge

certificate, Mr. Atsuku was handed a letter dismissing him from service with
retrospective effect from 25th March 2002 (back dated) against the backdrop that he
was caught on several occasions openly discussing violent politics, worst of it during
office hours7. But the simple question to be asked is, why did the educational
secretary go ahead to successfully accept Atsukus three months salary which by such
lawfully allows his successful retirement? Again, does it mean he did not have a
personal file in the ministry in which transactions about him are reflected? However,
there is no need stressing on such rhetorical questions. What matters here is that Mr.
Samuel Atsuku sought redress of his inappropriate dismissal and redeemed it to
continue with his political race8. The New Times Newspaper establishes that during
the PDP primaries, Mr. Samuel Atsuku was disqualified by the internal screening
committee of the party while Mr. Baver Dzeremo was returned as PDP candidate.
This compelled Mr. Samuel Atsuku to cross-carpet to the newly formed United
Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP) together with his relations, contemporaries, well
wishers and supporters enmass9. The paper notes that Governor Akume again used
Benue State Independent Electoral Commission (BSIEC) headed by Mr. Audu Ikyetor
to disqualify him. This according to the Truth Newspaper became a time bomb ready
to explode and only surfaced with an incident that led to tearing of PDP flag in
Wannune10. Iorvihi Ingyuran argues that, Mr. Atsuku himself did not advocate
violence rather he took this case to Makurdi High Court presided over by Justice
Ejembi Eko to determine his fate when brute violence became inevitable at
Wannune11.

What became the remote factor to Wannune political violence was the attack on
Mr. Iorvihi Ingyuran, a school teacher in Wannune cum Chairman Mbajir Community
Development Association by some members of the Military Wing Vision 200312.
According to Mr. Nongo Gbon, this group serves as watch dog and update the
governor about his tension laden Local Government13. Oral interview with Mr. Iorvihi
Ingyuran in his house at Wannune reveals that he had actually gone on a visit to
Asunkunya with Mr. Uma Suemo and was heading back to Wannune on that fateful
day, unsuspicious of the impending danger. They made a stopover at Mrs.
Mnguenyis place by which time the sponsored thugs which he identified as
Hilehyongo Vembe, Aondoakaa Iorja, Liambee Ijir, Angwa Kiridim, Terna Tarka and
two others intoxicated themselves, drove in a Liteace Bus and ambushed him at
Akondo, a settlement along Makurdi-Gboko road. Approaching their spot they
shouted at him to stop. He sensed the danger and drove off. He was madly chased by
the thugs in their Liteace Bus and was asked to stop or be crushed to death. At this
point he abandoned his Motorcycle and took to his heels where he found refuge in Mr.
Tor Atos compound. The thugs ransacked the whole compound in spite of wailings
and pleadings from the occupants of the residence and neighbours, they found him in
a kitchen squatting with a basket on top of his head, caught him, strip him naked and
dragged him to the tarred road and severely tortured him. Mr. Iorvihi Ingyuran
maintains that, even among the thugs an argument ensued as to whether or not he
should be killed. Others argued that they were instructed by the Governor to beat and
kill him while others insisted that the Governor could never have meant so.
In the final analysis, Mr. Iorvihi Ingyuran was later abandoned in chains;
passers-by came to his rescue and he was rushed to T.B.T. Hospital in Gboko.
According to Newsmate Magazine, this Military group sang victory songs back to

Wannune that Or Kpough Akume Yo Nan Dzua A I Ve. (He that dares Akume has
received the consequence) 14 People who were yet to know of the groups successful
expedition in Asukunya watched and gaped at the rampaging group in confusion. The
group also drove to Mr. Iorvihi Ingyurans resident and set it ablaze. That fateful day
they set the house of Mr. Uma and a beer parlour at Zongo believed to be patronized
by Governor Akumes opponent ablaze. The Truth Newspaper argues that Mr. Iorvihi
Ingyuran got this punishment because he was found of buying beer for UNPP
supporters and also ushering derogatory words against some highly placed
personalities of the PDP fold in authority15.
The following day which was Wannune market day UNPP sympathizers received
the attack and murder attempt on their cohorts demanded for satisfactory explanation
which never came. This resulted into mass protest, metamorphosing into total chaos.
The Newsmate describes this incidence as a boxing ring where in display was a free
for all fight.16 The crisis soon engulfed the entire village where several houses were
set on fire. There is no need to isolate here some of the houses affected by this
violence hence this is reflected in the next chapter. However it is pertinent to
emphasis that after this violence, there was reign of terror which compelled most
UNPP ardent supports to flee Wannune until Mr. Baver Dzeremo also known as the
last man standing completed his second term in office.

5.3

THE 2003/2004 POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KWANDE L.G.A

Kwande Local Government Area has an estimated population of over 258,000,
about 6.55% of the State population, covering an area of 2975.00 square kilometers17.
Its human composition is the two basic Tiv lineages, the Ichongo and the Ipusu which
invariably made up of four clans namely; Ikyurav-Ya, Turan, Shangev-Ya and Nanev.
The Ikyurav-Ya and Turan belongs to Ichongo lineage group while the Shangev-Ya

and Nanev belongs to Ipusu lineage axis. This view has been shared by A. Lyam.
According to him:
Traditionally, Shangev-Ya and Nanev who are geographically
contiguous areas are believed to have a common ancestry. For this
reason they always shared whatever political, economic, or social
gains that are available to them on a ya na anigbian principle Turan
and Ikyurav-ya also shared similar gains on the same basis18.

Our investigation reveals that this area began to witness political crises since
the 1980s and between 2003/2004, it was overridden by heavy violent conflicts19.
Scholars argue that one of the underpinning factors for 2003/2004 violence in this
area was premised on the existence of developmental gap between the Ichongo and
Ipusu mega clans20. They elaborated that the Nanav/Shangev-Ya clan (Ipusu) had 18
public schools, 7 district wards and 107 pooling units. While the Turan/Ikyurav-Ya
clan (Ichongo) had 15 public schools, 8 district wards and 140 pooling units. This
developmental gap did not augur well to the Nanav/Shangev-Ya who have higher
population density and numerous landless families as well as high number of
unemployed youths. These problems needed to be articulated and tackled by a
responsible administration.
Ahokegh on the other hand pointed out personality issue as the underpinning
factor in the Kwande crisis. According to him, Paul Unongos personality has been a
source of political uneasiness because he has always commanded control of the
people of the Kwande and Tivland at large. This was always a source of friction.
Accordingly, it has been observed that:
Kwande people have been listening to Unongo as their leader. Some
other sons of Kwande felt that they should be heard and not Paul. But
to Kwande people, Paul has not done anything bad so they continue to
hold him as their political leader. When politics came, Paul was at the
helm of it in Kwande. The sons of Kwande felt they should be heard
and not Paul: Ason Bur, Basil Kwanbe etc. brought their boys for

elective positions. But Kwande people voted for Pauls boys and this
lead to crises21. (Sic)

Ahokegh is convinced that Paul Unongo himself is aware of what people say about
him. He quoted how Paul Unongo tries to justify his personality before a marmot
crowd in 2006 at Adikpo thus:
People say Wantaregh Paul Unongo is a trouble maker because
Unongo is one person who if something is black and every other
person in Nigeria says it is red, Unongo would speak the fact by
insisting that it is black. That is the trouble22.

The personality variable cannot be ignored because of the events that unfold in this
area. From gathered evidence, troubles started in this area since 1999 when Dzeka of
PDP contested chairmanship election against Imoter Nungwa of ANPP. During the
counting of votes, crisis erupted and Paul Unongo had to be escorted out of the area
by policemen. The PDP candidate, Dennis Dzeka won the election and presided over
the affairs of the council until Tyoure took over consequent upon Dzekas death. Our
investigation reveals that when ANPP lost the 1999 election, Paul Unongo felt
challenged and as such began to build-up opposition against the PDP led
administration and this created tension and insecurity in Kwande local government
area.
In a letter to the Inspector General of Police, (IGP) Hon. Orya Korinjo the
them Political Adviser to the Government of Benue State under George Akume PDP
led administration enumerated several events which affected PDP members in
Kwande spanning from 2nd December 2000 to July, 200223. The letter reads in part as
follows:
2nd December 2000, there was shooting in Hon. Orya Korinjos (the
special adviser to Benue State Governor on political affairs) residential
house in Jato-Aka. 4th December 2000, they harassed and almost
kidnapped at gun point my special assistant Tevershima Anumve, who

brought in two police detectives to investigate the shooting. They also

attacked and seized two police pistols from the two C.I.D. detectives.
They also invaded the police station at Jato-Aka and made away with a
Yamaha 100 motorcycle, which is now brought and kept at the station
as exhibit. They destroyed the lock-up store of Hon. Samuel Tyoule,
then chairman of Kwande LGA at Jato-Aka. They also illegally
dispersed the LG revenue collection in Jato-Aka at the directives of
Mr. Tersur Yachiga, now ANPP chairmanship candidate for Kwande.
This revenue was never return to the Kwande LG coffers.
Throughout the year 2000; illegal roadblocks were mounted on all
roads leading to Jato-Aka by ANPP thugs. They cut down the umbrella
tree standing in front of the Jato-Aka PDP secretariat and burnt the
furniture in order to provide violence.
27th December 2000, physical assault on Hon. Philip .T. Igba, Mr.
Tornguvan Ugoh, Mr. Danladi Nyitse and Mr. Gbongbon Gbaagile.
17th February 2001, ransacked the houses of P.T. Igba and made away
15,000 Naira at gun point from Tornguva Ugohs house. Kidnapped at
gun point, beat up Tornguvan Ugoh and Adogo Ujonyi.
They also smashed the door shutters in the house of Hon. Philip T.
Igba. Burnt down furniture of Hon. Gbenda Lukela, then PDP
chairman in Kwande.
9th September 2002, attacked and beat up Imokaa Jige, Gwaza
Ashongo-PDP youth vanguard, threatened at gun point the life of
Emmanuel Tseen, a PDP youth.
5th January 2003, attacked and broke the campaign van of PDP
chairmanship flag bearer, shot one of the passengers Igbayima Iorwa,
in the process. He is still receiving treatment. Arrested at gun point
PDP members by the ANPP thugs. 3rd February 2003, burnt down Pa
Korinjo Ikyors sitting room Ate at Div village, 4th attack and beat
Terwase Atoo Anusu, Akor Ayari, shoot and scared people at Div and
also displayed 4 newly acquired automatic rifles at Nyihemba near
Jato-Aka. 9th February 2003, almost kidnapped Master Samuel Orya
Korinjo Jnr. at gun point at Jato-Aka. Gun shots at Jato-Aka dispersed
market women and made away with cash and other variables.
11th February 2003, ransacked the village of Telen Wende, a PDP
member and beat up members of his house hold24.
ANPP on the other hand reported instances of violence perpetrated on her
members to include: the killing of Mr. Moses Hembaor, a security boy to Mr. Paul
Unongos Juladaco Hotel on 17th February 2003; the seizure of Hon. Dooron Agogos
car on March 2004 to PDP secretariat by PDP thugs in Adikpo while he was eating in
a hotel, in course of rescue mission by ANPP youths, four PDP supporters were left
dead25. Commenting on Paul Unongo personality as a source of conflict in Kwande,
Mr. Pever emphasizes that: Paul Unongo feels that since this place is his, any time he

joins a political party, everybody should support him. The refusal of Kwande people
to follow him this time around is responsible for the present crisis in Kwande26.

From the available evidence, there is no reason discrediting the obvious fact
that Unogos personality is the potential source of Kwande crisis, this is because the
April 2003 gubernatorial election which Mr. Paul Unongo contested and was defeated
by the incumbent governor Dr. George Akume created serious tension and subsequent
political violence in Kwande. Oral interviews with informants at Adikpo and Jato-Aka
reveals that trouble started on 19th April 2003, after the gubernatorial election during
which it was learnt that Mr. Adzua Ashongo of PDP took election materials to his
home, Shangev-Ya in a bid to rig election for PDP. Against this backdrop, the ANPP
youths therefore mounted road block leading to Shangev-Ya to search for the stolen
electoral materials. It was allege that Adzua Ashongo communicated this
development to Makurdi and soldiers arrived Adikpo from Makurdi that fateful day in
two 18 seats buses, asking the youths to explain the reason for the blockade. The
youths explained the reason and even argued to have sought police permit27. It is not
quite obvious that the youths reported the issue to the police or if they did, the
Divisional Police Officer (DPO) permitted them. This is because, it could not be
imagined that the DPO who knows what the law is would allow a road that is for
general use be blocked by youths for reason of searching for missing electoral
materials, or allow them to do the duty that could better be done by the police.
However, the soldiers warned them against blockade and left the area without
harming any of them. On their return, they found the road block again. They arrested
some youths and began to torture them. This led to resistance in form of throwing
stones against the soldiers. The soldiers drove to the roundabout and fired some shots
in the air, while the youths concluded that the bullets were rubber ones and cannot

kill. Consequent upon this perception, the fleeing crowd returned against the soldiers.
The ensuing encounter left 15 youths dead28. After the soldiers killed and left, the
youths began to look for Ashongu whom they later discovered followed the soldiers
to Makurdi. As a result, their anger was shifted to PDP leaders and followers. Within
the passage of time, a second batch of soldiers arrived Adikpo from Makurdi in 3
helicopters to quell the crisis. But the burning that lasted throughout the night was
completed and the youths responsible for these act left the town. The soldiers blamed
the police. The DPO replied: Governorship election was conducted peacefully. After
the election, soldiers came without my knowledge and killed people. So the soldiers
who killed people are the cause of the trouble, since other activities were reactions 29.
Although this batch of soldiers left Adikpo without killing any body, from this period
onward, there was relative peace in Kwande until the drawing of the chairmanship
election in 2004. Every one patiently awaits the outcome of the case instituted in court
by the defeated ANPP governorship candidate against the victorious PDP candidate.
It is pertinent to point that close to 2004 chairmanship election there were
certain events that created tension which resulted to violence. Among these ordeals
was the attack of Mr. Gbenda Lukera and his supporter Mr. Agasha from Ushongo by
suspected ANPP thugs. Oral interview with informants at Adikpo alleged that on 22nd
of April 2004, PDP youths were shouting war songs throughout Adikpo town for fear
of attack30. It is likely that the youth vanguard at Jato-Aka were mobilized to come
down the next day as many of them were seem in action that fateful day. It is also
alleged that on 26th of April which was the eve of the election day, Dooron Agogo of
ANPP was eating in a restaurant adjacent to the High Court Adikpo near ACC and the
PDP youths saw and pushed his car to the PDP secretariat. In a flash, four armed

ANPP thugs in a Navy Blue Peugeot 504 attacked the PDP secretariat killing four
people and leaving six injured31.
In this tense and insecure atmosphere, the Benue State Independent Electoral
Commission (BSIEC) decided to conduct the March 27th Local Government election.
On the day of the election, electoral materials were released to supervisors and
reached destinations at 2pm. Already tension was generated that PDP was rigging
election. In reaction to this by ANPP thugs, what happened at the collation centre was
more or less daylight robbery32. The ballot boxes were snatched from the supervisors
and handed to untrained personnel whose names were not on the list of Presiding
Officers (PO). In less than one hour, the election results in Yaav ward of Jato-Aka
were returned. Sometimes, voters were more than the number registered. However,
what to do was determined by what the ANPP thugs decided. In fact many of the PDP
sympathizers did not participate in the election because they were terrorized. At the
end of the day, election results were returned and collated. The BSIEC officers
temporally accepted the results in 11 wards of Adikpo while 4 wards were rejected for
late arrival, for example in Mbadura ward the ward of the ANPP and PDP
chairmanship candidates. By this calculation, Mr. Tersur Yachiga of the ANPP won
with 30,438 votes followed by Mr. Philip Igba of the PDP who had 8,217 votes while
Mr. Orjir Gbande of UNPP had only 4,324 votes33. The results were then moved to
Makurdi the headquarters of Benue State Independent Electoral Commission (BSIEC)
accompanied by all relevant officers and security agents on Sunday night and
submitted for announcement. They were anticipated to be announced latest Monday
the 29th of March. But to peoples dismay, the radio announcement made by Radio
Benue Makurdi later announced the cancellation of the results.

According to BSIEC, the reason for the cancellation was as a result of wild
spread violence and irregularities that marred the exercise 34. It was alleged in some
quarters that the result of the election was discussed and concluded in a meeting
chaired by the Governor with the PDP stalwarts in Kwande Local Government. The
allegation goes that after the meeting, the Governor summoned the Electoral Officer
(EO) for Kwande Mr. Maxwell Kai and the Retuning Officer (RO) Mr. John Yaga on
how best to put argument in connection with the cancellation. This allegation may be
true against the backdrop that the state government at this time was much interested in
local government politics by imposing candidates of her choice as the case with Tarka
35

and Gwer Local Governments clearly indicates36.

All the same, the ANPP in Kwande instituted a case at the Adikpo High Court

compelling BSIEC to declare the result of Kwande Local Government. Again, the
people were disappointed as on 23rd of April 2004 when the High Court presided by
Justice Kpam Baaki strike out the case on the basis of incompetence jurisdiction to
entertain it. This ruling triggered crisis in alarming proportion. The embittered ANPP
youths burnt down the house of Ter Kwande, His Royal Highness (HRH) Zaki James
Adzapke in both Adikpo and Manyam, destroyed the residential house of the District
Head of Mbayoo Chief Shagher Chula, razed down the house of Dr. Liambee Shande
and the village house of Hon. Philip Igba in Ayaga-Mbaav (Turan) as well as the
village home of the former Chairman of PDP in Kwande Mr. Gbenda Lukera together
with his car and several houses belonging to PDP in Jato-Aka.
ANPP youths were said to have usurped the revenue collection in Jato-Aka,
Adikpo, Achia, Koti and Ada which the money was used for acquisition of arms. The
youths also chased away everybody suspected to be PDP sympathizer in both JatoAka and Adikpo until a statewide PDP organized militia group came to their rescue to

fight back. The said state organized militia group arrived Adikpo on Friday Morning
of 30th April 2004 and its men dressed in military uniform under the name of Tiv
Defence Corp (TDC) commanded by Col. Basil Kwambeh, although this fact has not
been substantiated37. The militia group was on serious reprisal attack. Their first
action was the killing of Mr. Peter Ashan a commercial motorcyclist and subsequently
began to burn down ANPP houses. Some of those houses burnt were the house of
Hon. Shaagee Boayali, Mr. Yarkwen Demekaa and several others. They also ate and
drank beer freely, raped women, stole property and extorted money from the
defenceless citizens. After two days, Adikpo was brought to total submission and a
PDP flag was mounted in Adikpo town. The second step of this militia was an attempt
to bring Jato-Aka, the home town of Mr. Paul Unongo under their control. This
expedition was a failure as one of their vehicle was said to have been damaged in
Ikov, however Manyam town an outskirts village before Jato-Aka was completely
burnt to ashes.
Following the non-successful penetration of Jato-Aka town, the said militia
changed route to use Adikpo-Ikyogen-Achia road and stationed at Nyihemba under
the directive of Mr. Gbaagile, 38 and were also using electric poles as their bearing. On
nearing Jato-Aka, they dismounted two road blocks along Turan Community
Secondary School killing two persons and finally entering Jato-Aka. Thereafter it was
reported that another set arrived in one full Lettace Bus. This set embarked on
extensive looting of the town. The PDP militia used sophisticated weapons which
ANPP sympathizers accused the government of providing. It is obvious that ANPP
militia lacked the fire power to withstand their PDP opponents and this was a major
defeat on their side. At this point, the people of Jato-Aka were partially cut off from
the rest of the people as most of them were afraid of the PDP militia reprisal attacks.

All the same, Jato-Aka was never occupied by the PDP militia as the Case with
Adikpo, this is because of the difficult terrain of Jato-Aka which is highly
characterized by poor network of roads. Furthermore, ANPP youths continued to
guard Jato-Aka with wisdom as most of them stayed behind collapsed buildings to
resurface after the numerous attacks.
It is also pertinent to point out that ANPP militia shifted their attention to
villages where PDP members resided. They illegally imposed taxes and levies on
them with the aim of raising money for arms and those who default were seriously
beaten. Even suspended PDP members who claimed to have repented and return to
ANPP were severely tortured. It is argued that two PDP mercenaries were arrested
and mutilated. In search for the mutilators, the PDP warriors arrived from their base in
Adikpo shooting sporadically and in the process killed Mama Adooshe Yaku, the
mother of late Mr. Terkula Chile (a former Director General in Benue State during
Rev. Moses Adasus administration) and Professor Love Mngohol Chile. Until the
PDP militia willfully terminated her life, she was the Mother of Motorcyclists
Association, Jato-Aka branch and a philanthropist. At age 71, she was still active and
useful to the young ones who saw in her qualities worthy of emulation39. PDP Militia
decided to make Nyihemba their base instead of Jato-Aka. This implies that PDP
militia was controlling Nanev, Shangev-Ya and Ikyurav-Ya while ANPP was
controlling only Turan. Henceforth, these groups continued to terrorize Kwande
throughout the period of the crisis. However, efforts were made towards peaceful
resolution of this crisis.

5.4

THE 2006 POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN ALIADE, GWER L.G.A

Gwer Local Government Area derives its name from River Gwer, it was
created in 1976 from Makurdi L.G.A. It has a land mass of 2,400 square kilometers

with a population of 163,647 and a growth rate of 2.99% as the 2006 population
figures indicates40. The Local Government Headquarters is located at Aliade
immediately South of Makurdi, the Benue State Capital. It is boarded in the North by
Makurdi L.G.A., Tarka in the North-East, Gboko in the East and Konshisha in the
South-East. Aliade, the Local Government Headquarters is a junction town linked by
three bitumen highways from the North, East and South-East parts of the country,
thus making transportation within the L.G.A. easy. It is also a semi-urban Local
Government and is inhabited mainly by the Tiv people although; there is a large
presence of other ethnic groups due to its semi-urban status, while the Igede people
occupy the

Akpachayi

council

ward.

Gwer

Local

Government

has

13

Districts/Council Wards namely; Akpachayi, Aliade Town, Gbamecha, Ikogbajir,

Ikyonov, Mbabur, Mbaiase, Mbaikyu, Mbaikyaan, Mbalom, Mbasomaobo, Sough and
Uhee. It is also pertinent to mention that, the Gwer Traditional Council is headed by
the Ter Gwer (Second Class Chief) and is assisted by the District Heads and
numerous Clan Heads respectively.
Our investigation on 2006 violence in Aliade Town reveals that the conflict
itself was politically motivated and did not extend to any other mentioned council
wards. According to oral interview with Mr. Christopher Avi, a local government
staff with Gwer Council Secretariat Aliade said that, there was peace and tranquility
in Aliade Town throughout 2006. However, this peace was truncated in December
2006 following the eruption of violent conflict that claims at least 10 lives41. The
immediate cause of this violence was traceable to political tussle between Dr. Donald
Ayargwer and Arch. Asema Achado, both of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)
over Gwer East State Constituency slot. According to the press release by the Gwer
Unity Forum, HRH Chief Dominic Akpe, the Ter Gwer II wanted Arch. Asema

Achado as unopposed PDP flag bearer at the expense of Dr. Ayargwer. The group
claimed to have bitterly opposed this plan in a letter dated 16, October 2006 and
addressed to the Tor Tiv IV and the Tiv Traditional Council (TTC) alerting the Tiv
Nation of the ugly role being played by the Ter Gwer. The group claimed that they
appealed to the Tor Tiv Dr. Alfred Akawe Torkula, the Tiv Traditional Council and
the concerned stakeholders in the unity of Tiv Nation to restrain Ter Gwer Chief Akpe
from partisan politics in order to avert a repeat of what happened to Kwande people in
200442. Mr. Tyowua Ashiga opines that, Ter Gwer was using Arch. Asema Achado to
fight Dr. Donald Ayargwer because of his personal grouse with Mr. Emmanuel
Ayargwer over a protracted legal battle of the Ter Gwer stool43.
Apart from this version, the Truth Newspaper asserts that Governor George
Akume, Ter Gwer HRH Dominic Akpe, Tyoor Aliade/Kbalar Chief John Munde and
Chief Tyokula Gbor masterminded the imposition of Arch. Asema Achado on the
people of Gwer. The paper elaborates that:
Governor Akume, through his uncle judge Kehem Dajoh (rtd)
addressed Gwer delegates at the residence of Torkula Gbor insisting
that the Governor anointed Achado for the position. Gwer Council
Chairman Gabriel Kwaghshir and two of Akumes Special Assistants,
Mrs Ullam and Gusa were allegedly assigned by the governor to
ensure that Ayargwer was defeated. The Governorexpressed
displeasure with the people of Gwer for always rejecting him and his
associates. This the Governor termed humiliation whichhe was
prepared and vowed never to take again44.
From the above analysis, it is obvious that Dr. Ayargwer was the peoples choice, but
politics of imposition and godfatherism was seriously in place to frustrate his mandate
thus giving way to violence as rightly observes by Gurr: when we feel thwarted in an
attempt to get something we want, we are likely to become angry, and when we
become angry the most satisfying inherent response is to strike out at the source of
frustration 45.

The remote cause of this violence is located in the PDP primary elections into
the State and National Assemblies conducted on 3rd and 4th of December 2006 in
which Dr. Donald Ayargwer emerged the winner of Gwer East State Constituency by
a clear margin of 36 votes (the results was released by the Benue State Electoral Panel
on 5th December 2006). With reasons not clear to the people of Gwer, the result was
turned again in favor of Arch. Asema Achado by the PDP Electoral Appeal Panel and
was made public in media report of Radio Benue by 8.00 PM news on the 7th of
December, 2006. The PDP Electoral Appeal Panel headed by Mr. Sola Aregbesola
justifies their action through a press release published in the Truth Newspaper and is
reproduce below:
You will recall that primary elections into the State and National
Assemblies were conducted in the three Senatorial Districts
Headquarters of our party PDP between Sunday 3rd and Monday 4th
December, 2006.
207 aspirants contested for the 29 seats of Benue State House of
Assembly in the primary elections. The results have been released by
the Benue State Electoral Panel on Thursday 5th December, 2006.
Consequently, the State Assembly Electoral Panel received 56
petitions from aggrieved aspirants within 24 hours time limit after the
official release of the results. A careful and painstaking review of the
petitions received by our panel had reached an advanced stage before
the announcement yesterday 7th December 2006, further directives
from the PDP National Headquarters on the results of the elections by
the Chairman of the Electoral Panel, Alhaji Iliyasu Dan Musa.
That announcement notwithstanding, the State Assembly Electoral
Appeal Panel in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by section
42 subsections C and D of the PDP Electoral Guidelines for
primary elections 2006, hereby announce the following two (2)
changes in the results of the Benue State House of Assembly Elections
released earlier by the Benue State Electoral Panel. Zone A, Kwande
East Constituency Hon. Simon Kwaghbulah and Zone B Gwer East
Constituency Arch. Asema Achado as been elected respectively
(emphasis added) 46
According to Joseph Iorver, the contentious Radio Benue announcement
became the springboard for violence in Aliade Town between those that were
jubilating for Arch. Asema Achado and protesters of Dr. Donald Ayargwer47. The

protesters were said to have blocked the Makurdi-Aliade Road, the Makurdi-Gboko
Road and the Makurdi-Otukpo Road. They also vandalized a beer parlor belonging to
Mrs. Shimenenger, pulled down all PDP flags, destroyed tables and benches
belonging to night food sellers that fateful night. Against this backdrop, the Assistant
Inspector General of Police (AIG) Zone 4 Mr. Declan S. Uzoma mobilized the police
to clear the blocked roads. However, the assigned officers went beyond the limit of
their duty which resulted to the death of two protesters and a police inspector Mr.
Simon Nwabane. The researcher gathered that there was reinforcement of police
officers and sophisticated Amoured Cars. The police were also directed to shot-atsight at the defenseless and innocent civilian, an order resulting to additional killing of
6 persons. The police were also guided by certain unknown individuals to attack
houses belonging to Dr. Donald Ayargwer sympathizers therefore making their
official assignment biased, suspicious and unpatriotic. In fact, this act was unlawful
and calls into question the role of the police in democracy. This is because their
inclusion rather complicated the entire violence bringing in further hardship to the
people of Aliade48.
After the violence which lasted for two days, series of conflict resolution
meetings were held both in Aliade and Makurdi and a number of resolutions were
taken. What again became a source of worry by the researcher was his inability to
comprehend the rationale behind the arrest of Dr. Donald Ayargwer after a conflict
resolution meeting headed by Chief Security Adviser to Governor Akume, Col.
Edwin Jando (rtd) at the Government House Makurdi. Dr. Donald was detained at the
Police Criminal Investigation Department Headquarters Makurdi while Arch. Asema
Achado walked about freely. As a result this recounciliation yielded very little
positive result.

5.5 THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN RESOLVING ELECTORAL

VIOLENCE IN TIVLAND
The government have constitutional role in resolving violence for the purpose
of maintaining peace, stability and harmonious co-existence of her citizens. Once
there is violence (whether communal, ethno-religious or political violence) there
bounds to be anarchy and chaos which truncates both the activities of the government
and her citizens. Against this backdrop, government takes some steps to address the
conflicting issues as the case of Tivland has demonstrated.

5.5.1 Deploy Security Agents

By security agents, the researcher means members of the Nigerian Police
Force, the State Security Services and the Army who are often deployed by the
government to quell violent situation in order to maintain peace and harmonious coexistence in the State. A close examination of the activities of the security agents in
Kwande and Gwer Local Governments reveals that, security agents were not neutral
but played into the hands of one of the parties to the conflict. For example, the shotat-sight directives in Gwer Local Government resulted to the death of; Uga Ugo,
Iorhember Chia, Aondofa Jubu, Terfa Adima, Wilfred Achado and Kar Theophilus
was seriously questionable49. Elsewhere in Nigeria, a lot of examples of this kind
abounds. The role of the military in Odi in Bayelsa State in late 1999 and particularly
their invasion and massacre in Tivland in October, 2001 also leaves much to be
desired. In advance countries from where we copy democracy, the military is hardly
used in quelling civil disorders. The last time the army played police role in the

United Kingdom (UK) was in 1919. At the end of the day, only two people were
killed. That was the last time in UK a person was killed on public order by troops50.
Another instance in which the researcher questions the role of the army in
particular was the 2003 Kwande political violence in which the shot-at-sight
syndrome claims 15 lives thereby exacerbating violence as observed by Mr. Akpoo,
the Adikpo DPO: Governorship election was conducted peacefully. After the
election, soldiers came without my knowledge and killed people. So the soldiers who
killed people are the cause of the trouble, since other activities were reactions 51. The
implications of the military involvement in the settlement of crisis are legion. Apart
from escalating tension and violence as witnessed in Tivland, they create additional
suspicion between the warring factions and their invitation to quell riots is a
demonstration of the incompetence of civil governance in Nigeria. The point being
made here is that the State is an umpire and agent of conflict mitigation, that its
response is not devoid of political content, and this has often exacerbated political
conflicts in Tivland.

5.5.2 Peace and Security Dialogue

Peace and security dialogue is another strategy which the government adopt
in order to tackle electoral violence in Tivland. With reference to Gwer political
violence, series of peace and security dialogue were held with both Parties in Conflict,
Security Agents, Traditional Rulers, Local Government Transition Chairman and
Stalk holders in Aliade Town and Makurdi, the Benue State Capital. Some of the
resolutions of these security and peace dialogue were52:
(i)

Traditional Rulers at all levels were restrained in partisan politics while both
parties in the election that give rise to the crisis were charged to follow due
process in order to seek justice as stipulated by the partys electoral guidelines.

(ii)

Political leaders in Gwer were to call their supporters to order so as to give

peace a chance while the parties in the crisis were to issue a radio
announcement jointly calling on their supporters to allow peace to prevail.

(iii)

The two parties were to travel to Aliade Town, the headquarters of Gwer in
one vehicle and address their supporters to eschew violence and bitterness and
work for the success of the PDP in the local government.

(iv)

The Government was also to look into the genuineness of the claims of those
whose property were destroyed and settled them.
Peace and security dialogue is a good strategy for conflict resolution but the

researcher gathers that the parties in conflict and the government did not adhere to
those resolutions thereby making it nothing but a mere talk-show jamboree.

5.5.3 Commissions of Inquiry

Another way the government approaches electoral violence in Tivland is by
setting-up commissions of inquiry into the immediate and remote causes of the
conflict with the view of finding lasting solutions as the Coomessie Commission of
Inquiry in Tivland after the Nande Nande and Atemityou indicates.
In the Kwande instance as well, the protracted nature of this conflict attracted
the attention of the Senate to investigate the underpinning issues. The motion for this
Commission of Inquiry was moved on the floor of the Senate by Professor Senator
Daniel Saror on 25th May, 2004 in which a Joint Committee on State and Local
Government Administration Fact Finding Mission was dispatched. The Committee
led by Senator Iyabo Anisulowo heard oral testimonies and collected written evidence
from both PDP and ANPP supporters as well as the general public53. On completion
of its assignment, the Committee submitted its deliberations. However, the Senate
decided to set it aside. The question that is begging for an answer is why the Senate,

the highest and most respectful law-making body of the land set aside the findings of
the Committee it had delegated? In defense, Senate President Hon. Adalphus Wabara
tried to exonerate the Senate from blame by observing that the decision of the Senate
was to among other things wait for the outcome of the Justice Alogba Commission
of Inquiry 54 which was set by the PDP government of Governor George Akume. But
the general opinion was that this explanation was too flimsy for the issue on ground.
As it eventually turned out, some group of persons who were implicated in the
findings of the Senate Committee did not want the Senate to speak over the matter.
This perception was confirmed by Anisulowo, the leader of the Senate delegation to
Benue State on Kwande political violence: the truth is not in doubt, but they dont
want it open. I went and did my work and submitted the report to the Senate People
went all out to bribe The Senate to make sure that the report was not debated

55

In fact, the Senate Committee did a wonderful work. The committee reported the
wanton destruction of lives and property in Kwande generally. But in specific terms,
it blamed the Kwande crisis largely on the altitude of Governor George Akume and
Dr. Iorchia Ayu.
A close look at the sitting up of the State Judicial Commission shows that, it
was done in bad light. For example, the Kwande crisis persisted over a long time, and
until the Senate Committee submitted it reports that the Benue State Government
conceived an option of mediation in the crisis in form of judicial arbitration. The
Governor should not have instituted another independent body to study the crisis
when the Senate already waded into the matter. Moreover, there is no doubt that the
Kwande crisis was basically a problem of the ANPP and the PDP and the Governor
was fully aware of this. In the final analysis, no government white paper was release
to this effect till date. This implies that there is great decadence in our democracy

arising from the fact that both the State and Federal Commissions of Inquiry failed
and did not yield anything. If due process were followed, the Senate Commission of
Inquiry could have brought better solution to the problems of Kwande people as the
Coomassie Commission did in 1964 to Tiv people.

5.6

THE

ROLE

OF

STAKEHOLDERS

IN

THE

MANAGEMENT

OF

ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN TIVLAND.

The role of stakeholders in managing electoral violence in Tivland cannot be
over emphasis. Here the role of the Concerned Sons of Kwande (CSK) on the
protracted violence in Kwande presents itself for elaborate discussion. The CSK was a
group who claimed to be absolutely non-partisan and had come together as the result
of their Christian conviction. The group comprised of prominent Kwande sons like
Prof. O.I Ayatse, Prof. J. Sambe, Prof. D.I Denga, Air Commodore S. Ugbor (rtd), Dr.
A. Lyam, Dr. T. Iordaah and Dr, G. Laha56. The concerted efforts of these
personalities paved way for the convention of Kwande Peace Summit (KPS). The
summit attracted so many Kwande sons and daughters in and outside Benue State.
The summit came out with the following resolutions:
i.

That there has been improvement in the security situations in Kwande in that;
there were no reported cases of recent killings. However, a general insecurity
among the people of Kwande arising from the activities of the militia groups
who have engaged in extortion of money from the public and have arrogated
to themselves security and adjudicatory powers by settling disputes, levying
and inflicting corporal punishment still exist.

ii.

The militia has also taken the revenue collection powers from the market
unions.

iii.

As the result of the general insecurity, some people who fled their homes were
still in hiding.

iv.

During the crisis, a lot of people were displaced because of the destruction of
their homes and property. This naturally resulted in the disruption of socioeconomic activities such as farming, education, trading and other activities.

v.

There shall be immediate cessation of all media activities in Kwande and

anybody that contravenes this directive will come under the wrath of the elders
and would be prosecuted.

vi.

All militia groups in Kwande should be disbanded immediately, their arms

retrieved and any Kwande citizen found to be hosting any militia group would
be held responsible, be sanctioned by the elders and prosecuted.

vii.

Consequently, all mercenaries should be made to vacate Kwande land

immediately and permanently.

viii.

Law enforcement duties should revert to constitutional authority, the Nigerian

Police. Consequently, Kwande indigenes should no more refer disputes to any
militia group. Anyone who violates this directive will attract the wrath of the
elders and the law.

ix.

Activities of market unions operating in Kwande Local Government Area

should be restored.

x.

All Kwande Sons and Daughters who fled their places of abode are called
upon to return without fear. Those whose houses were burnt should be
accommodated by relatives.

xi.

The committee set up by the Benue State on the rehabilitation and resettlement
of displaced persons in Kwande should be facilitated to accomplish their task.

xii.

Traditional rulers and community leaders should return to their bases and
announce these resolutions in markets, churches and other public places.

xiii.

The meeting commended the peace initiatives and the perseverance of the
Concerned Sons of Kwande and also acknowledged the peace efforts of the
Government, other organizations and individuals57.

The above resolutions were meant to account for the return to normalcy in Kwande.
However, the task was not an easy one as many people remained skeptical about some
of the resolutions especially that which called on all Kwande people in hide outs to
return home. Generally, these resolutions resulted to far-reaching positive impacts on
the lives of Kwande people. For example, the committee formed consequent upon
these resolutions campaigned for relief materials under the management of Professor
Uzah administered them to the victims of the crisis58. In the final analysis the Kwande
Sole Administrator Mr. Bem Tseen created a good avenue for peace to prevail. He is
said to have engaged the aggrieved youths in useful ventures. However, much peace
was achieved when Mr Tersugh Yachiga of ANPP was appointed the Care Taker
Chiarman thus satisfying the aspirations of the masses.

5.7

CONCLUSION
This chapter discussed some electoral violence experienced in Tivland since
the resurgence of democracy in 1999. It specifically discussed the 2002 electoral
violence in Tarka which arises as a result of the imposition of Hon. Baver Dzeremo of
the PDP against the popular candidate Hon. Sammuel Atsuku, this was a gravious
violation of the existing system of power shift accepted and practiced by the people
since Tarka LG was created in 1996. The chapter as well isolates some of the
underpinning issues of Kwande political violence of 2003/2004. On this basis factors
such as the developmental gap between the Ipusu cum Ichongo mega clans of

Kwande, Mr. Paul Unongo acceptability by the people of Kwande as a result of his
personality, and the failure of BSIEC to announce Hon. Tersur Yachiga of the ANPP
as the winner of 2004 Chiarmanship election have been elaborately discussed.
Furthermore, the chapter discussed the 2006 electoral violence in Gwer LG which
arises as a result of the imposition of Arch. Asema Achado as the PDP flag bearer of
the Gwer-East Constituency slot at the expense of Dr. Donald Ayargwer. In the final
analysis the chapter unveils the imposition of unpopular candidates by political
godfathers as a major factor for political violence in Tivland. The chapter also pointed
out some conflict resolution strategies adopted by the government in quelling
electoral violence, and why they failed. On this basis, it specifically questioned the
viability of the security agents as a result of their failure to dispense their
constitutional powers objectively. It also questioned the viability of both the Federal
and State Commissions of Inquiry in resolving electoral violence in Tivland. The
research therefore submits that, the government has so far proved ineffective in
resolving electoral violence in Tivland hence it has shown certain degree of interest
by always taking side with a party in conflict.

ENDNOTES
1

The Nigerian Standard of July 21, 1998, P.1.

A Handbook on Tarka Local Government Council during Hon. Mbaver Dzeremos

Administration, Oracle Business Ltd Makurdi, 2004, Pp.2-3.

Oral Interview with Mr. Philip Shiishi, 43 Years, on the 27/09/2011 in Tarka Local
Government Secretariat.

Wang, A. Ya Na Angbian as Basis for Political Stability in Nigeria: A Philosophical

Perspective in Benue Valley Journal of Humanities, Vol. 3 No.2, July-December
2000, P. 33.

Oral Interview with Emmanuel Vembe, Age 32 Years, Akpehe Makurdi, 2/10/2011.

Newsmate Magazine, 20th October 2002, Vol.1.No.6 ISSN 118-4354, P.45.

Newsmate Magazine P.45.

Newsmate MagazineP. 46.

The New Times Newspaper, 29th August-4th September 2002, Vol.12 No.34, P.1.

10

The Truth Newspaper, 31st August-6th September 2002, Vol.1. No. 02014, Pp.1-2.

11

Oral Interview with Mr. Iorvihi Ingyuran, Age 52 Years, Wannune Town,
17/09/2011.

12

Newsmate MagazineP.44

13

Oral Interview with Mr. Tivza Iorja, Age 66 Years, Wannune Town, 17/09/2011.

14

Newsmate MagazineP. 47.

15

The Truth NewspaperP. 2.

16

Oral Interview with Mr. Hwande Aza, Age 57 Years, Judges Quarters Makurdi,
17/09/2011.

17

Newsmate Magazine P.48.

18

Lyam, A. Kwande Crisis: A Community Conflict of many Interests in Gyuse, T.

(eds) et al, Conflicts in the Benue Valley, Benue State University Press Makurdi,
2006, P.42.

19

Lyam, A. Kwande Crisis P.44.

20

Lyam, A. Kwande Crisis P.45.

21

Amee, A. The History and Party Politics in Ikyurav-Ya, Uk Business World,

Makurdi, 2010, Pp.88-89.

22

Ahokegh, A. Communal Conflicts in Nigeria, 1960-2004: A Study of the Tiv

Experience, A Ph.D Thesis Submitted to the Department of History, Benue State
University Makurdi, 2008, P.173.

23

Ahokegh, A. Communal Conflicts P.173.

24

Power Newsletter, 15th June, 2004 Vol.1.No.7, P. 33.

25

Power NewsletterP.34.

26

Aza, B. The Aftermath of Kwande Political Crisis: Focus on Chairmanship Zoning,

Oracle Business Limited Makurdi, 2006, P.2.

27

Oral Interview with Mr. Terkura Pever, Age 48 Years, Adikpo Town, 8/11 2011.

28

Felix Adikpos Testimony in Ad-Hoc Committee Report P.5.

29

Felix Adikpos TestimonyP.6.

30

Felix Adikpos TestimonyP.7.

31

Oral Interview with Pa Agber Wua, Age 77, Adikpo Town, 3/12/2011.

32

Newsmate Magazine, 22nd November 2004, P.23.

33

Oral Interview with Mr. Ashemagema Iorapuu, Age 60 years, Adikpo Town,
3/12/2011.

34

Newsmate Magazine.P.15.

35

Newsmate MagazineP.16.

36

Oral Interview with Mr. Iorvihi Ingyuran, Age 52 Years, Wannune Town,
17/09/2011.

37

Oral Interview with Mr.Iorver Joseph, Age 30 Years, Kanshio Makurdi, 15/11/2011.

38

Newsmate MagazineP.19.

39

Oral Interview with Mr. Tervershima Tyohemba, Age 56, Aliade Town, 12/12/2011.

40

Utor, K. The Dynamics of Political Violence in Nigeria, Onaivi Printing and

Publishing, Nigeria Limited Makurdi 2006, Pp.21-22.

41

Enyi, E. Local Government and Rural Development in Nigeria: A Case of Local

Governments in Benue State, 1999-2007, A Ph.D Thesis Submitted in the
Department of Political Science, Benue State University Makurdi 2007, Pp.155-156.

42

Oral Interview with Mr. Chritopher Avi, Age 37 Years, Gwer L.G. Secretariate
Aliade, 16/11/2011.

43

Press Release of Gwer Unity Forum Aliade, Benue State of Nigeria, Published in The
Alternative Newspaper, December 31, 2006 Vol.5.No.16, P.3

44

Oral Interview with Tyowua Ashiga, Age 60, Aliade Town, 17/11/2011.

45

The Truth Newspaper, December 12, 2006 Maiden Edition, P.1.

46

Anifowose, R. Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba Experience,
Nok Publishers Enugu, 1982, P.6.

47

The Truth NewspaperP. 2.

48

Oral Interview with Mr.Iorver Joseph, Age 30 Years, Kanshio Makurdi, 15/11/2011.

49

The Alternative NewspaperP. 3.

50

Avav, T. et al, The Dream to Conquer, Onavi Press Makurdi 1992, Pp. 34-35.

51

Felix Adikpos Testimony in Ad-Hoc Committee Report P.5

52

Update Report on Political Crisis in Aliade Town, File No.GLG/S/PUB/53/4/428.

53

Gum, T. Kwande Crisis: Where the Senate Erred in Newsmate Newspaper of

November 22, 2004 P.20.

54

Gum, T. Kwande CrisisP.21.

55

The Quotation is derived from a dialogue between Senator Iyabode Anilsulowo and
The Journalist, Atsen Alura in Newsmate Newspaper, Vol.2. No.1, 2005, Pp.28-29.

56

Terzungwe, H. Political Violence and Its Impact on Kwande Local Government

Area of Benue State, 1960-2005, An M.A Dissertation Submitted to the Department
of History, Benue State University Makurdi, 2005, P.103.

57

Lyam, A. Kwande CrisisPp.54-56.

58

Appeal for Relief Materials to Assist the Victims of Kwande Crisis in Benue State of
Nigeria Being A Document of Kwande Relief Committee.

CHAPTER SIX
POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT
6.1

INTRODUCTION
According to a publication by Centre for Peace Initiative and Development
(CEPID), violence has negative definations and endless of derogatory terminologies
to affirm its activity and iniquity. It is an anti-social behavior that causes disorder, it is
uncivilized way of seeking for right and redress. It is a distructive expression of anger.
It is a physical use of strength or gadgets to inflict pains, agony and restlessness on
others1. Once there is violent conflict the impact is frightening and horrendous effects
enveloped the entire land and even its immediate neighbours. The rattle of guns, blitz
on hard earned magnificient buildings of opponents, cremation of lives that were shot
dead, the gnashing of teeth and fleeing away of people who have become refugees in
the neibouring towns and villages2. This chapter therefore navigates the repercussions
of electoral violence in Tivland from the economic, socio-political and cultural lences.

6.2

THE ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN

TIVLAND
Political violence has serious negative impact for meaningful development of
Tivland in this 21st century when nations of the world are clamoring for economic
development in the globalised system. First and foremost is the lost of human lives
that can never be replaced. Our investigations on death tolls from Gwer and Kwande
Local Government Areas have been shown on tables 1 and 2.

TABLE 1: LIST OF PEOPLE KILLED DURING THE KWANDE CRISES OF

2003/2004
S/N NAME

AGE

DATE KILLED

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Korinjo Ikyor
Igbakua Kusa
Msugh Fakaa
Dooshima Kaha
Dzege Aluka
Vashir Ate
Soja Hitara
Dooior Avia
Terfa Ujah
Agasha
Girma Shie
Mathew Chula
Terkimbi Iorhemen
Terdoo Apuu Igbudu
Ordue Igba
Terfa Ugbidye
Terver Tembega
Denen Saakwen

90
26
26
23
25
32
28
22
26
30
38
27
23
25
26
25
27
35

2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2003
2004
2004

19
20

Gwaza Bur
Iorja Haakaa

80
33

2004
2004

Source: Field Survey Report conducted on Kwande political violence in 2004 by A. Ahokegh, Communal
Conflicts in Nigeria 1960-2004: A Case of the Tiv Experience in fulfillment of his Ph.D thesis in the
Department of History, Benue State Universsity Makurdi.

TABLE 2: LIST OF PEOPLE KILLED DURING THE 2006 POLITICAL VIOLENCE

IN GWER LOCAL GOVERNMENT
S/N NAME
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Terkimbir Mban
Faga Abe
Aondofa Jubu
Ugah Ugoh
Terfa Adima
Theophilus Kar
Wilfred Achado
Iorhemba Chia

AGE

DATE KILLED

32
37
28
38
34
30
29
34

2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

Source: Updated Report on political crisis in Aliade Town, file No. GLG/S/PUB/53/4/428, Press Release by
Gwer Unity Forum, Aliade, Benue State of Nigeria Published in The Alternative Newspaper of
December 15, 2006 P.3

Even though these tables are not exhaustive because they have not given us
the total number of persons who died in these conflicts. However, they have shown
the death tolls of a certain class of people (the youths). This implies that the youths
are the executors of electoral violence as commonly seen else where in Nigeria. The
engagement of the youths in Kwande electoral violence and their resultant death for
example had repercussion on the economy of Kwande/Tivland at large. This is
because the youths constituted the most active segement of the working population.
Our investigation reveals that a tuber of yam which cost #50 in Adikpo market before
this crisis cost as high as #150 during the crisis and #200 immidiately after the crisis 3.
The high cost of a tuber of yam immediately after the crisis explains the failure of the
youths engaging on their farms. This brought untold hardship on the people as severe
food shortage set in; most families depended largely on their good neighbours in other
parts of Tiv society and Nigeria at large for food supply4. A house wife interviewed in
Adikpo market testifies that:

Firewood was the only available business alternative to me, because

with little money I got it from the rural women and resold in bits in the
town. So, with the little earnings from the firewood business I bought
small food such as gari for my househood 5( sic).
From the above quotation it is obvious that people were harmstung in meeting
their needs arising from the failure of agriculture. This means other needs such as
school fees and hospital bills which are regularly raised as part of deregulation and
commercialization becomes more difficult to meet and with this profound implication
for education and material life.

TABLE 3: PEOPLE WHOSE PROPERTIES WERE DESTROYED DURING THE

2002 POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN WANNUNE, TARKA LOCAL GOVERNMENT
S/N NAME

PROPERTY DESTROYED POLITICAL PARTY

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

E.T. Shima
Iyortyer Emmanuel
Atsuku Tsavbee
Gbilekaa Vembe
Orsongor Agoo
Yima Suemo
Iyorwakwagh Suemo
Baver Dzeremo
Bunde Mtom
Hon. Iongu Akighir
Iorvihi Igyuran
Akor Ku
Hon. Ashirga
Dzer Ikyegh
Akar T. Ashivor
Terngu Iyorja
Ioryem Labo
Mr. Mtswenem

House and a Car

Entire compound
Entire compound
Entire compound
Entire compound
Entire compound
Entire compound
Hotel
Entire compound
Entire compound
Entire compound
Entire compound
Entire compound
Entire compound
Entire compound
Entire compound
Entire compound
PDP Secretariat

UNPP
UNPP
UNPP
UNPP
UNPP
UNPP
UNPP
PDP
UNPP
UNPP
UNPP
PDP
PDP
PDP
PDP
PDP
PDP
PDP

19
20

Aposu Williams
Ayar Kyule

Entire compound
Entire compound

PDP
PDP

Source: Adopted and modified from the New Times Newspaper of August 29th September 4th 2002, Vol.12,
No.34.P.2

TABLE 4: PROPERTIES DESTROYED IN ALIADE TOWN IN THE 2006

ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN GWER LOCAL GOVERNMENT
S/N

NAME

PROPERTY DESTROYED

YEAR

1
2
3

4 bedroom flat
Entire Compound
Entire Compound

2006
2006
2006

4
5
6
7
8
9

Tion Kpoga
Ayila Juga
Lat.Capt. Anamba
Bya
Iorlaha Ullam
Mrs. Becky Sokpo
Swati
Mrs. Shiminenge
Govt. property
others

2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

10
11
12

HRH Ayila Juku

Late Ayua Num
Chief Gafara Adawa

Entire Compound
4 bedroom flat
4 bungalow and thatched huts
Beer parlor
Police pick-up van
Tables/benches belonging to night
food sellers.
Entire Palace
Entire Compound
Entire Compound

2006
2006
2006

Source: Updated Report on political crisis in Aliade Town, file No. GLG/S/PUB/53/4/428, Press Release of
Gwer Unity Forum, Aliade, Benue State of Nigeria Published in The Alternative Newspaper of
December 15, 2006 P.3

Tables 3 and 4 on the other hand give us skeletal information on property

destroyed from Tarka and Gwer Local Government Areas within a few days of
electoral violence. Property targeted here were mostly houses arising from the fact
that they were accessible and not moveable by their owners. The destruction target
was strictly from people who were active in partisan politics as indicated on table 3.
In the final analysis this brought about refugees problem to the people in their own
home land who survived on the mercy of their kin and kith in neibouring villages.

TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED COST OF DESTRUCTION DURING THE

KWANDE CRISES OF 2003/2004
S/N ITEM
QTY
ESTIMATED COST (#)
1
2
3

Total number of families directly

affected.
Total number of people directly
affected
Houses destroyed
(i)Flats
(ii)Bungalows
(iii)Hotels
(iv)Thatched Houses

1140
13680
88
170
2
2201

440,000,000.00
425,000,000.00
150,000,000.00
55,0250,000.00
11,075,000.00
7,980,000.00
17,100,000.00
15,000,000.00
10,000,000.00
2,850,000.00
17,720,000.00
9,690,000.00
50,000.00
2,400,000.00
441,000.00
3,500,000.00
11,970,000.00
80,000.00
350,000.00

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Mattresses
Kitchen Utensils
Furnitures
Arts, Crafts and Antiquities
Petrol filling stations
Farm implements
Food stuffs
Livestocks
Generator
Motorcycles
Bicycles
Motor Cars
Clothing
Sewing Machines
Grinding Machines

2215
485
943

19
20

Radios
Cash
TOTAL

20
-

1
1115
965
965
1
40
63
7
985
10
5

30,000.00
#1.156,826,000.00

Source: Kwande Relief Committee, Appeal for Relief Materials to assist the victims of Kwande Crisis in
Benue State of Nigeria, 2005 Pp.2-3

Finally, table 5 on its part quantified the estimated cost of destruction of the
material property in Kwande violence accumulating to over one billion naira, aside
millions of naira wasted on arms deal amidst the growing pauperization of the masses.
This is strongly regrettable on the basis of infrastructural development lacking in this
part of the country.

6.3 THE POLITICAL IMPLICATION OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN TIVLAND

The impacts of political violence on Tivland are diverse. To begin with, they
have spates numerous communal conflicts thereby intensifying and aggravating
political misunderstanding between various Tiv clans. There is a popular adage that in
politics there is no permanent enemy but permanent interest, this adage fails to
prove it substance as far as Tiv politics is concern. There is always permanent enmity
and suspicion that creates political confusion amongst groups.
Another serious political impact of electoral violence on Tivland could be seen
from the lenses of apathy of the Tiv electorate against the justifiable basis that at the
end of the process violence would erupt and their chosen leaders be completely
sidelined as seen in case of Kwande where Mr. Hanior Henda was appointed as the
Sole Administrator from 2004-2005, Mr. Bem Tseen from 2005-2006 while Mr.
Tersur Yachiga presided over the affairs of the Local Government from 2006-20076.
From another dimension, it could be seen that those who actively participated in Tiv
politics become subject of attack during political violence. As a matter of fact,
experience has discouraged a lot of people for fear of unforeseen circumstance. For
instance, in Tarka political violence Adam Kende Plaza belonging to Hon. Baver
Dzeremo was completely razed to ashes as pointed out on table 37. Similarly, in
Kwande the Juladaco Hotels belonging to Mr. Paul Unongo was set ablaze8, while
most of the houses destroyed in these violence belongs to the people that had a stalk
in one political party or the other as shown on tables 3, 4 and 5. This creates fear in
the minds of most people to join politics.
Another political impact of electoral violence in Tivland lies on the bane of
women in active politics arising from their light hearts imbued in them by nature. This
is because they are always dread of being attacked and cannot risk anyones life for

election victory which is a simple game in Nigerian politics. This again explains why
Tiv women show smugness in active politics, they prefer to remain where they are
and maintain the status quo than to be engulfed with quandary and violence in the
administering of making change.
Other general impacts of political violence experienced in Tivland and Nigeria
at large have been summarized by O. Ochefu thus9:
(i)

Entrenchment of weak and poor political leadership

(ii)

Creation of real and imaginary political enemies

(iii)

Divergence of political viewpoints leading to loss of political

advantages

(iv)

Disruption of genuine and needed political mediocrity

(v)

Dictatorship by the victor

(vi)

And elimination of democratic norms and fundamental rights of the

citizenry.

6.4 THE SOCIO-CULTURAL IMPACT OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN TIVLAND

Electoral violence has groomed a lot of jobless youths in Tivland as militia.
Those groomed as militia are exposed to the use of arms and set up their courts and
become their own judges and the jury at the same time. Apart from being exposed to
the use of arms, the jobless youths are also exposed to charms believed to give them
body protection or neutralize the effects of weapons. Some of those charms
administered on the youths during political violence are Gberkpugh which is a
medicine believed to give protection against all kinds of weapons such as gunshots,
metal or iron attacks, arrows, spears, machete etc. they are also exposed to Bende
(charm belt) which is worn around the waist. Bende users believe that it has the
potency to assist one disappear from sight when trapped in war or by an enemy.

Furthermore, the youths are exposed to Dufu (invisible charm) which serves similar
purposes like Bende. It is believed by its users to assist one metamorphose into a
lower creature like a spider or a wasp and escape capture when trapped10.
Whether these charms are effective or not, it does not concern us here. What
we are trying to do is to capture the picture which this kind of exposure has rendered
the youths in Tivland. To begin with, it has given the youths who believe the charms
unnecessary confidence and therefore endanger their lives in political violence. The
encounter between the youths and soldiers on the 19th of April 2003 at Kwande when
15 youths were left dead is a practical example of this11. Our investigations into
Kwande and Tarka also reveals that after political violence, the youths who become
militia indulge in criminal acts such as rape, stealing, proliferation of small arms and
weapons as well as thuggery. A reflection of the activities of political thuggery in
Tarka Local Government after the violence is a good demonstration of this kind. Oral
interview with informants established that Hon. Terna Ashiga was thuggry master
planner or schemer while Mr. Chion Tyough was their gang leader and reported each
bit of their activity to Hon. Terna Ashiga. Members in this group were Aondoakura
Iorja (pilot driver), Terngu Tsugh, Paapa Semaka, Igbadoo Abuwa, Hilehungu
Vembe, Azenda Nyion and Terseer Kidem causes terror for peaceful co-existence of
Tarka people and Tivland at large12. Some of the people who were killed included
Adzua Anyor Isholibo, Richard Adaa, Aondofa Nyiyongo, Iorvihishima Chia,
Antyerev Alfred, while Moses Iorlu took refuge in Makurdi, Umburga Gyakpo was
forced to decamp to PDP to save his life but also received serious beating for late
coming to the mainstream party while Simon Shange fled to Abuja. This makes
democracy in essence meaningless as observed by Alexis De Tocqueville that the
mere execution of electoral proceedings does not make a democracy, without the

concomitant liberal freedoms and human rights to accompany them, the idea of
democracy becomes useless (emphasis added)13.
Another fundamental impact of electoral violence in Tivland is the grave
deterioration of respect and honor for Tiv traditional rulers in recent times. Here again
a lot of examples present themselves for elaborate analysis. Worthy of mentioning is
the Kwande crises of 2003/2004 which recorded the destruction of the Ter Kwande
palace, his Royal Highness (HRH) Chief James Adzakpe both at Adikpo and JatoAka, while the palace of the Clan Head of Kumakwagh Chief Ingyuran Kperanshe at
Jato-Aka also was destroyed14. In Gwer, the palace of Chief Gafara Adawa the
District Head of Mbakyine was totally put to ashes. This implies that, traditional
institutions have completely lost its value thereby further aggravating lawlessness in
Tivland. The researcher gathers that after the 2011 general elections the Tor Tiv,
HRH Dr. Alfred Akawe Torkura became a subject of abuse in political songs. The
extent which political violence has down degraded the Tiv traditional institution calls
for urgent attention to reverse this trend otherwise the institution would not properly
serve as the custodian of Tiv values and an arbiter in conflict situations.
Apart from abuses on the Tiv traditional institution and elders, family
relationships has been strained to grave extent that there is no peaceful and
harmonious co-existence between some fathers and their sons, some husbands and
their wives and some father-in-laws and their son-in-laws etc. our investigation on
Kwande reveals that Mr. Kuatsea Ubera of ANPP is said to have taken his daughter
away from Mr. Atser Anbya of the Nzaav Kindred, Yaav Ward in Turan. Some
women on the other hand separated with their husbands and married new ones; the
case of Hembadoon Aso in Tse Aso of Yaav Ward is a practical example of this. She
is said to have taken refuge in her mothers place in Shitile where she eventually

married another man15. As of the time of this research work, the case was still pending
in law court.

6.5

THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN

IN TIVLAND
Women and children are another vulnerable segment of the Tiv society that
suffers so much during electoral violence. Women for instance suffers psychological
trauma arising from gun shots, rape, torture, death of their childrens and husbands,
relatives, and other sorts of humiliations. Good instances of rape were recorded during
Kwande protracted violence. In an article titled: Kwande Militia Attack Adikpo
Again, Rape Female Youth Corps vividly captures the picture of how four female
corps members were raped at Adikpo Town by militia groups in a broad day light 16.
In a similar vein, a house wife of Mbakor origin was forced to have illicit sexual intercourse with an insane man popularly known as Iorngurun in Jato Aka17. For fear of
shame, she flees to her fathers house and even after the violence refused to come
back. In this era of HIV/AIDS pandemic, the researcher imagines the total number of
women that might have contacted this deadly virus emanating from rape as a result of
electoral violence in Tivland.18 The rampart instance of rape arising from political
violence in Tivland undermines the 1979 Protection Rights adopted by the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discriminations against
Women19. Sadly enough, the violation of women rights in times of political violence
in Tivland has no consequences for the perpetrators.
Furthermore, because of high death tolls of adult males in Tivland during
violence, a sizeable proportion of women are widowed or bereaved of male
breadwinners and while having to endure the loneliness and vulnerability of
separation, the loss of male support and displacement often entails finding new

sources of livelihood in order to cope with the new demands placed upon them. Their
tensions and social hardships are thus exacerbated leading to long term deprivations20.
Children on the other hand are deprived of going to school as a result of political
violence. Reflecting on the Kwande crises, Utor laments that:
this caused the final year students who were to sit for WASC or
NECO Examinations abandoning these examinations. One can only
imagine the fate of these students, whose hopes and aspirations of
gaining admission into tertiary institutions come October this year,
automatically fizzle out. Will those students be compensated? If the
answer is yes, the next question is in what way? And by whom? (Sic)
21
.
Finally, children also suffer from malnutrition, food shortage and inadequate
access to medical facilities usually created by conflict situation; loss of parents, home
and family income implies relocating to live with relations or even to fend for
themselves. This in the final analysis violates Article 5 of the African Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child and Article 6 of the Childs Rights Convention22.

6.6

CONCLUSION
This chapter appraises the impact of electoral violence on the Tiv people of
Benue State. In doing so it demonstrated how energetic youths engage in destruction
of the existing scanty insfrastructure in this part of the country. In line with this
argument attempt has been made proving the extent which some Tiv people shown
apathy in partisan politics in recent times. This line of reasoning arises from the
obvious fact that most victims of electoral violence in Tivland are active participants
in politics while in the final analysis there is no justification for votes cast.
Furthermore, the work strongly blames the menace of the militia group in Tivland on
the selfish altitude of our politicians and demonstrated the extent to which it has
brought insecurity in contemporary Tiv society. Moreso, it also condemns Tiv

traditional rulers engaging in active politics to advert further degradation of our

traditional values on the basis that traditional institution could have serve as an arbiter
in times of violence. Finally, it pointed out the extent which electoral violence
impacted negatively on women and children who are the most vulnerable segment of
the society thereby questioning the substance of democratic governance in Nigeria.

ENDNOTES
1

Trainning Manual Conflict Management: Electoral Conflict and Violence

Management, Centre For Peace Initiative and Development (CEPID) Jos, 2003,
P.10.

Suleman, J. Ebiras: A People At War With Itself in National Image, August 2005,
Pp.15-16.

Oral Interview with Kwasehemba Igbawua, Age 45 Year, Adikpo Town, 8/11/2011.

Oral Interview with Orshi Bemgba, Age 48 Years, Jato-Aka Town, 9/11/2011.

Oral Interview with Nyihemba Aker, Age 52 Years, Jato-Aka Town, 9/11/2011.

Ukende, B. The Aftermath of Kwande Crisis: Focus on Chairmanship Zoning, Oracle

Business Limited Makurdi, 2006, P.8.

Amee, A. The History and Party Politics in Ikyurav-Ya, Uk Business World Makurdi,
2010, Pp.88-89.

The New Times Newspaper, 29th August-4th September 2002, Vol.12 No.34, P.1.

Ochefu, O. The Political Impact of Communal Crisis in Idomaland in Bur, A. et al,

(eds), Communal Relations Conflicts and Crisis Management Strategies, Aboki
Publishers Makurdi, 2002, P.63.

10

Shishima, S. The Medicine Man and Communal Conflicts in Akinwunmi, O. et al,

(eds), Inter Group Relations in Nigeria During the 19th and 20th Centuries, Aboki
Publishers Makurdi, 2006, Pp.666-667.

11

Adikpo, J.K. Testimony in Ad-Hoc Committee Report.

12

Oral Interview with Vember Emanuel, Age 32 Years, Akpehe Makurdi, 2/10/2011.

13

De Tocqueville, A. Democracy in America, New York, Signet, 2001, P.72.

14

Haanongon, T. Political Violence and its Impact on Kwande Local Government Area
of Benue State, 1960-2005, M. A Dissertation submitted in the Department of
History, Benue State University Makurdi, 2008, P.100.

15

Haanongon, T. Political Violence and its Impact on P. 101.

16

The Alternative of June 4-10, 2004, Vol.3. No.5. P. 1.

17

Haanongon, T. Political Violence and its Impact on P. 101.

18

Olabisi, A. and Fabusoro, E. Effects of Community-Based Care for People Living

with Hiv/Aids on the Agricultural Livelihood of the Family Members in Benue State,
Nigeria in Agriculture Journal 5(5) 2010, P.278.

19

Middle Belt, Not Killing Belt! The History, Dynamics and Political Dimensions of
Ethno-Religious Conflicts in the Middle Belt, Published by ActionAid Nigeria, with
the support of DFID, 2008, P.45.

20

Middle Belt, Not Killing Belt! The HistoryP. 48.

21

Utor, J. The Dynamics of Political Violence in Nigeria, Onaivi Printing and

Publishing Nig. Ltd Makurdi, 2006, P. 20.

22

Utor, J. The Dynamics of PoliticalP.21.

CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study is an investigation, presentation as well as documentation of
rampart electoral violence that has been threatening the corporate and harmonious
peaceful existence of Tivland since 1979. In analyzing these conflicts from theoretical
bases, the Frustration-Aggression and the Systemic theses have been closely
examined. The central premise of the Frustration-Aggression thesis is that; aggression
is always the result of frustration. This thesis faced constructive criticism especially
from psychologist, against this backdrop the researcher complement it with Systemic
hypothesis in order to avoid ambiguity. Systemic hypothesis is a modernization theory
that classifies nations into modern societies, traditional societies and modernizing
ones. It argues that modernity brings stability while modernization brings instability.
From this standpoint, the researcher has been able to explain the rationale behind
incessant electoral violence in Tivland since 1979.
In order to establish good historical bases for analyses, the research discussed
the Nande Nande and the Atemityou turbulent violence of 1960 and 1964. The Nande
Nande of 1960 follow immediately after 1959 general election when the people could
any longer endure the oppressive administrative policies of the ruling NPC against the
backdrop of supporting the UMBC/AG alliance. After this violence the government
could not address the contradictions that metamorphosed into blunt violence resulted
to Atemityou of 1964. The study is of the opinion that these turbulent violence
indoctrinated politics of violence in Tivland as seen shortly in 1979 and 1983 abusive
and violent campaigns in Tivland.

The work also establishes that the much expected democratic restoration of
1999 to 2011 is even worse when compared with 1979 and 1983 democracy. This is
because the archaic features which undermined the true virtues of democracy
resurfaced on rather geometric rate. For example, there was increase in the rate of
arson, hijacking of election materials, thuggery, falsification of election figures,
politics of god fatherism and imposition of candidates by god fathers on the
electorates. The vehement resistance of these always results to violence as epitomized
in case of Kwande, Tarka and Gwer local government areas.
The work establishes the rationale and dynamics of the 2002 electoral violence
in Tarka LG. it argues that Hon. Baver Dzeremo of the PDP was imposed on the
people of Tarka during his second tenure by the State Government against the existing
principle of power shift between Mbalahan and Mbachoughul basis of Ya Na
Angbian. To achieve this selfish political calculation, the State Government explores
the necessary avenue to frustrate Mr. Samuel Atsuku who attracted the affection of
Tarka people. This notwithstanding, Mr. Samuel Atsuku deflected to the newly
formed UNPP with his supporters such as Mr. Iorvihi Ingyuran who openly criticizes
the Governor and other PDP stalwarts in Tarka. Therefore the attack of Mr. Iorvihi
Ingyuran by PDP thugs served as a springboard for inevitability of brunt violence in
Tarka. Despite this upheaval Hon. Baver Dzeremo did his second tenure as the
Executive Chairman of Tarka Local Government and his political career was not even
truncated. Before he died he was a member of the Benue State House of Assembly
representing Tarka/Gboko Constituency.
Similarly, the 2006 electoral violence in Gwer L.G. was anchor on the
imposition of Arch. Asema Achado on the people of Gwer-East State Constituency.
From the available evidence, Dr. Donald Ayargwer won the affection of his people

and was considered as a rightful candidate for the PDP slot. It should be noted that,
Arch. Asema Achado was said to have been chosen by the State Government together
with Ter Gwer HRH Chief Dominic Akpe and Tyoor Aliade/Kbabar Chief John
Munde and Chief Tyokula Gbor. The Government used its fiat powers to turn the
PDP primary election result won by Dr. Donald Ayargwer in favour of Arch. Asema
Achado. This was made public on Radio Benue News of 8.00 PM thus stirring up
serious demonstration and subsequent brunt violence by the youths in Aliade Town.
However, the police were quickly deployed to quell the situation but were directed by
the Assistant Inspector-General of Police to shot-at-sight which resulted to the death
of six youths and this rather escalated the violence.
The work also discussed the 2003/2004 electoral violence in Kwande LG.
Here problem started in 1999 when Hon. Dzaka of the PDP won the Chairmanship
election at the expense of the popular candidate Hon. Imoter Nungwa. Following this
bitter experience, ANPP stalwarts in Kwande mounted strong opposition against the
PDP led Government thus creating insecurity in the area. Notwithstanding this tense
atmosphere, Mr. Adzua Ashongo of the PDP was alleged to have hijacked the 2003
gubernatorial electoral materials to his home town in Shangev-Ya, ANPP youths who
wanted to unseat Governor George Akume blocked the Road leading to Shangev-Ya
in search of the stolen electoral materials. It was alleged that, Mr. Adzua Ashongo
communicated this to Government House in Makurdi and soldiers arrived Adikpo in
two 18 seats buses. Instead of quelling the situation, the soldiers adopted shot-at-sight
approach which resulted to the death of fifteen youths thus further escalating the
violence.
When the 2004 Chairmanship election come, ANPP refused to be cheated
again and therefore worked in favour of Mr. Tersur Yachiga. On this basis, BSIEC

was said to have directed by Governor Akume to annul the result, while ANPP
Chairmanship elect challenged this decision and instituted a case at the Adikpo High
Court comparing BSIEC to declare him the winner. However, Justice Kpam Baaki
struck out the petition on the basis of incompetence jurisdiction. This decision stirred
violent conflict which affected the entire Kwande local government and Tivland at
large.
The work noted that, electoral violence has done a lot of harm to the
economic, socio-cultural and political spheres of Tiv society as well as contributed to
the marginalization of women in politics. The work also observed some pitfalls in the
existing mechanism of conflict resolution strategy especially, the roles played by
security agents in resolving violence in Kwande, Tarka and Gwer L.G.A. of Benue
State.
The study has confirmed that most of the electoral violence in Tivland has
been caused by godfathers who imposed their godsons against the choices of the
masses. Arising from the fact that godfathers are powerful and influential citizens,
they explore all necessary avenues to impose their godsons. For instance, they
connived with the electoral officials, security agents and their thugs to intimidate
voters, hoard election materials including ballot papers and result sheets, divert
election materials especially ballot papers and result sheets to their private homes as
well as deliberately refuse to provide adequate voting materials to pooling stations. In
the final analysis, they frustrate any aggrieved candidate who seeks redress in the
election petition tribunal. This implies that godfathers have the judicial system in their
own hands as rightly observed by Gboyega that, Political godfathers are by design
positioned above the laws of the land including the constitution. They and their thugs

can involve arms without interference; they are entitled to police escorts and are
immune to the crime of abduction, harassment and maiming.

7.2

RECOMMENDATIONS
In the context of the above, we make the following recommendations as a way
out of this posh. Firstly, there is every need to discourage politics of godfatherism in
Tivland and Nigeria at large. Here, the academia has a crucial role to play. The 21 st
century academia cannot shy away from this noble responsibility. They should reorientate godfathers and godsons on the grave consequences of this type of politics.
The academia should let godsons understand their leadership responsibilities of
bringing development to the grassroots rather than compensating godfathers in
monetary terms. They should be orientated to understand that godfathers have no
concern for the general interest of the people in their political strategies. This explains
why there is lack of social amenities such as adequate medical facilities, rural
electricity, water supply, good roads among other things. The academia should do this
through organizing conferences, seminars, public lectures and active participation in
politics. Political godfathers as well should be given a re-orientation on the
conception of elders as practiced by the traditional Tiv political system where because
of sensibility, fairness and impartiality in the discharge of their duties, their views
were scarcely contested regarding leadership recruitment. With this development,
politics could no longer be considered as a means to an end. The commercialization of
electoral offices would become a thing of the past and assassination of aspirants to
pave way for the victory of godsons would be discouraged. There would be a
community sense of interest where collectivity and unity of purpose would be upheld
against individualism and selfishness in the political system of Tivland and Nigeria at
large.

Secondly, there is need for proper institutionalization of democracy in Nigeria.

This has to begin with over-hauling the entire electoral process to achieve free and
fair elections. The work has identified frustration of the electorate through rigging,
conniving with electoral body/officials, hoarding electoral materials, falsification of
figures. INEC has done their best so far as 2011 general elections is concern. It has
introduced the computerization of the voters registration exercise through the
Electoral Data Captures Machines and documentation of the electoral process with the
current information technology. INEC has also customized ballot papers according to
constituencies to minimize ballot paper stuffing and also introduced a robust
communication system to fasten the declaration of election result linking 776 LGAs
to 36 States and Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Furthermore, INEC has introduced
political finance mechanism to reduce political campaign expenditure. This is aimed
at stopping wealthy politicians from hijacking and dictating the affairs of their
political parties. However, this is not enough to achieve free and fair election,
Professor Attahiru Jaga, his team and the entire INEC staffs despite their efforts may
not succeed without our contribution. It is therefore the collective responsibility of all
Nigerians. Furthermore, to minimize rigging in future elections, INEC needs to
introduce electronic voting system as is practiced in other advanced parts of the
world. This major would be better achieved when electoral laws are enforced against
the present situation where electoral culprits go scot free. New standards of behavior
should be set for all members of the security services, including an end to impunity
and institutional cover-up. This could be possible if the National Assembly bold to
make changes on existing statutes. The government should also provide the security
sector officials with regular training in democratic values, while the civil society

should develop the capacity to monitor effectively the security agencies and their
operations.
Thirdly, the youths and students as vanguards of the society have a bigger
challenge in election process. They should assist and contribute to the nations noble
cause and should stop aiding and abetting thuggery, hijacking ballot boxes,
kidnapping electoral staffs as well as killing innocent electorates. This could certainly
be achieved if the youths are properly empowered. This economic empowerment
could take place in various forms like granting of soft loans to the unemployed
youths, engaging them in skills acquisition programmes etc. in this case tension would
be reduced hence a reduction in electoral violence. When the youths are economically
empowered and are self employed, they would not be ready tools by power hungry
politicians who use them for political purposes and dump them soon after. In addition,
they would not be ready tools for militia groups during conflicts; afterall there is an
adage that says an idle mind is the devils workshop.
Fourthly, all hands must be on deck to stamp out corruption that has
contributed to the failure of democracy. Indeed, it is the greatest threat to national
development because of the glaring dimensions it has assumed. It is found in terms of
electoral fraud, financial embezzlement, untruthfulness, betrayer of trust or
confidence, disregard for the principles of rule of law as well as biased nature of the
judicial system where electoral tribunals that are saddle with the responsibility of
adjudicating on electoral matters compromise for money thereby upholding
technicalities at the expenses of judicial substance. This in essence has made the
primary function of the law as the last resort of a common man a myth rather than a
reality. The stamping out of corruption in Nigeria must start at the point of good
leadership: one that is willing to destroy the existing structures of corruption and

injecting a new spirit into the followership. Such spirit of ethical re-orientation would
create enduring positive attitudes as a culture, and like America, make Nigeria great
too. When the new portrait of Nigeria as described above is achieved, her emergent
responsible citizens would definitely see no need to engage in electoral violence
which in many cases is simply ways of expressing accumulated bitterness resulting
from the poor socio-economic and political situation.
Fithly, the liberation, collaborative and re-orientation role of the Civil Society
Groups (CSGs) could also assist in repositioning democracy in Tivland and Nigeria at
large. By Civil Society Groups we mean the Registered Charities, Development NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs), Community Based Organisations (CBOs),
Women Based Organisations (WBOs), Faith Based Organisations (FBOs),
Professional Associations, Trade Unions, Self-Help Groups, Social Movements,
Business Associations, Coalitions and Advocacy Groups. The Civil Society Groups
have been struggling for the promotion of the welfare of their individual members and
the defense of the national issues of development. The Civil Society Groups need to
play an important role in ensuring free, fair and credible election if democracy needs
to be strengthened. Strengthening democracy means among other things; securing
adherence to those principles embodied in the concept of democracy, securing
normative and institutional changes within the system in order to promote democratic
principles and building a vibrant civil society group. It is the various organs of civil
society along with other democratic institutions that would hold those who govern in
check. The lack of a civil society has made democracy vulnerable in the hands of
manipulative power elite be it a military regime or an elected civilian class. The
implication of this statement is that there is a need to have a Civil Society that would

be able to mobilize the people so as to increase their level of awareness of democracy.

It is this Civil Society that would enable the creation of a new political culture.
Finally, the role of the stalkholder in managing electoral violence in Tivland
cannot be overemphasis. Our stalkholders should stop looking at politics as an
enterprise but see it as a modernize way of selecting good leaders. As fathers of our
generation they should show moral values worthy to emulate by younger generation.
Instead of instigating violence they should engage in dialogue and apply the principle
of ya na angbian whenever there is clash of interest between political contestants.
Furthermore, our traditional rulers as well have a role to play in uplifting our fragile
democracy. As they are epitome of our culture and tradition, there is every need for
them to be completely non-partisan so that their voices would be respected whenever
there is misunderstanding arising from electoral process. If all these suggestions are
followed, we envisage a better and prosperous Tiv society, a society which would not
be left behind in the progressive march of humanity in this 21st century.

7.3

CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE
This dissertation which is on a history of post-election violence in Tivland
since 1979 is intended to contribute to the already existing knowledge on the subject
in Nigeria in the following ways:
1.

The work unveils that the main problem of electoral violence in Tivland
anchores on

the imposition of unpopular candidates on the electorates by

political godfathers.
2.

The work also make a case that electoral violence are greatly influence by the
quality of leadership at the time, be it in Tivland or Nigeria.

3.

The research pointed out that the high level of unemployed youths in Tivland
paved way to be easily used by politicians to perpetuate electoral violence.

4.

The work has brought to knowledge that security agents who have the
constitutional responsibility of maintaining peace and stability when political
violence erupts rather aid and abeit it by taking side with a party in conflict.

5.

The work has brought to fore that electoral violence has threatened peace,
stability and development of Tivland.

6.

Finally, the work has shown that there are lapses in the electoral process in
Nigeria. Elections are usually rigged and this gives room for conflict
enterprenuers to paralled gangster outfits which execute conflict.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
(A) PRIMARY SOURCES
(i)

ORAL INTERVIEWS AND PARTICULARS OF INFORMANTS.

S/N

NAME

AGE

OCCUPATION

PLACE

DATE

Asemaguma I.

60

Politician

Adikpo

3/12/2011

Avi C.

37

Civil Servant

Aliade

16/11/2011

Atule N.

39

Farmer

Adikpo

4/12/2011

Aker N.

52

Farmer

Jato-Aka

9/11/2011

Bengba O.

48

Driver

Jato-Aka

9/11/2011

Dzer N.

36

Farmer

Ikogen

13/04/2012

Hwande A.

57

Politician

Makurdi

17/09/2011

Igbawua K.

45

Farmer

Adikpo

8/11/2011

Iortim T.

36

Farmer

Aliade

16/11/2011

10

Iorja T.

66

Politician

Wannune

17/09/2011

11

Ingyuran I.

55

politician

Wannune

17/09/2011

12

Iorver J.

30

Student

Makurdi

15/11/2011

13

Kende M.

42

Trader

Adikpo

4/12/2011

14

Pa Agber W.

77

Pensioner

Adikpo

3/12/2011

15

Pever T.

48

Trader

Adikpo

8/11/2011

16

Shiishi P.

42

Civil Servant

Wannune

27/09/2011

17

Tyohemba T.

56

Farmer

Aliade

12/12/2011

18

Tyodue M.

55

Trader

Wannune

27/09/11

19

Tyodue I.

60

Farmer

Wannune

27/09/2011

(ii)

20

Tyokula A.

67

Farmer

Aliade

13/11/2011

21

Tyokula T.

37

Farmer

Aliade

13/11/2011

22

Tyowua A.

50

Farmer

Aliade

17/11/2011

23

Vembe E.

32

Banker

Makurdi

2/10/2011

24

Wuam A.

46

Politician

Aliade

19/01/2012

25

Wuaor J.

19

Student

Ikogen

13/04/2012

26

Wuaor M.

22

Student

Ikogen

13/04/2012

27

Yisa T.

31

Student

Ikogen

13/04/2012

NATIONAL ACHIVES KADUNA (NAK)

MAKPROF/2/6/0/PTL/5,

Greatbatchl, B Letter NO. PM 142/301, 1960

NAK/MAK/PROF/1983

Makurdi Census, 1932

NAK/MAK/PROF/1846

Railway Labour Camp, Benue Province, 1932

MAK/PROF/26/158

Tiv Studies, Bohannan Expedition, 1949

MAK/PROF/2/60/PLT/5

Kpum, et al, Letter Written to the Northern Nigerian Government

against Dent, 1960

(B)

SECONDARY SOURCES

(i)

PUBLISHED BOOKS

Abeghe, T. Tiv and Tiv Riots, Jos Plateau Publishing Company, 1965.
Abeghe, T. Tiv Riots and the Aftermaths, Oracle Business Limited Makurdi, 2005.
Anifowose, R. Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba Experience, Nok
Publishers Enugu, 1982.
Amee, A. The History and Party Politics in Ikyurav-Ya, UK Business World Makurdi, 2010.

Aza, B. The Aftermath of Kwande Political Crisis: Focus on Chairmanship Zoning, Oracle
Business Limited Makurdi, 2006.
Akinwumi, O. Crises and Conflicts in Nigeria A Political History Since 1960, Munster
Germany 2004.
Avav, T. et al, The Dream to Conquer, Onavi Press Makurdi, 1992.
Bienem, H. Violence and Social Changes: A Review of Current Literature, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1968.
Danchev, A. and Halverson, T. International Perspectives on the Yugoslavia Conflict,
London, Macmillan, 1960.
Downes, R. Tiv Religion, University Press, Ibadan, 1971.
Eugene, R. The Sons of Tiv, Bakar, Michigan 1969.
Gurr, T. Why Men Rebel, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
Gunderson, N. et al, Organizational Survey of the Tiv Native Authority, Zaria 1964.
Hembe, G. J. S. Tarka, The Dilemma of Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Aboki Publishers
Makurdi, 2003.
Isiche, I. A History of Nigeria, London: Longman.
Jibo, M. Tiv Politics Since 1959, Mandate International, Katsina-Ala, 1993. Longman.
Jibo, M. Chieftaincy and Politics: The Tor-Tiv in Politics and Administration of Tivland,
Frankfurt Main: Peter Lay JDPC 2003.
Dictionary of Contemporary English, 1978:1226.
Kukah, M. Democracy and Civil Society in Nigeria, Spectrum Books Limited Ibadan, 1999.
Makar, T. The History of Political Change among the Tiv In the 19th and 20th Centuries,
Enugu Fourth Dimension, 1994.

Middle Belt, Not Killing Belt! The History, Dynamics and Political Dimensions of EthnoReligious Conflicts in the Middle Belt, Published by ActionAid Nigeria, with the
support of DFID, 2008.
Nnoli, O. Introduction to Politics, Revised Second Edition, Pan African Centre for Research
on Peace and Conflict Resolution Enugu.
Ogenyi, E. The Idoma in Politics, Brains Books Makurdi, 2009.
Ojiaka, J. Nigeria: Yesterday, Today and ? African Educational Publishers Nig. Ltd
Onitsha 1981.
Olayemi, A. Cases of Conflicts in Nigeria: A Political History since 1960, New Brunswick:
Transaction.
Otite, O. Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation,
Spectrum Books, Ibadan, 1999.
Paden, J. Ahmadu Bello: Sardauna of Sokoto, Zaria: Hudaluda Publishers, 1986.
Potholm, C. The Theory and Practice of African Politics, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1979.
Shagaya, J.

Governance in Nigeria: The IBB Era An Insiders View, View Point

Communications Ltd, Jos 2000.

Shija, T. et al (eds.), Paul Unongu the Intelligentsia and the Politics of Development, Aboki
Publishers Makurdi, 2010.
The Revised Standard Version Bible, Great Britain, Collins Clear-Type Press.
Tilley, C. From Mobilization to Revolution, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley
Publishers Co. 1978.
Tocqueville, A. Democracy in America, New York, Signet, 2001.
Ukende, B. The Aftermath of Kwande Crisis: Focus on Chairmanship Zoning, Oracle
Business Limited Makurdi, 2006.

Ukpoju, J. Benue Politics and the Idoma Question 1968-1993, Aboki Publishers Makurdi,
2002.
Utov, C. The Underdevelopment of Tivland through Land Disputes and Communal Clashes,
Calabar: Rapid Educational Publishers 1995.
Utor, J. The Dynamics of Political Violence in Nigeria, Onaivi Printing and Publishing Nig.
Ltd Makurdi, 2006.
Uza, D. Animal Resources Potential in Benue State Land of Potentials: A compendium,
Calabar Rapid Educational, 1995.
Webber, M. The Methodology of the Social Sciences, Glencoe, the Free Press, 1969.
Yates, A. Frustration and Conflict, (London Methuen, 1962) P.192.

(ii)

PUBLISHED ARTICLES

Apenda, A. Inter-Group Marriage and its Implications for Tiv Culture, in O. Akinwunmi et
al (eds), Inter-Group Relations in Nigeria during the 19th and 20th Centuries, Aboki
Publishers Makurdi, 2006.
Adeniji, O. African Political, Military and Economic Affairs in their Relationship to
Security, Disarmament and Confidence Building in Africa, New York: UN
Secretariat, 1991.
Akande, T. Confidence Building Mechanism for Crisis Management in C. Garuba,
Capacity BuildingPp.91-104.
Amin, S. The Issue of Democracy in the Contemporary Third World in Ulf Himestand et
al (eds), African Perspectives on Development, E.A.E.P. Nairobi, 1994.
Bur, A. Communal Crises and its Impact on Community Development in A. Bur, (eds),
Communal Relations and Crisis Management, Aboki Publishers Makurdi, 2002.

Braimah, A. Culture and Tradition in Conflict Resolution in C. Garuba, Capacity Building

for Crisis Management in Africa, Gabuma Publishers Lagos, 1998.
Bur, A. Who Are the Tiv? A Social- Cultural Inquiry in to Tiv Dynamics in P.T. Ahire,
The Tiv in Contemporary Nigeria, copyright (c) Tiv studies project, 1993.
Do The Votes Count? Final Report of the 2003 General Elections in Nigeria Abuja
Transition Monitoring Group, 2003.
Deng, F. Anatomy of Conflict in Africa, in L. Goor, et al, (eds), Between Development and
Destruction: An Inquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial State, The
Netherlands: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Netherlands Institute of International
Relations, 1996.
Dent, M. A Minority Party: The United Middle Belt Congress in J. Mackintosh, Nigerian
Government and Politics, London, Allen and Unwin. 1960.
Dzurgba, A. Politics and Intellectuals in Benue State: A Democratic Perspective in

T.

Shija et al (eds.), Paul Unongu the Intelligentsia and the Politics of Development,
Aboki Publishers Makurdi, 2010.
Enahoro, D. Crisis Response Procedure: An African Military Perspective in C. Garuba,
Capacity Building
Hann, H. et al, Perspective on Collective Violence: A Critical Review, in H. Hirsch et al,
(eds.), Violence and Politics, New York; Harpre and Row, 1973.
Jibo, M. The Manipulative of Sub-Ethnic Differences in Tiv Politics since the Colonial Era
in G. Hembe, (eds) Issues in the Development of Tivland, Makurdi SGIDT 2001.

Luspha, P. Explanation of Political Violence: Some Psychological Theories versus

Indigration Politics and Society 2, 1971.
Lyam, A. Kwande Crisis: A Community Conflict of Many Interests in T. Gyuse, (eds) et
al, Conflicts in the Benue Valley, Benue State University Press Makurdi, 2008.
Milgram, S. Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, Human
Relations, 18 1965.
Nyityo, S. Party Political Struggle and Conflict in Benue Province, 1955-1965 in T. Shija
et al, Paul Unongu thePp.270-285.
OConnell, J. Competitive Struggle for Modernization between Ethnic Groups in A.
Hazzlewood, (eds), Political Integration: The Nigerian Case, African Integration and
Disintegration, London: OUD, 1964.
Ochefu, O. the political impact of communal crisis in idomaland in A. Bur et al (eds),
Communal Relations Conflicts and Crisis Management Strategies, Aboki Publishers
Makurdi, 2002.
Orngu, C. The Incidences of Irredentism in Nigeria since 1999: Echoes of the Nigerian Civil
War in A. Adejo (eds.), The Nigerian Civil War Forty Years After What Lessons?,
Aboki Publishers Makurdi.
Orgu, C. Core Issues in the Nature of Political Participation among Contemporarily Tiv in
T. Shija et al (eds.), Paul Unongu The

Shishima, S. The Medicine Man and Communal Conflicts in O. Akinwunmi (eds) et al,
Inter Group Relations in Nigeria during the 19th and 20th Centuries, Aboki
Publishers Makurdi, 2006.
Tilley, C. Collective Violence in European Perspective, in H. Graham, et al (eds.), Violence
in America, New York: Bantam, 1969.
Tyubee, B. Influence of Extreme Climate on Communal Disputes and Violence in Tiv Area
of Benue State, in T. Gyuse (eds) at al, Conflicts in the Benue Valley, Benue State
University Press, Makurdi, 2006.
Ukase, P. An Assessment of the Role and Participation of the Tiv in Nigerias Post-Colonial
Politics: Issues and Challenges in T. Shija, et al (eds.) Paul Unongu the
Uji, O. Pre-bendal Politics and the State of Development in Tivland Since 1960 in T. Shija,
et al (eds.), Paul Unongu the
Unongu, P. Were Do We Go From Here Position in an Open Letter to the Tiv People.
Varvar, T. Pre-Colonial Social and Political Structure in Tivland in Y. Ochefu (eds) et al, A
History of the Peoples of Benue State, Aboki Publishers Makurdi.
Varvar, T. Conflict Negotiation and Resolution: The Way Out of Communal Crisis in
Tivland, in A. Bur, Communal Relations, Conflict and Crisis Management
Strategies, Aboki Publishers Makurdi, 2002 Pp.84-85.

(iii)

JOURNALS

Adamu, H. Atemityou: The Tiv Revolt of 1960-1964, in The Pan Africanist, Vol.1, No.1,
1971.
Adejo, A, History: Conflict Resolution and National Unity in Nigeria in Journal of
Historical Society of Nigeria Vol.1 No. 1, Aboki Publishers Makurdi, 2004.

Akiga, B. The Descent of the Tiv from Ibinda Hill, Translated by P. Bohannan in Journal
of Africa, Vol. 24 No. 4. 1954.
Olabisi, A. and E. Fabusoro, Effects of Community-Based Care for People Living with
Hiv/Aids on the Agricultural Livelihood of the Family Members in Benue State,
Nigeria in Agriculture Journal 5(5) 2010, P.278.
Terkula, G. Political Violence and the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria in
Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol.1 Number 6, March 2007.
Wang, A. Ya Na Angbian as Basis for Political Stability in Nigeria: A Philosophical
Perspective in Benue Valley Journal of Humanities, Vol. 3 No.2, July-December
2000.
(iv)

NEWSPAPERS/MAGAZINES

The Alternative Newspaper, June 4-10, 2004, Vol.3. No.5.

The Alternative Newspaper, December 31, 2006 Vol.5.No.16.
The Alternative, June 14 2011, Vol.1.10 No. 6.
Thisday, April 7 2011, Vol. 16 No 5827.
The New Era Newspaper of 5th June, 2011, Vol. 1 No. 004.
The New Times Newspaper, 29th August-4th September 2002, Vol.12 No.34.
The Newsmate Magazine, 26th October, 2002, Vol.1 No.6 ISSN 1118-4354.
The Newsmate Magazine of November 22, 2004.
The Newsmate Magazine, Vol.2. No.1, 2005.
The Nation Newspaper, Sunday June 11 2011, Vol. 05, No.1788.
The National Image, August 2005, Pp.15-16.
The Nigerian Standard, July 21, 1998.
The Truth Newspaper, 31st August-6th September 2002, Vol.1. No. 02014.
The Power Newsletter, 15th June, 2004 Vol.1.No.7.

The Truth Newspaper, December 12, 2006 Maiden Edition.

The Tell Magazine, October 14, No 41, 2002.
The Voice Newspaper of December 16, 1991.

(C) TERTIARY SOURCES

(i)

GOVERNMENT REPORTS/ RECORDS

Adikpo, F. Testimony in Ad-Hoc Committee Report.

A Handbook on Tarka Local Government Council during Hon. Mbaver Dzeremos
Administration, Oracle Business Ltd Makurdi, 2004.
C. O. 957/14 Speech by the Hon. Alhaji C. B. E, MHA, Sardauna of Sokoto, Premier of the
Northern Region: Speech Delivered at Kaduna, 1st Feb. 1958.
House of Representative Debate, vol.19 1965-1966.
National Bureau of Statistics, www.Nigerianstat.Govt.Ng, 2006 Population Census.
1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Pp. 407.
Update Report on Political Crisis in Aliade Town, File No.GLG/S/PUB/53/4/428.
(ii)

UNPUBLISHED ARTICLES

Aliyu, N. The Police and the Electoral Process in Party Activities during the Transition
Period being a paper presented at a joint workshop organized by NOA/NP on Police
and Social Justice 1997.
Akukwe, C. Nigerian April 2011 Election: Moral and Enlightened Self Interest
Responsibilities of Politicians.
Gboyega, A. Democracy in Nigeria: Dividends, Prospects and Problems, A Paper
Delivered at the event marking the Fifth Anniversary of return to Civil Democratic
Governance in Oyo State, May 26th 2004.

Hagher, I. Popular Theatre and Politics in Tivland since 1960, A Paper Presented at the
Faculty of Arts Seminar, University of Jos, 16th Feb.1988.
Iyayi, F. The Conduct of Elections and Electoral Practices in Nigeria, A Paper Delivered at
the MBA Conference in Abuja on 24th August 2004.
Makar, T. A Short History of the Tiv People in The Programme for the Burial of Late TortTiv III, His Highness Ochivirigh Dr. James Akperan Orshi OON, 18th October-3rd
November 1990.
O. Okpeh, Why Violence Persist in Nigerias Election A Research Paper for the National
Assembly Database Research Group Abuja, September 2007.
Sebella, O. Post-Election Violence and the Failure of Intelligence, Wednesday, 27 April,
2011.
(iii)

THESIS

Ahokegh, A. Communal Conflicts in Nigeria, 1960-2004: A Study of the Tiv Experience,

A Ph.D Thesis Submitted to the Department of History, Benue State University
Makurdi, 2008.
Doward, D. A Political and Social History of the Tiv People of the Northern Nigeria 19001939, A Ph.D Thesis, University Of London, 1971.
Enyi, E. Local Government and Rural Development in Nigeria: A Case of Local
Governments in Benue State, 1999-2007, A Ph.D Thesis Submitted in the
Department of Political Science, Benue State University Makurdi, 2007.
Makar, T. A History of Political Change among the Tiv in the 19th and 20th Centuries, A
Ph.D Thesis Submitted to the Department of History ABU Zaria, 1975.
Orngu, C. A History of Socio-Political Conflicts in Nigeria, 1953-2005: Implications for
External Relations, A Ph.D Thesis Submitted to the Department of History, Benue
State University Makurdi, March 2009.

Usu, E. The Development of Clan Organization and Political Centralization among the Tiv,
A Ph.D Thesis Submitted to the Department of History, ABU Zaria.

(iv)

DISSERTATIONS/PROJECTS

Gbamwuan, A. Intra-Ethnic Conflicts in Benue State: A Case Study of Tivland, 1999-2004,

A B.A Project Submitted in the Department of History/International Studies,
University of Jos, 2008.
Haanongon, T. Political Violence and its Impact on Kwande Local Government Area of
Benue State, 1960-2005, M.A Dissertation submitted in the Department of History,
Benue State University Makurdi, 2008.
Imadu, E. Joseph Sarwuan Tarka Leadership Role and Scope 1932-1980, B.A. University
of Jos, 1982.
Terve, E. Nande Nande and Atemityou: An Appraisal of the Tiv Upheavals of 1959-1966,
B.A. ICS, Mkar, 1994.