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namely:
(ii)
Provided that where the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy thereof
is not available with the party applying for reference to arbitration under subsection (1), and the said agreement or certified copy is retained by the other party
to that agreement, then, the party so applying shall file such application along
with a copy of the arbitration agreement and a petition praying the Court to call
upon the other party to produce the original arbitration agreement or its duly
certified copy before that Court..
3. Section 17 in THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996
Interim measures ordered by arbitral tribunal.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the
request of a party, order a party to take any interim measure of protection as the
arbitral tribunal may consider necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the
dispute.
(2) The arbitral tribunal may require a party to provide appropriate security in
connection with a measure ordered under sub-section (1).
(3) In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of
the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the
transaction.
8. Section 28 in THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION (AMENDMENT)
ACT, 2015
In section 28 of the principal Act, for sub-section (3), the following sub-section
shall be substituted, namely:
(3) While deciding and making an award, the arbitral tribunal shall, in all
cases, take into account the terms of the contract and trade usages applicable
to the transaction.
Introduction
1.More user-friendly
2. Cost effective
3. Expeditious process (Speedy disposal) with minimum judicial intervention
4. Transparency in the proceedings
5. Proceedings to be in conformity with international principles
The 2015 Act provides a wider scope and mandate to the Arbitrators to expedite
the process of arbitration and act independently and in conformity with the
object of the Act.
III.
and applied the principle1, but they have also occasionally assumed that they
were empowered to deal fully with issues of validity, operativeness,
performability and applicability2. The prima facie approach was also adopted by
the Supreme Court of India.3
Further, in P. Anand Gajapathi Raju & Ors. v. P.V.G. Raju (Died) & Ors.4,
while iterating periphery of Section 8 of the 1996 Act, the Supreme Court said
that The conditions which are required to be satisfied under Sub-sections (1)
and (2) of Section 8 before the Court can exercise its powers are :
(1) there is an arbitration agreement;
(2) a party to the agreement brings an action in the Court against the other party;
(3) subject matter of the action is the same as the subject matter of the arbitration
agreement;
(4) the other party moves the Court for referring the parties to arbitration before it
submits his first statement on the substance of the dispute. . The language of
Section 8 is per-emptory.
The amended 2015 Act categorizes the issues particularly on questions of fraud
along with serious questions of fact and law to be expressly arbitrable.
Previously, this view was negated in judgements like in the case of
1 Fai Tak Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Sui Chong Construction & Engineering Co. Ltd., District Court, Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of China, 22 June 2009, [2009] HKDC 141, available on the Internet
at http://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/cases/ hkdc/2009/141.htm
2 Rondabosh International Ltd. v. China Ping an Insurance (Hong Kong) Co. Ltd., High CourtCourt of
First Instance, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, 29 December 2009, [2009] HKCFI
1198, available on the Internet at http://www.hklii.hk/eng/ hk/cases/hkcfi/2009/1198.html
3 Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. M/S. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. & Anr, Supreme Court, India, 12 August
2005, available on the Internet at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/847271/
IV.
Section 17.
With the 2015 Act coming into force, the tribunal shall now have the same
powers to make orders for interim measures as the Court. This has been a
boon for the parties to arbitration since interim measures are meant to be in
aid in with the process of arbitration. Moreover, the amended Act of 2015
resolves the shortcomings of the 1996 Act where the interim orders of the
tribunal were not enforceable.
The jurisdiction of the Arbitrator is bound by the terms of the Contract when
disputes w.r.t the rights and obligation under the Contract are raised. The
5 2010 1 SCC 72
6 Arbitration. Pet. No. 34/2013 dated May 28,2014
Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. M/s.L.K.Ahuja &
Co.7 rightly pointed out that that the Arbitral Tribunal is a Tribunal of limited
jurisdiction circumscribed by the terms of reference and the Arbitrator cannot
be equated with a court of law. Thereafter this view of the Apex Court was
opposed to with the amendment of 2015 whereby it is clearly stated that once
an arbitral tribunal has been constituted, no court will have jurisdiction to
ordinarily entertain an application under Sec.98. In order to establish a nexus
between Sec.17 and Sec.9 of the Act before the amendment, the Delhi High
Court in National Highways Authority of India (Nhai) vs China Coal
Construction Group Corporation9, held that
the existence of an application before an arbitral tribunal for interim measure
does not denude the court of its powers to make an order for interim measures
under article 9. That court took the view that being a superior judicial forum, the
courts power has primacy over those of an arbitral tribunal
These inconsistent approaches have been dealt with through the introduction
of the Amendment Act 2015 wherein it has been mandated that any order
issued by the arbitral tribunal to grant interim measures shall be deemed to be
an order of the Court for all purposes and shall be enforceable under the Code
of Civil Procedure of 1908 with the same authority as if it were an order of the
Court. This amendment addresses the main object of the Arbitration Act by
empowering the arbitration panel and minimizing Court interferences
simultaneously.
7 (2001) 4 SCC 86
8 Avalable at http://barandbench.com/when-good-intentions-are-not-good-enough-the-arbitrationordinance-in-india/
11 Decided on 2 November, 2004 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 7835 of 2003
a person before whom material is placed by the parties, being either or both of
evidence and submissions: he gives a decision in accordance with his duty to
hold the scales fairly between the disputants in accordance with some
recognized system of law and rules of natural justice. He is private in so far as
(1) he is chosen and paid by the disputants
(2) he does not sit in public
(3) he acts in accordance with privately chosen procedure so far as that is not
repugnant to public policy
(4) so far as the law allows he is set up to the exclusion of the State Courts
(5) his authority and powers are only whatsoever he is given by the disputants
agreement
(6) the effectiveness of his powers derives wholly from the private law of contract
and accordingly the nature and exercise of those powers must not be contrary to
the proper law of the contract or the public policy of England bearing in mind that
the paramount public policy is that freedom of contract is not lightly to be inferred
with. Whatever has been mentioned by Russell in this paragraph is equally true
for Indian Arbitrators.
13
1996 Act.This case concerned an arbitration agreement entered into before the
BALCO judgement and therefore, the parties had preserved the right to seek
interim relief before the Indian Courts even though the arbitration was seated
outside India. One of the parties had obtained interim relief from the
emergency arbitrator in Singapore restraining the other party from withdrawing
any amounts retained in a bank account pending the outcome of the
arbitration. The Bombay High Court, further to a Section 9 application under
the Indian Arbitration Act, passed reliefs in terms similar to those in the
emergency arbitrator award.
Therefore, although the court in the abovementioned HSBC case did not
directly enforce the emergency arbitrator award, this case could be of
strategic importance ,especially in contracts before the BALCO judgement
12 AIR 2005 Chh 21
13 Arbitration Petition No.1062 Of 2012 decided on 31 July 2014
where the rights under Section 9 of the Indian Arbitration Act have been
preserved. This case could provide an avenue for parties to obtain interim
relief before the Indian Courts faster than they normally would, although in
foreign-seated arbitrations such a route would only be available based on
arbitration agreements that were pre-BALCO judgement.
Section 17 under the 1996 Act lacked the force of law and effectiveness due
to absence of any statutory mechanism for the enforcement of interim orders
of the arbitral tribunal14. In furtherance of this lacunae, the Supreme Court
in Sundaram Finance Ltd v. NEPC India Ltd. 15 and M.D. Army Welfare
Housing Organisation v. Sumangal Services Pvt. Ltd.16 held that under
Section.17 of the Act, no power is conferred on the arbitral tribunal to enforce
its order nor does it provide for its judicial enforcement.
Further a question arose as to a petitioner can approach the Court for an
interim relief when it has already approached the Arbitral Tribunal in any
Foreign Country and also obtained a judgement from the High Court thereof.
To clear the abovementioned ambiguity, the Court in the case of Raffles
Design International India Private Limited and Ors. Vs. Educomp
Professional Education Limited and Ors17. held :
It is relevant to mention that Article 17H of the UNCITRAL Model Law contains
express provisions for enforcement of interim measures. However the Act does
14 Article on Interim Reliefs available at http://blog.ipleaders.in/interim-reliefs-arbitration-conciliationamendment-ordinance-2015/
not contain any provision pari materia to Article 17H for enforcement of interim
orders granted by an Arbitral Tribunal outside the India. Section 17of the Act is
clearly not applicable in respect of arbitral proceedings held outside India.
In the circumstances, the emergency award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal
cannot be enforced under the Act and the only method for enforcing the same
would be for the petitioner to file a suit.
Further in the case of Indiabulls Financial Services Ltd. & Ors. v.
Jubilee Plots and Housing Private Ltd.18, it was held that if a person
disobeys the orders passed under Sec.17 of the Act would be guilty of
contempt as provided under Sec.27(5) of the Act but in the case of Raffles
Design International India Private Limited and Ors. Vs. Educomp
Professional Education Limited and Ors19, a new principle was laid down
which could be deduced from the simple reading of the provision that a
person if gulilty of not following the interim orders of the arbitral tribunal in a
Foreign Country cannot be proceeded against for contempt under Section.27
of the Act.
Thereafter, the Delhi High Court in the case of Sri Krishan v. Anand20
attempted to resolve the lacuna of Sec.17 as mentioned above by laying down
the principle that any person failing to comply with the order of the arbitral
tribunal under Sec.17 would be deemed to be making any other default or
guilty of any contempt to the arbitral tribunal during the conduct of the
18 MANU/DE/1829/2009
19 OMP(I) (COMM.) 23/2015 Decided on 07.10.2016
20 (2009) 3 Arb LR 447 (Del)
proceedings under section 27 (5) of Act. The remedy of the aggrieved party
would then be to apply to the arbitral tribunal for making a representation to
the Court to mete out appropriate punishment. Once such a representation
is received by the Court from the arbitral tribunal, the Court would be
competent to deal with such party in default as if it is in contempt of an order
of the Court, i.e., either under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act
or under the provisions of Order 39 Rule 2A Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Thereafter, the 246th Law Commission report (herein referred to as LCR) in
order to provide a prudent solution, recommended the amendments to
Section 17 of the 1996 Act which allowed the orders of Arbitral Tribunal to be
applied with the same force of law as the Orders of a Court.
Section 17 amendment gives a wider scope and mandate to the interim
measures by the arbitral tribunals because any order passed by the tribunal
will be deemed to be an order of the Court for all purposes and be enforceable
under the Civil Procedure Code of India. Previously, the interim orders by the
arbitral tribunals could not be implemented with proper force of law since
they were not treated at par with a decree or order of Court.
VI. Power of arbitrator referring to Section 23 and 28 of the Act
The amended Sec.23 of 2015 Act enables the Respondent to file its
counterclaim against the Claimant, if any, in the same arbitration
proceedings, and need not initiate another arbitral proceeding.
The amended provision of the 2016 Act functions in contrary to the prevalent
practice in many ad hoc domestic disputes where tribunals consider the
22 Available at
http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/448666/Arbitration+Dispute+Resolution/Highlights+Of+Amendment+
To+The+Arbitration+And+Conciliation+Act+1996+Via+Arbitration+Ordinance+2015
used
in
Section.28(3),
held
that
any
VII. Conclusion
The Indian Judiciary has been criticised for its narrow approach to
arbitration which is further supplemented by the unreasonable delays, high
costs and delay in enforcement of the award. The abovementioned
amendments to the 1996 Act tries to curb all such inconsistencies by
23 Coderre v. Coderre, Montreal Court of Appeal, Canada, 13 May 2008, [2008] QCCA 888 (CanLII),
available on the Internet at http://canlii.ca/t/1wx0p