Part I.

Introduction
A. The Constitution as a social contract
B. How to read the Constitution
FRANCISCO V. HOUSE OF REP., G.R. NO. 160261, NOV. 10, 2003
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct
an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003,
former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives
Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the
House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22,
2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or
on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint
and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along
with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee
on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23,
2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear
that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly
political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
C. A framework for constitutional litigation
FRANCISCO V. HOUSE OF REP., supra

Part II
Amendment of the Constitution
A.
B.
1.
2.

Amendment vs. Revision

Proposal
By Congress as a constituent assembly
By Constitutional Convention

GONZALES V. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1968)

FACTS:
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the
plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held
(November 14, 1967). This was questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as
they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the

people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general election rather than in
the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up
with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other
respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts
because it is a political question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative
powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary,
such powers are inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That
being, when Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as
Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since
it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final
say whether or not such act of the constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special election.
SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the election
therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous
amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections
merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It
does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. Plebiscite should be scheduled on a
special date so as to facilitate Fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection. They should be
able to compare the original proposition with the amended proposition.
3. By the people thru initiative (See R.A. 6735 August 4, 1989)
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, G.R. 127325, MARCH 19, 1997
FACTS:
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to
Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval,
a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary

publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election
registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD
Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues
that 1.) the constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress,
2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on
statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in
Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the
Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution
was left to some future law as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution and if
so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
HELD:
RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is
unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides:
Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein.
. . The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right This provision is
obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin
Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17
cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment
which bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional
action. Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though
constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its
implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC
ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere
minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already
given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and
adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples initiative.

As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.

C. Submission
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 (1971)
FACTS:
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite concerning only the
proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even before the rest of the draft of the
Constitution (then under revision) had been approved. Arturo Tolentino then filed a motion to
prohibit such plebiscite.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition will prosper.
HELD:
Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an improper submission to the people.
Such is not allowed.
The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which
meant that the entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only.
Furthermore, the people were not given a proper frame of reference in arriving at their decision
because they had at the time no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would
ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the
entire document. This is the Doctrine of Submission which means that all the proposed
amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at
the same time, NOT piecemeal.

D. Ratification

Part III
Judicial Review

A Separation of Powers
In Re: LAURETA AND MARAVILLA, 148 SCRA 382 (1987)
FACTS:
Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani A.
Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division. Ilustre using contemptuous
language claimed that members of the court rendered unjust decision on the case GR 68635: Eva
Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that the Court acted unjustly
when Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself from participating when in fact he is a law-partner
of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed
the history of the case and found no reason to take action, stating that Justice Yap inhibited himself
from the case and was only designated as Chairman of First Division on 14 July 1986 after the
resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again addressed letters to Justices
Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of exposing the case to another forum of justice, to
which she made true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on 16
Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press.
Tanodbayan dismissed petitioners Complaint
ISSUE:
DECISION:
Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of
grave professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until further Orders.
Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for
themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under
the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. The supremacy of the
Supreme Courts judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of
powers and checks and balances under a republican form of government such that the three coequal branches of government are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own
sphere. Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.
DEMETRIA VS. ALBA, 148 SCRA 208 (1987)
FACTS:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform
Decree of 1977)as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general
interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayerson the primary grounds that
Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys,
amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President to override the
safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners
and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in
its performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has
become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
by the Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration was enacted in
pursuant thereof), which states that No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the Presidentmay by law be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
ISSUE:
1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional
2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act
HELD:
1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by empowering
the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the Executive Department
to any program of any department included in the General Appropriations Act, without any regard
as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item. It not only
disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds to
naught. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government has
assumed to do as void, as part of its constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to say that
the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this high authority, the judges claim
no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will.
Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.