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SovietMilitaryPower

ChapterIIForcesforGlobalWarfare
Sovietleaders,sinceKhrushchev'stime,havefollowedaconsistentpolicyforthedevelopmentof
theirintercontinentalforces.Theirmainobjectivehasbeentocapitalize,inpeacetime,onthecoercive
leverageinherentinpowerfulnuclearforcestoinduceparalysisinweaponsprogramsandcreate
politicaldisarrayinthefreesocieties.Inwartime,theywouldregardthethreatoractualuseofthose
forcesasthekeytothesuccessfulprosecutionoftheconflict.
Inaglobalconflict,SovietstrategicpolicywouldseekthedestructionofWesternnuclearforceson
thegroundandinflighttotheirtargets,thecapabilitytoensurenationalsurvivalshouldnuclear
weaponsreachtheSoviethomelandandtheabilitytosupportandsustaincombinedarmscombatin
severaltheatersofmilitaryoperations.Fromthesepolicydirectivescomeseveraloverarching
strategicwartimemissions:
protecttheSovietState,
supportthelandwarinEurasiaand
eliminatetheUScapabilitytoconductorsupportwarfareathomeandbeyonditsownshores.
ProtectionoftheSovietState,themostdifficultmission,wouldinvolve:
disruptionanddestructionoftheWest'snuclearassociatedcommand,controlandcommunications,
destructionorneutralizationofasmanyoftheWest'snuclearweaponsaspossibleonthegroundor
atseabeforetheycouldbelaunched,
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interceptionanddestructionofsurvivingweaponsaircraftandmissilesbeforetheyreachtargets
and
protectionoftheParty,theStateandindustrialinfrastructureandtheessentialworkingpopulation
againstthoseweaponsthatreachtheirtargets.Theaterandstrategicforcesandprogramsinplaceor
underactivedevelopmentdesignedtoaccomplishthesetasksinclude:
hardtargetcapableIntercontinentalBallisticMissiles(ICBMs),LongerRangeIntermediateRange
NuclearForce(LRINF)missilesandlandbasedcruisemissiles,
bombersandairlaunchedcruisemissiles(ALCMs)capableofpenetratingUSdefensivesystems,
SubmarineLaunchedBallisticMissiles(SLBMs)andcruisemissilesonvariousplatforms,
antisubmarinewarfare(ASW)forcescapableofattackingUSnuclearpoweredballisticmissile
submarines(SSBNs),
airandmissiledefenses,includingearlywarningsatellitesandradars,interceptoraircraft,surface
toairmissiles(SAMs),antiballisticmissile(ABM)radarsandinterceptorsandsomeantiaircraft
artillery,
antisatelliteweapons,
passivedefenseforces,includingcivildefenseforces,andcountermeasurestroopsandequipment
devotedtoconfusingincomingaircraftand
hardenedfacilitiesnumberinginthethousands,commandvehiclesandevacuationplansdesignedto
protectParty,military,governmentalandindustrialstaffs,essentialworkersand,totheextentpossible,
thegeneralpopulation.
SupportingalandwarinEurasiaandeliminatingtheUScapacitytofightandsupportconflictwould
requirethecapabilitytoemploytheaterandstrategicforcesoveravarietyofrangesandthe
destructionof:
othermilitaryassociatedcommandandcontrol,
warsupportingindustries,arsenalsandmajormilitaryfacilities,
portsandairfieldsintheUnitedStatesandthosealongseaandairroutestoEuropeanandAsian
theatersofwarand
satellitesurveillancesensors,groundbasedsurveillancesensors,facilitiesandcommunications.
Offensiveforces(ICBMs,LRINF,SLBMs,cruisemissilesandbombers)andantisatelliteweapons
wouldgenerallybeassignedthesetasks.Insomecases,specialpurposeforcescouldbeusedforthese
missions,especiallyinEurasia.Thesetaskswouldbegenerallylessdemandingthanthoseinthe
primecategory.
Sovietnuclearforcesaredesignedtofulfilltheirmissionsunderthebestandworstofcircumstances.
Inthecontextofanuclearwar,theSovietsbelievethemostfavorablecircumstancewouldbea
preemptivestriketheleastfavorablewouldbeafollowonstrikeafternuclearweaponshittheUSSR.
Betweenwouldbelaunchunderattackthatis,executingoffensiveoperationsafterweaponsaimedat
theUSSRhadbeenlaunched.TheSovietshavewiderangingprogramsintendedtoenablenuclear
forcestooperateundereachofthesecircumstances.Moreover,theSovietsappeartobelievethat
nuclearwarmightlastforweeksorevenmonthsandhavefactoredthisintotheirforcedevelopment.
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Inapreemptivestrike,theessentialswouldbeeffectivecoordinationofthestrikeandsound
intelligenceonWesternintentions.Sovietnuclearforcesroutinelypracticecommandandcontrol
undervariousconditions.Duringwartime,themainmissionofSovietintelligencewouldbeto
determinetheWest'scoursesofaction.
Launchunderattackcircumstanceswouldplacethegreateststressonattackwarningsystemsand
launchcoordination.Tomeetthisdemand,theSovietshaveestablishedasatellitebasedICBMlaunch
detectionsystem,builtanoverthehorizonradarmissilelaunchdetectionsystemtobackupthe
satellitesandhavelargephasedarrayradarsringingtheUSSR.Thesewarningdevicescouldgivethe
Sovietleadershiptimetolaunchtheirforcesafteranenemystrikehadbeenlaunched.Topreparefor
thispossibility,theSovietspracticelaunchingweaponsunderstringenttimeconstraints.
Followonstrikeswouldstressthesurvivabilityofthecommand,controlandcommunications
systemsaswellastheweaponsthemselves.TheSovietshaveinvestedheavilyinprovidingthis
survivability.TheSS17,SS18andSS19ICBMsarehousedintheworld'shardestsilos.Silo
deploymenthasbeenadoptedforABMsaswell.Toincreasesurvivability,theSS20LRINFmissile
ismobile.MobileICBMsareunderdevelopment,andamobilestrategicsurfacetoairmissileis
beingtested.Thelaunchcontrolfacilitiesforoffensivemissilesarehousedinveryhardsilosoron
offroadvehicles.Communicationsareredundantandhardened.Highercommandshavemultiple
vehiclesandaircraftavailablefortheiruseasalternatecommandposts.Bombershavealert
proceduresanddispersalairfields.Ballisticmissilesubmarinescouldbeplacedintunnelsneartheir
homeports,submergedindeepfjordsjustofftheirpiers,dispersedorprotectedbySovietsurfaceand
submarineforces.
ThebeliefthatwarmightbeprotractedhasledtotheUSSR'semphasison
survivabilityalongwithwarreserves,protectionforpeopleandequipmentandthe
capacitytoreloadlaunchers.FortheirICBM,LRINFandairdefenseforces,the
Sovietshavestockedextramissiles,propellantsandwarheadsthroughoutthe
USSR.SomeICBMsilolauncherscouldbereloaded,andprovisionhasbeenmade
forthedecontaminationofthoselaunchers.Plansforthesurvivalofnecessary
equipmentandpersonnelhavebeendevelopedandpracticed.Inaddition,resupplysystemsare
availabletoreloadSovietSSBNsinprotectedwaters.
Evenwiththeseambitiousdevelopmentanddeployment
programsovertheyears,theSovietsarecontinuingto
modernizeallaspectsoftheirstrategicforces.TheSoviet
leadershiphasalsobeendirectingacampaigntosupportand
amplifyongoingantinuclearmovementsintheWest,in
ordertoinfluence,delayorfrustrateWesternnuclear
programdevelopment.Usingthistwoprongedapproach,Moscowseeksnewgainsinrelative
capabilitydespitethedriveofWesterngovernmentstoredresstheimbalancethathasdevelopedover
thepastdecade.
BecauseoftheopennatureofUSsociety,andthefactthatmuchUStechnologyisunclassified,the
SovietshavebeenabletotakeadvantageofUSresearchanddevelopmenttoacceleratetheiralready
considerabletechnologicaleffort.InformationandhardwarealreadyobtainedhavesavedtheUSSR
billionsofdollarsandresultedintheachievementofsomemilitarycapabilitiesyearsinadvanceof
whatcouldhavebeenachievediftheyweresolelydependentontheirownresources.

IntercontinentalAttack
IntercontinentalBallisticMissiles
CurrentSystemsandForceLevels.TheoperationalSovietICBMforceismadeupof1,398silo
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launchers.Some818oftheselaunchershavebeenrebuiltsince
1972.Nearlyhalfofthesesilosarenewversionsoftheoriginal
designsandhavebeenreconstructedormodifiedinthepast5
years.Allofthese818siloshavebeenhardened,betterto
withstandattackbycurrentlyoperationalUSICBMs,andhouse
theworld'smostmoderndeployedICBMstheSS17Mod3(150
silos),theSS18Mod4(308)andtheSS19Mod3(360).DeploymentoftheseICBMsbeganonly5
yearsago.
TheSS18andSS19ICBMsareatleastasaccurateand
possiblymoreaccurateandcarrymoreMultiple
IndependentlyTargetableReentryVehicles(MIRVs)than
theMINUTEMANIII,themostmodernoperationalUS
ICBM.TheSS18Mod4carries10MIRVs,andtheSS19
Mod3carriessixwhereastheMINUTEMANIIIcarries
onlythree.TheSS18Mod4wasspecificallydesignedto
attackanddestroyICBMsilosandotherhardenedtargets
intheUnitedStates.Eachofits10warheadshasmorethan
20timesthedestructivepowerofthenucleardevicesdevelopedduringWorldWarII.Theforceof
SS18Mod4scurrentlydeployedhasthecapabilitytodestroymorethan80percentoftheUSICBM
silolaunchersusingtwonuclearwarheadsagainsteachUSsilo.TheSS19Mod3hasnearlyidentical
capabilities.Inaddition,theSS19Mod3couldbeusedagainsttargetsinEurasia.TheSS17Mod3
issomewhatlesscapableICBMthantheSS19butithassimilartargetingflexibility.
Theremaining580SovietICBMsilosarefittedwiththeSS11420SSllMod
2/3sand100SSllModIsand60SS13Mod2s.TheseICBMsareofolder
vintage,1966and1973initialdeploymentsrespectively,arehousedinless
survivablesilosandareconsiderablylesscapable.Nevertheless,theirdestructive
potentialagainstsofterareatargetsintheUnitedStatesandEurasiaissignificant
intermsofmanyoftheSovietnucleartasksoutlinedabove.
TheSS16isathreestage,solidpropellant,singleRVICBMthattheSovietsclaimhasnotbeen
deployed.Thesystemwasfirsttestedin1972thelastknowntesttookplacein1976.TheSS20
LRINFmissileiscloselyrelatedtotheSS16.TheSS16probablywasintendedoriginallyforboth
siloandmobiledeployment,usingequipmentandabasingarrangementcomparabletothatusedwith
theSS20.TheSovietUnionagreedinSALTIInottoproduce,test,ordeployICBMsoftheSS16
typeand,inparticular,nottoproducetheSS16thirdstage,theRVortheappropriatedevicefor
targetingtheRVofthatmissile.Availableinformationdoesnotallowaconclusivejudgmenton
whethertheSovietsdeployedtheSS16,butdoesindicateprobabledeployment.
DeploymentprogramsforallofthecurrentlyoperationalSovietICBMsystemsare
virtuallycomplete.Thecommand,controlandcommunicationsstructurefortheSoviet
ICBMforceismodernandhighlysurvivable,andthereliabilityoftheICBMs
themselvesisregularlysampledbylivefiringsfromoperationalcomplexes.
ThoseICBMsinthecurrentforcethattheSovietsdecidenottoreplacewithmodified
ornewICBMswillberefurbishedtoincreasetheirusefullifetime.Duringthisprocess,somesystem
modificationscouldalsobemade.Owingtothiscapacityforrefurbishment,theSovietscansustaina
higherlevelofconfidenceinsystemreliabilityoveralongertermthanwouldotherwisebepossible.
ForceDevelopments.Thecompletionofdeploymentprogramsnowunderwayprobablymarksthe
endofsignificantSovietinvestmentinsilolaunchersandinthedevelopmentofwhollynewliquid
propellantICBMs.AtleastoneadditionalmodifiedversionofboththeSS18andSS19,however,is
likelytobeproducedanddeployedinexistingsilosinthefuture.
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Despitethesedevelopmentprograms,theSovietsappeartobeplanningonnew,solidpropellant
ICBMstoredressfuturemissionshortfallsincounterforcecapabilityandsurvivability.Twonew
solidpropellantICBMs,themediumsizedSSX24andthesmallerSSX25,arebeingtestedfromthe
rangeheadatPlesetskintheSovietnorth.Availableevidencesuggestsmobileaswellassilo
deploymentforbothsystems.
TheSSX24willprobablybesilodeployedatfirst.Mobiledeploymentcouldfollowseveralyears
afterinitialoperationalcapabilityisachievedin1985.ThisICBMislikelytobeevenmoreaccurate
thantheSS18Mod4andSS19Mod3.
TheSSX25isapproximatelythesamesizeastheUSMINUTEMANICBM.Itwillcarryasingle
reentryvehicle.TheSSX25hasapparentlybeendesignedformobiledeployment,withahomebase
withlaunchergaragesequippedwithslidingroofsmassive,offroad,wheeledtransportererector
launchersandnecessarymobilesupportequipmentforrefiresfromthelauncher.
Developmentprogramsforallofthesemissileshavebeenunderwayformanyyears.
SubmarineLaunchedBallisticMissiles
CurrentSystemsandForceLevels.TheSovietsmaintaintheworld'slargest
ballisticmissilesubmarineforceforstrategicattack.AsofMarch1984,theforce
numbered64submarinesfittedwithsome936nucleartippedmissiles.Twoof
thesesubmarinesdonotcounttowardthe62SSBNlimitestablishedbySALTI.
Thesetotalsalsoexclude15oldersubmarineswith45missilesassignedtheater
missions.SixteenSSBNsarefittedwith264MIRVcapablesubmarinelaunched
ballisticmissiles.These16unitshavebeenbuiltanddeployedwithinthepast7years.Twothirdsof
theballisticmissilesubmarines,includingthoseequippedwithMIRVcapablemissiles,arefittedwith
longrangeSLBMsthatenablethesubmarinestopatrolinwatersclosetoTheSovietUnion.This
affordsprotectionfromNATOASWoperations.Moreover,thelongrangemissilesallowtheSoviets
tofirefromhomeports,ifnecessary,andstillstriketargetsintheUnitedStates.
TwounitsofthemostmodernSovietballisticmissilesubmarine,theTYPHOON,
havealreadybeenbuilt.Oneisoperationalandtheothersoonwillbe.Eachcarries
20SSN20solidpropellant,MIRVedSLBMs.TheTYPHOONistheworld'slargest
submarine,withadisplacementof25,000tons,onethirdgreaterthantheUS
TRIDENT.ThesubmarinecanoperateundertheArcticOceanicecap,addingfurther
totheprotectionaffordedbythe8,300kilometerrangeoftheSSN20SLBM.Three
tofouradditionalTYPHOONsareprobablynowunderconstruction,and,bytheearly1990s,the
Sovietscouldhaveasmanyaseightofthesepotentweaponssystemsintheiroperationalforce.
InaccordwiththeSALTIInterimAgreement,theSovietshave,since1978,removed
10YANKEEIunitsfromserviceasballisticmissilesubmarines.Theseunitshadtobe
removedasnewersubmarineswereproducedinorderfortheoverallSovietSSBN
forcetostaywithinthe62modernSSBNlimitsestablishedin1972.TheseYANKEEs,
however,havenotbeenscrappedandsomemaybereturnedtoserviceasattackor
cruisemissilesubmarines.
InafurtherdevelopmentwiththeYANKEESSBNforce,theSovietsmayhavebegun
toassigntheaterattackmissionstosomeofthe23remainingYANKEEIsubmarines.
However,YANKEEpatrolstargetedagainsttheUnitedStatescontinue.
ForceDevelopments.TheSovietshavebegunflighttestsofanew,liquidpropelled,longrange
SLBMtheSSNX23.ThissystemislikelytobedeployedasareplacementfortheSSN18SLBM
carriedbytheDELTAIIISSBN.TheSSNX23willhavegreaterthrowweight,carrymorewarheads
andbemoreaccuratethantheSSN18.

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andbemoreaccuratethantheSSN18.
BasedonpastSovietpractice,bytheendofthe1980s,theymayinitiate
testingofmodifiedversionsoftheSSNX23andtheSSN20.Bothof
thesesystemsarelikelytobemoreaccuratethantheirpredecessors.
TheSovietsemphasizeredundantandtimelycommandandcontrolfortheirmilitaryforces,especially
thoseforintercontinentalattack.TheSovietsmaydeployanextremelylowfrequency(ELF}
communicationssystemthatwillenablethemtocontacttheSSBNsundermostoperatingconditions.
StrategicAviation
CurrentSystemsandForceLevels.Sovietstrategicbombers
andstrikeaircraftarecontrolledbythecentralSoviet
leadershipusingfiveairarmiesasintermediatecommands.
ThesearmieswereestablishedtoplaceSovietstrategic
aircraftonafootinginpeacetimethatwouldfacilitatethe
transitiontowartime.Thesearmiesarefocusedonpotential
conflictinEurope,AsiaandtheUnitedStates.
Strategicaviationassetsincludesome170BEARandBISONbombers,235
BACKFIREbombers(including105BACKFIREbombersinSovietNavalAviation).
TheSovietsalsohave455mediumrangeBLINDERandBADGERbombers,450
shorterrangeFENCERstrikeaircraftand530tanker,reconnaissanceandelectronic
warfareaircraft.TheSovietshaveallocatedtheseaircraftamongthefiveairarmiesto
providesupportforspecifictheatersofmilitaryoperationsbutalsotoassurethe
flexibilitytoreallocateaircraftasnecessaryduringwartime.TheintercontinentalBEARandBISON
bombersareavailableformaritimeandEurasianmissions,andtheBACKFIREisclearlycapableof
useagainsttheUnitedStates.ThisflexibilityallowstheSovietstofocustheirstrategicairassetsas
circumstancesdictate.
TheSovietshavetakenrecentstepsthatindicategreatlyincreasedinterestinthe
longrangestrategicbomber.AnentirelynewvariantoftheBEARbomber
(BEARH),probablydesignedtocarrylongrangecruisemissiles,isnowin
productionthefirstnewproductionofastrikeversionoftheBEARairframein
over15years.Inaddition,olderBEARairtosurfacemissile(ASM)carrying
aircraftarebeingreconfiguredtocarrythenewer,supersonicAS4ASMin
placeofsubsonicAS3s.Severalofthesereconfigurations(BEARG)havebeen
completed.WiththenewBEARHinseriesproduction,thedeclineinthe
inventoryofBEARandBISONaircraftcharacteristicofrecentyearshasbeen
reversed.TheSovietstodayhavemorebombersoperationalthanjustafewyearsago.
TheBACKFIREisthemostmodernoperationalSovietbomber.
TheSovietscontinuetoproducetheaircraftatarateofabout30
peryearthisproductionrateislikelytobemaintainedatleast
throughtheendofthedecade.Theoriginaldesignhasbeen
modifiedseveraltimesandfurthermodificationsarelikelytobe
madetoupgradeaircraftperformance.TheBACKFIREisalong
rangeaircraftcapableofperformingnuclearstrike,conventional
attack,antishipandreconnaissancemissions.Itslowlevel
penetrationfeaturesmakeitamoresurvivablesystemthanits
predecessors.TheBACKFIREhassufficientrange/radiuscapabilitiesforittobeemployed
effectivelyagainstthecontiguousUnitedStatesonhighaltitudesubsonicmissions.Itslowaltitude
supersonicdashcapabilitiesmakeitaformidableweaponinsupportofmilitaryoperationsinEurope
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andAsiaaswell.TheBACKFIREcanbeequippedwithaprobeto
permitinflightrefuelingthiswouldfurtherincreaseitsrangeand
radiuscapabilities.
TheSovietshavesomeFENCERstrikeaircraftassignedtostrategic
aviation.TheFENCERisasupersonic,variablegeometry,all
weatherfighterbomberthatfirstreachedoperationalstatusin1974.
Threevariantshavebeendeveloped,themostrecentintroducedin
1981.Theaircraftisstillinproduction,andthenumberassignedto
strategicaviationislikelytoincreaseby50percentoverthenextfewyears.
ForceDevelopments.ThenewSovietlongrangebombertheBLACKJACKisstillintheflighttest
stageofdevelopment.TheBLACKJACKislargerthantheUSB1B,probablywillbesomewhat
fasterandmayhaveaboutthesamecombatradius.Thisnewbombercouldreachoperationalstatusin
1987.TheBLACKJACKwillbecapableofcarryingcruisemissiles,bombsoracombinationofboth.
ItprobablywillfirstreplacethemuchlesscapableBISONbomberandthenBEARAbomber.Anew
aerialrefuelingtankeraircraft,basedontheIl76/CANDID,hasbeenunderdevelopmentforseveral
years.Whendeployedinthenearfuture,thenewtankerwillsupporttacticalandstrategicaircraftand
significantlyimprovetheabilityofSovietaircrafttoconductlongerrangeoperations.
LongRangeCruiseMissiles
ForceDevelopments.TheSovietsaredevelopingfivenew,longrangecruise
missilesystems.Threeofthesearevariantsofasmallsubsonic,lowaltitude
cruisemissilesimilarindesigntotheUSTOMAHAWK.Thesevariantshavea
rangeofabout3,000kilometers.Thetwoothersarevariantsofalargersystem
probablydesignedforlongrangeoperations.ThissystemhasnoUScounterpart.
Thethreesmallercruisemissilesarebeingdevelopedforlaunchfromsea,groundandairbased
platformsrespectively.Theseabasedvariant,theSSNX21,issmallenoughtobefiredfrom
standardSoviettorpedotubes.CandidatelaunchplatformsfortheSSNX21include:theexisting
VICTORIIISSN,anewYANKEEClassSSN,thenewMIKEclassSSN(possiblyafollowontothe
ALFAClasshighspeed,deepdivingSSN)andthenewSIERRAClassSSN(possiblyafollowonto
theVICTORIII).TheSSNX21probablywillbecomeoperationalthisyear.SSNX21scarriedby
submarinescouldbedeployednearUScoasts.
ThegroundbasedSSCX4variantofthesmallcruisemissile
maynotbereadyforoperationaldeploymentuntilabout1985.
ItsrangeandthelikelihoodthattheSovietswillnotdeploythe
systemoutsidetheUSSRindicatethatitsmissionwillbein
supportoftheateroperations.Thesystemwillbemobileand
probablyfollowoperationalprocedureslikethoseoftheSS20
LRINFmissile.
TheairlaunchedversionofthiscruisemissiletheASX15couldreachinitialoperationalstatus
thisyearonthenewBEARHALCMcarrieraircraft.Thesystemcouldalsobedeployedon
BLACKJACKbomberswhenthataircraftreachesoperationalstatus.ThecombinationoftheASX
15andthenewBEARHandBLACKJACKbomberswillincreaseSovietstrategicintercontinental
airpowerinthelate1980s.
Thelargercruisemissile,whichhasnotyetbeendesignated,willhaveseaandgroundbased
variants.Boththeseaandgroundbasedversionscouldbeoperationalwithinthenext2years.
Whenfirstdeployed,eachofthesefivecruisemissileswillbefittedwithnuclearwarheadsand
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capableofthreateninghardenedtargets.Dependingonfuturemunitionsdevelopmentsandthetypes
ofguidancesystemsincorporatedintheirdesigns,theycouldeventuallybeaccurateenoughtopermit
theuseofconventionalwarheads.Withsuchwarheads,highlyaccuratecruisemissileswouldposea
significantnonnuclearthreattoUSandNATOairfieldsandnuclearweaponsinanonnuclearconflict.
USStrategicForces
Bymid1984,USstrategicdeterrentforceswillconsistof:
1,000MINUTEMANICBMs,
33TITANICBMs,
241B52G/Hmodelbombers,plusabout23aircraftundergoingmaintenanceandmodification,
56FB111bombers,plussomefiveaircraftundergoingmaintenanceandmodification,
496POSEIDON(C3andC4)fleetballisticlaunchers,and
120TRIDENTfleetballisticlaunchers.
ThehistoricandcontinuingobjectiveofUSstrategicforcesisdeterrenceofnuclearandmajor
conventionalaggressionagainsttheUnitedStatesanditsAllies.Thispolicyhaspreservednuclear
peaceforover38yearsand,insharpcontrasttotheSovietpriorityaccordednuclearwarfighting,is
basedontheconvictionofallpostwarAmericanadministrationsthattherecouldbenowinnersina
nuclearconflict.Rather,USdeterrencepolicyseekstomaintainthesituationwhereanypotential
aggressorseeslittletogainandmuchtoloseininitiatinghostilitiesagainsttheUnitedStatesorits
Allies.Inturn,themaintenanceofpeacethroughnucleardeterrenceprovidesthevitalopportunityto
realizeacomplementaryandconstantUSgoalofeliminatingnuclearweaponsfromthearsenalsofall
states.
Torealizethesedeterrenceobjectivesrequiresthedevelopment,deploymentandmaintenanceof
strategicforceswhosesizeandcharacteristicsclearlyindicatetoanopponentthathecannotachieve
hispoliticomilitaryobjectiveseitherthroughemploymentofnuclearweaponsorthroughpolitical
coercionbasedonnuclearadvantages.Despitethesepressingmilitaryrequirements,the1970ssaw
theUnitedStatesexhibitrestraintinmodernizingitsstrategicforces.Thiswasdonetopromotewhat
washopedtobesignificantprogressinSALTnegotiations.Asaresult,theUnitedStatesdidnot
introduceanynewICBMs,SLBMs,SSBNclassesorheavystrategicbombersinthe1972to1978
period.TheUnitedStatesdidintroducetheShortRangeAttackMissile(SRAM)toassiststrategic
bombersinpenetratingtheextensiveandgrowingSovietairdefenses.Alimitednumber,66,ofFB
111shorterrangebomberswerealsodeployedinthe196970period.Thesedevelopmentswere
requiredtomaintaintheeffectivenessofourbomberforceinresponsetotheSovietairdefense
improvements.
TheresultoftheasymmetryinUSandSovietmodernizationprogramshasbeentoerodethe
perceptionofUSdeterrentcapability,anditscontinuationcouldweakenUSabilitytomaintainpeace.
Toprecludesuchapossibility,torestoretherealandperceiveddeterrentcapabilityoftheUnited
StatesandtoresolvetheproblemsassociatedwithagingUSforces,thePresidenthasinitiatedandthe
Congresshassupportedacomprehensiveandintegratedstrategicmodernizationprogram.This
programincludes:
deploymentofmoresurvivableandeffectivecommand,controlandcommunicationssystems,
developmentofthenewTRIDENTIIsubmarinelaunchedballisticmissileandcontinued
procurementofTRIDENTClasssubmarines,
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procurementof100B1BbombersintheneartermanddeploymentoftheAdvancedTechnology
Bomberforthel990s,
modernizationofselectedB52bombersandintroductionofairlaunchedcruisemissilesintothe
force,
deploymentof100newPEACEKEEPER(MX)landbasedmissilesinMINUTEMANsilos
beginningin1986,and
developmentofanew,small,singlewarheadICBM.
StrategicDefense
StrategicdefensesarevitaltotheoverallSovietstrategyfornuclearwar.Asnotedabove,the
operationsofSovietdefensiveandattackforcesarecloselycoupledattackstrategiesaregearedin
largeparttothereductionofthedefensiveburden.IntheSovietconceptofalayereddefense,
effectivenessisachievedthroughmultipletypesofdefensivecapabilitiescompensatingfor
shortcomingsinindividualsystemsandforthelikelihoodthatneitheroffensivestrikesnoranyone
layerofdefensewillstopallattackingweapons.TheSovietshavemademajorimprovementsintheir
deployedstrategicdefensesandhaveinvestedheavilyinABMrelateddevelopment.
EarlyWarning
CurrentSystemsandForceLevels.TheSovietsmaintaintheworld'smostextensiveearlywarning
systemforbothballisticmissileandairdefense.Theiroperationalballisticmissileearlywarning
systemincludesalaunchdetectionsatellitenetwork,overthehorizonradarsandaseriesoflarge
phasedarrayradarslocatedprimarilyontheperipheryoftheUSSR.Theirearlywarningair
surveillancesystemiscomposedofanextensivenetworkofgroundbasedradarslinkedoperationally
withthoseoftheirWarsawPactAllies.
ThecurrentSovietlaunchdetectionsatellitenetworkiscapableofprovidingabout30minutes
warningofanyUSICBMlaunch,andofdeterminingtheareafromwhichitoriginated.Thetwoover
thehorizonradarsTheSovietshavedirectedattheUSICBMfieldsalsocouldprovidethemwith30
minuteswarningofanICBMstrikelaunchedfromtheUnitedStates,butwithsomewhatless
precisionthanthesatellitenetwork.Workingtogether,thesetwoearlywarningsystemscanprovide
morereliablewarningthaneitherworkingalone.
Thenextlayerofoperationalballisticmissileearlywarningconsistsof11largeHENHOUSE
detectionandtrackingradarsatsixlocationsontheperipheryoftheUSSR.Theseradarscan
distinguishthesizeofanattack,confirmthewarningfromthesatelliteandoverthehorizonradar
systemsandprovidesometargettrackingdatainsupportofABMdeployments.
CurrentSovietairsurveillanceradardeploymentsincludemorethan7,000radarsofvarioustypes
locatedatabout1,200sites.Thesedeploymentsprovidevirtuallycompletecoverageatmediumto
highaltitudesovertheUSSRandinsomeareasextendshundredsofkilometersbeyondtheborders.
LimitedcoverageagainstlowaltitudetargetsisconcentratedinthewesternUSSRandinhighpriority
areaselsewhere.Since1983,TheSovietshavebeguntodeploytwonewairsurveillanceradars.These
radarsassistintheearlywarningofcruisemissileandbomberattacksandenhanceairdefense
electronicwarfarecapabilities.
ForceDevelopments.Sincelastyear,anadditionalnewlargephasedarrayradarforballisticmissile
earlywarningandtargettrackinghasbeendiscoveredunderconstructioninSiberia.Thisbringstosix
thenumberofsuchradarsoperationalorunderconstructionintheUSSR.Thisnewradarclosesthe
finalgapinthecombinedHENHOUSEandnewlargephasedarrayradarearlywarningandtracking
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network.Together,thisradarandthefiveotherslikeitformanarcofcoveragefromtheKola
Peninsulainthenorthwest,aroundSiberia,totheCaucasusinthesouthwest.HENHOUSEcoverage
completesthecircle.Thenewlyidentifiedradaralmostcertainlyviolatesthe1972ABMTreatyinthat
itisnotlocatedontheperipheryoftheSovietUnionnorisitpointedoutwardasrequiredbythe
Treaty.Thecompletenetworkoftheseradars,whichcouldprovidetargettrackingdataforABM
deploymentsbeyondMoscow,probablywillbeoperationalbythelate1980s.
TheSovietsmayestablishanetworkofsatellitesingeostationaryorbitdesignedtoprovidetimely
indicationsofSLBMlaunches.Suchanetworkcouldbeoperationalbytheendofthedecade.
TheUSSRhasastrongresearchanddevelopmentprogramtoproducenewearlywarningandother
airsurveillanceradars,aswellastoimproveexistingsystems.Morethan20typesoftheseradarsare
currentlyindevelopment.Inaddition,theSovietsarecontinuingtodeployimprovedairsurveillance
datasystemsthatcanrapidlypassdatafromoutlyingradarsthroughtheairsurveillancenetworkto
groundcontrolledinterceptsitesandSAMcommandposts.Thesesystemswillcontinuetobe
deployeduntilallareasareequippedwiththem.
BallisticMissileDefense
CurrentSystemsandForceLevels.TheSovietsmaintainaroundMoscowtheworld'sonlyoperational
ABMsystem.ThissystemisintendedtoaffordalayerofdefenseforSovietcivilandmilitary
commandauthoritiesintheMoscowenvironsduringanuclearwarratherthanblanketprotectionfor
thecityitself.Since1980,theSovietshavebeenupgradingandexpandingthissystemwithinthe
limitsofthe1972ABMTreaty.
TheoriginalsinglelayerMoscowABMsystemincluded64reloadableabovegroundlaunchersat
fourcomplexesfortheGALOSHABM1B,sixTRYADDguidanceandengagementradarsateach
complexandtheDOGHOUSEandCATHOUSEtargettrackingradarssouthofMoscow.TheSoviets
areupgradingthissystemtothe100launcherspermittedundertheTreaty.Whencompleted,thenew
systemwillbeatwolayerdefensecomposedofsilobasedlongrangemodifiedGALOSH
interceptorsdesignedtoengagetargetsoutsidetheatmospheresilobasedhighacceleration
interceptorsdesignedtoengagetargetswithintheatmosphereassociatedengagementandguidance
radarsandanewlargeradaratPushkinodesignedtocontrolABMengagements.Thesilobased
launchersmaybereloadable.ThenewMoscowdefensesarelikelytoreachfullyoperationalstatusin
thelate1980s.
ForceDevelopments.TheUSSRhasanimprovingpotentialfor
largescaledeploymentofmodernizedABMdefenseswellbeyond
the100launcherABMTreatylimits.WidespreadABM
deploymenttoprotectimportanttargetareasintheUSSRcouldbe
accomplishedwithinthenext10years.TheSovietshavedeveloped
arapidlydeployableABMsystemforwhichsitescouldbebuiltin
monthsinsteadofyears.Atypicalsitewouldconsistofengagementradars,guidanceradars,above
groundlaunchersandthehighaccelerationinterceptor.Thenew,largephasedarrayradarsunder
constructionintheUSSRalongwiththeHENHOUSE,DOGHOUSE,CATHOUSEandpossiblythe
PushkinoradarsappeartobedesignedtoprovidesupportforsuchawidespreadABMdefensesystem.
TheSovietsseemtohaveplacedthemselvesinapositiontofieldrelativelyquicklyanationwide
ABMsystemshouldtheydecidetodoso.
Inaddition,theSovietsaredeployingonesurfacetoairmissilesystem,theSA10,andareflight
testinganother,themobileSAX12.TheSAX12isbothatacticalSAMandantitacticalballistic
missile.BoththeSA10andSAX12mayhavethepotentialtointerceptsometypesofUSstrategic
ballisticmissilesaswell.Thesesystemscould,ifproperlysupported,addsignificantpointtarget
coveragetoawidespreadABMdeployment.
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Sovietdirectedenergydevelopmentprogramsinvolve
futureABMaswellasantisatelliteandairdefense
weaponsconcepts.Bythelate1980s,theSovietscould
haveprototypesforgroundbasedlasersforballistic
missiledefense.Themanydifficultiesinfieldingan
operationalsystemwillrequiremuchdevelopmenttime,
andinitialoperationaldeploymentisnotlikelyinthis
century.
Groundandspacebasedparticlebeamweaponsforballisticmissiledefensewillbemoredifficultto
developthanlasers.Nevertheless,theSovietshaveavigorousprogramunderwayforparticlebeam
developmentandcouldhaveaprototypespacebasedsystemreadyfortestinginthelate1990s.
AntisatelliteSystems
CurrentSystemsandForceLevels.Sincerely1971,theSovietshavehad
thecapabilitytoattacksatellitesinnearearthorbitwithagroundbased
orbitalinterceptor.Usingaradarsensorandapellettypewarhead,the
interceptorcanattackatargetinvariousorbitsduringitsfirsttwo
revolutions.Aninterceptduringthefirstorbitwouldreducethetime
availableforatargetsatellitetotakeevasiveaction.Theinterceptorcan
reachtargetsorbitingatmorethan5,000kilometers,butitprobablyis
intendedforhighprioritysatellitesatloweraltitudes.Theantisatellite
interceptorislaunchedfromTyuratamwheretwolaunchpadsand
storagespaceforadditionalinterceptorsandlaunchvehiclesareavailable.Severalinterceptorscould
belaunchedeachdayfromeachofthepads.Inadditiontotheorbitalinterceptor,theSovietshavetwo
groundbasedtestlasersthatcouldbeusedagainstsatellites.TheSovietsalsohavethetechnological
capabilitytoconductelectronicwarfareagainstspacesystems.
ForceDevelopments.Emergingdirectedenergytechnologies
areseenbytheSovietsasofferinggreaterpromiseforfuture
antisatelliteapplicationthanfurtherdevelopmentoforbital
interceptorsequippedwithconventionalwarheads.The
Sovietscoulddeployantisatellitelaserstoseveralground
sitesinthenext10yearsortheycoulddeploylaserequipped
satelliteseitheravailableforlaunchoncommandormaintainedinorbit,orcoulddeployboth.Such
systemswouldhavesignificantadvantagesoveraconventionalorbitalinterceptor.Theseinclude
longerrange,multishotcapabilitiesandagreatercapacitytoovercomethetarget'sdefensive
measures.
TheSovietscouldtestaprototypelaserantisatelliteweaponassoonasthelate1980s.Initial
operationalcapabilitycouldbeachievedbetweentheearlyandmid1990s.
Sincetheearly1970s,theSovietshavehadaresearchprogramtoexplorethetechnicalfeasibilityofa
particlebeamweaponinspace.Aprototypespacebasedparticlebeamweaponintendedonlyto
disruptsatelliteelectronicequipmentcouldbetestedintheearly1990s.Onedesignedtodestroythe
satellitescouldbetestedinspaceinthemid199Os.
AirDefense
CurrentSystemsandForceLevels.TheSovietshavedeployedmassivestrategicairdefenseforces
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thatcurrentlyhaveexcellentcapabilitiesagainstaircraftflyingatmediumandhighaltitudesbutmuch
lesscapabilityagainstlowflyingaircraftandcruisemissiles.Sovietairdefenses,however,areinthe
initialstagesofamajoroverhaulgearedentirelytofieldinganintegratedairdefensesystemmuch
morecapableoflowaltitudeoperations.Thisoverhaulincludesthepartialintegrationofstrategicand
tacticalairdefensestheupgradingofearlywarningandairsurveillancecapabilitiesthedeployment
ofmoreefficientdatatransmissionsystemsandthedevelopmentandinitialdeploymentofnew
aircraft,associatedairtoairmissiles,surfacetoairmissilesandanairbornewarningandcontrol
system(AWACS).
Currently,theSovietshavesome1,200airdefenseinterceptorsandnearly10,000SAMlaunchersat
over900sitesdedicatedtostrategicterritorialairdefense.Anadditional2,000interceptorsandsome
1,800tacticalSAMsaredeployedwithintheUSSR'sbordersandcouldbemadeavailablefor
territorialdefense.
OlderFOXBATaircraftarebeingupgradedtotheFOXBATE
configurationgivingthemsomewhatbetterlookdownradar
capabilities.Moreimportantly,however,thenewMiG
31/FOXHOUNDinterceptor,thefirsttruelookdown/shootdown
capableaircraftintheSovietinventory,isbeingintroduced.The
FOXHOUNDaircraftiscomparableinsizetotheUSF14.Over50of
theseaircraftarenowoperational.
ThenewmultiplealtitudeSA10SAM,firstdeployedin1980,isnow
operationalatsome40siteswithnearly350launchersandfourSA10sperlauncher.Inaddition,SA
5deploymentcontinuesataveryslowpacewithintheUSSR.ThemostsignificantSA5deployments
haveoccurredoutsidetheUSSRinEasternEurope,MongoliaandSyria.
ForceDevelopments.VirtuallyalloftheSovietairdefensedevelopment
programsnowunderwayaregearedtoovercomingalongstandingvulnerability
tolowaltitudeairattack.TwonewfighterinterceptorstheSu27/FLANKER
andtheMiG29/FULCRUMhavetruelookdown/shootdowncapabilities.The
FULCRUMisasingleseat,twinenginefightersimilarinsizetotheUSF16.It
wasfirstdeployedearlierthisyear.TheFLANKERislargerthanthe
FULCRUMandisaboutthesamesizeastheUSF15.It,too,isasingleseat,twinenginefighter,
anditcouldbeoperationallydeployedthisyearornext.Bothhavebeendesignedtobehighly
maneuverable,airtoaircombataircraft.
ThesetwoaircraftandtheFOXHOUNDarelikelytooperateundercertain
circumstanceswiththenewIl76/MAINSTAYAirborneWarningandControl
Systems(AWACS)aircraft.TheMAINSTAYwillsubstantiallyimproveSoviet
capabilitiesforearlywarningandaircombatcommandandcontrol.Itwill
providetheSovietswiththecapabilityoverlandandwatertodetectaircraft
andcruisemissiletargetsflyingatlowaltitudes.TheMAINSTAYcouldbe
usedtohelpdirectfighteroperationsoverEuropeanandAsianbattlefieldsandtoenhanceair
surveillanceanddefenseoftheUSSR.Fouroftheseaircrafthavebeenbuilt.TheMAINSTAYshould
beoperationalthisyearanannualproductionrateofaboutfiveaircraftislikely.
ThethreenewSovietfighterinterceptorsareequippedwithtwonewairtoair
missilestheAA9designedfortheFOXHOUNDandtheAAX10designedforthe
FULCRUMandtheFLANKER.TheAA9isalongrangemissilethatcanbeused
againstlowflyingaircrafttheAAX10isamediumrangemissilewithsimilar
capabilities.
Inkeepingwiththeirdrivetowardmobilityasameansofweaponssurvival,theSovietsare
developingamobileversionoftheSA10SAM.ThismobileversioncouldbeusedtosupportSoviet
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theaterforces,but,perhapsmoreimportantly,ifdeployedwiththeterritorialdefenseforces,itwould
allowtheSovietstochangethelocationofthoseSA10sintheUSSR.ThemobileSA10couldbe
operationalby1985.
TheSovietshaveeffortsunderwaytodevelopatleastthreetypesofhighenergylaserweaponsforair
defense.TheseincludelasersintendedfordefenseofhighvaluestrategictargetsintheUSSR,those
forpointdefenseofshipsatseaandtheaterforcesairdefense.Followingpastpractice,theSovietsare
likelytodeployairdefenselaserstocomplementratherthanreplaceinterceptorsandSAMs.The
territorialdefenselaserisprobablyinatleasttheprototypestageofdevelopmentandcouldbe
operationalbetweenthemidtolate1980s.ItmostlikelywillbedeployedinconjunctionwithSAMs
inapointdefenserole.Sincethetwosystemswouldhavedifferentattributesandvulnerabilities,they
wouldprovidemutualsupport.Theshipbornelasersprobablywillnotbeoperationaluntilafterthe
endofthedecade.Thetheaterforcelasersmaybeoperationalsometimesoonerandarelikelytobe
capableofstructurallydamagingaircraftatcloserangesandproducingelectroopticalandeye
damageatgreaterdistances.
Inaddition,theSovietshaveunderwayadevelopmentprogramforanairbornelaser.Assuminga
successfuldevelopmenteffort,limitedinitialdeploymentcouldbeginintheearly1990s.Suchalaser
platformcouldhavemissionsincludingantisatellitedefense,protectionofhighvalueairborneassets
andcruisemissiledefense.
PassiveDefense
Sovietpassivedefensepreparationshavebeenunderwayinearnestforsome30years,
andhave,overtime,expandedfromtheprotectionofsuchvitalentitiesasthenational
PartyandgovernmentleadershipandArmedForces,toembracetheterritorial
leadership,nationaleconomyandgeneralpopulation.TheSovietsregardpassive
defenseasanessentialingredientoftheiroverallmilitarypostureandtheirwar
planning.Inconjunctionwithactiveforces,theSovietsplanfortheirpassivedefense
programtoensurethesurvivalandwartimecontinuityof:
Sovietleadership,
militarycommandandcontrol,
warsupportingindustrialproductionandservices,and
theessentialworkforceandprotectionofasmuchofthegeneralpopulationaspossible.
Asthisprogramhasexpanded,elementsofithavebeendesignatedbytheSovietsas"civildefense."
UseofthisterminitsnormalWesterncontextdoesnotconveythefullscopeofSovietCivilDefense.
ExtensiveplanningforthetransitionoftheentireStateandeconomytoawartimeposturehasbeen
fundamentaltoSovietpassivedefensepreparations.TheSovietGeneralStaffandCivilDefense
officialshavesupervisedthedevelopmentofspecialorganizationsandprocedurestoimplement
quicklythetransitiontowarandhaveemphasizedthemobilizationandprotectionofallnational
resourcesessentialtothesuccessfulprosecutionofwarandrecovery.
TheseniorSovietmilitaryestablishmenthasalsosupervisedthe30yearprogramtoconstruct
hardenedcommandpostsandsurvivablecommunicationsforkeymilitarycommandersandcivilian
managersatalllevelsofthePartyandgovernment.Likewise,protectivehardening,dispersaland
wartimeproductionplansforSovietindustryhaveallbeencoordinatedwiththewartimerequirements
ofthemilitaryandsupervisedbyCivilDefensepersonnel.Theprotectionofthegeneralpopulation
throughevacuationproceduresandextensiveshelteringinornearurbanareasisthemostvisible
aspectofthepassivedefenseprogram.
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SovietCivilDefenseManagement.ThesepassivedefenseprogramsreflecttheSovietconceptofthe
systeminitswartimemode.Thewartimemanagementsystemwouldbeamilitarizedsystemof
nationaladministrationinwhichpeacetimegovernmentbodiesbecomeCivilDefensecomponents
underdirectmilitarysubordination.ThiswouldextendtoSovietterritorialadministrationatalllevels
andtospecializedfunctionalcomponentssuchasindustrial,transport,powerandcommunications
ministries.SovietauthoritiesatalllevelswouldserveasuniformedchiefsofcivilDefenseand
commandtheirrespectiveorganizationsinamilitarycapacity.SovietCivilDefensethusservesboth
asavehicletoadministerpeacetimepreparationsandtrainingandastheinfrastructurethatwouldknit
togethercivilandmilitarybodiesintheirunifiedwartimemanagementsystems.
ContinuityofLeadershipFunctions.SovietcommandersandmanagersatalllevelsofthePartyand
governmentareprovidedhardenedalternatecommandpostslocatedwellawayfromurbancenters.
Thiscomprehensiveandredundantsystem,composedofmorethan1,500hardenedfacilitieswith
specialcommunications,ispatternedaftersimilarcapabilitiesaffordedtheArmedForces.Morethan
175,000keypersonnelthroughoutthesystemarebelievedtobeequippedwithsuchalternatefacilities
inadditiontothemanydeepbunkersandblastsheltersinSovietcities.
StabilityoftheWartimeEconomy.Sovietpassivedefenseeffortsincludemeasurestomaintain
essentialproductionandservicesevenduringanuclearwar.Elaborateplanshavebeensetforthefull
mobilizationofthenationaleconomyinsupportofthewareffortandtheconversiontowartime
production.Reservesofvitalmaterialsaremaintained,manyinhardenedundergroundstructures.
Redundantindustrialfacilitieshavebeenbuiltandareinactiveproduction.Industrialandother
economicfacilitieshavebeenequippedwithblastsheltersfortheworkforce,anddetailedprocedures
havebeendevelopedfortherelocationofselectedplantsandequipment.Byensuringthesurvivalof
essentialworkers,theSovietsintendtoreconstitutevitalproductionprogramsusingthoseindustrial
componentsthatcanberedirectedorsalvagedafterattack.
NorthAmericanDefenseForces
USandCanadianinterceptorforcesassignedtotheNorthAmericanAerospaceDefense(NORAD)
CommandmaintaincontinuousgroundalertatsitesaroundtheperipheryoftheUnitedStatesand
Canada.Alertaircraftinterceptandidentifyunknownintruders.Inacrisis,theAirForce,Navyand
MarineCorpswouldprovideadditionalinterceptors.SupportedbyAWACSaircraft,theseforces
couldprovidealimiteddefenseagainstbomberattacks.
TomeettheincreasingSovietbomberandALCMthreats,USinterceptorsquadronsassignedto
NORADarebeingequippedwithnewer,moreadvancedF15andF16aircraft.Thesemodern
fighterswillprovidealookdown/shootdowncapabilitytodetectandengageenemybombers
penetratingatlowaltitudes.TheCanadiansareupgradingtheirairdefenseforceswiththeCF18.
JointUSandCanadianprogrammedimprovementstolongrangesurveillanceincludemodern
microwaveradarsfortheDistantEarlyWarninglineandoverthehorizonbackscatterradarslooking
east,westandsouth.
Sovietspaceorientedmilitarysystemsposeanunacceptablethreattotheland,seaandairforcesof
theUnitedStates.SovietsatellitesprobablyhavethecapabilitytosupporttargetingofSovietantiship
cruisemissileslaunchedagainstUSsurfaceships.TheUSantisatellite(ASAT)program,centering
ontheAirLaunchedMiniatureVehicle,ispartofourresponsetothisandsimilarthreats.Atthesame
time,wearecontinuingtoexaminethepotentialbasisfornegotiatingASATarmscontrolagreements.
Finally,theUnitedStateshascalledforaresearchprogramtoexplorethepossibilityofstrengthening
deterrencebytakingadvantageofrecentadvancesintechnologythatcould,inthelongterm,provide
aneffectivedefenseagainstballisticmissiles.Theeffortfocusesonexistingresearchprogramsinfive
technologyareasthatofferthegreatestpromise.GiventheextensiveSovieteffortsinthisarea,theUS
programisaprudentandnecessaryhedgeagainstthepossibilityofunilateralSovietdeploymentofan
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advancedsystemcapableofeffectivelycounteringWesternballisticmissiles.SuchaunilateralSoviet
deploymentaddedtotheUSSR'simpressiveairandpassivedefensecapabilitieswouldjeopardize
deterrencebecausetheUSwouldnolongerbeabletoposeacrediblethreatofretaliationtoaSoviet
attack.
NuclearStockpiles
SincethefirstSovietnuclearexplosiononAugust29,1949,theSovietstockpileofnuclearwarheads
hasgrownsteadily,primarilyintheareaofoffensiveweapons.Incontrast,theUSstockpilewasone
thirdhigherin1967thanitistoday.Inaddition,asaresultoftwolandmarkNATOdecisionsin1979
and1983,thenuclearstockpileinEuropewilldeclinebyonethirdfromits1979level.
TheUSSR'snuclearweaponsprogramhasshowndiversityandsophistication.Today,Sovietnuclear
warheadsincludeafullspectrumoffissionandthermonucleardesignsusinguranium,plutoniumand
tritium,withweaponsyieldsuptomultimegaton.Thepreponderanceoftheseweaponsisassignedto
strategicoffensiveforces.BecauseofMIRVing,themegatonnageintheSovietarsenalleveledinthe
earlyseventies,andthenbegantodrop.However,withthedeploymentofnewnuclearweapons
systemstheirstockpilemegatonnagehasagainstartedtorise.
TheSovietnuclearenergyandweaponsdevelopmentprogramanditsassociatedindustrialbaseare
characterizedbyahighlycentralizedcontrolstructure.Theministrycontrollingnuclearweapons
developmentandproductionisinchargeofallnuclearmaterials,reactorsandweaponsresearchand
development(R&D)aswellasproduction.Sincetheministrycontrolsvirtuallyallfacilitiesrelatedto
thenuclearindustry,reactorutilizationcanbeunilaterallyalteredtosatisfymilitaryrequirements,
regardlessofthemilitaryorcommercialnatureoftheparticularreactorfacility.
Finally,duringthepasttwodecades,thenumberofworkersandtheamountoffloorspaceofthe
Sovietnuclearweaponsresearchanddevelopmentfacilitieshaveexhibitedconstantgrowth.
ManpowerdevotedtonuclearR&Dprobablyexceeds30,000employeesandiscomprisedofthebest
scientists,mathematicians,engineersandtechniciansSovietacademiacanproduce.TheirR&Defforts
aresupportedbyanactivenucleartestprogramconductedattheNovayaZemlyaandSemipalitinsk
nucleartestsites.
TheSovietSpaceProgram
SovietMilitaryPower1983outlinedtheexpansioninto
spaceoftheSovietquestformilitarysuperiority.During
theensuingyear,TheSovietshavemadeprogress
towardtheirdualmilitaryobjectivesofglobalsupport
tomilitaryforcesanddenialofenemyemploymentof
spaceduringwartime.Inaddition,progresshasbeen
madetowardthetwootherkeyobjectivesofenhancingtheinfluenceandprestigeoftheUSSRand
contributingtotheSovieteconomy.TherehasbeennochangeintheheavySovietemphasisonthe
militaryapplicationsofspace,reflectingtheirview,notedasearlyastwodecadesagointheclassified
Sovietmilitarypublication,MilitaryThought,that"themasteringofspace[is]aprerequisitefor
achievingvictoryinwar."
Sincelastyear,theSovietdevelopmentalprogramsforprovidingafamilyofnew
spacelaunchvehiclesandreusablespacecraftsuitableformilitaryandcivilpurposes
havecomeintosharperfocus.Significantnewlaunchandsupportfacilitiesat
Tyuratamarenearingcompletion.Someoftheseshouldbereadythisyearornextto
supportinitialtestingofnewlaunchvehicles.Thesevehiclesincludeaspace
transportationsystem(STSI,thatinmanyrespectscopiesthedesignoftheUSspace
shuttle,anewheavyliftlaunchvehiclebasedonthecorerocketsoftheSTSandanewmediumlift
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launchvehiclethatisevidentlydesignedforhighlaunchrates.Thenewspacecraftincludeaspace
shuttlethatdiffersfromtheUSshuttleonlyintherespectthatthemainenginesarenotontheorbiter,
asmallspaceplanethatcouldbeatestvehicleorascaleversionofamilitaryspaceplane,andaspace
tugthatwouldbeusedinspacetomoveequipmentandsuppliesfromoneorbittoanother.TheSoviet
shuttlecouldbefirsttestedinthemidtolate1980s.Thespaceplanescalemodelhasalreadybeen
testedthreetimes,andthespacetugprobablywillreachoperationalstatuslateinthe1980s.
Inaddition,theSovietsevidentlyintendtocontinueusingtheirmanytypesof
operationalspacelaunchvehiclesforatleastanotherdecade.Thiscurrentfamily
ofvehicles,whichsupportsaspaceeffortof100ormorelaunchesperyear,
combinedwiththenewgenerationofsystems,indicatesthatTheSovietswillbe
ablebythemidtolate1980stoincreasesignificantlytheirspaceprogrambothin
numbersandpayloadweight.Inthisregard,thenewheavyliftvehicleisestimated
tohavethecapabilitytoplacepayloadsweighingupwardsof330,000poundsinto
lowearthorbit.ThisisaboutseventimesmorethanthelargestoperationalSoviet
boostercandelivertoday,andaboutfivetimesthemaximumUScapability.
Despitetheobviouscivilandscientificusestowhichthesecapabilitiescouldbeput,theSovietswill
continue,asinthepast,todevotemostoftheirfuturespaceprogramtomilitarypurposes.
Militarysystemsnowaccountformorethan70percentofSovietspacelaunches.Another20percent
havecombinedmilitarycivilapplication,withlessthan10percentdevotedtopurelycivil/scientific
activities.Verylittleoftheireffortisdevotedtoprogramsthathaveeconomicbenefit.
TheSovietsroutinelyconductaboutfourtofivetimesasmanyspacelaunchesperyearas
theUnitedStates.Thisisnecessitatedprimarilybytheshortersystemlifetimesandpoorer
reliabilityofmostSovietsatellites.Thefactthattheyroutinelyoperatethiswayin
peacetime,however,givesthemaninherentlygreatercapabilitytoincreaserapidlythe
numberofmilitarysatellitesinorbitandtoreplacelostordamagedsatellitesaslongas
launchfacilitiesareintact.
TheUSandUSSRcurrentlymaintainaboutthesamenumberofoperationalsatellitesin
orbit,110to120.TheSovietinventoryofoperationalspacesystemsprovidesthecapability
toperformthefollowingmilitaryfunctions:
reconnaissanceandsurveillance,
command,controlandcommunications,
ICBMlaunchdetectionandattackwarning,
strategicandtacticaltargeting,
navigationalsupport,
meteorologicalsupport,and
antisatelliteoperations.
TheSovietshavesatellitesthataredesignedtoperformnavalsurveillanceandtargetingmissions.
ThesesatellitesarestrictlymilitarysystemsintendedtosupportSovietnavaloperationsagainstlarge
surfaceshipsandothersurfaceshipformations.
TheSovietshaveadeployedantisatelliteweaponsystemthatiscapableofattackingsatellitesinlow
tomediumearthorbits.TheintercontinentalwarfaresectionofthischapterhasaddressedSoviet
antisatelliteandotherspaceorientedweaponsprogramsinsomedetail.RecentSovietproposalsto
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banallASATtestsandfuturedeploymentsofASATweaponsareintendedtoputtheUnitedStatesat
adisadvantageinthisarea.Itisimportanttonotethattheproposedtreatydoesnotpreventdeveloping
anddeployingadvancedgroundbasedweaponssuchashighenergylasersthatcouldbeusedinan
antisatelliterole.
TheSovietscontinuetopursuetheirmannedspaceprogramsmaintainingin
orbittheSALYUTspacestation,whichismannedduringmostoftheyear.This
givestheSovietsthecapabilitytoperformavarietyoffunctionsfromspace,
includingmilitaryR&Dandtheuseofmantoaugmenttheirother
reconnaissanceandsurveillanceefforts.Alarger,permanentlymannedspace
station,expectedduringthenextdecade,willsignificantlyincreasetheirin
orbitoperationscapabilities.Thisstationcouldbeusedasasteppingstonetointerplanetary
explorationandtheestablishmentofbasesonotherplanetarybodies.TheSoviets,however,aremore
likelytousesuchastationtoperformcommandandcontrol,reconnaissanceandtargetingfunctions.
Duringwartime,itcouldperformthesefunctionsandmoreoffensivelyorientedmissionsaswell.The
Sovietsbelieveinthemilitaryutilityofmaintainingcosmonautsinorbit.Overthenext10years,
therefore,theSovietsarelikelytodevelopprimarilyformilitarypurposes:
apermanentlymannedSKYLABsizespacestationtobeoperationalinthenext23yearswitha6
to12personcrew,and
averylargemodularspacestation,tobeoperationalbytheearlytomid1990s,whichcouldhouse
asmanyas100personnel.
Byallmeasures,theSovietlevelofeffortdevotedtospaceinthe1980sisincreasingsignificantly
overtheactivitiesnotedinthe1970s.TheprojectedyearlyrateofgrowthoftheSovietspaceprogram
isexpectedtooutpaceboththeannualrateofgrowthinoverallSovietmilitaryspendingandthatof
theSovietgrossnationalproduct(GNP)foranumberofyearstocome.
TheSovietshaveembarkeduponalongterm,broadbasedefforttoexpandtheir
operationalmilitarycapabilityinspace.AmajorSovietobjectiveistoexpand
warfightingcapabilityinspaceandachieveameasureofsuperiorityinthatarena.Their
technologicalbaseisstrengtheningandisbeingenhancedbytechnologytransferfrom
theWest.Theirlaunchcapabilityisincreasingwiththedevelopmentofnewfacilities
andboostersystems.Theycontinuetooperatetheworld'sonlyoperationalantisatellite
system,whiletheytestanddevelopmoresophisticatedspaceweaponry.ItiscleartheSovietsare
strivingtointegratetheirspacesystemswiththerestoftheirArmedForcestoensuresuperiormilitary
capabilitiesinallarenas.

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