Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving

real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow Helen
Meyers Guzman, and his son David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also
American citizens. On 9 August 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim
assigning, ansferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and
interests in and over six parcels of land they inherited from Simeon.
Subsequent thereto, a new TCT was issued in the name of David Rey. On
5 February 1991, David Rey Guzman sold the land to Emiliano Cataniag.
Celso and Arthur Halili, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a
complaint questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two
conveyances between Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman and between
David Rey Guzman and Emiliano Cataniag. They also claimed ownership
over the land.

Whether or not the two sales are null and void.

NO, only the first sale
Helen Guzman's deed of quitclaim in which she assigned, transferred and
conveyed to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests over the property
she had inherited from her husband collided with the Constitution, Article
XII, Section 7.
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be
transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified to
acquire lands of the public domain". Aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence,
they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.
Nevertheless, jurisprudence is consistent that "if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers
it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and
the title of the transferee is rendered valid." In the case at bar, the
subsequent sale can no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity
of the initial transfer.
The rationale behind this policy is that if the ban on aliens from acquiring
not only agricultural but also urban lands is to preserve the nation's lands
for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be
thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by
aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.
Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Cataniag, a Filipino
citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective
of the constitutional provision to keep our land in Filipino hands has been
served.
You just recall this landmark case of Halili when we talk on how to cure a prior
prohibited transaction, wherein a private land has been trasferred or conveyed
to a foreigner national. So you are quoting section 5 of the 1935 Constitution
because there was also a prior case of Krivenko v. ROD, basically on the same
issue, but we (someone coughed kaya hindi clear) because this is an application
of the 1987 Constitution which is the provision is section of 1987 Constitution.
So when we talk of Halili, the doctrine is the curative effect of a subsequent
transfer to a Filipino citizen.

We will relate our discussion on the 4 modes of concession with Section 2 of

Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

ARTICLE XII - NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,

and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated.

We are limiting now to our discussion with the exception-the agricultural lands
because ito lang ang pwedeng ma alienate. We are talking now with concession,
modes of disposition so of course agricultural lands lang ang pwede.
4 MODES OF CONCESSION OF PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS:
1) Homestead
2) Sale
3) Lease
4) Confirmation of Imperfect Title
a) Judicial
b) Administrative
By Public Land as contemplated in CA 141, we mean that lands of the public
domain as such subject to alienation and disposal of the State in accordance
with CA 141.

C l a s s if i c at io n of A li e n a bl e a nd D is pos a b le L a n ds . Public Land Act

classifies alienable and disposable lands, agricultural lands according to the
use and purposes as to which land may be vested. So dont confuse yourself
with the classification in 1987 Constitution, kasi ito (CA 141) according to
purpose. Yung sa 1987 Constitution, yun talaga ang classification of Public
Land. So for CA 141, according to use and purposes to have agrcultural,
residential, industrial, commercial or similar productive purposes or
educational or charitable or other similar purposes, and resevations for
townsites and for public uses.
CA 141, as we all know before that it is the President, upon the
recommendation of the DENR Secretary, who is authorize to make such
classification. The classification as to the use and purpose of such agricultural
lands. Also you must not forget that one basic 3 requisite to disposition doon
sa 4 modes of concession or disposition is that the land is a the public land and
is alienable and disposable. With the cases later, we will learn, how do we know
if a public land is already disposable and alienable. This is one of the 3
requisites. There can be no concession or disposition if it is not an alienable or
disposable agricultural public land.

HOMESTEAD
It is defined as the house and the adjoining land where the head of the
family dwells. It can be the fixed residence of the head of the family with
the land and building surrounding the main house. We will differentiate
that with the usual understanding of family home under the Civil Code.
P U RP OS E . According to the Supreme Court in Jocson v. Soriano, it is to
provide a home for each citizen of the Government, where his family may
shelter and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune, and to inculcate
in individuals those feelings of independence which are essential to the
maintenance of three institutions.

The concept of a homestead revolves around this concept that it is basically a

gratuitous grant from the government. We will relate this concept out of the
liberality of the government because we will later that there is leniency as
regards to alienation and encumbrance, why there is a better right of
redemption when we talk of homestead as compared to other lands kasi ang
gusto nang government talaga is ibigay ang land to the landless citizens.
I mentioned before that homestead is different from our usual understanding
of the Family Home under the Civil Code. The similarity would be, both refe r to
the land of the house. Both are also exempt from execution but in homestead
doesnot necessarily a family home as contemplated by the Civil Code and th e
Family Home is not necessarily also a homestead. Homestead is granted by CA
141, hence it is from public agricultural land, alienable and disposable land,
wherein such is acquired through the application in accordance with CA 141 but
as suppose to that, the family home is situated in any titled land.
4 GENERAL CLASSIFICATION FOR AN APPLICANT IN HOMESTEAD:
1) Must be a Filipino citizen;
2) over 18 years old or head of the family;
3) must not own 12 hectares;
4) Applicant is not a beneficiary of any gratuitous allotment of more
than 12 hectares.
NOTE: CA 141 provides 24 hectares but it means automatically amended by the

present constitution. So if you read some provisions in CA 141 that provides

24 hectares, automatically amended na siya by the 1987 Constitution where
the limit is 12 hectares.

HOW ABOUT A MARRIED WOMAN, BECAUSE IN THE GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS, IT

SEEM THAT A MARRIED WOMAN IS NOT QUALIFIED TO APPLY FOR HOMESTEAD.
We hold that CA 141 is a very old law, approved in 1936 so basically
there are words and phrases which are not technically correct when
we apply it to the present age. But per cases it has been also settled
that the exceptions are also settled in subsequent issuances such
as the lands in Administrative Order No. 7, providing for exceptions
where a married woman may apply for a homestead.
GENERAL RULE: A married woman is not allowed to apply for apply for a

homestead.

EXCEPTIONS:
1) if the married woman has been living separately from her
husband and not dependent upon him for support;
2) if the husband is insane or incapacitated; or
3) the husband is in imprison serving a term as such duration as to
prevent him from complying with the requirements of the law
requiring the residence and the cultivation requirements.

GENERAL PROCEDURE FOR HOMESTEAD:

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

Homestead General Procedure (Chapter 4, CA 141)

Section 14: Under CA 141
File pro forma application with the Bureau of Lands
Approval
You are now allowed to enter the property
The cultivation requirement: for a period not less than 1 year nor
more than 5 years, applicant or homesteader must have cultivated
at least 1/5 of the land. (most important)
7) Notify the Director upon compliance of the requirements
8) Hearing
9) Grant of Homestead Patent
10) Registration with the Registry of Deeds (optional)

B a l b o a v . Ca r a l es : Such compliance is as good as vested interest in the

subject land in which to be regarded as equitable owner thereof.
We know that after compliance, there is still notification and hearing before
the actual grant of patent, but the case dictates that so long as you have

already complied with the cultivation requirement, it is already

considered as a vested interest, so you are already an equitable owner of
the subject land. So even without a patent, with actual grant of a patent,
a perfect homestead is already a property right.

FIL ING OF T H E APP LI CA TI ON

Prior of the fling of an application and before approval of your application,
you have no right. That is only after approval of your application wherein
you can already allowed entry. So because you are allowed entry, of
course you already have access.

Section118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its

branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patent

or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or
alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for
a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the
patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of
any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged
to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five
years and before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be
valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on
constitutional and legal grounds.
GENERAL RULE: From and after the approval of the application and 5 years from

the issuance of the patent there is absolutely no alienation and encumbrance

except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions.
A different rule would be the alienation, transfer, or conveyance which
needs the approval of the Director of Lands which would be, as provided
in Section 118, after the prohibitory period of 5 years and before 25
years. That would be merely directory for the Director of Lands to
approve the alienation/encumbrance.
*MEMORIZE THE PERIODS APPLICABLE FOR THE RESTRICTIONS ON SUBSEQUENT
ALIENATIONS (5 years; 25 years)
It is settled by jurisprudence that to constitute a violation of Section 118,
it is enough that a portion of the homestead, not necessarily the entire
portion of land, is encumbered or alienated within the prohibited 5-year
period.

WHAT IF THE PROPERTY HAS ALREADY BEEN REGISTERED OR BROUGHT INTO THE
APPLICATION OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION IN FAVOR OF A PERSON
WHO HAS VIOLATED SECTION 118? CAN THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE AN ACTION
FOR RECONVEYANCE, FOR EXAMPLE?
Yes. Even if it was already registered to another person.

WHAT IF IT WAS SOLD DURING THE 5-YEAR PROHIBITORY PERIOD BUT IT WAS MADE
TO APPEAR IN THE DOCUMENT THAT IT WAS MADE AFTER THE PROHIBITORY PERIOD?
It would still be prohibited. Section 118 is strictly construed.
Absolutely no alienation or encumbrance.
The answer would be different if falls under the situation wherein
it only need the approval by the Director of Lands. Take note of the
phrasing in Section 118, the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce shall not be denied except on two grounds:

WHY DO WE START COUNTING THE 5-YEAR REDEMPTION PERIOD IN CA 141

FROM THE DATE OF EXPIRATION?

1. Constitutional; and
2. Legal grounds

WHAT IF DURING THE PROHIBITORY PERIOD OF 5 YEARS,

ALIENATION/ENCUMBRANCE WAS APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS?

Because in involuntary dealings, there are usually a legal

redemption also given apart from the period of redemption
provided in CA 141. For example, foreclosures under the Rural Bank
Act where the law itself provides for a 2-year redemption period.
Since you start counting from the expiration of the legal
redemption period, you add 5 years period of redemption. You know
have 7 years.

THE

There is a violation. The answer would not be different even if your

alienation/encumbrance was approved by the Director of Lands
because it will not cure a violation.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE APPROVAL BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS? SO, AFTE R
THE 5-YEAR PROHIBITORY PERIOD?
This requirement is merely directory. It is merely a formality and
the sale, alienation, or encumbrance is not rendered null and void
by the mere failure to obtain the required approval.

WHEN DO WE START THE COUNTING OF THE PROHIBITORY 5-YEAR PERIOD?

There seems to be a conflict here because Section 118 states that
five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent. But
there is this case which provides that it is computed from the
promulgation of the order of issuance. Before a patent is issued,
there is actually an order for the issuance of the patent. It is a
separate order apart from the patent itself. It is settled in the case
of Enervida vs. De la Torre , that you start from the promulgation of
the order of issuance of the patent or grant.

INSTANCES WHERE IT IS NOT CONSIDERED AS A VIOLATION OF SECTION 118

(jurisprudence):
1. Vested rights in a homestead acquired under prior acts, not under
CA 141, which did not contain the prohibition;
2. Agreements for the partition of a homestead (agreement between
the family)

Partition is not a conveyance or alienation in legal

contemplation
Section 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free

patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to

repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a
period of five years from the date of the conveyance.

The enumeration here is not exclusionary. It can be applied to some other

persons not enumerated in Section 119.
The period for redemption provided here is 5 years from the date of conveyance.
The purpose of providing this right of redemption is declared in Rural Bank of
Davao vs. CA , homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable
agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and
cultivation. Which is why the right of redemption is granted because the aim
really is for the land-destitute citizens to have their own home.

INSTANCES WHEN SUCH RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 119 IS NOT

APPLICABLE:
1. Conveyance made to an immediate family member or his direct
ascendants or heirs;

No right of redemption since the intent of the law is to

preserve that land within the family
2. If the intention is not for the purpose of serving the land in the
family circle but for speculative purpose (greater profits)
3. Land is no longer devoted to agriculture

Section 22. Any citizen of lawful age of the Philippines, and any

such citizen not of lawful age who is a head of a family, and any
corporation or association of which at least sixty per centum of
the capital stock or of any interest in said capital stock belongs
wholly to citizens of the Philippines, and which is organized and
constituted under the laws of Philippines, and corporate bodies
organized in the Philippines authorized under their charters to do
so; may purchase any tract of public agricultural land disposable
under this Act, not to exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares
in the case of an individual and one thousand and twenty-four
hectares in that of a corporation or association, by proceeding as
prescribed in this chapter: Provided, That partnerships shall be
entitled to purchase not to exceed one hundred and forty-four
hectares for each member thereof. But the total area so
purchased shall in no case exceed the one thousand and twentyfour hectares authorized in this section for associations and
corporations.
There are two personalities that may be qualified to apply for sales patent:
1. Filipino citizens of legal age who is the head of the family; and
2. Any corporation or association of which is owned by 60% Filipino
citizens

HOW DO WE RECONCILE SUCH CONFLICT?

You always reconcile the provisions of CA 141 with the present
Constitution because under Section 3, Article X11 of the 1987
Constitution, corporations are disqualified from acquiring public
lands. Section 22 is deemed modified by the present Constitution ,
same as the maximum areas or limits that can be acquired is now
12 hectares only.

Take note in Section 118, CA 141 impliedly permits alienation after the 5-year
prohibitory period. But in line with the purpose to favor the homesteader and
his family, the law itself provides for a longer right of redemption in Section
119.
Note that this right of redemption is not waivable. It prevails even if you waive
a portion of it.

WHEN DO WE RECKON THE 5-YEAR PERIOD FOR REDEMPTION?

It is said to be 5 years from the date of the conveyance. But we
actually qualify it as we have voluntary and involuntary dealings.

Voluntary Dealings from the date of sale

Involuntary Dealings from the date of expiration of the

legal redemption period

GENERAL PROCEDURE FOR A SALES PATENT:

1.
2.
3.

Filing of Application
Appraisal
Publication and Posting of the notice of sale

It fixes the date of the public bidding

Rules on bidding, Chapter V of CA 141

The Director of Lands shall announce the sale

thereof by publishing the proper notice once a week
for six consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette, and
in two newspapers one published in Manila and the

other published in the municipality or in the province

where the lands are located, or in a neighboring
province, and the same notice shall be posted on the
bulletin board of the Bureau Of Lands in Manila, and
in the most conspicuous place in the provincial
building and the municipal building of the province
and municipality, respectively, where the land is
located, and, if practicable, on the land itself
4.

5.
6.

7.

Submission of Bids

We talk of sale bids enclosing cash or certified check,

treasury warrant, or post-office money order

The amount would be 10% of the bid and the bid price
must not be less than the appraised value of the land
Opening of the bids
Award

General Rule: It is awarded to the highest bidder

When there are two or more equal bids, the law grants
in favor of the applicants

If the applicant is not one of the highest bidders, the

applicant is given the chance to equal that of the
highest bidder.
Pay the price of the bid

The amount submitted with the bid (10% of the bid) is

applied automatically

You can pay it in full or in installments

Installments should not be more than 10 equal annual

installments

Same with other modes of concession, under CA 141 there is always this
cultivation requirement. For a sales patent, you need to have at least 1/5 of
the land which has to be cultivated within 5 years from the date of the award.
Before the issuance of the actual patent, the purchaser must show actual
occupancy, cultivation, and improvement of at least 1/5 of the land applied
until the date wherein the final payment is made.
The approval of the Sales Application merely authorizes the applicant to take
possession of the land so that he can comply with the requirements before a
final patent can be issued in his favor.

CAN THE SALES PATENT APPLICANT ENGAGE THE SERVICES OF ANOTHER OR AGREED
WITH ANOTHER PERSON AS TO THE CULTIVATION OF THE LAND?
Under PD 152 March 13, 1973 Prohibiting the Employment Or Use
Of Share Tenants In Complying With Requirements Of Law Regarding
Entry, Occupation, Improvement And Cultivation Of Public Lands. It
is not allowed.

business, with damages for the improvements only. (as amended

by PD 635)
Sec. 121. Except with the consent of the grantee and the approval

of the Secretary of Natural Resources, and solely for commercial,

industrial, educational, religious, or charitable purposes or for a
right of way, no corporation, association, or partnership may
acquire or have any right, title, interest, or property right
whatsoever to any land granted under the free patent,
homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act or to any
permanent improvement on such land.
The provisions of Section 124 of this Act to the contrary
notwithstanding, any acquisition of such land, rights thereto or
improvements thereon by a corporation association, or
partnership prior to the promulgation of this Decree for the
purposes herein stated is deemed valid and binding; Provided,
That no final decision or reversion of such land to the State has
been rendered by a court; And Provided, further, That such
acquisition is approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources
within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Decree. (as
amended by PD763)
ARE ADDITIONAL PURCHASES ALLOWED?
Yes with the following conditions:
Section 32. This chapter shall be held to authorize only one

purchase of the maximum amount of land hereunder by the same

person, corporation, association, or partnership; and no
corporation, association, or partnership, any member of which
shall have received the benefits of this chapter or of the next
following chapter, either as an individual or as a member of any
other corporation, association, or partnership, shall purchase any
other lands of the public domain under this chapter. But any
purchaser of public land, after having made the last payment upon
and cultivated at least one-fifth of the land purchased, if the same
shall be less than the maximum allowed by this Act, may purchase
successively additional agricultural public land adjacent to or not
distant from the land first purchased, until the total area of such
purchases shall reach the maximum established in this chapter:
Provided, That in making such additional purchase or purchases,
the same conditions shall be complied with as prescribed by this
Act for the first purchase.

In Section 29, there is a 10-year prohibitory period on conveyance,

encumbrance, and disposition of such lands.
Section108. No patent shall issue nor shall any concession or

contract be finally approved unless the land has been surveyed

and an accurate plat made thereof by the Bureau of Lands.
Section110. Patents or certificates issued under the provisions of

this Act shall not include nor convey the title to any gold, silver,
copper, iron, or other metals or minerals, or other substances
containing minerals, guano, gums, precious stones, coal, or coal
oil contained in lands granted thereunder. These shall remain to
be property of the State.
Sec. 112. Said land shall further be subject to a right-of-way not

exceeding sixty (60) meters in width for public highways,

railroads, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraph and telephone
lines, and similar works as the Government or any public or quasipublic service or enterprise, including mining or forest
concessionaires, may reasonably require for carrying on their

It is the same with Sales Patent, the procedure etc., only that the mode is lease.

QUALIFICATIONS :
Section 33. Any citizen of lawful age of the Philippines, and any

corporation or association of which at least sixty per centum of

the capital stock or of any interest in said capital stock belongs
wholly to citizens of the Philippines, and which is organized and
constituted under the laws of the Philippines, may lease any tract
of agricultural public land available for lease under the provisions
of this Act, not exceeding a total of one thousand and twentyfour hectares. If the land leased is adapted to and be devoted for
grazing purposes, an area not exceeding two thousand hectares
may be granted. No member, stockholder, of officer,
representative, attorney, agent, employee or bondholder of any

corporation or association holding or controlling agricultural

public land shall apply, directly or indirectly, for agricultural public
land except under the homestead and free patent provisions of
this Act: Provided, That no lease shall be permitted to interfere
with any prior claim by settlement or occupation, until the
consent of the occupant or settler is first had, or until such claim
shall be legally extinguished, and no person, corporation, or
association shall be permitted to lease lands here-under which
are not reasonably necessary to carry on his business in case of
an individual, or the business for which it was lawfully created and
which it may lawfully pursue in the Philippines, if an association
or corporation.
Procedure is the same. You need appraisal, publication and notice, submission
of sale bids, opening of bids, and how awarded.
Just remember where it differs from sale. Of course, since this is a sales
patent, we talk of a rent instead of a purchase price. The bid amount for your
lease patent application would be equivalent of the rental of the first three
months. Annual rents must not be less 3% of the value of the land.
The term of the lease will be for a period not exceeding 25 years renewable for
another 25 years. Upon the termination of the lease, all the improvements
thereon will now be the property of the State. Same with homestead and sales
patent, there are cultivation requirements. For a lease patent, you must have
cultivated 1/3 of the land within 5 years from and after the date of the approval
of the lease.
There are also restrictions on assignment, encumbrance, or subletting of lands
leased. It needs consent of the Secretary and that assignment, encumbrance,
or subletting for purposes of speculation shall not be permitted in any case.
Lease of additional areas is allowed provided that the additional area does not
exceed the maximum allowed.
The option to purchase the land is granted by CA 141 subject to the same
restrictions governing the sale, so he applies for the Sales Patent

TWO MODES:
1.
2.

Judicial Legalization or Confirmation under the Public Land Act

Administrative Legalization or Free Patents under the Public Land
Act

REPUBLIC VS RIZALVO
On Dec 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC
of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, an application fo
r the registration of a parcel of land, located in Bauang, La Union.
Respondent alleged thathe is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcel
of land, that he obtained title over theland by virtue of a Deed of
Transfer dated December 31, 1962, and that he is currentlyin possession
of the land. In support of his claim, he presented, among others,
TaxDeclaration for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment of
real property taxesbeginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the
application.
On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an
Opposition. TheMTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration
court, rendered its Decision,approving respondents application. The
Republic of the Philippines through the OSGfiled a Notice of Appeal.

However, the CA found no merit in the appeal and promulgatedthe

assailed Decision, affirming the trial courts decision.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent have shown indubitably that he has

complied
with
all
the
requirements showing that
the property, previously part of the public domain, has become private
property by virtue of his acts of possession in the manner and length
of time required by law.
NO. Under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, applicants for registration of title
must sufficientlyestablish first, that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest havebeen in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of thesame; and
third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.
The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The certification and
report dated July17, 2001 of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La Union,
states that the entire land areain question is within the alienable and
disposable zone, certified as such since January21, 1987. Respondent
has likewise met the second requirement as to ownership and
possession. The MTC and the CA both agreed that respondent has
presented sufficienttestimonial and documentary evidence to show that
he and his predecessors-in-interestwere in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of theland in question.
However, the third requirement, that respondent and his predecessors in-interest be inopen, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subjectproperty since June 12, 1945 or earlier, ha s
not been satisfied. Respondent only managed to present oral and
documentary evidence of his and his mothers ownershipand possession
of the land since 1958 through a photocopy of the Deed of AbsoluteSale
dated July 8, 1958 between Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana P. Rizalvo. He
presented Tax Declaration for the year 1948 in the name of Eufrecina
Navarro and realproperty tax receipts beginning in 1952. Even assuming
that the 1948 Tax Declarationin the name of Eufrecina Navarro and the
tax payment receipts could be taken in thiscase as proof of a claim of
ownership, still, respondent lacks proof of occupation andpossession
beginning June 12, 1945 or earlier.
What is categorically required by law is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Indeed, even assuming
arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification and report is enough to
signify that the land is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth, respondent is still not entitled to
registration because the land was certified as alienable and disposable in
1987, while the application for registration was filed on December 7,
2000, a mere thirteen (13) years after and far short of the required thirty
(30) years under existing laws on prescription.

WHAT ARE THE TWO MODES UNDER PD 1529?

SEC. 14. Who may apply .The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

UNDER THE FIRST MODE, WHAT ARE THE THREE REQUISITES?

Under Section 14 (1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently

establish:
1. first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain;
2. that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same;
3. third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.

WAS THERE AN EXPRESS DECLARATION FROM THE STATE THAT THE LANDS ARE
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE?
No. Respondent merely presented a certification and report from
the DENR-CENRO dated July 17, 2001 certifying that the land in
question entirely falls within the alienable and disposable zone
since January 21, 1987; that it has not been earmarked for public
use; and that it does not encroach any area devoted to general
public use. Unfortunately, such certification and report is not
enough in order to commence the thirty (30)-year prescriptive
period under Section 14 (2). There is no evidence in this case
indicating any express declaration by the state that the subject
land is no longer intended for public service or the development of
the national wealth.
Even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification and
report is enough to signify that the land is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth,
respondent is still not entitled to registration because the land was
certified as alienable and disposable in 1987, while the application
for registration was filed on December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen
(13) years after and far short of the required thirty (30) years
under existing laws on prescription.

SPS TAN VS REPUBLIC

The spouses Tan were natural-born Filipino citizens, who became
Australian citizens on 9 February 1984. They seek to have the subject
property registered in their names.
The subject property was declared alienable and disposable on 31 Dec
1925, as established by a Certification dated 14 August 2000 issued by
the DENR, CENRO.
Prior to the spouses Tan, Lucio and Juanito Neri had declared the subject
property for taxation purposes in their names.
The spouses Tan acquired the subject property from Lucio and Juanito
Neri and their spouses by virtue of a duly notarized Deed of Sale of
Unregistered Real Estate Property dated 26 June 1970. The spouses Tan
took immediate possession of the subject property on which they planted
rubber, gemelina, and other fruit-bearing trees. They declared the
subject property for taxation purposes in their names.
In 2000, the spouses Tan filed their Application for Registration of Title to
the subject property. The application of the spouses Tan invoked the
provisions of Act No. 496 and/or Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended.
The spouses Tan attached to their Motion a copy of Tax Declaration No.
4627 covering the subject property issued in 1948 in the name of their
predecessor-in-interest, Lucio Neri. They called attention to the
statement in Tax Declaration No. 4627 that it cancelledTax Declaration
No. 2948. Unfortunately, no copy of Tax Declaration No. 2948 was
available even in the Office of the Archive of the Province of Misamis
Oriental. The spouses Tan asserted that judicial notice may be taken of
the fact that land assessment is revised by the government every four

years; and since Tax Declaration No. 4627 was issued in the year
1948, it can be presupposed that Tax Declaration No. 2948 was
issued in the year 1944.
RTC granted the application of the spouses Tan.
CA granted the appeal of the Republic, and reversing and setting aside
the Decision of the RTC on the ground that the spouses Tan failed to
comply with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, which requires possession of the subject property to start on or
prior to 12 June 1945. Hence, the appellate court ordered the spouses
Tan to return the subject property to the Republic.

Whether or not Sps Tan have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since [12 June 1945], or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title.
NEGATIVE. The spouses Tan filed their Application for Registration of Title
to the subject property in the year 2000 generally invoking the provisions
of Act No. 496 and/or Section 48 of CA No. 141, as amended.
Two requisites which the applicants must comply with for the grant of
their Application for Registration of Title are: (1) the land applied for is
alienable and disposable ; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-

in-interest have occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously,

exclusively, and adversely since 12 June 1945.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order or administrative action, investigation reports of the
Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute.

In the case at bar, the spouses Tan presented a Certification from the
DENR-CENRO, dated 14 August 2000, to prove the alienability and
disposability of the subject property. The said Certification stated that
the subject property became alienable and disposable on 31 December
1925. A certification from the DENR that a lot is alienable and disposable
is sufficient to establish the true nature and character of the property
and enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence.
The spouses Tan, however, failed to satisfactorily establish compliance
with the second requisite for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title, i.e. , open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property since 12 June 1945
or earlier.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has been amended several times:
The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26,
1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for
a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an
applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same,
however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree 1073,
approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now
reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin- interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain,under a bona fide claim of acquisition or

ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately

preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by wars or force majeure . Those shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073,
presently requires, for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title, the possession and occupation of the piece of land
by the applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest, since 12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total
conformity with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
heretofore cited.
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession for thirty years or
more is not sufficient. It must be shown, too, that possession and
occupation had started on 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Even the spouses Tan do not dispute that the true reckoning period for
judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title is on or before 12
June 1945. They also admit that their possession and occupation of the
subject property fall short of the period prescribed by law. The earliest
evidence of possession and occupation of the subject property can be
traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of their predecessorsin-interest only in 1952. However, the spouses Tan are now asking the
kind indulgence of this Court to take into account Tax Declaration No.
4627 issued in 1948, which they had attached to their Motion for
Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals but which the appellate court
refused to consider. Just as they had argued before the Court of Appeals,
the spouses Tan point out that Tax Declaration No. 4627 was not newly
issued but cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2948; and should the Court take
judicial notice of the fact that tax assessments are revised every four
years, then Tax Declaration No. 2948 covering the subject property was
issued as early as 1944.
Tax Declaration No. 4627 was only issued in 1948, three years after 12
June 1945, the cut-off date under the law for acquiring imperfect or
incomplete title to public land. For the Court to conclude from the face of
Tax Declaration No. 4627 alone that the subject property had been
declared for tax purposes before 12 June 1945 would already be too
much of a stretch and would require it to rely on mere presuppositions
and conjectures.

The ruling herein is without prejudice to the spouses Tan availing

themselves of the other modes for acquiring title to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain for which they may be qualified
under the law.
NOTE OF THE REQUISITES AND AMENDMENTS.
(1) The original wording of Sec 48(b): since July 26, 1894
(2) RA 1942: simplistic 30 year period
(3) PD 1073: possession and occupation to commence since 12
June 1945 or earlier

WHAT IS NOW THE PERIOD BEING APPLIED?

A mere showing of possession for thirty years or more is not
sufficient. It must be shown, too, that possession and occupation
had started on 12 June 1945 or earlier.

WHY WAS THAT PERIOD APPLIED? WHAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED?

The date of application must be considered. In this case, the Sps Tan
filed their application in the year 2000. PD 1073 was already in
effect during that time.

TAX DECLARATION DISCUSSION.

Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proofs
of ownership of the property for which taxes have been paid. In
the absence of actual, public and adverse possession, the
declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership. They may be good supporting or collaborating evidence
together with other acts of possession and ownership; but by
themselves, tax declarations are inadequate to establish
possession of the property in the nature and for the period required
by statute for acquiring imperfect or incomplete title to the land.

LUNINGNING VS REPUBLIC
08 Jan 1998, PETs filed an application for registration of land under (PD)
No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. They
alleged that they acquired the Subject Property by purchase, and that
they, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, had
been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse
possession of the Subject Property in the concept of owner for more that
30 years.
The history of possession of the Subject Property back to 1958, when the
Subject Property was first declared for tax purposes by Justina Hintog.
Teodoro Calanog came into possession of the Subject Property in 1968. In
the same year, the Subject Property was transferred to spouses Alfredo
Tonido and Agatona Calanog. Agatona Calanog allegedly inherited the
Subject Property from Teodoro Calanog, her father; on the other hand ,
Alfredo Tonido supposedly purchased the same property also from
Teodoro Calanog, his father-in-law. Alfredo Tonido planted the Subject
Property with palay, sayote, coffee, guyabano and other fruit bearing
trees. After the demise of Agatona Calanog, the rest of the Tonido family,
consisting of Alfredo and his children, Samuel, Elizabeth, Benjamin, Imelda
and Esther, shared possession of the Subject Property.
21 Nov 1995, the Tonido family sold the Subject Property to PETs.
The history of possession of the Subject Property, as related above, was
supported by tax declarations in the name of petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest from 1958 to 1998.
TC approved PETs application for registration of the Subject Property.
REPUBLIC: TC erred in approving the application for registration despite
petitioners failure to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the Subject Property since 12 June 1945,
or earlier, as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by PD No. 1073. PETs also failed to produce muniments of title
to tack their possession to those of their predecessors-in-interest in
compliance with the prescriptive period required by law.
CA dismissed the application for registration.
PETs: they are entitled to confirmation and registration of their title to
the Subject Property in accordance with Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, although they had not identified under which
specific paragraph of the said Section.

Whether PETs have complied with the period of possession and

occupation required by the Public Land Act.
NEGATIVE. The application for registration filed by PETs is essentially an
application for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title
over the Subject Property, governed by Sections 47 to 57 of the Public
Land Act.
An applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete tit le
under the Public Land Act must be able to prove that: (1) the land is

alienable public land; and (2) his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since
time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073,
presently requires, for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title, the possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicants,
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June
1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree heretofore cited.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that PETs have failed to comply
with the period of possession and occupation of the Subject Property, as
required by both the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land
Act. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held that
The earliest period that the applicants could claim ownership over the
property is in 1958, which is the earliest date Justina Hintog, the
previous owner/occupant, declared the property for taxation purposes.
This is far later than June 12, 1945, the date prescribed by law that the
applicants possession under claim of ownership should have begun at the
latest.
IN ALL:
(1) Section 44 of the Public Land Act, as amended by RA No. 6940,
which provides for a prescriptive period of thirty (30) years
possession, applies only to applications for free patents;
(2) The case at bar is a judicial application for confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Property covered
by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act; and
(3) Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act requires for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title the continuous
possession of the land since 12 June 1945, or earlier, which
petitioners herein failed to comply with.

NOTE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE AND PUBLIC

LAND ACT.

Both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial
proceedings, and the decree of registration issued for both is conclusive and
final
GOAL: a Torrens title, which aims at complete extinguishment, once and for
all, of rights adverse to the record title

There already exists a title which

the court only needs to confirm

there exists a presumption that the

land applied for still pertains to the
State, and that the occupants and
possessors can only claim an
interest in the land by virtue of
their imperfect title or continuous,
open, and notorious possession
thereof

ROMAN CATHOLIC VS RAMOS

On Sept 15, 1966, the RCAM filed an application for registration of title of
property, pursuant to Commonwealth Act C.A.) No. 141 (the Public Land
Act).
RCAM claimed that it owned the property; that it acquired the property
during the Spanish time; and that since then, it has been in open, public,
continuous and peaceful possession of it in the concept of an owner.
The RCAM attached the following documents to support its application:
amended plan Psu-223919; technical description of Lots 1 and 2;9

surveyor s certificate;10 and Tax Declaration No. 9551 issued on

September 6, 1966.11
Republic claimed that the property is part of the public domain and
cannot be subject to private appropriation.
Ramos filed her opposition13 to the RCAM's application. She alleged that
the property formed part of the entire property that her family owns and
has continuously possessed and occupied from the time of her
grandparents, during the Spanish time, up to the present.
The RCAM presented in evidence the following documents, in addit ion to
those already on record: tax declarations issued in its name in 1948,
1973, 1981, 1990, 1993, and 1999; the certified true copy of Original
Certificate of Title No. 0082 covering the lot in the name of Garcia, which
adjoins the property on the south; and the affidavit of Garcia confirming
the RCAM's ownership of the property. It likewise submitted several
testimonial evidence to corroborate its ownership and claim of
possession of the property.

Who -between the RCAM and Cresencia -is entitled to the benefits of C.A.
No. 141 and Presidential Decree No. 1529 for confirmation and
registration of imperfect title?
NONE.
Since the RCAM filed its application on September 15, 1966 and its
amended application on October 4, 1974, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141,
as amended by R.A. No. 1942 (which then required possession of thirty
years), governs.
The RCAM failed to prove possession of the property in the manner and
for the period required by law.
First, the tax declarations issued in the RCAM's name in 1948, 1966,
1977, 1984, 1990, 1993 and 1999 did not in any way prove the character
of its possession over the property. The declaration for taxation
purposes of property in the names of applicants for registration or of
their predecessors-in-interest may constitute collaborating evidence
only when coupled with other acts of possession and ownership; standing
alone, it is inconclusive.
While the RCAM asserts that it had been in possession of the property
since the Spanish time, the earliest tax declaration that it could present
was that issued in 1948. Also, when it filed its application in 1966 and
its amended application in 197 4, the RCAM presented only two tax
declarations (issued in 1948 and 1966) covering the property. And since
then, up to the issuance of the January 17, 2005 decision of the R TC, the
RCAM presented only five other tax declarations -those issued in 1977,
1984, 1990, 1993 and 1999.
Second, even if we were to consider the RCAM' s tax declarations as basis
for inferring possession, the RCAM still failed to prove actual possession
of the property for the required duration. As already noted, the earliest
tax declaration that it presented was for 1948. RCAM first declared the
property in its name only in 1948 as this tax declaration does not appear
to have cancelled any previously-issued tax declaration. Thus, when it
filed its application in 1966, it was in possession of the property for only
eighteen years, counted from 1948. Even if we were to count the
possession period from the filing of its amended application in 1974, its
alleged possession (which was only for twenty-six years counted from
1948) would still be short of the thirty-year period required by Section
48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by RA No. 1942.
Third, the amended plan Psu-223919, technical description for Lots 1 and
2, and surveyor s certificate only prove the identity of the property that
the RCAM sought to register in its name.

Fourth, the RCAM did not build any permanent structure or any other
improvement that clearly announces its claim of ownership over the
property.. The "bahay ni Maria" where the RCAM conducts its fiestarelated and Lenten activities could hardly satisfy the possession
requirement of C.A. No. 141. As found out by the CA, this structure was
constructed only in 1991 and not at the time of, or prior to, the filing of
its application in 1966.

Since July 26 1894

The RCAM failed to prove that the property is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.
RCAM was bound to establish "the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute." It could have also
secured a certification from the government that the property applied for
was alienable and disposable.
We also find insufficient the evidence that Cresencia presented to prove
her claimed possession of the property in the manner and for the period
required by C.A. No. 141.
Cresencia was bound to adduce evidence that irrefutably proves her
compliance with the requirements for confirmation of title. To our mind,
she also failed to discharge this burden of proof.
First, the various pieces of documentary evidence that Cresencia
presented to support her own claim of imperfect title hardly proved her
alleged actual possession of the property. Specifically, the certificates of
marriage, birth and death did not particularly state that each of these
certified events, i.e. marriage, birth and death, in fact transpired on the
claimed property; at best, the certificates proved the occurrence of these
events in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal and on the stated dates,
respectively.
The presence on the property, as shown by photographs, of Cresencia s
daughter, of the two bancas owned by her family, and of the pile of gravel
and sand they allegedly used in their gravel and sand business also hardly
count as acts of occupation, development or maintenance that could have
been sufficient as proof of actual possession. The presence of these
objects and of Cresencias daughter on the property was obviously
transient and impermanent; at most, they proved that Cresencia and her
family used the property for a certain period of time, albeit, briefly and
temporarily.
Finally, the records show that the La Compania Refreshment Store
business (that they allegedly conducted on the property) actually stood
on their titled lot adjoining the property.
Second, while Cresencia registered in her name the adjoining lot (which
they had been occupying at the time the RCAM filed its application and
where their La Compania Refreshment Store stood), she never had the
property registered in her name. Neither did Cresencia or her
predecessors-in-interest declare the property for taxation purposes nor
had the property surveyed in their names to properly identify it and to
specifically determine its metes and bounds. The declaration for taxation
purposes of property in their names would have at least served as proof
that she or her predecessors-in-interest had a claim over the property
that could be labeled as "possession" if coupled with proof of actual
possession.

22 June 1957

30-year period

25 January 1877

Since 12 June 1945

or earlier

11 June 1978

Since 12 June 1945

or earlier

2000

12 JUNE 1945
OR EARLIER

JAN 1998

12 JUNE 1945
OR EARLIER

15 SEPT 1966

30-YEAR
PERIOD

WHAT HAPPENS IF YOUR APLICATION IS DENIED?

It is without prejudice to the applicant availing of the other modes
for acquiring title to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain for which they may be qualified under the law. (Sps Tan vs
Republic)

REPUBLIC VS DE GUZMAN
Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by
Norma Almanzor and Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land located in
Silang, Cavite.
TC denied the application for registration of the parcels of land mentioned
therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor while approved the application of
De Guzman.
CA affirmed the decision.

Whether the application for registration of De Guzman should be

approved?
NEGATIVE. The subject parcels of land were released as agricultural land
only in 1965 while the petition for confirmation of imperfect title was
filed by private respondents only in 1991. Thus the period of occupancy
of the subject parcels of land from 1965 until the time the application
was filed in 1991 was only twenty six (26) years, four (4) year s short of
the required thirty (30) year period possession requirement under Sec.
14, P.D. 29 and R.A. No. 6940.

Almeda vs. Court of Appeals: "The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
the private respondents had not qualified for a grant under Section 48( b)
of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land while it was
still inalienable forest land, or before it was declared alienable and
disposable land of the public domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen
into private ownership, and should be excluded from the computation of
the 30-year open and continuous possession in concept of
owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. 'Unless and until
the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply .

Thus possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.
Prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or
possession thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty
year possession requirement.
While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that private
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
of the subject land for sixty three (63) years at the time of the
application of their petition, our hands are tied by the applicable laws and
jurisprudence in giving practical relief to them. The fact remains that from
the time the subject land was declared alienable until the time of their
application, private respondents' occupation thereof was only twenty six
(26) years. We cannot consider their thirty seven (37) years of
possession prior to the release of the land as alienable because absent
the fact of declassification prior to the possession and cultivation in good
faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained classified as
forest or timberland, which he could not have acquired by
prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases which reiterate
that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private
appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert
them into private property. Possession of the land by private
respondents, whether spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen
into ownership.

REPUBLIC V. NAGUIT

W/N it is necessary under section 14(1) of PD 1529 that the subject land
shall be classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants
possession under a bonafide claim of ownership could start.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable
and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it
proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize
the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

Atty. Tan: Basically in this case, what was applied was the classification that
the land is alienable and disposable at the time of applicatio n. So it is a relax
application of section 14(1).

DIS TIN C TI ON B E T WE EN N AG UI T AN D HE RB I E TO

PEOPLE V. HERBIETO
Any period of possession prior to the date when the subject Lots were
classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possessi on; such
possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been
classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title shall not apply thereto.
In Naguit, the classification is only needed at the time the application for
registration was filed. The qualifying word since June 12, 1945 or simplistic
30 years is only to the occupation, not to really of the classification of
alienability. While in Herbieto, take note of section 4w. We mentioned about
the periods depending at the time where the application was filed. Kung alin sa
3 periods (CA 141- since July 26, 1894; RA 1942- 30 years; and PD1073- since
June 12, 1945) ang applicable. So in that particular case, ang period applicable
is June12, 1945. Naguit is saying that the period or simplistic 30 years

(depende if what is applicable), refers to the claim of ownership. So not

necessarily on the particular phrase that the land must be already
alienable and diposable. But Herbieto was saying na dapat, alienable and
disposable before your period of possession is counted. So any possession
prior to the declaration that the land is alienable and disposable should not be
counted. So dapat according to Herbieto, whenever you count, the land must
be already alienable and disposable.
Reconcile Naguit with Herbieto with regard to Sec. 48 particularly the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable as discussed in the case
of Malabanan.
What is the applicable classification? Should classification be only required at
the time of the application is filed or at the time the possession is counted
from.
SC: The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1)
is that which was adopted in Naguit . The contrary pronouncement
in Herbieto , as pointed out in Naguit , absurdly limits the application of
the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover
lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945,
even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona
fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles
than what would be feasible under Herbieto .
Further, The contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the
land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to
lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need
to explicitly overturn Herbieto , as it suffices that the Courts acknowledgment
that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is
indeed obiter .
Basically the Supreme Court is saying that it is absurd interpretation if we
construe it as the period June 12, 1945 is to be interpreted as referring to your
claim of ownership.

HEIRS OF MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC

(Justice Brion Dissenting Opinion)
According to J. Brion, the ponencias ruling that the classification of public
lands as alienable and disposable does not need to date back to June 12, 1945
or earlier is incorrect because:
(a) Under the Constitutions Regalian Doctrine, classification is a
required step whose full import should be given full effect and
recognition. The legal recognition of possession prior to
classification runs counter to, and effectively weakens, the Regalian
Doctrine;
(b) The terms of the PLA only find full application from the time a land
of the public domain is classified as agricultural and declared
alienable and disposable. Thus , the possession required under
Section 48(b) of this law cannot be recognized prior to the required
classification and declaration;
(c) Under the Civil Code, only things and rights which are susceptible
of being appropriated may be the object of possession. Prior to the
classification of a public land as alienable and disposable, a land of
the public domain cannot be appropriated, hence, any claimed
possession prior to classification cannot have legal effects;
(d) There are other modes of acquiring alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under the PLA. This legal reality renders the
ponencias absurdity argument misplaced; and

(e) The alleged absurdity of the law addresses the wisdom of the law
and is a matter for the Legislature, not for this Court, to address.

HEIRS OF MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC

(Motion for Reconsideration)
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands
of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands
that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to
belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or
disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered
alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive
modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land
Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the
agricultural land subject of the application needs only
to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the
time of the application, provided the applicants
possession and occupation of the land dated back to
June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive
presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant
arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the
land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By
legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of
the public domain and has become private property. 37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified
or declared as no longer intended for public use or for
the development of national wealth are removed from
the sphere of public dominion and are considered
converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private
ownership that may be alienated or disposed through
any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether
ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been
already converted to private ownership prior to the
requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition
sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil
Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.
The petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June
12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession
- possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State,
such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation
declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
SUMMARY (Atty Tan)
Under the topic of confirmation of imperfect title, there are two modes in
confirming your imperfect title:
1. JUDICIAL LEGALIZATION or CONFIRMATION
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LEGALIZATION

Most of the cases have discussed the important requisites of Judicial

Confirmation. Remember the periods because it is important to determine
the applicable law or period.

FA C TS TO P RO VE
1.
2.

The land is alienable and disposable

OCENPO since time immemorial or the period prescribed in the Public
Land Act (remember the three periods)

RE C ON CI LE THE RU LI NGS O N T H E A& D R EQ UI RE ME N T:

(Naguit, Herbieto and Malabanan)
GENERAL RULE: The land must be alienable and disposable at the time of the
application for confirmation was filed (Heirs of Malabanan vs Republic).
The land is not required to be alienable and disposable during the
entire period and possession. This was the pronouncement in
Herbieto. However, contrary to Herbieto, the Court appreciated
more the Naguit ruling which again goes back to the general rule.

Pu b li c F or es t . The rule is different if the land is a public forest

or a forest land. Then, whatever possession, occupation,
cultivation, it cannot be counted in favor of the applicant. Relate
this to the concept of non-registrability of properties because
admittedly, there are really properties which, by their nature,
cannot be registered (ex. Property of public dominion).

Agricultural
Timber
Mineral

Agricultural
Industrial
Residential
Resettlement
Mineral
Timber or forest
Grazing land

Agricultural
Timber or forest
Mineral
National parks

Both are against the whole world;

they take nature of the nature of judicial proceedings; and
the decree of registration issued for both is conclusive and final
Presumed that there exists already
a title to the land which is sought
to be confirmed.

The land is admittedly one

belonging to the State and the
application is claiming the same by
virtue of his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession
(which amounts to an imperfect
title)

The court may dismiss the

application with or without
prejudice to the right to file a new
application later for the
registration of the same land.

Court has the jurisdiction and

power to adjudicate the land in
favor of any of the conflicting
claimants and if none of them is
entitled, then in favor of the
government

The risk is only that the application

may be denied, without necessarily
losing the property.

Runs the risk of losing the land

applied for, without affording him
another chance.

Note : RA 9176 has extended the filing of applications for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title. The applicable period as of now is December 31, 2020.
AMINISTRTIVA LEGALIZATION
SEC 44. Any natural born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more
than twelve hectares who for at least thirty years has continuously occupied
and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a
tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition
Just take note that possession and occupation requirement that at least 30
years, that is the main difference of administrative legalization.

Although the right to a balanced and healthful ecology as stated here in the
Philippine Constitution is found in the State Policies, not really entered in the
Bill of Right, they are enforceable by themselves. In the Oposa case, it was
stated that it may not be written in the Philippine Constitution to be
enforceable because it is very fundamental.
After the pronouncement in 1993 of the case of Oposa, another landmark case
in 2008 is the Metro Manila Development Authority vs. Concerned Citizens of
Manila Bay, better known as the Manila Bay clean-up case. This is the first time
that a continuing mandamus was issued even before the enactment of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases providing for the issuance of
continuing mandamus.
Before, it was asked in the bar what is a continuing mandamus with reference
to this case. But now, its different because it was specifically provided in the
Rules which was enacted on April 13, 2010 in the exercise of the Supreme Court
of its extra-ordinary constitutional powers in promulgating the said rules. It is
said that there is no other country, even the United States of America, who has
come up with this type of procedural rules. So this is the first in the world. So
after the enactment in 2010, several justices were occasionally invited to talk
about how the Supreme Court of the Philippines came up with these particular
rules specifically to govern environmental cases.
The problem with the other countries is that they have no particular provisions
in their respective constitution as to the right to the promulgation of their own
set of rules as opposed to our 1987 constitution where it is specifically
provided.

need not be really injured by this particular act, law, inaction,

etc. because it trace back to the reasoning behind Oposa that it
is of paramount public interest to protect the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology. It is an exception, basically,
to your strict requirement on judicial review specifically on the legal
standing.
Recall that in your Constitutional Law, your standing is required to be
personal, substantial and direct injury which is not necessary when we
talk of environmental cases.

Also, there is now a specific provision on citizen suit. Meaning you can
sue as a citizen.
Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 2 (Pleadings and Parties), Section 5. Citizen suit.
Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or

generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations

under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue
an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the
reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to
intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff
may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the
Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by
their respective provisions.

Recall also in your constitutional law that you have this exception that
if you are suing as a taxpayer etc. etc. pwede diba. Pero here, it is
really not difficult to prove your standing as long as it is really and
environmental case because the rules itself provides for the liberal
interpretation on the requirement of legal standing. So the rules
specifically provides for citizen suit which is not really in other
instances except for a few laws enacted before the rules which
provides for citizen suit. For example, Clean Air Act, Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act, wherein may special provisions na talaga on a
citizen suit. Yung citizen suit provided in the rules will apply to all
other environmental cases na hindi Clean Air Act, Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act because prior to the enactment of the rules
may specific provision na ang citizen suit.

There is also this requirement of notification.

The rules of procedure is intended to provide innovative tools when we

deal with environmental cases. So basically there are differences as
opposed to regular criminal or civil case. For example, the first
innovative tool would be the liberalized locus standi and citizen suit.

Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 2 (Pleadings and Parties), Section 4. Who may file.
Any real party in interest, including the government and juridical entities
authorized by law, may file a civil action involving the enforcement or violation
of any environmental law.
What do you recall about locus standi in your constitutional law? What
are the requisites for judicial review? If you recall in your cases in your
constitutional law, there were instances wherein the requisites were
not complied with because of the strict requirement on legal standing.
Meaning, you must be injured. There is this requirement of injury as to
you. However, when it comes to environmental cases, the rules itself
provide that there is a liberal interpretation of your legal standing. You

Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 2 (Pleadings and Parties), Section 6. Service of the
complaint on the government or its agencies. - Upon the filing of the complaint,

the plaintiff is required to furnish the government or the appropriate agency,

although not a party, a copy of the complaint. Proof of service upon the
government or the appropriate agency shall be attached to the complaint.

It is a practice internationally that when you enforce your

environmental right, there must be notification. You will appreciate
this requirement when we discuss the MMDA case. As a
requirement, you need to notify that you are suing, as opposed to
regular civil actions and criminal cases where there is no need for
notification that you are filing a case, unless it is required (e.g. BP
22, the must be notice of the dishonor). This is different here
because it acknowledges the fact that the government is really the
primary enforcer of governmental laws and regulations. So you
must notify them that unless and until you act accordingly, we will
file.

Part I, Rule 1 (General Provisions), Section 4. Definition of Terms. - (c)

Also, there were procedural innovations intended to attain speedy
disposition of cases. For civil and criminal cases, basically the same
procedural innovations. There is this requirement of affidavits in
lieu of direct examinations (Judicial Affidavit Rule). As a rule for
environmental cases, you dont have direct examinations. You use
affidavits.

Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case

directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer
thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which
shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.

Rule 4, Section 2. Affidavits in lieu of direct examination. - In lieu of direct

There is also the concept of consent decree. Basically this is an

agreement or settlement to resolve an environmental dispute
between the parties. So basically, a settlement judgement. So it is
an acknowledgement of the complexity of environmental disputes
wherein it is encouraged to have a settlement. That is without
admitting fault of guilt. Also called consent judgme nts in some
jurisdictions.

examination, affidavits marked during the pre-trial shall be presented as direct

examination of affiants subject to cross-examination by the adverse party.

There is also a listing of pleadings which are prohibited. This

pleadings are identified as sources of delays.
Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 2 (Pleadings and Parties), Secti on 2. Prohibited
pleadings or motions . The following pleadings or motions shall not be

allowed:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, except to file answer, the
extension not to exceed fifteen (15) days;
(d) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(e) Reply and rejoinder; and
(f) Third party complaint.

Part I, Rule 1 (General Provisions), Section 4. Definition Of Terms. (b) Consent

decree refers to a judicially-approved settlement between concerned parties

based on public interest and public policy to protect and preserve the
environment.

Environmental Protection Order (EPO)

Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 7 (Writ of Kalikasan), Section 9. Prohibited
pleadings and motions. - The following pleadings and motions are prohibited:

(a) Motion to dismiss;

(b) Motion for extension of time to file return;
(c) Motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(f) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply; and
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default.

There are also special civil actions provided under the rules. This is
over and above our usual special civil actions when we reach third
year. One would be the writ of kalikasan. You study and memorize
how it is defined in the rules because you cannot find it anywhere.
Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 7 (Writ Of Kalikasan),Section 1. Nature of
the writ. - The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity

authorized by law, peoples organization, non-governmental organization, or

any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government
agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity,
involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

There is also this continuing mandamus. We have the normal

mandamus under the Rules of Court but here, for environmental
cases, it is denominated as a continuing mandamus.

Part I, Rule 1 (General Provisions), Section 4. Definition Of Terms.

(d) Environmental protection order (EPO) refers to an order issued by the court
directing or enjoining any person or government agency to perform or desist
from performing an act in order to protect, preserve or rehabilitate the
environment.

Temporary Environmental Protection Order

(TEPO)
Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 2 (Pleadings And Parties), Section 8. Issuance of
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO). - If it appears from the

verified complaint with a prayer for the issuance of an Environmental Protection

Order (EPO) that the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer
grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of the multiple -sala
court before raffle or the presiding judge of a single-sala court as the case may
be, may issue ex parte a TEPO effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from
date of the receipt of the TEPO by the party or person enjoined. Within said
period, the court where the case is assigned, shall conduct a summary hearing
to determine whether the TEPO may be extended until the termination of the
case.
The court where the case is assigned, shall periodically monitor the existence
of acts that are the subject matter of the TEPO even if issued by the executive
judge, and may lift the same at any time as circumstances may warrant.
The applicant shall be exempted from the posting of a bond for the issuance of
a TEPO.

This is not entirely new because it is found in our international

covenants, treaties, etc. but it is also applied when we deal with
environmental issues and environmental cases.
Part I, Rule 1 (General Provisions), Section 4. Definition Of Terms. (f)

Precautionary principle states that when human activities may lead to threats

of serious and irreversible damage to the environment that is scientifically

plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that threat.
Part V (Evidence), Rule 20 (Precautionary Principle) Section 1. Applicability. -

When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link

between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the
precautionary principle in resolving the case before it.
The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall
be given the benefit of the doubt.

Part V (Evidence), Rule 20 (Precautionary Principle) Section 2. Standards for

Application. - In applying the precautionary principle, the following factors,

among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2)
inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to the enviro nment
without legal consideration of the environmental rights of those affected.

S C OPE it is a listing of all the environmental laws that we have so

far. The rules with govern the enumerated laws. Basically, if it is an
environmental case, you apply the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases.
Part I, Rule 1 (General Provisions), Section 2. Scope. These Rules shall govern
the procedure in civil, criminal and special civil actions before the Regional Trial
Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts involving enforcement or violations of
environmental and other related laws, rules and regulations such as but not
limited to the following:
(a) Act No. 3572, Prohibition Against Cutting of Tindalo, Akli, and Molave Trees;
(b) P.D. No. 705, Revised Forestry Code;
(c) P.D. No. 856, Sanitation Code;
(d) P.D. No. 979, Marine Pollution Decree;
(e) P.D. No. 1067, Water Code;
(f) P.D. No. 1151, Philippine Environmental Policy of 1977;
(g) P.D. No. 1433, Plant Quarantine Law of 1978;
(h) P.D. No. 1586, Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement System
Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures and for Other
Purposes;
(i) R.A. No. 3571, Prohibition Against the Cutting, Destroying or Injuring of
Planted or Growing Trees, Flowering Plants and Shrubs or Plants of Scenic Value
along Public Roads, in Plazas, Parks, School Premises or in any Other Public
Ground;
(j) R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake Development Authority Act;
(k) R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act;
(l) R.A. No. 7076, Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act;
(m) R.A. No. 7586, National Integrated Protected Areas System Act including
all laws, decrees, orders, proclamations and issuances establishing protected
areas;
(n) R.A. No. 7611, Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan Act;
(o) R.A. No. 7942, Philippine Mining Act;
(p) R.A. No. 8371, Indigenous Peoples Rights Act;
(q) R.A. No. 8550, Philippine Fisheries Code;
(r) R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act;
(s) R.A. No. 9003, Ecological Solid Waste Management Act;
(t) R.A. No. 9072, National Caves and Cave Resource Management Act;
(u) R.A. No. 9147, Wildlife Conservation and Protection Act;
(v) R.A. No. 9175, Chainsaw Act;
(w) R.A. No. 9275, Clean Water Act;
(x) R.A. No. 9483, Oil Spill Compensation Act of 2007; and
(y) Provisions in C.A. No. 141, The Public Land Act; R.A. No. 6657,
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988; R.A. No. 7160, Local Government

Code of 1991; R.A. No. 7161, Tax Laws Incorporated in the Revised
Forestry Code and Other Environmental Laws (Amending the NIRC); R.A.
No. 7308, Seed Industry Development Act of 1992; R.A. No. 7900, High Value Crops Development
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases Act; R.A. No. 8048, Coconut
Preservation Act; R.A. No. 8435, Agriculture and Fisheries Modernizat ion Act of
1997; R.A. No. 9522, The Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law; R.A. No. 9593,
Renewable Energy Act of 2008; R.A. No. 9637, Philippine Biofuels Act; and other
existing laws that relate to the conservation, development, preservation,
protection and utilization of the environment and natural resources.

C O NS EN T DE C RE E (SU P RA )
Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 3 (Pre-Trial), Section 5. Pre-trial conference;
consent decree. - The judge shall put the parties and their counsels under oath,
and they shall remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences.
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive
at a settlement of the dispute. The judge may issue a consent decree approving
the agreement between the parties in accordance with law, morals, public order
and public policy to protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
Evidence not presented during the pre-trial, except newlydiscovered evidence, shall be deemed waived.

C O N TIN UI NG M AN D A MUS (S UP RA ) operative term would be

it shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied (e.g. MMDA
case, they were required to submit regular reports)
Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 8 (Writ Of Continuing Mandamus), Section 1.
Petition for continuing mandamus. - When any agency or instrumentality of the

government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act

which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law
rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching
thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an
environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment
is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law,
rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of nonforum shopping.
Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 8 (Writ Of Continuing Mandamus), Section 7.
Judgment. - If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ of

continuing mandamus requiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts

until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may be
warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The
court shall require the respondent to submit periodic reports d etailing the
progress and execution of the judgment, and the court may, by itself or
through a commissioner or the appropriate government agency, evaluate and
monitor compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or observations
on the execution of the judgment.

P R E CA U TI ON A RY P R IN CIP L E (S UP R A )
S T R A TE GI C L A WS UI T A G AINS T PUB LI C P A R TI CIP A TIO N
( S L APP ) a special affirmative defense in addition to those provided
in Civil Procedure.
Part I, Rule 1 (General Provisions), Section 4. Definition Of Terms. (g) Strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) refers to
an action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against any person,
institution or any government agency or local government unit or its officials

and employees, with the intent to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle
any legal recourse that such person, institution or government agency has
taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the
environment or assertion of environmental rights.

V E RI FI ED C O MP LA IN T
Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 2 (Pleadings and Parties), Section 3. Verified
complaint. The verified complaint shall contain the names of the parties,
their addresses, the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for.
The plaintiff shall attach to the verified complaint all evidence
proving or supporting the cause of action consisting of the affidavits of
witnesses, documentary evidence and if possible, object evidence. The
affidavits shall be in question and answer form and shall comply with the rules
of admissibility of evidence.
The complaint shall state that it is an environmental case and the
law involved. The complaint shall also include a certification against forum
shopping. If the complaint is not an environmental complaint, the presiding
judge shall refer it to the executive judge for re-raffle.

C I TIZ EN S UI T (S U P RA )
T E PO A N D EPO (S UP R A ) take note that it is exempt from the
posting of a bond as opposed to your normal writs.

P A YM EN T O F FI LI NG AN D O TH E R L EG A L F EES it is deferred
until judgement unless the plaintiff is allowed to litigate as indigent
in which case, he will not pay the fees.
Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 2 (Pleadings and Parties), Section 12. Payment of
filing and other legal fees. - The payment of filing and other legal fees by the
plaintiff shall be deferred until after judgment unless the plaintiff is allowed to
litigate as an indigent. It shall constitute a first lien on the judgment award.
For a citizen suit, the court shall defer the payment of filing a nd
other legal fees that shall serve as first lien on the judgment award.

P R E- T R IA L ( SUP R A ON CO NS E NT D E C RE E ) more or less the

same with your regular civil procedure but take note on pre-trial
conference and the possible issuance of a consent decree.

Section 3. Summary hearing. - The hearing on the defense of a SLAPP shall

be summary in nature. The parties must submit all available evidence in

support of their respective positions. The party seeking the dismissal of
the case must prove by substantial evidence that his act for the
enforcement of environmental law is a legitimate action for the protection,
preservation and rehabilitation of the environment. The party filing the action
assailed as a SLAPP shall prove by preponderance of evidence that the action is
not a SLAPP and is a valid claim.
Section 4. Resolution of the defense of a SLAPP. - The affirmative defense of a

SLAPP shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after the summary hearing. If
the court dismisses the action, the court may award damages, attorneys fees
and costs of suit under a counterclaim if such has been filed. The dismissal shall
be with prejudice.

If the court rejects the defense of a SLAPP, the evidence adduced during the
summary hearing shall be treated as evidence of the parties on the merits of
the case. The action shall proceed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

SP E CI A L CIV IL AC T IO N just remember na iba and rules na mag

govern sa kanya. Kaya nga special. There might be different rules as to
jurisdiction, venue, etc.
a. Writ of Kalikasan (supra, MEMORIZE) very important
term to aver that it is of such magnitude as to prejudice
the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces. Kung walang allegation on that, it
can be dismissed. Take note of the content of the
petition
i. Where to file it is filed in the Supreme
Court or any stations of the Court of
Appeals. Walang RTC.

Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 7 (Writ of Kalikasan), Section 3. Where to
file. - The petition shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the
stations of the Court of Appeals.
ii.

petition is really sufficient in form and

substance the writ issues as a matter of
course . It does not follow that you are

R U L ES 6 ON S L APP
Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 6 (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation)

already granted with the remedy. Because

the purpose of the writ is that the
respondent is required to file a verified
return. Meaning, you need to answer the
petition.

Section 1. Strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). - A legal

action filed to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse
that any person, institution or the government has taken or may take in the
enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion
of environmental rights shall be treated as a SLAPP and shall be governed by
these Rules.

Section 2. SLAPP as a defense; how alleged. - In a SLAPP filed against a person

involved in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the

environment, or assertion of environmental rights, the defendant may file an
answer interposing as a defense that the case is a SLAPP and shall be supported
by documents, affidavits, papers and other evidence; and, by way of
counterclaim, pray for damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
The court shall direct the plaintiff or adverse party to file an opposition showi ng
the suit is not a SLAPP, attaching evidence in support thereof, within a non extendible period of five (5) days from receipt of notice that an answer has
been filed.
The defense of a SLAPP shall be set for hearing by the court after issuance of
the order to file an opposition within fifteen (15) days from filing of the
comment or the lapse of the period.

Issuance of the writ (section 5) you file a

petition asking for a writ of kalikasan. If your

Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 7 (Writ of Kalikasan), Section 5. Issuance of
the writ. - Within three (3) days from the date of filing of the petition, if the
petition is sufficient in form and substance, the court shall give an order: (a)
issuing the writ; and (b) requiring the respondent to file a verified return as
provided in Section 8 of this Rule. The clerk of court shall forthwith issue the
writ under the seal of the court including the issuance of a cease and desist
order and other temporary reliefs effective until further order.
iii.

Contents of the return

Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 7 (Writ of Kalikasan), Section 8. Return of
respondent; contents. - Within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days after

service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified return which shall
contain all defenses to show that respondent did not violate or threaten to
violate, or allow the violation of any environmental law, rule or regulation or
commit any act resulting to environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.

All defenses not raised in the return shall be deemed waived.

The return shall include affidavits of witnesses, documentary evidence,
scientific or other expert studies, and if possible, object evidence, in support
of the defense of the respondent.
A general denial of allegations in the petition shall be considered as an
admission thereof.
iv.

Judgments these are just possibilities.

The court is not restricted on the list.
Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 7 (Writ of Kalikasan), Section 15. Judgment.
- Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for deci sion,
the court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of
kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing
acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws
resulting in environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person
or entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person
or entity to monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private
person or entity to make periodic reports on the execution of the final
judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or
restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual
petitioners.
b. Writ of Continuing mandamus (supra) familiarize how
it is defined. It is requiring to you act on something.
Requirement of mandamus is that there is no exercise
of discretion, it is purely ministerial on your part and the
law specifically enjoins that act as your duty. You
cannot be asked as a remedy if the act is not ministerial.
i.

Where filed

Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 8 (Writ of Continuing Mandamus), Section 2.
Where to file the petition. - The petition shall be filed with the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or
omission occurred or with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
ii.

No docket fees

Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 8 (Writ of Continuing Mandamus), Section
3. No docket fees. - The petitioner shall be exempt from the payment of
docket fees.

S L APP (S UP R A ) it may be also raised in a motion to dismiss. There

is a summary hearing.

P R E CA U TI ON A RY P RIN CIP L E (S U P R A ) applied in BT Talong

case. The first case wherein the precautionary principle was applied.
Usually discussed in Environmental Law class. For NatRes, you just see
how the precautionary principle is defined.

A homestead patent is different from the act of registration. Before

you put your patent under the Torrens system of registration, it is
merely a contract between the government and the grantee. It is the
act of registration that conveys for ancestral lands and binds third
persons. There are cases also that after the issuance of the patent,
you are entitled to the issuance of the certificate of title. The practical

scenario is that after you are issued with a patent, the

procedure is that it is automatically recorded in the Register of
Deeds for the issuance of the certificate of title. So, you will be
issued an Original Certificate of Title (OCT). After which, you are
going to sell the same, it is no longer within the prohibitions, then
what will be issued is Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). So you will
know if is the first certificate being issued because it is the OCT. So
usually it springs from a grant of a patent. Ang procedure kasi niyan
is if there is a grant of a patent, automatically, mag-refer sila sa ROD.
So, there is this transmittal from the DENR to the ROD for the issuance
of the certificate of title so it follows as a matter of course after your
grant of the patent. So wala ng gagawin si applicant, so mag-wait sya
sa issuance of the patent, and after which there is an issuance of the
OCT.
For legal discussion purposes, you delineate if it is merely a patent or
if there is already an issuance of the certificate of title. Kasi on the
latter part, there is already an act of registration (Torrens System of
registration) basically, third persons are already bound, as opposed to
the mere grant of patent.
Another important concept is Certificate of Title (OCT) is indefeasible. Same
concept of the Torrens System of registration. That said title cannot be
defeated by first possession by any other person nor subject to collateral
attack.

SECTION 53. It shall be lawful for the Director of Lands, whenever in the

opinion of the President the public interests shall require it, to cause to be
filed in the proper Court of First Instance, through the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead, a petition against the holder,
claimant, possessor, or occupant of any land who shall not have voluntarily
come in under the provisions of this chapter or of the Land Registration Act,
stating in substance that the title of such holder, claimant, possessor, or
occupant is open to discussion; or that the boundaries of any such land
which has not been brought into court as aforesaid are open to question;
or that it is advisable that the title to such lands be settled and adjudicated,
and praying that the title to any such land or the boundaries thereof or the
right to occupancy thereof be settled and adjudicated. The judicial
proceedings under this section shall be in accordance with the laws on
adjudication of title in cadastral proceedings.
Under Cadastral registration, it is the government or the State that
initiates the case. It is one way of compelling all the claimants to
litigate against one another regarding their respective claims of
ownership. As opposed to any other act of transfer for example
Judicial Confirmation, and there is an oppositor, dito, if we are talking
about cadastral registration, it is the government which initiated the
cadastral case and all the claimants will litigate and prove their claims
of ownership. The aim of this procedure is:
1) to settle all disputes over the land;
2) and to remove all clouds over land titles as far as practicable
Today, the applicable law regarding cadastral poceeding is Property
Registration Decree. So, it has no separate title cadastral registration
proceedings as opposed before, that there was a separate cadastral
act for the process for registration but now it is provided under
Property Registration Decree.

SECTION 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as

essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on

the basis of such application, and any false statements therein or omission
of facts altering, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set
forth in such statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or
change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto
produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It shall
be the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he
may deem it advisable, to make the necessary investigations for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the
application are true, or whether they continue to exist and are maintained
and preserved in good faith, and for the purposes of such investigation, the
Director of Lands is hereby empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas
duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the
courts. In every investigation made in accordance with this section, the
existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal
modification of essential facts shall be presumed if the grantee or
possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena
duces tecum lawfully issued by the Director of Lands or his authorized
delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct and specific
answers to pertinent questions, and on the basis of such presumption, an
order of cancellation may issue without further proceedings.
From the provision itself, it is the Director of Lands who will conduct
the said investigation as to the alleged fraud, as to securing any
patents or corresponding title of public lands; and to file a
corresponding court action for Reversion. Reversion, meaning, the
aim is to revert back the ownership to the State (being a public
land). All the concessions that we discussed presupposes that the
subject lands are public lands thats why there is an action for
Reversion. Notwithstanding the doctrine of indefeasibility of
torrens title, after the expiration of the 1 year period provided by
Sec 32 of Property Registration Decree, Section 101 of the Public
Land Act provides for a remedy whereby lands of the public domain
fraudulently awarded may be recovered or reverted back to the
State.
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for
value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason

of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected

thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments,
subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and
the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein
by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file
in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of
the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date
of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition
be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has
acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.
Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase
occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of
registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible
for the fraud.

SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the
public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-

General or the officer acting in his stead , in the proper courts, in the name
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Differentiate an action Reversion vs an action for nullity . Nullity in a
generic sense (relating to patent or certificate of title), you want it to
be nullified. The distinction lies with the allegations in the complaint.
In the action for Reversion, it could admit that it is owned by the state.
There is an admission that the disputed land is owned by the
government. In an action for nullity, the allegation in the complaint is
that, the plaintiff would allege ownership prior to the issuance of the
patent or certificate of title. The real party in interest in that case is
NOT the state but the plaintiff who is claiming pre-existing right of
ownership. Dont be confused sa Cadastral case, reversion, and an
action for nullity. Cadastral registration is on the registration of the
land. In Reversion, the government wanted to reclaim the ownership of
the land. In an action for nullity, it is the private individual who claims
ownership over the property. The plaintiff has a pre-existing right
prior to the grant of patent or a certificate of title.