[G. R. No. 158449.

October 22, 2004]

LUNINGNING P. DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN, JOSE REYES IGTIBEN, JOSE DEL ROSARIO
IGTIBEN, JR. and THERESA TOPACIO MEDINA, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
On 08 January 1998, petitioners filed with the trial court an application for registration of land
under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The
application covered a parcel of land with an area of 2,988 square meters, situated in Barangay Malabag,
Silang, Cavite, and more particularly described as Lot 5442, Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Ap-04-007007
(hereinafter referred to as the Subject Property). Petitioners alleged that they acquired the Subject Property
by purchase, and that they, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in actual,
continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession of the Subject Property in the concept of
owner for more that 30 years.[3]
No opposition was filed against the application and so petitioners proceeded with the presentation
of their evidence. The State was represented in the proceedings by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose M.
Velasco, Jr.[4]
Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, the trial court traced the history of
possession of the Subject Property back to 1958, when the Subject Property was first declared for tax
purposes by Justina Hintog.[5]
Teodoro Calanog came into possession of the Subject Property in 1968. In the same year, the
Subject Property was transferred to spouses Alfredo Tonido and Agatona Calanog. Agatona Calanog
allegedly inherited the Subject Property from Teodoro Calanog, her father; on the other hand, Alfredo
Tonido supposedly purchased the same property also from Teodoro Calanog, his father-in-law. Alfredo
Tonido planted the Subject Property with palay, sayote, coffee, guyabano and other fruit bearing trees.
After the demise of Agatona Calanog, the rest of the Tonido family, consisting of Alfredo and his children,
Samuel, Elizabeth, Benjamin, Imelda and Esther, shared possession of the Subject Property.[6]
On 21 November 1995, the Tonido family sold the Subject Property to petitioners, as evidenced by
a Deed of Absolute Sale.[7]
The history of possession of the Subject Property, as related above, was supported by tax
declarations in the name of petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest from 1958 to 1998. [8]
On 15 August 2000, the trial court rendered a decision approving petitioners application for
registration of the Subject Property. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.
In its appeal, the Republic alleged that the trial court erred in approving the application for
registration despite petitioners failure to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the Subject Property since 12 June 1945, or earlier, as required by Section 48(b) of

Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073.
Moreover, petitioners also failed to produce muniments of title to tack their possession to those of their
predecessors-in-interest in compliance with the prescriptive period required by law.[9]
On 20 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision finding the appeal meritorious,
setting aside the decision of the trial court, and dismissing the application for registration of petitioners.
[10]
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its resolution dated 22 May
2003.[11]
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying
that the decision of the Court of Appeals be set aside and that the decision of the trial court, approving
petitioners application for registration of the Subject Property, be reinstated.[12]
In the original application filed by petitioners before the trial court, they claim that they are entitled
to confirmation and registration of their title to the Subject Property in accordance with Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree, although they had not identified under which specific paragraph of the said
Section.[13]
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree reads
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
By the allegation of petitioners in their application of actual, continuous, uninterrupted, open,
public, and adverse possession of the Subject Property in the concept of owner, by themselves and through
their predecessors-in-interest, for a given period of time, it can be logically presumed that their claim to
the right to register the Subject Property was based on Section 14, paragraph (1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
However, subsequent pleadings filed by both petitioners and respondent Republic before the Court
of Appeals and this Court, discuss mainly the Public Land Act, thus, establishing that the application for
registration filed by petitioners before the trial court is essentially an application for judicial confirmation

of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Property, governed by Sections 47 to 57 of the
Public Land Act.
Proceedings under the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act are the same in that
both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and the decree of
registration issued for both is conclusive and final. They differ mainly in that under the Property
Registration Decree, there already exists a title which the court only needs to confirm. On the other hand,
under the Public Land Act, there exists a presumption that the land applied for still pertains to the State,
and that the occupants and possessors can only claim an interest in the land by virtue of their imperfect
title or continuous, open, and notorious possession thereof. Nonetheless, in the end, the two laws arrive at
the same goal, namely, a Torrens title, which aims at complete extinguishment, once and for all, of rights
adverse to the record title.[14]
In general, an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title under the
Public Land Act must be able to prove that: (1) the land is alienable public land; and (2) his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. [15]
The finding of fact of the trial court that the Subject Property is alienable public land is undisputed.
What is to be determined herein is whether petitioners have complied with the period of possession and
occupation required by the Public Land Act.
The provision of the Public Land Act that is particularly relevant to petitioners application is
Section 48(b). Through the years, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has been amended several times.
The case of Republic v. Doldol[16] provides a summary of these amendments, as follows

Indeed, the earliest period that the applicants could claim ownership over the property is in 1958, which is
the earliest date Justina Hintog, the previous owner/occupant, declared the property for taxation purposes.
This is far later than June 12, 1945, the date prescribed by law that the applicants possession under claim
of ownership should have begun at the latest.[17]
Petitioners maintain, however, that RA No. 6940, enacted on 28 March 1990, has repealed by
implication Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, and has effectively
reduced the required period of possession and occupation of the land to thirty years prior to the filing of
the application for confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
Petitioners arguments are without merit. This Court has already laid down the standard for repeals
by implication, as follows
It has been the constant holding of this Court that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so
declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United
States v. Reyes, a 1908 decision. It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist, that it be
shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be
inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of repugnancy clear and convincing in character.
The language used in the latter statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been
formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. What is needed is a
manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal.[18]
In herein case, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the provisions of RA No. 6940 do not even
address the same subject matter.
In the Public Land Act, the ways by which the State may dispose of agricultural l

x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple
thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25,
1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
abona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

CITY OF DUMAGUETE, herein Represented by City

Mayor, Agustin R. Perdices,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 168973

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

- versus -

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
August 24, 2011

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, presently requires, for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title, the possession and occupation of the piece of land by the
applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June 1945 or earlier. This
provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree heretofore cited.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioners have failed to comply with
the period of possession and occupation of the Subject Property, as required by both the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held that

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

DECISION

Before Us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[1] dated March 4, 2005 and Resolution[2] dated June 6, 2005 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. SP

No. 64379, which granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition of respondent Philippine Ports
Authority and set aside the Orders dated December 7, 2000 and February 20, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 44 of the City of Dumaguete in LRC Case No. N-201.

e)
all original muniments of title in the possession of the applicant which prove
ownership of the land;
f)
two copies of the petition/application.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On October 14, 1998, petitioner City of Dumaguete, through Mayor Felipe Antonio B.
Remollo (Remollo), filed before the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of
land with improvements, located at Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete (subject property), under the
Property Registration Decree. The application was docketed as LRC Case No. N-201.

Further, the application did not state the number of the lot sought to be registered, the number
of parcels applied for, the improvements found thereon, and indicate whether it claims a
portion of the road which serves as a boundary line.
All these must be alleged in the petition so that the Court will know the
nature of the property.

Petitioner alleged in support of its application:

1.
That the applicant, City of Dumaguete through its Honorable Mayor Felipe
Antonio B. Remollo, is the owner of the land subject of this application with all improvements
and buildings comprising the Engineers Compound where it is now situated and has been in
continuous occupation and possession of the same for more than 30 years or from the year
1960 (Affidavit of Ownership executed by Felipe Antonio G. Remollo, the City Mayor, dated
August 21, 1998 herein attached as ANNEX A). The said land consist of 5,410 square meters
and is situated and bounded and described as shown on the plan (true and photostatic copies of
the original plan marked Psu-07-006805 approved by the Regional Technical Director of the
[Department of Environment and Natural Resources] DENR, Regional Office, Cebu City
herein attached as ANNEX B) and technical descriptions attached hereto (technical description
attached as ANNEX C) and made a part hereof;
2.
That said land at the last assessment for taxation was assessed at P676,250,
Philippine currency, with market value of P1,352,500.00, Philippine currency. (Declaration of
Real Property with the assessed and market values attached as ANNEX D);
3.
That to the best of my knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage or
encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land, nor another person having any estate
or interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy;
4.
That the land was acquired by possessory title in open, continuous, adverse
occupation and possession in the concept of owner for more than thirty years since 1960
(please refer to ANNEX A);
5.
That the land is adjoined by the following:
NorthWestNorthEastSouthEast
All along line 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10 by Flores Avenue, City Road and the Dumaguete Port
RoadSouthWest along line 10-1 by Plan Msi-V-20453
xxxx
8. That the land included is bounded on the West by Flores Avenue and on the North by
the City Road, all public highways and on the East by the Dumaguete Port Road, a private road
made part of the Port Zone.[3]
In an Order[4] dated October 23, 1998, the RTC noted that:
A perusal of the records of the case shows that the annexes lack the following copies:
a)

two blue print copies of the approved plan;

b)
c)

two copies of the technical description of the lot sought to be registered;

two copies of the Surveyors certificate;

d)

a certificate in quadruplicate of the City Assessor of the assessed value of the land;

The RTC explained that the extra copies submitted by petitioner shall be forwarded by the RTC
Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission (LRC) in Manila for comment. Only thereafter
would the RTC set the application for hearing.
Petitioner filed its Compliance[5] with the above-mentioned Order, submitting additional copies of the
required documents and clarifying thus:

4.

1.
The approved plan does not state the number of lot sought to be
registered because it is a public land, thus, only PSU-07-006805 appears on the plan
which is being applied for registration;
2.
Only one (1) parcel of land is applied for by petitioners which consist
of five thousand four hundred ten (5,410) square meters, more or less;
3.
The City Engineers Building within the City Engineers compound are
the only improvement found thereon; and
Petitioners do not claim any portion of the road which serves as a boundary line.

The RTC accordingly set the initial hearing of LRC Case No. N-201 on April 12,
1999, and sent notices to the parties.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, and respondent,
represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, filed separate Oppositions [6] to the
application for registration of petitioner. Both the Republic and respondent averred that petitioner may not
register the subject property in its name since petitioner had never been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of the said property for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the
application; and the subject property remains to be a portion of the public domain which belongs to the
Republic.
After several postponements of the scheduled hearings, petitioner presented the testimony of its
first witness, Engineer Rilthe P. Dorado (Engr. Dorado), on January 14, 2000. Engr. Dorados examination
on the witness stand was terminated on April 7, 2000. The presentation of the other witnesses of petitioner
was then scheduled to continue onJune 2, 2000.[7]
However, before the next hearing, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, [8] seeking the
dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 on the ground that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case. Respondent argued that Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, refers only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership. The subject property in LRC Case No. N-201 is not alienable and
disposable, since it is a foreshore land, as explicitly testified to by petitioners own witness, Engr.
Dorado. A foreshore land is not registerable. This was precisely the reason why, respondent points out,
that the subject property was included in Presidential Proclamation No. 1232 (delineating the territorial
boundaries of the Dumaguete Port Zone), so that the same would be administered and managed by the
State, through respondent, for the benefit of the people.
In its Terse Opposition to Oppositors Motion to Dismiss, petitioner claimed that the subject
property was a swamp reclaimed about 40 years ago, which it occupied openly, continuously, exclusively,

and notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership. The technical description and approved plan of the
subject property showed that the said property was not bounded by any part of the sea. Petitioner invoked
Republic Act No. 1899,[9] which authorizes chartered cities and municipalities to undertake and carry out,
at their own expense, the reclamation of foreshore lands bordering them; and grants said chartered cities
and municipalities ownership over the reclaimed lands. Presidential Proclamation No. 1232 is immaterial
to the present application for registration because it merely authorizes respondent to administer and
manage the Dumaguete Port Zone and does not confer upon respondent ownership of the subject property.
[10]

to show that such reclamation was undertaken by it in consultation with the Secretary of
Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. [13]
The RTC decreed in the end that the instant application for original registration is dismissed for
lack of merit.[14]
In its Motion for Reconsideration[15] and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner contended that the dismissal of its application was premature and tantamount to a denial of
its right to due process. It has yet to present evidence to prove factual matters in support of its application,
such as the subject property already being alienable and disposable at the time it was occupied and
possessed by petitioner.
[16]

Respondent filed a Reply/Rejoinder (To Applicants Opposition to Oppositors Motion to

Dismiss), [11] asserting that there are no factual or legal basis for the claim of petitioner that the subject
property is reclaimed land. Petitioner sought the original registration of its title over the subject property
acquired through alleged continuous possession for 30 years under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, and not through the reclamation of the said property at its own expense under
Republic Act No. 1899. The present claim of petitioner that the subject property is reclaimed land should
not be allowed for it would improperly change the earlier theory in support of the application for
registration. Respondent reiterated that the subject property is foreshore land which cannot be registered;
and that Presidential Proclamation No. 1232 is very material to LRC Case No. N-201 because it confirms
that areas within the Dumaguete Port Zone, including the subject property, are not alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.
On September 7, 2000, the RTC issued an Order [12] granting the Motion to Dismiss of
respondent based on the following ratiocination:

Petitioner also pointed out that its witness, Engr. Dorado, testified only as to the physical status
of the land in question at the time when the cadastral survey of Dumaguete was made sometime in 1916.
[17]
In fact, Engr. Dorado expressly testified that the subject property was part of the shore or foreshore a
long time ago[;][18] and he did not testify at all that the subject property was a foreshore lot at the time
petitioner occupied and possessed the same. The physical state of the subject property had already
changed since 1916. It is now within the alienable and disposable area as per the Land Classification Map
No. 674, Project No. 1-D, BL C-6, certified on July 3, 1927, of the Bureau of Lands, now Land
Management Sector of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources[,] [19] as verified and
certified by the Chief of the Map Projection Section, Land Management Sector, DENR Regional Office in
Cebu City, who has yet to take the witness stand before the RTC.

The Court agrees with [herein respondent] Philippine Ports Authority that the basis of the
[herein petitioners] application for original registration of the subject lot is Section 14 of the
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. A
circumspect scrutiny of said Section readily shows that it refers to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain as proper subjects of registration, provided the applicant has met the
other requirements such as open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession for at least
thirty (30) years under a bona fide claim of ownership.

Petitioner insisted that the RTC should continue with the hearing of LRC Case No. N-201 and
allow petitioner to present evidence that the subject property is reclaimed land. Petitioner sufficiently
alleged in its application for registration that it has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the [subject property] for more than thirty (30) years under a bona fide claim of ownership.
[20]
In support of such allegation, petitioner must necessarily prove that the subject property was previously
a swampy area, which had to be filled or reclaimed before the construction of the City Engineers Office
building thereon.

It having been shown by [petitioners] own evidence that the lot subject of the application for
original registration is a foreshore land, and therefore not registerable (Dizon, et al. vs. Bayona,
et al., 98 SCRA 942, 944), the application must be denied.
Again as correctly argued by [respondent], [petitioners] reliance on Republic Act 1899 which
authorizes all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out the reclamation by
dredging, filling or other means of any foreshore lands bordering them and which confers
ownership on them of the lands so reclaimed, is misplaced, as such has never been alleged in
the application. It is fundamental that a party cannot prove what it has not alleged in his
complaint or application, as in this case.
The admission by Engr. Dorado that there is no formal declaration from the executive branch
of government or law passed by Congress that the land in question is no longer needed for
public use or special industries x x x further militates against the application.
Moreover, the authority granted to municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry
out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore
lands bordering them is for the purpose of establishing, providing, constructing, maintaining,
and repairing proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and
chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications.
By its own evidence, [petitioner] has utilized the subject property allegedly reclaimed by it as
Office of the City Engineer and not as docking and harboring facilities. [Petitioner] has failed

Respondent based its Opposition (To Applicants Motion for Reconsideration dated September
28, 2000)[21] and Opposition (To Applicants Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration) [22] on technical and
substantive grounds.
According to respondent, the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner violated Sections 4
(Hearing of motion), 5 (Notice of hearing), and 6 (Proof of service necessary), Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner did not set its Motion for Reconsideration for hearing even when the said Motion could
not be considered as non-litigable. The RTC could not hear the motion for reconsideration ex parte as they
are prejudicial to the rights of respondent. Petitioner also failed to comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the
Rules of Court when it did not attach to the Motion for Reconsideration a written explanation why it did
not resort to personal service of the said Motion. Thus, respondent averred that the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner should be treated as a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect. It did not
interrupt the reglementary period to appeal and the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000, dismissing LRC
Case No. N-201, had already attained finality. Respondent also pointed out that the Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration of petitioner suffered from the same fatal defects as the original Motion for
Reconsideration.
Respondent again posited that the subject property was foreshore land belonging to the State
and not subject to private appropriation, unless the same had already been declared by the executive or
legislative department of the national government as no longer needed for coast guard service, public use,
or special industries, and classified as alienable and disposable. Full- blown trial in LRC Case No. N-201
was no longer necessary as the evidence so far presented by petitioner had already established that the
RTC lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
In its Order[23] dated November 16, 2000, the RTC initially agreed with respondent that the
Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner violated Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 and Section 11, Rule 13 of
the Rules of Court. Resultantly, the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was considered as not filed

and did not toll the running of the period to file an appeal, rendering final and executory the order of
dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201.
However, after taking into consideration the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of
petitioner, the RTC issued another Order [24] dated December 7, 2000, setting aside its Order
dated September 7, 2000 in the interest of justice and resolving to have a full-blown proceeding to
determine factual issues in LRC Case No. N-201.

Respondent insists on the strict application of Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 and Section 11,
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Violations of the said rules were fatal to the Motion for Reconsideration
and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioner, and as a result, the RTC Order
dated September 7, 2000, dismissing LRC Case No. N-201, had already become final and executory and,
thus, beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC to set aside. Respondent urges us to reject the plea of petitioner
for a liberal application of the rules in the absence of a compelling reason to do so.
We grant the Petition.

It was then the turn of respondent to file with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration [25] of the
Order dated December 7, 2000. In an Order[26] dated February 20, 2001, the RTC denied the motion of
respondent and admitted the following:
A thorough review and perusal of the disputed order dated September 7,
2000 and December 7, 2000, whereby this Court dismissed [petitioners] petition for
registration of Lot No. 1, Dumaguete Cadastre, and later set aside the Order
of September 7, 2000, shows that there was honest mistake in declaring said lot 1,
as a shoreline. Indeed, the adjoining lots are already titled and bounded by a City
Road. It is not bounded by a sea. The Court wants to correct this error in its findings
on the September 7, 2000 Order, that Lot No. 1 is situated on the shoreline
ofDumaguete City. The Court simply committed an oversight on the petitioners
evidence that the lot in question is a foreshore land x x x when in fact it is not. And
it is for this reason that the court reconsidered and set aside said September 7, 2000
Order, to correct the same while it is true that said September 7, 2000 Order had
attained its finality, yet this Court cannot in conscience allow injustice to perpetuate
in this case and that hearing on the merits must proceed to determine the legality
and truthfulness of its application for registration of title.
Respondent sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64379. Respondent
challenged the RTC Orders dated December 7, 2000 and February 20, 2001 for having been issued by the
RTC in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondent reiterated that
the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000, dismissing LRC Case No. N-201 had already attained
finality. The defects of the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner rendered the same as a mere scrap of
paper, which did not toll the running of the prescriptive period to appeal the RTC Order datedSeptember 7,
2000.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated March 4, 2005, found merit in the Petition of
respondent and set aside the RTC Orders dated December 7, 2000 and February 20, 2001. The appellate
court, in its Resolution dated June 6, 2005, denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.
Hence, petitioner comes before us via the instant Petition for Review with the following
assignment of error:

GROUND FOR THE APPEAL

Error of law: The March 4, 2005 decision of the Court of Appeals and its
June 6, 2005 Resolution, erred on question of law in setting aside the Orders of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, dated December 7, 2000 and February 20,
2001. The said Orders of the trial court were made in order to determine factual
issues and to correct its error in its findings on theSeptember 7, 2000 Order. Thus,
the Court of Appeals decision is contrary to law, justice, equity and existing
jurisprudence.[27]

The grant of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion exists where an act is
performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[28]
The Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari in favor of respondent. The RTC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion when, in its Orders dated December 7, 2000 and February 20,
2001, it set aside the order of dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 and resolved to have a full-blown
proceeding to determine factual issues in said case.
Procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of
the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the
[29]
latter. In Basco v. Court of Appeals,[30] we allowed a liberal application of technical rules of procedure,
pertaining to the requisites of a proper notice of hearing, upon consideration of the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, as illustrated in well-settled cases, to wit:
The liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing is exemplified in Goldloop
Properties, Inc. v. CA:
,,,Admittedly, the filing of respondent-spouses' motion for reconsideration did not
stop the running of the period of appeal because of the absence of a notice of
hearing required in Secs. 3, 4 and 5, Rule 15, of the Rules of Court. As we have
repeatedly held, a motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of
paper; it presents no question which merits the attention of the court. Being a mere
scrap of paper, the trial court had no alternative but to disregard it. Such being the
case, it was as if no motion for reconsideration was filed and, therefore, the
reglementary period within which respondent-spouses should have filed an appeal
expired on 23 November 1989.
,,,But, where a rigid application of that rule will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice, then the rule may be relaxed, especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory
judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained
therein. Technicalities may thus be disregarded in order to resolve the case.
After all, no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities. Litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.
,,,Hence, this Court should not easily allow a party to lose title and ownership over
a party worth P4,000,000.00 for a measly P650,000.00 without affording him ample
opportunity to prove his claim that the transaction entered into was not in fact an
absolute sale but one of mortgage. Such grave injustice must not be permitted to
prevail on the anvil of technicalities.
Likewise, in Samoso v. CA, the Court ruled:
,,,But time and again, the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure are not to be
applied in a very strict and technical sense. The rules of procedure are used only to

help secure not override substantial justice (National Waterworks & Sewerage
System vs. Municipality of Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138 [1980]; Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, 72 SCRA 120 [1976]). The right to appeal should not be lightly
disregarded by a stringent application of rules of procedure especially where
the appeal is on its face meritorious and the interests of substantial justice
would be served by permitting the appeal (Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, 137
SCRA 570 [1985]; Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 76595, May 6, 1998). . . .
,,,,,In the instant case, it is petitioner's life and liberty that is at stake. The trial court has
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and his conviction attained finality on
the basis of mere technicality. It is but just, therefore, that petitioner be given the opportunity to
defend himself and pursue his appeal. To do otherwise would be tantamount to grave injustice.
A relaxation of the procedural rules, considering the particular circumstances herein, is
justified.[31] (Emphasis ours.)
In the case at bar, the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner, which sought the reversal of RTC Order dated September 7, 2000
dismissing LRC Case No. N-201, cite meritorious grounds that justify a liberal application of procedural
rules.
The dismissal by the RTC of LRC Case No. N-201 for lack of jurisdiction is patently
erroneous.
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred
by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or
body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. [32]
As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss; for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction
would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and
the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.[33]
Under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, as amended by Act No.
2347, jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title to land was conferred upon the Courts of
First Instance (CFI) of the respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered was
situated. Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions, is acquired upon the filing in
court of the application for registration, and is retained up to the end of the litigation. [34]
The land registration laws were updated and codified by the Property Registration Decree, and
under Section 17 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land registration was still vested on the CFI
of the province or city where the land was situated, viz:
SEC. 17. What and where to file. The application for land registration
shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land
is situated. The applicant shall file together with the application all original
muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by the
Bureau of Lands.

The Clerk of Court shall not accept any application unless it is shown
that the applicant has furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application
and all annexes.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
created the RTC[35] in place of the CFI. Presently, jurisdiction over an application for land registration
remains with the RTC where the land is situated, except when such jurisdiction is delegated by the
Supreme Court to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts under certain circumstances.[36]
It is not disputed that the Application for Original Registration of Title filed by petitioner
before the RTC of the City of Dumaguete conformed to Section 15 of the Property Registration Decree,
which prescribes the form and contents of such applications. In its Application, petitioner prayed that its
title to the subject property, which it repeatedly alleged to have acquired through continuous and adverse
possession and occupation of the said property for more than 30 years or since 1960, be placed under the
land registration laws. The allegations and prayer in the Application of petitioner were sufficient to vest
jurisdiction on the RTC over the said Application upon the filing thereof.
Respondent sought the dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
not because of the insufficiency of the allegations and prayer therein, but because the evidence presented
by petitioner itself during the trial supposedly showed that the subject property is a foreshore land, which
is not alienable and disposable. The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss of respondent in its Order dated
September 7, 2000. The RTC went beyond the allegations and prayer for relief in the Application for
Original Registration of petitioner, and already scrutinized and weighed the testimony of Engr. Dorado,
the only witness petitioner was able to present.
As to whether or not the subject property is indeed foreshore land is a factual issue which the
RTC should resolve in the exercise of its jurisdiction, after giving both parties the opportunity to present
their respective evidence at a full-blown trial. As we have explained in the Estate of the Late Jesus S.
Yujuico v. Republic[37]:
The plain import of Municipality of Antipolo is that a land registration
court, the RTC at present, has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
application which respondent Republic claims is public land. This ruling needs
elucidation.
Firmly entrenched is the principle that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by law. Consequently, the proper CFI (now the RTC) under
Section 14 of PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree) has jurisdiction over
applications for registration of title to land.
xxxx
Conformably, the Pasig-Rizal CFI, Branch XXII has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the land registration case filed by Fermina Castro, petitioners
predecessor-in-interest, since jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
the allegations of the initiatory pleading the application. Settled is the rule that the
authority to decide a case and not the decision rendered therein is what makes up
jurisdiction. When there is jurisdiction, the decision of all questions arising in the
case is but an exercise of jurisdiction.
In our view, it was imprecise to state in Municipality of Antipolo that
the Land Registration Court [has] no jurisdiction to entertain the application for
registration of public property x x x for such court precisely has the jurisdiction to
entertain land registration applications since that is conferred by PD 1529. The
applicant in a land registration case usually claims the land subject matter of the
application as his/her private property, as in the case of the application of

Castro. Thus, the conclusion of the CA that the Pasig-Rizal CFI has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the application of Castro has no mooring. The land
registration court initially has jurisdiction over the land applied for at the time
of the filing of the application. After trial, the court, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, can determine whether the title to the land applied for is
registerable and can be confirmed. In the event that the subject matter of the
application turns out to be inalienable public land, then it has no jurisdiction
to order the registration of the land and perforce must dismiss the
application. [38] (Emphasis ours.)
It is true that petitioner, as the applicant, has the burden of proving that the subject property is
alienable and disposable and its title to the same is capable of registration.However, we stress that the
RTC, when it issued its Order dated September 7, 2000, had so far heard only the testimony of Engr.
Dorado, the first witness for the petitioner.Petitioner was no longer afforded the opportunity to present
other witnesses and pieces of evidence in support of its Application. The RTC Order dated September 7,
2000 already declaring the subject property as inalienable public land, over which the RTC has no
jurisdiction to order registration was evidently premature.
The RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 has not yet become final and executory as petitioner
was able to duly file a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the
same, which the RTC eventually granted in its Order dated December 7, 2000. Admittedly, said motions
filed by petitioner did not comply with certain rules of procedure. Ordinarily, such non-compliance would
have rendered said motions as mere scraps of paper, considered as not having been filed at all, and unable
to toll the reglementary period for an appeal. However, we find that the exceptional circumstances extant
in the present case warrant the liberal application of the rules.
Also, the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated September 7, 2000 filed by petitioner did not comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court, for these did not include a written explanation why service or filing thereof was not done
personally. Nonetheless, in Maceda v. Encarnacion de Guzman Vda. de Magpantay,[39] citing Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort,[40] and Musa v. Amor,[41] we explained the rationale behind said rule and the
mandatory nature of the same, vis--vis the exercise of discretion by the court in case of non-compliance
therewith:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13
of the Rules of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not
filed if said rule is not complied with.
,,,,Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such
should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and
conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or
filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise,
personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to
appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing
pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with
little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or
(2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered containing the
pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly
procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby
causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.
,,,,If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of
adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule
13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if
the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation
was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise

of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service,

for Section 11 itself begins with the clause whenever practicable.
,,,We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort
to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal
service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and
person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or
filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be
accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not
practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court
shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues
involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged
for violation of Section 11.
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its
discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:
,,,As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of
pleadings must be done personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in
the present case, personal service would not be practicable. Considering the
distance between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition
was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have entailed
considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service was not
done personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so
worded with the use of may, signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives
the court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it
is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in
this case in the interest of substantial justice.
,,,In the case at bar, the address
Sonias counsels is Lucena City.
Such distance makes personal
explanation why service was not
supplied and citations omitted.)

of respondents counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner

Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City.
service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written
done personally might have been superfluous. [42] (Emphases

Our ruling in the above-cited cases is relevant to the instant case. Counsel for petitioner holds
office in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, in the Visayas; while counsel for respondent holds office
in Quezon City, Metro Manila, in Luzon. Given the considerable distance between the offices of these two
counsels, personal service of pleadings and motions by one upon the other was clearly not practicable and
a written explanation as to why personal service was not done would only be superfluous. [43] In addition,
we refer once more to the merits of the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 filed by petitioner, which justify the liberal
interpretation of Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court in this case.
Jurisprudence confirms that the requirements laid down in Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court that the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time
and place for the hearing of the motion, are mandatory. If not religiously complied with, they render the
motion pro forma. As such, the motion is a useless piece of paper that will not toll the running of the
prescriptive period.[44]
Yet, again, there were previous cases with peculiar circumstances that had compelled us to
liberally apply the rules on notice of hearing and recognize substantial compliance with the same. Once
such case is Philippine National Bank v. Paneda,[45] where we adjudged:
Thus, even if the Motion may be defective for failure to address the notice of
hearing of said motion to the parties concerned, the defect was cured by the court's
taking cognizance thereof and the fact that the adverse party was otherwise notified

of the existence of said pleading. There is substantial compliance with the foregoing
rules if a copy of the said motion for reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of
herein private respondents.

There being no controversy as to the facts and the petition raising pure questions of law, we adopt
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, as follows:[4]

In the present case, records reveal that the notices in the Motion were
addressed to the respective counsels of the private respondents and they were duly
furnished with copies of the same as shown by the receipts signed by their staff or
agents.

On September 7, 1971, Datu Ditingke Ramos filed with the Court of First Instance, Quezon City, an
application for registration of title covering a parcel of land situated in Quezon City, with an area of
100,000 square meters and covered by Plan (LRC) SWO-15055, as amended.[5]

Consequently, the Court finds that the petitioner substantially

complied with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and existing
jurisprudence on the requirements of motions and pleadings. [46] (Emphasis
supplied.)

On August 31, 1972, petitioner University of the Philippines (hereafter, U. P.) filed with the trial
court a motion for intervention in the case, claiming that the land covered by the application (by Datu
Ditingke Ramos) is within its property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462.

It was not refuted that petitioner furnished respondent and respondent actually received copies
of the Motion for Reconsideration, as well as the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC
Order dated September 7, 2000 filed by petitioner. As a result, respondent was able to file its Oppositions
to the said Motions. The RTC, in issuing its Order dated December 7, 2000, was able to consider the
arguments presented by both sides. Hence, there was substantial compliance by petitioner with the rules
on notice of hearing for its Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of
the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000. Respondent cannot claim that it was deprived of the opportunity
to be heard on its opposition to said Motions.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the RTC judiciously, rather than abusively or
arbitrarily, exercised its discretion when it subsequently issued the Order dated December 7, 2000, setting
aside its Order dated September 7, 2000 and proceeding with the trial in LRC Case No. N-201.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review of petitioner City of Dumaguete is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated March 4, 2005 and Resolution dated June 6, 2005 of the Court
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64379 are SET ASIDE, and the Orders dated December 7, 2000 and
February 20, 2001 of Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Dumaguete in LRC Case No.
N-201 are REINSTATED. The said trial court is DIRECTED to proceed with the hearing of LRC Case
No. N-201 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SEGUNDINA ROSARIO, respondent.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case

This is an appeal[1] from the decision of the Court of Appeals[2] setting aside the order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City which denied respondent Segundina Rosarios (hereafter,
Segundina) motion to dismiss[3] and cancelled the notice of lis pendens annotated on Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 121042.

On March 15, 1973, U.P. filed with the trial court an opposition and motion to dismiss Datu
Ditingke Ramos application for registration.
On June 6, 1973, the trial court issued an order which reads as follows:
Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the University of the Philippines and considering the
certification, sketch plan (Exhibits O and P). the testimony of the Acting Chief, Geodetic Engineer as well
as the written manifestation of the Land Registration Commission to the effect that the land subject matter
of this application and covered by plan SWO-15055 does not encroach on the property of the University
of the Philippines and that it is not inside any decreed property, the motion to dismiss the application is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On June 8, 1973, the trial court First Instance decided the application as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the application is hereby granted, declaring the applicant Rosario
Alcovendras Vda. de Ramos (surviving spouse of the original applicant who was substituted as party
applicant in the order of April 24, 1973) the absolute owner of the property applied for and covered by
Plan (LRC) SWO-15055, as amended, confirming her title thereto. Upon in the order of April 24, 1973)
the absolute owner of the property applied for and covered by Plan (LRC) SWO 15055, as amended,
confirming her title thereto. Upon this decision becoming final, let the required decree of registration be
issued and after payment of corresponding fees, let the certificate of title be issued in favor of Rosario
Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos, widow, Filipino and a resident of Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On March 19, 1974, the trial court[8] issued an order stating:
The decision rendered by this Court in the above-entitled case under the date of June 8, 1973 having
become final, the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission is hereby directed to comply with
Section 21 of Act 2347.[9]

The Facts

On May 8, 1974, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decree No. N-150604 in favor of
Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos, pursuant to which the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued OCT
No. 17 in her name.

On November 21, 1976, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City cancelled OCT No. 17 and issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 also in the name of Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos due to
errors in the technical description.[10]
On February 23, 1988, Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos executed a deed of absolute sale in
favor of Segundina Rosario (hereafter Segundina) covering the parcel of land embraced in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 223619.
On June 11, 1988, fire razed the Quezon City Hall Building which housed the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 was one of the titles destroyed by the
fire.
Subsequently, Segundina Rosario requested the Register of Deeds to reconstitute Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 223619 resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-78195
(223619).
On March 11, 1993, U.P. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Quezon City [11] a petition
for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N-126671) 367316 naming Segundina, Bugnay
Construction and Development Corporation and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, among others, as
respondents.
On November 10, 1994, Segundina caused the registration with the Register of Deeds of the deed
of absolute sale. Consequently, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042 in
Segundinas name, resulting in the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-78195(223619).

On November 10, 1997, the trial court [15] again denied Segundinas omnibus motion to dismiss and
cancel notice of lis pendens.[16]
On May 26, 1998, Segundina filed with the Court of Appeals [17] a petition for certiorari[18] assailing
the orders of the trial court denying her motion to dismiss.
On September 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in favor of Segundina. The
Court of Appeals reasoned that the third cause of action is barred by res judicata and that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Segundinas motion to dismiss. [19] We quote its dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the Orders dated
November 10, 1997, and April 16, 1998, are declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE insofar as they
deny petitioners Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens. The Third Cause of
Action in respondent University of the Philippines Amended Petition is ordered DISMISSED and the
Notice of Lis Pendens annotated on TCT No. 121042, CANCELLED. The writ of preliminary injunction,
insofar as it relates to the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 121042, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.[20]
On October 26, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals, a motion for reconsideration of the
afore-quoted decision.[21]
On December 17, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[22]

On November 19, 1996, after the parties had presented their respective evidence, U.P. filed an
amended petition alleging that it is the true, absolute and registered owner of a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and that the unlawful acts
of ownership being exercised by (Segundina) and (Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation)
as well as the existence of their spurious certificates of title, create a cloud of doubt on the title of (U.P.).
In its third cause of action, U.P. prayed that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042 or the
reconstituted titles or derivatives thereof be declared null and void ab initio for being spurious and
fraudulently issued.
On May 15, 1997, Segundina filed with the trial court an omnibus motion for the dismissal of U. P.s
third cause of action in the amended petition as well as the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendensannotated on TCT No. 121042.
On November 10, 1997, the trial court denied Segundinas omnibus motion.
On December 30, 1997, Segundina filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration
questioning the denial of her motion to dismiss and praying for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens.[12]
On April 16, 1998, the trial court [13] denied Segundinas motion for reconsideration and motion to
cancel the notice of lis pendens.[14]

Hence, this appeal.[23]

Petitioners Submissions
First, U.P. contends that the Court of Appeals erroneously allowed Segundinas motion to dismiss as
Segundina has yet to prove in a full-blown hearing whether her reconstituted title traces its roots to OCT
No. 17. According to U.P., the issuance of Segundinas title was highly anomalous.[24]
Second, U.P. assails the issuance of OCT No. 17 in LRC Case No. Q-239 as void ab
initio. According to U.P., the Court of First Instance never acquired jurisdiction over LRC Case Q-239 as
the requisite signature approval of the Director of Lands...over the survey plan...was nowhere to be found.
[25]

Third, U.P. asserts that the Court of Appeals ruled on unestablished factual issues...by admitting all
the photocopies annexed to respondent (Segundina) Rosarios petition as evidence despite the fact that they
all still remained subject to authentication and examination by the parties before the trial court. [26]
Fourth, U. P. attacks the verification of Segundinas petition in the Court of Appeals as defective.
The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

We outline the history of the title that Segundina holds (Title No. 121042): First, the land was
originally covered by Plan (LRC) SWO-15055, as amended, which the Court of First Instance declared as
not encroaching on the property of U.P. and as absolutely owned by Rosario Alcovendras Vda. de
Ramos. Thus, OCT No. 17 was issued in her name. Second, OCT No. 17 was cancelled and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 223619 was issued. Third, Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos executed an
absolute deed of sale over the land in favor of Segundina. Fourth, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619
was burned in the fire that razed the Quezon City Hall. Fifth, Title No. 223619 was reconstituted and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-78195 was issued in its place. Sixth, Segundina registered the deed of
absolute sale. Thus, Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-78195 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 121042 was issued in Segundinas name.
In LRC Q-329 the trial court declared U.P. as having no interest in the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 121042. However, UPs contention that OCT No. 17 is void for lack of the requisite
signature approval of the Director of Landsover the survey plan[27] is worth looking into.

There is no pretense that the foregoing conflicting claims entail determination of facts. It, thus, become
imperative that both parties be given their day in Court to avoid the danger of committing a grave injustice
if they were denied an opportunity to introduce evidence in their behalf.
It is within this context that the Court considers it appropriate under the present stage of the action to
DENY the instant motion.[34]
Pending final ruling on the merits of the case, Segundinas motion to cancel the notice of lis
pendens must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court REVERSES the decision of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on September 18, 1998, in CA-G. R. SP No. 47783.
In lieu thereof, the Court orders the case REMANDED to the trial court for trial on the merits.
No costs.

[28]

P. D. No. 1529 requires the Director of Lands to sign and approve the survey plan for the land
applied for, otherwise, the title is void.
Sec. 17. What and where to file - The application for land registration shall be filed with the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the land is situated. The applicant shall file together with the
application all original muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan approved by the Bureau of
Lands.
The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the applicant has furnished the
Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all the annexes (emphasis ours).
No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration proceedings until approved by the Director
of Lands.[29] The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. Unless a plan
and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are of no value. [30]

SO ORDERED.
nds is enumerated, to wit
SEC. 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows
1. For homestead settlement;
2. By sale;
3. By lease; and
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:

Thus, the allegation that the signature approval for the survey plan was nowhere to be found is an
important jurisdictional fact that must be ventilated before the trial court. In Republic v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,[31] this Court stated that void ab initio land titles issued cannot ripen into private
ownership. Thus, as OCT No. 17 is void and Segundina traces her rights to OCT No. 17, her claim would
have no basis as a spring cannot rise higher than its source.[32]

(a) By judicial legalization;

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

Whether the land covered by OCT No. 17 is inside decreed property is an issue of fact that can be
best determined by the trial court after an examination of the evidence. We find meritorious the trial courts
rationale for denying Segundinas motion to dismiss. We quote:

Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act
since the specific requirements and application procedure differ for every mode. More particularly, the
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles may be done two ways, either by: (a) administrative
legalization or free patents under Chapter VII of the Public Land Act; or (b) judicial legalization or
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles under Chapter VIII of the same Act. Having filed
their application before the courts, petitioners have pursued a judicial legalization or judicial confirmation
of their title to the Subject Property.

To establish their respective rights over the disputed property, both plaintiff and respondents submitted
documentary exhibits, the genuineness and authenticity of which can only be proved in a full blown trial.

Petitioners primarily base their arguments on the amendment by RA No. 6940 of Section 44 of the
Public Land Act, to read as follows

Further, the judgment in LRC Q-329 was subject to the qualification that If the parcel of land is
found to be inside decreed properties, this plan is automatically cancelled.[33]

SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twelve (12)
hectares and who, for at least thirty (30) years prior to the effectivity of this amendatory Act, has
continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest a tract or
tracts of agricultural public land subject to disposition, who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon
while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this Chapter,
to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twelve (12) hectares.
While the above-quoted provision does provide for a 30-year period of occupation and cultivation
of the land, Section 44 of the Public Land Act applies to free patents, and not to judicial confirmation of
an imperfect or incomplete title to which Section 48(b) applies.
The distinction between Sections 44 and 48(b) of the Public Land Act was recognized by Mr.
Justice Puno, in his separate opinion in the case of Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,[19] in which he discussed the development of the Regalian doctrine in the Philippine legal
system
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of ownership
under the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens to
Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete
titles and Section 48(b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles.
The remaining provisions of RA No. 6940 amend Sections 44 and 47 of the Public Land Act by
extending the periods for filing of applications for free patents and for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles, respectively, to 31 December 2000. Except for extending the period for filing of
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, RA No. 6940 does not touch on the
other provisions under Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act, such as Section 48(b) and the prescriptive
period provided therein.
Consequently, applying the standard provided by this Court on repeal by implication, there can be
no conflict or inconsistency between Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the provisions of RA No.
6940 that would give rise to a repeal of the former by the latter.
The subsequent effectivity of RA No. 9176 on 01 January 2001 does not affect the position of this
Court on the issues discussed herein. Once again, Section 47 is the only provision under Chapter VIII of
the Public Land Act amended by RA No. 9176 by further extending the period for filing of applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to 31 December 2020. The other provisions of the
Public Land Act amended by RA No. 9176, such as Sections 44 and 45, already refer to free patents under
Chapter VII. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, and the prescriptive
period provided therein still remain unchanged.
IN ALL:
(1) Section 44 of the Public Land Act, as amended by RA No. 6940, which provides for a
prescriptive period of thirty (30) years possession, applies only to applications for free patents;
(2) The case at bar is a judicial application for confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title over
the Subject Property covered by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act; and

(3) Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act requires for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title the continuous possession of the land since 12 June 1945, or earlier, which petitioners
herein failed to comply with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court AFFIRMS the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68546, which reversed the decision of the
lower court in LRC Case No. 98-133 (LRA Record No. N-69787) and dismissed the application for land
title of petitioners. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. 171514

July 18, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
DOMINGO ESPINOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the Decision1 dated November 11, 2004 and
Resolution2 dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456.
On March 3, 1999, respondent Domingo Espinosa (Espinosa) tiled with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Consolacion, Cebu an application3 for land registration covering a parcel of land with an area of 5,525
square meters and situated in Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu. In support of his application,
which was docketed as LRC Case No. N-81, Espinosa alleged that: (a) the property, which is more
particularly known as Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New), is alienable and disposable; (b) he purchased
the property from his mother, Isabel Espinosa (Isabel), on July 4, 1970 and the latters other heirs had
waived their rights thereto; and (c) he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the
property in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years.
Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan 07-0008934 to prove the identity of the land.
As proof that the property is alienable and disposable, he marked as evidence the annotation on the
advance survey plan made by Cynthia L. Ibaez, Chief of the Map Projection Section, stating that
"CONFORMED PER L.C. MAP NOTATION L.C. Map No. 2545 Project No. 28 certified on June 25,
1963, verified to be within Alienable & Disposable Area".5 Espinosa also presented two (2) tax
declarations for the years 1965 and 1974 in Isabels name Tax Declaration Nos. 013516 and 06137 to
prove that she had been in possession of the property since 1965. To support his claim that he had been
religiously paying the taxes due on the property, Espinosa presented a Certification6 dated December 1,
1998 issued by the Office of the Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and three (3) tax declarations for the
years 1978, 1980 and 1985 Tax Declaration Nos. 14010, 17681 and 010717.8
Petitioner opposed Espinosas application, claiming that: (a) Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141
otherwise known as the "Public Land Act" (PLA) had not been complied with as Espinosas predecessorin-interest possessed the property only after June 12, 1945; and (b) the tax declarations do not prove that

his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest are in the character and for the length of time
required by law.
On August 18, 2000, the MTC rendered a Judgment9 granting Espinosas petition for registration, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering for the registration
and the confirmation of title of Espinosa over Lot No. 8499, Cad 545-D (New), situated at Barangay
Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu, Philippines, containing an area of 5,525 square meters and that upon the
finality of this decision, let a corresponding decree of registration be issued in favor of the herein applicant
in accordance with Section 39, P.D. 1529.
SO ORDERED.10
According to the MTC, Espinosa was able to prove that the property is alienable and disposable and that
he complied with the requirements of Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Specifically:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented in the above-entitled case, the Court is convinced,
and so holds, that Espinosa was able to establish his ownership and possession over the subject lot which
is within the area considered by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The Court is likewise convinced that the applicant and that of predecessor-in-interest have been in open,
actual, public, continuous, adverse and under claim of title thereto within the time prescribed by law (Sec.
14, sub-par. 1, P.D. 1529) and/or in accordance with the Land Registration Act. 11
Petitioner appealed to the CA and pointed Espinosas failure to prove that his possession and that of his
predecessor-in-interest were for the period required by law. As shown by Tax Declaration No. 013516,
Isabels possession commenced only in 1965 and not on June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section
48(b) of the PLA. On the other hand, Espinosa came into possession of the property only in 1970
following the sale that transpired between him and his mother and the earliest tax declaration in his name
was for the year 1978. According to petitioner, that Espinosa and his predecessor-in-interest were
supposedly in possession for more than thirty (30) years is inconsequential absent proof that such
possession began on June 12, 1945 or earlier.12
Petitioner also claimed that Espinosas failure to present the original tracing cloth of the survey plan or a
sepia copy thereof is fatal to his application. Citing Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines13 and
Director of Lands v. Judge Reyes,14 petitioner argued that the submission of the original tracing cloth is
mandatory in establishing the identity of the land subject of the application.15
Further, petitioner claimed that the annotation on the advance survey plan is not the evidence admissible
to prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable.16
By way of the assailed decision, the CA dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed the MTC Decision
dated August 18, 2000. The CA ruled that possession for at least thirty (30) years, despite the fact that it
commenced after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert the property to private. Thus:

The contention of petitioner is not meritorious on the following grounds:

a) The record of the case will show that Espinosa has successfully established valid title over the subject
land and that he and his predecessor-in-interest have been in continuous, adverse, public and undisturbed
possession of said land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years before the filing of the
application. Established jurisprudence has consistently pronounced that "open, continuous and exclusive
possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same into private property
(Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 604). This means that occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years by applicant and his predecessor-in-interest vests title on such applicant
so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land (National Power Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 218 SCRA 41); and
b) It is true that the requirement of possession since June 12, 1945 is the latest amendment of Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141), but a strict implementation of the law would in certain cases
result in inequity and unfairness to Espinosa. As wisely stated by the Supreme Court in the case of
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567:
"Following the logic of the petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title
over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in
open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more." 17
The CA also ruled that registration can be based on other documentary evidence, not necessarily the
original tracing cloth plan, as the identity and location of the property can be established by other
competent evidence.
Again, the aforesaid contention of [the petitioner] is without merit. While the best evidence to identify a
piece of land for registration purposes may be the original tracing cloth plan from the Land Registration
Commission, the court may sufficiently order the issuance of a decree of registration on the basis of the
blue print copies and other evidence (Republic of the Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. L-70594, October 10, 1986). The said case provides further:
"The fact that the lower court finds the evidence of the applicant sufficient to justify the registration and
confirmation of her titles and did not find it necessary to avail of the original tracing cloth plan from the
Land Registration Commission for purposes of comparison, should not militate against the rights of the
applicant. Such is especially true in this case where no clear, strong, convincing and more preponderant
proof has been shown by the oppositor to overcome the correctness of said plans which were found both
by the lower court and the Court of Appeals as conclusive proofs of the description and identities of the
parcels of land contained therein."
There is no dispute that, in case of Del Rosario vs. Republic, supra the Supreme Court pronounced that
the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in
cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement, and that failure to comply
with such requirement is fatal to ones application for registration. However, such pronouncement need
not be taken as an iron clad rule nor to be applied strictly in all cases without due regard to the rationale
behind the submission of the tracing cloth plan.
x x x:

xxxx
As long as the identity of and location of the lot can be established by other competent evidence like a
duly approved blueprint copy of the advance survey plan of Lot 8499 and technical description of Lot
8499, containing and identifying the boundaries, actual area and location of the lot, the presentation of the
original tracing cloth plan may be excused.18
Moreover, the CA ruled that Espinosa had duly proven that the property is alienable and disposable:
Espinosa has established that Lot 8499 is alienable and disposable. In the duly approved Advance Survey
Plan As-07-0000893 (sic) duly approved by the Land Management Services, DENR, Region 7, Cebu City,
it is certified/verified that the subject lot is inside the alienable and disposable area of the disposable and
alienable land of the public domain.19
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in its Resolution20 dated February 13,
2006.
Petitioners Case
Petitioner entreats this Court to reverse and set aside the CAs assailed decision and attributes the
following errors: (a) Espinosa failed to prove by competent evidence that the subject property is alienable
and disposable; (b) jurisprudence dictates that a survey plan identifies the property in preparation for a
judicial proceeding but does not convert the property into alienable, much less, private; (c) under Section
17 of P.D. No. 1529, the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is mandatory to determine the exact
metes and bounds of the property; and (d) a blueprint copy of the survey plan may be admitted as evidence
of the identity and location of the property only if it bears the approval of the Director of Lands.
Issues
The resolution of the primordial question of whether Espinosa has acquired an imperfect title over the
subject property that is worthy of confirmation and registration is hinged on the determination of the
following issues:
a. whether the blueprint of the advanced survey plan substantially complies with Section 17 of
P.D. No. 1529; and
b. whether the notation on the blueprint copy of the plan made by the geodetic engineer who
conducted the survey sufficed to prove that the land applied for is alienable and disposable.
Our Ruling
The lower courts were unanimous in holding that Espinosas application is anchored on Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA and the grant thereof is warranted in view of
evidence supposedly showing his compliance with the requirements thereof.
This Court is of a different view.

Based on Espinosas allegations and his supporting documents, it is patent that his claim of an imperfect
title over the property in question is based on Section 14(2) and not Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in
relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA. Espinosa did not allege that his possession and that of his
predecessor-in-interest commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier as prescribed under the two (2) latter
provisions. On the contrary, Espinosa repeatedly alleged that he acquired title thru his possession and that
of his predecessor-in-interest, Isabel, of the subject property for thirty (30) years, or through prescription.
Therefore, the rule that should have been applied is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, which states:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing
laws.
Obviously, the confusion that attended the lower courts disposition of this case stemmed from their
failure to apprise themselves of the changes that Section 48(b) of the PLA underwent over the years.
Section 48(b) of the PLA originally states:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Thus, the required possession and occupation for judicial confirmation of imperfect title was since July
26, 1894 or earlier.
On June 22, 1957, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942 amended Section 48(b) of the PLA by providing a thirty
(30)-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Thus:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of

the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
On January 25, 1977, P.D. No. 1073 was issued, changing the requirement for possession and occupation
for a period of thirty (30) years to possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1073 states:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945.

and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is neither contemplated under Section 48(b) that if
possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land started after June 12, 1945, it is still
possible to acquire an imperfect title if such possession and occupation spanned for thirty (30) years at the
time of the filing of the application.
In this case, the lower courts concluded that Espinosa complied with the requirements of Section 48(b) of
the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 based on supposed evidence that he and his
predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the property for at least thirty (30) years prior to the time
he filed his application. However, there is nothing on record showing that as of January 25, 1977 or prior
to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073, he or Isabel had already acquired title by means of possession and
occupation of the property for thirty (30) years. On the contrary, the earliest tax declaration in Isabels
name was for the year 1965 indicating that as of January 25, 1977, only twelve (12) years had lapsed from
the time she first came supposedly into possession.

On June 11, 1978, P.D. No. 1529 was enacted. Notably, the requirement for possession and occupation
since June 12, 1945 or earlier was adopted under Section 14(1) thereof.
P.D. No. 1073, in effect, repealed R.A. No. 1942 such that applications under Section 48(b) of the PLA
filed after the promulgation of P.D. No. 1073 should allege and prove possession and occupation that
dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. However, vested rights may have been acquired under Section
48(b) prior to its amendment by P.D. No. 1073. That is, should petitions for registration filed by those who
had already been in possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for thirty (30) years
at the time P.D. No. 1073 was promulgated be denied because their possession commenced after June 12,
1945? In Abejaron v. Nabasa,21 this Court resolved this legal predicament as follows:
However, as petitioner Abejarons 30-year period of possession and occupation required by the Public
Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in
1977, the requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or
earlier, does not apply to him. As the Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes
place by operation of law, then upon Abejarons satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have
already gained title over the disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot impair vested rights such as a land grant.
More clearly stated, "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior
to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947" may apply for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.22 (Citations
omitted)
Consequently, for one to invoke Section 48(b) and claim an imperfect title over an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain on the basis of a thirty (30)-year possession and occupation, it must
be demonstrated that such possession and occupation commenced on January 24, 1947 and the thirty (30)year period was completed prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073.

There is nothing in Section 48(b) that would suggest that it provides for two (2) modes of acquisition. It is
not the case that there is an option between possession and occupation for thirty (30) years and possession

The CAs reliance on Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court23 is misplaced considering that the
application therein was filed on October 20, 1975 or before the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073. The same can
be said with respect to National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals. 24 The petition for registration
therein was filed on August 21, 1968 and at that time, the prevailing rule was that provided under Section
48(b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,25 the applicants therein entered into possession of the property on June
17, 1978 and filed their application on February 5, 1987. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the
individuals from whom the applicant purchased the property, or their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
possession since 1937. Thus, during the effectivity of Section 48(b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942, or
while the prevailing rule was possession and occupation for thirty (30) years, or prior to the issuance of
P.D. No. 1073, the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period was already completed.
Thus, assuming that it is Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 that should
apply in this case, as the lower courts held, it was incumbent upon Espinosa to prove, among other things,
that Isabels possession of the property dated back at least to June 12, 1945. That in view of the
established fact that Isabels alleged possession and occupation started much later, the lower courts should
have dismissed Espinosas application outright.
In sum, the CA, as well as the MTC, erred in not applying the present text of Section 48(b) of the PLA.
That there were instances wherein applications were granted on the basis of possession and occupation for
thirty (30) years was for the sole reason discussed above. Regrettably, such reason does not obtain in this
case.

Being clear that it is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply, it follows that the subject property
being supposedly alienable and disposable will not suffice. As Section 14(2) categorically provides, only
private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code,
only those properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for the development of
national wealth, are considered private. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,26 this Court held that

there must be an official declaration to that effect before the property may be rendered susceptible to
prescription:

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is
this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property
susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420(2) makes clear that those property "which
belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to
the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion
if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth." (Emphasis
supplied)

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be
no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.27
Thus, granting that Isabel and, later, Espinosa possessed and occupied the property for an aggregate period
of thirty (30) years, this does not operate to divest the State of its ownership. The property, albeit allegedly
alienable and disposable, is not patrimonial. As the property is not held by the State in its private capacity,
acquisition of title thereto necessitates observance of the provisions of Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation
to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 or possession and occupation since June 12, 1945. For prescription to
run against the State, there must be proof that there was an official declaration that the subject property is
no longer earmarked for public service or the development of national wealth. Moreover, such official
declaration should have been issued at least ten (10) or thirty (30) years, as the case may be, prior to the
filing of the application for registration. The period of possession and occupation prior to the conversion
of the property to private or patrimonial shall not be considered in determining completion of the
prescriptive period. Indeed, while a piece of land is still reserved for public service or the development of
national wealth, even if the same is alienable and disposable, possession and occupation no matter how
lengthy will not ripen to ownership or give rise to any title that would defeat that of the States if such did
not commence on June 12, 1945 or earlier.

At any rate, as petitioner correctly pointed out, the notation on the survey plan does not constitute
incontrovertible

evidence that would overcome the presumption that the property belongs to the inalienable public domain.
All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public
domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. 28
In Republic v. Sarmiento,29 this Court reiterated the earlier ruling in Menguito v. Republic30 that the
notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed is alienable and disposable is
not the positive government act that would remove the property from the inalienable domain. Neither it is
the evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert the presumption that the property is inalienable:

To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan
approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this
survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on
January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such a notation to prove that the lot is alienable is
insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains
part of the inalienable public domain.

"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3,
1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. . .
."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that
the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of the land in question.
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the
said surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been
declared alienable."31 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied)

Therefore, even if Espinosas application may not be dismissed due to his failure to present the original
tracing cloth of the survey plan, there are numerous grounds for its denial. The blueprint copy of the
advanced survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and location of the subject property if:
(a) it was duly executed by a licensed geodetic engineer; (b) it proceeded officially from the Land
Management Services (LMS) of the DENR; and (c) it is accompanied by a technical description of the
property which is certified as correct by the geodetic surveyor who conducted the survey and the LMS of
the DENR. As ruled in Republic v. Guinto-Aldana,32the identity of the land, its boundaries and location
can be established by other competent evidence apart from the original tracing cloth such as a duly
executed blueprint of the survey plan and technical description:

Based on the foregoing, it appears that Espinosa cannot avail the benefits of either Section 14(1) of P.O.
No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA or Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529. Applying Section
14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of the PLA, albeit improper, Espinosa failed to prove that: (a)
Isabel's possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable
and disposable. On the other hand, applying Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529, Espinosa failed to prove that
the property is patrimonial. As to whether Espinosa was able to prove that his possession and occupation
and that of Isabel were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been rendered
unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The
Decision dated November 11, 2004 and Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 72456 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Domingo Espinosa's application for
registration of title over Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New) located at Barangay Cabangahan,
Consolacion, Cebu is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is merely
to provide a convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact identity of the property
applied for registration and to ensure that the same does not overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining
lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application must be denied for failure to present the
original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is accompanied by pieces of evidencesuch as a duly
executed blueprint of the survey plan and a duly executed technical description of the propertywhich
may likewise substantially and with as much certainty prove the limits and extent of the property sought to
be registered.33

However, while such blueprint copy of the survey plan may be offered as evidence of the identity, location
and the boundaries of the property applied for, the notation therein may not be admitted as evidence of
alienability and disposability. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,34 this Court enumerated the documents
that are deemed relevant and sufficient to prove that the property is already outside the inalienable public
domain as follows:
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not enough for the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the land into
alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such
copy of the DENR Secretarys declaration or the Presidents proclamation must be certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of such official record.1wphi1 These facts must be established to prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.35 (Citation omitted)

he facts follow.
On April 3, 2002, respondents Zenaida Guinto-Aldana [4] (Zenaida), Ma. Aurora Guinto-Comiso, Ma. Luisa
Guinto-Dionisio, Alfredo Guinto, Jr., Pacita R. Guinto, Ernesto R. Guinto, Natividad R. Guinto and
Alberto R. Guinto, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 199 an Application
for Registration of Title [5] over two pieces of land in Talango, Pamplona Uno, Las Pias City. These lands,
identified as Lot No. 4 and Lot No. 5 in Conversion Consolidation Subdivision Plan Ccs-007601-000040D,[6] measure 1,509 square meters and 4,640 square meters, respectively. [7] Respondents professed
themselves to be co-owners of these lots, having acquired them by succession from their predecessors
Sergio Guinto (Sergio) and Lucia Rivera-Guinto (Lucia)Zenaidas parentswho, in turn, had acquired the
property under a 1969 document denominated asKasulatan sa Paghahati ng Lupa na Labas sa Hukuman
na may Pagpaparaya at Bilihan. Under this document, Sergio and Lucia Guinto acquired for a
consideration the respective shares on the property of Pastor Guinto, Dionisio Guinto, Potenciana Guinto
and Marcelina Bernardo who, together with Luisa, had derived the same from Romulado Guinto.
[8]
Respondents also alleged that until the time of the application, they and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in actual, open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous possession of these lots in the
concept of owner and that they had consistently declared the property in their name for purposes of real
estate taxation.[9]
In support of their application, respondents submitted to the court the blueprint of Plan Ccs007601-000040-D,[10] as well as copies of the technical descriptions of each lot, [11] a certification from the
geodetic engineer[12] and the pertinent tax declarations, [13] together with the receipts of payment therefor.
[14]
Expressly, they averred that the propertys original tracing cloth plan had previously been submitted to
the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 255 (Las Pias RTC) in connection with the proceedings in LRC Case
No. LP-128a previous registration case involving the subject property which, however, had been
dismissed without prejudice.[15]
The trial court found the application to be sufficient in form and substance; hence, it gave due
course thereto and ordered compliance with the publication and notification requirements of the law.[16]

Opposing the application, petitioner, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City,
advanced that the lots sought to be registered were inalienable lands of the public domain; that neither
respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in prior possession thereof; and that the muniment
of title and the tax declaration submitted to the court did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence
of bona fide acquisition or of prior possession in the concept of owner.[17]
At the hearing, Zenaida identified her herein co-respondents to be her siblings, nephews and
nieces. She likewise identified the adjoining lot owners named in the application and the supporting
documents attached to the application as well. She testified that the subject lots had been surveyed at the
instance of her family sometime between 1994 and 1995, and that said survey was documented in Plan
Ccs-007601-000040-D and in the geodetic engineers technical description of the lots. She implied that
they did obtain the original tracing cloth plan of the property, but it was forwarded to the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) by the Las Pias RTC in connection with the proceedings in LRC Case No.
LP-128. Notwithstanding this admission, and without objection from the oppositor, the blueprint of Plan
Ccs-007601-000040-D and the technical description of the property were provisionally marked in
evidence.[18]
Furthermore, Zenaida61 years old at the time of her testimonydeclared that she has known that
the subject lots were owned by her family since she was 5 years old and from her earliest recollection, she
narrated that her grandparents had lived in the subject lots until the death of her grandmother in 1961. She
implied that aside from her predecessors there were other persons, caretakers supposedly, who had tilled
the land and who had lived until sometime between 1980 and 1990. She remembered her grandmother
having constructed a house on the property, but the same had already been destroyed. Also, sometime in
1970, her family built an adobe fence around the perimeter of the lots and later, in the 1990s, they
reinforced it with hollow blocks and concrete after an inundation caused by the flood. [19] She claimed that
she and her father, Sergio, had been religious in the payment of real estate taxes as shown by the tax
declarations and tax receipts which she submitted to the court and which, following identification, were
forthwith marked in evidence.[20]
Zenaidas claim of prior, open, exclusive and continuous possession of the land was
corroborated by Josefina Luna (Josefina), one of the adjoining lot owners. Josefina, then 73 years old,
strongly declared that the subject lots were owned by Zenaidas parents, Sergio Guinto and Lucia Rivera,
since she reached the age of understanding, and that she had not come to know of any instance where a
third party had placed a claim on the property. When asked whether there was anyone residing in the
property and whether there were improvements made thereon, she said there was no one residing therein
and that there was nothing standing thereon except for a nipa hut. [21]
At the close of Josefinas testimony, respondents formally offered their exhibits without the oppositor
placing any objection thereto.[22] After weighing the evidence, the trial court, on July 10, 2003, rendered its
Decision denying the application for registration. It found that respondents were unable to establish with
certainty the identity of the lots applied for registration, because of failure to submit to the court the
original tracing cloth plan as mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. It likewise noted that the
fact of adverse, continuous, open, public and peaceful possession in the concept of owner has not been
proved by the evidence as Zenaidas and Josefinas respective testimonies did not establish the nature of the
possession of respondents predecessors.[23] The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the applicants to comply with the requirements of Presidential Decree No.
1529, the Application for Original Registration of Title is hereby DENIED.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on March 30, 2006, issued the
assailed Decision reversing the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant appeal is hereby
GRANTED.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. [26] Hence, it filed the instant petition which
attributes error to the Court of Appeals in reversing the trial courts July 10, 2003 decision.

Petitioner principally posits that under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the submission in court of
the original tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be registered is a mandatory requirement in
registration proceedings in order to establish the exact identity of the property. While respondents
admitted that the original tracing cloth plan of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 in this case was in the custody of the LRA
as a consequence of their first attempt to have the property registered, petitioner, invoking Del Rosario v.
Republic of the Philippines,[27] believes that respondents, on that score alone, are not relieved of their
procedural obligation to adduce in evidence the original copy of the plan, because they could have easily
retrieved it from the LRA and presented it in court.[28]
Furthermore, petitioner suggests that the blueprint of the subdivision plan submitted by
respondents cannot approximate substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 17 of P.D. No.
1529. Again, relying on the aforementioned Del Rosario case, petitioner observes that the blueprint in this
case, allegedly illegible and unreadable, does not even bear the certification of the Lands Management
Bureau.[29] Lastly, petitioner attacks respondents claim of prior possession. It notes that there is no clear
and convincing evidence that respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, adverse, public and exclusive possession of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 for 30 years.[30]
Commenting on the petition, respondents observe that petitioners arguments are mere
reiterative theses on the issues that have already been addressed by the Court of Appeals in the assailed
Decision and Resolution, and that there are no new matters raised which have not yet been previously
passed upon. Accordingly, they prayed that the petition be denied.[31]
We find the petition to be unmeritorious.
Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree of
1978, materially provides:
Section 17. What and where to file.The application for land registration
shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land
is situated. The applicant shall file, together with the application, all original
muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by the
Bureau of Lands.
The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that
the applicant has furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application and
all annexes.
The provision denotes that it is imperative in an application for original registration that the
applicant submit to the court, aside from the original or duplicate copies of the muniments of title, a copy
of a duly approved survey plan of the land sought to be registered. The survey plan is indispensable as it
provides a reference on the exact identity of the property. This begs the question in the instant case: Does
the blueprint copy of the survey plan suffice for compliance with the requirement? In not so many cases,
[32]
it was held that the non-submission, for any reason, of the original tracing cloth plan is fatal to the
registration application, since the same is mandatory in original registration of title. For instance, in
the Del Rosario case relied on by petitioner, the Court ruled that the submission of the original copy of the
duly approved tracing cloth plan is a mandatory condition for land registration as it supplies the means by
which to determine the exact metes and bounds of the property. The applicant in that case was unable to
submit the original tracing cloth plan of the land he was claiming because apparently, as in the present
case, it was previously transmitted by the clerk of court to the LRA. Yet the Court, deeming it the
applicants obligation to retrieve the plan himself and present it in evidence, denied the application, to wit:
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly
approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of
land is a mandatory requirement.The reason for this rule is to establish the true
identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion
thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the
possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining

land. The failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioners application
for registration.
Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted the original tracing
cloth plan to the branch clerk of court, but the latter submitted the same to the
LRA. This claim has no merit. Petitioner is duty bound to retrieve the tracing cloth
plan from the LRA and to present it in evidence in the trial court. x x x[33]
Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original tracing cloth plan
is merely to provide a convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact identity of the
property applied for registration and to ensure that the same does not overlap with the boundaries of the
adjoining lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application must be denied for failure to
present the original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is accompanied by pieces of evidencesuch as a
duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and a duly executed technical description of the propertywhich
may likewise substantially and with as much certainty prove the limits and extent of the property sought to
be registered.
Thus, sound is the doctrinal precept laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals,[34] and in the later cases of Spouses Recto v. Republic of the Philippines[35] and Republic of the
Philippines v. Hubilla,[36] that while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is
the original tracing cloth plan issued by the Bureau of Lands (now the Lands Management Services of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), blueprint copies and other evidence could
also provide sufficient identification. Pertinently, the Court in Hubilla, citing Recto, pronounced:
While the petitioner correctly asserts that the submission in evidence of
the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, is a
mandatory requirement, this Court has recognized instances of substantial
compliance with this rule. In previous cases, this Court ruled that blueprint copies
of the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands and other evidence
could also provide sufficient identification to identify a piece of land for registration
purposes. x x x[37]

the oppositor-appellee can be deemed as an implied admission that the original

tracing cloth plan and the blueprint copy thereof (Exh. J) are one and the same, free
from all defects and clearly identify the lands sought to be registered. In this regard
x x x, the blueprint copy of the plan (Exh. J), together with its technical descriptions
(Exhs. K and L), is deemed tantamount to substantial compliance with the
requirements of law.[40]
We now proceed to the issue of possession. Petitioner theorizes that not only were respondents unable to
identify the lots applied for registration; it also claims that they have no credible evidence tending to
establish that for at least 30 years they and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the
property openly, continuously, exclusively and notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.[41] We do not agree.
In an original registration of title under Section 14(1)[42] P.D. No. 1529, the applicant for registration must
be able to establish by evidence that he and his predecessor-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion
over the lot under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. [43] He must prove that for
at least 30 years, he and his predecessor have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land. Republic v. Alconaba[44] well explains possession and occupation of
this character, thus:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an
applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.[45]

In the case at bar, we find that the submission of the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,
together with the technical description of the property, operates as substantial compliance with the legal
requirement of ascertaining the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 applied for registration. The blueprint, which
is shown to have been duly executed by Geodetic Engineer Rolando Roxas (Roxas), attached to the
application and subsequently identified, marked, and offered in evidence, shows that it proceeded
officially from the Lands Management Services and, in fact, bears the approval of Surveys Division Chief
Ernesto Erive. It also shows on its face that the survey of the property was endorsed by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR. [38] This, compounded by the accompanying
technical description of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 duly executed and verified also by Roxas, [39] should substantially
supply as it did the means by which the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 may be ascertained.

Proceeding from this fundamental principle, we find that indeed respondents have been in possession and
occupation of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 under a bona fide claim of ownership for the duration required by
law. This conclusion is primarily factual.

Verily, no error can be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that respondents were
able to approximate compliance with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529. Also telling is the observation made by
the Court of Appeals that there was no objection raised by the oppositor or by the LRA to the admission of
the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D despite the fact that they were well-informed of the present
proceedings, to wit:

Certainly, respondents could have produced more proof of this kind had it not been for the fact that, as
certified by the Office of the Rizal Provincial Assessor, the relevant portions of the tax records on file with
it had been burned when the assessors office was razed by fire in 1997. [51] Of equal relevance is the fact
that with these tax assessments, there came next tax payments. Respondents receipts for tax expenditures
on Lot Nos. 4 and 5 between 1977 and 2001 are likewise fleshed out in the records and in these
documents, Sergio, Toribia and Romualdo are the named owners of the property with Zenaida being
identified as the one who delivered the payment in the 1994 receipts.[52]

In the instant case, the plaintiffs-appellants do not deny that only the
blueprint copy of the plan of the subject lands (Exh. J) and not the original tracing
cloth plan thereof was submitted to the court a quo since they had previously
submitted the original tracing cloth plan to the Land Registration
Authority. However, despite the failure of the plaintiffs-appellants to present the
original tracing cloth plan, neither the Land Registration Authority nor the
oppositor-appellee question[ed] this deficiency. Likewise, when the blueprint copy
of the plan (Exh. J) was offered in evidence, the oppositor-apellee did not raise any
objection thereto. Such silence on the part of the Land Registration [Authority] and

From the records, it is clear that respondents possession through their predecessor-in-interest dates back to
as early as 1937. In that year, the subject property had already been declared for taxation by Zenaidas
father, Sergio, jointly with a certain Toribia Miranda (Toribia). [46] Yet, it also can be safely inferred that
Sergio and Toribia had declared the land for taxation even earlier because the 1937 tax declaration shows
that it offsets a previous tax number.[47] The property was again declared in 1979,[48] 1985[49] and 1994[50] by
Sergio, Toribia and by Romualdo.

The foregoing evidentiary matters and muniments clearly show that Zenaidas testimony in this respect is
no less believable. And the unbroken chain of positive acts exercised by respondents predecessors, as
demonstrated by these pieces of evidence, yields no other conclusion than that as early as 1937, they had
already demonstrated an unmistakable claim to the property. Not only do they show that they had
excluded all others in their claim but also, that such claim is in all good faith.

Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule that while tax declarations and realty tax
payment are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are a good indication of possession
in the concept of owner. These documents constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over
the property, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at
least constructive possession. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property. It also announces his
adverse claim against the state and all other parties who may be in conflict with his interest. More
importantly, it signifies an unfeigned intention to contribute to government revenuesan act that strengthens
ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[53]

The City of Paraaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the
property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from
the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the
property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard
that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.3

Indeed, that respondents herein have been in possession of the land in the concept of owneropen,
continuous, peaceful and without interference and opposition from the government or from any private
individualitself makes their right thereto unquestionably settled and, hence, deserving of protection under
the law.

On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 30, 2006 Decision and the November 20, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500, areAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160453

November 12, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the
water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the
river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion,
not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.

Ruling of the RTC

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and
ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of
the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of Paraaque with an
area of one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd00-000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Paraaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders
the registration of Lot 4998-B in their names with the following technical description, to wit:
xxxx
Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for the Issuance of the
Decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.
Ruling of the CA
In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC, 5 to wit:

Antecedents
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III
(Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or
less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot
4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraaque
River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by
Arcadio Ivan.1
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his
co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been
formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse
possession for more than 30 years.2

To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and whether or not
respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
I.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents benefit
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."

In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:

On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III
and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this application which was previously a
part of the Paraaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4
which adjoins the same property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by
him through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased. Conformably with Art. 457 of
the New Civil Code, it is provided that:
"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."9
The CA upheld the RTCs pronouncement, holding:
It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code)
as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was
previously part of the Paraaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot
4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was obtained by the latter from his
mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo).10
The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code
was erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the
drying up of the Paraaque River.

Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original title of Lot 4
was issued in their mothers name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as the land
formed between Lot 4 and the Paraaque River, the unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil and
sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the Paraaque River, resulting in the
formation of Lot 4998-B.
The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that the effects of
the current of the river are not the only cause of the formation of land along a river bank. There are several
other causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the
uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did not establish at all that
the increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the
current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the
dry land with an area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by
the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years the span of time intervening between 1920,
when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in
existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when
he knew them to have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment
was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Paraaque River. Confirming this explanation was
Arcadio, Jr.s own testimony to the effect that the property was previously a part of the Paraaque River
that had dried up and become an orchard.
We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.s own Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687
confirmed the uniform conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been formed by the drying
up of the Paraaque River. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated
subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by
Dried River Bed."14

The Republics submission is correct.

Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish the merits of
their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is of greater
weight, or more convincing than that offered in opposition to it.11 They would be held entitled to claim the
property as their own and apply for its registration under the Torrens system only if they established that,
indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. 12 The deposit of soil, to be
considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current
of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers. 13
Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant the
grant of their application for land registration.
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual and
imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B.
Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of the Paraaque River,
leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously
part of the Paraaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."

That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B, which was
described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of respondent Arcadio
Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the Northeast." 15
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became
respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion.
The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the
river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not
recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to
claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the
Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and
categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and
categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application. 16 The first and
fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.17
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of
the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. 18 It
follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the
State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river
beds should belong to some other person.19

II
Acquisitive prescription was
not applicable in favor of respondents
The RTC favored respondents application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also because they had
taken possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than 30 years
based on their predecessor-in-interest being the adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river bank.
It rendered the following ratiocination, viz:20
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners thereof, they took
possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30)
years because their predecessors-in-interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along
the river bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision
plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact
that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OICChief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report
that the subject property is not a portion of the Paraaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with
Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.
Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of the foregoing
reports of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds and so holds that the applicants have satisfied all the
requirements of law which are essential to a government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance of
a certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that the applicants are not entitled
thereto, not having presented any witness.
In fine, the application is GRANTED.
As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.
Both lower courts erred.
The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree), which pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx

Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following,
namely: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June
12, 1945.21
The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took possession of the same
property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years." 22
Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA,
are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal, with such
findings being binding and conclusive on the Court,23 the Court has consistently recognized exceptions to
this rule, including the following, to wit: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 24
Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; and that
the inference made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the
Court should now review the findings.
In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse possession of the land for
more than 30 years, the RTC declared:
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners thereof, they took
possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty years
because their predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river
banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan
Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that
Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that
the subject property is not a portion of the Paraaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot
5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.
The RTC apparently reckoned respondents period of supposed possession to be "more than thirty years"
from the fact that "their predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land."
Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts respondents had performed showing their possession of the
property "continuously, openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The decision mentioned
only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be made. That, to us, was
not enough to justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not
conclusively prove the payors ownership of the land the taxes were paid for,25 the tax declarations and
payments being mere indicia of a claim of ownership;26 and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the
property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse possession.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to
make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because it
is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit
created by the current of the water becomes manifest27 has no applicability herein. This is simply because
Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank
by respondents predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to
acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

xxxx

On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse possession of Lot
4998-B was not even validated or preponderantly established. The admission of respondents themselves
that they declared the property for taxation purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from
199928 signified that their alleged possession would at most be for only nine years as of the filing of their
application for land registration on March 7, 1997.

And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only when
"river beds are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is uncontroverted,
however, that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the
subject land became dry as a result of the construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation
Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty
years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other
means without any competent proof that the land was already declared as alienable and disposable by the
Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is
a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial
accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems.
Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the
active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del
Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of public dominion,
namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those which
belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that
rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion.
Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not was a question that
the Court resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero,29 a case involving the registration of
land found to be part of a dried-up portion of the natural bed of a creek. There the Court held:
As for petitioners claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan
Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest,
Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the
latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of
the Civil Code, the same must fail.

Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect, the
subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the
aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned through the natural change in
the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new course," and the
owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying their value.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the
public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a river,
not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek
changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains
property of public dominion. (Bold emphases supplied)
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.30 No public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a
showing of a title from the State.31Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.32

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of
title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public
domain. It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural
land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes
of an imperfect title.

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of
the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to
acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the
natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of
public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the
Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already
declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property
through prescription.

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb
and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek,
including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek
has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.

Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and disposable by the
Government. They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the following notation
found on the survey plan, to wit:33

NOTE
ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM
All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm
Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director issued
by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Devt. on Jan. 3, 1968.

In Menguito v. Republic,35 which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,36 we specifically resolved the

issue of whether the notation on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and
disposability of public land, to wit:
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3,
1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x
x x."

Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299

Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.
Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map "classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the
propertys nature as alienable and disposable public land?
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive
order, administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act
or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, we said in
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap34 that:
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain
is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of
the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must
be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.There must still
be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006,
the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the
land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept
the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis
supplied)

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that
the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors assertion,
petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification by the Provincial
Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a
piece of public land was alienable and disposable in the following manner, viz:
x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove
that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by
respondent.1wphi1 The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the
trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and
admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and
disposable.

xxxx
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B
falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government
certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such government certifications
may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As
such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not
constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. (Emphasis supplied)
These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to
the effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Devt"
did not prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly,
respondents could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and
Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045 square meters, more or less,
situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as
exclusively belonging to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.
Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default [8] and commenced with the reception of
evidence.[9] Among the documents presented by respondent in support of its application are Tax
Declarations,[10] a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor,[11] and a Certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is within the alienable and disposable zone.
[12]
Thereafter, it awarded the land to respondent Corporation. [13]
Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic, [14] the CA ruled that since the former had actively participated
in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner
is thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal. [15] The CA further
found that respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the latters registrable title over the subject
property after having proven open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by itself and its predecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak of World War II. [16]
Dissatisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the
following arguments in support of its appeal:

The Courts Ruling

We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the case to the court a quo for further proceedings in
order to determine if the property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.I
The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in this case.

At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
lower court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled that
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. [18] Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law.[19] It cannot be acquired through a
waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
[20]
Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal. [21]
RP V BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
The Facts
On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land with an
assessed value of 4,330, 1,920 and 8,670, or a total assessed value of 14,920 for the entire
property, more particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, with an area of more
or less 10,732 square meters, located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas. [3]
On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997. [4] On 7
August 1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997.[5]
Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration on 8 January 1998 while the
records were still with the RTC.[6]
On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC
of San Juan, because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than 100,000.[7]

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that a party may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question
if he has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts
jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him [22] is based on
the doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy.[23] In Tijam, the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court
and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits
from the appellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower courts jurisdiction. Considering the
unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-litigant from
raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v. People,[24] we cautioned
that Tijam must be construed as an exception to the general rule and applied only in the most exceptional
cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case.
The facts are starkly different in this case, making the exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable.
Here, petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the records were still
with the RTC.[25] At that point, petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC,
simply because the case was not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to the MTC,
petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner
immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its Brief.[26] Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel
by laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal.

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. [27] In this case, petitioner Republic
has not displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that it has
abandoned or declined to assert its right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.
II
The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic raised two points of contention: (a) the
period for setting the date and hour of the initial hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be registered.
First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application,
because the RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day period provided under the
Property Registration Decree.[28]
We disagree.
The Property Registration Decree provides:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall, within
five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the
initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety
days from the date of the order. x x x.
In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17 July 1997.[29] On 18 July 1997, or a
day after the filing of the application, the RTC immediately issued an Order setting the case for initial
hearing on 22 October 1997, which was 96 days from the Order.[30] While the date set by the RTC was
beyond the 90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial
court. In Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc.,[31] petitioner Republic therein contended that there was
failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirements for original registration, because there were 125
days between the Order setting the date of the initial hearing and the initial hearing itself. We ruled that the
lapse of time between the issuance of the Order setting the date of initial hearing and the date of the initial
hearing itself was not fatal to the application.Thus, we held:
x x x [A] party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the
Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the
business of such official in the performance of his duties. A party cannot intervene
in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to
such party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to
punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has neither
responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the
requirements of the law.[32]

jurisdictional defect was still not cured, as the second Order was issued more than five days from the
filing of the application, again contrary to the prescribed period under the Property Registration Decree. [34]
Petitioner is incorrect.

The RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing within five days from
the filing of the application for registration, as provided in the Property Registration Decree, did not affect
the courts its jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was merely directory, and failure to issue the
Order within that period did not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance
with the five-day period is mandatory would make jurisdiction over the subject matter dependent upon the
trial court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. [35] It cannot
be contingent upon the action or inaction of the court.
This does not mean that courts may disregard the statutory periods with impunity. We cannot assume that
the law deliberately meant the provision to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.
[36]
However, the records of this case do not show such blatant disregard for the law. In fact, the RTC
immediately set the case for initial hearing a day after the filing of the application for registration,
[37]
except that it had to issue a second Order because the initial hearing had been set beyond the 90-day
period provided by law.
Second, petitioner contended[38] that since the selling price of the property based on the Deed of
Sale annexed to respondents application for original registration was 160,000, [39] the MTC did not have
jurisdiction over the case. Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended, [40] the MTCs
delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral and land registration cases is limited to lands, the value of which
should not exceed 100,000.
We are not persuaded.
The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land registration cases is indeed set forth in the
Judiciary Reorganization Act, which provides:
Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration
Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral
or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition,
or contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One hundred
thousand pesos (100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the
claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or
from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decision in these
cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial
Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691) (Emphasis supplied.)

Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize respondent Corporation by dismissing its
application for registration on account of events beyond its control.

Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two
instances: first, where there is no controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value of
which does not exceed 100,000.

Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7 August 1997 setting the initial hearing on 4
November 1997,[33] within the 90-day period provided by law, petitioner Republic argued that the

The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because petitioner opposed respondent Corporations
application for registration on 8 January 1998.[41]

However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance, because the value of the lot in this case
does not exceed 100,000.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the value of the land should not be determined with reference to its
selling price. Rather, Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the
property sought to be registered may be ascertained in three ways: first, by the affidavit of the
claimant; second, by agreement of the respective claimants, if there are more than one; or, third, from the
corresponding tax declaration of the real property.[42]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. Let this case
be REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Batangas, for reception of evidence to prove
that the property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

SO ORDERED.
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF TITLE

G.R. No. 147359

Present:

In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using the first method, because the records are
bereft of any affidavit executed by respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise, valuation cannot
be done through the second method, because this method finds application only where there are multiple
claimants who agree on and make a joint submission as to the value of the property. Here, only respondent
Bantigue Point Development Corporation claims the property.

FIELDMAN AGRICULTURAL TRADING CORPORATION, represented by KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR.,

Petitioner,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,*

The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with reference to the corresponding Tax
Declarations submitted by respondent Corporation together with its application for registration. From the
records, we find that the assessed value of the property is 4,330, 1,920 and 8,670, or a total assessed
value of 14,920 for the entire property.[43]Based on these Tax Declarations, it is evident that the total
value of the land in question does not exceed 100,000. Clearly, the MTC may exercise its delegated
jurisdiction under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended.
III
A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the property in
question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

- versus CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
Promulgated:

Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTCs exercise of its delegated jurisdiction, we find that
the lower court erred in granting respondent Corporations application for original registration in the
absence of sufficient proof that the property in question was alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. [44] The
applicant for land registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership by
establishing through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or
disposable based on a positive act of the government. [45] We held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc. that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land
sought to be registered.[46] The applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has
approved the land classification and released the land in question as alienable and disposable. [47]
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by
(1) a CENRO or PENRO[48] Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. [49]
Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its
application.[50] Clearly, this falls short of the requirements for original registration.
We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for reception of further evidence to prove that
the property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. If
respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation presents a certified true copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary, the application for original registration should be granted.
If it fails to present sufficient proof that the land in question is alienable and disposable based on a positive
act of the government, the application should be denied.

March 28, 2008

NACHURA, J.:

Petitioner Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corp. (FATCO), through Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr., appeals
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the October 23, 2000 Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52366, and the March 7, 2001 Resolution[2] denying its reconsideration.
On October 19, 1993, FATCO filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Union an application for
confirmation of title to parcels of land, described as Lots No. 1505, No. 1234 and No. 47030, [3] with an
aggregate area of 8,463 square meters, situated in Barrio Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union. The application
was docketed as LRA REC. No. N-63835.
FATCO alleged, among others, that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land which it
openly, exclusively and notoriously possessed and occupied for more than thirty (30) years under a bona
fide claim of ownership, tacking its possession with that of its predecessors-in-interest. It allegedly
acquired these lots in the following manner:
a) Lot No. 1505 covered by Tax Declaration No. 20304 was acquired by a Deed of
Exchange executed by and between the Brgy. Council of Poblacion, Bacnotan, La
Union, represented by its Brgy. Capt. Honesto Alcid and Brgy. Sec. Teofilo

Descargar, and the applicant, at San Fernando, La Union, on October 19, 1988
appearing as Doc. No. 415, Page No. 84, Book No. I, Series of 1988 in the notarial
register of Notary Public Roman R. Villalon, Jr., and registered with the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of La Union on November 16, 1988;
b) Lot No. 1234 covered by Tax Declaration No. 20305 was acquired by a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition with the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between
Ceferino Bucago, Ildefonso Bucago, Victoria Bucago, Felomina B. Higoy,
Elizabeth B. Espejo, Ernesto B. Dacanay, Maria Bucago, Reinerio P. Dacanay and
the applicant at San Fernando, La Union, on October 19, 1988 appearing as Doc.
No. 411, Page No. 84, Book No. I, Series of 1988 in the notarial register of Notary
Public Roman R. Villalon, Jr., and registered with the Registry of Deeds for
the province ofLa Union on November 16, 1988;
c) Lot No. 47030 covered by Tax Declaration No. 21971 was acquired by a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by and between Ernesto Adman, Amparo Carino Adman,
and the applicant at San Fernando, La Union, on August 27, 1990 appearing as Doc.
No. 235, Page No. 47, Book No. II, Series of 1990, in the notarial register of Notary
Public Roman R. Villalon, Jr., and registered with the Register of Deeds for
the Province of La Union on September 25, 1990.[4]
FATCO, thus, prayed for the registration or confirmation of its title over these parcels of land.
On December 1, 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance, as counsel for the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La
Union to appear in the case.[5]
On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order setting the application for initial hearing on February 28,
1995. The Order was published in the January 23, 1995 issue of theOfficial Gazette,[6] and the February
18-24, 1995 issue of the Guardian.[7] The notice of hearing was, likewise, posted in a conspicuous place in
each parcel of land included in the application, and on the bulletin board of the municipal building of
Bacnotan, La Union.[8] The Provincial Prosecutor of La Union was furnished with a copy of notice of
hearing on November 18, 1994.[9]
At the scheduled initial hearing on February 28, 1995, Atty. Marita Balloguing entered her
appearance as collaborating counsel for FATCO, and requested the resetting of the marking of exhibits.
[10]
The RTC granted the request and issued an Order resetting the hearing to April 19, 1995, viz.:
As prayed for by Atty. Balloguing, who entered her appearance in collaboration
with Atty. Ungria as counsel for the applicant, this case is reset to April 19, 1995 at
8:30 a.m. for the purpose of establishing jurisdictional facts.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The Republic, through the Provincial Prosecutor, was duly informed of the resetting.[12]
On March 2, 1995, the OSG again entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic and once
more deputized the Provincial Fiscal of San Fernando, La Union to appear in the case. [13] On the same
date, the Republic filed its Opposition to FATCOs application for registration on the following grounds:
(1) neither FATCO nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniments
of title and tax declarations of the applicant (and its predecessors-in-interest) do not constitute competent
and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for, and do not appear to be genuine;
(3) applicant (and its predecessors-in-interest) can no longer claim ownership in fee simple on the basis of
Spanish title or grant, since they failed to file the appropriate application for registration within the period
of six months from February 16, 1976, as required by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892; (4) the parcels

of land applied for forms part of the public domain and are not subject to private appropriation; and (5) the
application was belatedly filed as it was filed beyond December 31, 1987, the period set forth under Sec.
2, P.D. No. 1073.[14]
During the hearing on April 19, 1995, Prosecutor Gloria D. Catbagan appeared for the
Republic. FATCO, through counsel, offered in evidence the following documents to establish
jurisdictional facts:
Exhibit A - Consolidated Plan Ccn-013303-000129 of Lots 1505, 1234
and 47030
Exhibit B - Technical Description
Exhibit B-1 - Certification in lieu of Lost Surveyors Certificate
Exhibit C - Notice of Initial Hearing from LRA
Exhibit D - Affidavit of Publication by publisher of The Guardian
Exhibit D-1 - Clipping of Publication
Exhibit E - Whole issue of The Guardian for February 18 to 24, 1995;
Exhibit E-1 - Section A of publication of said issue;
Exhibit F - Certificate of Publication from the Official Gazette/ National
Printing Office;
Exhibit G - Certificate of Notification sent to Adjoining Owners
(Reserved);
Exhibit H - Certificate of Publication from LRA
Exhibit I - Sheriffs Certificate of Posting
Exhibit J - Certificate of Assessment[15]
The RTC then issued an Order[16] setting the case for the reception of evidence on May 25,
1995 at 8:30 in the morning.
In the ensuing trial, FATCO offered other documents and testimonial evidence to prove its title
to the parcels of land applied for. The Republic, on the other hand, did not submit evidence to controvert
FATCOs assertion.
In a Decision dated February 5, 1996, the RTC, upon a finding that FATCO had sufficiently established its
ownership of the lands in question, ordered the registration thereof in its name, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby approves
the application and orders that the parcels of land identified as Lots 1505, 1234 and
47030, Bacnotan Cadastre Pls-1050-D, containing an area of EIGHT THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE (8,463) square meters, more or less, located at
Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union, covered by Consolidated Plan Ccn-013303-000129
(Exh. A), and more particularly described in the technical description, Exh. B shall
be registered in the name of the applicant Fieldman Agricultural Trading
Corporation, with address at Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union, under the provisions
of the Property Registration Decree.
The encumbrance/mortgage of the property to the Far East Bank and Trust
Company, San Fernando, La Union Branch in the amount of Seventeen Million
(P17,000,000.00) Pesos, shall accordingly be annotated at the back of the title to be
issued in the name of the applicant.
Once this decision shall become final, let a decree of registration be issued.[17]
From the aforesaid decision, the Republic went to the CA. It faulted the RTC for giving due course to
FATCOs application arguing that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same in view of the nonpublication of the notice of actual initial hearing. It also claimed that FATCO failed to prove open,

continuous and notorious possession of the subject properties for more than thirty (30) years, as required
by law.
On October 23, 2000, the CA reversed the RTC Decision. The CA agreed with the Republic
that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over FATCOs application because the publication of initial
hearing was fatally defective. The notice that was published in the Official Gazette and in
the Guardian was the hearing set on February 28, 1995, but no hearing was conducted on the said
date. The actual initial hearing was held on April 19, 1995, a date different from what was stated in the
notice, thereby defeating the very purpose of the publication requirement.

Even if, at the February 28, 1995 hearing, FATCOs counsel requested a resetting, and the RTC
granted said request, the Republic and all interested parties were already fully apprised of the pendency of
the application. When the hearing was reset to April 19, 1995, interested parties, the Republic included,
may be deemed to have been given notice thereof.[23] There was, thus, no need for the re-publication of
notice of hearing, for clearly, the avowed purpose of Section 23 had already been accomplished. We,
therefore, find that the application for registration was rightfully given due course by the RTC. The CA,
thus, committed reversible error in holding otherwise.
Be that as it may, we cannot grant FATCOs plea for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision
granting its application for registration or confirmation of its imperfect title.

The CA disposed, thus:

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree explicitly states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the
Decision dated February 5, 1996 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
application for registration is DISMISSED.

SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to the land, whether personally
or through their authorized representatives.

SO ORDERED.[18]
FATCO filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on March 7, 2001.

(a) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945.

Hence, this petition for certiorari by FATCO theorizing that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD
THAT THE COURT A QUO DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
PETITIONERS APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.[19]

We will deal first with the jurisdictional issue.

Section 23[21] of P.D. No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, explicitly provides that
before the court can act on the application for land registration, the public shall be given notice of the
initial hearing thereof by means of publication, mailing, and posting.
FATCO insists that it complied with all the jurisdictional requirements, specifically the
publication of the notice of initial hearing. It, therefore, faulted the CA for reversing the RTC and,
accordingly, dismissing its application for registration.
The Republic, on the other hand, asserts that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over FATCOs
application because the publication of initial hearing was fatally defective. It points out that the initial
hearing set on February 28, 1995 was reset to April 19, 1995. The actual initial hearing, therefore, took
place on a date different from what was stated in the published notice of initial hearing. Hence, republication of the new notice of hearing was necessary, but FATCO failed to publish the notice of hearing
set on April 19, 1995, thus, preventing the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the application.
The Republic is correct that in land registration case, publication of the notice of initial hearing
is a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith affects the jurisdiction of the court. The
purpose of publication of the notice is to require all persons concerned, who may have any rights or
interests in the property applied for, to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the
application should not be granted.[22]
It is not disputed that there was publication, mailing, and posting of the notice of the initial
hearing set on February 28, 1995. FATCO, thus, complied with the legal requirement of serving the entire
world with sufficient notice of the registration proceedings. Accordingly, as of that date, the RTC acquired
jurisdiction over FATCOs application.

Before one can register his title over a parcel of land, he must show that: first, he, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive possession and occupation
thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, and second, the land subject
of the application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. [24]
To prove its length of possession, FATCO offered the testimonies of Antonio Casugay, its
division manager, Emilio Paz, owner of the adjacent lot, and of Ernesto Adman and Cifirino Bucago, its
predecessors-in-interest. It also presented deeds of conveyance and several tax declarations covering the
lands in question.
Unfortunately for FATCO, the testimonies of its witnesses do not serve to prove the validity of
its cause. Antonio Casugay and Emilio Paz merely stated that FATCO acquired the subject lots and had
taken possession of the same in 1988 or 1989. [25] FATCOs predecessor-in-interest, Ernesto Adman, on the
other hand, testified that he acquired ownership and possession of Lot No. 4703, also described as Lot No.
1504-A, from Victor Dacanay only in 1983 or 1984. [26] Similarly, Cifirino Bucagos testimony[27] did not
establish the period of possession required by law over Lot No. 1234. His testimony consists merely of
general statements with no specifics as to when he began occupying the land. He did not introduce
sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation that he possessed Lot No. 1234 for the length of time
prescribed by law.
Neither do the tax declarations prove FATCOs assertion. The earliest tax declarations presented
for Lot No. 1505 and Lot No. 47030 were issued only in 1948, [28] while the earliest tax declaration for Lot
No. 1234 was issued in 1970.[29] We have ruled that while a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to
prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession.[30]
Basic is the rule that an applicant in a land registration case must prove the facts and
circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements which are
mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice. [31]
In this case, FATCO did not present sufficient proof that its predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, continuous and adverse possession of the subject lots since June 12, 1945. At best, FATCO can
only prove possession of Lots No. 1505 and No. 47030 since 1948, and of Lot No. 1234 since 1970. But
as the law now stands, a mere showing of possession for thirty (30) years or more is not sufficient. It must
be shown too that possession and occupation had started on June 12, 1945 or earlier.

It is clear that FATCO failed to comply with the prescribed period and occupation not only as
required by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree but also by Commonwealth Act No. 141 or
the Public Land Act, which states:

(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and Advance
Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David; [4]
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;[5]

Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to
wit:

(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)

dispensing with the need for Surveyors Certificates for the Subject Lots;[6]
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of certificates of title
covering the Subject Lots;[7]

xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied.)

(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by
virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963;[8]
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831, in the
name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No.
941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in 1994;
[9]
and

Thus, even if FATCOs case is considered as one for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public land
Act (CA No. 141), as amended, it would still meet the same fate.

(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel
Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and
respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to
Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.[10]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The petition for registration of title filed by Fieldman
Agricultural Trading Corporation is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
HERBIETO, respondents.

vs.

JEREMIAS

AND

DAVID

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated
22 November 2002,[1] which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion,
Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,[2] granting the application for land registration of the respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with
the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No.
8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in
fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and
Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.[3] Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted
the following set of documents:

On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to
the respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to
comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents
muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to
the Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.[11]
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. [12] All owners of the land
adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing. [13] A copy of the Notice was
also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of
the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located. [14] Finally, the Notice
was also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 1999 [15] and The Freeman Banat News on 19
December 1999.[16]
During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special Default,
with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for registration of the Subject Lots. The
respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove
jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from the
respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.
[17]

On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and
confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot No.
8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December

1999, final and executory, and directing the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to
issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots.[18]
Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the Court of
Appeals.[19] The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC
Judgment reasoning thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered has been classified as
within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of
the Civil Code, respectively provides that All things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of
patrimonial character shall not be the object of prescription and that Ownership and other real rights over
immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need
of title or of good faith.
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired the subject parcels of
lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted it with
jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is
undisputed that herein appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the subject
land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo
that appellees possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject lots had
been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant does not
hold water.
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated
June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By express
provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration, as
provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any manner provided by
law. Again, even considering that possession of appelless should only be reckoned from 1963, the year
when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject
parcels of land in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed
the instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court finds no reason to
disturb the finding of the court a quo.[20]
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot
be considered in determining compliance with the periods of possession required by law. The Subject Lots
were classified as alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENROs certification. It also
alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked
the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,[21] where this Court declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land
of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.

Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application
consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner Republic
contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the application for registration of title to land shall be filed
by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners.
While an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the subject parcels of land
belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are
situated within the same province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute
and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the
proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land
registration under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the
latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
I Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction to
proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the respondents but for reasons different
from those presented by petitioner Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and
proceed with respondents application for registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even though they were
not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking the individual and separate
registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the respondents was fatal
to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear their application for registration
of the Subject Lots, based on this Courts pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,[22] to
wit:
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above-cited sections of
the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed
with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is
mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This procedural lapse
committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their
application for registration of the Subject Lots.
The Property Registration Decree[23] recognizes and expressly allows the following situations: (1)
the filing of a single application by several applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of
land sought to be registered;[24] and (2) the filing of a single application for registration of several parcels
of land provided that the same are located within the same province. [25] The Property Registration Decree
is silent, however, as to the present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for two
parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual registration of the parcels of land in their
respective names.

Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this Court refers
to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration
Decree itself provides that, [t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character
and whenever practicable and convenient.
Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the Property
Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint application for registration filed
by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of a
single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should
have filed separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to
hear and proceed with the case. [26] They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. [27] Instead,
under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission of
the courts jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the
case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with
separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of
any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of
parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been corrected by
the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC
failed to detect the misjoinder when the application for registration was still pending before it; and more
regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion
for severance of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by the Property
Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration
court.
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a
defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction
to hear and proceed with respondents application for registration.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,[28] and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless
there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.[29]
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of the Initial
Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following manner:
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the

Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to
all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as
known, and to all whom it may concern. Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in
court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property Registration Decree
expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon
the land registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals [30] that
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly
confirm and register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration
Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements of publication, mailing, and posting of the
Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of
general circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this
Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation, thus
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when
the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all
of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality
that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its
circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.
Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other
real estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of
default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a
manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and
posting.[31]
In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03
September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette,
dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat
News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the
rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial
hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already
be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat
News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for him
to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents application for
registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself
states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would
be in default and would forever be barred from contesting respondents application for registration and
even the registration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of
Special Default on 03 September 1999.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is
tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the
publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire
jurisdiction over respondents application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21
December 1999, ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David

over Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000, declaring
its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a
decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC
without jurisdiction.

Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act because
there are specific requirements and application procedure for every mode. [38] Since respondents herein
filed their application before the MTC,[39] then it can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the
judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.

II Period of Possession

Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144
hectares,[40] may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads

Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial
confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and proceed with
respondents application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal
issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title to public land.
Respondents application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their title to the
Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their
parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his
testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner
since 1950.[32]
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents themselves, the
Subject Lots are within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of
Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963.
Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential
Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992. [33] The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain,
classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from the government; [34] and it is indispensable that the person claiming title
to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law.[35]
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral
lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the State. [36] It explicitly enumerates the
means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).[37]

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war orforce majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicial
confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June
1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June
1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession;
such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and
disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. [41] It is very apparent then
that respondents could not have complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be
judicially confirmed or legalized.
The confirmation of respondents title by the Court of Appeals was based on the erroneous
supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the Property Registration
Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of the
Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in any other manner provided by law. It then
ruled that the respondents, having possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application, have

acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in relation to Article
1137, both of the Civil Code.[42]

From the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and the pleadings of the parties, the
following were established:

The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration Decree and the
Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed
by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land applied for pertains
to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their
imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession. [43] As established by this Court in the
preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the
provisions of the Public Land Act.

On the basis of the private respondents' exhibits, [5] on 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July 1920, a
parcel of land located in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, was
surveyed for the spouses Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris (hereinafter the spouses Ribaya) by
Telesforo Untalan, a Bureau of Lands surveyor. The parcel of land was found to comprise an area of
25,542,603 square meters. The survey plan was denominated as Plan II-13961 and allegedly approved by
the Acting Director of Lands on 3 January 1922.However, as noted by the Court of Appeals in its 9
January 1991 decision,[6] these exhibits do not at all show the surveyor's signature. Moreover, as per Land
Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of Forestry, the above parcel of land was considered part of the
public forest and released for disposition only on 31 December 1930.[7]

However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire imperfect or
incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for judicial confirmation
or legalization thereof must be in accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the
Public Land Act reads
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right, claiming any lands or
interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application to the
proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into and
that a certificate of title be issued to them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. [44]
Hence, respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots must have complied with the
substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements
under the Property Registration Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real rights apply in
general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands of the public domain.
Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be considered a special law [45] that must take precedence
over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an established rule of statutory construction that between a general
law and a special law, the special law prevails Generalia specialibus non derogant.[46]
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of
the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated 02
February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents application for registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF LUIS RIBAYA, namely, ANDREA RIBAYA
BUENVIAJE, LUIS RIBAYA, ANTONIA RIBAYACONDE, and JOHN DOE REBAYA,
all represented by ANDREA RIBAYA-BUENVIAJE as Administratrix of the Estate of
Luis Ribaya, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In 1925, the spouses Ribaya applied for registration and confirmation of title of the lot covered by
Plan II-13961 before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Albay. The case was docketed as LRC Case
No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26050. Notice of the application, and hearing thereof were published in the
17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette,[8] and in its decision of 18 September 1925,[9] the CFI granted
the said application.
Sometime later, or on 18-21 November and 23-30 November 1925, a resurvey of the parcel of land
covered by Plan II-13961 was conducted at the instance of the spouses Ribaya. This gave rise to Plan
II13961-Amd., which embraced, inter alia, four different parcels of land with an aggregate area of only
10,975,022 square meters, instead of the original 25,542,603 square meters. Plan II-13961-Amd. appeared
to have been approved by the Director of Lands on 26 February 1926. [10] The application was not amended
to reflect the resurvey and the amended plan was not published.
On 31 July 1926, the corresponding decree of registration was issued, [11] while on 19 August 1926,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3947 covering the four lots embraced by Plan II-13961-Amd. was
issued in the names of the spouses Ribaya.[12]
On 11 September 1958, OCT No. 3947 was administratively reconstituted from the owner's
duplicate copy thereof and the reconstituted title was denominated as OCT No. PO-10848 (3947).[13]
In 1964, the heirs of Luis Ribaya (herein private respondents) received compensation from the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for damages sustained by the land during the
war.[14]
In 1968, pursuant to a deed of partition executed by the private respondents herein, the land covered
by OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was subdivided per Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-96075, approved on 16
December 1968.[15] Then, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was cancelled and separate Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) were issued to the private respondents.[16]
In a letter dated 6 January 1977, sixty-two (62) farmers occupying the land [17] and claiming
ownership thereof, requested the Director of Lands to institute an action to annul OCT No. RO-10848
(3947).[18] Finding merit in the request, herein petitioner filed a verified complaint, dated 17 August 1978,
with the CFI (now Regional Trial Court) of Albay, Branch V, for the declaration of nullity of OCT No.
3947, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), and all subsequent titles emanating from the original title, viz., TCT
Nos. T-31333 to T-31358, inclusive. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6198.

The petitioner claimed therein that OCT No. 3947 was obtained through fraud and that the land
registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land for lack of republication of the amended plan,
neither did the spouses-applicants comply with Section 45(b) of Act No. 2874. [19] The petitioner further
alleged that at the time the petition for registration was filed, the land covered therein was forest land, and
therefore, inalienable.
On 27 October 1979, the aforementioned 62 farmers filed a complaint-in-intervention and prayed
that the land revert to the petitioner and their titles over the portions respectively occupied by them
confirmed.
In its decision of 11 November 1987[20] the Regional Trial Court (RTC) held for the petitioner as
follows:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 3947 and administratively reconstituted
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-10848 (3947) as null and void ab initio and without
force and effect;
2. Declaring separate Transfer Certificates of Title, to wit: T-31333, T-31334, T-31335, T31336, T- 31337, T-31338, T-31339, T-31340, T-31341, T-31342, T-31343, T-31344, T31345, T-31346, T-31347, T- 31348, T-31349, T-31350, T-31351, T-31352, T-31353, T31354, T-31355, T-31356, T-31357 and T-31358, emanating from OCT No. 3947 and
OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), all issued to the heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina
Revatoris, as likewise null and void and without force and effect;
3. Ordering [respondents] Heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris to surrender their
copy of OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) as well as their separate transfer certificates of title
to the Register of Deeds of Albay, who (sic) is thereafter directed or ordered to cancel
the same;
4. Ordering the reversion of the land to [petitioner] Republic of the Philippines, as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain.
5. And ordering the dismissal of the counterclaim.
The trial court found that at the time the spouses Ribaya filed their petition for registration, the land
was already classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land; however, the then CFI, as a land
registration court, did not acquire jurisdiction over the said lot due to lack of publication or republication
in the Official Gazette of Plan II-13961-Amd., which was the basis of the decree of registration and OCT
No. 3947. Consequently, said OCT No. 3947 and its derivative titles were void. [21] In so finding, it relied
on Fewkes vs. Vasquez,[22] where it was held that any amendment or alteration in the description of the land
after its publication and decree of registration was not permissible unless coupled with republication.
The trial court likewise ruled that there was no evidence that the possession of the spouses Ribaya
and their predecessors-in-interests was open, continuous, and adverse under abona fide claim of ownership
for the required number of years; moreover, they failed to present any tax declarations. It then concluded
that the said Spouses may have occupied portions of the land at a later time, but not in the concept of bona

fide owners, for mere casual cultivation and raising of cattle on the land did not constitute "possession" as
contemplated by law.[23]
The private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 17351), which, in its
decision[24] of 9 January 1991, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the trial court.The appellate court
further pointed out another reason why the registration in favor of the applicants was invalid, thus:
[W]hen [the] spouses [Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris] applied for registration thereof in their names
said land was still part of the public forest. The land was released for public disposition only on December
31, 1930 as shown by the Land Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of Forestry (Exhs K, K5). Consequently, OCT No. 3947 as reconstituted by OCT No. RO-10848 is void ab initio.
It is well-settled that lands of the public domain classified as forest or timber lands, are incapable of
registration in the names of private persons and their inclusion in a title nullifies the title (Director of
Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 and cases cited therein.)[25]
In refuting the claim of the private respondents that publication of the amended survey plan was
unnecessary in light of the decision of this Court in Benin vs. Tuazon,[26] the Court of Appeals held that the
facts in Benin were different. In Benin, an approved survey plan was submitted before the property was
decreed for registration, while in the present case:
[T]he land was decreed for registration on September 18, 1925, while its survey was performed sometime
in November and December 1925. The amended survey plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) thereof was approved
by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926. In other words, the survey plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) of
the land in the instant case was approved when the land was already decreed for registration. . . .[27]
There was then, the Court of Appeals concluded, a violation of Sections 23 and 26 of Act No. 496. [28]
The private respondents seasonably moved for a reconsideration of this decision.
In its resolution[29] of 24 January 1994, the Court of Appeals granted the motion for reconsideration
and set aside its decision of 9 January 1991, reversed that of the trial court of 11 November 1987, and
dismissed the complaint and the complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 6198 of Branch 7 of the RTC
of Legazpi City. In overturning its previous decision, the Court of Appeals ruled that OCT No. 3947 "is
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec. 38, Act No.
496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496). One (1) year after its transcription which is
the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became incontrovertible (Sec. 38,
Act No. 496)."[30]
It further applied the presumption of regularity in the grant of the land applied for by the spouses
Ribaya, and even extended said presumption to their compliance with all conditions required by law, in
particular, their "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under
a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894." It thus burdened the Republic "to prove
otherwise."[31]
It likewise ruled that the failure of the spouses Ribaya to present tax receipts was not fatal, and that
although they actually lived in Oas, Albay, such did not negate the character of their possession for

"[p]ossession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before he can be said that he is in possession."[32]

which is the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became incontrovertible
(Sec. 38, Act No. 496).[36]

The Court of Appeals also rejected the application of the Fewkes case and applied, instead, the
decision in Benin, where this Court held that republication could be dispensed with in an amendment in
the application or in the survey plan, where such amendment consisted of the exclusion of a portion
covered by the original application and the original survey plan as published. Accordingly, the land
registration court retained its jurisdiction.

First, the one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition for review
and is reckoned from the entry of the decree. In the second place, there are other remedies available to an
aggrieved party after the said one-year period, e.g., reconveyance, covered by Section 65 of Act No. 496
which, inter alia, provides that "in all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his
legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of
any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title." [37] Likewise, an action for damages is sanctioned in
cases where the property has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value, which may be filed
within four years from discovery of the fraud.[38] Recourse may also be had against the Assurance Fund. [39]

Finally, the Court of Appeals withdrew its earlier finding that the land in question still formed part
of the public forest at the time of the application for registration. It asserted, instead, that there was
insufficient basis to conclude that a parcel of land only became open to disposition on the basis of the date
of approval of the land classification map, because such approval may have been made later by authority
of a prior executive declaration.[33]
Unsatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition and asserts that (1) the indefeasibility of title
does not lie against the State in an action for reversion of land; (2) the spouses-applicants failed to prove
possession of the land for the period required by law, and the evidence shows that their possession was not
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious under abona fide claim of ownership; (3) the amended survey
plan was not published, (4) the land covered by OCT No. 3947 was then part of the forest land, hence,
inalienable; and (5) the accuracy of the land survey was doubtful. [34]
In their Comment, the private respondents allege that the petition merely raises factual matters and
argue that OCT No. 3947 is absolutely incontestable, considering that the land was no longer part of the
public forest when it was decreed in favor of their parents. They further contend, invoking Benin, that the
issue of republication is inapplicable since the publication of the original survey plan was already had in
compliance with law. Moreover, possession of the land by their parents, the spouses-applicants, was duly
proven, i.e., donations of portions thereof in favor of the government and the compensation they received
from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for damages sustained by the land
during the war sufficiently proved that they were the legitimate owners of the land. Finally, the original
survey plan could no longer be questioned by the petitioner.[35]
As the Court sees it, only two relevant issues need be resolved, to wit:
1. Whether the Republic of the Philippines is barred by prescription to bring the action for
annulment of OCT No. 3947 and all its derivative certificates of title; and
2. Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over the four parcels of land
subject of the amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and covered by the decree
issued on 31 July 1926 by the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision
of the said court of 18 September 1925.
As to the first issue, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that OCT No. 3947 was, to
repeat:
[C]onclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec. 38, Act
No. 496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496). One (1) year after its transcription

Finally, prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of property which is part of the
public forest or of a forest reservation which was registered in favor of any party. Then too, public land
registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time. In Republic vs.
Animas,[40] we ruled:
Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to
the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the state
in such cases for the Statute of Limitation does not run against the state. The right of reversion or
reconveyance to the state is not barred by prescription.
We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was part of the public forest
and released only on 31 December 1930, [41] the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the
land, which was not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the State's action to annul the certificates of title
issued thereunder and for the reversion of the land is not barred by prescription.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the land registration court in LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 26050 never acquired jurisdiction over the land covered by either the original plan (Plan II13961) or the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) for lack of sufficient publication of the first and total
want of publication of the second.
As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of Appeals, the notice of the
hearing of application of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of the land covered by the original plan
was published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there was only one publication
thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the governing law then, required two publications. Hence, the decision
of 18 September 1925 of the land registration court was void for want of the required publications. The
requirement of dual publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the registration court;
[42]
it is a jurisdictional requisite.[43] Land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot
be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the Land through publication and service of notice.[44]
Worse, the decision of 18 September 1925 was entirely based on an alleged original survey
plan. The fact remains, however, that in November of that year that original plan was amended (Plan II13961-Amd.) and the amended plan was not published at all. There is no evidence that the court amended
its decision to conform to the amended plan, neither is there a showing that the parties even attempted
publication thereof. However, the decree that was subsequently issued was based on the amended plan
insofar as the four lots were concerned.

A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the land. [45] On the basis of the
decree, OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows then that the land registration court may have amended its
decision to conform to the amended plan for the four lots which ultimately found their way into the decree
issued by the General Land Registration Office, and finally, into OCT No. 3947. Whether it did so or not
and the General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the decree to conform to the amended plan,
such aims were fatally flawed due to the absence of publication of the amended plan. As such, the land
registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land embraced by the amended plan.
The Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 and the private respondents,
however, maintain that the publication of the amended plan was unnecessary under our pronouncements
in Benin vs. Tuazon.[46] This case reiterates our rulings in Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial,
[47]
Juan and Chuongco vs. Ortiz,[48] Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua,[49] Lichauco vs. Herederos de
Corpus,[50] and Director of Lands vs. Benitez,[51] that only where the original survey plan is amended
during the registration proceedings, by the addition of land not previously included in the original plan,
should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area
added after the publication of the original plan. Conversely, if the amendment does not involve
an addition, but on the contrary, a reduction of the original area that was published, no new publication is
required.
Reliance on Benin and its predecessors is misplaced. In the first place, the amendment of the
original survey plan for the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was made after the land registration
court rendered its decision. It follows then that a re-opening of the case was indispensable; however, no
such re- opening appears to have been done therein. Second, as earlier shown, the land registration court
acquired no jurisdiction over the land covered by the original plan because of insufficient publication in
the Official Gazette. Third, it has not been sufficiently shown that the four parcels of land covered by OCT
No. 3947, which are based on the amended plan, are but a small part of the same and covered by the
original survey plan.This conclusion is thoroughly discussed below.
In the 24 January 1994 resolution of the Court of Appeals, it found the original areas covered by
Plan 13961 to be 25,542,603 square meters and the four parcels of land embraced in the amended plan,
Plan II-13961-Amd., to be in the aggregate of 10,975,022 square meters. Thus:
In the case at bar, in 1925, the spouses Ribaya sought for a judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title of the land described as follows:
Parcel of land (Plan II-13961) containing an area of 25,542,603 square meters, with the buildings and
improvements thereon, situated in the Barrio Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay,
P.I. x x x (Italics Supplied).
Said 25,542,603 square meter land was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27, 1920 by
Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands which survey was approved by the Acting Director
of Lands on January 3, 1922, (Exh. 6).
The notice of application and hearing of the land as aforedescribed, was published in the March 17,
1925 issue of the Official Gazette (Exhs. J and J-1).
The land registration court issued a decision in favor of the spouses Ribaya on September 18, 1925
but for a smaller parcel of land than the 25,542,503 square meters are applied for.On November 23 and 30,

1925, said smaller parcel of land was surveyed by Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved
by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 as Plan II-13961-Amd. (Exh. H and series).
Plan II-13961-Amd. embraced 4 parcels of land in the aggregate area of 10,975,022 square meters
separately described as follows:
1. A parcel of land (Lot No. 1 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 3,318,454 square
meters, more or less;
2. A parcel of land (Lot No. 2 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,575,195 square
meters more or less;
3. A parcel of land (Lot No. 3 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 4,844,205 square
meters, more or less;
4. A parcel of land (Lot No. 4 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,237,368 square
meters, more or less.[52]
This was also its finding in its earlier decision of 9 January 1991.[53]
In their Comment of 30 May 1994, the private respondents do not, for obvious reasons, dispute
such finding and so they not only quoted it therein,[54] they also explicitly assert that:
The undisputed facts are that the original plan of the land applied for which was published in the Official
Gazette contained an area of 25,542,603 square meters. The land actually embraced in the decree of
registration contained only 10,975,022 square meters.[55] (Italics supplied)
In hectares, the 25,542,603 square meters means Two Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty Four Hectares,
two ares, and six hundred and three centares (2,554 has., 2 ares, and 603 centares); and the 10,975,022
square meters means one thousand and ninety seven hectares, five ares, and twenty-two centares (1,097
has., 5 ares, and 22 centares).
However, the trial court is somewhat confused as to the area of the land covered by Plan II-13961,
as well as, that covered by the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.). Thus:
[A]nd on March 7, 1978 Land Investigator Selecio San Felipe wrote the Director of Lands that the report
of the ocular inspection and investigation conducted on May 14, 15 and 16, 1977 was true and correct, . . .
that Plan II 3961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 489.3649 hectares, located
at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 18-21, December 8-9, 1925 by Private Land
Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 (Exhibits
G, G-l and G-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG-l and GG-2 for Intervenors); that Plan II-13961 Amd.,
Sheet no. 2, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 608.1373 hectares, located at Magragondong,
Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 23-30, 1925 by Private Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and
was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 (Exhibits H, H-l and H-2 for plaintiff and
Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2 for intervenors); . . . that Original Certificate of Title No RO-10848 (3947)
covers 4 parcels of land, to wit: Lot No. 1, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 3,318.454 square
meters more or less, Lot No. 2, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of1,575.195 square meters more

or less, Lot No. 3, Plan II-13961- Amd.), containing an area of 4,844.005 square meters more or less, and
Lot No. 4, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,237.368 square meters more or less with a total
of 10,975.022 square meters more or less; x x x that Plan II-13961 of property as surveyed for Luis
Ribaya, situated in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, province of Albay, containing an
area of 25,542.603 square meters, was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27, 1920 in
accordance with Section 45 of Act 2874 by Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, and the
said plan was approved by the Acting Director of Lands on January 3, 1922 (Exhibits 6 and 6-A). . . .
[56]
(Italics supplied)
Note that instead of a comma (,) before the last three digits in the areas of the four lots covered by the
amended plan, as well as the areas embraced in the original plan, the trial court placed a period (.). The
change from a comma to a period is of vital significance. For, translated into hectares, the 25,542.603
square meters would be only Two (2) hectares, five (5) ares, and five hundred and forty-two (542)
centares; and the aggregate of 10,975.022 square meters for the four lots embraced in Plan II-13961-Amd.
would be one (1) hectare and nine hundred seventy-five (975) centares.
Indeed, the disagreement between the Court of Appeals and the trial court as to the land area of the
original survey plan (Plan II-13961), i.e., whether it was 25,542,603 square meters (twenty-five million
five hundred and forty-two thousand and six hundred three square meters) as found by the former,
or 25,542.603 square meters (twenty-five thousand, five hundred forty-two point six hundred and three
square meters) as found by the latter, only shows the unreliability of the original plan sought to be
established through Exhibits 6 and 6-A. The Court of Appeals itself so found it to be in its decision of 9
January 1991 because these exhibits did not show that the survey plan was signed by the surveyor. Thus:

Clearly then, there is absence of factual basis to conclude that the four parcels of land included in
OCT No. 3947 are but a part of the land covered by the original plan (Plan II-13961).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 of the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17351 is SET ASIDE, while its decision therein of 9
January 1991 affirming in toto that of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City of 11
November 1987 in Civil Case No. 6198 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE DE LUZURIAGA,[1] represented by JOSE DE LUZURIAGA, JR.,
HEIRS OF MANUEL R. DE LUZURIAGA, HEIRS OF THE LATE REMEDIOS DE LUZURIAGAVALERO, and THE LATE NORMA DE LUZURIAGA DIANON,
Petitioners,
- versus REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES thru the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Respondent.
x-------------------------------------------x
HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE DE LUZURIAGA, represented by JOSE DE LUZURIAGA, JR., and
HEIRS OF THE LATE REMEDIOS DE LUZURIAGA-VALERO AND THE LATE NORMA DE
LUZURIAGA-DIANON,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 168848

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

- versus G.R. No. 169019

Although the trial court said so (decision, p. 4) its basis, which is (original) Plan II-13961 (Exhs. 6, 6A), did not indubitably establish the same. In the first place, said original plan (Plan II-13961) does not
bear the signature of the surveyor thereof, thereby casting doubt on its genuineness and due execution. x x
x[57] (Italics supplied)
Such doubt gains strength if we consider that if indeed the area embraced therein was that found by the
Court of Appeals, i.e., 25,542,603 square meters with a comma before the last three digits it would have
been physically impossible to finish the survey thereof in only eleven days (9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and
27 July 1920). Plainly, the present-day sophisticated survey instruments were not then
available. Furthermore, the trial court indicated in its findings of fact that in addition to the four lots
covered by OCT No. 3947, there were other large tracts covered by the amended survey plan (Plan II13961-Amd.), viz.:
[T]hat Plan II-13961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 489.3649 hectares,
located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, . . . (Exhibits G, G-1 and G-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG1 and GG-2 for Intervenors); that Plan II-13961 Amd., Sheet no. 2, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area
of 608.1373 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay,... (Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2 for plaintiff
and Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2 for intervenors);[58] (Italics supplied)
The disagreement between the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be definitely resolved
because no reliable copy of the original Plan II-13961 was presented. Exhibits "6 and 6-A are a machine
copy of the blueprint of the said Plan, which is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. They are, at most, secondary evidence, which are inadmissible for failure of the offer or to
prove any of the exception provided therein and to established the conditions for their admissibility. Even
if they are admitted, they have no probative value.

REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES thru the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
June 30, 2009
x

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Facts

Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 1524 of the Bacolod Cadastre, particularly
described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 1524 of the Cadastral Survey of Bacolod),
with the improvements thereon, situated in the Municipality of Bacolod. Bounded
on the N. and NE., by the Lupit or Magsungay Pequeo River; on the SE., by Calle
Araneta and Lots Nos. 440, 442 and 441; on the SW., by the Sapa Mamlot; and on
the W. by Creeks x x x; containing an area of [TWO HUNDRED SIXTY EIGHT

THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY TWO (268,772) square

meters], more or less.[6]
On May 16, 1997, petitioners filed an Application for the Registration of Title, docketed as
Cad. Case No. 97-583 before the RTC. In it, the subject lot was specifically identified as Lot No. 1524,
AP-06-005774, Cad. 39, Bacolod Cadastre, situated in the City of Bacolod, Island of Negros. The survey
plan, conducted by Geodetic Engineer Eluminado E. Nessia, Jr. and duly approved on May 17, 1997 by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional Office, Iloilo City; and the
technical description of the subject lot, prepared by the Office of the Regional Technical Director, Land
Management Services, DENR, Region VI, Iloilo City, were submitted to the RTC.
On May 12, 1998, the application was amended to state, thus: x x x that the parcel of land in
question be ordered registered and that an original Certificate of Title be issued in the name of the late
Jose R. [De] Luzuriaga, Sr. pursuant to Decree No. 22752 covering Lot No. 1524 of Bacolod Cadastre. [7]
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order of general default except as against respondent
Republic of the Philippines, which entered its due appearance through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) which, in turn, designated Bacolod Assistant City Prosecutor Abraham Bayona to represent the
OSG at the trial.
Among the evidence petitioners adduced during the hearings was a copy of Decree No.
22752[8] dated October 7, 1916, issued by the General Land Registration Office (GLRO) pursuant to the
decision in the cadastral case confirming and granting unto the late Jose R. De Luzuriaga full ownership
of Lot No. 1524.
RTC Decision Granting Application for Registration of Lot 1524
By Decision[9] dated May 24, 1999, the trial court ratified its order of general default and
judicially confirmed the incomplete title of the late De Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot No. 1524 pursuant to
Decree No. 22752. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of general default
previously entered is ratified and JUDGMENT is hereby rendered confirming the
title of the late Jose R. De Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot No. 1524 of Bacolod Cadastre
under Decree No. 22752 dated October 7, 1916 (Exh. K & L) identified in the
approved Survey Plan (Exh. M) and technically described in the Technical
Description (Exh. N).
As soon as this decision becomes final, let an Original Certificate of
Title be issued in the name of the late Jose R. De Luzuriaga, Sr., pursuant to Decree
No. 22752 covering Lot No. 1524 of Bacolod Cadastre in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.

The OSG, for the Republic, received a copy of the Decision on June 22, 1999, but opted not to
file an appeal.
Pursuant to the above decision the Bacolod Registry issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. RO-58 in the name of De Luzuriaga, Sr.
DAALCO Sues for Quieting of Title
Meanwhile, in September 1999, Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, Co., Inc. (DAALCO) filed a
Complaint[10] against petitioners before the RTC for Quieting of Title, Annulment and Cancellation of
[OCT] No. RO-58 with prayer for injunctive relief and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10924
and entitled Dr. Antonio A. Lizares Co., Inc., (DAALCO) v. Jose R. De Luzuriaga, III, et al.[11] In gist,

DAALCO claimed that its predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Lizares, was the registered, lawful, and
absolute owner of Lot No. 1524 as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 190-R (T-247
[T-19890]) issued by the Register of Deeds (RD) of Bacolod City on February 8, 1939. Said TCT served
to replace OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares and was issued pursuant to Decree No. 22752, GLRO
Cad. Rec. No. 55 as early as November 14, 1916 and registered in the registration book of the Office of
the RD of Negros Occidental, at Vol. 10, p. 283.
To buttress its case, DAALCO pointed to the fact that the RD, after the finality of the May 24,
1999 RTC Decision, did not issue an OCT in the name of De Luzuriaga, Sr., as prayed for in the
application of petitioners and as ordered by the cadastral court. What the RD instead issuedowing to the
issuance in 1916 of OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizareswas a reconstituted title, i.e., OCT No. RO58. Finally, DAALCO maintained having been in actual, open, and continuous possession as registered
owner of the subject lot.
The Petition for Relief from Judgment by the Republic
On November 24, 1999, or six months after the RTC rendered its Decision, the Republic
through the OSG, however, sought the annulment thereof via an unverifiedPetition for Relief from
Judgment[12] filed before the same RTC which rendered the above decision in Cad. Case No. 97-583.
To support its prayer for annulment, the Republic alleged, first, that petitioners failed to
indicate in their application all the heirs of the late De Luzuriaga, Sr. and their corresponding authorization
for the application in their behalf.
Second, the Republic asserted that petitioners cannot use Decree No. 22752 as basis for the
application of land registration as said decree effectively barred said application. It invited attention to
Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, which requires the simultaneous issuance of the decree
of registration and the corresponding certificate of title. As argued, the policy of simultaneous issuance
prescribed in the decree has not been followed in the instant case.
Third, the Republic, relying on Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of
Appeals,[13] contended that no new title over the subject lot can be issued in favor of the applicant, the
same lot being already covered by a title, specifically OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares.
Fourth, again citing jurisprudence,[14] the Republic maintained that the applicant, even if
entitled to registration by force of Decree No. 22752, is already barred by laches, the same registration
decree having been issued 83 long years ago.
In the meantime, Judge Anita G. Chua replaced retired Judge Ramon B. Posadas as presiding
judge of the RTC, Branch 51 in Bacolod City.
The Ruling of the RTC
By Order dated August 31, 2001, Judge Chua, on the finding that the petition for relief from
judgment is not sufficient in form and substance and having been filed out of time, [15] denied the
petition. Specifically, the RTC found the Republics petition to be unverified and filed beyond the 60th day
from receipt on June 22, 1999 of a copy of the May 24, 1999 RTC Decision.
Subsequently, the Republic moved for reconsideration [16] of the above denial order arguing that
its procedural lapses are not fatal to its case. It cited Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[17] in which the
Court held that the merits of the substantive aspects of the case are deemed a special circumstance or
compelling reason for the reinstatement of its petition and prayed for the relaxation of the Rules.
Moreover, the OSG alleged that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Cadastral Case No. 97-583
inasmuch as the corresponding amended application for registration dated May 5, 1998 was not published
and a copy of which the Republic was not served.
Finally, the Republic raised anew the argument on the unavailability of Decree No. 22752 as
basis for the application of land registration in view of the implementation of Sec. 39 of PD 1529.

The Republic later filed a Supplement (To Motion for Reconsideration) reiterating the merits of
its case.

The petitions are bereft of merit.

The RTC denied the Republics motion for reconsideration through an Order of October 24,
2002. In the same order, the trial court observed that the Republic is actually asking the present presiding
judge to review the decision of her predecessor, Judge Posadas, and to annul the same decision. Pursuing
the point, the RTC, citing Miranda v. Court of Appeals[18] and Nery v. Leyson,[19] ratiocinated that a judge
who succeeds another has no reviewing and appellate authority and jurisdiction over his predecessors final
judgment on the merits of a case, such authority residing, as it does, in the ordinary course of things, with
the appellate court.
Aggrieved, the Republic elevated the case before the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75321, the petition raised the sole issue of whether the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in denying its petition for relief from judgment.
The Ruling of the CA
On November 26, 2004, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting certiorari
and ordered the remand of the instant case to the trial court for reception of evidence to determine whether
the RTCs Decision confirming the title of the late Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot 1524 will result in a double
titling of the subject lot. The fallo of the CAs decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the case is remanded to the court a quo for reception of
evidence in order to resolve the issue of whether or not the Decision dated May 24,
1999 confirming the title of the late Jose R. De Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot No. 1524 of
Bacolod Cadastre really resulted to double titling and thereafter, to rule on the
merits of the petition for relief from judgment.
SO ORDERED.[20]
The CA predicated its ruling on the following factors: (1) the merits of the petition for relief
from judgment far outweigh the procedural technicalities that obstruct it, i.e., not verified and filed out of
time; and (2) the Republic was able to make out a prima facie case of double titling, supported by a
Letter/Report[21] issued by the Bacolod City RD on December 7, 2001 showing that Lot No. 1524 was
already registered under, and an OCT already issued in, another mans name.
Through the equally assailed May 25, 2005 Resolution, the CA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, we have these petitions, with the supplemental petition filed on July 28, 2005; while the
main petition for review on certiorari was filed on August 11, 2005, which explains the lower docket
number of the former.

The CA acted within its sound discretion in giving, under the factual premises and for reasons
set out in the assailed decision, due course to the Republics petition for relief from judgment and
remanding the case to the trial court for reception of evidence. Under the peculiar facts and circumstances
of the case, we agree with the appellate courts holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the petition for relief from the May 24, 1999 Decision.
Procedural Issue: Relaxation of the Rules to
Promote Substantial Justice
We can concede that the unverified petition for relief from judgment of the OSG was filed out
of time. Such a petition must be filed within: (a) sixty (60) days from knowledge of judgment, order, or
other proceedings to be set aside; and (b) six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order, or other
proceedings.[25] In the case at bar, the OSG admits receiving the May 24, 1999 Decision on June 22,
1999. Thus, when it did not file a notice of appeal of said decision within the 15-day reglementary period
for filing an appeal, the OSG was left with the remaining remedy of relief from judgment subject to the
conditions provided under Secs. 1 and 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. But, as thing turned out, the
OSG, for the Republic, belatedly filed its petition only on November 24, 1999, or more than five months
from receipt or knowledge of the May 24, 1999 RTC Decision.
The Republic ascribes its failure to file a timely notice of appeal or a petition for relief from
judgment on the negligence of the OSG personin charge of receiving all pleadings assigned to Asst.
Solicitor Josefina C. Castillowho belatedly gave the copy of the RTC Decision to the latter due to
oversight. And the Republic prays for the relaxation of the rigid application of the Rules based on the
merits of its petition for relief from judgment.
While the reglementary periods fixed under the rules for relief from judgment are mandatory in
character,[26] procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance may, in the interest
of substantial justice, be relaxed.[27] Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, they are not to be applied with severity and rigidity when such application would
clearly defeat the very rationale for their existence. In line with this postulate, the Court can and will relax
or altogether suspend the application of the rules, or except a particular case from the rules operation when
their rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice.[28]
The peculiarities of the instant case impel us to do so now. Foremost of these is the fact that the
Republic had properly made out a prima facie case of double titling over the subject lot, meriting a
ventilation of the factual and legal issues relative to that case.
Apropos the matter of verification which the OSG failed to observe, it cannot be overemphasized that the requirement on verification is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings.
Non-compliance with it is not jurisdictional, and would not render the pleading fatally defective. [29] A
pleading required by the Rules of Court to be verified may be given due course even without a verification
if the circumstances warrant the suspension of the rules in the interest of justice.[30] So it must be here.

The Issues
Substantive Issue: Prima Facie Case of Double Titling
Petitioners raise as ground for review in G.R. No. 169019 the following issues and assignment
of errors:
The Courts Ruling
The core issue in these petitions is whether the appellate court gravely abused its discretion in
granting the Republics petition for relief from judgment despite: (1) the May 24, 1999 Decision in
Cadastral Case No. 97-583 having become final and executory; and (2) the issue of double titling having
been raised in DAALCOs complaint in Civil Case No. 99-10924 for quieting of title and cancellation of
OCT No. RO-58 before the RTC, Branch 46 in Bacolod City.

Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where
there is no other available or adequate remedy. [31] And its determination rests with the court. In the instant
case, certain attending facts and circumstances, as shall be set forth below, make for an exceptional case
for allowing relief from judgment.
Register of Deeds report shows doubling titling when another OCT is issued for subject
lot

First. The Letter/Report[32] issued by the Bacolod City RD on December 7, 2001, ineluctably
indicating the registration of subject Lot No. 1524 and the subsequent issuance of an OCT in the name of
another person, provides a reasonable ground to believe that a case of double titling would result should
another title issue for the same lot in the name of De Luzuriaga, Sr. Thus, there exists a compelling need
for another hard look at Cad. Case No. 97-583 and for the trial court to address the likelihood
of duplication of titles or double titling, an eventuality that will undermine the Torrens system of land
registration.
OCT already issued for subject lot
Second. The prior issuance on November 14, 1916 of OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares
over Lot No. 1524 persuasively buttresses a prima facie case on the issue of double titling. Civil Case No.
99-10924 for quieting of title filed by DAALCO before the RTC, Branch 46 in Bacolod City tends to
show that DAALCOs predecessor-in-interest,Lizares, was issued OCT No. 2765 in 1916 ostensibly
pursuant to Decree No. 22752, GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 55. This is confirmed by the adverted Letter/Report.
Decree No. 22752 is the same decree petitioners relied upon in Cad. Case No. 97-583 for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title over subject Lot No. 1524. Obviously, one and the same decree
cannot serve as basis for a valid grant of separate titles in fee simple over the same lot to two different
persons.
Ownership of subject lot best ventilated in civil case
Third. Since petitioners and DAALCO separately claim owning Lot No. 1524, the ownership
issue would be best litigated in Civil Case No. 99-10924 filed by DAALCO for quieting of title. Lest it be
overlooked, both parties anchor in a way their ownership claim on Decree No. 22752. It ought to be
stressed, however, that an OCT was issued several months after Decree No. 22752 was rendered, and the
certificate was issued to Lizares, not to De Luzuriaga, Sr. De Luzuriaga, Sr., during his lifetime, never
contested or assailed the title issuance to Lizares, suggesting the possibility of a lawful transfer of
ownership from one to the other during the period material. In any case, for purposes of Cad. Case No. 97583, the fact that an OCT was already issued for the subject lot would, perforce, foreclose the issuance of
another OCT for the same lot.
As has been consistently held, neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a
decision in a land registration case. [33] In line with this doctrine of the inapplicability of prescription and
laches on registration cases, the Court has ruled that the failure on the part of the administrative authorities
to do their part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from
ownership of the land.[34] Following these doctrinal pronouncements, petitioners argue that they can
rightfully bank on Decree No. 22752 to defeat the claim of DAALCO.
Petitioners above posture may be given cogency but for the issuance, pursuant to the same
decree, of OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares. Nothing on the records adequately explains, nor do
petitioners attempt to do so, how a registration decree adjudicating Lot No. 1524 to De Luzuriaga, Sr.
became the very medium for the issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Lizares. Consequently,
whatever rights petitioners might have over the subject lot as heirs of De Luzuriaga, Sr. ought to be
litigated against the successors-in-interest of Lizares to put a final rest to their clashing claims over Lot
No. 1524.
Issuance of reconstituted title beyond the judgment in the cadastral case
Fourth. OCT No. RO-58 was issued by the RD of Bacolod City purportedly in execution of
the final and executory decision in Cad. Case No. 97-583. Yet the Court notes that the title issuance went
beyond the scope of the judgment sought to be executed. The second paragraph of the fallo of the May 24,
1999 RTC Decision granting and confirming ownership of subject Lot No. 1524 unto the late Jose R. De
Luzuriaga clearly ordered, thus:

As soon as this decision becomes final, let an Original Certificate of

Title be issued in the name of the late Jose R. De Luzuriaga, Sr., pursuant to
Decree No. 22752 covering Lot No. 1524 of Bacolod Cadastre in accordance with
law.[35]
But the RD of Bacolod Cityin grave abuse of discretion, instead of issuing an OCT in the name
of De Luzuriaga, Sr., as directed by the courtissued a reconstituted title over Lot No. 1524 in the name of
the heirs of De Luzuriaga, Sr. Not lost on the Court is the fact that a reconstituted title is ordered issued in
an ordinary civil case, not in a cadastral proceeding for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over
unregistered property, as in the instant case.
Basic is the rule that execution must conform to what the decision dispositively decrees.
Logically, an execution is void if it does not strictly conform to every essential particulars of the
judgment rendered.[37] Be that as it may, the issuance of the reconstituted title is rendered moot and
ineffective by the grant of relief from judgment.
[36]

Cadastral Case and Quieting of Title Case can proceed independently

Fifth. Petitioners contention that a petition for relief from judgment and the special civil action
for quieting of title cannot proceed separately is without solid basis. Cad. Case No. 97-583 and the suit for
quieting of title in Civil Case No. 99-10924 each involves different concerns and can proceed
independently. The cause of action of the Republics petition for relief from judgment of double titling of
the subject lot is different from DAALCOs quest for quieting of title. From another perspective,
DAALCO basically seeks to nullify the issuance of OCT No. RO-58 in the name of the De Luzuriaga
heirs, while the Republics petition assails the grant of ownership to De Luzuriaga, Sr. over a parcel of land
duly registered under OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares, who thereafter transferred the title to his heirs
or assigns. In fine, both actions may proceed independently, albeit a consolidation of both cases would be
ideal to obviate multiplicity of suits.
The RTC Had Jurisdiction in Cadastral Case
The Republic, after participating in the proceedings below, has raised the issue of jurisdiction,
drawing attention to the non-publication of the amended application for registration during the trial of
Cad. Case No. 93-857. The Court cannot see its way clear to the jurisdictional challenge posed by the
Republic. As it were, the Republic entered its appearance in Cad. Case No. 97-583 represented by
prosecutor Bayona. The petitioners in that case appeared to have complied with the essential jurisdictional
requirement of publication. The required survey plan, technical description, and original tracing cloth have
been duly presented and submitted as evidence. Prosecutor Bayona obviously found the cadastral
proceedings to have been in order, else, he would have duly protested and assailed the same.
We hardly can subscribe to the Republics argument that the publication of the amendment in
petitioners application is a condition sine qua non for the RTC, acting as cadastral court, to acquire
jurisdiction. Sec. 7[38] of Act No. 2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act, and Sec. 35 [39] of PD 1529,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree, provide for the publication of the application for
registration and the schedule of the initial hearing. This is so since judicial cadastral proceedings, like
ordinary administrative registration, are in rem, and are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure,
and evidence. Due publication is required to give notice to all interested parties of the claim and identity
of the property that will be surveyed. And any additional territory or change in the area of the claim
cannot be included by amendment of the plan or application without new publication, otherwise the
cadastral court does not acquire jurisdiction over the additional or amended claim. But where the identity
and area of the claimed property are not the subjects of amendment but other collateral matters, a new
publication is not needed.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that due publication was made for Lot No. 1524, its
identity and area. The amendment in petitioners application in the relief portion neither altered the area
and identity of the subject lot nor added any territory. Thus, no new publication is required. Besides, the

Republic, through Prosecutor Bayona, has been duly notified of such amendment. Consequently, the
Republic could not plausibly argue that it was deprived of its day in court.
Anent DAALCOs motion to intervene and interest over the subject lot, it may address its
motion to the lower court, although intervention may no longer be necessary in the light of Civil Case No.
99-10924 pending before the RTC, Branch 46 in Bacolod City, where DAALCO can properly ventilate its
ownership claim as against that of petitioners, who, incidentally, are impleaded in said case as
respondents/defendants.
A final consideration. A petition for relief is in effect a second opportunity for an aggrieved
party to ask for a new trial. [40] Once granted either by the trial court or the appellate court, the final
judgment whence relief is sought is deemed set aside and the case shall stand as if such judgment had
never been rendered. In such a case, the court shall then proceed to hear and determine the case as if a
timely motion for new trial or reconsideration had been granted by it.[41]
Here, the presiding judge of the RTC, Branch 51 in Bacolod City, by the remand to the court of
Cad. Case No. 97-583, is not asked to review and/or annul a final judgment of his or her predecessor or of
another RTC, as there is nothing for the presiding judge to nullify in the first place, the annulling act
having been taken by the CA. Hence, the trial courts invocation, as seconded by petitioners, of the
teachings of Nery,[42] is off-tangent. Nery, it is true, held that a trial court is without jurisdiction to annul a
final judgment of a co-equal court. Nery was, however, cast against a different factual and legal milieu.
Suffice it to state for the nonce that Nery involved a final judgment of the RTC against which no petition
for relief has been interposed. In view of the first reason, the final judgment was not effectively set aside,
unlike here.

WHEREFORE, the Verified Petition for Review on Certiorari and Supplemental Petition are
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the CAs November 26, 2004 Decision and May 25, 2005
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 75321 are hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 167215

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
seeking to set aside a part of the Decision[1] dated February 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CAG.R. SP No. 71358 insofar as it sustained the denial of the Notice of Appeal[2] filed on January 11, 2002
by the petitioner from the Decision[3] dated August 30, 2001 of Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 93-LRC-0008.
LRC No. 93-LRC-0008 involves the second application filed by Evaristo Tiotioen on September 6,
1993 for judicial confirmation and registration under the Torrens System of two parcels of land
denominated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan PSU-230646, situated in Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet, with an
aggregate area of 180,488 square meters. Evaristo Tiotioen was substituted by his heirs in the case when
he died on June 21, 1997. Santiago A. Santiago, the Municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet, and the
petitioner
opposed
the
aforesaid
application.
In a Notice of Appearance[4] dated October 20, 1994, the OSG formally requested that its
appearance be entered as counsel for the petitioner and that all notices of hearings, orders, resolutions and
decision be served to the OSG at its given address. The said notice of appearance informed the court that
the OSG authorized the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet to appear in the case, subject to the conditions
quoted hereunder:
The Provincial Prosecutor, La Trinidad, Benguet, is authorized to appear
in this case, and therefore, should also be furnished notices of hearing, orders,
resolutions, decisions and other processes. However, as the Solicitor General retains
supervision and control of the representation in this case and has to approve
withdrawal of the case, non-appeal, or other actions which appear to compromise
the interest of the Government, only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions
served on him will bind the party represented.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Present:
Petitioner,

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
AZCUNA,
- versus -

REYES,* and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

Promulgated:
HEIRS OF EVARISTO TIOTIOEN,
October 8, 2008
Respondents.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The petitioner filed its Opposition[5] dated October 20, 1994 and Supplemental Opposition[6] dated June 20,
1995 on the ground that the parcels of land, applied for registration by the respondents, belong to the
communal forest of La Trinidad, Benguet, and are therefore inalienable land of the public domain, which
have not been classified and considered as disposable and alienable.
After trial, the land registration court rendered its Decision dated August 30, 2001 which
granted the application. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court, finding that the Applicants have shown their adverse,
continuous and notorious possession and in the concept of owners of the land
applied for since time immemorial, and thus their title thereto is proper to be
confirmed, and is hereby confirmed.
The applicants, namely: NICOLAS TIOTIOEN, single; ILDEFONSO TIOTIOEN,
married to Adelaida Tiotioen; CONCEPCION TIOTIOEN-DIAZ, married; NANCY
TIOTIOEN-OGOY, married and FILOMENA TIOTIOEN-DULNUAN, married; all
of legal age, Filipinos and residents of Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet are hereby
declared owners pro indiviso of a parcel of land situated at Pico, La Trinidad,
Benguet containing an area of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE (123,935) SQUARE METERS for Lot 1 and
FIFTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (56,553) SQUARE
METERS for Lot 2. The subject land is particularly described in the Original
Tracing Cloth Plan (Exh. AA-1), Survey Plan (Exh. A), and in the Technical

Description (Exhs. B & B-2), subject to the claim of oppositor Santiago A. Santiago
as per agreement with the applicants and when the decision becomes final and
executory, let a final decree be issued for the issuance of title accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner and the municipality received their respective notices of the above-mentioned
decision on September 6 and 7, 2001. The municipality filed its Motion for Reconsideration thereto
on September 20, 2001. The petitioner, on the other hand, filed a Motion and Manifestation[7] on October
5, 2001 adopting the said motion of the municipality.
In the Resolution[8] dated December 6, 2001, the land registration court denied for lack of merit
the motion for reconsideration of the municipality and declared the same as pro forma because the issues
cited were already passed upon in the decision sought for reconsideration. The municipality filed its notice
of appeal on the following day it received its notice of the said resolution. The OSG was not furnished by
the land registration court with a copy of this resolution but it was informed of the said resolution only by
the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2002[9], through a Letter[10] dated December 19,
2001. Consequently, the OSG filed its subject notice of appeal for the petitioner onJanuary 11, 2002.
The land registration court denied the notice of appeal of the municipality on the ground that the
latters pro forma motion for reconsideration did not interrupt the reglementary period to appeal. The
petitioners notice of appeal was also denied supposedly for having been filed out of time [11].
The petitioner sought the reconsideration of the denial of its notice of appeal which was again
denied by the land registration court in an Order[12] dated April 23, 2002, quoted hereunder:
ORDER
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) of the Order of the Court dated January 29, 2002 denying their Notice of Appeal having
been filed beyond the reglementary period.
Be it noted that the OSG received the Decision dated August 30, 2001 on September 06,
2001 and filed its Notice of Appeal on January 11, 2002. Conformably with Section 3,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, prescribing a 15-day appeal period, the last day
for the perfection of an appeal by OSG should have been on the 21st day of September
2001. Per se, it was filed beyond the reglementary period for which to perfect an appeal.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who
seeks to avail of the right must comply with the rules. These rules, particularly the statutory
requirement for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period laid down by law, must be
strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and
for orderly discharge of judicial business (Ben Sta. Rita v. C.A., et al., G.R. No. 119891,
August 21, 1995).
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no convincing and logical reasons to reconsider its
Order dated January 29, 2002 and hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration. [Emphasis
supplied]
The municipality and petitioner separately assailed before the CA the orders of the land
registration court denying their respective notices of appeal. The CA granted the petition filed by the
municipality and gave due course to its appeal but denied the one filed by the petitioner. The CA pointed
out that the petitioner filed its motion and manifestation adopting the adverted motion for reconsideration
of the municipality beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal and, thus, the decision of the land
registration court already attained finality insofar as the petitioner was concerned. The strong grounds
alleged by the petitioner were likewise rejected by the CA which explained and ruled as follows:
The merit impressed in petitioner Republic of the Philippines position is, however,
more apparent than real. Notwithstanding the studied avoidance of direct references

thereto, the fact remains that the Solicitor General received its copy of the 30 August 2001
decision rendered in the case on 6 September 2001 and thus only had until the 21 st of the
same month to either move for a reconsideration of said decision or perfect an appeal
therefrom. There is, therefore, no gainsaying the ineluctable fact that the selfsame
decision had already attained finality as against petitioner Republic of the Philippines by
the time the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet filed the 4 October 2001
manifestation adopting petitioner municipalitys motion for reconsideration.
It thus matters little that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet appears to have
been duly furnished with a copy of the aforesaid 6 December 2001 resolution on December 10,
2001 or that it only informed the Office of the Solicitor General of said adverse ruling through
the 19 December 2001 missive the latter received on January 4, 2002. The rule that copies or
orders and decisions served on the deputized counsel, acting as agent or representative of
the Office of the Solicitor General, are not binding until they are actually received by the
latter has little application where, as in the case at bench, said office had been duly
furnished a copy of the decision in the main case which, for reasons it alone can explain, it
allowed to attain finality. Under the factual and legal milieu of the case, public respondent
cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of or excess of jurisdiction
for denying the 10 January 2002 Notice of Appeal filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
way beyond the reglementary period for petitioner Republic of the Philippines appeal.
Neither are we, finally, swayed by the strong grounds petitioner Republic of
the Philippines purportedly has to pursue an appeal from public respondents 30 August
2001decision. Except on jurisdictional grounds, correction of a lower courts decision
could, for one, only be done by regular appeal within the period allowed by law. Our
perusal of the grounds cited by petitioner Republic of the Philippines, for another, yielded
nothing which had not yet been raised and will once again be raised by petitioner
municipality.
WHEREFORE, the petition filed by petitioner Municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet is
GRANTED and the assailed 23 January 2002 order and 30 April 2002 resolution are,
acoordingly, NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered GIVING DUE
COURSE to said petitioners appeal.
The petition filed by the Office of the Solicitor General for and in behalf
of petitioner Republic of the Philippines is, however, DENIED for lack of
merit. [Emphasis supplied]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner claims that the OSG, as its principal counsel in the subject land registration case, is entitled
to be furnished with copies of orders, notices, and decision of the trial court, and that the date of service of
such copies to the OSG is the reckoning period in counting the timeliness of its appeal[13]. The petitioner
contends that the OSG was not furnished with a notice of the Order [Resolution] dated December 6,
2001 of the land registration court which denied the adverted motion for reconsideration of the
municipality.The prescribed period within which to file petitioners appeal did not commence to run and,
therefore, its notice of appeal should not be treated as filed out of time.
The petitioner prays in the alternative that issues of procedure should be set aside and its appeal should be
given due course alleging again the strong grounds that it has adduced against the decision of the land
registration court.
In their Comment[14] and Memorandum[15], the respondents contend that the appellate court
correctly denied the notice of appeal of the petitioner for having been filed out of time. They stress the fact
that the petitioner received the adverted decision of the trial court on September 6, 2001 and that the
petitioner filed its notice of appeal thereto only on January 11, 2002 which is way beyond the prescribed
period under the Rules of Court.
We find merit in the petition.

The relevant facts involving the procedural issues in this case are undisputed. The petitioner
and the municipality received a notice of the adverted decision of the land registration court on September
6 and 7, 2001, respectively. The municipality timely filed its motion for reconsideration of the said
judgment on September 20, 2001. The provincial prosecutor adopted this motion for reconsideration of the
municipality on October 5, 2001 which was beyond the fifteen-day period counted from receipt of the
petitioner of a copy of the decision. The land registration court denied the said motion for reconsideration
of the municipality in its Resolution dated December 6, 2001. The OSGwas not furnished with a notice of
such resolution. The OSG was informed by the provincial prosecutor of such denial on January 4,
2002 when it received the Letter datedDecember 19, 2001 of the Provincial Prosecutor. The OSG filed the
subject notice of appeal for the petitioner only on January 11, 2002 which the land registration court
denied for having been filed way beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period to appeal which the said
court reckoned from September 6, 2001. The CA affirmed the land registration courts denial of the subject
notice of appeal of the petitioner but gave due course to the appeal of the municipality.
In deciding this case, this Court is guided by the settled doctrine that the belated filing of an
appeal by the State, or even its failure to file an opposition, in a land registration case because of the
mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents does not deprive the government of its right to appeal
from a judgment of the court. InDirector of Lands v. Medina[16], we said:
Considering the foregoing, the lower court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the
appeal of the government on the basis of what it perceived as a procedural lapse. The lower
court should be reminded that the ends of substantial justice should be the paramount
consideration in any litigation or proceeding. As this Court ruled in Republic v. Associacion
Benevola de Cebu, "to dismiss the Republic's appeal merely on the alleged ground of late
filing is not proper considering the merits of the case" and to ignore the evidence presented
by the provincial fiscal in behalf of the Director of Forestry which constituted the crux of the
government's case "would defeat the time-honored Constitutional precepts and the
Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.
In Heirs of Marina C. Regalado v. Republic[17], we ruled:
The failure of the Republic to file any opposition or answer to the application
for registration, despite receipt of notice thereof, did not deprive its right to
appeal the RTCdecision.
Relative to the allegation that the Director of Lands or that the government did not
oppose the application of herein respondent, as in fact on December 26, 1969 an
order of general default was issued by the court against the whole world, suffice it
to say that as stated by this court in Luciano vs. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769, 'it is a well
known and settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or its government,
is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents .'
And, in an earlier case, Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 32 SCRA
211, 'there was an enunciation of such a principle in this wise: 'Thus did the lower
court, as pointed out by the then Solicitor General, conclude that the government
was bound by the mistaken interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer and the
auditor general.' It would consider estoppel as applicable. That is not the law.
Estoppel does not lie. [Emphasis supplied]
Moreover, we have advised the lower courts, under exceptional circumstances, to be cautious
about not depriving of a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of
technicalities.[18] In Tanenglian v. Lorenzo, et al., [19] we recognized the importance of the facts and issues
involved and gave due course to an appeal despite that it was the wrong mode of appeal and that it was
even filed beyond the reglementary period to do so, thus:

circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal.
In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine
the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did
not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to
prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts
have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement
of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full
opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.
xxx xxx xxx
In Sebastian v. Morales, we ruled that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except
only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure, thus:
[C]onsidering that the petitioner has presented a good cause for the proper and just
determination of his case, the appellate court should have relaxed the stringent
application of technical rules of procedure and yielded to consideration of
substantial justice.
The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent
procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict
and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It is a far better and
more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
The vast tracts of land involved in this case are claimed by the petitioner to be a protected
watershed area, which allegedly preserves the main source of water of theMunicipality of La
Trinidad. Relative thereto, the petitioner raises substantial factual and legal issues which should be
decided on their merit instead of being summarily disposed of based on a technicality.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the appellate court is hereby PARTIALLY MODIFIED so as to give due course to the Notice
of Appeal filed on January 11, 2002 by the petitioner from the Decision dated August 30, 2001 of Branch
63 of the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 93-LRC-0008.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE R. MARTINEZ, G. R. No. 160895
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Respondents.
Promulgated:
October 30, 2006
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary

situations that merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the

DECISION
The central issue presented in this Petition for Review is whether an order of general default
issued by a trial court in a land registration case bars the Republic of thePhilippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, from interposing an appeal from the trial courts subsequent decision in favor of the
applicant.
The antecedent facts follow.
On 24 February 1999, petitioner Jose R. Martinez (Martinez) filed a petition for the registration
in his name of three (3) parcels of land included in the Cortes, Surigao del Sur Cadastre. The lots,
individually identified as Lot No. 464-A, Lot No. 464-B, and Lot No. 370, Cad No. 597, collectively
comprised around 3,700 square meters. Martinezalleged that he had purchased lots in 1952 from his uncle,
whose predecessors-in-interest were traceable up to the 1870s. It was claimed that Martinez had remained
in continuous possession of the lots; that the lots had remained unencumbered; and that they became
private property through prescription pursuant to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141. Martinez further claimed that he had been constrained to initiate the proceedings because the Director
of the Land Management Services had failed to do so despite the completion of the cadastral survey of
Cortes, Surigao del Sur.[1]
The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-30 and raffled to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Surigao del Sur, Branch 27. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was furnished a
copy of the petition. The trial court set the case for hearing and directed the publication of the
corresponding Notice of Hearing in the Official Gazette. On 30 September 1999, the OSG, in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, opposed the petition on the grounds that appellees possession was not in
accordance with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141; that his muniments of title were
insufficient to prove bona-fide acquisition and possession of the subject parcels; and that the properties
formed part of the public domain and thus not susceptible to private appropriation.[2]
Despite the opposition filed by the OSG, the RTC issued an order of general default, even
against the Republic of the Philippines, on 29 March 2000. This ensued when during the hearing of even
date, no party appeared before the Court to oppose Martinezs petition.[3]
Afterwards, the trial court proceeded to receive Martinezs oral and documentary evidence in
support of his petition. On 1 August 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision [4]concluding that Martinez and his
predecessors-in-interest had been for over 100 years in possession characterized as continuous, open,
public, and in the concept of an owner. The RTC thus decreed the registration of the three (3) lots in the
name of Martinez.
From this Decision, the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal dated 28 August 2000,[5] which was
approved by the RTC. However, after the records had been transmitted to the Court of Appeals, the RTC
received a letter dated 21 February 2001 [6] from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) stating that only
Lot Nos. 464-A and 464-B were referred to in the Notice of Hearing published in the Official Gazette; and
that Lot No. 370, Cad No. 597 had been deliberately omitted due to the lack of an approved survey plan
for that property. Accordingly, the LRA manifested that this lot should not have been adjudicated
to Martinez for lack of jurisdiction. This letter was referred by the RTC to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action.[7]
On 10 October 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision, [8] reversing the
RTC and instead ordering the dismissal of the petition for registration. In light of the opposition filed by
the OSG, the appellate court found the evidence presented by Martinez as insufficient to support the
registration of the subject lots. The Court of Appeals concluded that the oral evidence presented
by Martinez merely consisted of general declarations of ownership, without alluding to specific acts of
ownership performed by him or his predecessors-in-interest. It likewise debunked the documentary
evidence presented by Martinez, adjudging the same as either inadmissible or ineffective to establish proof
of ownership.

No motion for reconsideration appears to have been filed with the Court of Appeals
by Martinez, who instead directly assailed its Decision before this Court through the present petition.
We cannot help but observe that the petition, eight (8) pages in all, was apparently prepared
with all deliberate effort to attain nothing more but the perfunctory. The arguments raised center almost
exclusively on the claim that the OSG no longer had personality to oppose the petition, or appeal its
allowance by the RTC, following the order of general default. Starkly put, the [OSG] has no personality to
raise any issue at all under the circumstances pointed out hereinabove. [9] Otherwise, it is content in
alleging that [Martinez] presented sufficient and persuasive proof to substantiate the fact that his title to
Lot Nos. 464-A and 464-B is worth the confirmation he seeks to be done in this registration case; [10] and
that the RTC had since issued a new Order dated 1 September 2003, confirming Martinezs title over Lot
No. 370.
In its Comment dated 24 May 2004, [11] the OSG raises several substantial points, including the
fact that it had duly opposed Martinezs application for registration before the RTC; that jurisprudence and
the Rules of Court acknowledge that a party in default is not precluded from appealing the unfavorable
judgment; that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Lot No. 370 since its technical description was not
published in the Official Gazette; and that as found by the Court of Appeals the evidence presented by
Martinez is insufficient for registering the lots in his name. [12] Despite an order from the Court requiring
him to file a Reply to the Comment, counsel for Martinez declined to do so, explaining, among others, that
he felt he would only be taxing the collective patience of this [Court] if he merely repeats x x x what
petitioner had succinctly stated x x x on pages four (4) to seven (7) of his said petition. Counsel for
petitioner was accordingly fined by the Court. [13]
The Courts patience is taxed less by redundant pleadings than by insubstantial arguments. The
inability of Martinez to offer an effective rebuttal to the arguments of the OSG further debilitates what is
an already weak petition.
The central question, as posed by Martinez, is whether the OSG could have still appealed the
RTC decision after it had been declared in default. The OSG argues that a party in default is not precluded
from filing an appeal, citing Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals,[14] and asserts that [t]he
Rules of Court expressly provides that a party who has been declared in default may appeal from the
judgment rendered against him.[15]
There is error in that latter, unequivocal averment, though one which does not deter from the
ultimate correctness of the general postulate that a party declared in default is allowed to pose an appeal.
Elaboration is in order.
We note at the onset that the OSG does not impute before this Court that the RTC acted
improperly in declaring public respondent in default, even though an opposition had been filed
to Martinezs petition. Under Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended, the order of default
may be issued [i]f no person appears and answers within the time allowed. The RTC appears to have
issued the order of general default simply on the premise that no oppositor appeared before it on the
hearing of 29 March 2000. But it cannot be denied that the OSG had already duly filed its Opposition
to Martinezs petition long before the said hearing. As we held in Director of Lands v. Santiago:[16]
[The] opposition or answer, which is based on substantial grounds,
having been formally filed, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking
cognizance of such registration case to declare the oppositor in default simply
because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial healing. The pertinent
provision of law which states: "If no person appears and answers within the time
allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the
contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded . . . ," cannot be
interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer before it, which has
long been filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less than illogical,
unwarranted, and unjust. Had the law intended that failure of the oppositor to

appear on the date of the initial hearing would be a ground for default despite his
having filed an answer, it would have been so stated in unmistakable terms,
considering the serious consequences of an order of default. Especially in this case
where the greater public interest is involved as the land sought to be registered is
alleged to be public land, the respondent Judge should have received the applicant's
evidence and set another date for the reception of the oppositor's evidence. The
oppositor in the Court below and petitioner herein should have been accorded
ample opportunity to establish the government's claim. [17]
Strangely, the OSG did not challenge the propriety of the default order, whether in its appeal
before the Court of Appeals or in its petition before this Court. It would thus be improper for the Court to
make a pronouncement on the validity of the default order since the same has not been put into issue.
Nonetheless, we can, with comfort, proceed from same apparent premise of the OSG that the default
order was proper or regular.
The juridical utility of a declaration of default cannot be disputed. By forgoing the need for
adversarial proceedings, it affords the opportunity for the speedy resolution of cases even as it penalizes
parties who fail to give regard or obedience to the judicial processes.

inMatute v. Court of Appeals[26] that the new availability of a defaulted defendants right to appeal did not
preclude a defendant who has been illegally declared in default from pursuing a more speedy and
efficacious remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the judgment by default set aside as a nullity.[27]
In Tanhu v. Ramolete,[28] the Court cited with approval the commentaries of Chief Justice
Moran, expressing the reformulated doctrine that following Lim Toco, a defaulted defendant cannot
adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the final hearing, although.
[under Section 2, Rule 41,] he may appeal the judgment rendered against him on the merits. [29]
Thus, for around thirty-odd years, there was no cause to doubt that a defaulted defendant had
the right to appeal the adverse decision of the trial court even without seeking to set aside the order of
default. Then, in 1997, the Rules of Civil Procedure were amended, providing for a new Section 2, Rule
41. The new provision reads:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal.An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules
to be appealable..No appeal may be taken from:
a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

The extent to which a party in default loses standing in court has been the subject of
considerable jurisprudential debate. Way back in 1920, in Velez v. Ramas,[18] we declared that the
defaulting defendant loses his standing in court, he not being entitled to the service of notices in the case,
nor to appear in the suit in any way. He cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the final hearing.
[19]
These restrictions were controversially expanded in Lim Toco v. Go Fay,[20] decided in 1948, where a
divided Court pronounced that a defendant in default had no right to appeal the judgment rendered by the
trial court, except where a motion to set aside the order of default had been filed. This, despite the point
raised by Justice Perfecto in dissent that there was no provision in the then Rules of Court or any law
depriving a defaulted defendant of the right to be heard on appeal.[21]

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise
on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;

The enactment of the 1964 Rules of Court incontestably countermanded the Lim Toco ruling.
Section 2, Rule 41 therein expressly stated that [a] party who has been declared in default may likewise
appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no
petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance with Rule 38.
[22]
By clearly specifying that the right to appeal was available even if no petition for relief to set aside the
order of default had been filed, the then fresh Rules clearly rendered the Lim Toco ruling as moot.

Another provision in the 1964 Rules concerning the effect of an order of default acknowledged
that a party declared in default shall not be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings, nor to take part in
[23]
the trial. Though it might be argued that appellate proceedings fall part of the trial since there is no final
termination of the case as of then, the clear intent of the 1964 Rules was to nonetheless allow the defaulted
defendant to file an appeal from the trial court decision. Indeed, jurisprudence applying the 1964 Rules
was unhesitant to affirm a defaulted defendants right to appeal, as guaranteed under Section 2 of Rule 41,
even as Lim Toco was not explicitly abandoned.

In the 1965 case of Antonio, et al. v. Jacinto,[24] the Court acknowledged that the prior necessity
of a ruling setting aside the order of default however, was changed by the Revised Rules of Court. Under
Rule 41, section 2, paragraph 3, a party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the
judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to set
aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance with Rule 38. [25] It was further qualified

(g) A judgment or final order for or against or one or more of several parties or in separate
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending,
unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Evidently, the prior warrant that a defaulted defendant had the right to appeal was removed
from Section 2, Rule 41. On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules incorporated the
particular effects on the parties of an order of default
Sec. 3. Default; declaration of.If the defending party fails to answer
within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party
with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending
party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the
claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion
requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be
delegated to the clerk of court.

(a) Effect of order of default.A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings but shall not take part in the trial.

(b) Relief from order of default.A party declared in default may any time after notice thereof
and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper
showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on
such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
(c) Effect of partial default.When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action
against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court
shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the
evidence presented.
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded.A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not
exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated
damages.
xxx
It cannot be escaped that the old provision expressly guaranteeing the right of a defendant declared in
default to appeal the adverse decision was not replicated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Should this
be taken as a sign that under the 1997 Rules a defaulted defendant no longer has the right to appeal the
trial court decision, or that the Lim Toco doctrine has been reinstated?

true under the present amended Rules. [36] Former Court of Appeals Justice Herrerra likewise reiterates
the Lina doctrine, though with the caveat that an appeal from an order denying a petition for relief from
judgment was no longer appealable under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules.[37] Herrera further adds
Section 2, paragraph [2] of the former Rule 41, which allows an appeal
from a denial of a petition for relief, was deleted from the present Rule, and
confined appeals to cases from a final judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein, when declared by these rules
to be appealable. A judgment by default may be considered as one that
completely disposes of the case.[38]
We are hard-pressed to find a published view that the enactment of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure accordingly withdrew the right, previously granted under the 1964 Rules, of a defaulted
defendant to appeal the judgment by default against him. Neither is there any provision under the 1997
Rules which expressly denies the defaulted defendant such a right. If it is perplexing why the 1997 Rules
deleted the previous authorization under the old Section 2, Rule 41 (on subject of appeal), it is perhaps
worth noting that its counterpart provision in the 1997 Rules, now Section 1, Rule 41, is different in
orientation even as it also covers subject of appeal. Unlike in the old provision, the bulk of the new
provision is devoted to enumerating the various rulings from which no appeal may be taken, and
nowhere therein is a judgment by default included. A declaration therein that a defaulted defendant may
still appeal the judgment by default would have seemed out of place.

By 1997, the doctrinal rule concerning the remedies of a party declared in default had evolved into a fairly
comprehensive restatement as offered in Lina v. Court of Appeals:[30]

Yet even if it were to assume the doubtful proposition that this contested right of appeal finds
no anchor in the 1997 Rules, the doctrine still exists, applying the principle ofstare decisis. Jurisprudence
applying the 1997 Rules has continued to acknowledge the Lina doctrine which embodies this right to
appeal as among the remedies of a defendant, and no argument in this petition persuades the Court to rule
otherwise

a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file
a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18)

In Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[39] the Court, through Justice
Callejo, Sr., again provided a comprehensive restatement of the remedies of the defending party declared
in default, which we adopt for purposes of this decision:

b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the
default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion
for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;

It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default loses his standing in court and his right to
adduce evidence and to present his defense. He, however, has the right to appeal from the judgment by
default and assail said judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the amount of the judgment is excessive or
is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his
complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law. Such party declared in default is proscribed from seeking
a modification or reversal of the assailed decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by him in the
Court of Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he would thereby be allowed to regain his right to adduce
evidence, a right which he lost in the trial court when he was declared in default, and which he failed to
have vacated. In this case, the petitioner sought the modification of the decision of the trial court based on
the evidence submitted by it only in the Court of Appeals.[40]

If post-1997 jurisprudence and the published commentaries to the 1997 Rules were taken as an indication,
the answer should be in the negative. The right of a defaulted defendant to appeal remains extant.

c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and
executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the
evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)[31]
The fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Yet
even after that provisions deletion under the 1997 Rules, the Court did not hesitate to expressly rely again
on the Lina doctrine, including the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal from the
judgment rendered against him. This can be seen in the cases of Indiana Aerospace University v.
Commission on Higher Education,[32] Tan v. Dumarpa,[33] and Crisologo v. Globe Telecom, Inc.[34]

If it cannot be made any clearer, we hold that a defendant party declared in default retains the
right to appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material
allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of
a motion to set aside the order of default. We reaffirm that the Lim Toco doctrine, denying such right to
appeal unless the order of default has been set aside, was no longer controlling in this jurisdiction upon the
effectivity of the 1964 Rules of Court, and up to this day.

Annotated textbooks on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure similarly acknowledge that even
under the new rules, a defaulted defendant retains the right to appeal as previously confirmed under the
old Section 2, Rule 41. In his textbook on Civil Procedure, Justice Francisco answers the question What
are the remedies available to a defending party in default? with a reiteration of the Lina doctrine, including
the remedy that a defaulted defendant may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as
contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him.[35] Justice Regalado also restates the Lina rule in his textbook on Civil Procedure,
opining that the remedies enumerated therein, even if under the former Rules of Procedure, would hold

Turning to the other issues, we affirm the conclusion of the Court of Appeals
that Martinez failed to adduce the evidence needed to secure the registration of the subject lots in his
name.

It should be noted that the OSG, in appealing the case to the Court of Appeals, did not
introduce any new evidence, but simply pointed to the insufficiency of the evidence presented
by Martinez before the trial court. The Court of Appeals was careful to point out that the case
against Martinez was established not by the OSGs evidence, but by petitioners own insufficient evidence.
We adopt with approval the following findings arrived at by the Court of Appeals, thus
The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the
applicant who must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the
land applied for. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing
evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors by any of
the means provided for the proper acquisition of public lands, the rule is settled that
the property must be held to be a part of the public domain. The applicant must,
therefore, present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim. He may
not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual
evidence of possession and title

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

DUARDO

SALVACRUZ, BEATRIZ MANACOP, FELICISIMA FLORES, GENEROSO

SALVACRUZ, BLANDINO SALVACRUZ, MILAGROS SALVACRUZ and THE HEIRS
OF CORAZON SANTIAGO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DOROTEA
TAMISIN GONZALES, respondents.
DECISION

PARDO, J.:

Considered in the light of the opposition filed by the Office of the

Solicitor General, we find the evidence adduced by appellee, on the whole,
insufficient to support the registration of the subject parcels in his name. To prove
the provenance of the land, for one, all that appellee proffered by way of oral
evidence is the following cursory testimony during his direct examination, viz:

The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] setting aside the
orders[2] of the trial court that denied petitioners motion to set aside the order of general default [3] in an
application for registration of a parcel of land, consisting of one thousand, one hundred seventy six
(1,176), situated in barrio Batong Malake, municipality of Los Baos, province of Laguna.[4]

In the dreary tradition of most land registration cases, appellee has

apparently taken the absence of representation for appellant at the hearing of
his petition as license to be perfunctory in the presentation of his
evidence. Actual possession of land, however, consists in the manifestation of
acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise
over his own property. It is not enough for an applicant to declare himself or
his predecessors-in-interest the possessors and owners of the land for which
registration is sought. He must present specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere
conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation.

The Facts

The record shows that appellee did not fare any better with the
documentary evidence he adduced before the trial court. The October 20, 1952
Deed of Sale by which appellee claims to have purchased the subject parcels
from his uncle, Julian Martinez, was not translated from the vernacular in
which it was executed and, by said token, was inadmissible in evidence. Having
submitted a white print copy of the survey plan for Lot Nos. 464-A and 464-B,
appellee also submitted the tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 370 which does not,
however, appear to be approved by the Director of Lands. In much the same
manner that the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a mandatory
statutory requirement which cannot be waived, the rule is settled that a survey plan
not approved by the Director of Lands is not admissible in evidence.[41]
These findings of the Court of Appeals, arrived at after a sufficiently extensive evaluation of
the evidence, stand in contrast to that contained in the RTC decision, encapsulated in a oneparagraph prcis of the factual allegations of Martinez concerning how he acquired possession of the
subject properties. The Court of Appeals, of course, is an appropriate trier of facts, and a comparison
between the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and that of the RTC clearly demonstrates that it was
the appellate court which reached a more thorough and considered evaluation of the evidence.

As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the burden of proof expected of the petitioner in a
land registration case has not been matched in this case.

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,[5] are as follows:

On May 26, 1994, Digna Vergel, Eduardo Salvacruz, Beatriz Maacop, Felicisima Flores, Generoso and
Blandino Salvacruz, Milagros Evangelista and the heirs of Corazon Santiago, namely: Leocadio, Jr. and
Concepcion Santiago (petitioners herein) filed with the Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna an
application for registration of a parcel of land (for titling purposes).
On July 20, 1994, the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands filed an opposition
to the application for registration.
On December 15, 1994, the trial court issued an order of general default against the whole world with the
exception of Republic of the Philippines x x x.
On October 3, 1995, respondent Dorotea Tamisin Gonzales filed with the trial court an Urgent Motion to
Set Aside the Order of General Default alleging, inter alia, in her affidavit that she is claiming the land in
question subject of this petition as an owner x x x which motion was opposed by the petitioners herein.
On October 12, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a reply to the opposition interposed by the
petitioners and, at the same time, filed an Urgent Motion praying for the suspension of the proceedings.
On October 18, 1995, the trial court issued the first assailed order, the dispositive portion of which is
quoted, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the motion to set aside the Order of default as well as the motion to suspend the
proceedings filed by the movant through counsel is hereby denied for lack of merit.

On October 20, 1995, petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion to Strike Out Urgent Motion to
Suspend Proceeding.
On November 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the motion to set aside the order of general default, which motion petitioners opposed.
On November 28, 1995, the trial court issued its second questioned order, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration, dated November 16, 1995, is
hereby denied for lack of merit.
On December 13, 1995, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals[6] a petition for certiorari alleging that
the trial court judge acted capriciously and without or in excess of his jurisdiction and gravely abused the
exercise of his discretion in issuing the two aforementioned orders.[7]
On April 02, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision annulling the trial courts orders
dated October 18, 1995 and November 28, 1995, and consequently, setting aside the trial courts order of
general default dated December 15, 1994, in Land Registration Case No. 88-94-C with respect to
respondent.[8]
Hence, this appeal.

We grant the petition. The Court of Appeals arbitrarily set aside the trial courts order of general
default without factual basis save for its own gut feeling, ipse dixit.[10] Respondents failure to file timely
opposition to the application for land registration because she missed reading the publication of the notice
in the Official Gazette[11] or in the newspaper Malaya issue of August 8, 1994,[12] in itself may not be
considered excusable negligence.
In respondents motion to set aside order of general default, she alleged that petitioners were aware
of her claim of ownership over the subject property, but did not give her personal notice of the filing of the
application. She learned about the application by accident. In the petition for certiorari she filed with the
Court of Appeals, respondent alleged that petitioners filed the application in bad faith, surreptitiously and
without notice to her.[13] The Court of Appeals did not make a finding on this.
Hence, we find that the appellate court erred in setting aside the order of general default in the Land
Registration Case No. 88-94-C, without making a specific finding of fraud, accident or excusable neglect
that prevented respondent from timely opposing the application.
We are not a trier of facts. Consequently, we have to remand the case to the Court of Appeals for it
to make findings of fact constituting fraud, accident or excusable neglect sufficient for the court to lift the
order of general default in the land registration case involved.
The Fallo

[9]

The Issue
The issue presented is whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial courts order of
general default in the land registration case involved without making a specific finding of fraud,
negligence, accident or excusable mistake but relying on its view that substantial justice and speedy
determination of the controversy would be better attained in lifting the order of general default, to enable a
claimant to oppose and to establish a case of ownership in herself.
The Curts Ruling

WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No.
39239.
Let the case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings with instructions to
determine whether there exists facts warranting the lifting of the order of general default in LRC Case No.
88-94-C of the trial court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.