BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN VS ZAMORA

342 SCRA 449

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a Junk VFA Movement, Bishop Tomas Millamena (Iglesia
Filipina Independiente), Bishop Elmer Bolocan (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), Dr. Reynaldo
Legasca, Md, Kilusang Mambubukid Ng Pilipinas, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Gabriela, Prolabor, and The Public
Interest Law Center, petitioners, vs. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Foreign Affairs Secretary
Domingo Siazon, Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado, Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre, Senate President
Marcelo Fernan, Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Blas Ople, Senator Rodolfo Biazon, And Senator
Francisco Tatad, respondents.
FACTS: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases
Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United
States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in
1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases
agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military
bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign
Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests
of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides discussed, among other
things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then
President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent
Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5, 1998, President
Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998,
the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to
the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
ISSUES (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA; (2) whether the VFA is
governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution; (3)
and whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.
RULING: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that
the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears
stressing that a taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
(2) Yes.The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that
the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether
under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the
concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.
(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, the
Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people is then
without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in
character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes
and bounds within which each of the three political branches of government may exercise the powers
exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.

LINA OBANA Y ZAMORA VS JUDGE ANDRES SORIANO

G. R. No. 60353, AUGUST 29, 2001
FACTS: Jaime Liron, private respondent, was earlier charged before the trial court with rape,
the Information alleging that he had committed the crime by inserting his finger in the vagina of
petitioner Jolyna Obana y Zamora against her will and without her consent. Acting on a motion
in favour of respondent Liron, the trial court referred the case to the Office of the Prosecutor, this
time charging the accused no longer with rape but with acts of lasciviousness.
Petitioners argue that to exclude fingers under the context instrument or object, absurdity will
result.
Respondents, however, for their part, insist that what the law reads is all the courts can apply.
Instrument or object is a phrase, they submit, that does not include the fingers; citing a piece of
legislative history in the discussion in the Bicameral Conference Committee of Congress that
apparently records the decision to exclude the fingers. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the term instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another
person include fingers under Article 266 A, Paragraph 2 of R.A. 8353.
RULING:
The starting point of construction should not be journals of debates or committee discussion, but
the text of the law itself. Dickerson, in his well read treatise on statutory interpretation applies
that the court should not overthrow the principle by treating as co-equal the enacted statues and
the legislative hearings or committee reports.
It may be uncommon to refer to his finger as an object, but it would not do such violence to the
term object for even in common use, it is synonymous to a thing. Ballentines Law Dictionary
defines object as a material thing, any tangible thing, visible or capable of discernment by the
senses. Clearly, a finger falls within the ambit of this concept.
It is a rule in statutory construction that where such construction is consonant and not in
variance with the purpose of the statute, and does not thwart or defeat the same, or where it is
not obvious from the statute that the evil to be suppressed, or the remedy to be advanced,
requires that the construction be limited or enlarged.
The title of the statute itself expands the definition of the crime of rape. Excluding the insertion
of finger would be unintelligible, arbitrary and capricious delimitation of what the law had set out
to expand. It is also based on the rule that statutes should be construed as a whole for the
purpose of the law itself.
It falls under the consequential analysis or absurdity rule where the courts must work with norms
of reasonableness or fairness.

SANTOS JR. VS PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION

566 SCRA 272
FACTS: PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed a complaint for a sum of money against
petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be collected was the petitioners
unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of
directors. Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter cannot be
located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondents motion,
the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent caused the publication of the
summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent
submitted the affidavit of publication and the affidavit of service of respondents employee to the effect
that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioners last known address. Petitioner still
failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication of summons. Hence, respondent filed
a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte. Trial court granted said motion and proceeded with the
ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by
respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the
clerk of court. Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such execution
with the clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioners answer because the same was filed
way beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari but failed
and even sustained the trial courts decision and ordered the former to pay the amount plus legal interest
and cost of suit. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is lack of jurisdiction over the petitioner due to improper service of
summons.
2. Whether or not the rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
applies only to actions in rem, not actions in personam.
3. Whether or not the affidavit of service of the copy of the summons should have been prepared by
the clerk of court and not respondents messenger.
HELD:
1. Section 14, Rule 14 provides that in any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown
owner or the like or when his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligentinquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in
a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may order.
Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his
whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect the service of summons
upon him by publication in anewspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was proper served
with summons by publication and that there is jurisdiction over his person.
2. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to
the kind of action to which the rule was applicable but this has been changed, it now applies to
any action. The present rule expressly states that it applies in any action where the defendant is
designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Hence, the petitioners contention that the complaint
filed against him is not covered by the said rule because the action for recovery of sum of money
is an action in personam is not applicable anymore.
3. The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by registered
mail to defendants last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit
showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office,
postage for prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address. The
rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the
clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and
processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the
party who resorts to service by publication.

BERNARDO VS BERNARDO
96 PHIL 202
FACTS: On December 31, 1947, the Republic of the Philippines purchased from Roman
Catholic Church the estate known as the "Capelania de Tambobong" in Malabon, Rizal, under
the provisions of section 1, of Commonwealth Act No. 539. Said Act authorizes the expropriation
or purchase of private lands and that lands acquired thereunder should be subdivided into lots,
for resale at reasonable prices to " their bona fide tenants or occupants." Crisostomo R.
Bernardo, respondent herein, applied to the Rural Progress Administration for the purchase of
the lot in question. Petitioners Enrique Bernardo, et al ., contested the application and claimed
preferential right to such purchase, and on January 12, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration
resolved to recognize the petitioners as entitled to preference. The respondents then appealed
to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the latter upheld their claim, and the decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are bona fide occupants of the lot in question.
HELD: No, Enrique does not come under the description of bona fide tenant or occupant
employed in the statute. The term "bona fide occupant" (admittedly petitioner is not a tenant)
has been defined as "one who supposes he has a good title and knows of no adverse claim"
(Philips vs. Stroup, 17 Atl. 220,221); "one who not only honestly supposes himself to be vested
with true title but is ignorant that the title is contested by any other person claiming a superior
right to it" (Gresham vs. Ware to that of a possessor in good faith in our Civil Law (Civil Code of
1889, art. 433; new Civil Code, art. 526). The essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore,
lies in honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
intention to over each another.
It is also in contrary that the words "bona fide occupants" employed in the Commonwealth Acts
are equivalent to "actual" occupants. The first reason is that Section 7 of Act 1170 of the old
Philippine Legislature, employs the terms "actual bona fide settlers and occupants", plainly
indicating that "actual" and "bona fide" are not synonymous, while the Commonwealth acts
deleted the term "actual" and solely used the words "bona fide occupant", thereby emphasizing
the requirement that the prospective beneficiaries of the acts should be endowed with legitimate
tenure. The second reason is that in carrying out its social readjustment policies, the
government could not simply lay aside moral standards, and aim to favor usurpers, squatters,
and intruders, unmindful of the lawful or unlawful origin and character of their occupancy. Such
a policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining their just solution. It is safe to say that the
term "bona fide occupants" was not designed to cloak and protect violence, strategy, double
dealing, or breach of trust.
The SC ruled that a person who, at the time of the acquisition of the Tambobong Estate by the
Government, has been gratuitously occupying a lot therein by mere tolerance of its lessee, and
who does not own the house erected on such lot, is not a "bona fide occupant" entitled to its
acquisition, as the term is used in Commonwealth Act. No. 539.

PEOPLE VS DELA CUESTA

304 SCRA 83
FACTS: Petitioner Julian Santulan and Antonio Lusin who have been succeeded by
their heirs were rival claimants with respect to the lease of a parcel of foreshore land of
public domain with an area of about 4 hectares located at Barrio Kaingin, Kawit
Cavite. The Petitioner Santulan surveyed the land on December 5, 1942 and filed an
application on Dec. 29, 1942 to lease for five (5) years for agricultural purposes an area
of 36, 120 sq. meters and including the application for revocable permit to occupy the
said land for planting of Bakawan which later develop to fishpond seven years later after
acquiring ordinary fishpond permit from BFAR. On the other hand, private respondent
Lusin was reported and was being summoned that he was illegally entered the area
covered by the petitioners fishpond permit and was refrain from introducing
improvements.
However, private respondent Lusin filed applications 1n 1942 and 1945 for a revocablepermit and a lease of a foreshore for the purpose of producing salt in the said land. He
also contends that he had been in the continues and exclusive possession of the land
since 1920 when it was still under water, and that he had used it as a site of his fish
corrals, and allegedly converted two (2) hectares into fishpond enclosed with mud dikes
and provided with a concrete sluice gate and another sluice gate made of wood. On the
northern part of the land bordering the bay were bamboo stakes placed at close
intervals to serve as water breakers to protect the mud dikes from being washed away
by the action of the sea. The private respondent said that he introduced the alleged
improvements from 1951 to 1953. The 1942 foreshore lease applications of Petitioner
Santulan and private respondent Lusin gave rise to Bureau of Lands Conflict.
ISSUE: Whether or not the continues and exclusive possession of the private
respondent could nullify the petitioners preferential right to lease the land by reason of
his riparian rights?
RULING: The Director of Land ruled that the disputed land was subject to reparian
rights which may he invoked by petitioner Julian Santulan as owner of the upland in
accordance with section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1. It was found out that
the disputed land is foreshore land covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of the
ordinary tides that is an extension of Santulans Lot No. 986 of the Kawit cadastre, with
an area of 17, 301 square meters, registered in his name in 1937 under Original
Certificate of Title No. 6 which was issued by virtue of a free patent, and the said
foreshore land was allegedly formed by soil deposits accumulated by the alluvial action
of the sea, and the petitioner was the first to enter the land and to make dikes thereon.

Private Respondent Antonio Lusin was found out to be possessor in bad faith, and
latters allegation with respect to the possession and improvements could not nullify the
petitioners preferential right to lease the land by reason of his riparian rights. Therefore,
the rejection of the private respondents revocable permit and foreshore lease is proper.
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30. 1936
32. Preference of the Reparian Owner The owner of the property adjoining foreshore
lands, marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of
navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his
property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and
regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefore within sixty
(60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands
advising him of his preferential right.
Strictly speaking, "riparian" refers to rivers. A riparian owner is a person who owns land
situated on the bank of a river.
Riparian owner" embraces not only the owners of lands on the banks of rivers but
also the littoral owners, meaning the owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or
lake or other tidal waters. The littoral is the coastal region including both the land along
the coast and the water near the coast or the shore zone between the high and low
watermarks.

PEOPLE VS SANTIAGO
5 SCRA 231
The information herein alleges that defendant Isauro Santiago has committed the crime
of "libel" as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of October 1959, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, for the evident purpose of injuring the name and reputation of Arsenio H.
Lacson, and of impeaching and besmirching the latter's virtue, honesty, honor and
reputation, and with the malicious intent of exposing him to public hatred, contempt and
ridicule, did then and there wilfully, feloniously, maliciously and publicly call said Mayor
Arsenio H. Lacson, in the course of a political speech delivered at 392 Fraternal,
Quiapo, in said city, thru the medium of an amplifier system and before a crowd of
around a hundred persons, the following, to wit: "Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang
hiyang Alkalde, Mayor Lacson raped a woman at the Aroma Cafe and another City Hall
employee in Shellborne Hotel", which are false, malicious and highly defamatory
statements against Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson, delivered with no good intentions or
justifiable motive, but solely for the purpose of injuring the name and reputation of said
Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson and to expose him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.
Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime charged
therein is, not libel, but oral defamation, which has already prescribed, it having been
allegedly committed on October 5, 1959, or more than six (6) months prior to the filing of
the information on August 11, 1960. The Court of First Instance of Manila granted this
motion and, accordingly, quashed the information, with costs de oficio. Hence, this
appeal by the prosecution.
The only issue in this case is whether the crime charged in the information is oral
defamation, under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, or libel, under Article 355, in
relation to Article 353, of the same Code. Said provisions read:
ART. 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and
insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall bearresto menor or a fine not exceeding
200 pesos".
ART. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of
writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical
exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished
by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to
6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party.

ART. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or
of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
The prosecution maintains that "the medium of an amplifier system", thru which the
defamatory statements imputed to the accused were allegedly made, falls within the
purview of the terms "writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph,
painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means",
appearing in said Article 355, in the sense, at least, that in "amplifier system" is a means
"similar" to "radio".
This pretense is untenable. To begin with, as correctly stated in defendant's brief, "radio
as a means of publication is "the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves
without conducting wires intervening between transmitter and receiver" (Library of
Universal Knowledge)" (see, also, 18 Encyclopedia Britanica, p. 285), "while
transmission of words by means of an amplifier system", such as the one mentioned in
the information, "is not thru "electromagnetic waves" and is with the use of "conducting
wires" intervening between the transmitter . . . and the receiver . . . .
Secondly, even the word "radio" used in said Article 355, should be considered in
relation to the terms with which it is associated "writing, printing, lithography,
engraving . . . phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition or cinematographical
exhibition" all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent
nature as a means of publication, and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that
prescribed for oral defamation. Thus, it has been held that slanderous statements
forming part of a manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel (Sorensen
vs. Wood, 243 N.W. 82, 82 A.L.R. 1109; Nules vs. Wasner, 20 P. [2d] 487, 104 A.L.R.
877), whereas the rules governing such offense were declared inapplicable to
extemporaneous remarks of scurrilous nature, made ad libitum in the course of a radio
broadcast by a person hired to read a prepared text, but not appearing thereon (Summit
Hotel Co. vs. National Broadcasting Co., PA-124 A.L.R. 963).1wph1.t
IN SHORT, the facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation
punished in Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribed six (6) months
after its commission, or on April 5, 1960 (Articles 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code), over
four (4) months before the filing of said information, in view of which the order appealed
from is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., is on leave.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILS INC VS GOMEZ

571 SCRA 18