K.

SELF
INCRIMINATION,
IMPRISONMENT OF DEBT

DOUBLE

JEOPARDY,

NON-

GALMAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
On 21 August 1983, Benigno S. Aquino Jr. was killed while being
escorted by soldiers from his plane at the Manila International Airport.
The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the
man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be
unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman,
although he was the personal friend of Col. Arturo Custodio who picked
him up from his house on 17 August 1983) was a communist-hired
gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. The
military later filmed a re-enactment of the killing scripted according to
this version and continuously replayed it on all TV channels as if it were
taken live on the spot. President Marcos instantly accepted the military
version and repeated it in a nationally televised press conference that
he gave late in the evening of 22 August 1983. President was
constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate the killing of
Aquino. After two false starts, he finally constituted the Board on 22
October 1983 which held 125 hearing days commencing 3 November
1983 (including 3 hearings in Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los Angeles,
California) and heard the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in
20,377 pages of transcripts, until the submission of their minority and
majority reports to the President on October 23 and 24, 1984. Both
majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version
as propounded by the chief investigator, Maj. Gen. Prospero A. Olivas,
that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin. It opines that Ninoy's
assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a
communist plot. The only difference between the two reports is that
the majority report found all the 26 respondents headed by then AFP
Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military conspiracy and
therefore "indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S.
Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983;" while
the chairman's minority report would exclude 19 of them and limit as
plotters "the 6 persons who were on the service stairs while Senator
Aquino was descending" and "General Luther Custodio because the
criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented without
his intervention." On 11 November 1985 Saturnina Galman and
Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late Rolando
Galman, and 29 other petitioners, composed of 3 former Justices of the
Supreme Court, 5 incumbent and former university presidents, a former
AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and solid
citizens of the community, filed the present action alleging that
Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities
constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross
violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the
sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. They prayed
for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
restraining the Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits
in the pending criminal cases which it had scheduled on 20 November

1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying

the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial
before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. At the hearing
on 18 November 1985 of Galman, et. al.'s prayer for issuance of a TRO
enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision in the two
criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by 9-to-2 votes to issue the
restraining order prayed for. But 10 days later on 28 November 1985,
the Court by the same 9-to-2-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss
the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued 10 days
earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. On 29
November 1985, Galman, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration. On
20 March 1986, Galman, et. al. filed their motion to admit their second
motion for reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust of the second
motion for reconsideration was the startling and therefore unknown
revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera that President
Marcos had ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo
Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash
the criminal cases against the 26 accused and produce a verdict of
acquittal. On 3 April 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the
second motion for reconsideration and ordered the respondents to
comment thereon. The accused opposed the second motion for
reconsideration and prayed for its denial. As a whole, all the other
respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the
issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition of the
Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all accused on 2 December
1985, with counsels for Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing
that assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the
remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment where the burden of
proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by clear, competent and
convincing evidence the cause of the nullity. Issue: Whether the
acquittal of the 26 accused during Marcos time bars subsequent
prosecution, on account Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 )Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) of new evidence that the proceedings leading to said
acquittal was rigged. Held: President Marcos misused the
overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian
powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the
Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically depicted in the Report,
and borne out by the happenings (res ipsa loquitura), since the
resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his
Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of
the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it would summon the
demonstrators back to the streets) and at any rate was not acceptable
to the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all
26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacaang
conference, would accomplish the two principal objectives of
satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers to be charged
in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of
double jeopardy.The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial
and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified; and declared
the sham trial a mock trial and that the predetermined judgment of
acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio. It is settled doctrine that
double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of

the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the

prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is
denied due process. The cardinal precept is that where there is a
violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises
a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due
process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is
void for lack of jurisdiction. Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a lawless thing,
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever it exhibits its head. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a
valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment,
(d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. More
so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the
present cases where the sham trial was but a mock trial where the
authoritarian president ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to
rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the
predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as
innocent of all the accused. Manifestly, the prosecution and the
sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court
and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring
and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the
carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict
of acquittal such as that in the present case is a void judgment.
Therefore, no double jeopardy attaches. A void judgment is, in legal
effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no
rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon
it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
PEOPLE VS VALERIANO
VILLAFLOR VS SUMMERS
Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The
trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject herself into physical
examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the
determine the crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner
refused to such physical examination interposing the defense that such
examination was a violation of her constitutional rights against selfincrimination.
Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the
petitioners constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that
the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition

against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the

proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible.
BELTRAN VS SAMSON
Facts: Felix Samson, Judge of the Second Judicial District ordered
Francisco Beltran to appear before the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela,
Francisco Jose, to take dictations in his own handwriting from the latter.
The purpose for such was for the fiscal to compare Beltran's
handwriting and to determine if it is he who wrote certain documents
supposed to be falsified. Beltran filed a petition for a writ of prohibition.
Issue: Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by Beltran for the
purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether
he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes
evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the
constitutional provision (i.e. "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."). Held: The fiscal under section
1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of
the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of
any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without
prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The
privilege is found in the Jones Law, which provides that "Nor shall he be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This
text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." As to its
scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends
to all giving or furnishing of evidence. Writing is something more than
moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers. Writing is not a purely
mechanical and attention. Herein, writing means that Beltran is to
furnish a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero) petition of
the provincial fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, the
present case is similar to that of producing documents of chattels in
one's possession. And as to such production of documents or chattels,
which is not so serious as present, the same eminent Professor
Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864): "2264,
Production or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. 1. It follows
that the production of documents or chattels by a person (whether
ordinary witness or party-witness) in response to a subpoena, or to a
motion to order production, or to other form of process treating him as
a witness (i. e. as a person appearing before the tribunal to furnish
testimony on his moral responsibility for truth- telling), may be refused
under the protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded."
Thus, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a
similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and
one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
The present case is more serious than that of compelling the
production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is
compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence
which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. It
cannot be contended that if permission to obtain a specimen of

Beltran's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished.

Considering the circumstance that Beltran is a municipal treasurer, it
should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine
specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to
obtain a specimen or specimens without resorting to the means
complained of, that is not reason for trampling upon a personal right
guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases
criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases
are accidental and do not constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege.
This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent
persons. Hence, the Court ordered the judge and the fiscal and those
under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from
compelling Beltran to take down dictation in his handwriting for the
purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
CHAVEZ VS CA
Facts: A few days before 12 November 1962, Roger Chavez saw
Johnson Lee, a Chinese, driving a Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Thunderbird car. With Ricardo Sumilang
(movie actor Romeo Vasquez) in mind, whom he knew was in the
market for such a car, Chavez asked Lee whether his car was for sale.
Lee answered affirmatively and left his address with Chavez. Then, on
November 12, Chavez met Sumilang at a barbershop, informed him
about the Thunderbird. But Sumilang said that he had changed his
mind about buying a new car. Instead, he told Chavez that he wanted
to mortgage his Buick car for P10,000.00 to cover an indebtedness in
Pasay City. Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they went to see Luis
Asistio, who he knew was lending money on car mortgages and who,
on one occasion, already lent Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00 on the same
Buick car. Asistio however told the two that he had a better idea on
how to raise the money. His plan was to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez'
reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to
someone who was selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by
trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to
a third person for a profit. Chavez, known to be a car agent, was
included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was
selling his Thunderbird. In the morning of November 14, Chavez
telephoned Johnson Lee and arranged for an appointment. Sometime in
the afternoon, Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in his Thunderbird on
Highway 54. Sumilang was introduced as the interested buyer.
Sumilang's driver inspected the car, took the wheel for a while. After
Sumilang and Lee agreed on the purchase price (P21,000.00), they
went to Binondo to Johnson Lee's cousin, Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name
the car was registered. Thereafter, they went to see a lawyer-notary
public in Quezon City, known to Chavez, for the drafting of the deed of
sale. After the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by Sumilang as
the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok the vendor, and Sumilang's driver and
Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto. As payment was to be made at
Eugene's restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then drove in the
Thunderbird car to that place. The deed of sale and other papers
remained in the pockets of Johnson Lee. At Eugene's, a man

approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was
ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note
that the money should be brought to the restaurant. At the same time
he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note
bearer. Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For
Sumilang, who had left the table to pose for pictures with some fans
and came back, again left never to return. So did Chavez, who
disappeared after he left on the pretext of buying cigarettes. The two
Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the
place where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They
then immediately reported its loss to the police. Much later, the NBI
recovered the already repainted car and impounded it. Right after the
meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that
same day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the
Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang
P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the
transaction. On November 14, the registration of the car was
transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days
later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan. Roger Chavez, Ricardo
Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias "Ging"
Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio,
Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul
Doe were charged with qualified theft of a motor vehicle, a Thunderbird
car (Motor H9YH-143003, Plate H-16648, Pasay City 1962) together
with its accessories worth P22,200.00, belonging to Dy Sun Hiok y Lim.
Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have
not been identified nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty. On 23 July
1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City. When trial opened, the
prosecution called upon Roger Chavez to testify as an ordinary witness
(not a State witness). The trial proceeded, with "Fiscal Grecia"
conducting the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez. On 1 February
1965, the trial court rendered judgment which acquitted all other
accused except Roger Chavez, who was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. He was accordingly
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of not less than 10 years,
1 day, as minimum and not more than 14 years, 8 months and 1 day as
maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of
P21,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to
undergo the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the
costs. The Thunderbird car then in the custody of the NBI was ordered
to be turned over to Ricardo Sumilang, who was directed to return to
Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless the latter chose to pay P21,500.00,
representing the balance of the contract price for the car. The sentence
was promulgated on 8 March 1965. Roger Chavez appealed to the
Court of Appeals. On 14 May 1967, the Court of Appeals resolved to
dismiss the appeal. A move to reconsider was unavailing as, on 21 June
1968, the Court of Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 )Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Appeals, through a per curiam resolution, disposed to
maintain its May 14 resolution dismissing the appeal, directed the City
Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant of
arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to the turn him over to

Muntinglupa Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment below,

and ordered remand of the case to the Quezon City court for execution
of judgment. Chavez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and in
the alternative, prayed for grant of the alternative remedies of
certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct
the said court to forward his appeal to the Supreme Court for the
reason that he was raising purely questions of law. Issue: Whether a
petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus is the proper remedy for the courts
disregard of Chavez constitutional guarantee against selfincrimination. Held: The course which Chavez took is correct. Habeas
corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an
exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally
restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are
disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction
and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the
accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of
conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is
the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another
remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant.
Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of
Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be
granted upon a judgment already final. For the writ of habeas corpus as
an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect
well a person whose liberty is at stake. Under our own Rules of Court,
to grant the remedy to Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of
disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule
102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, "to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto." Further, a void judgment is
in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no
rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings
founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any
one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers.
Still, since Chavez is still serving under a final and valid judgment of
conviction for another offense. he is entitled to liberty thru habeas
corpus only with respect to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, under which he was prosecuted
and convicted.
IVLER VS SAN PEDRO
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason
Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence

Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of

respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponces vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On
2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was
meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of
reckless imprudence.
The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the
two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the
MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the
arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioners motion, the MTC proceeded with
the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his
bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying
petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but
as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his
petition for certiorari when the MTC ordered his arrest following his
non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and
2. Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of
respondent Ponces husband.
RULING:
The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from,
among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with
the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a
valid information.
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two
cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled

otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical

Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not."
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts,
were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasioffenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are
distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a
single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other
crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its
various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as
constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365
charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the
beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48,
but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the
certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light
offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted
belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by
extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that
only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave
or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasioffenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article
365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should
cushion the effect of this ruling.
Petition granted.
ICASIANO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Acting Municipal Trial Court Judge of Naic, Cavite, Aurelio G.
Icasiano, Jr. issed 2 orders of detention dated 18 and 27 November
1986 against Romana Magbago for contempt of court because of her
continued refusal to comply with a fifth alias writ of execution.
Magbago filed an administrative complaint dated 17 February 1987

with the Supreme Court against Judge Icasiano. After evaluating the
allegations of the complaint, Icasiano's comment thereon and the Court
Administrator's recommendation, the Supreme Court dismissed the
administrative complaint for lack of merit in an en banc resolution
dated 2 February 1988. Meanwhile, on 17 March 1987, Magbago also
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the same lettercomplaint
earlier filed with the Supreme Court; this time, she claimed violation by
Judge Icasiano, Jr. of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019,
sec. 3 par. [e]) in TBP-87-00924. After considering Judge Icasiano's
answer, in a resolution dated April 1988 Special Prosecutor Evelyn
Almogela-Baliton recommended dismissal of the complaint for lack of
merit. The recommendation was approved by then Special
Prosecutor/Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales. It appears from the records
of the Tanodbayan, which were forwarded to the Supreme Court, upon
order of the Court in connection with this case, that the resolution
dismissing the complaint was released on 14 April 1988. The office of
the Tanodbayan received another complaint from the same Romana
Magbago (TBP-87-01546). The exact date of filing of the second
complaint is not stated but the records of the case were allegedly
among those transmitted to the then newly created office of the
Ombudsman; unfortunately, the transmitted records did not contain
the earlier resolution of dismissal in TBP-87-00924. Special Prosecutor
Nicanor Cruz, Jr. who was assigned to investigate the case (TBP-8701546) appeared completely unaware of the earlier case, TBP-8700924. The corresponding information against Icasiano was thereafter
filed with the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case 14563). After said
information was filed on 21 March 1990, Icasiano (as accused) filed a
motion for reinvestigation. Icasiano's motion for reinvestigation was
denied in the 29 June 1990 resolution, of the Sandiganbayan. Icasiano
then moved to quash the information on the grounds, among others,
that the accused shall be placed in double jeopardy in so far as the
resolution of the Hon. Supreme Court in Administrative Case RTJ-87-81.
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Icasiano filed the petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the resolution of the
administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court bars the subsequent
filing of a criminal case against the accused in the Sandiganbayan.
Held: After a closer look at the records of the case, the Court is of the
view that the distinction between administrative and criminal
proceedings must be upheld, and that a prosecution in one is not a bar
to the other. It is, therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that
double jeopardy does no apply in the present controversy because the
Supreme Court case (against Judge Icasiano) was administrative in
character while the Sandiganbayan case also against Judge Icasiano is
criminal in nature. When the Supreme Court acts on Constitutional Law
II, 2005 ( 20 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero) complaints against judges or
any of the personnel under its supervision and control, it acts as
personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging
justiciable controversies. Administrative procedure need not strictly
adhere to technical rules. Substantial evidence is sufficient to sustain
conviction. Criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, on the
other hand, while they may involve the same acts subject of the

administrative case, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To

avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is fundamental that
the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution:
(a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; c) a valid
arraignment; (d) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (e) the
defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. All
these elements do not apply visa-vis the administrative case, which
should take care of Judge Icasiano's contention that said administrative
case against him before the Supreme Court, which was dismissed,
entitled him to raise the defense of double jeopardy in the criminal
case in the Sandiganbayan. The charge against Judge Icasiano before
the Sandiganbayan is for grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality
and incompetence in having issued 2 orders of detention against
complaining witness Magbago. Ordinarily, complainant's available
remedy was to appeal said orders of detention in accordance with the
Rules. It is only when an appellate court reverses the lower court
issuing the questioned orders can abuse, partiality or incompetence be
imputed to the judge. Here no appeal from the questioned orders of the
issuing judge (Icasiano) was taken: instead, administrative and criminal
cases were filed against the judge for issuing the orders. It is precisely
for this reason, among other, that the administrative case against
Judge Icasiano was dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of merit;
and yet, it cannot be assumed at this point that Judge Icasiano is not
criminally liable under RA 3019, par. 3(e) for issuing the questioned
orders of detention. In fact, the Ombudsman has found a prima facie
case which led to the filing of the information. In any case, the
dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint cannot bar the
present prosecution, since double jeopardy does not apply. As held in
Cirilo Cinco, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines,
a preliminary investigation (assuming one had been conducted in TBP87-00924) is not a trial to which double jeopardy attaches.
PEOPLE VS PINEDA
read case
PEOPLE VS TAMPAL
Facts: Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel
Padumon, Pablito Suco, Dario Suco and Galvino Cadling were charged
of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical injuries in the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo Ochotorena as
presiding judge. However, only private respondents, Luis Tampal,
Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, and Samuel Padumon were
arrested, while the others remained at large.
The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero moved for postponement due to his
failure to contact the material witnesses. The case was reset without

any objection from the defense counsel. The case was called on
September 20, 1991 but the prosecutor was not present. The
respondent judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as
unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsidereation, claiming that his
absence was because such date was a Muslim holiday and the office of
the Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. The motion was
denied by respondent judge.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right of the
accused to a speedy disposition of their cases.
(2) Whether or Not the dismissal serves as a bar to reinstatement of
the case.
Held: In determining the right of an accused to speedy disposition of
their case, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of
the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.
What are violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial are
unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable
length of time. In the facts above, there was no showing that there was
an unjust delay caused by the prosecution, hence, the respondent
judge should have given the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute
its case.
The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double
jeopardy. In several cases it was held that dismissal on the grounds of
failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar another
prosecution for the same offense, but in this case, this does not apply,
considering that the rights of the accused to a speedy trial was not
violated by the State. Therefore, the order of dismissal is annulled and
the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
PEOPLE VS FERRER
Facts: On 5 March 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of
the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Feliciano Co in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac. On March 10, Judge Jose C. de Guzman
conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case
against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the
corresponding information. The twice-amended information (Criminal
Case 27), recites "That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in
the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist
Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force,
violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose

of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the

government under the control and domination of an alien power, by
being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school
of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said
Communist Party of the Philippines. That in the commission of the
above offense, the following aggravating circumstances are present, to
wit: (a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with
insult to public authorities; (b) That the crime was committed by a
band; and (c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or
afford impunity." Co moved to quash on the ground that the AntiSubversion Act is a bill of attainder. Meanwhile, on 25 May 1970,
another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, charging Nilo
Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation
was had, an information was filed. On 21 July 1970 Tayag moved to
quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1)
Republic Act 1700 is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces
more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it
denies him the equal protection of the laws. Resolving the
constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of 15
September 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a
bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad, and dismissed the
informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. The
Supreme Court resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for
certiorari. Issue: Whether the Anti-Subversion Law partakes of the
nature of a Bill of Attainder. Held: Article III, section 1 (11) of the
Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall
be enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative
for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills
of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers
by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling
legislative usurpation of the judicial function. History in perspective,
bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and
political minorities, and it is against this evil that the constitutional
prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the
imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to
stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder. Herein, when the AntiSubversion Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it
does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 3 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero) or the members thereof
for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the
Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4,
against membership in the outlawed organization. The term
"Communist Party of the Philippines" is used solely for definitional
purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the
Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same
purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on
conduct. Were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be
totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone,
without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the
undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established.

The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined
the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined
the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to
further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government
by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under
the control and domination of a foreign power. Further, the statute
specifically requires that membership must be knowing or active, with
specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what
section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful,
must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful
goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an
element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty
knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the
organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of
mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives. Even assuming,
however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this
feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. It is only when a
statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them
without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. Nor is it
enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may
fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is
also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct.
This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a
legislative adjudication of guilt. Indeed, if one objection to the bill of
attainder is that Congress thereby assumes judicial magistracy, then it
must be demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainder
reaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposes are
inescapable. Section 4 of Anti-Subversion Act expressly states that the
prohibition therein applies only to acts committed "After the approval
of this Act." Only those who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts
affiliate themselves with, become or remain members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successors or of any
subversive association" after 20 June 1957, are punished. Those who
were members of the Party or of any other subversive association at
the time of the enactment of the law, were given the opportunity of
purging themselves of liability by renouncing in writing and under oath
their membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that such
renunciation shall operate to exempt such persons from penal liability.
The penalties prescribed by the Act are therefore not inescapable.
LACSON VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by
elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group
(ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and
petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of

the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was
a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong
Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano
Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident.
Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation.
However, a review board modified the panels finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and
herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a
reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the
Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the
cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to
Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the
principal accused are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending
resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from
the phrase principal accused in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249,
including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all
cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the
approval hereof.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners
right to due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution
as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the
Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong
Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto
statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the
Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the
accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether
the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts
jurisdiction.
RULING:
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249
violate their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to
deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were
presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by

the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law
must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and
not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to
all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases
involving certain public officials and under the transitory provision in
Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner
and intervenors argument, the law is not particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court.
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law,
generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not
apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit
certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that
define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law,
but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of
procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of
R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been
committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the
office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance
of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the
information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended
information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting
of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the
discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the
amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested
and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their
custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not
established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the
charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of
official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the
subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the
Sandiganbayan.
LOZANO VS MARTINEZ

This case is a consolidation of 8 cases regarding violations of the

Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (enacted April 3,
1979). In one of the eight cases, Judge David Nitafan of RTC Manila
declared the law unconstitutional. Among the arguments against the
constitutionality of the law are a.) it is violative of the constitutional
provision on non-imprisonment due to debt, and b.) it impairs freedom
of contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes, BP 22 is constitutional.
The Supreme Court first discussed the history of the law.
explained how the law on estafa was not sufficient to cover
involving the issuance of worthless checks; that in estafa,
punishes the fraudulent issuance of worthless checks to cover
simultaneous obligations but not pre-existing obligations.

The SC
all acts
it only
prior or

BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing

checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or
dishonored for payment. The practice is proscribed by the state
because of the injury it causes to public interests.
BP 22 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt. The debt contemplated by the constitution
are those arising from contracts (ex contractu). No one is going to
prison for non-payment of contractual debts.
However, non-payment of debts arising from crimes (ex delicto) is
punishable. This is precisely why the mala prohibita crime of issuing
worthless checks as defined in BP 22 was enacted by Congress. It is a
valid exercise of police power.
Due to the insufficiency of the Revised Penal Code, BP 22 was enacted
to punish the following acts:
any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank.

And
any person who makes or draws and issues any check on account or
for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check
in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Congress was able to determine at that time that the issuance of
worthless checks was a huge problem. The enactment of BP 22 is a
declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the
making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance
to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
Checks are widely used due to the convenience it brings in commercial
transactions and confidence is the primary basis why merchants rely on
it for their various commercial undertakings. If such confidence is
shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be
greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore tending
to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of
worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the
banking community. Thus, the Congress, through their exercise of
police power, declared that the making and issuance of a worthless
check is deemed a public nuisance which can be abated by the
imposition of penal sanctions.
The Supreme Court however also explained that (regardless of their
previous explanation on ex delicto debts) the non-payment of a debt is
not the gravamen of the violations of BP 22. The gravamen of the
offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.
It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The
law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of
its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed
by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.