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Dialectic of Action
George T. Rozos
Dialectic of Action
HESTIA
PUBLISHERS & BOOKSELLERS
ATHENS 1994
Preface
This work returns to the perennial question of the relationship between
theory and practice in the hope of adding some light to the related issue of
the meaning and justification of radical action. The question is pursued
with the help of the dialectic, and especially through an important feature
of it, according to which rationality that which supplies a valid form of
justification is a matter of continuous reinterpretation at various levels,
until an all-inclusive level of meaning has been reached. Such structuralization of reason, which combines unity with difference, enables us to deal
more effectively with the recurring problem of dualism, whereby practice
and theory, action and its justification, belong to different universes, that
of action and thought, respectively. Whether the justification of an action
is moral or instrumental, it is pursued in the realm of words, concepts, and
ideas, whereas action belongs to the realm of physicality.
Hegel's Logic is the locus classicus for the development and defense of the
dialectical method, as his Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit are for
its application to the corpus of disciplinary knowledge. All three, and especially the Logic, are used extensively in overcoming the difficulties associated with rigid dualism, and in effecting a synthesis of theory and practice
which is logically sound and relevant to recent social and historical experience. All good philosophy is not only true but part of living experience,
though the link between the two may not be immediately apparent and
must, therefore, be made explicit. Such is the nature of Hegel's philosophy, inasmuch as it is notoriously difficult and the logical chains leading to
the all-inclusive context of meaning, wherein all dualities have been overcome, are both long and tortuous. Yet there are ways that this project can
be made intellectually more manageable, and educationally more available
to a wider public than students of philosophy.
One such way is to begin with those aspects of the dialectic of theorypractice which translate most easily into recognizable experience. Having
learned from the self-critique of reason that it is not homogeneous, w e
must now exercise caution in dealing in the same way with thought-forms
(dialectical categories) and language. Granted, as a philosophical discipline,
the dialectic shares with other philosophical systems the discursive medium
of language. But unlike other systems with objectivist bias in regard to experience, the dialectic has inherited a distinct preoccupation with subjectivity from its romantic and idealist lineage. This, along with the structuralization of rationality, proves a clear advantage in pursuing the intended syn-
priate to it: (1) Long quotations were selected with an eye to self-containment and continuity. Once stated, these passages are frequently reused in
different contexts, variously reconstructed with the help of added parenthetical statements, and illustrated through material from contemporary
experience. (2) Key categories from the Logic are used as dialectical roles
in which sub-categories of action are cast for the purpose of eliciting their
dialectical development. (3) In the same vein of rendering explicit the unifying presence of action, surrogates of these sub-categories are located in
the Logic, and the triadic structure of the dialectic is used to show their interchangeability. (4) Organized along alphabetical lines, indexes are particularly useful for reference and guidance in cases where the discourse is essentially linear and inhabited w i t h proper names and atomic events
and/or meanings amenable to concise (dictionary-type) definition. As it
will become increasingly apparent, a dialectical discourse is, by contrast,
circular, intensively self-referential, and highly coherence-dependent for
the determination of meaning. Adapting style to subject matter, the customary index was dropped, and an older device of placing notes in the
margins was resurrected, in the hope of accenting internal coherence and
facilitating the flow of the argument.
The Dialectic of Action is addressed to the student of philosophy and social thought, the philosophically inclined general reader and, not least, the
reflective radical who wishes to gain some insight into his action. It fits into the current intellectual climate of (re)discovery of Hegel, which coincides with an increasingly skeptical attitude about Marx's stature as a dialectician, a philosopher of radical action, and a visionary of a n e w humanity. Not accidentally, it also coincides with the dismantling of social
systems claiming Marx as their patron saint, as well as with a seemingly
independent striving to "deconstruct" systematic philosophy particularly Hegel's, its most illustrious representative.
Contents
Preface
ix
B. A Psychoanalytic Paradigm
13
23
32
45
B. Interchangeably of Categories
55
C. Strategy
65
73
79
90
96
101
115
132
147
v. Dissolution of Theory-Practice
168
173
204
219
228
245
258
271
281
293
309
316
337
363
369
375
390
400
411
435
461
A. Political Praxis
In order to pursue our claim that the dialectic is about action, and radical action at that, w e shall begin with a preliminary definition of the dialectic in the context of a paradigm
from radical politics. Implicit in the dialectic is a procedure of
challenging what is presupposed or taken for granted within
any given level of discourse. Any challenge, indeed any proposition, presupposes a context or level of meaning, and there is a
difference between a challenge within any given context and
the challenge of the context itself. The radical function of the
dialectic derives from this capacity of going beyond what lies on
the surface and getting at the root of things by challenging the
underlying context. There are other philosophical systems such
as phenomenology and analytic philosophy which share this
radical function with the dialectic. However, the dialectic is distinguished from these other forms of presuppositional challenge
as a result of this radical function being built-into its most fundamental logical features in a system of closely knit parts.
The dialectic can thus be tentatively defined as the process
whereby contexts of meaning are established only to be challenged as soon as the elaboration of their implications leads to
internal contradictions. This propels them to a more inclusive
context of meaning, or a higher level of coherence. In being
transcended, the previous level of meaning has become explicit
and the rules governing its coherence are no longer hidden or
taken for granted. Experience is being reordered at each n e w
level of meaning which subsumes the previous one under a
new set of rules about coherence. The process leads ultimately
to an all-inclusive context, where nothing is left implicit and
which is at once both the presupposition and the outcome of
the whole process. The dialectic, then, can also be said to form
a system of hierarchically arranged contexts of meaning in an
order of increased comprehensiveness or coherence.
Radical politics can illustrate this simple model of the dialectic if we consider a case in which persistent failures and frustrations in one's efforts may lead either to readjustment of values
or goals, or to retracing one's steps in an attempt to find out
what went wrong. If the latter course is taken, the probe may
Definition of the
dialectic as presuppositional challenge.
Illustration through
radical politics and
the centrality of
theory-practice.
range from a search for errors in the application of a given theory, or theory-like proposition, to the re-examination of the
theory itself. If this too proves unsatisfactory, the probe may
reach the category of theory-practice itself, which underlies all
cases of a similar application. Such a probe would indicate that
doubt has reached the level (context of meaning) of fundamental cultural rules of the game which a healthy, stable society
normally follows unself-consciously. This sequence of probes
w o u l d correspond to the levels of meaning outlined above,
while the latest of them would qualify as a radical presuppositional challenge because it would involve a wide range of actual
and potential activity encompassed by theory-practice. In other
words, it would entail a radical critique on a broad cultural
front transcending more customary radical probes, such as
those focusing on the socio-economic level. Far from saying
that our probe is to bypass social and economic conditions as
factors for consideration, our claim is that the detection and
evaluation of such conditions, screened through the dual category of theory-practice, have to be re-examined along with the
latter which has now come under scrutiny as well.
This is not the end of the repercussions of the radical challenge just outlined. For the presuppositional challenge of theory-practice has remained, thus far, on the discursive level and
as such it has stopped short of the radical possibilities implicit in
the physical aspects of politics. To put it differently, the strict
compartmentalization of the discursive and physical aspects of
culture, including political activity, is the result of structuring
by polar categories such as theory-practice. When deeply embedded polarities are undermined by presuppositional challenges of radical politics the field is left open for other forms of
action including physicality and violence. Much of the radical
political and countercultural scene of the 1960s consisted of
such challenges of basic rules of the establishment, including
those liberal values of rationality arid efficiency, as incorporated
in the logic of theory-practice. Insa narrow sense the latter is
part of a cluster of methodological rules that define rationality
in science. But in our modern (post-Renaissance) era, wherein
science sets general cultural parameters, theory-practice finds
itself embedded in a fundamental context of cultural meaning,
as the opening paragraphs of this paradigm clearly indicate.
Thus, when, as a result of radical action, a transition is made
from discursive to non-discursive (physical) means in politics, it
turns out that this is no mere leap into irrationality, as defined
by the previous context of meaning or as the opponents of the
activists are claiming, but a step toward a possible synthesis of
Dialectical meaning
of synthesis illustrated through theorypractice.
Dialectic as a process
of totalization, and
the transition from
predictive to retrodictive logic.
scious challenge of the old structure of action and the formulation of the n e w will be preceded by a period in which groups
challenge theory-practice experientially in the various forms it
is found embodied in institutions and social practices. Group actions cannot be reduced to sums or multiples of individual
ones. Being part of a group action reinforces the lack of individual self-consciousness about one's motives and consequently
blunts awareness about the links between motivations and intentions, on the one hand, and their outcomes, on the other. If
outcomes of collective actions are difficult to plan, such actions
which also claim the status of an dialectical synthesis planned
beforehand are impossible. They can only be shown to be so
retrodictively. This points to a tentative conclusion to which
w e shall return in more detail later that the construction of a
dialectical synthesis can only be staged ex post facto. In our example, it is the historian-philosopher of the future who will determine whether the countercultural activities of the 1960s
constituted genuine syntheses or frivolous actions. He will
make explicit what had lain implicit in their experiential challenges, while determining whether a n e w context of meaning
has emerged within which theory and practice find themselves
ordered under a new set of rules.
B. A Psychoanalytic Paradigm
This paradigm picks up where the last one left off: with consciousness used to illustrate the dialectical synthesis of theory
and practice into action. The important bearing of consciousness on the issue of dialectical synthesis becomes obvious if w e
recall our comments in the Preface about the centrality of subjectivity in the dialectical process. Psychology, more particularly
phenomenological psychology and psychoanalysis, centers on
self-consciousness with the help of the concept of transcendence. This is also shared by certain brands of philosophy and,
of course, by the dialectic. Transcendence is a form of steppingout from a given context of meaning for the purpose of gaining
some insight into its structure. Obviously it is a technique of
rendering explicit what remains implicit and, as such, it has
proved to be a powerful tool in the hands of a wide range of
disciplines for challenging ideologies and all forms of unselfcritically held knowledge. But it has shown itself to be especially potent against the most tenacious and all-pervading of modern ideologies scientism which has been the target, in one
w a y or another, of disciplines as varying as Kantian metaphysics, p h e n o m e n o l o g y , linguistic analysis, s o c i o l o g y of
knowledge, and deconstruction. However, as in the case of presuppositional challenge earlier, it has remained on the level of
an intellectual critique because transcendence has not reached
deep enough into the fundamental logical features of the discourse, thus allowing the theory-practice polarity and its surrogates to remain untouched. Psychoanalysis has, for our purposes of illustration, an advantage over these disciplines in that
as a therapeutic art concerned with modification of behavior
it shares with the dialectic the built-in logical feature that propels presuppositional challenge from a discursive activity to action. Thus our paradigm of what might be called a successfully
terminated therapy may also give us a glimpse into the elusive
synthesis of theory and practice into action. Needless to add
that w e make no special claims about the scientific validity or
therapeutic value of the proposed model, which is offered solely for paradigmatic illustration.
The centrality of
consciousness for the
dialectical synthesis
of theory-practice.
Psychoanalysis as a
case of dialectical
synthesis by way of
transcendence of
context of meaning.
Transcendence
illustrated through
the dialectical triad
of immediacy
mediationre-immediation.
Lack of completeness
propels the dialectic
forward.
Comparison of the
dialectic with other
philosophies of
transcendence.
this transition, from Husserl's notorious problems with intersubjectivity to Sartre's questionable synthesis of Marxism and
existentialism, attest to such deficiency.
Hegel avoided such pitfalls: first, by adopting a more powerful logical apparatus to sustain radical transcendence; second,
by shifting from a pseudo-timelessness to a retrospective-historical discourse in which he could demonstrate that, though not
apparent without radical presuppositional challenge, the individual remains ingrained in any scientistic discourse claiming
objectivity and predictive power because of the built-in subjectobject duality. Thus the shift to an essentially historical discourse becomes pari passu an abandonment of predictive claims,
without involving a categorial assimilation of science and philosophy by history resulting in historicism. This is the standpoint of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, wherein historical correlates are found for the modalities of individual consciousness.
Transcendence is applied by the retrospective philosopher to
unveil segments of historical experience in which the transition
from individual to group is an accomplished cultural fact. The
categorial apparatus appropriate to each historically given
group varies with time and culture as do the ways of transition
and integration. This approach enabled Hegel to avoid misdirected quests for a presuppositionless beginning and misplaced
hopes for a solution which was based on insufficient transcendence: a transition from individual to group using consciousness (which seems to be a clean start) for a point of departure,
but which is actually a historically given form of consciousness.
For such a misleadingly fresh point of departure graphically
illustrated in the paradigm as a point on a open-ended axis
Hegel substituted a form of circularity about which more will be
said later. The seemingly unmediated form of existence, Being,
with which he started his Logic, is also mediated since, in addition to being a category of Logic, it is also part of individual and
cultural experience anchored in a historical setting of western
culture.
The superiority of
the dialectical notion
of open-endedness
as circularity.
Extension of the
dialectical context
of meaning from
the individual to
the group.
Rudiments of group
in the adversarial
relationship between
the radical and the
liberal.
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Extension of the
dialectical context
of meaning from
the individual to
the group.
Rudiments of group
in the adversarial
relationship between
the radical and the
liberal.
oriented experience he shares with his fellow-radicals. In demanding that the radical submit his vision in the form of a theory, the liberal is also asking that he abandon his presuppositional challenge and adopt the rules of theory-practice into the
new context. Assuming that the radical bows to his opponent's
request and submits a set of propositions which fulfill the preliminary requirements of a testable hypothesis, the next question of the liberal will be: "Does it fit the facts?" or " H o w do
you know it will work in practice?" But terms like "fact," "it
works," even 'Ireality" and "truth," which will be used in the
ensuing exchange, are to be understood in the context of the
scientistic corpus into which the radical has allowed himself to
be drawn. These terms are loaded not merely in the positivistic
sense (also part of the scientistic ideal) of failing to represent reality because language has not been totally purged of its particularisms; but, more important, in the sense of being part of a
self-contained whole of mutually supported elements, which is
capable of screening out what is viewed as meaningless or nonexistent and preserving what will cohere with it. In this light,
scientistic rigor can be attributed not to its universality, or the
fidelity of its propositions to a universally valid notion of reality,
but to its abstractive features which enable it to filter out variants of reality or experience which prove disturbing to its coherence. To unload such key terms of their peculiar function is
not a matter of banishing them and replacing them with those
of a universal language, but of disclosing h o w their being
loaded is part of their belonging to a given context of meaning.
But in order to do this one has to transcend the prevailing context and its categorial apparatus.
The same abstractive features of scientism which fortify it
against challenge when they remain concealed in the presuppositional level, also become a source of its vulnerability w h e n
they are unveiled through transcendence. Culture as a conception of a whole i.e., as a supreme example of an all-inclusive
context of meaning is an intricate network of powerful defense mechanisms as long as its fundamental rules of the game
remain at the unself-conscious level of its members. But they
begin to weaken as soon as self-consciousness about them begins to set in. This is no accident if w e bear in mind that unselfconsciousness assures cultural efficiency, as w e shall see later in
discussing dialectical anthropology. Exposing this concealed efficiency through enhancing self-consciousness increases the
vulnerability of a culture, whether the enhancement is self- or
externally induced by a radical challenge. But an established
culture is also vulnerable to a radical challenge of a non-discur-
Parallels to the
analytical paradigm.
Differences between
the protagonists
as a dispute about
the meaning of
rationality.
sive nature. This is the kind of experiential challenge w e suggested earlier in introducing the element of immediacy in the
dialectic of action, whereby the step ahead involving synthesis
cannot be consciously planned without negating the dialectical
process. Now, with our radical and his opponent locked in confrontation, w e can again put this dialectical insight into use.
A defense of the status quo by the liberal would draw upon
concealment of presuppositions, rely on the screening mechanism of prevailing categories, and downgrade the importance of
experiential elements. The radical, on the contrary, would challenge presuppositions, disclose the role of categories as defense
mechanisms, and emphasize the creative role of experiential elements in carrying out the challenge. In terms of the psychoanalytic paradigm, the radical represents the patient's motivation
to modify his behavior through action originating in the painful
experience of neurosis, while the liberal corresponds to his resistance to therapy manifested as intellectualization of the
process and de-immediation of action. The concept of rationalization has its counterpart in established reason, for as the form e r is e x p o s e d t h r o u g h analysis, so is the latter deflated
through philosophical transcendence. As rationalization relieves the analysand from facing the connection between his
neurotic behavior and concealed parts of his past experience, so
does established reason obscure its links with prevailing institutions thus giving it the illusion of timelessness and universality.
The patient resists getting at the experiential roots of his behavior as the liberal refuses to face the concealed presuppositions
of his rationality.
The key issue of the dispute between the protagonists
that which constitutes rational action is essentially the same
as that confronted by the two earlier paradigms. For the most
part it was broached in negative terms in the political paradigm:
what a genuine dialectical synthesis, which took the form of an
exemplary radical action, is not. It was found to be one whose
validation does not depend on the rules of the context (of theory-practice) which has been transcended. It was then shown, in
the positive terms of the analytical paradigm which followed,
what a dialectical synthesis of theory-practice is like, qua selforiginating action, following a shift in the context of meaning.
Now, with the gradual disclosure that the context of meaning
of liberal's t h e o r y - p r a c t i c e is essentially scientistic, the
question about the rationality of the radical's action can be
settled in context.
In the case of the liberal trying to ascertain the rationality of
the radical's action by asking him to produce a theory or theory-
like proposition, the latter is justified in challenging the presuppositional grounds of the theory-practice relationship. For example, the radical can point out that what he is being asked to
produce is defined within the context of the theory-practice relationship which, however, cannot itself be derived through theorizing, nor be tested and validated through practice without
falling into circular reasoning. Any attempt to validate this relationship as if it were an empirical matter, i.e., by reference to experience through the familiar scientistic procedures, would be
begging the question. The empirical test through theory-practice
that the liberal is implicitly proposing for the action of the radical is a criterion for a historically and culturally given conception
of rationality, i.e., scientistic rationality. In other words, the validation of a principle is something of a different order dialectically speaking, belonging to a more inclusive context of meaning
than the justification of an action according to the same principle. This is also true in regard to the difference between rationality of action judged by scientistic criteria and that established
ex post facto by criteria of cultural and historical coherence.
Though the actual dialogue between the two is not likely to
move on this level of abstraction, the structure of their respective strategies has been clearly outlined: their attempts to conceal, or conversely, lay bare for inspection the presuppositions
of the prevailing context, the hidden agenda of the status quo.
The liberal's task is made lighter by the fact that much of the
concealment is done automatically by the culture's built-in defense mechanisms, the network of institutions as embodiments
of established reason inclusive of language, ethical norms, customs and manners. For example, polite expressions or conciliatory mannerisms of daily discourse may, upon closer scrutiny,
be revealed as protective mechanisms by way of removing presuppositions from routine observation. A reasonable, even innocuous, invitation of the radical to "talk things over" usually
implies keeping the exchange within certain prescribed limits
and not allowing either party to revert to physicality or to shift
into such "philosophical," "transcendent," or "academic" issues
such as "presuppositions." While on the same level of everydayness and popular wisdom, the liberal may continue that
"the situation is more complex than it appears," or that "all
facts are not yet in" and that w e should therefore not " f o o l
around with mindless experiments." Scientism, in its vulgar
version sets the tone about rationality of action even at the level of sub-dialogue, thus providing additional protection to the
status quo through the encasement of its presuppositions in
everyday speech structures.
Built-in cultural
defense mechanisms
of the status quo.
Conservative bias
of scientistic
methodology.
Illustration of
cultural defense
mechanisms through
the rationality of
means-ends and
substantive-instrumental reason.
Physicality and
violence as presuppositional
challenges.
Anticipation of
the group as the
locus of an elevated
subjectivity.
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Dialectical synthesis
modeled after
economics.
Parallels between
bourgeois and
countercultural
challenges.
Smith's replacement
of social (pre-bourgeois), by an economic (modern) transindividual, order.
The logical
metaphor of
society as an
example of dialectical concreteness.
Further illustration
of the dialectical
integration of the
individual into the
group through the
Invisible Hand.
strategies by economists, a more strictly scientistic interpretation, of the sort that did not take place in the history of economic thought until relatively late. This would have called for
successive adjustments of the model of perfect competition (the
Invisible Hand) until empirical confirmation was possible or, if
this proved unsuccessful, for the model to be dropped. The logical metaphor, on the other hand, self-contained to a degree as
it is, can be used as a heuristic device to explore social subject
matter by allowing its logical possibilities to unfold. This, in fact,
happened for a long time in economic thought, to the detriment of its development as a empirical science.
Without trying to minimize the similarities between theories, models, and metaphors in terms of self-containment, capacity for self-selecting empirical data, and heuristic value, the
contrast between theories and metaphors above was intended
to emphasize the difference between empirical and dialectical
concreteness. Whereas scientifically and commonsensically a
metaphor is empirically grounded or physically tangible, dialectically it is (albeit at a low level of concreteness) self-complete
or, as w e put it above, having a life of its own. Since explicit ness or unveiling of what lies behind the surface is a fundamental value of the dialectic in its quest for all-encompassing
coherence, it is weary of a mode of comprehension like the scientistic, which relies on a problematic (dualistic) epistemological structure of mental-physical, as it did w i t h the similar
methodological structure of theory-practice. Instead, it opts for
a structure of self-containment including both terms of the polarity what w e have called a "mix" of the aprioristic and the
empirical in the case of the metaphor. Recalling the UFO case, it
was the lack of explicitness about the high-order (implicit) parameters of reality which resulted in the self-selection of empirical data that "proved" the non-existence of UFO's. It is a similar lack of explicitness leading to self-concealment that the dialectic is avoiding, which is being illustrated through the selfcompleteness of the metaphor. Needless to add that the selfcontainment of the metaphor, and correspondingly of any moment of the dialectical process short of the final one, is not truly
all-inclusive, thus allowing for an advance to the next higher
context of meaning.
We can return to the Invisible Hand for an illustration of the
incompleteness of the aggregation of individuals leading to the
self-completeness of the group as a result of their satisfactory
integration into it. This can also be interpreted as a change in
quality as a result of increase in quantity or, better still, as a
qualitative leap in a context of meaning by way of a universal-
ization of a feature in the context preceding it. It is the universalization of the knowledge (or ignorance) of all entrepreneurs
given a large enough number of them so that no one can affect the price by controlling output that makes it possible for
the Invisible Hand to work for the benefit of the whole. If one
or more participants have superior knowledge about market
conditions, monopolies and oligopolies emerge and the universal pursuit of self-interest is no longer conducive to the general
welfare, as the Invisible Hand ceases to operate for their benefit
without their knowledge. In effect, a more inclusive or secondorder context of meaning has been generated, as the knowledge of the master student of the market system (e.g., Adam
Smith) is now being shared by participants who were previously ignorant of it. As one's knowledge of the system increases, so
does his capacity to determine, with increasing accuracy, the
net effect of his actions on the whole and thereby neutralize
the effects of the Invisible Hand. The operation of the latter can
now be seen as the result of lack or deficiency in self-knowledge (or self-consciousness in terms of the advanced moments
of the dialectic). The fallacy of composition has become inoperative at this level of knowledge (context of meaning) because
its logical individuals have become self-conscious beings w h o
will not allow themselves to be victimized by the fallacy. To
paraphrase the old logic textbook example, people will discontinue going to parades equipped with stools, if they know that
any differential advantage will be wiped out when they all try
to enjoy it.
It may appear, from our treatment of Smith's metaphor of
the Invisible Hand as an illustration of a dialectical context of
meaning and of the elaboration of its implications as a paradigm for the transition from one context to the next that it is
possible to substitute dialectic for empirical theory. In other
words, the dialectic might be misconceived (in fact, it has been
by some of its critics in the past) as an injunction to deduce empirical features of the world from the properties of logical systems like the fallacy of composition. In our case, pointing to the
socio-logical metaphor of the Invisible Hand as a mix of empirical and aprioristic elements might be misconceived as an effort
to derive, even in the barest outline, the theory of imperfect
competition from the logical exploration of the properties of the
Invisible Hand. The detailed explanation of why this is not the
case must wait until later, but the basic reason for it has already
emerged from the discussion so far. As w e move up the dialectical ladder rigidly dichotomous categories become less reliable.
The a pnon-empirical has n o w been added to theory-practice
Anticipation of
later dialectical
developments by
the social fallacy of
composition.
and means-end in the treatment of human action by social disciplines. These dual structures are not summarily abolished but
are being set up in order to be dialectically synthesized or sublated. Each of their polar terms becomes progressively more
concrete through an admixture with elements from its opposite, in the way suggested by the mix of the a priori and the empirical elements in our metaphor, until the moment when they
find themselves, almost by surprise, synthesized. Reality comes
in many grades w h i c h scientism, in its self-concealment of
rigidly polarized categorial structures, tends to overlook. The
metaphor was a mix from both aprioristic and empirical elements from the outset, since there was already an empirical element present in the logical metaphor w h e n the latter was
dressed up in a social garb in order to serve as a social fallacy of
composition. As the logical possibilities of the Invisible Hand
began to unfold, new empirical content was introduced to give
sensuously concrete form to the illustration of the new possibilities. With each extension the old mix of the empirical and the
a priori takes on the role of a new a priori until a higher level of
dialectical concretion is reached, and so on. This is a reformulation of the familiar rhythm of the dialectic in terms of the social
fallacy of composition, whereby, with every expansion of a context of meaning and the rendering of its implications explicit,
the old context becomes incorporated in the new one under a
n e w set of rules. But it is also a dialectical response to Kant's
question about the possibility of the synthetic a priori.
The centrality of
self-consciousness
for the transition to
the next context of
meaning (and
paradigm).
The dialectical
importance of the
social metaphor of
the Invisible Hand
restated.
The possibility of
the resurfacing of
theory-practice
polarity considered.
objects. The break was initiated with Vico's cutting of the epistemological Gordian noose from around the neck of philosophy, which ushered in the emancipation of cultural disciplines
f r o m the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l t u t e l a g e of physical science.
Vico said that w e do not need epistemological certification of
our knowledge of cultural matters. We understand such matters
for the simple reason that w e made them. The explanation is
much more complex than that, but the gist of it is contained in
this simple pronouncement. The great edifice of German Idealism is a direct descendant of Vico's Copernican Revolution in
the methodology of cultural disciplines. Kant's conception of
creative or spontaneous reason and Hegel's central notion of
Spirit provide the immediate links between Vico's insight and
modernity. The peculiarly humanistic approaches to culture by
phenomenology, existentialism and hermeneutics (interpretation), as well as the methodological innovations within social
sciences as a result of these approaches, can be traced directly
to this final overcoming of epistemological dualism by the persevering holistic commitment of philosophy.
Hegel's conception of
There is a practical in both the pragmatic and the selfSpirit as a safeguard originating moral senses of the term dimension of holistic
against the resurfac- philosophy. It follows directly from the reorientation of philosoing of the polarity of
phy's holistic claim from being to meaning and from (scientistheory-practice.
tic) knowledge to (cultural) interpretation. By contrast to scientistic objects which are "known" because they are external to
the subject, cultural objects are "interpreted" because they are
clusters of meaning generated by the subject in the course of
social interaction with others over the lifespan of a culture.
Though cultural objects, cultural complexes, and indeed culture
itself, are of our o w n doing, w e are not aware of our roles as
their creators because of the limitations of our conceptual grasp
and cultural memory. Hegel's conception of Spirit which will
be explored more deeply later encompasses both the exoteric
aspect of our sedimented meanings (Objective Spirit) which
renders it independent and even alien to us in its facticity, and
Spirit's esoteric side (interpretation), which represents our own
effort (Subjective Spirit) at desedimentation of those layers of
sedimented meaning which compose it. In other words, there
are two complementary aspects of Spirit: On the one hand, an
objective side representing culture which, though our creation,
confronts us as alien in its sedimented opacity and misleads us
to treat it as if it were a scientistic object; and, on the other, a
subjective side standing for our quest to comprehend culture,
and in doing so, through the desedimentation of our very own
sedimented meanings, to comprehend ourselves.
In setting unitary Spirit at the center of philosophical enterprise, while substituting theory and practice for its subjective
and objective faces, respectively, one can get still another
glimpse of the modern holistic claim of philosophy, as regards
the unity of theory and practice, on the basis of meaning. Practice corresponds to the process by which sedimented meanings
generate cultural objects, while theory is the way by which sedimented meanings are understood through being rendered
transparent by way of desedimentation. The unitary claim of
philosophy is not advanced by virtue of any supramundane
form of being, but on the basis of the interpretation of cultural
objects or other manifestations of commonly shared culture.
Contrary to the prevailing view of common sense and scientistic understanding that it is somehow resides in the clouds, philosophy, in its dual capacity as outlined above, has its feet on
earth. What of course prevents the perception of philosophy, as
bearing on everyday life, from being immediately obvious to
common sense as well as to science, is that the logical chains of
mediation the links in the process of unveiling or desedimentation between philosophy and everyday life are both
long and tortuous. However, philosophy is at home with both
the world of essences of empirical science and that of appearances of common understanding for the simple reason that it
advances nothing new, but merely brings to consciousness
through the unveiling of sedimented meaning what common
sense and specialized disciplines have all along believed to be
true in their circumscribed contexts of meaning. Philosophy,
therefore, amounts to no more than self-consciousness of culture or Spirit. Unless this claim is taken seriously, the world appears, from the vantage point of philosophy, as incoherent as it
does from that of specialized disciplines which, having carved
out from the world their own peculiarly coherent universes of
discourse, relegate whatever does not fit into it as belonging to
the domain of obscurity or outright irrationality.
The remainder of this Chapter is devoted to the illustration
of this holistic effort of philosophy with special reference to the
unity of theory and practice. The preceding paradigms of their
synthesis are viewed from the standpoint of dialectical philosophy as layers of meaning sedimented in psychoanalytic, revolutionary, and economic activity, as a result of the routines of linguistic usage and social practice. Though the dialectically progressive arrangement of the paradigms anticipates the culminating holistic act of philosophy in synthesizing them, there are
still pockets of opacity which can only be rendered transparent
Pre-modem view
of philosophy qua
bearing on everyday life.
with the help of the ultimate tool for overcoming sedimentation, self-consciousness, the privilege of dialectical philosophy.
Though the analytical paradigm represented a rudimentary
form of social situation consisting of two individuals, their roles
were prearranged and one was assigned the important function
of guiding transcendence. In this respect the role of the analyst
resembled that of the practitioner of the Platonic dialektike, the
Socratic philosophos, the lover (philos) of wisdom (sophia). But
wisdom is no mere intellectual understanding of virtue, nor
routine practice of it, but the dialectical synthesis of them in the
person of the sophos. The practice of virtue follows necessarily a
deeper form of intellectual-cww-experiential understanding
along the lines of the analytical paradigm. The post-Classical
change in the meaning of philosophy from love of t h e o r y - W practice of virtue to a mere philosophizing about it, made it almost impossible for the modern student of philosophy to make
sense of the Socratic doctrine according to which all it takes is
true knowledge of virtue in order to issue in virtuous action.
Advanced as it may seem when proposed as a synthesis of theory and practice at the philosophical level, this Greek synthesis
of theory and practice stands quite low in terms of the dialectical path traversed by philosophy between Plato and Hegel.
In his three-volume Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel
opens the discussion w i t h pre-Socratics and proceeds on a
course exemplifying temporal advance along with dialectical
concreteness, concluding with his own system which he takes to
be the dialectical summation of the work of his predecessors.
Given his approach, the Greek paradigm, like the analytical, is a
preliminary one containing implicitly that which is to become
fully explicit at the end of the dialectic. The synthesis of theory
and practice comes full circle from the unself-consciously held
Greek version to Hegel's o w n fully developed and self-consciously formulated one. For example, from the vantage point of
Hegel, scientistically oriented post-Renaissance philosophy,
which in one form or another had dominated the scene until his
times, seemed incapable of performing the transcendence which
would also involve transcending itself qua merely mental activity. This much Hegel was probably intimating in his frequently
misunderstood remarks about philosophy ending with him.
Once philosophy has made it impossible to think of itself as a
species of dialectical synthesis of theory and practice, the way
back to synthesis is through the end of philosophy as it is
known. In other words, the change in the meaning of philosophical activity, from the Socratic reflection-and-action to the
m o d e r n reflection about action, made it impossible for the
alectical insight from a paradigm required the gradual suspension of both built-in constraints by the parameters and abstractive features of the concepts involved in it. The modifications
undergone in the rigid juxtaposition of the empirical and the a
priori, and the shift from reason to Reason in the economic paradigm, were examples of the latter. The change from therapeutic
to normal setting, the extension of the end-points on the timeaxis and the foregoing of the prearranged roles in the process of
transcendence in the analytical paradigm, were examples of the
former. In the analytical paradigm which (because of the severity of constraints) ranked lowest on the dialectical scale of concreteness, the shift in the context of meaning from externally
applied to self-applied theory resulted swiftly, and with near-logical necessity, in a synthesis of theory-practice anticipating the
final outcome of the dialectic. Not so in the case of scientism in
the service of politics whereby, with the relaxation of these constraints and the transition to the more concrete level of politics,
a similar synthesis could not have taken place without a good
deal more of mediation. The economic paradigm illustrated the
transition from individual to group and the succeeding shift
from consciousness to self-consciousness: from the situation in
which one thinks that the rules are operating in front of one's
eyes, but they are, in fact, operating behind his back, to that
where they are operating behind his back, but he knows that
this is so. Unlike the situation of the analytical paradigm, here
no one can be entrusted with guiding transcendence without
the risk of reinjecting the old rules into the new context. With
the transition from individual to group and from individual reason to trans-individual Reason, there is no one w h o can be
trusted as a repository for this function in a way which corresponds to the analyst of the psychological paradigm. The emergence of the group brings an element of contingency regarding
h o w transcendence is to be initiated. There is no way of planning the next dialectical step without reinfecting that which was
intended as synthesis with the germs of what it was supposed to
overcome. As the challenge cannot be planned without aborting
the dialectical effort, so is it impossible to assign the role of the
challenger beforehand without negating transcendence. The
challenge, therefore, has to be left to those experiential elements
which are not categorially preselected through scientistic rationality and theory-practice in particular. It can only originate in
those undomesticated elements which were branded irrational
or non-existent by established reason, but which nevertheless
persevered in its interstices.
Philosophy on the
integrating path of
sophia as revised by
the Absolute Idea.
inclusive context of the Absolute, as indeed every other category of the dialectic, is both a presupposition and an outcome, depending on which way it is facing on the circle. Although the
Absolute can go no further in terms of a more all-inclusive context, there is a "forward" in terms of the beginning of the dialectical process the forward movement of the circular path
on the w a y to Being. So the Absolute is the outcome if it is
facing backward and is adopting a retrospective standpoint,
and a presupposition if it is facing forward and adopting a predictive outlook.
The final synthesis
as a result of transcendence from
object-language to
meaning-language.
Possible misunderstandings of
meaning-language
clarified through the
concept of circularity.
sense realism and its many variations, pressing from both the
cultural and the philosophical front in the last century, have
made these misunderstandings difficult to avoid. It takes more
than the usual effort and time to convince a contemporary educated audience that Spirit (Geist) and Notion (Begriff), the two
super-categories of the later stages of the dialectic, are about
meaning rather than disembodied entities and subjective notions. A similar fate may await the present effort to render the
universe of meaning through the loaded object-language of the
metaphor of a Janus-faced Absolute moving along a circular
path. But having gone so far in this mode with the help of paradigms, there seems little choice but to continue and conclude
this Part by recalling some cases from these paradigms which
deal with fundamental concepts most susceptible to object-language and endeavor to restate them in meaning-language.
During our earlier comparison of Hegel's treatment of being
with other philosophies of transcendence, w e noted that his
point of departure was a matter of convenience rather than a
presuppositionless beginning. Being was found to be a form of
unmediated existence posited by philosophers w h o are unaware of what is implicit in it as a product of historically given
form of consciousness. Like any other form of immediacy, a
posit conceals mediation, but this is not realized at the moment
it is being posited and has to wait for the next higher context of
meaning, wherein the unveiling of what had lain implicit takes
place. Thus the earlier context becomes explicit in the later one,
and the end is implicit in the beginning. It takes a whole succession of dialectical steps to make fully explicit in the absolute
context not only what has been implicit in the previous one,
but in the process itself of making explicit. In other words, the
full meaning of rendering something explicit is k n o w n only
when nothing remains implicit in the succession of contexts of
meaning and when, in addition, it has become clear that the
process of rendering explicit is circular. There is a qualitative
difference between the absolute context and all the rest which
has important consequences for the final synthesis of theory
and practice. It can be formulated with special reference to being by pointing out that the philosophical examination of what
is, leads inexorably to an investigation of what it means to be.
But since there are many contexts of meaning, a referential
point is necessary, a context of contexts, if there is to be a
meaningful discourse about the meaning of a being and ultimately about being itself. The Absolute is such referential context of meaning whose fixity cannot be impugned by retorting
that it is time-bound and therefore changeable. For, the concept
Circularity leads to
the dialectical fixing
of identity through
opposition.
of time is itself part of that same universe of meaning and subject to the same rules of the absolute context as being.
Recalling the analytic paradigm, w e can point out that with
the establishment of the circular pattern of the dialectic, all remaining constraints imposed by the time-axis of analytic experience have been suspended. The initial and terminal points of the
axis were first allowed to become open-ended and then, with
the introduction of the philosophical paradigm, they were
joined in conformity with the circular structure of the dialectic.
The dual process of mediation and immediacy, of unveiling what
lies implicit and positing, of retroflection and action, is no longer
initiated only at select points on the axis. Any point on the circumference can serve as the locus for initiating this process and
the resulting movement, the heart of the dialectic, leads back
and forth to the point of origin from different directions. If w e
wish to relieve this heavily burdened object-language from the
load imposed by visual metaphor and gradually shift to the
meaning-language appropriate to this advanced stage of the dialectic, w e may say that the feature of a dialectical moment as
Janus-faced can be conveyed in meaning-language by saying
that the meaning of a term or process is fixed through its opposite. As the all-inclusive context is approached it becomes progressively apparent that hitherto recalcitrant polar terms have
all along been on either side of the same two-faced process. Immediacy is shared by both thought and action, and so is mediation. What appears as unmediated thought or action turns out,
upon unveiling, to involve mediation, and the converse is true
of mediation. Action is implicit understanding and understanding is action m a d e e x p l i c i t . As s o m e o n e w h o posits, the
retroflective philosopher is a man of action, and as someone
w h o retroflects, the man of action is a potential philosopher.
This is not a series of obliterations of distinctions, which
might seem to be the case if the object-language of these statements is taken at face value. Hegel would be the first to condemn the flouting of the so-called laws of formal logic or the
muddling of distinctions. If taken as elements in the domain of
meaning, these statements underline interconnectedness with
those in opposition in the formation of the texture of meaning.
In the sense that the advanced categories of of the dialectic are
about meaning, and that philosophical activity par excellence
makes meaning explicit, Hegel has given reflection the privileged standpoint and the last word to the philosopher. But having granted that, w e must also concede in the spirit of the twoway traffic of the dialectic, that the man of action is given the
green light in the name of immediacy so that the philosopher
has something to reflect upon. What appears as pure immediacy in the former's impulsive action is revealed, upon philosophical unveiling through mediation, to be a reflection of the age
the man of historical action is a child of his times. To paraphrase Kant's admission that he had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith, Hegel had to limit philosophy to
retroflection in order to leave the future open for the man of
action. Significantly, the Absolute Idea, which is the context of
meaning for both in the last moment of the Logic, is also the final synthesis of theory and practice.
A. Structure
W e are still in the process of introducing the main project Strategy to be
and laying down a strategy that will facilitate our task. This Part followed and broad
is accordingly divided into three Chapters. The first deals with a description of works
to be used.
description of the structure of the main works which w e shall
be using. The second will be conveying something about the
rhythm of the dialectic employing Aristotle's concepts of matter
and form as a foil. Finally, the third will deal with matters of
strategy to be used in the Parts which follow.
In view of the great complexity and close interconnectedness between the different works of the Hegelian system, it is
advisable to provide a sense of its structure beginning with the
Encyclopedia in which the systematic intent is most visible. This
work, by whose structure w e shall be primarily guided, can be
viewed as a vast interdisciplinary project cast along dialectical
principles and dealing with subject matter which Hegel treated
in a more concise manner in separate works. It is divided into
three parts: the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy
of Spirit, corresponding at once to the triadic rhythm of the dialectic and the subject matter of the logico-mathematical, physical-biological, and cultural-humanistic disciplines, respectively.
This tripartite division repeats itself, as structure and subject
matter divide and subdivide throughout the Encyclopedia and
the other of Hegel's major works. The Logic subdivides into Being, Essence, and the Notion, corresponding to quantitative, scientistic, and dialectical rationality, respectively. The Philosophy of
Nature subdivides into Mechanics, Physics, and Organics. The
Philosophy of Spirit subdivides into Subjective Spirit (anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology), Objective Spirit (law,
morality, politics, sociology, and history), and Absolute Spirit
(art, religion, and philosophy).
Since w e will also deal extensively with Hegel's Science of Logic Subdivisions of the
Encyclopedia
(a more detailed version of the Logic), the following list of their
and the Science
combined subdivisions has been created for use as a reference.
of Logic.
The overarching triad of Being is QualityQuantityMeasure.
Each of these moments contains between two or three subdivisions of which w e give only two. Quality subdivides into Being
[(pure) BeingNothingBecoming], Determinate Being (Da-
Parallelism between
Aristotle's teleology
and Hegel's dialectic,
cultural product, i.e., the table reflecting the artistic style and
social norms of the age.
In the context of the macro-scale, this interaction between
form and matter becomes a line of progression, organically teleological in Aristotle and dialectical in Hegel. In the former's
schema of progression, matter is potentially something until is
is actualized in a given form which in turn serves as matter for
the next form, and so on. In Hegel's dialectical schema also,
each step makes explicit what has been implicit in the one before it. But, unlike Aristotle's, where nature provides the movement, here it is dialectical Reason that provides the impetus.
Every step up the ladder is a reconstitution of the context of
meaning in line with criteria of coherence which Reason imposes on itself as it presses harder on the presuppositions of any
given context. As w e m o v e up Aristotle's scale of nature, or
Hegel's hierarchy of dialectical moments, there is a progressive
determinacy in terms of the pre- or self-selection of form and
matter depending on the two thinkers' principles of nature and
Reason, respectively. As the form becomes more articulated and
the matter more in-formed, the degrees of freedom left for the
next step are reduced. What is implicit in each is progressively
limited by its increasing internal articulation. The potential uses
of wood in a raw state are infinitely more numerous than when
used for the construction of a table, and they are further reduced when the table has been made in a specific style for the
purpose of being incorporated into a given interior design. For
both thinkers the process of realization entails an ultimate point
of reference and model of perfection against which it can be
measured. In other words, the process of increasing determinacy results into a kind of stasis, a limiting state where all potentiality has been realized, a state in which everything implicit
has been rendered explicit. This is God qua pure actuality in
Aristotle and the Absolute in Hegel.
Unsettling as this conclusion about concreteness as a measure
of perfection might be for the modern reader (steeped as he is
likely to be in our ideology of linear progress and the meaning of
concreteneness as sensuous affinity or tangibility) he should bear
in mind the vast differences in cosmological outlook between the
classical times and ours. As for Hegel, such position follows directly from his shift from scientistic reason to humanistic (dialectical) Reason, and from predictive to retrodictive rationality in
the advanced stages of the dialectic. This is reflected in the transition from Essence to the Notion in the Logic and from Nature to
Spirit in the overarching triad of the Encyclopedia.
or: it is the unity of them, are not capable of grasping it; for it is not a
quiescent third, but, precisely as this unity, is self-mediating movement and activity. As that with which we began was the universal,
so the result is the individual, the concrete, the subject; what the former is in-itself, the latter is now equally for-itself, the universal is
posited in the subject. The first two moments of the triplicity are abstract, untrue moments which for that very reason are dialectical,
and through this their negativity make themselves into the subject.
The Notion itself is for-us, in the first instance, alike the universal
that is in-itself, and the negative that is for-itself, and also the third,
that which is both in-and-for-itself, the universal that runs through
all the moments of the syllogism; but the third is the conclusion, in
which the Notion through its negativity is mediated with itself and
thereby posited for-itself as the universal and the identity of its
moments. (Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller, London: George
Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1969, pp. 833-34, 837-38; subsequently referred to as Science of Logic. Throughout our work all emphases are
in the original texts unless otherwise specified. Minor changes in
capitalization and spelling have been made for the sake of conformity with the rest of the quoted passages in our text.)
Preliminary terminological clarifications and Hegel's
own account of dialectical circularity.
Some of the terms used by Hegel such as immediacy and mediation, abstract and concrete, and the first, second, and third
moments of the triad, more popularly known also as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, are already familiar. Others, such as in-itself, for-itself and in-and-for-itself will be clarified in context in
the next Chapter. But the detail of the important term "sublation" and the way in which it preserves or retains the essence of
what it cancels through the creative use of negation, must wait
until the discussion of Essence in Part m. It is worth noting here
that "triplicity" reflects the syllogistic form in general, and in this
instance that of UniversalParticularIndividual (Concrete
Universal). This gives Hegel the opportunity to underline the
movement toward concreteness at the micro-level of the triad
through the transition from the abstraction of the universal concept to the equally abstract (one-sided) concreteness of something particular, and from there to the synthesis of the two in
the self-containment or self-completeness (also known as concrete universality) of the logical individual. The last term that
Hegel adds to our familiar polarity is, in effect, a breakdown of
the second term Aristotle's concrete thing or "substance" (ousia) in order to reveal the inner dynamic that propels the dialectic on its path. In contrast to Aristotle where nature supplies
the movement, in Hegel it turns out (after the self-concealment
of scientistic reason has been revealed) that it is Reason operating on itself that does so. But the sharing of this feature of reason, i.e., of the formal "triplicity" of the syllogistic form, with
traditional logic, also gives Hegel the opportunity to emphasize
their difference in terms, of the concreteness of the third term.
Limitations of the
linear discursive
medium for dialectical exposition.
smaller triads and those arching above them. The transitions between larger triads are often laconic and may even appear unwarranted because they seem inadequately necessitated. For example, in the transition from Subjective to Objective Spirit in
the Philosophy of Spirit, the preparation for a synthesis (in terms
of building up of concreteness) has been going on between the
opposing moments of the overarching triad. But it is difficult to
make this explicit in a linear mode of exposition without disrupting the sequence of the lesser triads under them.
Time and again critics have complained about the abruptness, even arbitrariness, of the transition from Logic to Nature
in the Encyclopedia. But, in fact, the ground has been prepared
by the lesser categories from behind the surface, so that when
the advanced categories of action (Cognition and Will) at the
end of the Logic first encounter Nature, it is as if they are meeting someone familiar. This familiarity is, of course, the result of
the circular feature of the dialectic, whereby dialectical moments are both presupposition and outcome. For example, theory-practice does not encounter Nature in its scientistic garb,
but as highly mediated Cognition and Will which, having dialectically incorporated theory-practice, recognize Nature, not
as raw nature, but as dialectically structuralized Nature. The circularity involved here results in discovering as already present
in Nature what has all along been thought by scientism and
common sense to be a presupposition for the understanding of
nature something derived from logic with an intention to
apply to external nature.
But there is another important piece without which the nature of dialectical transitions is bound to remain a puzzle: Selfconsciousness, which has been fully attained with the last category of the Absolute Idea in the Logic, is also the synthesis of
Cognition and Will. In v i e w of this, the encounter of Nature
will be made by the Absolute Idea which contains, in sublated
form, the advanced successors of theory and practice Cognition and Will. The transition from Logic to Nature has, therefore, to be reformulated as follows: Not only is Nature being encountered as familiar, but also in full awareness about the limitations of the scientistic categories of theory-practice. Recalling
our UFO illustration, it would be as if, say, a dialectically inclined physicist were to review, in full transparency about presuppositions, the results of some Air Force scientists who, in
their self-concealment about the embeddedness of ontological
presuppositions into their deeper categorial apparatus, had concluded that certain sightings were unreal. The important consequence of dialectical circularity for our purpose is that, unlike
Misplaced criticisms
of the dialectic due to
the limitations of the
linear medium.
B. Interchangeability of Categories
Our introduction of the dialectic by way of the Aristotelian
concepts of form and matter is already evidence of interchangeability of categories within the dialectical process since these
concepts are also important categories of the dialectic. Further
hints about interchangeability can be found in what has already
been said about immediacy-mediation, externality-internality,
and abstract-concrete in terms of features which they share
with each other and with theory-practice. This line of thought
will be pursued further because interchangeability plays a key
role in the strategy to be employed in the following pages. But
first a f e w words about the concept of definition itself, which
underlies our position on interchangeability, and which, it is
hoped, will also help to explain its role of pre-eminence in our
treatment of the subject.
A dialectically rich category may be compared to a package
formed out of layers of meaning accumulated through successive sublations. But its concreteness is not apparent unless one is
constantly aware of the process the category has undergone
unless one, so to speak, is willing to untie the package at a moment's notice. This highlights the premium, from a dialectical
standpoint, for understanding a concept in context or, more accurately, in process. It also underlines the familiar difficulties
generated by the linearity of discursive medium for our reliance
on simultaneity. Freedom-necessity, subject-object, and theorypractice, especially the latter's dialectically advanced successors,
such as Cognition-Will, are examples of concrete polar categories. In the case of the Will (or the Practical Idea of the Science
of Logic), the intervening mediations have eradicated almost all
traces of outward resemblance to their ancestry, so that it takes
quite a task of unveiling to establish their line of descent. This is
not to say that the gradations in the concreteness of concepts are
the discovery of the dialectic. The dialectic has simply accented
this fact by placing the process of making explicit what remains
implicit at the center of its methodology. Not all dialectical concepts are categories of varying concreteness. For example, immediacy-mediation, as well as others to be added to the list later,
are operational terms not amenable to development, but cast in
Interchangeability
related to dialectical
concreteness and
illustrated through
freedom and immediacy-mediation.
The concept of
definition related
to dialectical concreteness.
polar form to facilitate the dialectical process by promoting interchangeability between themselves and those subject to concretion. By its very nature, as one term of a dual category, immediacy connotes abstraction, or incompleteness, and points to
its polar opposite, mediation, for completeness and concreteness.
Immediacy and mediation sift experience between themselves in
ways other than traditionally utilized. The former corresponds to
the surface as represented by those elements of sensuous experience which lend themselves most readily to description. By contrast, mediation corresponds to exploration of what lies behind
the surface, the dominion of scientific theorizing and philosophical speculation. As an illustration of how the onto-logic of dialectical categories such as immediacy and mediation interface
with concrete social and historical reality, one can point out that
immediacy can be used logically-psychologically in connection
with a discourse in order to indicate the function of non-discursive (emotional, intuitive) elements, in contrast to chains of deduction or intellectual argumentation. Or, adding a measure of
socio-historical concreteness, immediacy can be used in conjunction with action to refer to speed, abruptness, or surprise,
characterizing military force or revolutionary violence, for the
attainment of given ends, which could conceivably have been
pursued through mediation.
Viewed from outside of a dialectical context, dialectically
concrete concepts (or categories) seem vague and lacking in
precision and tractability which w e associate with scientistic
discourse. This is due precisely to their concreteness in conjunction with the limitations of linearity of the discursive medium.
Their definition is, in effect, the story of their lives. Take, for example, freedom as a cultural concept by contrast to a precisely
defined juridical freedom necessary in the adjudication of a libel
suit. The former, though vague and totally intractable for purposes of adjudication, is quite functional within its context of
meaning, and dialectically more advanced than the latter, since
it incorporates juridical freedom in its definition contains it
in a sublated form, as Hegel would say. As linguistic analysis
would state this point, the unsatisfactory outcome of attempting a satisfactory dictionary-type definition of cultural freedom,
is not due to the primitive state of the subject matter, nor to our
intellectual sloppiness, but to a category-mistake, i.e., to our attempting the wrong type of definition. The concept of cultural
freedom is quite appropriate for, say, a historical discourse in
which the terms are concrete enough to allow placement in
context instead of a dictionary-type definition in order to elicit
their meaning. But this operation involves a great deal of over-
Other polarities turned into triads which have been anticipated in the discussion can now be explicitly identified- ImmediacyM e d i a t i o n - R e - i m m e d i a t i o n , Individual (predictive)
reasonits negation (as irrationality in the political paradigm
and as ignorance in the economic one)-(retrodictive) Reasom
Subjective freedom (in which the subject is unaware that determination is self-given) its negation through (external) Determination
( c o n c r e t e ) F r e e d o m ( n e g a t i o n of the negation
through Reason's realization [self-consciousness] that determination is the result of Reason's operation on itself [internal or
self-determination]); Internality-Externality-Mediated (elevated or enriched) Internality; or, alternatively, (individual)
Subjectivity Objectivity Elevated (or trans-individual) Subjectivity; and, last but not least, TheoryPractice (or in reverse
order Practice-Theory)their synthesis in Action. Further development of these triads, in addition to others, is awaiting in
Part HI. This will suffice for now if a sense of interchangeability
between them is established in v i e w of their concreteness or
operational nature. Dialectically concrete concepts like action
and f r e e d o m cut across the w h o l e dialectic through interchangeable categories as above, which stand as surrogates for
them, while these concepts remain implicit throughout the
process and surface only at the end of it. The rest of this Chapter will pursue this issue of interchangeability, using the paradigms of Part I to show that the same material can support categories of high concreteness, in addition to theory-practice
The similarity of structure between the polarities of theorypractice and mediation-immediacy extends also to matter-form
and freedom-necessity. However, both sets are related to each
Illustrations of
interchangeability
through theory-practice and internalityexternality.
Thus, given the nature of the protagonists' underlying presuppositions, their respective ideals of knowledge and action
are not merely left unrealized, but remain, in principle, unrealizable if pursued for-themselves, i.e., as they appear to the protagonists from their individual vantage points. For, not until
their methodological individualism and epistemological dualism
have been transcendednot merely bypassed as w e witnessed
in the case of the radical abovedoes any ground exist for a final synthesis of theory-practice. If these ideals are to be pursued with any success, they have to be viewed also in-themselves, i.e., as not-yet-in-view potentialities, and not merely
not-in-view, as they were previously seen from their respective
individual standpoints. But to do this involves shifting to a
Interchangeability of
theory-practice with
determination
self-determination
(freedom).
and unveiling the intricacies of human existence which appear to the naivete of common sense and scientism alike, as so
much confusion and disorder.
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C. Strategy
In the last Chapter w e discussed overlapping polar categories
which behaved in accordance with what Wittgenstein called
"family resemblances." This is the kind of resemblance shared
by members of a class in which there is no one common similarity, but their resemblance is based on features shared by
some members in one respect, and other members in another.
In a dialectical context, this kind of resemblance would characterize a class of highly concrete concepts ("concrete universals"
in Hegel's terminology) which have incorporated a number of
features through mediation. It would then follow, by their description as concrete, that the resemblance of these entities
with other members of their class, would be with respect to one
or some, but not all, features. For example, as w e saw in the
last Chapter, freedom and action have family resemblances
which we established through intermediary concepts, or operational categories. Though not categories in the formal sense of
having an assigned position in the list of the last Chapter, these
concepts stand as surrogates for more authentic ones. They owe
their family resemblances to their logical structure as against
their more concrete fellow family memberse.g., cultural complexes such as liberalism, the Baroque, the Third World, and
generally entities such as those which inhabit Hegel's domain of
Spiritwhich owe their interchangeability to high concreteness
on the dialectical scale.
The short list of polarities given in the last Chapter will be
expanded with new ones as they are needed in the following
discussion but, most important, the third term will be supplied,
thus rendering explicit the contribution of the dialectic. A partial list of triads sharing family resemblances with the super triad of the Logic (BeingEssenceNotion) has been constructed
since it, along with the previous list, will be useful for reference
throughout Part III: ImmediacyMediationRe-immediation,
In-itselfnessFor-itselfnessIn-and-for-itselfness, Intuition
Conception(dialectical)Thought, Abstract Universality ParticularityConcrete Universality (Individuality), Undifferentiated
unityDifferentiationDifferentiated unity, Indifference
DifferentiationSelf-differentiation, InternalityExternality
Surrogate categories
and their operationalfunction.
ing of the final synthesis, but now with the benefit of what has
intervened within socially and historically concrete Spirit.
It is possible to view Part III as a series of attempts at increasing comprehensiveness of the synthesis of theory and practice.
This was also the aim of Part I in which the paradigms and illustrations from sensuously concrete subject matter were used
to convey the same. In this sense there is a symmetry between
Parts I and III as well, for both contain three types of union of
theory and practice in the same ascending order of dialectical
concreteness. First, there is the analytical paradigm dealing
with the dialectical synthesis of action at the individual level
which prima faciae corresponds to the final moment (philosophical psychology) of Subjective Spirit. But by virtue of the symmetry between Logic and Philosophy of Spirit, this fits somewhere
at the end of Being. Such a retrograde step is not surprising if
we recall that the rather advanced model of synthesis found in
the final stage of successful therapy was staged with the help of
severe abstractive parameters. Relaxing these constraints led to
a more open-ended dyadic structure of the political-scientistic
paradigm, which brought us one step closer to the social group,
and correspondingly, to early Essence and Objective Spirit.
Second, there is the dialectical synthesis of theory-practice at
the level of the group found at the heart of Objective Spirit, i.e.,
the cluster of institutions and the social disciplines belonging to
them. To the extent that the latter are pervaded by scientistic
methodology, their logic corresponds to the early and middle
Essence. The movement toward more complexity and higher
integration of the group proceeds gradually within Objective
Spirit, as does a parallel movement within the corresponding
structures in late Essence and the Notion in the Logic. The humanistic disciplines (except dialectical philosophy, for which is
reserved the final moment of both Logic and Spirit) and their
methodology belong to these spaces. Part I moved in symmetry
with this progressive complexity and integration, by allowing
the political paradigm to continue w h e r e the psychological
could go no further. The economic paradigm, in turn, exemplified a synthesis approximating social praxis, by way of working
out the implications of the dyadic structure of the political paradigm. The dialectical insight into the nature of what appears external to be truly internal dawns midpoint in the course of the
paradigms. The economic paradigm marks the emergence of elevated subjectivity (or externality-in-internality) and the dividing line between the logic of parts and the logic of wholes, between scientistic and dialectical rationality, and b e t w e e n
Essence and the Notion.
sion of relatively f e w individuals capable of practicing retrodictive rationality, repeating, in a manner of speaking, Hegel's "toil
of the Notion." For the overwhelming majority, including most
of Hegel's critics on this score, Reason is still working behind
their backs while they, not unlike Plato's prisoners of the cave,
get only a glimpse of its workings.
A Hegelian
Interpretation
of the Dialectic of
Theory and Practice
the proposition
Thought is Being.
Philosophy of Spirit
that
The implicitness of
theory-practice in
Being disclosed
through dialectical
circularity.
The corollaries of
such disclosure for
theory-practice.
Addressing the psychological aspects of immediate knowledge, which corresponds to our radical's immediacy, or priority
of practice, Hegel concludes:
Under these circumstances examination is directed to the field of
experience, to a psychological phenomenon. If that be so, we
need only note, as the commonest of experiences, that truths,
which we well know to be the results of complicated and highly
mediated trains of thought, present themselves immediately and
without effort to the mind of any man who is familiar with the
subject... The facility we attain in any sort of knowledge, art, or
technical expertness, consists in having the particular knowledge
or kind of action present to our mind in any case that occurs, even
we may say, immediate in our very limbs, in an outgoing activity.
In all these instances, immediacy of knowledge is so far from excluding mediation, that the two things are linked together, immediate knowledge being actually the product and result of mediated knowledge. (Logic, #66)
In his undialectical outlook Jacobi shows both faces of immediacy of Being: subjectivity and objectivity, the radical's priority
of practice and the liberal's priority of fact. With respect to the
latter, Jacobi refused to unpack what appeared as solid and irreducible fact. He "decline(d) to examine the nature of the fact,
that is the Notion of it" which leads to truth qua interconnectedness. But he also resembles the radical in his failure to see the
inseparability of immediacy from mediation in even such spontaneous action as those "immediate in our very limbs, in an outgoing activity." The first kind of failure centers on the unmediated fact on the objective side, while the second refers to the subjective side and the self. Both neglect mediation as inseparable
from immediacy, the one in what is given and the other in what
is being posited. Both are doomed by lack of insight regarding
mediation's role in perpetuating the gap b e t w e e n theory and
practice a gap they wish to close. For, while each may be able
to detect the mediations embedded in his adversary's immediacy, he fails to see it operating in his own.
Being emerges f r o m this short o v e r v i e w in a state of selfconcealment or, dialectically speaking, in-itself (in a state of
potential self-revelation) because it lacks the tools for mediation that will give it the capacity to v i e w itself for what it is,
or for-itself. H o w e v e r , this concealment is clear for-us w h o ,
having arrived at Being through the circular path of the dialectic, are familiar with what lies ahead. A similar conclusion was
reached about the immediacy of practice as w i t h that of unmediated Being, by casting the former in the roles of its surrogates Nature and Being. The radical's body-knowledge, the sort
of practical knowledge present in his " v e r y limbs in an outgoing activity," assures h i m of an u n m e d i a t e d access to truth
about action. But this proves to be a self-perpetuating illusion,
as w e shall see w h e n practice is cast in the role of the False Infinite, another surrogate category from the realm of Being. The
liberal is on a similar track of perpetuated self-certainty coupled with self-concealment, except that n o w the locus of immediacy is not subjectivity but objectivity. But, as w e already
know from the application of the principle of circularity, there
is no w a y of certifying either the primacy of Being qua experience or the logical priority of Being as fact. There are pauses of
self-certainty (for-itselfness) along the dialectical path, as Spirit
rediscovers and redefines itself in terms of the categories of
Dialectical definition
of Being through its
opposite.
Transition from
(pure) Being to
Determinate Being
by way of Nothing.
In order to test the value of the dialectical insight about scientistic objectivity for theory-practice, some instances of differentiated Being (or beings) should be cast into dialectical roles
whose outcomes are then observed in terms of our polar category. In this respect, not all moments in the self-differentiation
of Being are of equal interest to us. But g i v e n our focus on
theory-practice, there are t w o classes of candidates from which
our selection can be made: First, the progenitors of the scientistic notion of objectivity, the ontological antecedents of concepts such as empirical datum and physical entity in science;
and second, the methodological antecedents of scientism in the
area of quantification in general. The former are dealt with in
the Logic under Quality, and the latter under Quantity, while
Measure, which provides their synthesis, lays the ground for
the transition to Essence. From the first class of candidates it is
the dialectical role of the Other (introduced in the last quotation) that will occupy us the most because it cuts across many
moments, and as such, fits well the progenitor of the object in
the subject-object relationship, which underlies scientism.
T h e f e a t u r e of Being as an u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d continuum,
w h i c h has b e e n articulated in the preceding triad, B e i n g
NothingBecoming, already begins to negate itself in the triad
under Determinate Being. This is essentially accomplished as
Being and Nothing (which, through their lack of determinacy
are t w o sides of a coin) neutralize each other, thus resulting
momentarily in a stable unity.
Both (i.e., Being and Nothing) are the same, Becoming, and although they differ so in direction ( i.e., the one is ceasing-to-be
and the other is coming-to-be) they interpenetrate and paralyze
each other.
Becoming, as this transition into the unity of Being and Nothing,
a unity which is in the form of Being or has the form of the onesided immediate unity of these moments, is Determinate Being. (Science of Logic, p. 106)
Hegel uses "interpenetration" instead of the usual "sublation"
in this transition, but he also points out that Being and Nothing
"are not reciprocally sublated the one does not sublate the
other externally but each sublates itself in itself and is in its
own self the opposite of itself." Nor has negation which is the
one side of sublation, the other being preservation or incorporation yet attained its important function qua determination.
In Determinate Being its determinateness has been distinguished as
Quality; in Quality as determinately present, there is distinction
of reality and negation. Now although these distinctions are present in Determinate Being, they are no less equally void and sublated. Reality itself contains negation, is determinate Being, not indeterminate abstract Being. Similarly, negation is Determinate Being, not the supposedly abstract Nothing but posited here as it is in
itself, as affirmatively present, belonging to the sphere of Determinate Being. Thus Quality is completely unseparated from Determinate Being, which is simply Determinate qualitative Being.
This sublating of the distinction (of reality and negation) is more
than a mere taking back and external omission of it again, or than
a simple return to a simple beginning, to Determinate Being as
such. The distinction cannot be omitted, for it is. What is, therefore, in fact present is Determinate Being in general, distinction in
it, and sublation of this distinction; Determinate Being, not as devoid of distinction as at first, but as again equal to itself through
sublation of the distinction, the simple oneness of Determinate Being resulting from this is sublation. The sublatedness of the distinction is Determinate Being's own determinateness; it is thus Beingwithin-Self: Determinate Being is a Determinate Being, a Somewhat.
Somewhat is the first negation of negation, as simple self-relation in
the form of Being...The negative of the negative is, as Somewhat,
only the beginning of the subject Being-within-Self, only as yet
quite indeterminate. It determines itself further on, first, as a Being-for-Self and so on, until in the Notion it first attains the concrete intensity of the subject. (Science of Logic, pp. 114-15)
These early transitions f r o m the Logic give the reader a
sense of the compactness of Hegel's language and the rhythm
of the dialectic in what follows. But most important, one can
get a glimpse of the creative role of negation "negation is
Determinate Being, not the supposedly abstract Nothing" in
generating through sublation the earliest progenitor of the scientistic object, the Somewhat. Though devoid of differentiation in the familiar sense of qualities and attributes of things,
as they are found in its successors (the categories of Essence),
Determinate Being displays the first instance of differentiation
in the Logic. This is based on the fundamental dialectical principle of determination through negation. The moving force of
this differentiation is the distinction between reality and negation which are carry-overs from the previous moments of Being and Nothing, respectively. " N o w although these distinc-
Sublation as
negation of
negation.
Upgrading of Being
and the build-up of
concreteness.
Consolidation of
Being along the
dialectical path.
thus setting the stage for encountering externality and abstraction. The highlights between Somewhat and Being-for-Self (for
our purpose of tracing dialectical counterparts of the scientistic
object in this context) are: the Other, Finitude (Limit), and Infinite (True and False).
Somewhat is the negation of the negation in the form of Being-, for
this second negation is the restoring of the simple relation to self;
but with this, Somewhat is equally the mediation of itself with itself.
Even in the simple form of Somewhat, then still more specifically
in Being-for-Self, subject, and so on, self-mediation is present; and it
is present even in Becoming, only the mediation is quite abstract.
In Somewhat, mediation with self is posited, in so far as Somewhat
is determined as a simple identity...
The mediation with itself which Somewhat is in itself, taken only
as negation of the negation, has no concrete determinations for its
sides; it thus collapses into the simple oneness which is Being.
Somewhat is, and is, then, also a Determinate Being; further, it is
in /tee//also Becoming, which, however, no longer has only Being
and Nothing for its moments. One of these, Being, is now Determinate Being, and, further, a Determinate Being (i.e., a Somewhat). The second is (as outcome of self-mediation) equally a Determinate Being, but determined as a negative of the Somewhat
an Other. (Science of Logic, p. 116)
Taken in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the p r e v i o u s transition, this
seems quite straightforward. It utilizes Somewhat's feature of
self-relation to establish it "as a simple identity," a "simple oneness which is Being." But Somewhat has also dialectically incorporated Becoming, "which, h o w e v e r , no longer has only
Being and N o t h i n g for its m o m e n t s . " For, in the m e a n t i m e
"Being (has given rise to) Determinate Being, and, further (on
to) a Determinate Being," while Nothing has provided the negative element in the self-relation of the Somewhat, the "negative of the Somewhat," thus generating out of it the Other.
Here is an example of h o w the power of negativity in building up concreteness is being hidden under layers of mediations
even at the outset of the dialectical course. Similarly, one can
begin to appreciate the value of the dialectic in unveiling these
mediations and, pari passu, the sources of self-deception of scientism in o v e r l o o k i n g w h a t lies buried under its cherished
concepts of objectivity and theory-practice.
Besides, this school (i.e., the Empirical School) makes sense-perception the form in which fact is to be apprehended: and in this
consists the defect of empiricism. Sense-perception as such is always individual, always transient: not indeed that the process of
knowledge stops short of sensation: on the contrary, it proceeds to
find out the universal and permanent element in the individual
apprehended by sense. This is the process leading from simple perception to experience.
Anticipation of
the vagaries of the
scientistic view of
objectivity.
Corollaries of the
dialectic of Being for
theory-practice
reinforced by
paradigms.
as self-contained, are familiar to us. The analysand of the earlier paradigm hopelessly reproduced the subject-object dualism
that was the source of his neurosis. The remedy was provided
by a change in the context of meaning and the emergence of
the notionally structured synthesis of theory-practice. So is the
overcoming of infinite regress achieved here by the generation
of the rudiment of self-containment, first in the True Infinite
and then in the Being-for-Self, as w e shall see shortly. In the
case of the psychoanalytical paradigm the self-concealment in
the methodological domain of theory-practice was locked into
a relationship of mutual reinforcement w i t h the ontological
self-deception of viewing oneself as a thing. Similarly, w e have
a situation n o w in which the supposedly irreducible sensa or
facts supply t h e o r y w i t h the ultimate entities for its testing
ground of practice. The latter are the ingredients which constitute the objects of science t h r o u g h successive mediation in
Essence. But, as in previous cases, mediation is obscured because scientism, in its self-concealment, ignores the dialectical
links between moments and mistakes its o w n limited concern
as self-contained. For an example f r o m the case of Being, w e
can use the surrogate triad Undifferentiated Unity Differentiation Differentiated Unity in conjunction with the charge
Hegel levels against the Empirical School for "dismembering
the t h i n g , " and n e g l e c t i n g " t h e r e - u n i o n of w h a t has been
parted." In mistaking its limited concern as self-complete, scientism focuses o n the middle term at the exclusion of what
precedes and w h a t f o l l o w s it, thus obscuring the dialectical
links backward to the primitive self-containment (pre-existing
unity) of (pure) Being and forward to a more advanced form
of unity of the True Infinite and Being-for-Self. This was precisely the handicap under which the liberal was laboring in the
political paradigm earlier. He was treating cultural objects in
modo scientifico by bringing them into the testing range of theory-practice, that is, in separation f r o m their pre-existing unity
wherein they have been culturally "loaded."
Cautioning against
misguided holistic
claims in the name
of philosophy.
a limit and a barrier: it is not what it ought to be, that is the Infinite, but
is only Finite. (Logic, #95; emphases added in the last instance)
The two faces of
Being as prototypes
of the penultimate
categories of the
dialectic.
since the Limit is in the determination itself as a limitation, Somewhat transcends its own self.
The "ought" therefore contains the determination in double form:
once as the implicit determination counter to the negation, and
again as a non-Being which, as a limitation, is distinguished from
the determination, but is at the same time itself an implicit determination. (Science of Logic, p. 132)
The entry of the "ought," and by implication of the "is," into the dialectic of Being qua surrogates of the Somewhat and
the Other makes increasingly apparent the underlying presence of theory and practice. The dialectic of the " o u g h t " and
the "is" is central to the final synthesis of theory-practice and a
special Section is d e v o t e d to it at the end of Part III. But as
with other important elements in the final synthesis, the role
of the " o u g h t " is anticipated early in the dialectic of Being.
Once the roles of the "is" and the "ought" are assigned to the
Somewhat and the Other, negation plays the same important
role of determination as it did earlier with their surrogates. W e
recall that the followers of scientism, in their self-concealment,
v i e w e d the situation m e r e l y f o r - t h e m s e l v e s , in claiming a
"clean start" from the objective (at the exclusion of the subjective) side. N o w this is true of the philosophers of immediacy
from the subjective (at the exclusion of the objective) side. But
the transition to True Infinity unmasked the self-concealment
of both. " S o m e w h a t in its passage into Other only joins w i t h
itself. To be thus self-related in the passage, and in the Other, is
the True Infinity."
Negation plays the same creative role with the "ought" and
the "is" as it did with their surrogates through showing that by
virtue of being opposites each is essential to the meaning and
i n t e g r i t y of t h e o t h e r . T h e r o l e of n e g a t i o n is m a n i f e s t e d
through the f u n c t i o n of the Limit, most significantly in the
finding of the first quoted paragraph: since the Limit is part of
the determination of the meaning of Somewhat, the recognition of this entails that Somewhat has transcended the Limit
and in doing so has transcended itself. The implication f r o m
the fact that Somewhat has "transcend(ed) its own self is, that
having, so to speak, stepped out of itself, it realized the role of
negation in the formation of its meaning and integrity and is
now, therefore, in possession of a more complete v i e w of itself.
The "Somewhat only transcends its Limit in so far as it is the
accomplished sublation of the Limit, is the in-itself (Somewhat
in potentia or the 'ought') as negatively related to it (its Limit)."
This conclusion is then applied in the f o l l o w i n g paragraph to
the "ought" which is n o w in full v i e w of being determined in
N o sooner had Being-for-Self (the prototype of self-containment and subjectivity) emerged than the dialectic reverted to
B e i n g at its most abstract a t o m i z e d m a n i f e s t a t i o n , that is,
quantitative Being. The sub-triad of Being-for-Self consists of
O n e M a n y ( R e p u l s i o n ) R e p u l s i o n and Attraction, w h i c h
sets the stage for the categories of Quantity.
The relation of the negative to itself is a negative relation, and so a
distinguishing of the One from itself, the repulsion of the One:
that is, it makes Many Ones. So far as regards the immediacy of
the self-existents, these Many are: and the repulsion of every One
of them becomes to that extent their repulsion against each other
as existing units, in other words their reciprocal exclusion.
(Logic, #97)
Quantity is pure Being, where the mode or character is no longer
taken as one with the Being itself, but explicitly put as superseded
or indifferent...the meaning being that, toward whatever side the
determination of magnitude be altered, the thing still remains
what it is. (Logic, #99 and Zusatz)
The chief illustrations of these categories come from atomic
t h e o r y in p h y s i c s a n d a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e
methodology of mathematics. In both cases Hegel uses the occasion to r e n e w his attack on the scientists for allowing their
abstractive m e t h o d o l o g y and implicit philosophizing to lead
them to bad metaphysics.
Newton gave physics an express warning to beware of metaphysics, it is true; but, to his honor be it said, he did not by any
means obey his own warning. The only mere physicists are the
animals: they alone do not think: while man is a thinking being
and born metaphysician. The real question is not whether we
shall apply metaphysics, but whether our metaphysics are of the
right kind: in other words, whether we are not, instead of the
concrete logical Idea, adopting one-sided forms of thought, rigidly
fixed by (the) Understanding, and making these the basis of our
theoretical as well as our practical work. It is on these grounds
that one objects to the Atomic philosophy. (Logic, #98 Zusatz)
If Quantity is not reached through the action of thought (of the
logical Idea), but taken uncritically from our generalized image of
it, we are liable to exaggerate the range of its validity, or even to
raise it to the height of an absolute category. And that such a danger is real, we see when the title of exact science is restricted to
those sciences the objects of which can be submitted to mathematical calculation. Here we have another trace of bad metaphysics (mentioned in #98 Zusatz) which replaces the concrete
Idea by partial and inadequate categories of (the) Understanding.
(Logic, #99 Zusatz: second parenthetical phrase in the text)
Social atomism is used as another illustration of Hegel's criticism of the methodology of scientism. Social reality is closer to
the Idea than physical reality, and yet social atomism seeks to
understand social reality in terms of the implicit metaphysics
of physical atomism.
In modern times the importance of the atomic theory is even
more evident in political than in physical science. According to it,
the will of individuals as such is the creative principle of the State:
the attractive force is the special wants and inclinations of individuals; and the Universal, or the State itself, is the external nexus of
a compact. (Logic, #98)
Some general observations about the place of theory-practice in Being are in order before w e leave this sphere. Perhaps
these can be rendered more transparent if w e generate still another surrogate triad for Being Essence Notion, reflecting
h o w the relationship between our polar terms (not the terms
themselves) relate to the members of the overarching supertriad. The terms of this n e w triad will in all instances be theory-practice, but in each case the relationship will be characterized differently depending on the sphere w i t h i n w h i c h they
operate. These characterizations are available to us f r o m our
earliest list of surrogate triads, since they w e r e generated precisely so they can be interchangeable with the terms of the super-triad by virtue of family resemblances. Thus, selecting from
the first terms of the surrogate triads immediacy, externality,
and indifference, w e can say that these terms can also apply as
characterizations for the relationship between theory and practice under Being, inasmuch as they stand as surrogates for the
latter. By contrast, their relationship in Essence will be characterized by mediation. It will not be one of synthesis, but a perpetuation of a relation of duality for the moment let us call
it one of for-itselfness, or reflection b e t w e e n t w o mirrors in
which images reduplicate themselves without ever coinciding.
Finally, the last moment will be one of genuine unity inclusive
of difference. This synthesis will correspond to re-immediation
that is returning to the immediacy of unity but preserving the
benefits of mediation, as illustrated by the analysand at the climactic m o m e n t of his termination of successful therapy. The
result will appear in triadic f o r m as follows: Theory (or Practice) as external or indifferent to Practice (or T h e o r y ) T h e o r y
(or Practice) reflected into Practice (or Theory)Synthesis of
Theory and Practice.
With particular reference to Being, this relationship can be
confirmed if w e consider that the entities generated out of the
process of Being's self-differentiation are the very contents of
practice e.g., the sense-data, the irreducible facts, the results
of scientism's quest for a "clean start." The above characteriza-
Implications of the
dialectic of Being for
theory-practice.
Methodological
implications of the
dialectic of Being.
built-in abstractive process. If the content is minimal the system approximates an axiomatic one whose predictive value is
high in the sense that w h a t is d e r i v e d f r o m it (e.g., proofs,
corollaries) is predictably what has been put into it in terms of
definitions, postulates, axioms, and rules. As the empirical
content becomes enriched, the abstractive process goes into effect by selecting from such content and filling-in according to
its conceptual requirements. But, as in previous occasions, it is
not the process of self-selecting itself that is being questioned.
This has been going on at every level of the dialectic according
to the context of meaning prevailing at it. Rather, what is at issue again is scientism's self-concealment in mistaking the object of its o w n activity as something externally given, and the
product of its o w n quantification as a faithful reflection of the
intricacies of nature. W h a t is being o b j e c t e d to, in H e g e l ' s
words, is not doing metaphysics but doing the wrong kind, and
"instead of the concrete logical Idea, adopting one-sided forms
of thought, rigidly fixed by (the) Understanding." "If quantity
is not reached through the action of thought (of the logical
Idea, which is also the standpoint of complete self-consciousness), but taken uncritically f r o m our generalized ( c o m m o n sensical) image of it, w e are liable to exaggerate the range of its
validity, or even raise it to the height of an absolute category."
The self-concealment of scientism is so deeply r o o t e d in the
abstractive procedures of quantification, that Hegel goes so far
as to warn even empirical scientists against it.
If it be the office of comparison to reduce existing differences to
Identity, the science, which most perfectly fulfills that end, is
mathematics. The reason of that is, that quantitative difference is
only the difference which is quite external... It follows from what
has been formerly said about the mere Identity of Understanding
that, as has also been pointed out (#99 Zusatz), neither philosophy
nor the empirical sciences need envy this superiority of mathematics. (Logic, #117 Zusatz; parenthetical phrase in the text)
H o w e v e r , scientism i n v o l v e s m o r e than quantitative
m e t h o d o l o g y and if w e are prepared to e x t e n d our adopted
strategy of exposing its self-concealment beyond its quantitative
aspect, w e should be able to carry our strategy into Essence, to
which scientism's conceptual apparatus more accurately corresponds, and to which w e must n o w turn our attention.
Strategy in dealing
with Essence.
Distinction of
Essence from
Being, with special reference to
theory, mediation,
and reflection.
list of surrogate triads, BeingEssenceNotion, was Immediac y M e d i a t i o n R e - i m m e d i a t i o n . But mediation also corresponds to theory as the latter relates to practice by way of reflection. This suggests the key role that the surrogate middle
terms t h e o r y and m e d i a t i o n w i l l be p l a y i n g in explicating
Essence. Reflection will be carrying most of the burden of mediation and Hegel will be making full use of the both etymological and metaphorical affinities between thought processes
and reflection properties of light to secure the role of mediation in this sphere. This is the context in which theory will be
taking its turn in claiming priority over practice by virtue of
mediation between terms which have hitherto been burdened
w i t h externality. The last paragraph of Being and the first of
Essence in the Logic summarize this development very well.
In Being, the form of reference (or relation) is purely due to our
reflection (as travellers on the circular path) on what takes place;
but it (i.e., reflection) is the special and proper characteristic of
Essence. In the sphere of Being, when Somewhat becomes an
Other, the Somewhat has vanished. Not so in Essence: here there
is no real Other, but only Diversity, reference of the one to its Other. The transition of Essence is therefore at the same time no transition: for in the passage of different into different, the different
does not vanish: the different terms remain in their relation.
When we speak of Being and Nothing, Being is independent, so is
Nothing. The case is otherwise with the Positive and the Negative.
No doubt these possess the characteristics of Being and Nothing.
But the Positive by itself has no sense; it is wholly in reference to
the Negative. And it is the same with the Negative. In the sphere
of Being the reference of one term to another is only implicit; in
Essence on the contrary it is explicit. And this in general is the distinction between the forms of Being and Essence: in Being everything is immediate; in Essence everything is relative. (Logic, #111
Zusatz; italics added in the first instance)
The terms of Essence are always mere pairs of correlatives, and not
yet absolutely reflected in themselves: hence in Essence the actual
unity of the Notion is not realized, but only postulated by reflection. Essence, which is Being coming into mediation with itself
through the negativity of itself is self-relatedness, only in so far
as it is relation to an Other, this Other however coming to view
at first not as something which is, but as postulated and hypothesized. Being has not vanished: but, firstly, Essence, as simple
self-relation, is Being, and secondly as regards its one-sided characteristic of immediacy, Being is deposed to a mere negative, to a
seeming or reflected light Essence accordingly is Being thus reflecting light into itself...That reflection, or light thrown into itself,
constitutes the distinction between Essence and immediate Being,
and is the peculiar characteristic of Essence itself. (Logic, #112)
The point of view given by the Essence is in general the standpoint of 'Reflection.' This word 'reflection' is originally applied,
Distinction of
Essence from Being
in terms of grades of
indifference.
sically distinct from one another. The further step which requires
to be made here is to grasp that this reflection of their differences
into their unity is not merely the product of the external reflection
of the subjective thinker, but that is the very nature of the differences of this unity to sublate themselves, with the result that their
unity proves to be absolute negativity, its indifference to be just as
much indifferent to itself, to its own indifference, as it is indifferent
to otherness. (Science of Logic, pp. 383-84)
Preliminary location
of theory-practice in
the dialectic of
Essence.
I
j
j
j
j
ated unity, and not as self-differentiated unity or unity-in-difference it is " o n l y implicitly the Absolute, not the Absolute
grasped as Actuality." At this point it may be useful to refer to
the surrogate triads: IndifferenceDifferentiationSelf-differentiation (or Unity-in difference), and IdentityDifference
Identity-in-Difference, which w e shall encounter shortly. Difference stands dialectically higher than indifference because it
admits its opposite in fixing its meaning, while indifference explicitly rejects any such connection.
j
j
j
j
j
j
i
]
j
j
j
j
j
j
i
j
j
^
I
j
I
Determination
of the present state
of theory-practice
through anticipation of what is forthcoming in their
synthesis.
Exploration of the
mirror-like quality
of reflection in order
to illuminate
thought in Essence.
Further anticipation
offorthcoming synthesis through an
intimation of
elevated subjectivity.
Illustration of active
Reason (the "act of
knowledge ")
through the active
universal of the
syllogistic structure.
Now language is the work of thought: and hence all that is expressed in language must be universal. What I only mean or suppose is mine: it belongs to me, this particular individual. But
language expresses nothing but universality; and so I cannot say
what I merely mean. And the unutterable, feeling or sensation,
far from being the highest truth, is the most unimportant and
untrue. (Logic, #20)
H e g e l t h e n proceeds to the second m o m e n t of thought,
which corresponds to Essence and the middle terms of the triads above.
(b) Thought was described as active. We now, in the second place,
consider this action in its bearings upon objects, or as reflection
upon something. In this case the universal or product of its operation contains the value of the thing is the essential, inward, and
true.
For instance, we observe thunder and lightning. The phenomenon
is a familiar one, and we often perceive it. But man is not content
with a bare acquaintance, or with the fact as it appears to the
senses; he would like to get behind the surface, to know what it
is, and to comprehend it. This leads him to reflect: he seeks to find
out the cause as something distinct from the mere phenomenon:
he tries to know the inside in its distinction from the outside.
Hence the phenomenon becomes double, it splits into inside and
outside, into force and its manifestation, into cause and effect.
Once more we find the inside or the force identified with the universal and permanent...
In thus characterizing the universal, we become aware of its antithesis to something else. This something else is the more immediate, outward and individual, as opposed to the mediate, inward
and universal. (Logic, #21)
(c) By the act of reflection something is altered in
which the fact was originally presented in sensation,
or conception. Thus, as it appears, an alteration of the
be interposed before its true nature can be discovered.
the way in
perception,
object must
(Logic, #22)
sumed the standpoint for-us, w e r e viewing the results of Being's self-differentiation in their immediacy as objective entities.
But with the transition to Essence and the rise of mediation to
pre-eminence, these entities can n o w be seen for what they
truly are in their unmediated form "far from being the highest truth, (they are) the most unimportant and untrue."
Similar results regarding the increasing role of subjectivity
can be reached if w e begin to unmask the self-concealment of
the Understanding while in Essence, but begin to discern the
presuppositional links forward with the Notion. The most relevant surrogate triads for illustrating this step ahead are SubjectivityObjectivityRe-instated Subjectivity, and Externality
InternalityExternality-in-Internality. Essence has made good
on its claim vis-a-vis objectivity, but only up to a point; for it is
still remaining committed to deep-seated dualisms, such as subject-object, thought-being, and theory-practice in its advanced
form of CognitionWill, or Theoretical IdeaPractical Idea.
Once it has "adopt(ed) one-sided forms of thought, rigidly fixed
by (the) Understanding," it is impossible for Essence to conceive
of its having initiated the relationship of subject and object,
whereby the former projects the latter through reflection as its
own and comes to the conclusion of the dialectical synthesis of
the two. Nor can it being fixed on the subject-object polarity
conceive of the possibility of "Objective Thoughts" in a different way than "are more especially discussed in the common
logic, where they are usually treated as forms of (subjective)
conscious thought only." (Italics added in this instance). The emergence of trans-individual subjectivity resolves the impasse of
the Understanding that initiated the process of synthesis of being and thought through the instrumentality of reflection, but
is unable to carry it through because of self-concealment about
presuppositional links backward with Being and forward with
the Notion: backward by missing the fact that the unity with its
object, which it was trying to establish through mediation, preexisted in the undifferentiated immediacy in Being; and forward by overlooking the point that it had itself placed its o w n
obstacles to the u n i o n w i t h its object, t h r o u g h m e d i a t i o n ,
which by its very nature perpetuates dualism. The remedy for
this lies in somehow taking advantage of immediacy which, as
w e shall see in full detail later, the Notion will do through reimmediation after having incorporated Essence's accomplishments through reflection.
The dialectic of thought qua reflection, or the dialectic of
the "I," as it is formulated in terms of subjectivity, is of central
importance to us because it provides the dialectical-idealist
Appreciation of both
accomplishments
and shortcomings of
Essence through a
glimpse into the
dialectical future.
context of elevated subjectivity necessary for resolving the inextricable difficulties associated with these hard core dualisms.
As Hegel put it, the "ideality of the finite is the chief maxim of
philosophy; and for that reason every genuine philosophy is
idealism." (Logic, #95)
IT
Recapitulation and
background of Identity in the double
role of differentiation and integration.
The centrality of
Identity in light of
what lies ahead.
Grades of Identity
determined along
similar lines as
those of Being.
Comparison of
dialectical insight
with scientific
practice.
Distinction between
dialectical and undialectical (tautologous) identity.
unself-consciously in accordance to our stated motto, which distinguishes their d o m a i n (of Essence) f r o m the N o t i o n : that
whereas in Essence thought operates on itself, in the Notion it
also knows that it does so. This discrepancy between what they
are doing and what they think they are doing, is most evident
in what methodologists of science and sometimes luminaries
among its practitioners in their methodological asides have
to say about their activity. As w e shall see in what f o l l o w s ,
what they say as methodologists is conspicuously undialectical,
which is symptomatic of what w e refer to in the course of this
study as self-concealment of scientism. At this particular juncture self-concealment is manifested in the fact that physical reality is constructed, in the sense of the UFO example of Part I.
Theory is already incorporated in the scientistic object qua contents of practice and, therefore, the priority of theory under
Essence turns out to be as much of a pseudo-problem as the
priority of practice under Being. In both cases, establishing priority presents itself as a problem because of the self-concealment of scientism regarding presuppositional links forward and
backward, of lack of awareness about what it has "packed into"
its very o w n object which it perceives as external. The incorporation of Difference in Identity, or its embodiment of both the
essential and the unessential at the outset, is an indication that
the theoretical component is already implicit in the pre-existing
(primitive) unity of Being.
Self-relation in Essence is the form of Identity or of Reflection-intoself, which has here taken the place of the immediacy of Being.
They are both the same abstraction, self-relation.
The unintelligence of Sense, to take everything limited and finite
for Being, passes into the obstinacy of Understanding, which views
the finite as self-identical, not inherently self-contradictory. (Logic,
#113)
This Identity, as it has descended from Being, appears in the first
place only charged with the characteristics of Being, and referred
to Being as to something external. This external Being, if taken in
separation from the true Being (of Essence), is called the Unessential. But that turns out a mistake. Because Essence is Being-in-self,
it is essential only to the extent that it has in itself its negative, i.e.
reference to another, or mediation. (Logic, #114)
When the principles of Essence are taken as essential principles of
thought they become predicates of a presupposed subject, which,
because they are essential is 'Everything.' The propositions thus
arising have been stated as universal Laws of Thought. Thus the
first of them, the maxim of Identity, reads: Everything is identical
with itself, A=A: and, negatively, A cannot at the same time be A
and not A. This maxim, instead of being a true law of thought,
is nothing but the law of abstract Understanding. The propositional
form itself contradicts it: for a proposition always promises a distinction between subject and predicate; while the present one does
not fulfill what its form requires.
Identity is, in the first place, the repetition of what we had earlier
as Being, but as become, through supersession of its character of immediateness. It is therefore Being as Ideality. It is important to
come to a proper understanding of the true meaning of Identity:
and, for that purpose, we must especially guard against taking it as
abstract Identity, to the exclusion of all Difference. That is the
touch-stone for distinguishing all bad philosophy from what alone
deserves the name of philosophy... So again, in connection with
thought, the main thing is not to confuse the true Identity, which
contains Being and its characteristics ideally transfigured in it, with
an abstract Identity, identity of bare form. (Logic, #115 and Zusatz)
There is an important symmetry between Being-Nothing in
Being and Identity-Difference in Essence. Indeed the "abstract
Identity" of the last quoted paragraph or the "mere Identity" of
the earlier quoted passage from Logic #117 Zusatz, can be taken as
equivalent to the tautologous self-relation of (pure) Being "Being, pure Being, without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is only equal to itself." The difference between "true Identity" and "mere" or "abstract Identity," is found
in the dialectical incorporation of the intervening moments between Being and Essence between "what w e had earlier as
Being, (and what it has) become, through supersession of its character of immediateness," or between "abstract Identity" and that
"which contains Being and its characteristics ideally transfigured
in it." Identity provides the link between the more distant progenitors of the scientistic object, such as Being, Somewhat, and
Other, and its successors like Existence, and Thing(hood).
Comparison with
Being in regard
to grades of concreteness.
(#114), Essence "is essential to the extent that it has in itself its
negative, i.e. reference to another, or mediation."
The either/or structure of Being resembles the binary logic
of the computer, in which all the riches of the programmable
differentiation are high multiples of the basic yes/no dualism of
its logic. It's immense tractability is due to its equally great
speed in repeating the same operation. M o r e than anything
else, computer logic exemplifies the "mere Identity of the Understanding" of the mathematical methodology of Being. Indifference is generated by the severity of the abstractive procedure, which reduces all sensuous concreteness to binary operations, and externality is highlighted by the fact that any change
of rules requires the external intervention of the programmer.
By contrast, "true Identity" already contains negation within itself, by virtue of belonging to Essence and being the product of
the self-splitting of Being into the essential and the unessential.
As the opening paragraph #112 of Essence put it, the latter
"which is Being coming into mediation with itself through the
negativity of itself is self-relatedness, only in so far as it is relation to an Other, this Other h o w e v e r coming to view at
first not as something which is, but as postulated and hypothesized." This is important because, once incorporated into Identity, negation becomes inseparable from the various exemplifications of Identity throughout Essence the particular identities
of the scientistic object as Existent, Thing, and so on. If we proceed to deal with such objects through scientific method, and
theory-practice in particular, as if they were cases of "mere" or
"abstract Identity," w e are setting ourselves up for the worst
form of self-concealment. Here lies the import of Hegel's charge
against "the obstinacy of Understanding, which views the finite
(such as the scientistic object above) as self-identical, not inherently self-contradictory." As it is evident from Hegel's reference
to the "universal Laws of Thought" in the same paragraph, this
is also the center of his running argument against formal logicians concerning the nature of the "laws" of identity and contradiction. This argument concerns us only to the extent that
Hegel's position, consistent with that of the identity of thought
and being earlier, is a case for de-compartmentalization at the
most f u n d a m e n t a l l e v e l of the structure of language and
thought. As such, Hegel's position bares the presuppositional
links of Essence backward and forward and discloses the hidden
agenda of scientism to which it corresponds. Furthermore, since
such form of self-concealment is the other side of claiming universality for something partial, or viewing one's own finite domain as self-contained, our discussion for the remainder of this
Section will be limited to the "universal Laws of Thought" insofar as they bear on these two closely related issues.
W h e n Hegel describes the first of these " l a w s " as being
"nothing but the law of abstract Understanding," he summarizes both sides of our concern: the roots of reification of the
object of theory (or contents of practice), and the compartmentalization of reality and negation (of identity and contradiction). He is suggesting that the Understanding has, in its selfconcealment, put forth a claim for universality on behalf of the
"Laws of Thought," when in fact these are laws peculiar to its
domain alone. In support of his contention, Hegel points to the
propositional form which, in "promis(ing) a distinction between subject and predicate" contradicts the tautologous selfidentity of the first "law" of thought. No progress is possible in
any endeavor, disciplinary or otherwise, through tautologous
propositions such as the "laws" of identity and contradiction
A = A and its complement that A cannot be both A and not-A.
Rather, it is those propositions which make predicative use of
"is" a is grey, A is heavy, etc. which carry the burden for
advances of k n o w l e d g e in both science and the conduct of
everyday life. The Understanding can answer in defending the
"laws" that they are not put forth for heuristic purposes but to
ensure that no matter what the discourse, its elements have to
be identified and clearly delineated. But this is precisely what
Hegel wishes to avoid. He is aware that there are no irreducible
building blocks of reality or "clean starts," and concerned that
such delineation would result in reification and eventual obstruction in the understanding of reality.
For example, by the time the internally undifferentiated
Somewhat reaches Essence, it has been incorporated into Identity which is now internally differentiated. It is a kind of identity which, thanks to the operation of reflection or the direct
operation of negation depending upon one's standpoint contains within itself its opposite, difference. If the "law of identity"
reduces Identity to "mere" or "abstract Identity" by depriving it
of what it has incorporated, it will conceal its presuppositional
links and, in so doing, obscure the process of concretion. Unless
what has been dialectically incorporated through past mediations can be "unpacked" at a moment's notice, w e are bound to
be misled about the nature of reality. It is the propositions that
make predicative use of "is" which provide the tools for such
"unpacking," while the "law of identity" obstructs this by keeping identity free of content, and the existential use of "is" in
strict separation from its predicative. This is the ontological
source of the self-concealment of scientism about its own foun-
Hegel's critique of
formal logic in the
light of his view of
negation.
Illustration of
Hegel's critique by
reference to the function of the copula.
N o inference should be drawn from what has just been concluded that the dialectic ignores or confounds the distinctions
established by these polarities. Quite the contrary, these and
other polarities are the lifelines from which the dialectic derives
its impetus. But distinctions are made to be abolished and reconstituted at a higher and more concrete level. The dialectic
can be v i e w e d as a series of such reconstitutions in a long line
of polarities using Identity-Difference as the point of departure.
Nor is Hegel flouting the distinction between the existential and
the predicative function of the copula, which he admits is the
propelling force in the dialectic.
In the form of the proposition, therefore, in which Identity is expressed, there lies more than simple abstract Identity; in it, there
lies this pure movement of Reflection in which the Other appears
only as Illusory Being, as an immediate vanishing; A is, is a beginning that hints at something different to which an advance is to be
made; but this different something does not materialize; A isA;
the difference is only a vanishing; the movement returns to itself.
The propositional form can be regarded as the hidden necessity of
adding to abstract Identity the more of that movement. (Science of
Logic, 415-16)
As in the quoted counterpart of this passage from the Logic
(#115), in which the propositional f o r m promises something
which the tautologous existential proposition A = A does not deliver, here "this (something) different does not materialize" because of the limitation imposed by "abstract Identity." But in
this case Hegel also looks at the positive side of the situation
and finds that, due to the "pure m o v e m e n t of Reflection (Int r o f l e c t i o n ) , " w h i c h has built-up concreteness f r o m w i t h i n
Identity, w e are confronted with something "more than simple,
abstract Identity." Thus, "the propositional form can be regarded (as it should have been f r o m the beginning, were it not for
Constructive role of
contradiction in
building up concreteness.
Identity (inclusive
of Difference) as
the key to concreteness qua all-inclusiveness.
Examples of Identity
in interdisciplinary
projects.
Applications of the
dialectic of Identity
to theory-practice.
abandoned the mirrors. The former case, the abstract side of reflection paralleling "mere" Identity, corresponds to the persistence of duality in different forms throughout Essence. The latter, the concrete side of reflection paralleling "true" Identity, corresponds to the fact that the terms of the persisting dualities of
Essence increase in concreteness behind the surface, so that at
any given moment the synthesis takes place almost by surprise.
The relationship between theory and practice undergoes exactly
the same process by way of surrogacy linking it to reflection. But
consistent with its abstract view of Identity, scientism continues
to view each term of the theory-practice polarity as tautologically self-identical and, therefore, the two of them as unalterably
opposed. And, all this, when in actual practice, w e know that
scientism behaves otherwise. If empirical science w e r e to
scrupulously heed the methodological injunctions of what Hegel
calls the sterile philosophy of Identity, its propositions would be
reduced to a string of tautologies. Fortunately for empirical science, the Cunning of Reason has been w o r k i n g behind the
backs of its luminaries more often than not, as in the case of
Adam Smith earlier, and Hegel's example of Newton, w h o tended, at their best moments, to disregard their own methodological pronouncements and the injunctions of the philosophy of
abstract Identity. Thus, the key to the e x p l a n a t i o n of the
progress in empirical science seems to lie in the fact that, in spite
of the sterility of its professed methodology of theory-practice,
the terms of the polarity are already exemplifying dialectical, or
concrete, Identity.
Prior to the introduction of Identity and reflection, similar
considerations were raised in the parallel case of the polarity of
the a priori and the empirical in the economic paradigm, and
again in the case of the primitive dialectic of matter and form
in Part II. In both cases w e tried to capture the sense of concrete Identity of each of the terms, by calling them a "mix" of
elements from itself and its polar opposite. More recently, capitalizing on the distinction between True and False Infinity, the
same point was conveyed by distinguishing vicious circularity,
associated with trying to deal with empirical matter through
abstract Identity, and a non-vicious circularity, or spirality, associated with the use of concrete Identity. The difference between the two can also be accounted for by the fact that, because of the admixture of determination and contingency, or
the "mix" in the cases of the a priori and the empirical, there is
always an undomesticated element of contingency; or an unabsorbed empirical residue at the beginning of each dialectical
round. It is precisely this element of resurfacing contingency,
Identity illuminates
the relationship between the synthetic
a priori, dialectical
circularity, and
theory-practice.
It is the same unabsorbed empirical residue which helps remove the mystery from the synthetic a priori the capacity of
the a priori to generate n e w empirical knowledge. If Identity
and Difference are taken in a dialectical sense as mutually inclusive, and the a priori is similarly treated with respect to the
empirical, then not only is dialectical circularity compatible
with the synthetic a priori, but it becomes coextensive with it.
The a priori and the empirical are not irreconcilably opposed,
and dialectical circularity is neither fallacious nor conducive to
sterility of thought. This would have been the case if the two
had been mutually exclusive, as with abstract Identity and Difference taken as rigidly compartmentalized. To revert to our
UFO example, vicious circularity would be present if the facts
for testing the existence of the entities in question were preselected by the particular theory that they had been called upon
to validate. Such a case would involve no unabsorbed empirical
residue and would correspond precisely to the illustration of
double mirrors reduplicating the same image with no difference
whatsoever. But there is no fallacious circularity if the facts
were preselected by a theory from a wider or more advanced
Scientistic folly of
universalization
illustrated through
the history of science.
Universalization by
way of compartmentalization as exemplified by Kant.
Universalization by
way of compartmentalization as exemplified by Kant.
Further illustration
of universalization
by recalling the scientistic paradigm.
plication of science becoming its historical and cultural embodiments. But the Cunning of Reason did not stop there. We recall
from the case of Adam Smith, and Hegel's observations on the
self-concealment of the physicists, that what was exported by
the physical, or "hard," to the "soft" disciplines, or methodologically emulated by the latter since then, was, for the most part,
not what the former practiced, but what they thought (in their
self-concealment) they were practicing. It is, therefore, no accident but a confirmation of Hegel's charges of sterility against the
philosophy of abstract Identity, that "soft" sciences, which are
scrupulously following scientific methodology, are still producing a good deal of useless tautologies.
Reflection in Hegel's
two versions of the
Logic.
The meaning of
Essence fixed as the
essential through the
negation of Being.
Epistemological
contributions
of the Essence
to the dialectic.
Essence is process like Becoming, but as Reflection-withinitself it is internal relatedness which, in the absence of solid
end-points like the Somewhat and the Other of Being, becomes
a "transition... (which) is therefore at the same time no transition" or, more emphatically, "the movement of nothing to nothing,
and so back to itself It becomes increasingly difficult not to notice that what Hegel is describing has less resemblance to a
physical process of reflection, and more to the operation of
thought working on itself, as w e observed it in the discussion of
Identity. If this is true, Introflection has to provide a place for
objectivity within the interiority of thought if the dialectic is not
to be reduced to a branch of introspective psychology. In fact,
the next transition to External (via Presupposing) Reflection
consists of just that.
Transition to the
second moment of
Reflection via Presupposing Reflection.
presupposing stance outside of its self-imposed circle of negativity, thus turning into Presupposing Reflection.
In spite of what seemed to be the dissolution of Being and its
variants of objectivity under the impact of the negativity of
Essence, the former reasserts itself implicitly in its old solid self
in the closing sentence of the most recently quoted paragraph
w i t h the help of double negation. A f t e r all, Being was the
source of Essence, though for a while it had been "deposed to a
mere negative, to a seeming or reflected light." This is a good
example of dialectical transition from one context of meaning
to the next. By following through the implications of the first,
and upon discovering an element which disturbs its internal coherence here the two sides of Reflection within the same
context w e proceed to reorder them under different rules of
the game: the rules of externality involving a presupposition replace those of internality which rely on positedness. The resurfacing of externality beckons a general, but temporary, shift in
the rules of the game from Becoming to Being, from self-mediation to mediation involving externality, and from positing to
presupposing. More specifically for the category at hand, it signifies a shift f r o m reflection as embodied in the relational
process of Essence what w e called earlier the immanent path
of Spirit to reflection as external, similar to the standpoint
for-us earlier, or that of the "subjective thinker" in Being. Far
from erasing previous gains, this apparent backward step consolidates them through sublation.
The implications of this shift to externality are also important but w e will save them for the conclusion of this Section.
However, it should be stated in anticipation, lest it be presumed
that the dialectic of Reflection is far too abstract or pure in
thought to be of consequence for theory-practice, that the latter
is very much in presence but remains implicit in this phase of
the dialectic of Essence. If theory is substituted for thought, and
the latter's self-reflexive feature stands for the self-awareness
that theory has to develop while on the immanent path (for-itselfness), then the dialectic of Reflection represents the self-education of theory so as to avoid self-concealment. Whereas in
Being theory is represented by the "subjective thinker" standing
outside the immanent path, and practice by the products of Being's self-differentiation; in Essence theory begins its self-education by joining Reflection on the road to dialectical adventure.
So far, Illusory Being, a spin-off from Being (though it lacks all
solidity characterizing an object), has provided theory with its
first lesson about its objects as logical constructions. First came
Positing Reflection with its emphasis on the posited or de-
Restoration of the
objectivity of Being
with dialectical
gains from the intervening sublation.
Implications of the
shift to externality.
Transition to the
last moment of the
synthesis of Determining Reflection.
real self-containment, if not at risk of being reduced to a solipsistic exercise in thought. But External Reflection is in no better
position by itself since, by contrast to the former moment in
which "differences (externality) are simply posited, (and) taken
back into Essence," in the latter they remain in the exteriority
of Being they are "reflected into themselves" but their externality "is not reflected into its Other, into its non-Being (into
the interiority of self-reflecting thought)."
Finally, in #3 w e arrive at the long awaited synthesis, which
is worked out through a process of mutual complementing,
whereby the strengths of each moment provide the remedy for
the shortcomings of the other. The Positing Reflection, while
strong in internal coherence ("sublatedness") through the negativity of thought "negation as such, a non-Being" but
lacking externality, compensates for External Reflection's externality by supplying positedness. The latter, on the other hand,
being strong in externality ("presupposedness") and in building-up concreteness in Being "its reflectedness-into-self is its
subsistence" but lacking in internal coherence, provides the
former with the ingredient of reflection-into-self. The combination of positedness and reflection-into-self ensures not only internal coherence but also, that what is being posited is a solid
Other, and not an Illusory Being. The result is that Determining
Reflection includes "the relation to its Otherness within itself in
line with the true meaning of self-containment, or internal coherence. Or, as the concluding sentences put it more graphically, the Determining Reflection "is positedness, negation, which
however bends back into itself the relation to Other, and negation which is equal to itself, the unity of itself and its Other, and
only through this is an Essentiality."
Another important corollary of the synthesis of Determining
Reflection is the coincidence of presupposition and outcome. We
introduced this in connection with the two-way movement on
the circular path of the dialectic in Part I, but lacked the dialectical equipment of Reflection to pursue it formally. There was an
anticipation of this accomplishment already in External Reflection, where it was pointed out that the higher grade of Being
reached through Reflection was more akin to True Infinite
which, as synthesis of the Somewhat and Limit, needed no presuppositional anchoring outside of it. Only at the last moment
does it become explicit that positedness is the other side of presupposition. The insight dawns at the point of the union when it
is realized that presupposing itself is an activity of thought, as is
positing, and does not, so to speak, come out of the blue. This
becomes more obvious if w e recall that this is the same activity,
Circularity
confirmed by
the dialectic
of Reflection.
whose two inseparable sides of immediacy and mediation correspond here to presupposition and positedness. In the Hegelian
terminology of the dialectic of Reflection our charge against the
protagonists of the political paradigm would now read: They remain in self-concealment that "positedness (our "mediation") is,
as such, negation; but, as presupposed (by the same mediating
activity of thought which now posits it as immediacy), it is also
reflected into itself. Positedness is thus (in its new enriched status qua synthesis) a determination of Reflection." (Science of Logic, p.
406; added emphases between our parentheses)
Illustration of circularity and synthesis
through the scientistic paradigm.
The complementary
roles of Identity and
Reflection in building up concreteness.
Corollaries of the
dialectic of Reflection
for theory-practice.
This of course never happens in good scientific practice because what is being postulated always has some connection with
the empirical domain. This is precisely what Hegel wants to
bring out but with an important n e w dimension: full transparency about the process under way so that there is no fear of
self-concealment, i.e., so that there is coincidence in what em-
pirical scientists are doing and what they think they are doing.
After all, the reason for the abandonment of the standpoint forus upon entering Essence and the ex hypothesi elimination of the
correct but perhaps unself-consciously held position of scientists, was an auspicious beginning of the self-education of
Spirit on the immanent path. Unlike scientism, which often believes that it has made a "clean start" w h e n in fact it has not,
Spirit wants to explore the implications of such belief. The result
in this case confirms earlier findings that there is no such thing a
"clean start" since thought has been found as much tainted with
Being, and vice versa, as is theory in relation to practice. This is
a corollary of the circular structure of the dialectic in general,
and of the coincidence of presupposition and outcome in particular, of which the dialectic of Reflection is a formal presentation.
However, the moment of Positing Reflection deals with half of
the demonstration of this coincidence, namely the part that begins with positing and shows that it entails presupposing. The
moment of External Reflection, on the other hand, starts with
presupposition and shows h o w this involves positing. Finally,
Determining Reflection points to their synthesis as a state of
complementarity where each compensates for the other's shortcomings through its own strong points.
In terms of our casting of theory and practice in the roles of
the moments of Reflection, an overly ambitious theory has so
far been cast in the role of Positing Reflection with the result of
learning that presupposition is the other side of positing. N o w a
new level of immediacy (or re-immediation) has been generated with a spot no longer occupied by Illusory Being, but by solid Being (an "immediate Being") standing for the object of theory and contents of practice. After some initial exultation about
concreteness (accomplished through reflection-into-itself) of
such entity, its weaknesses begin to show up. Though securing
a higher level of concreteness for its n e w Being, External Reflection has not fully benefitted from the insight about the coincidence of positing and presupposing. The positing of its n e w
Being is not fully justified in the sense of being rationally linked
to its antecedent the "positing has no presupposition" so that
it ends being "only something posited." The positing and the
presupposing have the same referent, but the propositions to
which they correspond are not included in the same context of
meaning. In Hegel's words, External Reflection "is only in reflection-into-self, but it is not this Reflection itself." In the language of theory-practice, in spite of the fact that the object of
practice (the new "immediate Being") is no longer viewed as an
irreducible fact but is certified as concrete "tainted with the-
Anticipation of the
synthesis of theorypractice by the dialectic of Reflection.
ory," if you wish the relationship between theory and practice is still burdened with externality, since the logical connection between the capacity of theory to posit a theoretical construct as its object, and the presupposition of an external object,
is yet to be made by theory.
The shortcomings of both Positing and External Reflection
cancel each other, as the internality of the former makes up for
the lack of the same by the latter, and vice versa. In the context
of theory-practice, the strength of theory lies in its ideal of internal coherence as w e saw it developed in Positing Reflection,
until its ideal was undermined by the discovery that positing is
the other side of presupposition, which necessitated moving
outside of its closely knit web of determinacy. The strength of
practice, on the other hand, rests on externality and the capacity to provide a link with what lies outside of the interiority of
theory. The synthesis of theory and practice, like the synthesis
of Determining Reflection, supplies the structure for the complementary suspension of the flaws of the other two moments
or, in Hegel's words, the relocation on the part of Determining
Reflection of "the relation to its Otherness within itself."
Particularization of
Identity exemplified
in the category of
Ground.
but it is no less the contradiction resolved." Hegel n o w goes bey o n d the m e r e diagnosis that the Ground, like Identity, is a
"negative unity." Consistent with operating on the immanent
path, he works f r o m within this n e w category to develop the
first easily recognizable relational concept for dealing with the
empirical world. Without going into the detail of its sub-moments, which were also omitted from our list, it is safe to characterize the Ground as a formative causal relationship established between t w o terms, as represented by the motto "everything has a sufficient ground." Essence, at this dialectical moment, is represented by the category of the Ground and, as the
many illustrations Hegel supplies suggest, reality is viewed and
interpreted in the light of this loose sort of determinacy.
We must be careful, when we say that the Ground is the unity of
Identity and Difference, not to understand by this unity an abstract
identity. Otherwise we only change the name, while we still think
the identity (of Understanding) already seen to be false. To avoid
this misconception we may say that the Ground, besides being the
unity, is also the difference of identity and Difference...We wish, as
it were, to see the matter double, first in its immediacy, and secondly in its Ground, where it is no longer immediate. This is the
plain meaning of the law of sufficient ground, as it is called; it asserts that things should essentially be viewed as mediated. (Logic,
#121 Zusatz; parentheses in the text)
The last sentence tells us that the object of theory in this
moment of Essence "should essentially be viewed as mediated."
What w e have known since the political paradigm is n o w being
formally worked out and stated in the process of self-discovery
of Spirit. Hegel's numerous examples illustrate his cautionary
remark about Contradiction not being "a blemish, an imperfection or a defect in something," but a necessary ingredient of its
" n e g a t i v e u n i t y " qua mediated. If this is not understood the
concrete identity of the entity at hand, be it physical or moral,
collapses into abstract self-identity. Under these circumstances
the use of the latter for reasoning about the relationship of
G r o u n d to G r o u n d e d in tautologies has o n l y the f o r m of a
causal explanation.
With the same justice as the (formal) logician maintains our faculty of thought to be so constituted that we must ask for the ground
of everything, might the physicist, when asked why a man who
falls into the water is drowned, reply that man happens to be so
organized that he cannot live under water; or the jurist, when
asked why a criminal is punished, reply that civil society happens
to be so constituted that crimes cannot be left unpunished. (Logic,
#121 Zusatz)
Ground explicated
through sophistry
and platitudinous
explanations.
Existence exemplifies
the process of
differentiation
in Essence.
Transition to Thing
(hood) as a further
exemplification of
particularization of
Identity with an
accent on selfcontained unity.
The dialectical r h y t h m in Essence has been variously described in the preceding pages as an interplay between unity
and duality, "the whole and its o w n moment," Identity and Difference, internality and externality, mediation and immediacy,
essential and unessential, and reflection-into-self and reflection-into-another. All of these plus a n e w polarity between "to
be" and "to have" are explicit, or strongly implied, in the above
transitions. In the Ground the emphasis lies on the first of these
polarities, but with Existence the balance tips in the direction of
the second. In this sense Existence resembles Being, its progeni-
tor in the line of categories corresponding to the scientistic object. But there is an important difference in concreteness since
Existence has dialectically absorbed all intervening mediations
("intermediations"). Also, Existence exemplifies re-immediation since the Ground is basically a exercise in self-mediation.
The implications of this move are carried one step further in the
same paragraph where Existence qua re-immediation "the
immediate unity of reflection-into-self and reflection-into-another" winds up in an "indefinite multitude of existents," a
diversity of facts.
The reaffirmation of immediacy in the form of the surfacequality of diverse facts which "are in many directions grounds as
well as consequents," signifies that w e are w e l l w i t h i n the
bounds of scientism. If w e situate ourselves in terms of Hegel's
correspondences between logic and the history of philosophy,
we end up as follows: Locke corresponding to Thinghood, Hume
to the World as Appearance, Spinoza to the Absolute of Essence,
Leibniz to Actuality Proper, and Kant to Absolute Relation. We
are now in the vicinity of Galileo and Descartes, the rising fortunes of scientism and the foundations of its self-concealment
regarding hidden ontological agendas. The immediacy (surfacequality) of existent facts and their capacity of serving as both
grounds and consequents, makes it possible to assign them specific time and space coordinates. Determinateness has thus been
given a boost, but this has been secured at the expense of abstraction, since the present feature of immediacy of existents obscures their deeper determination and common origin in the
"negative unity" of the Ground. The most dramatic manifestation of this source is the current methodological rule of ceteris
paribus ("all other things [existents] being equal"), while deductive operations are being conducted for a more manageable
number of variables under the auspices of theory-practice.
While this rule has proved to be a powerful tool in conjunction with mathematical techniques, such as differential equations in the (dialectically) abstract physical sciences, in the case
of their sisters dealing with the highly concrete social world, it
has proved a chronic affliction as evidenced by the fortunes of
economics. The situation with theory-practice is no better since,
as pointed out earlier, it is part of the methodological packet
that has been deferentially received f r o m scientism without
properly examining its content. So theory, in the true sense of
for-itselfness the double-mirror e f f e c t characteristic of
Essence selects from the existent facts those which it has
been programmed to select in the first place. In short, w e are
faced with a situation whereby the difference in concreteness
Illustrations of the
interplay of unity
and diversity from
the history of
philosophy and
the sciences.
Transition to the
categories of
Appearance.
Existence has reasserted itself along with the apparent moment and the specificity (location in space and time) of existents, which can be utilized in the formulation of empirical laws
or theories. In the case of the former, which correspond to the
Law or World of Appearances, mathematically stated invariable
associations are formulated between observables (apparent or
unessential terms) w i t h o u t reference to unobservables (real
terms or essences). By contrast, theories, which correspond to
Thing and its Matters, postulate unobservables (represented by
Matters as the essential or real t e r m ) and test the results of
their theoretical deductions in the controlled experience of experiments or in everyday practice (represented by the Thing as
the unessential or apparent term). In both cases the confirmation via theory-practice may come through with flying colors
but, as p o i n t e d out in the case of Existence, this does n o t
amount to much. Casting scientism into dialectical roles forces
Illustration of
the categories of
Appearance from
philosophy and the
sciences.
into the open its presuppositional amnesia: backward concerning the pre-existing unity of the apparent and the real, and forward in regard to their forthcoming synthesis in Actuality. With
Existence it was scientism's amnesia about the Ground as the
"negative unity" of the existents; n o w it is the lack of insight
about the unity of matter and form. More precisely, in the case
of phenomenalism, it is its overlooking that the essential (now
behind-the-surface moment which it dismisses) is as much the
product of both immediacy and mediation, as the apparent one
which it takes for granted.
To illustrate Hegel's charge against scientism for "capriciously
adopting single (i.e., without their polar opposite or negative
complement) categories...so as trace back to them every object
investigated," w e can assume the position of a behaviorist who
is trying to give an explanation of human action with special
reference to driving in traffic. The possibility of establishing a
law stating in quantitative terms the degree of association between red traffic lights and bringing one's car to a halt may
readily suggest itself. A statement in the form of a scientific law
can be produced which, in all probability, will be confirmed in
practice and used for traffic control, police assignments, city
planning, etc. But without the postulation of non-observables
that extend beyond the physical and into the moral and cultural world, it is impossible to offer a genuine explanation about
human action. Unless the correlations between traffic lights and
human reactions are placed in a succession of wider contexts of
meaning whose dialectical counterparts are the interplay between reflection-within-self and reflection-into another, or between "the whole and its own (negative) moment" with the
result of contributing further determinations, the outcome is a
mere abstraction. Put into the terms of the forthcoming categories of Appearance Proper, the outcome has the barest form
but not the content of an explanation. For example, these further determinations in the explanation may be initiated by asking questions about the role of culturally required rule-conforming behavior, moral values about respect of life and property, in addition to those about police effectiveness and the
handing out of summonses.
Illustration of the
one-sidedness of the
World of Appearance by way of vulgar phenomenology.
The only mere physicists are the animals: they alone do not think:
while man is a thinking being and a born metaphysician. The real
question is not whether we shall apply metaphysics (of the crude
dualistic-scientistic version, or no metaphysics at all, by reverting
to equally crude mere description), but whether our metaphysics
are of the right (dialectical) kind (involving the synthesis of surface
and behind-the-surface).
The effect of its undialectical outlook shows w h e n vulgar
p h e n o m e n o l o g y confronts the scientistic "think" of our times
with the same strategy that scientism, beginning with Galileo,
confronted the pre-scientific world-view of its times: Challenging the "taken for g r a n t e d " w o r l d - v i e w by zeroing-in on its
built-in presuppositions that had been hidden from everyday life,
without the benefit of the intervening mediations between n o w
and then. The difference is, that while Galileo questioned "natural attitude" by w a y of challenging its presuppositions in the
name of theorizing science, vulgar phenomenologists are challenging the presuppositions of scientism in the name of the
worldview of "everyday life" that Galileo had long since demolished. Genuine phenomenology, on the other hand, systematically exposes what common sense has often intuited but could
not always make clear. This is the basic insight behind the concept of "behind-the-surface," the much misunderstood phenomenological exploration of "everydayness," and the equally
misunderstood powerful tool of phenomenological description.
The suspension of theorizing, and of other forms of intellectual
mediation, of which making distinctions is a species, are tools
and not end-products of phenomenology. Its reduction ("bracketing") of the contents of mediation, so that it can be taken as
m e r e data of c o n s c i o u s n e s s , i . e . , as r a w m a t e r i a l easily
amenable to description, may look like banishing of all theorizing and a relapse to sheer immediacy only to vulgar phenomenology. It looks as if the latter (having turned its back on the
fruits that philosophy had diligently gathered regarding the nature of presuppositions in the course of its epistemological quest
between Galileo and Kant) is restoring the hidden presuppositions of "natural attitude" that Galileo had exposed, in the place
of those of science that Kant had found limited.
Implications of
the dialectic of
Appearance for
theory-practice.
Applications of the
dialectic of Content
and Form.
The latter (the sciences) are finite, because their mode of thought,
as a merely formal act, derives its content from without... This partition disappears in philosophy, and thus justifies its title of infinite
knowledge. Yet even philosophic thought is often held to be a
merely formal act; and that logic, which confessedly deals only
with thoughts qua thoughts, is merely formal, is especially a foregone conclusion... Even ordinary forms of thought however, and
the common usage of language, do not in the least restrict the appellation of content to what is perceived by the senses, or what has
a being in place and time. A book without content is, as every one
knows, not a book with empty leaves, but one of which the content is as good as none... But this is to admit that thoughts are not
empty forms without affinity to their content, and that in every
other sphere as well as in art the truth and the sterling value of the
content essentially depend on the content showing itself identical
with the form.
Dualism reaches its full maturity in the categories that fall
under Correlation, which is the synthesis of the W o r l d of Appearance and Content-Form. The f o r m e r contributes to their
synthesis the insight b e q u e a t h e d to it by M a t t e r and Form,
namely that the w o r l d is m o r e of a unity under Appearance
than Essence had led us to b e l i e v e . The latter, o n the other
hand, bestows to their synthesis a w o r l d v i e w w i t h a strong
promise of a lasting unity but still dominated by polarity, n o w
in the form "of the absolute correlation of Content and Form,"
or "their reciprocal r e v u l s i o n . " T h e o u t c o m e is the triad of
Whole-PartsForce and its ExpressionInner-Outer, headed
by Correlation in the Logic and by Essential Relation in the Science of Logic. That these categories comprise a veritable goldmine
of social scientistic self-concealment should come as no surprise
if w e consider that Essential Relation is the apogee of the dialectical counterparts of dualistic scientism. M o r e important for
our concern, the polar terms are rigidly fixed in equipoise with
no clue as to h o w duality will be resolved.
Transition to the
categories of
Essential Relation
(or Correlation).
Discussion of the
dialectical triad
under Correlation.
The immediate relation is that of the Whole and the Parts. The content is the whole, and consists of the parts (the form), its counterpart. The parts are diverse from one another. It is they that possess
independent being. But they are parts, only when they are identified by being related to one another; or, in so far as they make up
the whole, when taken together. But this 'Together' is the counterpart and negation of the part.
Essential correlation is the specific and completely universal phase
in which things appear. Everything that exists stands in correlation, and this correlation is the veritable nature of every existence.
The existent thing in this way has no being of its own, but only in
something else: in this other however it is self-relation; and correlation is the unity of the self-relation and relation-to-others.
The relation of the whole and the parts is untrue to this extent,
that the Notion and the reality of the relation are not in harmony.
The notion of the whole is to contain parts: but if the whole is taken and made what its notion implies, i.e. if it divided, it at once
ceases to be a whole. Things there are, no doubt, which correspond
to this relation: but for that very reason they are low and untrue
existences. We must remember however what 'untrue' signifies.
When it occurs in a philosophical discussion, the term 'untrue'
does not signify that the thing to which it is applied is non-existent. A bad state or a sickly body may exist all the same; but these
things are untrue because their Notion and their reality are out of
harmony... And if this be so in organic life, it is the case to a much
greater extent when we apply this relation to the mind and the
formations of the spiritual world. (Logic, #135 and Zusatz; parentheses in the text)
Exemplifications
of categories of
Correlation in cases
of disciplinary selfconcealment.
Domestication of the
category of Whole
and Parts by way of
the paradigms.
Transition to the
category of Force
and Manifestation.
Illustration of Force
and its Manifestationsfrom social
psychology.
Transition to the
category of the
Inner and Outer.
The Inner (Interior) is the ground, when it stands as the mere form
of the one side of the Appearance and the Correlation, the empty form of reflection-into-self. As the counterpart to it stands the
Outer (Exterior), Existence, also as the form of the other side of
the correlation, with the empty characteristic of reflection-intosomething-else. But Inner and Outer are identified: and their identity is identity brought to fullness in the content, that unity of reflection-into-self and reflection-into-other which was forced to appear in the movement of Force. Both are the same one totality,
and this unity makes them the content. (Logic, #138) (Parentheses
in the text)
The wealth of Hegel's illustrations all of them f r o m the
social and humanistic disciplines leaves no question as to the
strategic importance of this category as the point of transition to
Actuality. As such it signals the shift from scientism to humanism and f r o m the dominance of theory-practice to action. The
full exploration of Inner-Outer takes us into the heart of the dialectical concept of freedom.
v. Dissolution of Theory-Practice
Actuality introduces
the syntheses of
being and thought,
the actual and the
rational, and theorypractice, by way of
re-immediation.
Actuality is the unity, become immediate, of Essence with Existence, or of the Inner with Outer. The utterance of the actual is the
actual itself: so that in this utterance it remains just as essential,
and only is essential, in so far as it is in immediate external existence.
We have... met Being and Existence as forms of the immediate. Being is, in general, unreflected immediacy and transition into another. Existence is immediate unity of Being and Reflection; hence Appearance: it comes from the Ground, and falls to the Ground. In Actuality this unity is explicitly put, and the two sides of the relation
identified. Hence the actual is exempted from transition, and its externality is its energizing. In that energizing it is reflected into itself:
its existence is only the manifestation of itself, not of an Other.
Actuality and thought (or Idea) are often absurdly opposed. How
commonly we hear people saying that, though no objection can be
urged against the truth and correctness of a certain thought, there
is nothing of the kind to be seen in actuality, or it cannot be actually carried out!... Thought in such a case is, on one hand, the synonym for a subjective conception, plan, intention or the like, just
as actuality, on the other, is made synonymous with external and
sensible existence... Ideas are not confined to our heads merely,
nor is the Idea, upon the whole, so feeble as to leave the question
of its actualization or non-actualization dependent on our will. The
Idea is rather the absolutely active as well as actual. And on the
other hand actuality is not so bad and irrational, as purblind or
wrong-headed and muddle-brained would-be reformers imagine...
The same view may be traced in the usages of educated speech,
which declines to give the name of real poet or real statesman to a
poet or a statesman who can do nothing really meritorious or reasonable. (Logic, #142 and Zusatz; parentheses in the text)
Theory-practice
emerges to explicitness and synthesis.
In the course of Part III theory-practice has, until now, remained implicit and has had to be elicited through surrogates.
At this point, almost as if by surprise, it rises to the surface as a
result of the synthesis of the I n n e r and the Outer, and of
Essence and Existence. A polar category which was appropriate
to the domain of abstractive and predictive rationality of scientism, n o w turns out to be a unitary category applied retrodictively to the highly concrete world inhabited by cultural entities. T h e preceding paragraphs p r o v i d e the categorial background to the celebrated, but often misunderstood, Hegelian
formulation of the coincidence of the rational and the actual.
These terms are not abstractions no mere "subjective conception^), plan(s), intention(s) or the like," nor mere "external
and sensible e x i s t e n c e ( s ) " but are, instead, terms w h i c h
have, through successive mediations, reached such a high degree of concreteness, as to automatically issue in their coinci-
dence, i.e., without "its (the Idea's) actualization or non-actualization (being) dependent on our will." Actuality the objective side of Hegel's aphorism about the identity of the rational
and the actual is no mere Existence (or commonsensical reality), but the end-product of sublation of all preceding grades
of objectivity, or exemplifications of Identity, in types of scientistic objects (or contents of practice) since Being. Nor is rationality mere scientistic rationality, but what w e have identified
as the surrogate for theory in Reflection (the "external reflection
of the subjective thinker"), which has also grown in concreteness through its mediating activity in Essence between now and
then. The forces behind the gradual convergence and eventual
coincidence of the rational and the actual, of theory and practice, are the same forces which were responsible for the building up of concreteness of the polar terms along the categorial
path of Being and Essence with Actuality as the outcome.
Yet, w h i l e concreteness advances and c o n v e r g e n c e approaches the point of coincidence of theory and practice, the
implications of what is taking place remain hidden from common sense and scientistic modes of investigation and explanation. Self-concealment, in regard to the changing role of theory-practice, prevails for the same reasons and has the same effect, as it did earlier under the sequence of the categories of the
dialectic: the inability to discern the pre-existing link between
apparently separate moments, resulting in the perpetuation of
dualism. However, there is an important difference. Theorypractice, in its more advanced version of the Theoretical and
Practical Idea, is categorially prior to these scientistic modes of
disciplinary understanding, inasmuch as they presuppose this
advanced form of theory-practice and the logically and ontologically prior to it subject-object polarity. In other words, when it
comes to self-concealment, the fundamental pre-existing link
between theory and practice lies hidden not one, but two layers
below the middle categories of Essence. It cannot, therefore, be
unveiled in the course of the latter and must wait for the Notion, the toil of Actuality notwithstanding.
Significantly, the first volume of the Science of Logic, which
includes Being and Essence, is titled Objective Logic, while the
second, which is devoted to the Notion, is called Subjective
Logic. Mere subjectivity would be as hopeless as mere objectivity in supplying the ground for the final synthesis without reverting to reduplication this time of the subject-object polarity. It will take the dialectically elevated, or trans-individual
subjectivity, after which the second volume of Hegel's work was
named, to accomplish this task. Ironically, or better still, in the
The element of
surprise in the
synthesis points to
the build-up of
concreteness behind
the surface.
Elucidation of the
structure of the synthesis of theory and
practice through a
peek into the future.
true dialectical spirit, the same Reflection which initiated convergence when it first integrated the standpoint of the "subjective thinker" into the immanent process, was responsible not
only for regenerating polarity through its two-pronged reflection, but now also for exposing the deeper layer of duality below the surface of Essence. Reflection regenerated externality
in the very effort to overcome it. But, in the course of the same
process, it was again unveiling the more deeply embedded externality implicit in the the polarities of subject-object and theory-practice in its advanced form. While we, the "external reflection of the subjective thinker" of Being were being incorporated in the objective process, w e were preserved and upgraded
to philosophical observers at the level of the elevated subjectivity of the Notion. From such elevated vantage point w e shall
eventually be able to deal with the results of Essence as if they
were contents of a trans-individual self-consciousness. In other
words, externality persists only in the sense that, instead of taking its object as merely external as would be the case in Being,
theory views it within the intro-reflected space of Essence "as
postulated and hypothesized," w h i l e w e can still behold its
viewing from the outside.
This is p r e c i s e l y h o w d i s c i p l i n a r y k n o w l e d g e , and its
methodological apparatus in particular, was viewed by dialectical philosophy in the last Section. Since such knowledge in the
context of Essence is a species of "reflective Understanding,"
the understanding of its object and modes of explanation are
forms of for-itselfness. Moreover, since unlike the new philosophical observer's standpoint, this disciplinary knowledge is
presuppositionally amnesic backward and forward, it tends to
remain categorially arrested and reduplicates the polarity of the
category to which it corresponds. As long as the polarity of the
essential (Essence) and the apparent (Existence) is still unsublated, or as long as disciplinary knowledge remains at the first
level of self-concealment, theory corresponds to the essential,
and practice to the apparent, moment. The existent fact constitutes the scientistic object and contents of practice, while theory
supplies the thought-determinations with the help of posited
unobservables behind the surface. But as soon as self-concealment on this layer is removed by exposing the pre-existing link
between the two moments, scientistic theory-practice loses its
raison d'etre: t h e o r y has n o t h i n g e x t e r n a l to mediate and
Essence and Existence find themselves synthesized in Actuality.
However, since the disclosure of the pre-existing link between
subject and object in the unitary Idea (or Spirit) has to wait until the Notion in order to be exposed, the ontological and epis-
temological presuppositions of theory-practice remain embedded at the deeper level of self-concealment throughout Essence.
In this respect, it may be useful to recall that the process of progressive concreteness, as approached via Identity, having exemplified itself in the particularized identities of scientistic objects,
does not stop short of the duality of subject-object but continues beyond Essence. Identity as both "the whole and its o w n
moment," will finally be consummated when its terms standing for subject and object respectively it can instantiate itself
in self-consciousness the model for the Idea and for "all activity and self-movement of Spirit." (italics added in this case)
The transition to Actuality is of added significance for our
purposes because, in dissolving scientistic theory-practice and
yet retaining the underlying standpoint of epistemological realism implicit in the subject-object dualism, it points to a cluster
of disciplines straddling the scientistic world of theory-practice
and the humanistic world of action. Their ambiguities illuminate not only the transitional space that they occupy between
these two worlds, but also the dialectic of action which occupies
our attention. This space is inhabited by social disciplines whose
methodological loyalties are divided between the scientistic and
humanistic approach to their subject matter.
To begin with, there are some disciplines, such as social psychology, which believe in a more eclectic approach (inclusive of
various combinations of ingredients from each methodological
bag) in the hope that this will suit things human. Second, there
are those closer to the dialectical v i e w of synthesis of matter
and form, and method and subject matter. As a consequence,
the latter have worked out their own categorial apparatus with
particular reference to action, so as to replace the dissolving
theory-practice in matters human. We refer here to the Weberian concept of action qua meaning-oriented behavior, Alfred
Schiitz's phenomenological approach to action, the related analytical philosophy of action of Wittgenstein and his followers,
the Marxist concept of social praxis, and a psychoanalytical
model of action reminiscent of our paradigm in Part I. The last
cannot be attributed specifically to anyone, though Freud could
be its best claimant. Nor have w e proposed this model as the
most advanced in therapeutic terms. Its chief merit, for our
purposes, has been its paradigmatic value for illuminating a
low-grade (by criteria of dialectical concreteness) synthesis of
theory and practice. We shall not be detained by each case of
action since sociology will be taken up later in connection with
the dialectic of Means-End, and the Marxist version of the dialectic of action will occupy Part IV in its entirety. Social psy-
The transition to
Actuality clarified
by a critique of
methodological confusion regarding
concept of action.
chology or, to be fair, our incomplete sampling from it, exemplifies a basic weakness in determinateness, which is characteristic of this zone of ambiguity and is also shared, albeit to varying degrees, by other social disciplines.
W e recall that the rationale behind the structuralization of
disciplinary k n o w l e d g e in Part II was that the dialectically
ranked disciplines shared with the categories (to which they corresponded in the hierarchical scale) certain logical features that
fitted them best in the unitary project of the Encyclopedia. The
same dialectical criteria were used for ranking these disciplines
as were used by Hegel for their categorial counterparts: a mix of
internal cohesion and determinateness which contributed to allinclusiveness in proportion to their proximity to the all-inclusive
Absolute Idea. Moreover, each disciplinary context of meaning,
as did its categorial counterpart, had its own criteria of cohesion
standards of precision, degree of determinateness, rules of
evidence, meaning of truth. These disciplines were not bound
together into an interdisciplinary project by a uniformity of criteria, for such binding would have turned the Encyclopedia into a
lofty abstract universal, just another Comtean project. It was not
their similarities but their differences, not their static quality but
their movement, that kept the Hegelian interdisciplinary project
together. Not unlike other finite things, disciplines "in their indifferent multiplicity are simply this, to be contradictory and disrupted within themselves and to return into (the negative unity of) their
Ground." Taken in their totality, their ground is no less than the
dialectical fold as a whole. But in particular, for those located in
that transitional space between thinghood and humanity, it is
the correspondingly transitional categories between Essence and
the Notion. This means that Actuality cannot be ignored, especially as it applies to the object of inquiry of these disciplines, the
concept of an actualized human being.
The parts cannot be allotted the essential role in the course
of the inquiry about the nature of a human being, without relapsing to sheer empiricism which "labors under a delusion...
that, while analyzing the objects, it leaves them as they are
(when) it really transforms the concrete into an abstract." Nor
should the disciplines aspiring to the knowledge of what a human being is, allow themselves to fall into the trap of Scholasticus by waiting to acquire the proper methodological knowledge, apart from the knowledge of what an actual human being is, before they embark on the task. The best confirmation
of the coincidence of methodology and subject matter came via
the synthesis of Matter-Form, Content-Form and, in cases
dealing particularly w i t h human matters, the Inner-Outer,
Illustration of
methodological
ambiguities in
regard to action
through analytical
psychology.
ones (modes of behavior) by positing unobservables as theoretical constructs (id, superego). From our dialectical standpoint,
Freud's major contribution his insight about the motivation
for self-concealment being also, by way of neurosis, the impetus
behind the quest for self-understanding is also a key factor
behind the exposing of unwarranted scientistic claims, including
those advanced on behalf of psychoanalysis itself.
The paradox of a body of knowledge adding immensely to insight about human behavior, while at the same time removing
the ground for its scientistic validation, is only apparent. So is the
professed correspondence between field theories in physics and
in psychology, which may have inspired the scientistic claims of
psychoanalytic methodology in the first place. Both can be exposed by casting psychoanalysis in the dialectical role best approximating its self-perception (i.e., its for-itselfness) as scientistic
discipline, the category of Force and its Expression. The parallel
was suggested at the end of the last Section between field theory
in psychology involving synergistic and antagonistic forces (e.g.,
death wish, libido) and correlated topographic concepts (e.g., id,
ego, superego), on the one hand, and the electro-magnetic field
theory involving forces and topographically defined entities in
physics, on the other. The analogy exemplifies a situation (as in
the case of Adam Smith earlier), whereby conceptual misapplication serves to propel the dialectic forward and steer the corresponding discipline to a methodology which is at one with the
subject matter in which form and matter are in coincidence.
The key to the disclosure of misapplication here is the confusion
of the two levels of self-concealment: the first layer, wherein disclosure reveals the pre-existing link between the apparent and
essential moments, and the second, in which it reveals the more
deeply embedded link between subject and object and their
methodological counterparts of theory and practice. The former
is within the operating range of scientism, where Maxwell's differential equations provide an elegant and highly determinate
way for linking underlying processes and apparent entities. Not
so Freud's inferences, linking inner states to outer manifestations
through the use of theoretical constructs, for which he has been
severely criticized in scientistic quarters. To the extent that Freud
and his followers allowed scientistic criteria to guide their work,
this criticism is well deserved. But Freud was, unbeknownst to
himself, also transcending these criteria in his psychoanalytic
practice, which in this sense is dialectically ahead of his theorizing and methodology. The issue, then, is not an improvement of
the theory in a theory-practice setting, as the methodologists of
science were urging, but the applicability of theory-practice in
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Self-contradictory
nature of the Exposition of the Absolute
leads to the Absolute
Attribute.
ing in general, as well as of Reflection, has resolved itself. Accordingly, the process of determining what the Absolute is has a negative outcome, and the Absolute itself appears only as the negation of all
predicates and as the void. But since equally it must be pronounced to be the position of all predicates, it appears as the most
formal contradiction... But we have to exhibit what the Absolute
is; but this 'exhibiting' can be neither a Determining nor an External Reflection from which determinations of the Absolute would
result; on the contrary, it is the exposition, and in fact the self-exposition, of the Absolute and only a display of what it is. (Science of
Logic, p. 530)
The result of the first act of the rehearsal, the Exposition of
the Absolute as it emerges f r o m the above quotation, is the
Absolute as an undifferentiated whole giving the impression
"as the negation of all predicates and as the void" of an Upanishadic Brahman. "But since (according to the labors of the
dialectic so far) equally it must be pronounced to be the position of all predicates, it appears as the most formal contradiction." The former is an erroneous perception because it overlooks the fact that the Absolute is the most concrete entity as a
result of past mediations "in it every determinateness of
Essence and Existence, or of Being in general, as well as of Reflection, has been r e s o l v e d . " This v i e w is contradicted by our
knowledge of the workings of the dialectic. A mere exposition
of the Absolute "in fact the ^//-exposition, of the Absolute
and only a display of what it is" would have to conform with
this first view, inasmuch as it would ignore the enormity of
hidden mediations behind this meager show of an Absolute.
This cannot be but a short-lived position because even in the
form of a mere "self-ex position... and only a display of what it
is," it cannot proceed with its task without resorting to External Reflection. But this would be self-defeating for a conception of an Absolute within which, by definition, "Reflection has
resolved itself." This contradiction forces the transition to the
next moment, the Absolute Attribute.
But the Exposition of the Absolute is, in fact, its own act, which begins
from itself and arrives at itself. The Absolute, merely as absolute identity, is determinate, namely, as the identical; it is posited as such by reflection as against opposition and manifoldness; or it is only the negative
of reflection and the process of determining as such. Therefore not
only is this expounding of the Absolute something imperfect, but so
also is the Absolute itself which is only arrived at. Or, the Absolute that
is only an absolute identity, is only the Absolute of an External Reflection.
It is therefore not the absolute Absolute but the Absolute in a determinateness, or it is Attribute. (Science of Logic, p. 532-33)
With External Reflection in place the Absolute returns to the
path of concreteness. The familiar dialectic of Reflection is back
in action, except that now it is working from within and is being centered on the most advanced particularization of Identity,
that of the (self-)identity of the Absolute. The same triadic
rhythm of Reflection is operating now: First, the positing of the
Illusory Being corresponding to the Show or the illusion of an
Absolute of the last moment; second, the viewing of the result
qua external in the f o r m of an Other of this moment; and,
third, the "bend(ing) back into itself the relation to Other... the
unity of itself and the Other" of the next moment. However,
there is an important difference because, unlike the earlier situation in which the dialectic advanced by sublating the Other,
n o w there is no genuine Other. By the operating rules of the
context of meaning of the Absolute there is nowhere to go outside of it. Yet, by the rules of External Reflection there is an inside and an outside (last encountered as the Inner and the Outer which synthesized into Actuality) of which the Absolute is
the first moment. External Reflection is responsible for a relapse of the Absolute into a context of meaning which exhibits
further capacity for determination and more advance in concreteness. These are proper features for lesser categories but not
fitting for the Absolute which is, by definition, the consummation of concreteness. "Therefore not only is the expounding of
the Absolute (through External Reflection) something imperfect, but so also is the Absolute itself which is only arrived at
(through external means)... It is therefore not the absolute (or
genuine) Absolute but the Absolute in a determinateness, or it
is (in the form of an) Attribute (like any other category, when it
becomes an attribute of the 'absolute Absolute')."
Inability to restore
The transition from the crude externality of the Exposition
the Absolute due to
of the Absolute to the more subtle one of the Absolute Atpersisting externality. tribute had momentarily raised the hope that once inside the
Absolute w e would be able to eliminate the dualistic trace that
had infected the Absolute by way of its exposition from a standpoint external to it. But our hope was dashed upon the realization that as an attribute the Absolute is a mere thought-determination or form which expresses only part of what it means to
be the Absolute. This reduces the Absolute again to a relative
Absolute and forces the dialectic onward to the Mode of the
Absolute and Formal Possibility. In Actuality earlier, the final
synthesis of theory and practice was not consummated because
the subject of the deeply embedded polarity of subject-object
had remained unsublated. So now the synthesis of Inner-Outer
has not closed the dialectical circle of determination because of
the continuing need of a standpoint from which to give an exposition of the Absolute which is similarly inhabited by the un-
Temporary relief of
the instability of the
Absolute through
the Absolute Mode.
"the night in which all cows are black." Yet, the difference between them lies in Hegel's provision for content through the
transition to the Mode of the Absolute and from there to Actuality Proper and its categories covering the w h o l e spectrum
from Formal Possibility to Absolute Necessity. As the dialectic of
Matter and Form, as well as that of Content and Form, and the
interplay between the a priori and the empirical in the economic paradigm have taught us, the way to add flesh-and-blood to
the form is not that of common sense and scientism. The content of Absolute is not going to be poured as if into an empty
container called "absolute form" at some future moment because, consistent with the principle of the identity of Content
and Form, the "absolute form" is not only supplied with content,
but it is identical with "absolute content."
...the content of the Absolute is just this, to manifest itself. The Absolute is the absolute form which, as the diremption of itself is utterly
identical with itself, the negative as negative, or that (which) unites
with itself, and only thus is it the absolute identity-with-self which
equally is indifferent to its differences, or is absolute content. The content,
therefore, is only this exposition itself. (Science of Logic, p. 536).
As a consequence, w e shall be witnessing a progressive concreteness of the already existing form-cwm-content until w e realize almost by surprise as in the case of the dissolution of
scientistic theory-practice that while the apparently pure formal side of the Absolute had been building up, the concreteness
associated with its material side had already been added on.
There should be no mystery left if w e bear in mind that logical
and sensuous concreteness are two sides of the same coin, or
that both are products of the same self-activated Spirit. Recalling Hegel's short definition of idealism, the "ideality of the finite
is the chief maxim of philosophy; and for that reason every
genuine philosophy is idealism." Without this in mind it may
seem puzzling to place the triad of the Idea as the apex of concreteness in the end of Logic, to say nothing of the apparently
inexplicable abruptness in the transition from the Absolute Idea
to Nature at the very conclusion of the same work.
In light of this dress rehearsal for the Absolute Idea in the dialectic of the Absolute of Essence, w e may have another look at
the methodologies of the disciplines corresponding to this first
installment of the Absolute. This seems in order as absolute
form is aspiring to be the "absolute Absolute" and yet remains
short of it (while still in Essence) because of persisting externality between content and form. The same fate awaits social disciplines, straddling as they do Essence and the Notion, by virtue
of their humanistic content and yet unable to totally disengage
themselves from scientistic forms, which they should have accomplished by now if they were to have achieved an identity of
content and form. The last victim of presuppositional amnesia
was a specimen of social psychology cast in the categories of Essential Relation in the Science of Logic and Correlation in the Logic. In our search for illustration w e tried to clarify the effort of
this sub-discipline to resolve the perennial question of the relative weight of heredity and environment in the formation of
character. From a dialectical viewpoint, each of the polar terms
claimed the essential role, but in the process of doing so they
were reinforcing the claim of the other side. Social psychology
was locked-in, alternating between two irreconcilably opposed
positions. A more advanced position, that both sides can claim
the essential moment, evolved gradually among these categories, as the opposed moments converged until the synthesis
of Inner and Outer led to Actuality by way of its first triad of
the Absolute. But unless a discipline is dialectically aware of the
underlying unity between seemingly irreconcilable terms, it
cannot hold on to the insight of "both," because this insight is
virtually useless in its lack of determinacy when assessed by scientistic criteria, to which an undialectical discipline is, by its
very nature, harnessed.
Perhaps it should be clarified that "irreconcilable" in this
context means that the two positions are presuppositionally, or
"in principle," opposed so that the causal chain leading from
the environment to character and from heredity to character is
of a different nature. For example, a sociobiologist handling the
latter would consider the rules of social or historical causation
flabby, and the social psychologist attending to the f o r m e r
would consider those of scientistic causation unduly restrictive.
It is the same kind of irreconcilability about fundamental rules
of the g a m e the u l t i m a t e of these b e i n g the " l a w s of
Thought" that the dialectic has been combatting all along in
moving f r o m one context of meaning to the next by w a y of
presuppositional challenge. T h e r e f o r e , w h i l e the claim of
"both" under non-dialectical conditions can be found unacceptable, from a dialectical standpoint it is not only acceptable, but
indeed required. The amnesic about links forward (to humanistic) and backward (to scientistic) interdisciplinary effort is thus deprived of a genuine use of "both" which is neither
flabby nor unfitting to its domain. Needless to add that the
progress of science does not stop short of multiple chains of
causation, as shown in the case of Force and its Expression.
Two or more variables can easily be accommodated in social explanation which would thus exhibit an increase in determinacy.
But the point remains that this would involve scientistic reductionism where it might be inappropriate dialectically speaking, being hitched to the standpoint of External Reflection as
the comparison of Maxwell and Freud suggested earlier. The dialectical legitimation of the standpoint of "both" can therefore
be viewed as a preliminary step in establishing a connection between methodological holism and the category of the Absolute.
In terms of a disciplinary counterpart, the category of the
Absolute is a generalization of the case of "both" (i.e., of Correlation). For example, an aspiring functionalist sociologist, w h o
has seen the pitfalls of scientism and may have come under the
spell of the Durkheimian holistic v i e w of society as the incarnation of God, may pronounce that it is not merely two, but all,
elements in society in their interconnectedness that account for
any single one in a social whole. Though pointing in the right
direction, this statement is rather bland in its generality unless
it is filled with empirical content. This too seems like the right
step, but on closer inspection it is fraught with a number of difficulties: First, the content is being added-on externally, "raked
together from the outside as something given and contingent,"
in the q u o t a t i o n that f o l l o w s ; second, it invites scientistic
methodology so that one can draw f r o m it operational consequences and not be "submerged in the abyss of the Absolute by
a r e f l e c t i o n alien to that c o n t e n t " ; and third, it retains the
standpoint outside the social w h o l e for its exposition. W h a t
seemed like a promising start turns out, in the absence of dialectical " m e m o r y , " to be a relapse into a positivist enterprise
which has in fact happened to functionalism.
Essence, Existence, the world-in-itself, Whole, Parts, Force these
reflected determinations appear to ordinary thinking as a true being
which is valid in-and-for-itself; but the Absolute as against them is
the Ground in which they have been engulfed... In its true presentation this Exposition (of the Absolute) is the preceding whole of
the logical movement of the sphere of Being and Essence, the content
of which has not been raked together from outside as something
given and contingent, or submerged in the abyss of the Absolute by
a reflection alien to that content; on the contrary, it has determined
itself internally through its inner necessity, and as Being's own Becoming and as the reflection of Essence, has withdrawn into the Absolute as into its Ground. (Science of Logic, pp. 531-32)
Illustration of
the dialectic of
the Absolute via
phenomenological
sociology.
Our dress rehearsal for the forthcoming dialectic of the Absolute Idea in the Notion, by w a y of the present dialectic of the
Absolute of Essence, has served to highlight the lack of universal applicability of scientism to the social world. Scientism's ontological and methodological dualism, variously exemplified as
internality-externality, subject-object, and theory-practice, has
structures which have infected philosophy and the methodology of social science have been undermined. Having suspended
doubt, which philosophy would have maintained in order to
investigate the epistemological and ontological status of "human" and "humanitarianism," sociology of knowledge accepts
everyday knowledge about them as given. No epistemological
priority is given to the philosophical "knowledge" of these concepts over those held by the bureaucrat at the United Nations
or the employee at the Department of Welfare. The philosopher's privileged standpoint has been subverted by depriving
him of the conceptual tools of mediation, which gave him access to such position in the first place. By accepting the "knowledge" of the philosopher on the same footing as that of others
in the phenomenological context of Everyday Life, the sociologist of knowledge has denied the philosopher an entry into the
realm of the "essence" of things by way of theorizing. This is
the main tool of the non-phenomenological philosopher, the
scientist, and the aspiring forms of common sense, for getting
behind the surface of things for the purpose of discovering a
higher order of reality.
Allowing phenomenological sociology to play the dialectical
role of the category of the E x p o s i t i o n of the A b s o l u t e in
Hegel's interdisciplinary project confirmed our tentative findings of the philosophical paradigm (to be restated with finality
later in the Notion) that philosophy reasserts its holistic claim
on knowledge by shifting its focus from objectivism to meaning. This was restated in the preceding paragraphs with an
added twist of a dialectical paradox, wherein the confirmation
was carried out by a discipline of a radically empirical temper
such as phenomenology. The philosophical paradigm used the
same language of object-turned-to-meaning in the synthesis of
theory and practice as phenomenological sociology and the
Absolute use now. In the language of the philosophical paradigm, the synthesis of theory and practice into action takes
place at the level of meaning, whereby "all determinations (including reflection itself) are posited in this (absolute) identity as
sublated." Or, in the language of the phenomenological sociologist, having "bracketed" (i.e., suspended) the scientistic and
other built-in "structures of relevance" of the social world, w e
can get on with the proper task of sociology, which is to describe what is left as a texture of meanings.
The theory-practice polarity is among those bracketed as belonging to the practical structure of relevance or the preconceived way of viewing the world in the light of scientism and
common sense. By reducing the various socially generated
mere immediate Existence but exists as form-unity of being-withinself or inwardness and outwardness, it immediately contains the initself or possibility. What is actual is possible. (Science of Logic, p. 542)
It may sound paradoxical to say that the needed content, the
flesh-and-blood of the "absolute form" which w e have developed
so far, can be added onto with the help of categories of possibility. But if w e recall h o w the visions of the radical shaped the
actualities of the present some of the paradox may begin to dissolve. In fact, Hegel's purpose is to elicit such content from the
"absolute form" itself by bringing the categories encompassing
the w h o l e spectrum f r o m the possible to the necessary, and
from the potential to the actualized, within the fold of Actuality. As it will soon become apparent, the consequences of such a
move are far-reaching for disciplinary methodology, as well as
for the world of political and historical action.
Beginning w i t h the first m o m e n t of the triad of Actuality
Proper, the pair of Formal Possibility and Contingency, Hegel
distinguishes two sides in Formal Possibility. As with Identity, of
which it is a particular instance, it has a positive side corresponding to abstract (self-)Identity and a negative side which
corresponds to its complement, (self-)Difference. This will help
establish his aim: the inclusion of Possibility into Actuality
through the familiar two-pronged device of Reflection. The following is the first step in this strategy.
Possibility therefore contains two moments: first, the positive moment that it is a reflectedness-into-self; but since it is reduced in
the absolute form to a moment, the reflectedness-into-self no
longer counts as Essence, but has, secondly, the negative meaning that
Possibility lacks something, that it points to an Other, to Actuality
in which it completes itself. (Science of Logic, p. 543)
The definition of Formal Possibility a f e w lines later, according to which "everything is possible that is not self-contradictory," is a
corollary of the "positive moment," in the sense that Formal Possibility in the context of this m o m e n t is a bare Essentiality, a
mere "identity-with-self (i.e., abstract self-identity) and "as such
it is the relationless, indeterminate receptacle for everything
whatever...This merely formal predication of something it is
possible is therefore equally as superficially empty as the law
of contradiction and any content that is admitted into it." As in
the case of the triad under Essentialities earlier in Essence, w e
can be thankful to "the negative meaning (above) that (Formal)
Possibility lacks something, that it points to an Other, to Actuality in which it completes itself."
The possible, however, contains more than the bare law of identity. The possible is the reflected reflectedness-into-self, or the identical
simply as moment of the totality, and hence it is also determined as
being not in itself; it has therefore the second determination of being only a possible and the ought-to-be of the totality of form. Possibility without this ought-to-be is Essentiality as such; but the absolute form contains this, that Essence itself is only a moment, and
without Being lacks its truth.
But this relation (i.e., the pre-existing unity or Ground which determines both moments of Formal Possibility as possible), in which
the one possible also contains its Other, is the contradiction that
sublates itself. Now, according to its determination it is the reflected, and as we have seen, the self-sublating reflected; it is therefore
also the immediate and thus becomes Actuality.
Everything possible has therefore in general a being or an Existence.
This unity of (Formal) Possibility and Actuality is Contingency. (Science of Logic, pp. 543-45)
Actuality Proper
as an upgrading of
reality by virtue
of Possibility.
has thus been provided for both realized and unrealized possibilities in the unity of the "totality of form" of the Absolute.
This absolute unrest of the becoming of these two determinations (i.e.,Transition to NecesAbstract Possibility and Actuality) is Contingency. But just because
sity provides further
each immediately turns into its opposite, equally in this Other it simconcreteness to the
ply unites with itself, and this identity of both, of the one in the other,
Absolute.
is (Formal or Relative) Necessity.
The necessary is an actual; as such it is something immediate,
groundless-, but equally it has its actuality through an Other or in its
ground, but at the same time is the positedness of this ground and
the reflection of it into itself; the possibility of the necessary is a
sublated possibility. The contingent, therefore is necessary because
the actual is determined as a possible, hence its immediacy is sublated and repelled into the ground or the in-itself, and the grounded,
and also because this its possibility, the ground-relation, is simply
sublated and posited as being. The necessary is, and this that simply
is, is itself the necessary. (Science of Logic, pp. 545-46)
If the previously stated objective of the triad of Actuality
Proper is the enhancement of the concreteness of the "absolute
form," then the content has to be closely knit to the form, or the
process of determination has to move in step with the nature of
the content. This is epigrammatically stated in the last sentence
paralleling the o f t e n quoted aphorism f r o m the Preface of
Hegel's Philosophy of Right which equates the rational and the actual. The sentence preceding that famous (or infamous) aphorism provides the logical background to this statement and
would have saved many misunderstandings and disparaging remarks against its author had it been more widely known and
understood. Formal Possibility, the green light par excellence for
radicals, visionaries, and generally for those w h o want to meddle with bare Existence, has found a way into Actuality via Contingency right next to the merely existent: "the contingent,
therefore, is necessary because the actual is determined as a possible." Hence, the radical vision's seeming disconnectedness (i.e.,
the contingent's "immediacy") to, and irrelevance for, reality
(i.e., Actuality) has been unmasked as a self-concealment of the
logic of the establishment (i.e., the logic of the Understanding).
Instead, the connection with, and relevance of the radical vision
to, reality stand firm by virtue of the c o m m o n ground they
share, that which both visions and reality are made of. Reverting
to the same explanation of the text, not only is this so because
the contingent's "immediacy is sublated and repelled into the
ground...and the grounded," but "also because this its possibility
(i.e., the Formal Possibility which issued in Contingency), the
ground-relation (since by the same token it too n o w shares the
Implications of the
dialectic of Possibility for radical politics.
Misunderstanding
regarding Hegel's
criticism of idealism.
Hegel's critique of
the use of Possibility.
Expression exemplifies this process, but even more does InnerOuter, which is the most closely-knit polarity short of the formal unity of the Absolute.
The same process of implicit issuing into explicit, and of Inner manifesting itself in the Outer, which characterizes these
categories, is also the main feature of the synthesis of theorypractice into action. The gradual convergence of the polar
terms, which eventually becomes unity in Actuality, describes
accurately the transformation of theory-practice from external
application between terms of a polarity to action qua actualization proceeding from within the same term which is the product of their synthesis. If this single term can be viewed as a subject, as will become increasingly obvious when w e approach
the Notion, then what w e have at hand is the idealist doctrine
of freedom dressed in dialectical garb: action as rendering explicit what is implicit in the agent, or freedom as self-realization
and action qua essentially free. The next Section, dealing with
the implications of the dialectic of Actuality for the concept of
freedom, is an elaboration about this vital point of action as essentially free action. W e had our first inkling of this action in
our paradigmatically self-generated action of the analysand, by
contrast to his self-application of theory-practice, at the terminal phase of his successful therapy.
This development in the relationship between the terms of
the polarity is in accord with our casting of it in triadic form
earlier. In that case, the shift from the second to the third moment was equivalent to one from externality to internality. It is
also consistent with the changes that have been taking place in
the Absolute. For if w e are again allowed to borrow momentarily from the future, the Absolute, especially after the crucial
step from external to self-exposition and the establishment of
its nature as self-manifestation, is the model for the self-completeness of elevated subjectivity within which the synthesis of
theory-practice in its most advanced form will take place. In
this sense the important move from external to self-exposition
in the Absolute and the establishment (in the quotation that
follows) that the externality of Real Actuality "is an inner relationship to itself alone (and that) what is actual can act," is another confirmation that under the rules of the game of totalization theory-practice has been superseded.
Real Actuality (which along with its necessary complement, Real
Possibility, constitute the second moment of Actuality Proper) as
such is in the first instance the thing of many properties, the existent
world; but is not the Existence that resolves itself into Appearance,
but, as Actuality, it is at the same time the in-itself (i.e., potentiality) and the reflection-into-self (i.e., self-containment); it preserves
itself in the manifoldness of mere Existence; its externality is an inner relationship to itself alone. What is actual can act; something
manifests its actuality through that which it produces. Its relationship to another something is the manifestation of itself: neither a
transition the relation between Somewhat and an Other in the
sphere of Being nor an appearing where the Thing is only in
relation to others and, though a self-subsistent, has its reflection-into-self, its determinate essentiality, in another self-subsistent.
This possibility (i.e., the other side of Real Actuality) as the in-itself
of Real Actuality is itself Real Possibility, and first of all, the in-itself as
pregnant with content. Formal Possibility is reflection-into-self only as
abstract Identity, which merely means that something is not internally self-contradictory. But if one brings into account the determinations, circumstances and conditions of something in order to ascertain its possibility, one is no longer at the stage of Formal Possibility, but is considering its Real Possibility. (Science of Logic, pp. 546-47)
From all appearances Real Actuality and Real Possibility
have together defined a whole which is both structurally and
dynamically self-complete insofar as it also "can act" and
"manifest its actuality through that which it produces." Furthermore, they have overcome externality inasmuch as "its
(i.e., Real Actuality's) externality is an inner relationship to itself
alone" and they can account between themselves for both actuality "the thing of many properties, the existent world"
and its potentiality or what can issue from it "the in-itself as
pregnant with content." However, upon closer scrutiny it is found
that necessity has not kept up with this progress. The Formal
Necessity which matched the Formal Possibility and Contingency of the last moment has to be upgraded to fit the new relationship of form and content engendered by Real Actuality
and its activistic features. Hence the rationale behind taking up
Necessity again, which, as it turns out, still cannot close the circle of determination so that w e can pass to Absolute Relation,
the last triad of Essence.
But this Necessity is at the same time relative. For it has a presupposition from which it begins, it has its starting point in the contingent.
For the real actual as such is the determinate actual, and has first of
all its determinateness as immediate being in the fact that it is a multiplicity of existing circumstances; but this immediate being as determinateness is also the negative of itself, is an in-itself or possibility,
and thus it is Real Possibility. As this unity of the two moments it is
the totality of the form, but the totality which is still external to itself... Real Possibility does, it is true, become Necessity; but the latter thus begins from that unity of the possible and the actual which
is not yet reflected into itself this presupposing and the self-returning movement are still separate or Necessity has not yet spontaneously determined itself into Contingency.
has been. As has previously been the case with other kinds of
disciplinary knowledge, self-concealment in historical knowledge hinges on the categorial level at which the discipline has
been arrested pursuing its subject matter. Invariably this difficulty can be traced to the overlooking of the positive function
of negation or its determining capacity (determinate negation),
most recently encountered in the determining role of Possibility
in the dialectic of Actuality Proper. This is not difficult to explain since it is this taking of negation in its merely negative
side which isolates the discipline from what is before and after
it, thus fostering amnesia and precluding anything like a genuine interdisciplinary project. But self-concealment is also compounded by the fact that as the discipline finds itself more advanced on the dialectical scale it tends, in its self-concealment,
to drag along fragments from the scientistic logic of past moments. For example, the Understanding operating within historical knowledge may try to give scientistic legitimacy to its
counter-to-fact conditionals by dressing them up in probabilistic
language. It may try to reproduce a scientistic statement by filling in the outlying conditions, by assigning to them probable
values according to past experience, and even venture into predictive "if..., then" statements about similar possible future occurrences on the basis of it. Such procedure may even appear
to have Hegel's blessing from the previously quoted passage introducing Real Possibility:
But if one brings into account the determinations, circumstances
and conditions of something in order to ascertain its possibility,
one is no longer at the stage of Formal Possibility, but is considering its Real Possibility.
But the similarity of such reasoning as a basis for a probabilistic-cwm-predictive treatment is doubly misleading: First, because the "if..., then" structure is part of the abstractive-predictive equipment of scientism which has been superseded since
the holistic approach of the Absolute. Second, even if the barrier of abstractiveness is bypassed by allowing an ever-expanding
set of conditions, thus taking the whole range of Real Possibility
as the universe of discourse for such a probabilistic statement,
that universe has not ceased to be suffering from contingency.
"The latter (Real Necessity, which because of this contingency
'is at the same time relative') thus begins from that unity of the
possible and the actual which is not yet reflected into itself (i.e.,
still suffering from lack of unity) this presupposing and the
self-returning movement (the outcome) are still separate or necessity has not yet spontaneously determined itself into contingency
(i.e., external necessitation has not given way to self-necessitation as befits a truly coherent whole)."
This cumulative self-concealment in the methodology of historical knowledge can be illustrated by pursuing a little further
Hegel's scornful remarks in the Logic. They were directed at the
use of logical possibility by the Understanding in the example
involving the possibility of Sultan becoming a Pope. A historian
operating by the rules of the Understanding may retort that
Hegel's scorn is a bit overstated since, while it might be logically
possible for the Sultan to become a Pope, it is highly improbable. It may be promising to resort to probability in order to
avert "the empty Understanding (from) find(ing) its chief pleasure in the fantastic ingenuity of suggesting possibilities and lots
of possibilities." He may further insist that rather than follow
the tortuous dialectical path in order "to show h o w null and
meaningless they are," w e should employ one of these "empty
forms" of Understanding in this case probabilistic thinking
to rid ourselves of contingency. But closer reflection on the
most recent dialectical developments in Actuality Proper shows
such expectation to be misplaced. Probability presupposes a
highly grounded universe of discourse, and its predictive power
about an event depends upon the determination and assignment of values and surrounding conditions. Unless contained
by abstractive procedures which limit the universe of discourse
within which probabilistic thinking operates, the ever-expanding chain of conditions inexorably points to the whole of the
Absolute. But this is precisely what the Understanding in its abstractive preoccupation and predictive outlook is prevented
f r o m doing w h e t h e r it be the e n f o r c e m e n t of the ceteris
paribus clause, or the pursuit of its familiar compartmentalization through abstract universalization.
Even assuming that the Understanding pursued the Absolute
by, for example, the need of philosophically secure foundations
of probability, or the hope that this will insure better predictive
success, w e n o w know that self-concealment will persist at a
deeper level. It is the externality of the predictive standpoint itself, which injects contingency in the "absolute form" that the
Understanding and scientism are trying to approximate in their
universalist tendencies. Recalling the dialectic of Actuality Proper, it was essentially a scientistic syndrome, a carry-over from
the dialectic of Ground, of pursuing determinacy with a method
burdened with externality (i.e., an alternation of conditioningconditioned) which infected the "absolute form" with a beginning, transforming it into just another link in an interminable
chain of conditions. So too, in this case of cumulative self-con-
Critique of historical
methodology extended to counter-to-fact
conditionals.
Foundations of the
dialectical concepts of
freedom and action
in the Absolute and
Actuality Proper.
Correspondence
gins to emerge more clearly in Subjective Logic. For it is this elevated subject (what neo-Hegelians often referred to as the
higher self, or Self), which is the proper object of a genuinely
free will "the content (which) is intrinsically firm and fast,
and (the free will) knows it at the same time to be thoroughly
its o w n . " Viewed in this light of the trans-individual subject,
the issue of freedom places us on a head-on course vis-a-vis the
persisting subject-object polarity, because it demands its resolution in the form of an elevated subjectivity, what Hegel means
by Spirit. Given our present preoccupation with freedom, it is
fitting to provide some continuity with this pending issue of
subject-object polarity, thus anticipating the forthcoming outcome of the concept of action qua essentially free action in the
concrete setting of Spirit.
Not unlike the concept of action emerging out of the con-
Illustration of the
(or Cunning of Reason) if he is to liberate himself from the impersonal forces of the market; so must our subject embrace the
standpoint of the social whole in the form of trans-individual
Reason if he is to transcend his individualism and get rid of the
show of freedom associated with freedom qua mere choice.
If, as w e have been arguing, the polar terms of freedom are
dialectic offreedom
through the dialectic
ofthe "I."
The emergence of
dialectical freedom as
self-realization within a wider whole.
brands of the New Left or Marxist humanism. Humanistic psychology has tried to synthesize the therapeutic norm of psychoanalytic "normalcy" and the concept of self-realization. Though
with the best of intentions and the accompaniment of repeated
pronouncements that such "normalcy" goes hand-in-hand with
a "good society," the effort did not and could not have succeeded because of the built-in externality between these norms.
This is inevitable because, as a professional discipline and
therefore, by its very nature, harnessed to certain "official" definitions of social reality humanistic psychology has to take
certain things for granted. Thus, the form and content of freedom are not at one with each other or, to use Hegel's words,
"the matter of choice is given, and known as content dependent not on the will itself, but on outward circumstances."
Though at a more dignified level, and with a more substantive
menu from which to make choices, the situation is, in principle,
no different from one involving an owner of a TV satellite antenna and a variety of programs to choose from. In neither case
is the individual "conscious to (himself) that (his) content is intrinsically firm and fast, and knows it at the same time to be
thoroughly (his) own."
The outcome in terms of mere "freedom of choice" would be
similar to Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's conception of meditation as
empty form which, torn apart from the content of a holistic path
inclusive of diet, moral code, physical, intellectual, and spiritual
discipline, can equally accommodate the "self-realization" of
saints, bankers, policemen, or gangsters. Viewed from the opposite direction of concrete freedom, had the will of the citizen of
the dissolving socialist regimes been "conscious to itself that its
(socialist) content is firm and fast, and k n o w ( n ) it at the same
time to be thoroughly its own," he could have claimed a "genuinely free will" even if he had a limited political and economic
choice, without having to duplicate Western-style pluralism and
consumerism. Nor would a more all-encompassing approach,
such as a Marcusean or New Left brand of humanistic Marxism
in which a planned "good society" is envisioned to optimize individual self realization, be able to overcome this thorny problem of externality. The social planning involved in this position
is symptomatic of its view that the social whole is a precondition
for individual self-realization, rather than a genuine whole inclusive of self-realization. In other words, the unity implied between the individual and the whole, when w e think of the former as the subject of self-realization and the latter as the objective conditions of society conducive to its optimization, is still
burdened with externality. The lingering subject-object polarity
Illustration of
freedom qua selfrealization through
disciplinary
knowledge and
contemporary life.
Contingency in the
planning offreedom
parallels uncertainty
in the planning of
dialectical synthesis
of action.
Parallelism between
freedom and action
in building up concreteness behind the
surface.
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i. Self-Actualizing Spirit
As w e are about to take temporary leave of the Logic and
embark on the Philosophy of Spirit, w e should recall why this digression was deemed appropriate according to our original
plan. It was then thought to be both structurally fitting to
Hegel's overall schema, and facilitating our task of explication,
to take a recess and go back to the psychological and cultural
concreteness begun in Part I. With regard to structural appropriateness, it should also be recalled that the overarching triad
of the Logic corresponds not only to the system as a whole
i.e., LogicNatureSpirit as arranged in the Encyclopedia but
also to the triadic structures of its divisions and sub-divisions.
Taking Spirit as an example, BeingEssenceNotion corresponds both to its divisions in SubjectiveObjectiveAbsolute
Spirit and the sub-divisions of Subjective Spirit into Soul (anthropology)Consciousness (phenomenology)Mind (philosophical psychology). This multiple correspondence sheds light
on the many-levelled syntheses, which w e shall be encountering in the dialectic of freedom and action. More particularly for
our case, the correspondences between Logic and concrete Spirit
gives us the opportunity to refer to various specific forms of action which, in our preoccupation with scientistic theory-practice and the radical implications of its synthesis in action, had
no occasion to relate to the categorial schemata of the Logic.
For example, in the sub-categories of Soul w e shall soon begin to recognize a variety of routine actions which dominate
our everyday life as it is organized within culture. In their characteristic unself-consciousness these actions correspond to the
in-itselfness of Being which stands apart from the standpoint of
reflection of the "subjective thinker." But the picture changes
with the convergence of the two paths and the transition to
Consciousness whose logical counterpart is Essence, the familiar scene of reflection: the standpoint of for-itselfness where
theory views practice in its own image, i.e., as self-external or
severed from their pre-existing unity in unself-conscious Being.
Subdivisions of
Spirit and their
correlates in
the Logic.
Meaning and
definition of Spirit
through dialectical
surrogates.
Meaning of Spirit
through historical
and cultural counterparts.
Spirit as agent
capable of action.
Subjectivity), or alternatively in the case of the historical development of freedom, ObjectivitySubjectivitySubjectivity- inObjectivity (Elevated Objectivity or the exoteric aspect of Spirit).
Whereas the first triad represents the dialectic of freedom from
the standpoint of an individual graduating to that of Spirit, the
second (corresponding to Hegel's historical and political works)
views freedom from the position of Spirit qua historical subject.
Spirit goes through the same process of self-realization, with
self-consciousness as a yardstick of progress along the dialectical
scale, since there is no wider whole beyond itself to which it can
attend. On this scale, the classical Greek polis, though possessing
the right objective conditions, is wanting in self-consciousness.
The middle term of the last triad represents the rise of subjectivity as a precondition for universal self-consciousness, which is finally attained by Spirit with the Protestant Revolution in the last
moment of the triad. Historically, this is the point at which the
first triad begins to be applicable because, as Hegel points out in
his Lectures in Philosophy of History, the Protestant Revolution
opens only a potentiality which each individual can realize in
pursuing his concrete freedom.
This v i e w of Spirit, as a historical subject undergoing the
same dialectic of freedom qua self-realization, is also reflected in
the historical view of the dialectic of action. In this light of the
pre-modern view of freedom as implicit in the objective conditions of the community of the polis, action is more of what
might be called group-action, i.e., activity characteristic to the
members of a social, cultural, or hieratical group. This is reflected in the Greek terms for the classification of human activities
in theoria, praxis, and poesis. Originally these terms referred to
group activities oriented toward contemplation of transcendent
entities, management of the common good, and craftsman-like
creation, respectively. Far f r o m their modern etymological
counterparts of theory, practice, and poetry, whose subjects are
individuals, their precursors were collective representations, or
what w e call trans-individual subjects. The implications of this
difference are far-reaching for understanding the difference in
the political and moral order (e.g., the attribution of honor or
responsibility to the group, rather than the individual, for one's
actions) between antiquity and modernity. Bearing this in mind
will help us to avoid unwarranted analogies between the two
cultures and, especially in this case, to appreciate Hegel's view
of Spirit as the agent behind the historically conceived dialectical synthesis of the moments of freedom along the lines of the
second triad: the pre-modern organic cohesion of individual
and social whole, the modern (post-Renaissance) rise of subjec-
tivity, and the post-modern (post-Reformation) true subjectivity which synthesizes the other two by way of its own contribution of self-consciousness.
It is no accident that the Philosophy of Spirit opens on a classical note the integrity characterizing the political and intellectual life of the polis but also with a modern accent on selfconsciousness, "the summons to Greeks of the Delphic Apollo,
Know Thyself" (Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, trans. W. Wallace/A.V.
Miller, London:Oxford University Press, 1971, #377 Zusatz; subsequently cited as Philosophy of Spirit; Geist has been rendered as
"Spirit" unless otherwise specified; certain minor changes in
spelling and capitalization have been made for the sake of uniformity). Subjective Spirit will be concentrating on the Delphic
motto but, by exploring internality in increasingly concrete
terms, it will also render progressively transparent the external
term (Objective Spirit) as part of its activity. Thus, the cause of
freedom is being forwarded by the same means as the dialectic
of the "I" cast in the triad of concrete universality of the Logic,
but in empirically concrete terms.
If we consider Spirit more closely, we find that its primary and
simplest determination is the T.' The 'I' is something perfectly simple, universal. When we say 'I,' we mean, to be sure, an individual; but since everyone is 'I,' when we say 'I,' we only say something quite universal. The universality of the T enables it to abstract from everything, even from its life. But Spirit is not merely
this abstractly simple being equivalent to light, which was how it
was considered when the simplicity of the soul in contrast to the
composite nature of the body was under discussion; on the contrary, Spirit in spite of its simplicity is distinguished within itself;
for the T sets itself over against itself, makes itself its own object
and returns from this difference, which is, of course, only abstract,
not yet concrete, into unity with itself. This being-with-itself of the
T in its difference from itself is the T s infinitude or ideality. But
this ideality is first authenticated in the relation of the T to the infinitely manifold material confronting it. This material, in being
seized by the 'I,' is at the same time poisoned and transfigured by
the latter's universality: it loses its isolated, independent existence
and receives a spiritual one.
Theology, as we know, expresses this process in picture-thinking
by saying that God the Father (this simple universal or being-within-self), putting aside his solitariness creates Nature (the being that
is external to itself, outside of itself), begets a Son (his other T ) ,
but in the power of his love beholds in this Other himself, recognizes his likeness therein and in it returns to unity with himself;
but this unity is no longer abstract and immediate, but a concrete
unity mediated by the moment of difference; it is the Holy Spirit
which proceeds from the Father and the Son, reaching its perfect
actuality and truth in the community of Christians; and it is as this
Hegel's definition
of Spirit through
philosophy, religion,
and history.
Illustration of the
dialectic of Soul by
way of anthropological participant
observation.
alectical language, this prop will stand until culture, with the
Notion, reaches the standpoint of in-and-for-itselfness (i.e., of
viewing itself in terms of its o w n categories) at which point the
"subjective thinker" is at one with the immanent process.
Inasmuch as Physical Soul, the first moment of Soul, corresponds to Being, w e can expect the same self-generated tendencies of alternating differentiation and individuation as in the
latter. As in (apparently) unmediated Being and Nature, Soul
qua Physical Soul begins as an immediate unity, but progressively unfolds in a great variety of combinations with physical,
biological, and geographical factors. W h e n this unity is gradually challenged at the end of Physical Soul, it is due not to surreptitiously injected dualisms but to internally developing tensions.
Since our main interest lies in the "pre-existing unity" of theory
and practice in the anthropological setting of Soul, it is w o r t h
noting Hegel's uses of the conception of an immediately unitary
Soul to steer clear from the dualism of soul-body and its more
secular offspring, the perennial mind-body problem.
Spirit came into being as the truth of Nature. But not merely is it, as
such a result, to be held the true and real first of what went before:
this becoming or transition bears in the sphere of the Notion the
special meaning of 'free judgement.' Spirit, thus come into being,
means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and
sets itself aside: it means that Spirit presupposes itself no longer as
the universality which in corporeal individuality is always self-externalized, but as a universality which in its concretion and totality
is one and simple. At such a stage it is not yet Spirit, but Soul. (Philosophy of Spirit, #388)
The Soul is no separate immaterial entity. Wherever there is Nature, the Soul is its universal immaterialism, its simple 'ideal' life.
Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and
individualizing of Spirit: it is in the Soul that Spirit finds the material on which its character is wrought, and the Soul remains the
pervading, identical ideality of it all. But as it is still conceived thus
abstractly, the Soul is only the sleep of Spirit the passive nous of
Aristotle, which is potentially all things.
The question of the immateriality of the Soul has no interest, except where, on the one hand, matter is regarded as something true,
and Spirit is conceived as a thing, on the other. But in modern
times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their
hands... The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of
Nature is implicitly at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and
conception of life with this proviso, however, that its existence
or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the sway of selfexternalism. It is otherwise with Spirit. There, in the intelligible
unity which exists as freedom, as absolute negativity, and not as
immediate or natural individual, the object or the reality of the intelligible unity is the unity itself; and so the self-externalism, which
is the fundamental feature of matter, has been completely dissipat-
Pre-existing unity of
Soul undermines
dualism throughout
Spirit.
Having gone through a succession of grades of truth and reality until w e reached their highest grade in the all-inclusive Absolute in Essence, w e should have no difficulty recognizing
Hegel's use of the results of the Logic to undermine the claims of
dualism in the case of matter-mind and body-spirit. Like Aristotle, w h o m Hegel praises for his organicist conception of soul
(psyche), Hegel's Soul uses a structural approach to overcome
these built-in dualisms in current discourse about the soul. "The
Soul is (Nature's) universal immaterialism, its simple 'ideal' life.
Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all particularizing and
individualizing of Spirit." He also adopts the dynamic dimension of psyche as "the sleep of Spirit... which is potentially all
things." The first particularizations of Spirit as Soul are collective
representations exemplifying a thorough fusion of mental and
physical, cultural and climactic, as well as racial and geographic
elements a fusion which can be conveyed in expressions such
as primitive soul, arctic soul, Latin soul. As the dialectic advances within the moment of Physical Soul, its self-differentiation reaches individuation "the Soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject." (Philosophy of Spirit, #395)
The category of Soul now applies to stages of the individual lifecycle, those of the sexes, and states of wakefulness and sleep.
Use of the logic of
The advanced conceptions of action and freedom, familiar
Essence to illuminate to us from late Actuality, can already be traced in these collecthe self-discovery
tive representations of early Soul. Furthermore, since various
and freedom of Soul.
collective souls exist in such a way that cultural contact is possible between them, w e are again given the opportunity to cast
concrete recognizable cultural situations in the categories of
Spirit. Every collective soul is, as part of self-generated Spirit,
the product of the process of self-creation consistent with the
dialectic of Reflection, which Hegel announced earlier in introducing Spirit: "As Spirit is free, its manifestation is to set forth
Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus setting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a
Illustration of the
logic of self-discovery
of Soul through the
cultural dilemmas of
the Third World.
Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual, it is, because immediate, not yet as its self, not a true subject
reflected into itself, and is therefore passive. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it a subject which
may even exist as another individual. By the self-hood of the latter
it a substance, which is only a non-independent predicate is
then set in vibration and controlled without the least resistance on
its part. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be
called its genius. (Philosophy of Spirit, # 405)
This m o m e n t points to the familiar result encapsulated in
the surrogate triad of concrete universality to the effect that
true individuality involves internal differentiation. A "monadic"
state will lead to individuality by w a y of a dyadic relationship,
which is illustrated by a variety of situations ranging f r o m the
normal e.g., mother-foetus; dreaming and the unconscious
or "implicit self" to paranormal states such as a wide assortment of hypnotic or "magnetic" cases, and even supernormal
powers e.g., premonitions, extra-sensory perception, clairvoyance, and spiritual healing.
This standpoint can be called magical relationship of the Feeling
Soul, if this term connotes a relation of inner to outer or to something else generally, which dispenses with any mediation; a magical power is one whose action is not determined by the interconnection, the conditions and mediations of objective relations; but
such a power which produces effects without any mediation is 'the
Feeling Soul in its Immediacy.' (Philosophy of Spirit, #405 Zusatz)
Arbitrary as it may seem by empirical standards of verification, this sector of immediacy of Spirit is anthropologically very
important because it encompasses many classes of immediacy
of action which have "dispense(d) with any mediation." Religious and ritual actions as well as mass-psychological manifes-
Interpretation of
Feeling Soul
through immediacy
of practice (action).
tations still fall within this range. Since, at this stage, Soul has
not yet reached the distinction between subject and object, no
mediation exists to validate the "interconnection" between the
terms of this polarity. Instead, there is a passive and an active
function in a dyadic relationship, whose members are dominated by i m m e d i a c y as if they w e r e at o n e w i t h each other. In
terms of categories of action, this situation corresponds to immediacy on the opposite end of the re-immediation reached by
the analysand at the moment of his terminal session. Both the
analysand and the "genius" are at one with themselves in the
sense that there is no gap between the decision to act and action itself. The "genius" and the "magnetizer" have no more
need of empirical m e t h o d o l o g y to validate their action than
does an individual w h e n it comes to his inner state. But the difference between immediacy and re-immediation signifies that:
whereas the "genius," not aware of the distinction between decision to act and action, simply acts; the analysand, having gone
through the middle moment of mediation through theory-practice, both knows the distinction and transcends it in action.
The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same
facts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality, and to know which, in its sober moods, it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion)
are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence.
This perception is a sort of clairvoyance-, for it is a consciousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius, and finding itself
in the very heart of the interconnection, and so can dispense with
the series of conditions, external one to another, which lead up to
the result the conditions which cool reflection has in succession
to traverse and in so doing feels the limits of its own external individuality. (Philosophy of Spirit, #406; parentheses in the text)
Implications of Feeling Soul for scientific
methodology.
abstract into a concrete universal by w a y of the familiar surrogate triad at each context of meaning. As the discussion of externality has shown, the concrete universal of the dialectic is
the "self-actualizing universal" and not the abstract universal of
the Understanding, whose empirical content has "been raked
together from the outside as something given and contingent,"
thus raising Understanding's myopic dualistic v i e w of reality to
the universality of knowledge. Hegel returns to his critique of
empirical m e t h o d o l o g y in the Philosophy of Spirit w i t h o u t the
logical underpinnings, but with added scorn and special reference to psychology, and the "pre-existing unity" n o w referred
to as "the original unity" of Spirit.
With this defect of the form (i.e., the disunity of universal and particular described above) there is necessarily linked the despiritualization of the content...For though this (i.e., empirical) psychology
also demands that the various spiritual forces shall be harmoniously
integrated a favorite and oft-recurring catch-phrase on this topic,
but one which is just as indefinite as 'perfection' used to be this
gives expression to a unity of Spirit which only ought to be, not to
the original unity, and still less does it recognize as necessary and
rational the particularization to which the Notion of Spirit, its intrinsic unity, progresses. This harmonious integration remains,
therefore, a vacuous idea which expresses itself in high-sounding
but empty phrases but remains ineffective in face of the spiritual
forces presupposed as independent. (Philosophy of Spirit, #378 Zusatz)
The moments of Soul served as anthropological samples of
this "original unity" of Spirit and good illustrations of dialectical
incorporation at a stage of sheer immediacy. As such, the components of culture remain, unbeknownst to its members, inextricably linked not only with each other but also with the physical environment. First, this unity had its locus in Physical Soul
wherein human collectivity was at one with nature. Then, with
Feeling Soul, the focus shifted to a dyadic relationship representing an incipient form of individuality (Feeling Soul in its Immediacy), since the latter involves self-differentiation. But it is implicitly self-diremption, which again is a stage for the emergence
of true individuality. Finally, in the second moment of Feeling
Soul, Self-Feeling or, more accurately, Soul's sense of self
which w e are about to enter now, this self-diremptive aspect of
individuality takes the f o r m of insanity. Immediacy of knowledge and action, and the unmediated transition from the former
to the latter, which w e have been witnessing so far, will again be
highlighted by juxtaposition to self-diremption.
Recapitulation
and transition to
Self-Feeling.
The seeming perversity of insanity occupying the middle between the "original unity" of the first moment, Physical Soul,
and the recapturing of that unity in the individuality of Actual
Soul of the third m o m e n t , should not be a source of puzzle-
Sickness as disunity
between body and
mind.
a n d i l is o n l Y as a
remption or an abstractive view of what already is a "splittingup" to be mended in the next round of synthesis.
Crime and insanity are extremes which the human mind in general
has to overcome in the course if its development, but which do not
appear as extremes in every individual but only in the form of limitations, errors, follies, and offences not of a criminal nature. This is
sufficient to justify our consideration of insanity as an essential
stage in the development of the Soul... The necessity of this
progress lies in the fact that the Soul is already in itself the contradiction of being an individual, a singular, and yet being at the same
time immediately identical with the universal natural Soul, with its
substance. (Philosophy of Spirit, #408 Zusatz)
Insanity as selfdiremption is a
necessary step toward freedom qua
self-realization.
between state and lacking a developed "objective consciousness," Self-Feeling Soul reifies this "particular feeling" which
"is held fast... having the form of a simply affirmative (i.e., merely
positive and so devoid of negative determination which is the
earmark of sublation), hence corporeal being." The sick "I" has
advanced the cause of freedom, having contributed a rather
early installment toward self-consciousness, but in doing so it
has generated for itself a state of unfreedom "a duality of being...produced in him which is not overcome by his objective
consciousness." Freedom carries a heavy price, among others,
of self-diremption in the form of insanity. "Man alone has the
capacity of grasping himself in this complete abstraction of the
7'. This is w h y he has, so to speak, the privilege of folly and
madness." (Philosophy of Spirit, #408 Zusatz).
Consequences of the
Hegelian view of
sickness for the
dialectic of action
and disciplinary
knowledge.
The cultural and philosophical implications of this interpretation of madness as a state of unfreedom which is, nevertheless, a necessary stage in the path of self-realization, are too
great in number and importance to take up here. Instead, w e
shall concentrate on those interpretations centering on our topic the paradigmatic possibilities of the dialectical treatment of
insanity for the illumination of the dialectical synthesis of theory-practice. The madness of Soul is the early prototype of the
modern (i.e., post-classical) malady of self-diremption of a culture, wherein theory-practice has progressively become the
dominant category of action. In both the above, and in our psychoanalytical paradigm of synthesis of action, sickness is a form
of reification: one deals with oneself and other human beings
through a method modelled after scientism. The most obvious,
and at the same time most pervasive, manifestation of this sickness qua reification in modern soul is to be found in the fact
that "objective consciousness... (as defined by scientistic theory-practice) is held fast, is not transformed into ideality." The result is the all-too-familiar feature of modernity, whereby reification permeates all compartments of modern soul:'the rules of
the game for earning a living dominate the way one puts one's
life together as a whole.
One should not be misled about sickness qua reification associated with scientism by the apparent lack of symmetry between Self-Feeling and scientistic soul, i.e., that the latter does
not reify particular subjective feelings but rather holds fast onto
"objective consciousness." Insofar as scientism corresponds to
Essence and, by extension, to Consciousness, the two cases belong to different levels in the dialectical scale. The moment of
Self-Feeling corresponds to an incipient form of externality
which is confined within the Soul and whose referent is the fix-
ated feeling "this feeling... having the form of a simply affirmative, hence corporeal, being." The more advanced externality
vis-a-vis nature has to wait for the transition to Consciousness,
wherein the viewing of nature takes place not merely in the
light of "the magical relationship" of the Feeling Soul in its Immediacy as an extension of the self. For, Self-Feeling Soul had
already overcome this much, only to fall back within its o w n
confines. Rather, the overcoming should be of a true Other to
be dealt with through the instrumentality of theory-practice. In
this case of incipient externality is found not only correspondence between the middle moments of triads of equal overarching capacity, but between middle moments of different capacity as well, i.e., Essence, Consciousness, and Self-Feeling Soul.
What matters, both dialectically and culturally, for our purCultural (holistic
poses of using the dialectical view of insanity to elucidate issues
and particularism
about action and culture in general, is not the specific content of
implications of the
"the moment of difference (between the subjective and objective dialectic of insanity.
sides which) become(s) fixed as a passive, simply affirmative being," but rather the fact that one term of the polarity "is held fast,
is not transformed into an ideality." Similarly, the significance of
the cure as a consequence of the dialectical insight about the
malady of dualism, is that it is a form of transcending this fixation or "fixed limitation," whereby "the duality of being... produced (in the patient) "is... overcome" and not the particular
content of this duality. Only under these circumstances of alienation, common to both culture and the individual, can the importance of the conclusion "that insanity must be grasped essentially as an illness at once mental and physical" become fully illuminated. By pursuing an extended and often profound coverage of
the realms of the prehistorical, the paranormal, the supernormal, and the abnormal, Hegel has partially suspended, by way of
his conception of soul (i.e., Aristotelian soul unity-in-ethnic diversity), the monotheistically grounded dualistic (soul-vmwsbody) parameters of humanistic discourse. His dialectical unityin-diversity approach to culture provides valuable insights into
the current debates about cultural diversity which, dualistically
structured as they are, swing heedlessly between mindless relativism and narrow-minded Judeo-Christian Eurocentrism. These
insights will be taken up in Part V along with other dialectical
explorations of the contemporary scene.
The categories of action have correspondingly benefitted
Transition to the
from this suspension. One can appreciate the extent to which category of Habit
immediacy of action has faithfully served humanity in the
and the immediacy
course of countless millenia of its formative existence. The imof routine practice.
portant function of immediacy can now be fully recognized by
Formally, Habit is the synthesis of the t w o main characteristics of the preceding moments: the fusion of Feeling Soul in its
Immediacy and the self-diremption of Self-Feeling into a higher
unity w h i c h prefigures concrete universality, i.e., a "concrete
immediacy." The latter incorporates, on the one hand, "abstract
universal being" through disengagement from "the particulars of
feelings" and "repetition" of "the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling" and, on the other hand, particularity to the extent that various forms of cultural consciousness (e.g., religious,
moral, etc.) can be said "to be his as this (particular) self, this
(particular) soul." Abstract universality slowly emerges out of
the "original unity" of the Soul, as this unity further breaks
down before the final synthesis of Soul in Actual Soul. This has
significance for our purposes because the "original unity" reflects our pre-existing unity of theory and practice: first as immediacy of action or practice, then Habit, and soon to be encountered as Actual Soul. All of these constitutes incipient forms
of re-immediation of action, inasmuch as the "original unity"
stems from the structural-functional conception of Soul, which
has been exemplified throughout this discussion in its non-dualistic approach to action.
The ingredients of the non-dualistic approach to action in
Soul are as follows: First, in Feeling Soul in its Immediacy as a
condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental, but "psychical"; second, in the realization that action has to be understood
as governed by a "magical relationship" which "dispenses with
any mediation" as a requisite in theory-practice; and finally in
the application of this unitary principle whereby it is recognized
"that insanity must be grasped essentially as an illness at once
mental and physical." The "original unity" of Soul will be reinstated in the forthcoming Actual Soul, but not before it undergoes a
series of self-diremption, the latest of which is Habit. In the latter, Soul becomes further "de-universalized" through self-application of division of labor with an eye to efficiency through detachment from the immediacy of feelings. "The Soul (is) making
itself an abstract universal being, and reducing the particulars of
feelings... to a mere feature of its being... The Soul is freed from
them... (and is) at the same time open to be otherwise occupied
and engaged." (Italics added in this instance) In Habit, Soul is separating itself from its feelings by objectifying them, by "building
up the corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of Soul."
Unlike the state of "original unity" in which the "merely bodily"
and the "merely mental" coincided in the "psychical" structure
which is Soul, now feelings and "corporeal expressions" can be
distinguished from each other by virtue of the latter's "repetition... and the generation of habit as practice."
One may be tempted to conclude, with this apparent separation of the physical from the mental, the preoccupation with efficiency, and the externalization of practice,that the rise of polarity
of theory-practice in the realm of Spirit is finally at hand. Not yet
however, for though with Habit w e have reached beyond mere
Recapitulation of
non-dualistic, as
well as diremptive,
elements of action
implicit in Soul.
Habit prefigures
diremption between physical from
mental implicit in
institutionalization.
nature and into a "second nature," w e are still short of Consciousness where duality in all its manifestations truly belongs.
Soul has indeed generated a rudimentary sort of mediation, because Habit qua second nature and, by extension, practice as repetition, are "an immediacy created by the Soul." Yet Habit is also
part of mere nature "because it is an immediate being of the Soul."
(Added emphases in the last t w o instances) To paraphrase and
extend our familiar motto distinguishing Essence from Notion in
terms of self-consciousness: whereas in Consciousness the "I" operates on itself and thinks that it operates on something external,
and in M i n d it similarly operates on itself and it knows that it
does so, in Soul it lacks even a clear sense of the separation between the two. This anticipation of mediation in the final moments of Soul is reminiscent of the similar prefiguring of Essence
in Measure, the final moment of Being. But it is equally an incipient form of re-immediation of action, as it is more evident in Actual Soul, the last moment of Soul.
Reaffirmation of
non-dualism in
Actual Soul by way
of language and art.
The Soul, when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own, finds itself there a single subject; and the coiporeity is
an externality which stands as a predicate, in being related to which,
it is related to itself. This externality, in other words, represents not
itself, but the Soul, of which it is the sign. In this identity of interior
and exterior, the latter subject to the former, the Soul is actual: in its
corporeity it has its free shape, in which it feels itself and makes itself
felt, and which as the Soul's work of art has human pathognomic and
physiognomic expression. {Philosophy of Spirit, #411)
The Actual Soul is a reaffirmation of the non-dualistic conception of the first moment of Soul (Physical Soul) after incorporating the contributions of the second m o m e n t (Feeling
Soul), including the important benefits of detachment f r o m
feelings through repetition (Habit). By virtue of the latter it can
liberate enough energy for symbolizing activity, thus signalling
the transition to higher forms of culture. The process of liberation through delegation of routine action to habit, reaches a
high point w i t h the symbolizing function of language. "Seen
from the animal world, the human figure is the supreme phase
in which Spirit makes an appearance. But for the Spirit it is only its first appearance, while language is its perfect expression."
(Philosophy of Spirit, #411) Language is an advanced specimen of
Soul's "corporeity b e ( i n g ) m o u l d e d and made thoroughly its
o w n . " It can be equally taken as a high-grade immediacy or,
as above, a low-grade re-immediation of action. For the externality implied in this action is not yet the genuine externality to be d e v e l o p e d in Consciousness as it was in Essence; it
"represents not itself, but the Soul, of which it (i.e., externality)
is the sign." In placing language under Habit in the context of
Cautionary note on
the apparent attainment offreedom in
Actual Soul.
yond the citizen of the polis to the good Christian knight, the
good Marine, and of course the good radical of our paradigm.
They all are part of a closely-knit community whose values cohere in varying degrees with a wider social whole. But above
all, they share in this "magical relationship" of immediate operation of mind and body in pursuing their ideals and defending
their values. As the more insightful reformers and experimental
educators of all times, but especially of the 1960s realized, experiential education along the principle of the "concrete immediacy" of the Soul viewed as "at once mental and physical," is indispensable for societal bonding through instillation of values.
Recalling our example of the correspondence of theoria, praxis,
and poesis to parts of the soul of the polis, the expectation was
that in a healthy community each part will act in line with the
category of action appropriate to it without having to apply the
test of theory-practice. The latter would have automatically resorted to mediation, which would mean that the right knowledge may not have automatically issued in virtuous action.
But w e must not try to advance too quickly, lest we may be
perceived as suggesting that the freedom of the citizen of the
polis is also ours. Our casting of Actual Soul into the role of
both re-immediation (facing backward) and immediacy (facing
forward) highlighted the facf (also done earlier in conjunction
with casting Hegel's dialectic of freedom in historical terms)
that the self-diremption of Actual Soul in the hands of Consciousness is both a historical fact and a philosophical determination after the fact. To put it in the dialectical language of SelfFeeling Soul, the insanity implied in scientistic theory-practice
is an "essential stage in the d e v e l o p m e n t of Soul." Hegel's
meticulous inclusion and emphasis of self-consciousness as an
ingredient in the definition of modern freedom, was meant also
as a warning against culturally and historically unwarranted invocations of ideals of classical paedeia in the education and, indeed, socialization in our times. That right knowledge can issue
immediately in virtuous action seems inconceivable to our
modernity, inhabited as it is by moral theorists who are preaching virtue during their working hours, but w h o turn to "do
their o w n thing" after work and all of this in the name of
freedom. But, more fundamentally, it is symptomatic of how
modernity is imbued with the syndrome of mediation as exemplified in theory-practice, which has also encroached upon the
domain of action and freedom. Equally inconceivable for a
member of a pre-modern culture (particularly that of early polis
where the virtue of honor reigned supreme) would be the selfdirempted behavior of our teacher of moral virtue.
Emergence of
ness and ending with reunified Mind takes place within the
compass of increasingly self-enriched (concrete) subjectivity. Finally, instead of a synthesis between theory associated with a
subject, and practice with an object, w e shall witness their synthesis in Mind only insofar as they represent these self-generated polarities within the subject.
The transition f r o m Soul to Consciousness is the result of
Consciousness from
Spirit by way of
w h a t w e h a v e encountered in the last m o m e n t as the increased p o w e r of Actual Soul has its corporeity "moulded and
self-reflection.
The symmetry
between Consciousness and Essence
The Spirit as ego is Essence; but since reality, in the sphere of qua middle triadic
Essence, is represented as in immediate being and at the same time
terms, and as dual
as 'ideal,' it is as Consciousness only the appearance (phenomenon)
structures.
of Spirit. (Philosophy of Spirit, #414; parenthesis in the text)
sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as implicitly and
explicitly determinate, as Reason, the Notion of Mind. (Philosophy of
Spirit, #417)
Further symmetries
between Logic and
Spirit illuminate
Spirit's project of progressive concreteness.
The building up of concreteness of the subjective term is already in process, as the latter begins as "only the appearance" of
Spirit in the first quoted paragraph, and m o v e s to gradually
"make its appearance identical with its essence." The "grades of
this elevation of certainty to truth" are pari passu grades of subjectivity, which are structuralized as is Being. In #415 Hegel is
explicit that "consciousness consequently appears differently
m o d i f i e d according to the difference of the given object; and
the gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation
in the characteristics of the objects." Thus, from the standpoint
of Subjective Spirit, the raising of "its self-certainty to truth" corresponds in the Logic to the synthesis of Essence and Appearance in Actuality "to mak(ing Spirit's) appearance identical
with its essence." Pursuing "the grades of this elevation of certainty to truth" one step further, the first sub-division of Consciousness Proper, Sensuous Consciousness, corresponds to Existence in the Logic; its second, Sense-perception, to the Thing;
and its third, Intellect or, what w e have been referring to as
the Understanding (Verstand) throughout these pages corresponds to scientistic rationality from the phenomenalism of early Appearance to the sophisticated theory-construction of late
Essential Relation.
The transition from Consciousness Proper to Self-consciousness results in an upgrading of Spirit's project of "elevation of
certainty to truth," as Spirit turns the light on itself, as its object. But m o r e important for the undertaking of progressive
concreteness, there is a sharp turn toward social and historical
concreteness, totally belied by the triad's title but perfectly fitting Spirit's long-run enterprise. Anticipating what is forthcoming, with the help of symmetries between Logic and Spirit, the
gains f r o m the build-up of concreteness in the subject under
Consciousness Proper are applied to Self-consciousness. The latter, being treated like the contradiction between Essence and
Appearance in the Logic, yields to what corresponds to late Actuality in that work, Universal Self-consciousness. Finally, in
Reason corresponding to the Subjective Notion in the Logic
the model of self-consciousness resurfaces as Spirit makes
the transition to Mind. At this level of high concreteness of the
subject, the boundary between subject and object becomes increasingly difficult to fix and their respective theoretical and
practical roles, as w e have hitherto known them, reverse themselves and become fused in the subject. As of now, the subject's
Concreteness begins to build up rather quickly for the remainder of Consciousness, starting with a category which may
seem unsuitable for such a role, Self-consciousness. The latter is
pursued through variously illuminating socially and historically
concrete embodiments, but not before the logical foundations
are set with the categorial equipment of the Logic. The familiar
dialectical rhythm of Identity used to pursue the self-differentiation in a succession of particularized identities of Being is n o w
used again, beginning with an abstract conception of self-identity, of the 1=1.
Self-consciousness is the truth of Consciousness: the latter is a consequence of the former, all consciousness of an other object being as
a matter of fact also self-consciousness. The object is my idea: I am
aware of the object as mine; and thus in it I am aware of me. The
formula of Self-consciousness is 1=1: abstract freedom, pure 'Ideality'; and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is its own object, there is
strictly speaking no object, because there is no distinction between
it and the object.
In the formula, 1=1, is enunciated the principle of absolute Reason
and freedom. Freedom and Reason consist in this, that I raise myself to the form of 1=1, that I know everything as mine... that in the
world I find myself again, and, conversely, in my consciousness
have what is, what possesses objectivity. This unity of the T and the
object which constitutes the principle of Mind is, however, at first
only abstractly present in immediate Self-consciousness, and is
known only by us who reflect on it, not as yet by Self-consciousness itself. Immediate Self-consciousness has not as yet for its object the 1=1, but only the 'I'; therefore, it is free only for-us, not foritself, is not yet aware of its freedom, and contains only the foundation of it, but not as yet freedom that is truly actual. (Philosophy of
Spirit, #424 and Zusatz)
As the truth of Sense-perception is the Intellect (Understanding), so is Self-consciousness the truth of Consciousness. Following the dialectical principle of circularity, the more advanced category in logically completing or making explicit the less advanced one, also provides the context of meaning in which the
latter can be understood. Self-consciousness is as much presupposed in consciousness, though this remains implicit, as it is the
outcome of the latter, inasmuch as what was previously an ex-
Parallelism between
the dialectic of Identity and that of
Consciousness.
the same conclusion is formally effected in the dialectical transition from Consciousness Proper to the triad of Self-consciousness. This is only the beginning of securing the object within
the fold of the subject, thus laying a similar foundation for freedom on the part of concrete Spirit as the dialectic of freedom
has laid in logical terms in Actuality Proper. But it is a very important beginning in the sense that the logical connection between externally caused to self-given action has been, since the
Cartesian point of contact between mind and matter, an ongoing riddle for dualistic mind.
The dialectical unfolding of action qua self-given begins with
Appetite, the first sub-moment of Self-consciousness. Re-immediation is at work again since such beginning of Self-consciousness points to its lowly roots in Soul. But it is also indicative of
a related phenomenon, which is fundamental for our project.
This was referred to above as reversal of the polarity of theorypractice, which lays the ground for the advanced form of "practical" as self-given: the situation whereby the subject of the last
quotation "free(s) itself from its (passive) sensuousness, to set
aside the given (from the outside) objectivity (which is also the
testing ground of scientistic practice) and identify it with itself."
These ingredients of an incipient practical qua self-given attitude of the subject are found in pre-existing unity in Appetite.
Such continuity of this "practical" from the quasi-animalistic
Appetite to the self-given action according to universal laws of
the last moment of Self-consciousness, Universal Self-consciousness, would have no doubt appalled Kant w h o , as w e
shall see in detail later, wanted the sensuous and the rational
domains compartmentalized. However, w e should be cautious
in realizing that this is only one battle with externality and that
the confrontation with the object will not be over with Selfconsciousness in the middle of Subjective Spirit. It is well to remember that here Self-consciousness (and M i n d in a more
comprehensive way later) is dealing with objectivity within itself, as a preliminary step to its final synthetic task in the Idea.
Stated in our customary alternative way, Spirit has first to build
up its concreteness qua subject (Subjective Spirit) and later as
object (Objective Spirit) in anticipation of the final synthesis.
This is done for the purpose of pre-empting any situation in
which either term may resurface as merely subjective or merely
objective thus aborting the synthesis. In short, while a succession of battles are being won, the war with externality will not
be over until w e reach the Idea, and more precisely the Absolute Idea.
Appetite, the
moment of Selfconsciousness, as
the progenitor of
self-given (free)
action.
Social organization
as a basis for selfrealization emerges
out of the struggleto-the-death for
recognition.
The justly celebrated dialectic of master and slave in the Phenomenology of Spirit, of which this is a most severe condensation,
is, in addition to being a stage in the development of Self-consciousness, also a paradigm for social development as force
gives way to power and its consolidation through institutions of
production and social control. Having learned the benefits of
self-control and habits of workmanship from the slave, upon
w h o m he has become increasingly dependent, the master is
now ready to join him in obedience to the universal rule of law
and the impersonal rationality of the productive process. The
door is even left open for the emancipation of both from social
stratification and subjugation to division of labor, as the transition is being made to the last moment of Self-consciousness,
Universal Self-consciousness and the principle of Reason.
Universal selfconsciousness, or
the standpoint of
Reason, as the consciousness offreedom
belonging to all.
In this stage (i.e., Universal Self-consciousness), therefore, the mutually related self-conscious subjects, by setting aside their unequal
particular individuality, have risen to the consciousness of their real universality, of the freedom belonging to all, and hence to the
intuition of their specific identity with each other... In this state of
universal freedom, in being reflected into myself, I am immediately
reflected into the other person, and, conversely, in relating myself
to the other I am immediately self-related... The nature of this relationship is thoroughly speculative (i.e., dialectical); and when it is
supposed that the speculative is something remote and inconceivable, one has only to consider the content of this relationship to
convince oneself of the baselessness of this opinion. The speculative, or the rational and true, consists in the unity of the Notion or
subjectivity, and objectivity. (Philosophy of Spirit, #436 Zusatz)
This unity of Consciousness and Self-consciousness (in Universal
Self-consciousness) implies in the first instance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. But the difference between
those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity or rather it
is a difference which is none. Hence its truth is the fully and really
existent universality and objectivity of Self-consciousness which
is Reason. (Philosophy of Spirit, #437)
Thus, Consciousness, the middle moment of Subjective Spirit, culminates in an intersubjective form of rationality, already
encountered as the Cunning of Reason in Adam Smith's model
of economic organization under the principle of the Invisible
Hand. Not unlike the previous situation in which the dyadic interplay of individual rationality (in the case of the liberal and
his opponent) issued in trans-individual Reason as the principle
behind advanced forms of social organization, so n o w the dialectic of the individual self-consciousnesses of master and slave
results in a trans-individual (Universal) Self-consciousness
"which is Reason."
At first sight this may seem to be Subjective Spirit's misappropriation of a task concerning social organization which is reserved for Objective Spirit. But if w e recall the discussion at the
opening of this Section about the build-up in concreteness of
the subjective and objective terms of Spirit in anticipation of
the synthesis, this is perfectly appropriate. It should, therefore,
come as no surprise certainly not as much of a surprise after
the similar experience of progressive concreteness of the terms
of theory-practice resulting in the synthesis of Actuality that
Reason now emerges as social embodiment in the climactic moment of Self-consciousness, whose prima faciae psychological
nature hardly conveys anything as institutionally concrete as
Reason which is its dialectical outcome. After all, it is such objectification (in an elevated subjectivity) of mere (i.e., psychologistic) subjectivity that has been going on throughout these moments, especially in Self-consciousness, which w e tried to convey by the title of this Section. For example, the socially concrete material pertaining to the dialectic of master and slave is
no mere external manifestations of their respective self-consciousnesses, but a component of a Universal (trans-individual)
Self-consciousness in the making a "really existent universality and objectivity of Self-consciousness which is Reason."
Nor are Hegel's illuminating cultural and historical material in
the Phenomenology of Spirit mere exemplifications of a succession
of forms of individual consciousness and self-consciousness, as
they are often taken to be. Rather, they are dialectical phases of
a unitary Spirit on its path to progressive concreteness by way
of attainment of self-consciousness. Assuming that w e can abstract away from the dynamic dimension of the dialectic, Hegel
is, in this respect, close to Plato's organic doctrine of the community in the Republic in the sense that w h e n it comes to its
function and the articulation of parts, the community is the individual soul writ large.
This conclusion is consistent with the requirement for the elevated subjectivity of a trans-individual subject as the locus for
our final synthesis. Subjective Spirit, and the moment of Selfconsciousness in particular, have secured such a subject whose
elevated nature is the other side of its high level of concreteness, i.e., the possibility of including within itself what has hitherto been social and historical externality. Without such possibility for it is only just that until the synthesis of Subjective
and Objective Spirit the synthesis of theory-practice and subject-object will continue to elude us. In this connection it is also
worth noting that Reason, in its capacity of embodiment in history and institutions (as w e shall soon encounter it in Objective
Spirit), is the converse of concrete Self-consciousness in its possibility of incorporating socio-historical externality. Expressed in
terms of symmetries between the Logic and the Philosophy of
Spirit, w e have reached the latter's counterpart in the Logic, the
point from which w e set out at the end of Essence for our digression into the Philosophy of Spirit and our search for more
sensuously concrete formulations of the dialectic of theory and
practice. The conclusion which then equated the actual and the
rational is now the logical counterpart of Reason's capacity for
embodiment "the unity of the Notion or subjectivity, and objectivity" in Reason here. Hegel's castigation of realism, to the
effect that "ideas are not confined to our heads merely, nor is
the Idea, upon the whole, so feeble as to leave the question of
its actualization or non-actualization dependent on our will,"
corresponds to his condemnation of an equally abstract view of
Reason: "the baselessness of th(e) opinion" that "the speculative is something remote and inconceivable."
The symmetry extends further in terms of turning the possibilities opened up by Self-consciousness and Reason into the
actuality of the Idea and self-complete Spirit. In the Logic traces
of externality continued to resurface as contingency undermined the totalizing effort of Actuality Proper. This had manifested itself at the level of theory-practice as a symptom of the
deeply embedded subject-object duality, which prevented the
convergence of the terms of the polarity from consummating
themselves into a final synthesis. In other words, the coincidence of the rational and the actual was pronounced by a subject for which it was still external, the effort of the dialectic of
Actuality Proper notwithstanding. The counterpart of this in
the Philosophy of Spirit is represented by the fact that the moment of Mind still awaits us before the subjective term of Spirit
can come to full concreteness and readiness to unite with its
objective counterpart. Stated differently, Reason is not ready for
its role as an institutional embodiment in Objective Spirit before engaging in a bout of self-scrutiny, as represented by Mind.
Or, adapting our familiar motto, which distinguishes phases of
the Logic, to the corresponding conditions of Subjective Spirit:
While in Consciousness (Essence) thought operates on itself but
thinks that it operates on something external, and in Mind (Notion) it operates on itself in full awareness that it does so, in
Reason too thanks to the m o m e n t of Self-consciousness
which preceded it it is aware that it operates on itself, but it
does not know precisely how this takes place. It is this last point
that Mind is meant to take care of in the temporary retreat of
Reason to the interiority of thought, and as the cultivation of
ssausnopsuoj apnuoj
As is evident from perusing the list of the categories of Subjective Spirit, Mind subdivides into Theoretical, Practical, and
Free M i n d . The latter is the synthesis of the other t w o and
moves along the same lines as the familiar dialectic of freedom
outlined in the course of Actuality. However, we are now dealing, not merely with the logical structure of the "I," but with a
psychologically fleshed-out " I " around that structure. In this
sense of concreteness w e stand at a more advanced dialectical
level than w e did earlier. Our applications of the dialectic of
f r e e d o m in A c t u a l i t y w e r e i n t e n d e d to illustrate that its
progress is stifled as long as its totalizing effort was infected by
contingency or, put differently, as long as the dialectic remained
short of the Notion. N o w that the Notion is close at hand in the
form of its counterpart in Subjective Spirit (i.e., Mind), we are
being confronted with a different sort of inadequacy. Unlike Actuality, Mind is not burdened with externality because it did
not attain the kind of self-containment it set out to achieve.
Rather, having accomplished its task (the synthesis of the theoretical and practical terms at the individual level, which w e
shall soon witness), it continues to fall short of the synthesis of
the individual and the social whole as encountered in Essence,
but not as yet fully resolved in the Logic. Thus, neither Mind
nor Essence, for different reasons, can provide the setting for
the final synthesis, though as complements of each other the
psychological concreteness of the "I" and in its juxtaposition to
the Other (the social whole), respectively they have taken
one step toward getting closer.
Such step w e are now about to take as w e bypass the detail
of the sub-categories of Theoretical and Practical Mind and
move directly to their synthesis.
As Consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it, viz.
the natural Soul (#413), so Mind has or rather makes Consciousness its object: i.e. whereas Consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its Other (#415), the Mind realizes that identity
as the concrete unity which it and it only knows. Its productions
are governed by the principle of all Reason that the contents are at
once potentially existent, and are the Mind's own, in freedom.
Thus, if we consider the initial aspect of Mind, that aspect is
twofold as being and as its own: by the one, the Mind finds in itself something which is, by the other it affirms it to be only its own.
The way of Mind is therefore (a) to be Theoretical: it has to do
with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its
own: or it has to free knowledge from its pre-supposedness and
therefore from its abstractness, and make the affection subjective.
When the affection has been rendered its own, and the knowledge
The dialectical
moments of Mind in
symmetry with
theory-practice.
Gradual shift in
the meaning of
"practical" from
scientistic to moral
with the dialectic of
totalization.
petite, and all the way back to the original unity of theory and
practice in Soul, has to include among its links the externally given practice of scientistic theory-practice. The anomaly of having
the same term cover such seemingly incompatible meanings, led
serious thinkers to draw a sharp distinction, and even generate
philosophical terminology, in order to avoid what they considered irreconcilable meanings of "practical."
We can begin to show that such anomaly is only apparent by
repeating our contention, that only in the context of a trans-individual subject is the final synthesis of theory and practice, in
their most advanced formulation, possible. Throughout this
work w e have assumed a continuity between the externally
given (scientistic) "practical" and the self-given "practical" (as
part the domain of freedom). Now, in the light of the preliminary sketch of the dialectical synthesis of an advanced version
of theory and practice as Theoretical and Practical Mind, we can
ascertain the connection between, on the one hand, the role of
the trans-individual subject as the locus for the final synthesis
and, on the other, the changing relationship between the two
meanings of "practical" (also referred to as the reversal of the
polarity of theory-practice). Already at the end of Theoretical
Mind, "when the (immediate) affection (of external being) has
been rendered its own," the practical qua externally given has
been sublated into what is a trans-individual subject. In retrospect, w e can see that this process has been going on behind
the surface all along, as progress was being made in the theoretical effort of Essence. Correspondingly, this happened also in
Consciousness, with Self-consciousness supplying the indispensable ingredient to the formula of "being and as its own" by
bringing the object under the rubric of a new subjectivity (i.e.,
self-consciousness as the core of trans-individual subjectivity).
The scientistic "practical" has been dialectically absorbed qua
external and retained as internal in the new subjectivity, from
which point it can be declared self-given and delivered in normative terms. Thus, some of the reverence has been removed
from the practical qua self-given, especially its capacity to deliver moral commands dressed in universality, beginning with Actuality Proper in the Logic and, correspondingly, with Universal
Self-consciousness in the Philosophy of Spirit. For, as w e recall
from the application of the dialectic of Actuality to the concept
of freedom, it was the inexorable logic of totalization under the
pressure of resurfacing contingency that yielded freedom as
self-realization, but only when pursued self-consciously by an
individual also willing the interest of the whole.
the practical (not yet deed and action, but) enjoyment. (Philosophy of
Spirit, #444; parentheses in the text)
True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding
its purpose in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a content is only possible in thought and through
thought: it is nothing short of absurd to seek to banish thought
from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life.
Intelligence has demonstrated itself to be Mind that withdraws into
itself from the object, that recollects itself in it and recognizes its inwardness as objectivity. Conversely, will at the start of its self-objectification is still burdened with the form of subjectivity. But here, in
the sphere of Subjective Spirit, we have only to pursue this externalization to the point where volitional intelligence becomes Objective Spirit, that is, to the point where the product of will ceases
to be merely enjoyment and starts to become deed and action.
(Philosophy of Spirit, #469 and Zusatz)
Futility of assigning
logical priority to
either polar term
in effecting the synthesis of Mind.
The build-up in concreteness of the respective terms, especially Theoretical Mind, occupies the bulk of the middle section
of Mind. But the general sense in which this foreshadows their
convergence and contains the germ, not only of their synthesis
at the level of Subjective, but at that of Objective Spirit as well,
is contained in the above quoted passages. The build-up of Theoretical Mind culminates in thought (Thinking) and of Practical
Mind in enjoyment. But, as Hegel emphasizes above, the content of their synthesis in Free Mind (or Free Action) "true
liberty, in the shape of moral life... the will finding its purpose
in a universal content" in line with the dialectic of freedom
cannot be understood unless enjoyment is mediated by thought
for, "such a content (of e n j o y m e n t ) is only possible in
thought and through thought."
Hegel shows the way in which conditions for the union of
Theoretical and Practical Mind pre-exist (activity or "productivity" underlies both) their respective syntheses, which issue "in
the theoretical range (in) the word, and in the practical (not yet
deed and action, but) enjoyment." By insisting on their common
feature of activity more accurately of self-"productivity"
characteristic of Spirit rather than distinguish them respectively as "active and passive," he is setting the stage for recognizing the mental and the physical in the context of a unitary
principle as he did under Soul. Now, however, in the light of
the intervening moment of Consciousness and the historically corresponding Cartesian revolution of dualistic consciousness
looking for a point of contact between mental and physical substance, to say nothing about their synthesis their pre-existing
unity in Soul is not sufficient. One must look for a mediated
unity, which, in fact, Free Mind (or Free Action) is. The unitary
Illustration of the
non-dualism of
mental-physical
through the Paradigms of Part I.
The unity-producing
power of negation
and sublation exemplified in the moments of Theoretical
Mind.
seek(ing) to banish (it) from the moral, religious and law-abiding life." As w e shall soon see in Objective Spirit, what is found
embodied in institutions and physical structures is not individual thought per se, but the latter as mediated by the activity of
the trans-individual subject, or Spirit, in the manner of the economic paradigm. In this the radical partakes as much as the liberal, albeit to a great extent unself-consciously. This also fits the
conclusion of the philosophical paradigm that the certification
of the radical's action as genuine challenge to Objective Spirit
can only come post festum. Similar considerations hold vis-a-vis a
possible objection that for Hegel to push externality to the limit
in the interest of internality (inclusive of externality) is essentially a process of re-appropriation rather than of sheer destruction. Again, as clarified in Soul, Spirit is free from destruction or
death, and any seeming setback for it can only be interpreted
after the fact as an opportunity to consolidate its powers on its
path to a higher level of self-consciousness and freedom. Therefore, any conclusions as to how much better off Spirit (i.e., culture) would have been if, say, the barbarians had not sacked
Rome, or Mao's Red Guards had not destroyed irreplaceable
treasures of high historical and artistic value, belong to the
same class of futile speculations as those of the cultural historian of the Stalin era.
As the dialectical meaning of negativity and the related
process of sublation clearly suggest, destruction is the other side
of creation and rejection is an essential aspect of re-appropriation. If progressive concreteness of the polar terms, achieved by
way of pushing externality to its limits and appropriating what
continues to lie on the periphery through the dialectic of Identity (and Reflection), then sublation is indispensable to the
process of re-appropriation. Even the process of knowing and
its organon, Theoretical Mind, which is commonly considered
the apex of conservation, are good illustrations of this dual
process of selection and rejection, appropriation and alienation,
and creation and destruction. For example, Representation
(Vorstellung), the second moment of Theoretical Mind, means
literally re-presentation of what lay implicit in Intuition. The
latter has also undergone the same process of re-appropriation
through its informal sub-moments of selective attention and
fixation of the object potentially within its fold. The sub-moments of Representation perform the same task through the
more sophisticated discursive apparatus of Theoretical Mind. In
Recollection (Erinnerung) the subject literally re-collects
makes its own once more, now in a more secure and intimate
w a y a specific segment of the contents of Intuition which
was his to begin with. On the other hand, Imagination (Einbildungskraft) is involved in the creation of its images out of what
has been internalized in Recollection.
Significantly, the process of symbolization is placed under
the creative rubric of Imagination, pointing to several important
developments which affect the remainder of Spirit. For example, Hegel adopts the position of priority of language o v e r
thought, as is also evident from his placement of Thinking
i.e., categorially advanced thought having Actuality as its approximate logical counterpart after Imagination and Memory
(Gedachtnis) at the end of Theoretical Mind. But given the dialectical (circular) interpretation of categorial order, the meaning of such priority has to be understood according to the familiar reversal of temporal and logical priority. This point was first
expounded in Part I as the Janus-faced Spirit of the circular
path of the dialectic, and more formally in introducing Spirit
earlier: "From our point of view Spirit has for its (temporal) presupposition Nature, of which it is the truth, and for that reason
(logically speaking) its absolute prius." We cannot go into further
detail in this important and controversial matter without being
deflected from our main topic. But the dialectic offers, in the
combination of circularity and structuralization of both symbolization and thought, fruitful approaches to this thorny problem
of the relationship between thought and language. W e can
view language, along with reality to which it is linked through
thought, not monolithically but as consisting of grades depending upon its position on the dialectical scale. A n y attempt to
keep language compartmentalized from either thought or reality would reintroduce the familiar polarity of thought and being
under the guise of a new dualism of symbolization and reality.
Thus, one can speak of each discipline as having its own discourse, not merely in terms of a range of subject matter, .but also in terms of its peculiar structure of language. Each discipline
can be said to have its own "English," not so much in terms of
vocabulary, grammar, and syntax, which can still remain less
than literary without significant detriment to the disciplinary
sub-text, but more so as the "logic" or structure of the disciplinary discourse itself is concerned. For example, the particular
disciplinary literacy appropriate to sociological theory, and its
associated philosophical complements, has closer structural
affinity to the analytical "logic" of legal argument, rather than
the narrative structure of history, the inform-and-command
"logic" of a bureaucratic memo, or the descriptive-classificatory
"logic" of zoology, botany, and so on. This is precisely what
Hegel is contesting when he gives full rein to Spirit qua active
Deconstructionist
parallels to the
dialectical conception
of language.
Intelligence (now at the stage of Thinking) is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition (i.e., the reservoir from which Imagination
draws for its symbolizing activity), but only because that intuition
is already its own (#454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact
(#462): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of
the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as Being finds that is the genuine universal which is its own unity
overlapping and including its Other, viz. Being...
Thinking is the third and last main stage in the development of intelligence; for in it the immediate, implicit unity of subjectivity and
objectivity present in Intuition is restored out of the opposition of
these two sides in Representation as a unity enriched by this opposition, hence as a unity both in essence and in actuality. The end is
accordingly bent back into the beginning... Those who have no
comprehension of philosophy become speechless, it is true, when
they hear the proposition that Thought is Being. None the less, underlying all our actions is the presupposition of the unity of
Thought and Being. (Philosophy of Spirit, #465 and Zusatz; parentheses containing numbers in the text)
Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode
of Being, is, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own
property: the last negation of immediacy has implicitly required that
the intelligence shall itself determine its content. Thus thought, as
free Notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content, which is its
mode no less than it is a mode of Being, it is Will. (Philosophy of
Spirit, #468)
The synthesis of the theoretical and practical moments in
Theoretical Mind is accomplished when the process of progressive concreteness in the form of re-appropriation has been carried to its logical conclusion, turning the practical into the theoretical moment's property. The proprietary metaphor for the
synthesis, originally introduced "as being and as its own," has
been preserved throughout a long chain of intermediation until
all externality has been appropriated by the theoretical moment
what had hitherto remained alien has ceased to be so "now
that it (the theoretical moment) has completed taking possession
(of it), in its own property." The result of this build-up in concreteness of the theoretical term into a transition to the practical term has been as inescapable as it has been startling in its
simple naturalness. But the amount and complexity of the
preparatory work required for such an apparently simple outcome should not go unnoticed. For example, Hegel has given
us evidence of the presence of the dialectic of Identity by pointing out "the genuine (i.e., concrete) universal which is its own
unity overlapping and including its Other, viz. Being." Also evident is the necessity of the operation of circularity on the dialectical path "the end is accordingly bent back into the beginning" if the process of re-appropriation is to amount to
anything more than a proprietary metaphor. Last but not least,
the same operation of totalization is under way in connection
with the dialectic of freedom as had occurred in Essence, but in
reverse sequence. Whereas in Actuality Proper the will is "conscious to itself that its content is intrinsically firm and fast, and
knows it at the same time to be thoroughly its o w n , " here
thought "shall itself determine its content... (so that) as free Notion, is also free in point of content."
Though with the transition f r o m Theoretical to Practical
Mind their synthesis has been rendered virtually complete,
Hegel proceeds to use the same symmetrical approach to the
synthesis as he did earlier with the theoretical term, but n o w
working through the progressive concreteness of the practical
term. The focus is being reversed and the attention directed to
the theoretical features incorporated in the practical term, as
the process of intermediation carries us forward to Free Mind
(or Free Action). Practical Sense (or Feeling), the first sub-moment of Practical Mind, also represents the purest form of immediacy of action.
It (Practical Sense) is thus 'practical feeling,' or instinct of action. In
this phase, as it is at bottom a subjectivity simply identical with
reason, it has no doubt a rational content, but a content which as it
stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent
and subjective... (Philosophy of Spirit, #471)
The "Ought" ... (corresponding to this formative "practical") is the
claim of its essential autonomy to control some existing mode of
fact which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to
that claim.
Delight, joy, grief, etc., shame, repentance, contentment, etc., are
partly only modifications of the formal 'Practical Feeling' in general,
but are partly different in the features that give the special tone
and character mode to their 'Ought.'
The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world, so far
at least as evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and
painful merely, arises on this stage of the formal Practical Feeling.
Evil is nothing but the incompatibility between what is and what
ought to be. (Philosophy of Spirit, #472)
The synthesis of
Mind approached
from Practical Mind
via progressive
concreteness.
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us evidence of the presence of the dialectic of Identity by pointing out "the genuine (i.e., concrete) universal which is its own
unity overlapping and including its Other, viz. Being." Also evident is the necessity of the operation of circularity on the dialectical path "the end is accordingly bent back into the beginning" if the process of re-appropriation is to amount to
anything more than a proprietary metaphor. Last but not least,
the same operation of totalization is under way in connection
with the dialectic of freedom as had occurred in Essence, but in
reverse sequence. Whereas in Actuality Proper the will is "conscious to itself that its content is intrinsically firm and fast, and
knows it at the same time to be thoroughly its o w n , " here
thought "shall itself determine its content... (so that) as free Notion, is also free in point of content."
Though with the transition from Theoretical to Practical
Mind their synthesis has been rendered virtually complete,
Hegel proceeds to use the same symmetrical approach to the
synthesis as he did earlier with the theoretical term, but n o w
working through the progressive concreteness of the practical
term. The focus is being reversed and the attention directed to
the theoretical features incorporated in the practical term, as
the process of intermediation carries us forward to Free Mind
(or Free Action). Practical Sense (or Feeling), the first sub-moment of Practical Mind, also represents the purest form of immediacy of action.
It (Practical Sense) is thus 'practical feeling,' or instinct of action. In
this phase, as it is at bottom a subjectivity simply identical with
reason, it has no doubt a rational content, but a content which as it
stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent
and subjective... (Philosophy of Spirit, #471)
The "Ought" ... (corresponding to this formative "practical") is the
claim of its essential autonomy to control some existing mode of
fact which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to
that claim.
Delight, joy, grief, etc., shame, repentance, contentment, etc., are
partly only modifications of the formal 'Practical Feeling' in general,
but are partly different in the features that give the special tone
and character mode to their 'Ought.'
The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world, so far
at least as evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and
painful merely, arises on this stage of the formal Practical Feeling.
Evil is nothing but the incompatibility between what is and what
ought to be. (Philosophy of Spirit, #472)
The synthesis of
Mind approached
from Practical Mind
via progressive
concreteness.
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t;iu31uo3 J O
us evidence of the presence of the dialectic of Identity by pointing out "the genuine (i.e., concrete) universal which is its own
unity overlapping and including its Other, viz. Being." Also evident is the necessity of the operation of circularity on the dialectical path "the end is accordingly bent back into the beginning" if the process of re-appropriation is to amount to
anything more than a proprietary metaphor. Last but not least,
the same operation of totalization is under way in connection
with the dialectic of freedom as had occurred in Essence, but in
reverse sequence. Whereas in Actuality Proper the will is "conscious to itself that its content is intrinsically firm and fast, and
knows it at the same time to be thoroughly its o w n , " here
thought "shall itself determine its content... (so that) as free Notion, is also free in point of content."
Though with the transition f r o m Theoretical to Practical
Mind their synthesis has been rendered virtually complete,
Hegel proceeds to use the same symmetrical approach to the
synthesis as he did earlier with the theoretical term, but n o w
working through the progressive concreteness of the practical
term. The focus is being reversed and the attention directed to
the theoretical features incorporated in the practical term, as
the process of intermediation carries us forward to Free Mind
(or Free Action). Practical Sense (or Feeling), the first sub-moment of Practical Mind, also represents the purest form of immediacy of action.
It (Practical Sense) is thus 'practical feeling,' or instinct of action. In
this phase, as it is at bottom a subjectivity simply identical with
reason, it has no doubt a rational content, but a content which as it
stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent
and subjective... (Philosophy of Spirit, #471)
The "Ought" ... (corresponding to this formative "practical") is the
claim of its essential autonomy to control some existing mode of
fact which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to
that claim.
Delight, joy, grief, etc., shame, repentance, contentment, etc., are
partly only modifications of the formal 'Practical Feeling' in general,
but are partly different in the features that give the special tone
and character mode to their 'Ought.'
The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world, so far
at least as evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and
painful merely, arises on this stage of the formal Practical Feeling.
Evil is nothing but the incompatibility between what is and what
ought to be. (Philosophy of Spirit, #472)
The synthesis of
Mind approached
from Practical Mind
via progressive
concreteness.
Will as choice claims to be free, reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. However, as the content, in
which its former universality concludes itself to actuality, is nothing but the content of the impulses and appetites, it is actual only
as a subjective and contingent will. It realizes itself in a particularity, which it regards at the same time as a nullity, and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from... and (this)
satisfaction, which is just as much no satisfaction, (leads to) another, without end. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is the
universal, which under the name of Happiness the thinking will
makes its aim. (Philosophy of Spirit, #478)
Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of
things desired a universality which only ought to be. (Philosophy
of Spirit, #480)
But such abstract for having failed to sublate particularity
universality is no different than its counterpart in the Logic
in which the "absolute form," having left its content insufficiently sublated, burdened the totalizing effort of Actuality Proper
with contingency and kept freedom of choice f r o m being consummated in genuinely free will. It is the same obstacle, in the
way of finalization of the synthesis of theory and practice in Actuality, that is blocking our way in culminating the synthesis of
the theoretical and practical moments in Mind now. Earlier w e
called it a deeper or second-layer polarity of subject-object,
which had to wait for the Notion and especially the Idea for its
resolution. Now, more-explicitly, it is the psychologistic parameters imposed by Subjective Spirit which block the synthesis. The
nature of Spirit at this level is still (though highly concrete) an
individual, and not yet the trans-individual, subject. The same
difficulty can be conveyed by saying that Happiness is a totalization of merely the "will as choice" which, by its very nature
qua subjective, places a restriction in the totalizing e f f o r t of
Spirit. Nor, as one may expect, does the ultimate category of
both Mind and Subjective Spirit, Free Mind (or Free Action)
what Hegel also refers to in the following quotation as "actual
free will" provide the final remedy for this problem.
Actual free will is the unity of Theoretical and Practical Mind: a free
will, which realizes its own freedom of will, now that the formalism, fortuitousness, and contractedness of the practical content up to
this point have been superseded. By superseding the adjustment of
means therein contained, the will is the immediate individuality selfinstituted an individuality, however, also purified of all that interferes with its universalism, i.e. with freedom itself. This universalism the will has as its object and aim, only so far as it thinks itself,
knows this its concept, and is will as free intelligence. (Philosophy of
Spirit, #481; emphases added in the first and third instances)
The Mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object,
i.e. which has its true being for characteristic and aim, is in the first
The simultaneity in
the build-up of concreteness of the objective and subjective
terms of Spirit.
The Objective Spirit is the Absolute Idea, but only existing in posse:
and as it is thus on the territory of finitude, its actual rationality retains the aspect of external apparency... These aspects (i.e., 'external things of nature' and 'ties of relation between individual wills')
constitute the external material for the embodiment of the will.
(Philosophy of Spirit, #483)
Restatement of the
process of building
up concreteness behind the surface.
Exemplifications
of the build-up of
concreteness behind
our backs by the
Cunning of Reason.
This is precisely what w e are confronted with in the transition f r o m the interiority of Subjective Spirit to the apparently
unrelated exteriority of Objective Spirit. The bearing that this
apparent abruptness of Spirit's transition has on our project is
worthy of our notice: Beyond just being told that the categories
of action pertaining to Essence or Spirit remain, for the most
part, implicit or behind the surface, w e n o w know the function
of this implicitness in light of the overall dialectical picture. W e
know, for example, that the explicit synthesis of the theoretical
and practical moments within Mind is only half of the picture.
The other half is the extension of this synthesis, by virtue of the
features of the dialectic just considered, beyond the interiority
of M i n d and into the exteriority of Objective Spirit. Or, stated
using the will as an example, its externalization beyond the interiority of Mind is an essential ingredient of the concept of the
w i l l itself, as it is implicitly granted in the t w o most recently
quoted paragraphs of the last Chapter and as it will be made
fully explicit in what follows.
It should, therefore, be no source of amazement that social
institutions of modernity, with all of their paraphernalia, appear
The much discussed problem of contingency is another element from late Essence to be used in completing the picture of
the new retrospective rationality. The transition to the Absolute
was intended to remedy contingency generated by External Reflection, through the reduction of both categorial framework
and the content embraced by it to the same level of self-description, or the Self-exposition of the Absolute. But it is also
recalled that neither the Absolute, nor the triad of Actuality
Proper which followed, could completely resolve this problem
as long as the Absolute operated in the context of meaning of
Essence. The same traces of externality that prevented the consummation of the dialectical synthesis of theory-practice under
Actuality, also prevented the resurfacing element of contingency from coming to rest in the fold of the Absolute. In Hegel's
familiar odd expression, "(Real) Necessity (still burdened with
external necessitation) ha(d) not yet spontaneously determined itself into Contingency." Translated into the corresponding historically concrete categories of Spirit, this meant that with predictive rationality still tainting historical discourse it was impossible to shake off relativism from historical interpretation.
Casting Stalin in the role of a patron of modern art, with the
help of the categories of Formal and Real Possibility, highlighted
the parallelism b e t w e e n a totalizing e f f o r t through logical
means and one through historically retrospective means. But it
also showed an important difference which will become more
evident as w e proceed, i.e., the difference between historical
understanding corresponding to the categories of Actuality
Proper and the same understanding under Objective Spirit, attained with the benefit of Self-consciousness from the intervening self-exploration of Subjective Spirit. The reverse is also true,
as the interposition of the last triad of Essence between Subjective and Objective Spirit will show for a better understanding of
Law and Sittlichkeit in what follows. If breaking away from Logic
to digress into Spirit at the end of Actuality Proper helped to lay
the ground for historical consciousness, and through the latter
illuminate the Notion, then returning to the site where w e left
Logic will also be instrumental in setting the stage for what lies
immediately ahead in Objective Spirit. In the remainder of this
Section w e shall change our course by briefly reverting to
Essence at the point from which w e took off for our digression
into Spirit, just short of the last triad of Actuality. By interposing the last triad of Essence between Subjective and Objective
Spirit w e can focus more sharply on an important correspondence between Logic and Spirit. This increases our appreciation
of Law and Sittlichkeit as instances of re-immediation logically
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Interposition of the
last triad of Essence
for an enhanced
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concrete Spirit.
Elucidation of
Absolute Necessity
and Absolute
Relation by way of
classical sociology.
Durkheimian
sociology's deficient
determination.
In the finite sphere we never get over the difference of the formcharacteristics in their relation: and hence we turn the matter
round and define the cause also as something dependent or as an
effect. This again has another cause, and thus there grows up a
progress from effects to causes ad infinitum. (Logic, #153)
Reciprocal action realizes the causal relation in its complete development. It is this relation, therefore, in which reflection usually
takes shelter when the conviction grows that things can no longer
be studied satisfactorily from a causal point of view, on account of
the infinite progress already spoken of... Reciprocity is undoubtedly the proximate truth of the relation of cause and effect, and
stands, so to say, on the threshold of the Notion; but on that very
ground, supposing that our aim is a thoroughly comprehensive
Idea, we should not rest content with applying this relation... To
make, for example, the manners of the Spartans the cause of their
constitution and their constitution conversely the cause of their
manners, may no doubt be in a way correct. But, as we have comprehended neither the manners nor the constitution of the nation,
the result of such reflections can never be final or satisfactory. The
satisfactory point will be reached only when these two, as well as
all other, special aspects of Spartan life and Spartan history are
seen to be founded in this Notion (where the terms of Reciprocity
are found in their unity). (Logic, #156 Zusatz)
This pure self-reciprocation is therefore (Absolute) Necessity unveiled or realized. (Logic, #157; emphases added)
The last sentence encapsulates the failure of Durkheim to
combine his insight about society qua re-immediation with the
appropriate category of "self-reciprocation." As a result, his unveiling suffers a relapse into a scientistic enterprise. It also
points to the next step of remediation of classical, by w a y of
phenomenological, sociology through having "(Absolute) Necessity (or Absolute Actuality) unveiled or realized." The role of
phenomenological sociology will be undertaken in the next
Section where w e shall encounter Spirit's other face in the unveiling of re-immediation. By n o w w e have secured, with the
help of the last triad of Essence, a better foothold on the logical
significance of the shift from predictive to retrodictive rationality, and a better picture as to the reasons w h y that which lies
ahead has to be dealt with in terms of "unpacking," or having
"(Absolute) Necessity (or Absolute Actuality) unveiled or realized." In the absence of such approach, the detail of what confronts us in its immediacy say, the "special aspects of Spartan
life and Spartan history" will not properly cohere, or will be
short of being "on the threshold of the Notion." This does not
mean that with the organization of such detail in terms of the
category of Reciprocity w e have reached the self-containment
of the Notion. But at least, in the logical concreteness of "pure
self-reciprocation," scientistic determinism has lost its predictive
zeal, which it had secured at the cost of abstractiveness beginning as early as the mathematical categories of Being.
Yet, no clue has been given as to the category on which w e
can safely rely to service the n e w socio-historical approach
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without the reservations put forth by Hegel for the use of Reciprocity in the case of Spartan history. In other words, whereas
scientistic causality and predictive rationality have been preserved qua sublated within the retrospective approach, there is
as yet no category w h i c h can provide foolproof protection
(from traces of externality) for the process of unveiling. The
need for such undergirding of historical exploration can hardly
be overemphasized in view of the frustrations w e encountered
in our attempted efforts at totalization during the course of our
historical exemplifications of Actuality Proper. Eventually this
logical undergirding will be provided by Teleology and the dialectic of Means and End at the point of transition between the
Objective Notion and the Idea, which is also the logical counterpart of the transition from Objective to Absolute Spirit. In
the meantime, w e have to be content with the pursuit of the
implications of the historio-logic in Objective Spirit, as has been
elaborated upon with the benefit of the intervening insights
from the triad of Absolute Relation.
This truth of necessity, therefore, is Freedom: and the truth of Substance is the Notion, an independence which, though self-repulsive into distinct independent elements, yet in that repulsion is
self-identical, and in the movement of Reciprocity still at home and
conversant only with itself.
Necessity is often called hard, and rightly so, if we keep only to necessity as such, i.e. to its immediate shape... Freedom too from this
point of view (i.e., of independent subsistence) is only abstract, and
is preserved only by renouncing all that we immediately are and
have. But, as we have seen already, the process of necessity is so directed that it overcomes the rigid externality which it first had and
reveals its inward nature... Necessity indeed qua necessity is far
from being freedom: yet freedom pre-supposes necessity, and contains it as an unsubstantial element in itself. (Logic, #158 and Zusatz)
Liberty, shaped into the actuality of a world, receives the form of
Necessity, the deeper substantial nexus of which is the system or organization of the principles of liberty, whilst its phenomenal nexus
is power or authority, and the sentiment of obedience awakened in
consciousness. (Philosophy of Spirit, #484)
The refitting of the dialectic of freedom so as to include ne- Accent on the unveiling of embodied
cessity becomes unavoidable at the end of Essence because "libimmediacy once
erty, shaped into the actuality of a world, receives the form of
Necessity." Once Absolute Necessity enters the picture as the log- Objective Spirit
is conceived as
ical counterpart of Objective Spirit's re-immediation, the dialecre-immediation.
tic of freedom has to be updated to accommodate necessity. But
this signals a change in the context of meaning for the interpretation of freedom since now, with retrospective rationality in
effect and freedom embedded in institutions, the accent is on
unveiling the structure of necessity. In other words, since necessity qua absolute is the basic feature of social reality, the new
rule of the game for the interpretation of freedom is the same
as that of Objective Spirit as a whole: an injunction to accept its
necessity and commence the process of unveiling. There is no
way, within the given parameters for subjective freedom, to
make a dent on Absolute Necessity short of relaxing the condi-
Adaptation of the
dialectic of action
to the exigencies of
Objective Spirit.
Misunderstanding
of the facticity of
Objective Spirit as a
call for acquiescence.
concrete outcome consisting of institutional activity-cwm-mortar-and-glass prescribes the paths along which everyday activity takes place.
In other words, the category of action appropriate to this
phase of Objective Spirit is institutional or routinized practice.
Functioning institutions, as layer-upon-layer embodiments of
various clusters of norms have, to a great extent, replaced conscious testing and application of rationality with respect to individual actions. As a result, self-conscious methodological
screening is reserved only for unruly occasions. The other area
"the abstract universality of its goodness" in which Objective Spirit is found wanting and needs to be complemented
by Subjective Spirit, will eventually be provided in a sublated
form: First, the remedy to routine practice of institutionalized
life by way of those abstract claims in the name of "goodness"
which, as w e have already seen in our radical's repertory and
shall again encounter in Moralitat, are capable of making a dent
in institutionalized routine practice. But, more important, a
dent will be made by the Practical Idea which, as the most concrete practical moment, exemplifies the best antidote to institutionalized routine in terms of a (possibly radical) challenge to
the shortcomings of Objective Spirit.
Objective Spirit, coupled as it is with Absolute Necessity, can
be the source of endless misconceptions regarding the dialectic,
and consequent misinterpretations of Hegel's views about action, if taken apart from its subjective complement. For example, without careful consideration of the logical counterparts to
Objective Spirit, Hegel's acceptance of what is essentially a
point of departure for the unveiling of the status quo, can be easily mistaken as an apology for it. In fact, Objective Spirit is no
less of an embodiment of challenges to the status quo from diverse quarters, e.g., radical challenges demanding to be "shaped
into the actuality of a world, and (be) receive(d in) the form of
Necessity." For, as w e have been told above, it is indeed a failure
of Objective Spirit, which "consists partly in having its freedom
immediately in reality, in something external therefore, in a
thing." But, in anticipation of the final synthesis, Hegel continues that this failure of Objective Spirit is compensated by the
complementary strength of Subjective Spirit, to the effect that
"subjective freedom exists as the covertly or overtly universal rational will, which is sensible of itself and actively disposed to
the consciousness of the individual subject." To recall the oft invoked metaphor of the Janus-faced Spirit, here w e are being
presented with "subjective freedom" representing Spirit's path of
immediacy and concealment of its tracks forward, while being
complemented by the path of mediation and unveiling backward the "freedom immediately (or through re-immediation incorporated) in (institutional) reality."
As is evident from the list of the categories of Objective Spirit, Sittlichkeit synthesizes Law and Moralitat. Or, more plainly,
the institutional setting incorporates conceptions of right that
have been crystallized in legal norms, as well as "oughts," in
different stages of concreteness which have successfully challenged what is established. To use Hegel's favorite expression,
Spirit finds in these externalized and objectified legal norms
"something which is" and confronts it, to begin with, in its immediacy and abstract universality as alien, rather than as something which Spirit can affirm "to be only its own."
The free will is:
(A) Itself at first immediate, and hence as a single being the person: the existence which the person gives to its liberty is property.
The Right as Right (law) is formal, abstract right.
(B) When the will is reflected into self, so as to have its existence inside it, and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular, it
is the right of the subjective will, morality of the individual conscience.
(C) When the free will is the substantial will, made actual in the
subject and conformable to its concept and rendered a totality of
necessity it is the ethics of actual life in Family, Civil Society,
and State. (Philosophy of Spirit, #487; parentheses in the last instance in the text)
The "actually free will" that w e left at a high level of concreteness within the parameters of the interiority of Free Mind, w e
now encounter (given the more advanced parameters of Objective Spirit) at a low level of concreteness, as "a single being
the person" situated in a relationship to externality vis-a-vis the
abstract universality of Law qua "formal, abstract right." The will,
as external to law, has reverted to in-itselfness from the in-andfor-itselfness it had attained in Free Mind, because freedom in
Objective Spirit has to go through the same labor of totalization,
now within the expanded definition of externality. Once again,
Spirit must undergo the process of first re-cognizing and then
re-appropriating what is "only its own." Though they seem to
confront us as outsiders, legal and social institutions are of our
own doing. They are products of the forward trek of immediacy
(or re-immediation) throughout the anthropological stages of
Soul, and subject to the task of unveiling in the course of the
backward path of Objective Spirit. This shift in direction is already evident in the summary of the moments of Objective Spirit quoted above. In the second moment of Moralitat, corresponding to for-itselfness, Spirit turns inward and "the will is reflected
Detailed account of
the dialectical incorporation offreedom
in Objective Spirit.
ir
Illustration of the
unveiling dimension
of Objective Spirit by
way of phenomenological sociology.
and is about to be reappropriated, is an embodiment of categories as exemplified above in the design incorporated in the
institutional and physical setting of a prison or a factory. In
turning its attention to the institutional order under the n e w
rules of retrospective rationality, Spirit has directed its beam on
its own embedded categories, including those concepts of action
under Moralitat, which constitute the progressively mediated
grades of "ought" and challenges to the social order.
The full import of Moralitat qua challenge of institutionalized
The element of parvalues can be better appreciated by bringing to mind the conticularity as chaltrast between the first two moments of Objective Spirit, as sumlenge to the facticity
marized in the last quotation. Whereas in the first moment of
of Objective Spirit
in-itselfness (Law) or potential (abstract) freedom, the will is still found in Moralitat.
"immediate, and hence as a single being the person" is being
confronted by the establishment which "as Right (law) is formal,
abstract right," in the second moment of for-itselfness (Moralitat),
"the will is reflected into itself." This moment represents the
"particular... the right of the subjective will, (and the) morality of
the individual conscience." Though sandwiched between the abstract universality of the first moment and the concrete universality of the last one, this should not obscure the function of
Moralitat qua challenge to the status quo by virtue of its features
of particularity, subjectivity, and the "morality of the individual
conscience." But at the same time it should not be forgotten that
the residual subject-object polarity is still to be sublated in the
Notion. The retrospective rationality, whose application has now
resulted in our acceptance of Objective Spirit in its immediacy as
a preliminary to the commencement of unveiling, is also a kind
of abstractive procedure, now in the form of an is-ought dualism. On the one hand, w e have the standpoint of hands-off Objective Spirit associated with its facticity but, on the other, w e
have the challenge of it by Moralitat which, though sublated in
Sittlichkeit, will resurface with added fervor and concreteness in
its logical counterpart in the Notion as the Practical Idea. In effect, there has been a trade-off of dualisms the is-ought for
predictive-retrodictive rationality for the sake of overcoming
the persistent problems associated with the internal coherence
of the Absolute, in the hope that it will finally pave the ground
for the final synthesis of the Absolute Idea. Already the transition to Actuality Proper and the process of totalization can be
perceived as a prefiguring of this trade-off of polarities: scientistic theory-practice and subject-object for those centered on the
time-axis, such as present-past and predictive-retrodictive rationality. The is-ought polarity, to which the next Section is devoted, represents a species of the latter which also incorporates the
Exemplification of
unresolved dualisms
in sociological subdisciplines.
Complementarity of
phenomenological
and Marxist sociologies in their respective deficiencies.
w h e t h e r it opts for the proletariat, the Party, or an intelligentsia, for the location of a "universal rational will." The full
force of Hegel's insistence, as evidenced by the dialectic of freedom in Actuality Proper, that free will has necessarily the social
whole as its object, suddenly comes back into play. Now, however, there is an added realization of h o w hopeless the logical
separation is between "subjective freedom" and the "universal rational will," and, consequently, h o w self-deceptive the effort
can be of securing either ethical neutrality, or the "ought," according to the "universal rational will" or "subjective freedom," in
separation from each other.
The respective shortcomings of sociological sub-disciplines
compared to those
of Subjective and
Objective Spirit.
he is no better off in terms of furthering determinacy for reasons which are only apparently different. He shares his phenomenological colleague's awareness that values are socially
located. But his problem originates in his attempt to accomplish what is tantamount to a dialectical synthesis of the Theoretical and Practical Idea from a foundation of insufficient concreteness. W h i l e he is aspiring to transcend the " t w o hats"
rule, he remains in self-concealment regarding the indispensable dynamic of totalization involved in the dialectic of freedom. In other words, his one-sidedness stems not from lack of
awareness that his "ought" is socially located, but rather from
the fact that the latter lacks the dialectical ripeness that would
enable it to lead directly to the synthesis of which he thinks it
capable. In the absence of a dialectical u p g r a d i n g of his
"ought" from the level of "subjective freedom" to the "universal
rational will" which so far has proven elusive, his "ought" is
still too much in his head, in the manner of Subjective Spirit,
for his aim to come to fruition.
This parallelism between the two sub-disciplines of sociology
on the one hand, and of subjective and objective moments of
Spirit on the other, may not be immediately obvious because
the intervening shift from predictive to retrodictive rationality
between these two moments has relegated the object of theoretical concern to the past. Though not apparent, this shift is
symptomatic of the intensified theoretical concern, insofar as
now it is not only the object, but the categorial equipment as
well, that is subsumed under the more comprehensive nonpredictive theoretical compass. Such intensification, approximating, as w e noted earlier, the gaze of classical theoria, has
been the impetus behind the unveiling of Objective Spirit following re-immediation, and correspondingly, behind the preoccupation of the phenomenological sociologist with ethical neutrality. Having graduated from predictive theorizing to retroflective theoria, Spirit, more than ever before, is projecting its concern on what is rather than on what will or ought-to-be. The logical root of this conservative face of Spirit, apparent in the case
of phenomenological sociology, is of course, Absolute Necessity
(or Absolute Actuality), the foundation of its re-immediation as
Objective Spirit. But this is only half of the story, as it will become evident when w e probe more deeply into the logical ancestry of Spirit's Janus-facedness.
The distant progenitor of the present two-way indeterminacy (resolved by the dialectic of Mind only to resurface in Objective Spirit and exemplified in the predicaments of our sociologists) can be traced all the w a y back to the treatment of
Complementarity of
the respective contributions and shortcomings of the two
sociological disciplines prefigures
those of the "is "
and the "ought."
"ought" in its most incipient form under the immediacy of Being. Such treatment might have seemed odd at the time, but in
light of what has intervened in Essence regarding polarity and
the role of mediation, as inextricably linked to immediacy in
furthering "ought's" concreteness, this is now understandable.
For, insofar as immediacy means externality between subject
and object, the unmediated forms of the "is" and the "ought"
which kept the two sub-disciplines of sociology apart, are two
sides of the same coin. In this case externality underlies both
the theoretical attempt to understand what is, and the practical
standpoint of what ought to be. In their self-concealment
about the complementarity of both their failures and strengths,
the phenomenological sociologist and the Marxist sociologist of
k n o w l e d g e are in a direct line of succession to the earliest
identification of self-concealment in connection with the socalled unmediated "is" of Being and the immediacy of the
"ought" of Jacobi, respectively.
Parallelism between
the path of theorypractice and the
is-ought.
Continuity of the
path of the "ought,'
appearances
notwithstanding.
Practical Mind considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought (1) in the contrast which the new mode of
being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and condition an antagonism which in
Consciousness grows to correlation with external objects. (2) That
first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into thinking universality. (Philosophy of Spirit, #470)
The 'Ought' of Practical Feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to control some existing mode of fact which is assumed to be
worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. But as both, in their
immediacy, lack objective determination, this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjective and superficial
feeling of pleasant or unpleasant.
Evil is nothing but the incompatibility between what is and what
ought to be. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term indeed infinitely so,
considering that casual aims may also come under the form of
Ought. (Philosophy of Spirit, #472)
As is evident from Hegel's assessment of its levels of concreteness above, a genuine moral "ought" cannot be reached within
the confines of Subjective Spirit because of the latter's self-im-
posed individualistic parameters. But, it is also recalled, even beyond Practical Feeling ( w h e r e these passages belong), after a
succession of mediations involving such theoretically infused
categories as Interest and Choice, the "ought" continues to suffer from indeterminacy to be "an ambiguous term." Happiness, the penultimate and most concrete practical category of
Subjective Spirit, epitomizes its incapacity to transcend its individualism and psychologism the Subjective Spirit "has for its
products, in the theoretical range, the word, and in the practical
(not yet deed and action, but) enjoyment." (Added emphases within
the parentheses in this instance) This task of transcending individualism and psychologism is eventually undertaken by Objective Spirit, and Moralitat in particular, which shoulders the burden of transforming a host of psychological categories to their
moral counterparts. Freedom must, so to speak, be reconquered
after the synthesis of Free Mind (or Free Action) under an expanded context of meaning inclusive of externality. Contingency
has to be confronted once more while the familiar battles for totalization must be fought again, n o w on the dialectically higher
plateau of Objective Spirit. There is a clear sense of this replay in
the parallelism between the categories of Practical M i n d (i.e.,
Choice, Interest, Happiness) and their counterparts in Moralitat
(i.e., Purpose, Intention and Welfare).
Similarly, in Subjective Spirit there is already an obvious anticipation of its inadequacy to logically support the categories of
the sphere of Morality of Conscience (Moralitat), to say nothing
of those of Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit) in which L a w and Moralitat
are finally synthesized.
Their genuine rationality (i.e., belonging to the psychological
'oughts' under Impulse and Choice) cannot reveal its secret to a
method of outer reflection which pre-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts, and therefore is
wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. But the
immanent 'reflection' of Mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy, and gives their content a rationality and objectivity, in which they exist as necessary ties of social
relation, as rights and duties. It is this objectification which evinces
their real value, their mutual connections, and their truth. And
thus it was a true perception when Plato... showed that the full reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice, namely in the construction of the State as the Ethical Life.
(Philosophy of Spirit, #474)
Yet in the overall triadic structure of Objective Spirit it is not
Moralitat (representing the "ought" of moral conscience), as one
might have expected, but Law representing the "is," which occupies the m o m e n t of immediacy ( r e - i m m e d i a t i o n f r o m the
standpoint of Free Mind or Free Action). Moralitat, in turn, occu-
Contingency injected
by the "ought"
traced to its logical
root in Essence.
The dialectic of action in Objective Spirit consists in the progressive externalization of the will beginning with its embodiment in "an external thing," which is Property, the first moment of Law. This process continues through Contract, and
Right and Wrong, as externalization extends from things to the
will of others. But in Moralitat this trend is temporarily reversed
as the "will (is) reflected into itself" as part of the transition
from "person" to "subject" and from legal "deed" to moral "action." The will pauses and turns inward in the middle (mediating) moment of Objective Spirit, as it did in the corresponding
Consciousness of Subjective Spirit, before it turns again outward in being sublated into Sittlichkeit. The mediation by Moralitat (through its categories of Purpose, and Intention and Welfare) enhances Sittlichkeit's concreteness by linking it to the exteriority of Objective Spirit in the same way that their psychological counterparts of Choice, Interest, and Happiness operated
in the interiority of Subjective Spirit. But as in the case of the
latter and that of the logical prototype of both, i.e., Actuality
Proper, contingency is still haunting Objective Spirit, as eloquently evidenced by the ambiguities of the Morality of Conscience in the last quotation and the conflicting "oughts" of the
earlier one.
The way in which such contingency prefigures for our present discussion in the dialectic of Actuality Proper can be
shown more clearly if w e allow Possibility to stand for the
"ought" and Actuality for the "is" in the effort of late Essence to
synthesize the a priori and the empirical. We recall that the first
approximation of the synthetic effort resulted in Contingency
as the dialectical synthesis of (Abstract) Possibility and a low
grade of Actuality. At first sight, this step from Abstract (or Formal) Possibility to Contingency may not seem to be much of an
advance. But a review of the transitions will confirm that this
was not the case once it became obvious that, in line with determinate negation, unrealized Possibility serves to fix Actuality
"everything possible has therefore in general a being or an
Existence," since "the possible... contains more than the bare law
of identity. (It) is the reflected reflectedness-into-self, or the identical simply as moment of the totality... and the ought-to-be of the
totality of form." By the time w e reach the second stage of the
The dialectic of
action reflects the
conservative and radical faces of Spirit.
custodian of universal interest. The logic of totalization inherent in the dialectic of freedom is similarly hampered in the case
of Corporation. For now, it is the restricted class of enlightened
administrators who, as the repositories of universal interest, can
self-consciously pursue genuine freedom through the process of
totalization, while the majority can go on performing their duties "without any selective reflection." This much Hegel has
granted in the last quoted paragraph, by allowing Civil Society
to contribute to the synthesis of the State merely "the form of
conscious universality." The State becomes "the absolute aim
and content of the knowing subject, which thus identifies itself
in its volition to the system of reasonableness." (emphasis
added in the second instance in this case) It is only to such enlightened minority and only potentially to everybody that
the rendition of the State as "the self-conscious Ethical Substance" refers, while the rest of the citizenry fits the description
according to which it is "without any reflection (that) the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is."
The State emerges as much as a culmination of what preceded it within Sittlichkeit as it does a negation of it through the injection of self-consciousness by way of the universal class. In
order for this to be appreciated w e must recall that Objective
Spirit, which was introduced logically as re-immediation in the
form of Absolute Actuality (or Absolute Necessity) about to be
unveiled, socio-historically represented countless norms which
have been unself-consciously clustered into institutions literally
behind our backs for millennia. The Family and the System of
Wants have been typical of this domain of culture in the spirit
of Soul. But the operation of the Cunning of Reason is not limited to economics, though perhaps inspired and best illustrated
by it. It also includes religion with all its rich exoteric paraphernalia, and art w i t h its dimension of unself-consciousness,
though Hegel chose to deal with them in their more absolute
rather than cultural forms, thus placing them under Absolute
Spirit. As an institution depending upon unself-consciously
generated mechanisms of social control for its perpetuation, the
state is a logical extension of what preceded it in Sittlichkeit and,
before that, in Soul. Hegel's adulatory remarks about the state
in the Philosophy of Right, especially its association with divinity
and his insistence on religion as the foundation of the state, are
more like sociological observations about legitimation through
divinization, or the order-maintaining function of religion,
rather than the merely crude attempts to justify the Prussian
state, as they have sometimes been misinterpreted.
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Once the transition is made from a state of affairs where social controls are mainly the job of the Cunning of Reason to
that where self-consciousness predominates and freedom is secured for all, such social functions of religion as the "vene r a t i o n of) the state as a secular deity," give way to an understanding, "infinitely harder" though it might be, of the State
qua Spirit "unfolding itself to be the actual shape and organization of a world." As "self-conscious Ethical Substance," the State
is an advanced form of social organization, as well as a negation
of Sittlichkeit, because the understanding of the origin and function of cultural norms is gradually becoming the province of all.
W h e n Hegel insisted in his lectures in the Philosophy of History
that the modern era of freedom for all begins with the revolution in consciousness heralded by Protestantism, he may have
also had in mind this negation of unself-conscious operation of
social controls heralded by this revolution and given a secular
embodiment in the universal class of civil servants of the State.
The latter is an advanced moment as promoter of freedom because it sets the parameters within which what has been effected before it, by the Cunning of Reason, can now gradually be
the function of self-conscious activity. But Philosophy of History
adds a caution to this, as does the dialectic of Objective Spirit,
inasmuch as freedom for all is still only a potentiality. As w e recall from the analysis of its logical structure, freedom involves a
process of totalization which requires that self-consciousness
should prevail throughout the social whole. So that, in addition
to satisfying the conditions imposed by the formula of freedom
in Actuality Proper, our unself-conscious participation in the
formation of culture through time, of which w e have so far re-
Universal history
highlights, through
contrast, the forthcoming timeless and
absolute Notion.
E. Dialectical Synthesis of
Action in the Logic of the Notion
Recapitulation of the
dialectic of action.
Elucidation of the
enhanced role of
self-consciousness
in Objective Spirit
through the dialectic
of the "/."
the former from as far back as the Practical Feeling in Soul, and
the latter from the second moment of Consciousness. In fact,
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h s e e m e d to h a v e issued out of
nowhere in the facticity of Objective Spirit, is a highly concrete
or elevated form of subjectivity without which the process of
unveiling of institutional setting would be inconceivable. Even
more surprising, as the locus of the long-awaited synthesis of
subject-object and theory-practice in their advanced forms, selfconsciousness adds nothing more to their already accomplished
syntheses by Objective Spirit than its unique power of explicitness through unveiling, which was already implicit in the operations of Objective Spirit.
Self-consciousness' new role of adding transparency to concreteness below the surface can be illuminated if the externalization of the will, which Objective Spirit is all about, is understood in connection with the dialectic of the "I" and its logical
surrogate triad of Abstract UniversalityParticularityConcrete Universality (Individuality). Then the process of unveiling
characteristic of Objective Spirit is revealed to have been always
the operation of self-consciousness, that is, of the "I" qua concrete universal. The trans-individual subject as Spirit is no different than a collective representation (or spiritual entity) operating on itself. Far from being manifestations of mere subjectivity or sequential arrangement of topics, Art, Religion, and Philosophy in Absolute Spirit constitute dialectical transitions in
the best sense of the term "this development of one thing
out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by." There is no more mystery or surprise in the emergence
of self-consciousness out of facticity during the process of unveiling the articulations of the institutional setting. Nor is there
just political convenience in Hegel's assignment of self-consciousness to the universal class of public administrators, since
unveiling is not an externally applied procedure but an application of Spirit on itself. Once the view of art and religion as culture's highest forms of self-interpretation is granted, it is easier
to accept the "V qua concrete universal rather than the individual "I" of the particular great artist or religious innovator as the
subject of self-consciousness or self-interpretation. To put it
bluntly, it is safer to accept culture's self-interpretation of its art,
as exemplified in its intellectual and aesthetic products over
time, rather that the inanities all too often offered by great
artists as interpretations of their work.
The concept of culture as such, i.e., as collective representation the counterpart of Hegel's Spirit whose logical equiva-
lent is the Notion is a rather recent rediscovery by social disciplines which has not yet penetrated educational consciousness even at the level of university textbooks. Culture, on the
other hand, has generated art, religion, and all sorts of social
formations through the ages without the self-conscious participation of individuals. Self-conscious Spirit speaks as much
through Hegel or, more accurately, through his strategically
placed category of Philosophy at the very end of Absolute Spirit
as it does through the great historians of the nineteenth and
the sociologists and anthropologists of the twentieth. It is hoped
that the Notion will remove all remaining obstacles in comprehending that Spirit's capacity for self-consciousness and self-interpretation is not an obfuscation of meaning, or a generation
of a new form of mysticism, but a second-level discourse or a
metalanguage dealing with the meaning of meaning Hegel's
"Notion of the Notion" (Science of Logic, p. 582). Such metalanguage is n o w necessary because, w i t h the cessation of the
process of externalization of Objective Spirit, the subject-object
language has outlived its function and any prolongation of its
use can only threaten to reinject dualism into the final synthetic effort of the Notion. The time has come for Spirit to turn inward and re-examine its meaning-endowing instruments, beginning with the whole apparatus of formal logic with its builtin presuppositions in favor of a (subject-)object language. In
this sense Subjective Logic, i.e., the logic of the Notion occupying the second half of the Science of Logic, presents no new material but a scrutiny of what was already presented in Being and
Essence, now in the light of a renewed effort of totalization on
the basis of a texture of meaning. The old contingency-ridden
Absolute of Actuality will be reconstituted with the help of the
newly elevated subjectivity as trans-individual self-consciousness, so that the Notion will slowly but inescapably assume the
form of a practical as well as of a theoretical norm. In the true
spirit of Platonism (whose concept of the Idea was borrowed by
Hegel as the ground for the final synthesis of theory and practice in the Absolute Idea), the Notion represents theoretical coherence as much as it does the structure of totalization within
which the will is realized into genuine freedom.
Introduction of the
Notion qua concrete
universality through
self-interpretation of
art and culture.
The Notion is the principle offreedom, the power of Substance self-re- Basic definitional
alized. It is a systematic whole, in which each of its constituent
ingredients of the
functions is the very total which the Notion is, and is put as indisNotion.
solubly one with it. Thus in its self-identity it has original and complete
determinateness.
The position taken up by the Notion is that of absolute idealism...In
the logic of Understanding, the Notion is generally reckoned a mere
form of thought, and treated as a general conception... The Notion,
in short, is what contains all the earlier categories of thought merged in it.
It certainly is a form, but an infinite and creative form, which includes, but at the same time releases from itself, the fullness of all
content. And so too the Notion may, if it be wished, be styled abstract, if the name concrete is restricted to the concrete facts of
sense or of immediate perception...
We speak of the deduction of a content from the Notion, e.g. of the
specific provisions of the law of property from the notion of property; and so again we speak of tracing back these material details to
the Notion. We thus recognize that the Notion is no mere form
without a content of its own. (Logic, #160 and Zusatz; all emphases
supplied with the exception of the first instance)
The onward movement of the Notion is no longer either a transition
into (as in the case of Being), or a reflection on something else (as in the
case of Essence), but Development. For in the Notion, the elements
distinguished are without more ado at the same time declared to be
identical with one another and with the whole, and the specific
character of each is a free being of the whole Notion. (Logic, #161;
emphases supplied with the exception of the last instance)
The Notion is generally associated in our minds with abstract generality, and on that account it is often described as a general conception. We speak accordingly, of the notions of color, plant, animal, etc... This is the aspect of the Notion which is familiar to Understanding...
But the universal of the Notion (i.e., the concrete universal) is not
a mere sum of features common to several things, confronted by a
particular which enjoys an existence of its own. It is, on the contrary,
self-particularizing or self-specifying (i.e., a logical individual), and with
undimmed clearness finds itself at home in its antithesis. For the sake
both of cognition and of our practical conduct, it is of the utmost
importance that the real universal should not be confused with
what is merely held in common.
The distinction referred to above between what is merely in common, and what is truly universal, is strikingly expressed by
Rousseau in his famous 'Contrat Social,' when he says that the
laws of a state must spring from the universal will (volontegenerate),
but need not on that account be the will of all (volonte de tous)...
The constituents of
self-containment and
freedom in the meaning of the Notion as a
genuine whole.
Illustration of the
Notion through
the conception of
a norm-
The time has finally come to remedy the contingency generated by the most recent dualism on the time-axis that which
was branded a trade-off of the is-ought dualism for that of pastpresent or present-future. In historically concrete terms, this
was manifested at the conclusion of Objective Spirit as the familiar relativism injected by Universal History in what had
seemed to be the synthesis of the "is" and the "ought" in the
m o m e n t of the State. The N o t i o n qua timeless structure of
meaning supplies the preconditions for overcoming this latest
form of contingency. The result of this effort is the Idea, as
shown by the following extended quotations. The next and last
time w e encounter the theoretical and practical moments, in
the form of the Theoretical and Practical Idea, they will have
been completely purged of all traces of built-in externality, fully
mediated in their respective concreteness and, therefore, ready
for their final synthesis in the Absolute Idea.
In the (teleological) End the Notion has entered on free existence
and has a being of its own, by means of the negation of immediate
objectivity. It is characterized as subjective, seeing that this negation is, in the first place, abstract, and hence at first the relation between it and objectivity still one of contrast. (Logic, #204)
The teleological relation is (cast in the form of) a syllogism in
which the Subjective End coalesces with the objectivity external to
it, through a middle term which is the unity of both. This unity is
on one hand the purposive action, on the other the Means, i.e. objectivity made directly subservient to purpose. (Logic, #206)
Purposive action, with its Means, is still directed outwards (i.e., is
still burdened with unfreedom due to externality), because the
End is also not identical with the object, and must consequently
first be mediated with it. The Means in its capacity of object stands,
in this second premiss, in direct relation to the other extreme of
the syllogism, namely, the material or objectivity which is presupposed...
Reason is as cunning as it is powerful. Cunning may be said to lie
in the inter-mediative action which, while it permits the objects to
follow their own bent and act upon one another till they waste
away, and does not itself directly interfere in the process, is nevertheless only working out its own aims... God lets men do as they
please with their particular passions and interests; but the result is
the accomplishment of not their plans, but His, and these differ
decidedly from the ends primarily sought by those whom He employs. (Logic, #209 and Zusatz)
The Realized End is thus the overt unity of subjective and objective
(Ends)... The (Realized) End maintains itself against and in the objective (End, or the End in the process of accomplishment): for it is
But what virtually happens in the realizing of the End is that the
one-sided subjectivity and the show of objective independence confronting it are both canceled. In laying hold of the means, the Notion constitutes itself the very implicit essence of the object. In the
mechanical and chemical processes the independence of the object
has been already dissipated implicitly, and in the course of their
movement under the dominion of the End, the show of that independence, the negative which confronts the Notion, is got rid of.
But in the fact that the End achieved is characterized only as a
Means and a material, this object, viz. the teleological, is there and
then put as implicitly null, and only 'ideal.' This being so, the antithesis between form and content has also vanished. While the End
by the removal and absorption of all form-characteristics coalesces
with itself, the form as self-identical is thereby put as the content,
so that the Notion, which is the action of form, has only itself for
content. Through this process, therefore, there is made explicitly
manifest what was the notion of design: viz. the implicit unity of
subjective and objective is now realized. And this is the Idea.
The finitude of the End consists in the circumstance, that, in the
process of realizing it, the material, which is employed as a means,
is only externally subsumed under it and made conformable to it.
But, as a matter of fact, the object is the Notion implicitly: and thus
The Idea is truth in itself and for-itself, the absolute unity of the
Notion and objectivity. Its 'ideal' content is nothing but the Notion
in its detailed terms: its 'real' content is only the exhibition which
the Notion gives itself in the form of external existence, whilst yet,
by enclosing this shape in its ideality, it keeps it in its power, and
so keeps itself in it. (Logic, #213)
The Idea may be described in many ways. It may be called Reason
(and this is the proper philosophical signification of reason); subject-object; the unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and the
infinite, of soul and body; the possibility which has its actuality in
its own self; that of which the nature can be thought only as existent, etc. All these descriptions apply, because the Idea contains all
the relations of Understanding, but contains them in their infinite
self-return and self-identity. (Logic, #214)
The implications of the synthesis in Teleology are many and
far-reaching. To begin with, action, under the various bodies of
knowledge that are incorporated in Spirit (e.g., psychology,
economics, politics, and history), is hierarchically structured
under the principle of freedom qua realization as exemplified in
the Notion and especially the Idea. With "the antithesis between form and content ha(ving) also vanished," all movement
forward in realization has ceased. Paradoxical as it may sound,
this is a corollary of the logical priority of the Notion and its acceptance as the norm "both of cognition and our practical conduct" earlier. It entails a standard or norm which is not merely
fixed, as norms as commonly understood, but is also internal to
what is being applied and, therefore, not fixed by the commonly accepted meaning of the term, i.e., as externally fixed or given. This causes difficulties for the Understanding, as does what
follows from it: that "the Good, the absolutely Good, is eternal-
Implications of the
synthesis of the Idea
via Teleology for the
persisting dualisms
of our project.
ly accomplishing itself in the world... but is already by implication, as well as in full actuality accomplished." The difficulty
stems from the fact that externality, which the dialectic has virtually overcome in the Idea, is something onto which the Understanding is tenaciously holding.
Understanding may demonstrate that the Idea is self-contradictory:
because the subjective is subjective only and is always confronted
by the objective, because Being is different from Notion and
therefore cannot be picked out of it, because the finite is finite
only, the exact antithesis of the infinite, and therefore not identical
with it; and so on with every term of the description. The reverse
of all this however is the doctrine of Logic. Logic shows that the
subjective which is to be subjective only, the finite which would be
finite only, the infinite which would be infinite only, and so on,
have no truth, but contradict themselves, and pass over to their
opposites. (Logic, #214)
Idea as the expanded
To these irreconcilable polarities, as viewed by the UnderIdentity (inclusive of
standing, Hegel could have added another between what "is
Contradiction) in the
eternally accomplishing itself in the world" and what is "in full
context of all contexts. actuality, accomplished." Their common ground can be further
identified by pointing out that the polarity of the norm, and
what it is being applied to, is a variant of Form-Matter that has
been overcome in Essence under conditions less than the selftotalizing context of the Notion. Now, however, it is being reused in a new context of meaning whereby it can yield no less
than the identity of the polar terms. But w e must also recall
that Identity includes Difference, which is represented in the
last quotation by its sub-category, Contradiction. As Hegel put
it, the polarities of the Understanding "have no truth, but contradict themselves, and pass on to their opposites." The resulting dialectical synthesis is incorporated, in turn, by way of sublation into the n e w expanded Identity now exemplified in the
Idea: "While the (Realized) End by the removal and absorption
of all form-characteristics (i.e., by the sublation of lower categorial forms in the new all-embracing context of meaning of the
Notion) coalesces with itself, the form as self-identical (i.e., the
n e w expanded identity of form inclusive of the difference of
content) is thereby put as the content, so that the Notion,
which is the action of form, has only itself as content." From
where it n o w stands, at the apex of the dialectical scale, with
nowhere to go except to its own final moment of the Absolute
Idea, the Notion provides the norm for all grades "of cognition
and our practical conduct" that the dialectic has gone through.
But, since the Notion has overcome externality, "the antithesis
between (the norm) and (what it is being applied to) has vanished." Or, again, "as self-identical (the form or the Notion) is
thereby put as the content, so that the Notion, which is the action of form has itself for content."
The internality of the norm (or the overcoming of the externality of matter and f o r m ) at the level of the N o t i o n is the
source of puzzlement for the Understanding and the key to the
resolution of the apparently irreconcilable contradictions that remain before the final synthesis. It is also the corollary of the
principle of concrete universality and an alternative formulation
of the equally fundamental principle of dialectical circularity. In
introducing the Notion in the already quoted #163 that "for the
sake both of cognition and of our practical conduct, it is of the
utmost importance that the real (i.e., the concrete) universal
should not be confused with what is merely held in common
(i.e., the abstract universal)," Hegel was pointing to the Understanding's familiar habit of "raking" content with the help of the
abstract universal. This has been, literally, the trade-mark of scientism which claims, in its self-concealment, universality for a
grade of action which is only appropriate to its domain.
Circularity is no less cardinal in the synthesis of Means and
End in Teleology. Indeed the connection between Teleology and
circularity can also be demonstrated through the action of the
concrete universal, whose feature of self-containment or selfcompleteness is characteristic of the Notion. Our first set of
quoted passages from the Idea began with a juxtaposition of infinite design, through which the Notion enjoys "free (i.e., selfdependent or self-complete) existence" achieved "by means of
the negation of immediate (i.e., unmediated) objectivity." This
is in contrast to finite design, whose "purposive action, with its
Means, (is) still directed outwards (i.e., is still burdened with
unfreedom due to externality), because the End is also not identical with the object, and must consequently first be mediated
with it." This link between freedom and circularity through
concrete universality can be further sustained by noting that
the distant progenitors of finite and infinite design can be
traced all the way back to Being, in the False and True Infinite,
respectively. The former (as did finite design) represented an infinite regress perpetuating the characteristic for Being's feature
of externality. Similarly in finite design "we have got therefore
only a form extraneously impressed on a pre-existing material:
and this form... is also a contingent characteristic. The End
achieved consequently is only an object, which again becomes
a means or material for other Ends, and so on for ever." (emphases added in this instance) The True Infinite, on the other
hand, leads directly to Being-for-self which, in its incipient self-
Implications of the
synthesis of the Idea
for internality of
norms, circularity,
and concrete universality.
element of truth: for truth can only be where it makes itself (in
line with the principle of internality) its own result." Self-con cealment, as used in our encounters with scientism, is, from the
vantage point of the final m o m e n t of Teleology, part of the
hide-seek-and-discover game which the Idea plays with itself.
As such, self-concealment is as much internal to the Idea as is
the norm (i.e., truth) to gauge it.
In the course of its process the Idea creates that illusion (which
makes it appear that the absolutely Good is yet unaccomplished,
thus requiring the actualizing force of our action), by setting an antithesis to confront it: and its action consists in getting rid of the illusion which it has created.
Should a question remain in regard to internality fostering
the very same relativism that the Notion is trying to overcome,
one has to be reminded that, freedom which stands at the apex
of all grades of action as the supreme norm, is also what defines
the Notion "The Notion is the principle of freedom, the power of Substance self-realized." Recalling Universal History,
which is Spirit's counterpart to the moment of Teleology in Logic, subjective freedom corresponds to Subjective End, determinism to Means, and Realized End to freedom qua self-determination (and self-realization). The contingency associated with historical relativism (the reinterpretation of the past in the light of
the changing values of the present) corresponds to the infinite
regress of the middle moment "the limited content of the
End... which again becomes a Means or material f o r other
Ends, and so on for ever." Finally the overcoming of contingency in both cases comes about through the Notion conceived
as a norm defined in terms of genuine or concrete freedom.
However, since Spirit and Logic differ in their kind of concreteness, freedom takes a different form of expression in each case.
Whereas in the Logic it is a structure of totalization beginning
early with the dialectic of the "I" and culminating through the
Absolute and Substance in the Notion, in Spirit it is self-realization in the socio-historical context of Objective Spirit.
The teleo-logic literally the logic of the end-purpose or
perfection is the logic of self-realization in a cosmic context.
At the end of Universal History it was expressed in the sensuous-figurative language of Christian theology in anticipation of
the transparency of the moment of Philosophy at the end of
Absolute Spirit. But far from belittling freedom as the practical
norm par excellence, the interposition of Art and Religion between Universal History and Philosophy reinforces it. For philosophy can n o w unveil the contributions of art and religion,
not only as forms of cultural self-interpretation, but also as ide-
sphere of the Notion as did scientism in Essence. In the remainder of this Section w e shall endeavor to give a more sensuously
concrete, and even contemporary, dimension to the moment of
Teleology with the help of ideology and the kind of action with
which it is associated.
The premodern cultural space is fully inhabited by spirits
and ghosts, which scientistic modernity in its self-concealment
(especially since the Enlightenment), has branded as dysfunctional and attempted to exorcise. Not surprisingly, many of
these inhabitants were brought down precisely because they
functioned by operating unbeknownst to individuals in line
with the dictates of the Cunning of Reason. But in the process
of being dismantled, other more modern and therefore more
functional because of being difficult to detect ghosts were
put in their place. Some of the latter will be taken up in the
concluding chapters of this study in conjunction with applications of the dialectic to current issues. The Romantic m o v e ment, to which Hegel supplied the fundamental philosophical
undergirding of self-consciousness, provided the much needed
corrective lens to the myopia of the Enlightenment. German
idealism, in particular, deserves the credit for having exposed
the various rigging mechanisms that scientism contributed to
modern culture: first, by unveiling the categorial schemata of
scientism (Kant), and then providing their historio-logical interconnections. But it took anthropology and sociology another
century to rediscover self-consciousness and put Spirit (culture)
and spirits (trans-individual cultural entities) back on a respectable footing, w h i l e alerting us to scientistic claims of
putting ghosts out of business once and for all by means of the
Understanding. By its very nature as de-totalizing, or contingency-laden, action will continue to regenerate ghosts through
concealment of Spirit's footprints on the path of immediacy.
Though secular by nature and political in flavor, those post-Enlightenment ghosts Sorel's "myths" and the various ideologies or "isms" which, by their presence, dominate modern historical space are no different than their premodern equivalents in promoting action behind the backs of individuals. Their
dialectical location is the open-ended arena of Universal History
in Spirit and, correspondingly, the finite ends (and finite design) of the Means-End dialectic of Teleology in the Logic. The
added dimension of time, resulting in what w e called historical
consciousness (i.e., the awareness that something does not
merely belong to the past but that it also has a past), made it
possible for Spirit to observe its actions and assess their value
British empiricism
and French scientism as precursors of
the age of ideology.
Ideological praxis
as theory-practice
dualism cast along
a time-axis.
chotomy of theory-practice, the pre-Renaissance unitary conception of knowledge and action, scientism conceived knowledge as instrumental. Scientifically inspired philosophy subsequently became the means for dealing with human conduct as
an end. Once cast dialectically as means and end, respectively,
knowledge (theory) and conduct (practice) were bound, in the
absence of the Notion, to a relationship of externality governed
by finite design and doomed from the outset to the self-perpetuation with which, by now, w e are all too familiar.
Historically speaking, successfully tested in external and allegedly neutral nature, scientific methodology was uncritically
imported by empiricist philosophy f r o m science in order to
solve its epistemological and ethical problems. But, in its selfconcealment, the former also imported the subject-object and
mind-matter dualism implicit in the ontology of the n e w science. From its inception, modern post-Renaissance culture
seems to have rigged all important questions in terms of such
interlocking dualisms as being-thought in ontology, subject-object in epistemology, is-ought in ethics, and theory-practice in
methodology. The same can be said about the polarity of pastpresent playing surrogate for theory-practice in ideological praxis. Without the dialectic of Actuality Proper, in which Actuality
and Possibility assumed the roles of present (or past) and future
(and by which is shown their mutual determinateness) ideological praxis, whether political or scientistic, is locked in a Utopian
setting where our polarity takes the form of a present reality as
against an unreachable ideality. In fact, as the dialectic of Actuality Proper has taught us, what appears segregated in the future, and amenable only to the abstractive adaptation of theory-practice, is very much the projection of aspirations of the
present, as they have been mediated by the past. And conversely, what appears secluded in the past is an interpretation of the
present in the light of the dreams and hopes of the future. The
ideologues want us to believe that they are trying to change the
future in line with plans laid in the present and the experience
of the past, when in fact they are trying to make a dent on the
present with tools borrowed from the present.
The polarity of ideological praxis on the time-axis can only
be surmounted by overcoming the polarities generated between
past, present, and future. But action is time-bound and as such
is burdened with contingency. These problems will have to be
faced again, in the feature of timelessness of the Absolute Idea,
as the locus of the final synthesis in the next Section. However,
we have already had a taste of what is to come in the moment
of Realized End of the triad of Teleology, where a coincidence
Creation of illusions
through unintended
outcomes by ideological self-concealment.
has been reached between what "is eternally accomplishing itself in the w o r l d " and what "is already by implication, as well
as in full actuality, accomplished." Self-concealment, under
which w e are still laboring in the final moment of the Realized
End, is manifested here as our failure to recognize this identity.
This is the illusion of our age or, in Hegel's words "the illusion
under which w e live." It is inextricably linked with a situation
wherein, given the pervasiveness of division of labor and the
compartmentalization of means and ends, e v e r y activity or
f o r m of knowledge is defined as a means in the service of another v i e w e d as an end, and so on ad infinitum. This can claim
precedence among the illusions peculiar to our age because its
intensification, since the age of the revolutions, has also coincided with the rediscovery of self-consciousness. Like the division of labor, o n w h i c h it squarely rests, this externality of
means and ends has been imported wholesale from scientistic
and engineering projects into the management of human affairs. Occasionally, questions have been raised concerning human engineering and, generally, the management of human
matters along the same lines as non-human resources. Yet, the
absence of a dialectical structuralization of activity and the
knowledge pertaining to it, makes it impossible to oppose such
externality of these terms without falling prey to either some
unquestioning (almost mystical) acceptance of their unity, or
their irreconcilable polarity in the f o r m of a divergence between intended results and unintended outcomes.
For example, the ideological self-concealment underlying
the symmetry b e t w e e n theory-practice and past-future is the
other side of the myth-generating function of ideological praxis,
or the eschatological use of the future for generating change.
The ideological concern is served well insofar as action is generated toward a desired end. But what turns out as the realized
end is usually different than what was intended by the ideologues in the first place. To repeat, ideology
is the illusion under which we live. It alone supplies at the same
time the actualizing force on which the interest of the world reposes. In the course of its process the Idea creates that illusion, by setting an antithesis to confront it; and its action consists in getting rid
of the illusion which it has created.
Thus the Idea also provides the r e m e d y for self-concealment in " r e m o v i n g the illusion (of i d e o l o g y ) which makes it
(i.e., 'the consummation of the infinite End') seem yet unaccomplished," by telescoping future and past into a timeless actuality of the present. This is the structurally familiar state of
affairs wherein "the Good, the absolutely Good, is eternally ac-
Recapitulation of
the shortcomings of
object-language.
sided subjectivity and the show of objective independence confronting it are both cancelled... and in the course of their movement under the dominion of the (Realized) End, the show of
that independence, the negative which confronts the Notion, is
got rid of." In its concreteness as a cultural entity, the Means
can no more be treated as an isolated means, than the Theoretical and Practical Idea can be viewed as mere scientistic theorypractice, or, for that matter, than can Stalin qua historical figure
be taken as a physical body or just another individual. As already quoted in the dialectic of Means and End:
In laying hold of the Means, the Notion constitutes itself the very
implicit essence of the object (which heretofore in its abstraction has
been claiming independence)...and thus when the Notion, in the
shape of (Realized) End, is realized in the object, we have but the
manifestation of the inner (i.e., concrete) nature of the object itself.
Objectivity is thus, as it were, only a covering under which the Notion lies concealed.
In its increasingly behind-the-surface concreteness, the objectivity of the means is a cover for the elevated subjectivity of
the Idea. This recalls other similar cases, notably at the opening
of Actuality and again in the b e g i n n i n g of O b j e c t i v e Spirit,
whereby, upon the synthesis of theory and practice, w e suddenly realized that the concreteness of the polar terms leading to it
have been continuously building-up behind the surface. N o w
again, the Notion "lies concealed" behind the seemingly abstract
term of the objectivity of means, which has grown in concreteness, as indicated by its proximity to the synthesis of the final
moment. The same build-up is also suggested by the fact that "in
laying hold of the Means, the Notion constitutes itself the very
implicit essence of the object." (Emphases added in this instance to
indicate both concreteness and the feature of concealment)
For the Understanding, or the rationality of the Enlightenment, such reliance on Teleology may seem to be no more than
a relic of theology. But, as w e noted above, its applications are
as wide-ranging as they can be illuminating. For example, by
the v e r y self-imposed Marxist standards of creating a " n e w
communist man," the Soviet and thereafter the Chinese, the
Cambodian, and the Albanian efforts have proved to be failures because the means had, so to speak, infected the end. Unlike a scientistic universe of discourse in which, due to its abstractive nature, the externality of means and ends is relatively
unambiguous, in a cultural context externality is more or less
apparent because of varying degrees of concreteness, depending
upon its advanced position on the dialectical scale. In other
words, w h o e v e r pursues a noble end w i t h means alien to it,
has, because of the concrete (cultural) nature of the terms, de-
Spirit. This element of surprise should not be misleading in regard to the important role of the gradual behind-the-surface
process of concretion, or be taken as evidence that the synthesis
can be e f f e c t e d externally through action. Nor, of course,
should the gradual process of concretion be interpreted as an
invitation for inaction, as w e shall see in the coming Section.
The behind-the-surface activity of Spirit also invites action because no one knows precisely h o w close one is to the surprise
(or to the shock in the case of a revolution), or how decisive
one's action may be in bringing it about.
Admittedly, the conditions set by the Notion for the pursuit
of an ideal constitute a tall order. But this, among other things,
shows how much store Hegel places in the "toil of the Notion"
for the accomplishment of "the absolutely Good" without having "to wait upon us." To domesticate his language with the
help of a n t h r o p o l o g y , he underscores h o w much remains
buried-under in the course of countless acts of immediacy
through the ages and, by the same token, how much unveiling
and consciousness-raising is still required before humankind
can even think about planning a culture. It is precisely this
form of cultural self-concealment that Hegel seems to wish to
convey by placing Life as the first moment of the Idea. Needless
to add that this is not a mere organic category at this late stage
of the dialectic, but rather, culture defined in the above sense as
unself-conscious life-like culture not just organic life, which
is a category of Nature. As such, it represents immediacy, or unself-consciousness, which is what culture has been all about for
countless ages, and still is, for the overwhelming majority of
humanity. Spirit has managed pretty well so far without having
to "wait upon us," though again by its very own rules w e have
no hard (external) criterion to gauge this nor, of course, do we
have any way to judge how things would have been otherwise
without being entangled in the counter-to-fact conditionals of
the historians of the Stalin era. Only with the relatively recent
revolution of consciousness, and the emergence of freedom as a
possibility for all, did w e begin to gain a glimpse of what lay behind the surface, and of the immensity of the task of unveiling
ahead, by comparison to which any scientistic project has to be
ranked as secondary, if not insignificant.
Recapitulation of
progress toward
defining the
Absolute Idea.
by receiving the existing world into itself, into subjective conception and thought; and with this objectivity, which is thus taken to
be real and true, for its content it fills up the abstract certitude of
itself. On the other hand, it supersedes the one-sidedness of the
objective world, which is now, on the contrary, estimated as only a
mere semblance, a collection of contingencies and shapes at bottom visionary. It modifies and informs that world by the inward
nature of the subjective, which is here taken to be the genuine objective. The former is the instinct of science after Truth, Cognition
properly so called: the Theoretical action of the Idea. The latter is
the instinct of the Good to fulfill the same the Practical activity
of the Idea or Volition (or the Will). (Logic, #225)
The theoretical moment reaches the determinateness which
characterizes the
practical moment.
The necessity, which finite cognition produces in the Demonstration, is, in the first place, an external necessity, intended for the
subjective intelligence alone. But in necessity as such, Cognition itself has left behind its presupposition and starting-point, which
consisted in accepting its content as given or found. Necessity qua
necessity is implicitly the self-relating Notion. The subjective Idea
has thus implicitly reached an original and objective determinateness, a something not-given, and for that reason immanent in
the subject. It has passed over into the Idea of the Will.
The necessity which Cognition reaches by means of the Demonstration is the reverse of what formed its starting-point. In its starting-point Cognition had a given and a contingent content; but
now, at the close of its movement, it knows its content to be necessary. This necessity is reached by means of subjective agency. Similarly, subjectivity at starting was quite abstract, a bare tabula rasa. It
now shows itself as a modifying and determining principle. In this
way we pass from the Idea of Cognition to that of Will. The passage, as will be apparent on closer examination, means that the
universal, to be truly apprehended, must be apprehended as subjectivity, as a notion self-moving, active, and form-imposing.
(Logic, #232 and Zusatz)
The subjective Idea as original and objective determinateness, and
as simple uniform content, is the Good. Its impulse towards self-realization is in its behavior the reverse of the Idea of truth, and
rather directed towards moulding the world it finds before it into a
shape conformable to its purposed End. This Volition has, on the
one hand, the certitude of the nothingness of the pre-supposed object; but, on the other, as finite, it at the same time pre-supposes
the purposed End of the Good to be a mere subjective idea, and the
object to be independent. (Logic, #233)
This action of the Will is finite: and its finitude lies in the contradiction that in the inconsistent terms applied to the objective world the
End of the Good is just as much not executed as executed, the
End in question put as unessential as much as essential, as actual
and at the same time as merely possible. This contradiction presents
itself to imagination as an endless progress in the actualizing of the
Good; which is therefore set up and fixed as a mere 'ought,' or goal
of perfection. In point of form however this contradiction vanishes
when the action supersedes the subjectivity of the purpose, and
along with it the objectivity, with the contrast which makes both finite; abolishing subjectivity as a whole and not merely the one-sidedness of this form of it. (For another new subjectivity of the kind,
that is, a new generation of the contrast, is not distinct from that
which is supposed to be past and gone.) This return into itself is at
the same time the content's own 'recollection' that it is the Good
and the implicit identity of the two sides, it is a 'recollection' of
the pre-supposition of the theoretical attitude of mind (#224) that
the objective world is its own truth and substantiality.
While Intelligence merely proposes to take the world as it is, Will
The synthesis of
takes steps to make the world what it ought to be. Will looks upon
the theoretical and
the immediate and given present not as solid being, but as mere
practical moments
semblance without reality. It is here that we meet those contradicis the result of the
tions which are so bewildering from the standpoint of abstract
complementarity
morality. This position in its 'practical' bearings is the one taken by
the philosophy of Kant, and even by that of Fichte. The Good, say
of their respective
these writers, has to be realized: we have to work in order to proimperfections.
duce it: and Will is only the Good actualizing itself. If the world
then were as it ought to be, the action of the Will would be at an
end. The Will itself therefore requires that its end should not be realized. In these words, a correct expression is given to thefinitudeof
Will. But finitude was not meant to be the ultimate point: and it is
the process of Will itself which abolishes finitude and the contradiction it involves. The reconciliation is achieved, when Will in its result returns to the pre-supposition made by Cognition. In other
words, it consists in the unity of the Theoretical and Practical Idea.
Will knows the end to be its own, and Intelligence apprehends the
world as the Notion actual. This is the right attitude of rational cognition. Nullity and transitoriness constitute only the superficial features and not the real essence of the world. That essence is the Notion in posse and in esse: and thus the world is itself the Idea. All unsatisfied endeavor ceases, when we recognize that the final purpose
of the world is accomplished no less than ever accomplishing itself.
Generally speaking, this is the man's way of looking; while the
young imagine that the world is utterly sunk in wickedness, and
that the first thing needful is a thorough transformation. The religious mind, on the contrary, views the world as ruled by Divine
Providence, and therefore correspondent with what it ought to be.
But this harmony between the 'is' and the 'ought to be' is not torpid and rigidly stationary. Good, the final end of the world, has being, only while it constantly produces itself. And the world of Spirit
and the world of nature continue to have this distinction, that the
latter moves only in a recurring cycle, while the former certainly also makes progress. (Logic, #234 and Zusatz; parentheses in the text)
As evident from the list of the categories of the Notion, Cognition (in General) has only two moments, Cognition (Proper)
and the Will. Thus the Absolute Idea can be taken as the synthesis of both LifeCognition (in General) and of Cognition
(Proper)Will. From the quoted passages, #224 and #225 belong to Cognition (in General), #232 to Cognition (Proper), and
#233 and #234 to the Will. Cognition (in General) highlights,
i.e., the experiencing of the world as an object-for-a-(trans-individual)-subject which, if followed through in its implications,
leads to the Practical Idea. In other words, it takes a concrete
universal in the form of trans-individual subjectivity a "universal, (which) to be truly apprehended, must be apprehended
as subjectivity" to perform this phenomenological operation
from the vantage point of an implicit pre-existing unity of Cognition and Will, if w e are to make a success of the transition
from the former to the latter and their eventual synthesis.
Hegel capitalizes on this difference in conceptual apparatus
between the Understanding, which a geometrical demonstration of a theorem instantiates, and the Notion to effect the important transition from Cognition to the Will. Viewed for-itself,
i.e., as it sees itself from the vantage point of finite cognition,
Demonstration entails "an external necessity intended for the
subjective intelligence alone." But viewed in-itself (or for-us,
the philosopher standing on the high plateau of the Notion),
"necessity qua necessity (or 'necessity as such') is implicitly the
self-relating Notion. This is so because "Cognition itself has left
behind (its realist-dualistic epistemological standpoint according
to which) its presupposition and starting point consisted in accepting its content as given and found." That this result, i.e.,
"something not-(externally-)given, and for that reason immanent in the subject," constitutes precisely the crucial "pass(ing)
over into the Idea of the Will," should come as no surprise, if
w e recall that according to the dialectic of freedom "the genuinely free will...is conscious to itself that its content is intrinsically firm and fast, and knows it at the same time to be thoroughly its
own." (italics added in the last two instances) The transition to
the Will is thus effected by establishing a higher form of Cognition (Truth) which overcomes contingency through the kind of
self-necessitation characteristic of the Will, and whose defining
feature is also a form of totalization, i.e., freedom. The result
can also be viewed as a reinstated-at-a-higher-level subjectivity
(which the title of the Notion as Subjective Logic also conveys),
whereby the universal is "apprehended (concretely) as (an elevated subjectivity), as a notion self-moving, active, and formimposing," rather than in the familiar scientistic manner, as abstract universal "raking" external content.
But no sooner has the Will tied the loose ends of Cognition
through this elevated subjectivity than cracks begin to develop
again in the newly attained unity. For, though in "its impulse towards self-realization (through) moulding the world it finds before it," the Will promotes coherence, the very nature of action
itself which "pre-supposes the purposed End of the Good to be a
mere subjective idea, and (by implication) the object to be independent," again opens the door to contingency. Now the Will also suffers from finitude, which "lies in the contradiction that in
the inconsistent terms applied to the objective world the End of
the Good is just as much not executed as executed." Either the
"End of the Good" is realized through action, in which case it
cancels itself in the process, or in an effort to remain intact it abstains from externalization, thus rendering itself ineffectual by
being separated from its aim. "This contradiction presents itself
to imagination as an endless progress in the actualization of the
Good; which is therefore set up and fixed as a mere 'ought,' or
goal of perfection." Hegel's grudge against Kant's conception of
the will is that the latter's qualification of it as the only thing
which deserves to be unconditionally called good, has, in effect,
rendered it unrealizable. Kant transformed the will into an abstract universal whereby it could not issue in externalization
without cancelling itself, nor could it preserve itself without being reduced to "a mere 'ought,' or a goal of perfection... The
Will itself therefore requires (according to 'these writers') that its
End should not be realized." But, as w e know by now, Kant's
"good will," this "goal of perfection," which he tried to keep uncontaminated from what he called "empirical admixtures," is already such a "mix" of the empirical and the a priori because it is,
in fact, a concrete universal. Being the product of repeated mediations with empirical content throughout the two phases of
Spirit, and more recently as the embodiment of ideological
praxis, the Will is already a highly concrete entity. Though in
terms of their relationship to freedom the conceptions of the will
of the two thinkers are similar, in terms of action Kant is operating, because of his unredeemed dualism, as if the dialectic of
Content-Form had never taken place.
In order to further appreciate this important transition, perhaps one has to consider that the dialectical progenitor of the
Will, and counterpart of Kant's "good will" is Moralitat, which is
the source of unconditional moral "oughts" being cast in abstractly universal terms. The defect in this formulation which
propelled Moralitat to Sittlichkeit was a lack of necessary (i.e., internally necessitated) externalization. Kant's categorical form
was found unacceptable because, being cast in the form of an
abstract universal and therefore lacking internal necessitation,
it could issue indifferently in goodness or wickedness. Hegel's
remedy for this (moral) form of contingency placing moral
experience in the social and historical context of Ethical Life
(Sittlichkeit) sufficed for a while until it resurfaced as historical relativism in Universal History, and n o w as a result of the
Final synthesis of
the theoretical and
practical moments
accomplished by carrying concreteness to
its logical conclusion.
pie determinateness; thus the Good, although valid in and for itself, is some particular end, but an end that has not to wait to receive its truth through its realization, but is already on its own account the True.
As the Idea contains within itself the moment of complete determinateness, the other Notion with which the Notion enters into relation
in the Idea, posseses in its subjectivity also the moment of an object;
consequently the Idea enters here into the shape of self-consciousness
and in this one aspect coincides with the exposition of the same.
But what is still lacking in the Practical Idea is the moment of consciousness proper itself; namely, that the moment of actuality in
the Notion should have attained on its own account the determination of external being. Another way of regarding this defect is that
the Practical Idea still lacks the moment of the Theoretical Idea. (Science of Logic, pp. 818-21)
The structural similarity of the version of the Science of Logic to
that of the Logic, and of both to Teleology, is evident. In both, externality between subject and object is surmounted through elevated subjectivity as the locus for their synthesis, though the Science of Logic puts the accent on self-consciousness. Closer to Teleology, the latter version uses the triadic form of syllogism, casting subject and object in the first and second terms of the triad.
Thus, the second term the Means earlier, and the "empty
form of immediacy," or the "reality in the form of external actuality," now represents the externalization of the first, the Subjective End earlier, and the "urge in so far as this actuality (of the
Good) is still subjective" now. The final term stands for subjectivity in its elevated form, as synthesis of the Idea and the Absolute Idea, in the moments of Teleology and the Idea of the
Good, respectively. The syllogistic form used in the Science of Logic (through the surrogate triads of in-and-for-itselfness and concrete universality) has the merit of highlighting the transition
from "practical" qua demand of (Practical) Reason "the worth
of the universal" to "practical" as "the out-and-out actual,"
which explains the "superiority" of the Practical over the Theoretical Idea. The enigmatic (if not Platonic) "recollection" by
which the Logic accounts for the synthesis, is replaced in the Science of Logic by self-consciousness, which can more coherently
discharge the same function. The latter represents no mere subjectivity but a return of subjectivity to itself, i.e., to its newly elevated status, after having encountered the object in the second
m o m e n t . For according to the notional structure, there is
nowhere else to go "the particularity of the content is in first
instance infinite (i.e., self-enclosed or self-contained) through
the form of the Notion, whose own determinateness it is." Or, as
Hegel put it in the last two of the above quoted paragraphs:
Comparison of the
two versions of the
Logic in regard to
the final synthesis of
theory-practice.
As the Idea contains within itself the moment of complete determinateness, the other Notion with which the Notion enters into relation in the Idea, possesses in its subjectivity also the moment of an
object; consequently the Idea enters here into the shape ofself-consciousness...
But what is still lacking in the Practical Idea (which is now being
provided by the return movement of subjectivity entailed by the
notional structure) is the moment of consciousness proper (i.e., of
cognitive consciousness) itself, namely that the moment of actuality
in the Notion should have attained on its own account the determination of external being (or, in the words of the Logic, 'that the objective
world is its own truth and substantiality'.) (italics in addition to
those of the text)
Self-consciousness
ensures that Theoretical Idea's want
for the realization of
the Practical Idea is
not allowed to abort
the synthesis.
Caution against
misunderstanding
and/or misapplication of the final
synthesis of theorypractice.
Recapitulation of the
synthetic achievement of the Absolute
Idea.
sesses not only the worth of the universal but also of the outand-out actual." This is followed a few lines later by the assertion that "its urge to realize itself is, strictly speaking, not to
give itself objectivity this it possesses within itself but
merely this empty form of immediacy." This affirmation of "actuality" and "objectivity" as possessions of the Good may seem
puzzling in view of an earlier statement in the same quotation,
wherein the Good is defined in terms of "the demand for an individual external actuality." The contradiction proves to be only
apparent if w e equate "empty form of immediacy" with "individual external actuality" and both with Existence, in contrast
to the more advanced categories of Actuality and Objectivity
(i.e., Objective Notion) on the dialectical scale. This confirms
the high concreteness of the Idea of the Good as having dialectically incorporated all these grades of reality. But it is also an
indication of the power of its "urge... positing its own self... (in
order) to realize itself" without leaving a trace of externality
"to posit its own determination and by sublating the determinations of the external world to give itself reality in the form of
external actuality."
Second, the restoring of Practical Idea's "recollection" of the
unity of the Good and the True is based on certain ambiguity
about its content. Hegel unveils them with the help of the dialectic of Content-Form and of In-itselfnessFor-itselfness. On
the one hand, there is the "finitude of the content" of the Good,
inasmuch as "this is a determinate content and to that extent
something finite and limited." On the other hand, "the particularity of the content is in the first instance infinite through the
form of the Notion." So that in its "urge" to externalize itself,
the Practical Idea is involved both in universalizing its content
"the subjective is for this reason no longer something merely
posited, arbitrary or contingent but an absolute" while at the
same time particularizing it "but on the other hand, this form
of concrete existence, being-far-self has not as yet the form of the
in-itself as well." Thus, concludes Hegel rather inconspicuously,
"the (Idea of the) Good although valid in and for itself (i.e., explicitly realized in its universality), is (still) some particular end,
but an end that has not to wait to receive its truth through its
realization, but is already on its own account the (Idea of the)
True." There is an obvious correspondence between the version
of Logic, in which the synthesis is effected by the Will choosing
as its object the universal content of "the Good (which is also)
the implicit unity of the two sides," to the above in "what appears in respect of form as such, as opposition, appears in the
form of the Notion ("recollected" by the Practical Idea as being)
reflected into simple identity." There is an equally obvious parallelism between "the final purpose of the world (being) accomplished no less than ever accomplishing itself," in the Logic, and
the "end (of the Good) that has not to wait to receive its truth
through its realization, but is already on its o w n account the
True," in the Science of Logic. This is especially true because the
synthesis of the Absolute Idea (through the Idea of the Good
choosing its own content according to the rules set by the Idea
of the True) points to sensuously concrete illustrations of the
Notion, without falling into the trap suggested by attempts at
so-called "applications" of it.
It follows directly from the above quoted text of the Science of
Logic that the Notion has the capacity, by entering "into the
shape of self-consciousness," to turn finitude into (dialectical) infinity and contingency into self-containment through self-determination. Or, again in Hegel's words, "the particularity of the
content is...infinite through the form of the Notion." Since selfcontainment is a high-grade internality in line with the surrogate triad InternalityExternalityInternality (inclusive of Externality), the result of the Absolute Idea can be restated: The
synthesis was accomplished when the (Idea of the) Good made
its own (i.e., internalized) externality (not merely any externally given end but, according to the prevailing context of meaning, externality itself, or the meaning of externality), thus precluding any further resurfacing of it. This outcome may be recognized as structurally similar to the earlier dialectic of InnerOuter leading to the synthesis of Actuality, with the exception
that, in the first case, the objectivist context of meaning still
prevailed. The same was true then of the individual (in contrast
to the present case of trans-individual) subject, since in the earlier case the subject-object polarity remained unsublated. The
Inner and the Outer synthesizing in Actuality were no less the
dialectical progenitors of the Theoretical and Practical Idea,
than was scientistic theory and practice converging into action
behind the surface in Actuality, before that. As the latter anticipates the Absolute Idea in terms of the coincidence of progressively concrete polar terms, so is it foreshadowing the unity of
the Good and the True in the Absolute Idea in the synthesis of
the Inner (Internality) and the Outer (Externality). It does so
by showing that the individual-psychologistic position, still
holding in the case of Correlation, has to be transcended by a
historicaltrans-individual one if the final synthesis is to take
place. This is not immediately obvious in the formal derivation
of Actuality, but it shows through in some otherwise tantalizing
illustrations from the Zusatz, as w e will see in the following,
Clarification of the
final synthesis by
way of tracing the
predecessors of the
Theoretical and
Practical Idea and
their respective
syntheses.
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Hegel's criminal, in his self-concealment about the link between the Inner and the Outer his higher Self and his regular
self, as some neo-Hegelians call trans-individual and individual
subjectivity, respectively also supplies a valuable paradigm for
the exploration of a wealth of modern situations: Individuals
find themselves condemning activities viewed as externally imposed (say, the destruction of the environment), "whereas in
fact the penalty (imposed by agonizing nature) is only the manifestation of (their) own (inner) criminal (consumerist) will." The
coincidence between Neo-Hegelian "Self" and "self," or between
the Rousseauist "volonte generale" and the "volonte de tous,"
which underlie the process of socialization, naturally brings to
mind the parallel process of freedom as self-realization in reconciling individual and general will, and abstract freedom (of
choice) with concrete freedom. These two grades of freedom can
be further domesticated by reference to contemporary forms of
higher education. We can elaborate on the difference between
professional studies and liberal arts by saying that, whereas the
former are oriented towards making a living, the latter are properly aimed for putting one's life together as a whole. The holistic
dimension of freedom the element of totalization encountered in the Neo-Hegelian (Higher or Real) Self, or in the dialectic of the Absolute providing the logical context for self-realization corresponds to the objective of liberal arts education. On
the other hand, the subsidiary role of freedom qua choice
"free choice as suspended" or "freedom in form," corresponds
to professional education in a culture which has essentially rendered means (making a living) and end (putting one's life together as a whole) external to each other. When w e routinely
state that liberal arts education is intended to teach people "how
to think," "to open their minds," or that it is meant "for free individuals," w e mean to scrutinize prevailing forms as well as
subject matter. W e claim that, in studying liberal arts, our students are reaching out toward the holistic presuppositions of
genuine freedom, of which the training in how to make a living
exemplifies mere "choice as suspended," which is subsidiary to
the primary goal of freedom. For example, in liberal arts, students learn to exercise their freedom between holistic options,
such as cultural life-styles or forms of life, which include freedom of "choice as suspended" self-realization versus consumption orientation, risk-taking versus security, physicality versus
sedentariness, and so on rather than mere choice, say, between consumer goods (taking consumerism as a form of life for
granted), or b e t w e e n jobs (taking a life style of security for
granted). The demand, not always heeded in a mass culture
Elaboration on the
final synthesis by
way of the confrontation between the
protagonists of the
political paradigm.
viewed separately prior to their final synthesis. Thus, the radical's normative position has an "out-and-out actual(ity)," for
the same reason of concreteness through mediation that the
Practical Idea had prior to its attainment of an "empty form of
immediacy." Assuming the same degree of concreteness, his position is superior to that of the liberal for "it possesses not only
the worth of the universal but also of the out-and-out actual.
(His) is an urge in so far as this actuality is still subjective positing its o w n self, and not having at the same time the form of
immediate presupposition (with which the cognitive standpoint
and basis for the position of the liberal has been burdened)."
Through the transcendence of the liberal's presupposition and
the contingency stemming from it his "form of immediate
presupposition" above the radical has also transcended the
former's standpoint, both as a theoretical construction lacking
coherence and as a defective foundation for values due to its
scientistic structure. In other words, the radical, by "positing
(his) own self," has surmounted the liberal's taking the institutional setting for granted and inability to benefit from the insight of his o w n theoretical attitude at its most concrete: "that
the objective world (of the established institutions) is (not real
in its own right, but rather is his) own (i.e., the liberal's) truth
and substantiality."
We are, however, advancing too quickly if w e leave our previous assumption intact, that the concreteness of the position of
the radical is on a par with that of the Practical Idea. This is a
lot to assume but, more decisively, it is impossible for him to
v e r i f y such equivalence short of trying "to mould the world
(he) finds before (him) into a shape comformable to (his) purposed End... (in accordance to his) certitude of the nothingness
of the pre-supposed object." In other words, any attempt on the
radical's part to gauge the concreteness of his action by placing
it on the dialectical scale, would also constitute a tacit admission of an ability to predict the next step, thus countering the
retrodictive context of meaning of the Notion. This gives him
the green light, indeed more than that, it becomes necessary for
the radical to act in order to test the concreteness of his position
without knowledge of future syntheses. This, in turn, raises the
familiar charge of irrationality. Now, with the benefit of the Notion, w e can confirm that this charge is unfounded because the
radical is, in effect, being accused of failing to act in accordance
with the long since transcended conception of scientistic theory
that is totally inappropriate for his kind of action. He is now,
however, also aware of himself as the source of another form of
irrationality which is inherent in his action qua contingency-
Implications of
the synthesis of
the Absolute Idea
for contemplation
and action.
Illumination of
the Absolute Idea
through the competing philosophies
of Plato, Aristotle,
and Kant.
goodness. N o w with his reference to noesis noeseos, Hegel acknowledges his debt to Aristotle for placing self-consciousness at
the pinnacle of the Absolute Idea. But it is Kant to whom he is
most indebted, especially for serving as a foil in Subjective Logic,
which Hegel considered his own unique contribution to philosophy. Kant, like the rest of these thinkers, shared his preoccupation with the concept of totalization. But as Plato knew, and
Kant demonstrated with rigor, this concept is not something that
can be arrived at empirically. It is, rather, a demand of reason
(Idea of Reason in Kant's terminology) in order to establish coherence and avoid contradictions (Antinomies of Reason) resulting from the pursuit of such demands with scientistic tools that
do not measure up to the task. Hegel's dissatisfaction with Kant,
to the extent that it bears on our project, was that in establishing
the claims of Reason vis-a-vis those of the Understanding, he did
not fully secure the superiority of the former over the latter, but
left them side by side, with the consequence that theoretical and
practical reason continued to occupy separate domains. Kant,
Hegel would argue, had lost the original insight of Plato about
the unity of Reason, by pursuing its critique undialectically with
what had been essentially the method of the Understanding.
Kant, on the other hand, would have recognized in Hegel's dialectic some of his own Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of
Pure Reason, especially his Antinomies generalized in Hegel's Logic as a categorial apparatus with a constructive intent. But he
would have, nevertheless, dissociated himself from such uses of
the dialectic as the technique of mediation, entailing progressive
logical concreteness which involved a "mix" of the a priori and
the empirical. Kant would have deplored the inevitable transition from logical to sensuous concreteness (Spirit), as well as the
illustrative Zusatze and our effort to generate historically concrete counterparts of categories, as "empirical admixtures"
which interfere with the exposition of the principles of "pure"
theoretical and practical reason.
Consequently, what is for Hegel the action of the good will
"posit(ing) its own determination and by sublating the determinations of the external world g i v ( i n g ) itself reality in the
form of external actuality" remains for Kant at the mental
level, short of externalization a mere "posit(ing o f ) its own
determination" lest the purity of its abstract universality be
tainted by "empirical admixture." But if it is to qualify as practical reason, Hegel's (Idea o f ) Good (or Kant's "good will") cannot but be externalized, i.e., get hold of "a determinate content
and to that extent (become) something finite and limited," before it is found wanting in universality and forced to pass on to
The only mere physicists are the animals: they alone do not think: while
man is a thinking being and a born
metaphysician.
Logic
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0} diSoj
uioMf
uoi;isum
-y
The peculiarity of
the transition from
Logic to Nature explained by the selfcompleteness of the
Absolute Idea.
out its phenomenological tool-box to unveil the categorial structure implicit in what we, in our self-concealment, have all along
been perceiving as raw nature.
The f o l l o w i n g excerpt illustrates Spirit's unveiling project
with special reference to the central categories of Nature, space
and time, f o l l o w i n g the transformation of nature into Nature
(qua "self-externality"). Armed with the categorial apparatus of
the just concluded Logic, Spirit can no longer v i e w space and
time as the roots of externality but instead as the product of
self-externality of the Idea. Stated in terms of our contrast between object-language and meaning-language, an expansion of
the context of meaning has taken place involving a shift f r o m
"natural" to "spiritual" objects in what follows:
The question of the eternity of the world (this is confused with Nature, since it is a collection of both spiritual and natural objects)
has, in the first place, the meaning of the conception of time, of an
eternity as it is called, of an infinitely long time, so that the world
had no beginning in time; secondly, the question implies that Nature is conceived as uncreated, eternal, as existing independently
of God. As regards the second meaning, it is completely set aside
and eliminated by the distinctive character of Nature to be the Idea
in its otherness. As regards the first meaning, after removing the
sense of the absoluteness of the world, we are left only with eternity in connection with the conception of time.
About this, the following is to be said: (a) eternity is not before or
after time, not before the creation of the world, nor when it perishes; rather is eternity the absolute present, the Now, without before and after. The world is created, is now being created, and has
eternally been created; this presents itself in the form of the preservation of the world. Creating is the activity of the Absolute Idea;
the Idea of Nature, like the Idea as such, is eternal, (b) In the question whether the world or Nature, in its finitude, has a beginning
in time or not, one thinks of the world or Nature as such , i.e., as
the universal; and the true universal is the Idea, which we have already said is eternal. The finite, however, is temporal, it has a before and an after; and when the finite is our object we are in
time... Having rid oneself of the conception of the absolute beginning of time, one assumes the opposite conception of an infinite
time; but infinite time, when it is still conceived as time, not as
sublated time, is also to be distinguished from eternity. It is not this
time but another time, and again another time, and so on (#258),
if thought cannot resolve the finite into the eternal... In our ordinary way of thinking, the world is only an aggregate of finite existences, but when it is grasped as a universal, as a totality, the question of a beginning at once disappears... We pass beyond it, but not
to infinity, but only to another beginning which, of course, is also
only a conditioned one; in short, it is only the nature of the relative which is expressed, because we are in the sphere of finitude.
This is the metaphysics which passes hither and thither from one
abstract determination to another, taking them for absolute. A
The relinquishing of the epistemological realist props generated by the Absolute Idea has been accomplished thanks to
the p o w e r of sublation without the loss of either the use of
the categories of space and time for purposes of conducting science, or the Idea's painstakingly attained notional integrity in
anticipation of the task ahead in Nature. The changing relationship between temporal and logical priority in line with the triadic rhythm of the Encyclopedia as a whole has been anticipated
by #381, already quoted at the opening of the Section on Spirit.
"From our point of v i e w Spirit has for its (temporal) presupposition Nature, of which (being also the logical presupposition) it is
the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius." This is apparent
here as follows: First, the sublation of temporal into logical priority as represented by the Absolute Idea. Second, the reassertion by the former of its independence vis-a-vis the latter as reflected in the self-externalization of the Idea qua Nature. And,
third, their reunion in the final moment of Spirit according to
the last quotation. In other words, the sequential arrangement
of the Encyclopedia reflects the fact that nature precedes culture
temporally, but the interpretation, and indeed the mere perception of culture, logically presupposes a categorial apparatus
evolved by culture over the ages. What complicates this simple
presentation is that among those culturally constructed categories are also those (such as time and space), implicit in textual arrangement and the art of discursive exposition. This difficulty, with which w e tried to deal in Part H and occasionally bet w e e n n o w and then, is behind much of Hegel's tendency to
f l e e into non-discursive modes such as the above of "the
Idea freely releas(ing) itself in its absolute self-assurance and inner poise" at some of the most critical turns of his argument.
Far from contradictory, the coincidence of these two priorities
underlying the transition from Logic to Nature, is dialectically legitimate and complementary through the incorporation of the
logical apparatus of time-bound Nature (now representing Idea's
self-externality) into the timeless self-completeness of the Absolute Idea. This can perhaps be further illustrated by reference
to Teleology with which the Idea shares the same preoccupations with respect to time. Within Teleology can be found both
the commonsensical (linear or realistic) temporal structure of finite design providing the support for the Good "eternally accomplishing itself in the world"; and the divine (atemporal) side
of infinite design providing the ground for the Good being "already by implication, as well as in full actuality, accomplished."
(italics added in this instance) Similarly, within the context of
the Absolute Idea, the time-bound aspect of the Practical Idea,
providing the ground for action, is being transcended by the
timelessness associated with the Absolute Idea, as it is being realized that it is impossible to overcome the contingency of action
without also transcending its props: Absolute Idea's "self-externality in its complete abstraction Space and Time."
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tuouj uoyisuvu}
3L{) Jo
SU01}V}3UD
-j-sjuisiiu sjqissoj
DipdjVlQ
dm
fo
Misapplications of
dialectical philosophy in society anticipated by misinterpretations of the
dialectic of Nature.
The Philosophy of Nature takes one step further in domesticating this often confounding transition, making it easier to understand its important implications regarding the misapplication of
the dialectic.
The Philosophy of Nature may perhaps be regarded prima faciae as a
new science; this is certainly correct in one sense, but in another
sense it is not. For it is ancient, as ancient as any study of Nature at
all; it is not distinct from the latter and it is, in fact, older than
physics; Aristotelian physics, for example, is far more a Philosophy
of Nature than it is physics. It is only in modern times that the two
have been separated...Physics and natural history are called empirical sciences par excellence, and they profess to belong entirely to the
sphere of perception and experience, and in this way to be opposed
Difficulties for
theory-practice due
to the misunderstanding of the
transition from
Logic to Nature.
Distinction between
scientific knowledge
of nature and philosophy of nature.
the question: What kind of a plant is this? or it can refer to perception if the name is given; if I do not know what a compass is, I get
someone to show me the instrument, and I say, now I know what
a compass is. 'Is' can also refer to status, as for example when I ask:
What is this man? But this is not what we mean when we ask:
What is Nature? It is the meaning to be attached to this question
that we propose to examine here, remembering that we want to
acquire a knowledge of the Philosophy of Nature.
We could straightway resort to the philosophical Idea and say that
the Philosophy of Nature ought to give us the Idea of Nature. But
to begin thus might be confusing. For we must grasp the Idea itself
as concrete and thus apprehend its various specifications and then
bring them together. In order therefore to possess the Idea, we
must traverse a series of specifications through which it is first
there for us. If we now take these up in forms which are familiar to
us, and say that we want to approach Nature as (philosophical)
thinkers, there are, in the first place, other ways of approaching
Nature which I will mention, not for the sake of completeness, but because we shall find in them the elements or moments which are
requisite for a knowledge of the Idea and which individually reach
our consciousness earlier in other (i.e., more commonsensical)
ways of considering Nature. In so doing we shall come to the point
where the characteristic feature of our inquiry (in highlighting the
philosophical presuppositions of Nature) becomes prominent. Our
approach to Nature (from the more commensensical standpoint) is
partly practical and partly theoretical. An examination of the theoretical approach will reveal a contradiction which, thirdly, will lead
us to our (speculative or dialectical) standpoint; to resolve the contradiction (between the theoretical and practical approaches) we
must incorporate what is peculiar to the practical approach, and by
this means practical and theoretical will be united and integrated
into a totality. (Philosophy of Nature, pp. 3-4; emphases added in the
third and fourth instances)
The project lying ahead for Hegel in his Philosophy of Nature
is to enter the realm of nature as a (metaphysical or philosophical) "thinker," rather than merely as a physical scientist. This he
can n o w do thanks to the insight gained about meaning from
the realm of the Idea and the synthesis of theory and practice
in particular. As the analysis of the question, "What is Nature?"
suggests, such insight is of n o use in f u r t h e r i n g theoretical
knowledge, such as expanding the domain of empirically established propositions in a disciplinary corpus. Nor is it of any help
in solving practical questions in the field of scientific application. There is no sense in pursuing either of these courses independently "for the sake of completion," since the Absolute Idea
has, in its self-completeness, superseded any advance along
these lines by either theoretical and practical endeavor, proceeding in separation from each other.
Marx's targeting of
the Absolute Idea in
his criticism of Hegel.
of Nature.
constitutes the specific character in which Nature, as Nature, exists. (Philosophy of Nature, #247)'
Externality here is not to be understood as the self-externalizing world of sense o p e n to the light, o p e n to the m a n end o w e d w i t h senses. It is to be taken h e r e in the sense of
alienation a mistake, a defect, which ought not to be. For
what is true is still the Idea. Nature is still the form of the
Idea's other-being. A n d since abstract thought is the essence,
that w h i c h is e x t e r n a l to it is by its essence s o m e t h i n g
merely external. The abstract thinker recognizes at the same
time that sensuousness externality in contrast to thought
weaving within itself is the essence of nature. But he expresses this contrast in such a w a y as to make this externality
of nature, its contrast to thought, its defect, so that inasmuch
as it is distinguished f r o m abstraction, nature is something
defective. Something which is defective not merely for m e
or in m y eyes but in itself intrinsically has something
outside itself which it lacks. That is, its being is something
other than it itself. Nature has therefore to supersede itself
for the abstract thinker, for it is already posited by him as a
potentially superseded being.
'From our point of view Spirit has for its presupposition Nature, of
which it is the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this
its truth Nature is vanished, and Spirit has resulted as the "Idea"
entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the
Idea are one either is the intelligent unity, the Notion. This
identity is absolute negativity for whereas in Nature the intelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externalization has been nullified and the unity in that way been
made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same it is this
identity only so far as it is a return out of nature. (Philosophy of
Spirit, #381)'
'Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an
unmediated transition to Nature which comes to be. As Spirit is
free, its manifestation is to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus setting forth its world, at the same
time presupposes the world as a nature independently existing. In
the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being a being in which the Spirit procures the affirmation and
truth of its freedom.'
'The Absolute is Spirit this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. (Philosophy of Spirit, #384)'
(Marx, Karl, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, trans. M.
Milligan, Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1961, pp.
167-71; subsequently referred to as Manuscripts-, parenthetical
statements in the text; the translations of Miller (Philosophy of Nature) and Wallace-Miller (Logic and Philosophy of Spirit) used
throughout this study, with some modifications in terminology and
capitalization, have been substituted for those in Marx's text to ensure uniformity with the rest of our text)
Marx's ignorance of
the logical structure
of the dialectic.
Marx's mistaking
Existence for Actuality, and sensuous
for dialectical
concreteness.
the point where, in his words, "there is no longer any determination that is not equally posited and itself N o t i o n . " Whereas
Hegel labored to add dialectical concreteness to the categories of
the second part of the Logic (Subjective Logic) by including the
object within the reinstated subjectivity of the Notion, Marx, in
one clean sweep (done in the name of what he mistakenly took
to be added concreteness), placed it outside of the Notion and
back into the dualistic structure of Essence. Thus he missed out
entirely on the value of transcendence as the radical tool par excellence, the "metaphysics... the entire range of the universal determination of thought... the diamond net into w h i c h e v e r y thing is brought and thereby first made intelligible," and used
instead the terminology of the Notion as if it belonged to the
pre-dialectical dualistic metaphysics.
It is clear from his discussion of the Philosophy of Nature that
Hegel is perfectly aware of the value, and indeed the beauty, of
sensuously concrete nature that eludes both the scientific and
philosophical approaches.
The more thought enters into our representation of things, the less
do they retain their naturalness, their singularity and immediacy.
The wealth of natural forms, in all their infinitely manifold configuration, is impoverished by the all-pervading power of thought,
their vernal life and glowing colors die and fade away. The rustle
of Nature's life is silenced in the stillness of thought; her abundant
life, wearing a thousand wonderful and delightful shapes, shrivels
into arid forms and shapeless generalities resembling a murky
northern fog. (Philosophy of Nature, #246 Zusatz)
This is the "abstract thinker" of Marx's philosophical manuscript quoted above:
the man estranged from himself (who) is also the thinker estranged from his essence that is, from the natural human essence.
His thoughts are therefore fixed mental shapes or ghosts dwelling
outside nature and man. Hegel has locked up all these fixed mental
forms together in his Logic... as the superseding of this alienation,
as a real expression of human thought.
Hegel's strategy for combating alienation fails, according to
Marx's interpretation, because he remains in his o w n individual
existence as a "thinker estranged f r o m his essence that is,
f r o m the natural and human essence." Or, as he put it a f e w
lines later, Hegel's effort against alienation is "in a stoppingshort at the last act the act of self-reference in alienation
as the true mode of being of these fixed mental forms." Here is
the core of Marx's theory of alienation, the derivation of the
" f i x e d mental shapes or ghosts d w e l l i n g outside nature and
m a n " f r o m "his essence," the e x p l a n a t i o n of his intellectual
products through "the act of self-reference (i.e., the part of the
Marx is categorially
arrested at the level
of dualistic Essence.
Ground-Grounded, Essence-Existence, Content-Form, InnerOuter, etc. They are all problematic and dialectically unstable in
the course of Hegel's Logic, but apparently taken for granted in
Marx's "Critique" and subsequent works. Hegel tried to forestall
tendencies to bifurcate experience into thought-being, subjectobject, theory-practice, and so on. He showed that, unless attention is directed to the dichotomizing role of these categories
of Essence, these tendencies will continue to claim part of the
domain of Spirit, a task for which they are not suited. But he
did not deny their suitability in the pursuit of subject matter
which, because of its abstractive ("finite") nature, is subject to
treatment by such categories. Our discussion of his Philosophy of
Nature indicates that he w o u l d grant this to the scientist (his
"natural philosopher"), w h o is normally unself-conscious about
the limitations of his categorial equipment, but is kept within
the boundaries of his discourse by institutional checks and disciplinary compartmentalization. M o r e o v e r , he w o u l d allow a
similar liberty to the dialectical philosopher (his "philosopher of
nature") w h o , operating self-consciously about the nature of
his categories within the circular structure of the dialectical system has, so to speak, to rediscover Essence in nature before he
is led, by his immanent approach, to the very same results in
Nature as he' was in the Logic.
It has already been mentioned that, in the progress of philosophical knowledge, we must not only give an account of the object as
determined by its Notion, but we must also name the empirical appearance corresponding to it, and we must show that the appearance does, in fact, correspond to its Notion. However, this is not an
appeal to experience in regard to the necessity of the content. Even
less admissible is an appeal to what is called intuition (Anschauung),
which is usually nothing but a fanciful and sometimes fantastic exercise of the imagination on the lines of analogies, which may be
more or less significant, and which impress determinations and
schemata on objects only externally. (#231, Remark). (Philosophy of
Nature, #246 Remark; parentheses in the text)
Under the operating rules of the dialectic "the progress of
philosophical knowledge" of the above passage Hegel could
not allow an attempt to establish the Notion empirically, that is
to attempt to v e r i f y it as if it w e r e an empirical proposition.
This would have meant negating transcendence and obviating
the w h o l e purpose of the dialectic. But he did not propose to
bypass empirical procedure either, as the above and other passages cited from his w o r k clearly indicate. His intent is further
underlined by the reference to #2 31 of the Logic at the end of
the last quotation. This leads directly to the familiar #232 from
the transition of Cognition to the Will earlier, by w a y of show-
Misconception of the
Notion as requiring
external (empirical)
confirmation.
ing that geometrical knowledge (Kant's paradigm for an a priori synthetic corpus of propositions w h i c h the latter thought
both rigorously demonstrable and compatible with sensuous
e x p e r i e n c e ) was n o t presuppositionless and, t h e r e f o r e , no
model for dialectical concreteness or self-containment. While
incorporating intuition as a necessary sensuous prop for its
verification (the equivalent of the need of "empirical appearance corresponding to it" above), demonstrated knowledge, as
exemplified by geometry, is still burdened with externality
it "impress(es) determinations and schemata on objects only
externally."
That these methods (of demonstration), however indispensable
and brilliantly successful in their own province, are unserviceable
for philosophical cognition, is self-evident. They have presuppositions; and their style of cognition is that of Understanding, proceeding under the canon of formal Identity... The abuses which
these methods with their formalism once led to in philosophy and
science have in modern times been followed by the abuses of what
is called 'Construction'... The name 'Construction (construing) of
notions' has since been given to a sketch or statement of sensible
attributes which were picked up from perception, quite guiltless of
any influence of the Notion, and to the additional formalism of
classifying scientific and philosophical objects in a tabular form on
some presupposed rubric, but in other respects at the fancy and the
discretion of the observer. In the background of all this, certainly,
there is a dim consciousness of the Idea, of the unity of the Notion
and objectivity, a consciousness, too, that the Idea is concrete.
But that play of what is styled 'construing' is far from presenting
this unity adequately a unity which is none other than the Notion properly so called; and the sensuous concreteness of perception is as little the concreteness of Reason and the Idea.
Another point calls for notice. Geometry works with the sensuous
but abstract perception of space... Its inobservancy as to the nature
of its methods and their relativity to the subject matter prevents
this finite cognition from seeing that, when it proceeds by definitions and divisions, etc., it is really led on by the necessity of the
laws of the Notion. For the same reason it cannot see when it has
reached its limit; nor if it have transgressed that limit, does it perceive that it is in a sphere where the categories of Understanding,
which it still continues rudely to apply, have lost all authority.
(Logic, #231; parentheses in the last instance in the text)
The Notion contains,
within itself, its empirical confirmation.
a formal identity (or the identity by the rules of the Understanding), but the result of expanding the context of meaning,
or changing the rules of the game, so as to accommodate arising contradictions. In this case it is unsublated residues of externality the result of "raking" of "sensible attributes... f r o m
perception, quite guiltless of any influence of the Notion...
(and) at the fancy and the discretion of the observer" which
propel the Notion to its final conclusion in the Absolute Idea by
generating contradictions between themselves and the ideal of
self-containment already formed within the Notion. From the
higher standpoint of the latter, the contradiction between the
empirically oriented Understanding and the meaning-oriented
Reason is resolved through the Notion's characteristic context
of meaning of self-consciousness. Under its rules of the game,
situations dealt with by the logic of the Understanding and the
Notion, as objects and meanings, respectively, are distinct but
not unalterably opposed. For example, a practicing empirical
scientist qualifies for inclusion in the Notion if he is self-conscious of being a performer of meaning-endowing acts under
the rubric of Reason, while conducting his empirical investigations under the auspices of the Understanding. The contradiction between Reason and the Understanding is present only to
the extent that he remains unself-conscious about his meaningcreation and perceives himself as dealing with the real world of
objects. Or, as Hegel put it, the contradiction is due to the Understanding's "inobservancy as to the nature of its methods and
their relativity to the subject matter." But all contradiction ceases and both logics are found to be immanent in the Absolute
Idea with the attainment of self-consciousness, or w h e n the
Understanding can see that "it is really led on by the necessity
of the laws of the Notion.".
There is no dialectic without transcendence without selftranscendence to be exact since the standpoint of the Notion,
from which transcendence becomes fully explicit, is that of selftranscendence, or what w e have called reinstated subjectivity.
This high-order subjectivity, the result of transcendence, has
been mistaken by Marx for a (merely subjective) idea (in the
head) of the philosopher " f r o m beginning to end nothing
else but abstraction (i.e., the abstract thinker)." That it is (qua
subjective) an abstraction is undoubtedly true, since it historically originated as Hegel's thought, but it is not merely this, nor
"nothing else but" this, as Marx claims, if self-transcendence is
to be taken seriously. Since this is a fundamental point concerning the dialectic, Marx's error infects his whole argument
and transforms his "Critique" into a parody of Hegel's Absolute
sition, the break in the paradigm occurred with the shift from a
mere to an elevated subjectivity, or the change from an inauthentic to an authentic self in the person of the analysand. This
was formally accomplished later with the transition from the individual to the group and from Subjective to Objective Spirit. At
first this move appeared rather perplexing in its immediacy. But
on closer scrutiny it was shown that the element of surprise was
due to the same self-concealment syndrome encountered in the
corresponding moments of the Logic, in which the first version
of the synthesis of theory and practice seemed to emerge out of
nowhere. In both cases thought was, in effect, operating on (an
embodiment o f ) itself unbeknownst to itself, so that the emergence of the logical context (in the Logic) and the institutional
setting (in Spirit) in the midst of what were essentially subjectivist preoccupations, had indeed caught thought by surprise. In
both cases the "categories of Understanding, which (thought)
still continue(d) rudely to apply, (had) lost all authority." In his
failure to appreciate Spirit for what it is and his determination to
reduce philosophical to psychological categories, Marx operates
under the same syndrome of self-concealment. Characteristically, he considered metaphysical thought, which he called the activity of abstracting, as a solipsistic one which bears the same relation to the study of the actual world as masturbation does to
sexual love.
Having gone through the Logic, there is no need to underline
that the task of the Understanding could not have been better
carried out with another set of tools. The term "Essence" signifying, in a characteristically Hegelian way, both a category and
its content, the pursuit of the particular h u m a n essence
("species-being," as Marx calls it in the Manuscripts of 1844), is
bound to be a dualistically structured scientistic quest, "humanistic" and "anthropological" Marxist protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. For, even granting the gist of these arguments that Marx's "human essence" is historically defined
through praxis, and setting aside the conceptual problems arising from the definition of an "essence" changing through time
with no trans-historical substratum serving to fix the common
underlying element in historically defined human essence, the
dualistic structure is being resurrected at the next step, thus obviating any synthetic ambitions based on praxis. In other words,
species-being is now being defined within any given historical
context in terms of non-fulfillment of human potentialities, or
human non-realization measured by reference to alienation.
Thus, we are back into the logical structure of dualistic Essence,
now in the form of non-alienated, to-be-realized in the future,
Marx's synthetic
effort is obviated
by his underlying
essentialism.
Marx's mistaking of
dialectical for vicious
circularity.
human essence versus alienated presently-to-be-overcome human existence. This injection of time, in Marx's strategy for overcoming alienation, coupled with his historization of essence,
may seem to place him quite a f e w steps ahead of Essence in
Universal history and, correspondingly, to raise his form of action from scientistic theory-practice to the category of action
appropriate to that moment, namely ideological praxis. But this
is only seemingly progress a "show," his mentor Hegel would
say of dialectical advance, whose flimsiness can be traced
again to the passages quoted earlier from his Critique, before the
concept of praxis can be taken up in detail in the next Section.
in the preceding pages w e saw how Marx's diagnosis of the
defects of the Absolute Idea and the ills of the "abstract thinker"
led him to misinterpret a logical-ontological as a subjectivistpsychologistic discourse: self-transcendence for self-indulgence;
a sensuous manifestation of the dialectical structure or rhythm
(of self-alienating Spirit) for a subjective state (of the philosopher's malady); the tools of subject-object-bound Essence for
those of the dialectic; (philosophical) meaning for (empirical)
truth; and the Idea for an idea. If such diagnosis is correct, there
can be no high hopes placed on his prescription for the remedy
of alienation, at least not by dialectical criteria. Even when the
philosopher, driven from philosophizing by ennui, had dropped
"abstraction" and pursued nature through "intuition," he could
find no relief from the malady of alienation. For, he
...the abstract thinker who has committed himself to intuiting, intuits nature abstractly... the abstract thinker learns in his intuition
of nature that the entities which he thought to create from nothing, from pure abstraction the entities he believed he was producing in the divine dialectic as pure products of the labor of
thought forever weaving in itself and never looking outward
are nothing else but abstractions from characteristics of nature. To
him, therefore, the whole of nature merely repeats the logical abstractions in a sensuous, external form. He analyzes it and these
abstractions over again. Thus, his intuition of nature is only the
act of confirming his abstraction from the intuition of nature is
only the conscious repetition by him of the process of begetting
his abstraction...
One more instance of mistaken identity with far-reaching
consequences for his argument can be added to those already
listed above, as Marx tries to force his scientistic scheme on
Hegel's dialectic: Dialectical circularity is mistaken for one of
the vicious type, with the kind of pernicious effects found in
our discussion of the two forms of circularity as early as the scientistic paradigm of theory-practice in Part I. Marx asserts that
for Hegel, "the whole of nature merely repeats the logical abstractions in a sensuous, external form... His intuition of nature
Hegel's notional
structure precludes
the application of the
Idea as if it were a
theoretical structure.
draw the curtain of the final act on a practical note (the re-immediated Idea letting itself "go forth freely in Nature"), he now
starts with practice, the practical way " w e relate ourselves to
nature." Nature, far from being "nothing" and "devoid of sense,"
as Marx claims, is something "immediate and external" related
to "an immediately external, and therefore sensuous individual" in the two sentences which Marx has chosen to omit from
his quotation of Hegel. The Zusatz following #245 elaborates on
these opening sentences regarding the practical relationship of
man to nature in richness of illustration and sensuous concreteness not easily matched by Marx's description of his own praxis.
The practical approach to Nature is, in general, determined by appetite, which is self-seeking; need impels us to use Nature for our
own advantage, to wear her out, to wear her down, in short, to
annihilate her.... The other characteristic of the practical approach
is that, since it is our end which is paramount, not natural things
themselves, we convert the latter into means, the destiny of which
is determined by us, not by the things themselves... The negation
of myself which I suffer within me in hunger, is at the same time
present as an Other than myself, as something to be consumed; my
act is to annul this contradiction by making this Other identical
with myself, or by restoring my self-unity through sacrificing the
thing. (Philosophy of Nature, #245 Zusatz)
Marx's dialectically
deficient approach
to nature.
The theoretical approach begins with the arrest of appetite, is disinterested, lets things exist and go on just as they are; with this attitude to Nature, we have straightway established a duality of object
and subject and their separation, something here and something
yonder. Our intention, however, is rather to grasp, to comprehend
Nature, to make her ours, so that she is not something alien and
yonder. Here, then, comes the difficulty: How do we, as subjects,
come into contact with objects? If we venture to bridge this gulf
and mislead ourselves along that line and so think this Nature, we
make Nature, which is an Other than we are, into an Other than she is.
Both theoretical approaches (i.e., the rationalist and the empiricist)
are also directly opposed to each other: we transform things into
universals (in the way illustrated earlier in rhapsodizing about im-
poverished nature), or make them our own, and yet as natural objects they are supposed to have a free, self-subsistent being. This,
therefore, is the point with which we are concerned in regard to
the nature of cognition this is the interest of philosophy. (Philosophy of Nature, #246 Zusatz; emphases added)
With the benefit of hindsight from the discussion of the Logic,
we can recognize the Notion qua immanent in Nature. W e now
realize that the difficulty in bridging the gap between ourselves
and Nature in "com(ing) into contact with objects" is built
into the question, so that the latter is part of the problem. As the
expression with the added emphasis above epigrammatically
conveys, the externality implicit in the epistemological posing of
the question infects the ontological issue, thus moving us one
more step away from the resolution of the philosophical problem of "grasp(ing)... (or) comprehend(ing) Nature." By now w e
know that the unveiling process of what lies behind the surface
has to extend beyond the "duality of object and subject and their
separation, something here and something yonder," to the categorial structure of subject-object in terms of which the question
had been posed to begin with. As it can be expected, the conclusion in the Philosophy of Nature is no different than that of the
Logic or the Philosophy of Spirit. On the practical side, there is the
crude agnostic attitude vis-a-vis nature, also called "animalistic,"
as we shall see momentarily. This is associated with Being in the
Logic and with the naive or primitive (i.e., unmediated) synthetic attempts of Jacobi's philosophy of immediacy and Schelling's
philosophy of nature. On the theoretical side, there are the empiricist and the one-sided subjective idealist approaches to nature, associated with the irremediable dualism of the British empiricists and Kant, respectively. When their synthesis is finally
reached in the Philosophy of Nature, it is, in effect, a replay of the
familiar mutual cancellation of the opposed theoretical and
practical terms, as recalled from the syntheses of Subjective Spirit and the Absolute Idea.
The difficulty arising from the one-sided assumption of the theoretical consciousness, that natural objects confront us as permanent and impenetrable objects, is directly negatived by the practical
approach which acts on the absolutely idealistic belief that individual things are nothing in themselves. The defect of appetite, from
the side of its relationship to things, is not that it is realistic toward
them, but that it is all too idealistic. Philosophical, true idealism
consists in nothing else but laying down that the truth about things
is that as such immediately single, i.e., sensuous things, they are
only a show, an appearance (Schein). Of a metaphysics prevalent
today (i.e., Kantian) which maintains that we cannot know things
(in-themselves) because they are absolutely shut to us, it might be
said that not even the animals are so stupid as these metaphysi-
cians; for they go after things, seize and consume them. The same
thing is laid down in the second aspect of the theoretical approach
referred to above, namely, that we think natural objects. Intelligence familiarizes itself with things, not of course in their sensuous
existence, but by thinking them and positing their content in itself;
and in, so to speak, adding form, universality, to the practical ideality which, by itself, is only negativity, it gives an affirmative character to the negativity of the singular. (Philosophy of Nature, #246
Zusatz; parentheses in the first instance in the text)
Misleading one-sided
reliance on immediacy or mediation; or
mistaking re-immediation for sheer
immediacy.
Hegel's critique of
his predecessors in
regard to immediacy
is equally applicable
to Marx.
ousness, the torment, the patience, and the labor of the negative." The remedy is, of course, the familiar concrete universal,
the "diamantine identity, ( w h i c h ) also contains d i f f e r e n c e . "
Hegel proceeds to illustrate this in the figurative language of the
Christian doctrine of the Trinity. This not only illuminates the
embeddedness of the philosophical in cultural categories and
religious symbolism, but also shows h o w notional logic and
theo-logic cooperate in locating the category-mistakes of the
Understanding. For example, once w e abandon the misguided
effort to bring back the Notion under the reign of causality and
the rest of the categories of Essence, the mystery is r e m o v e d
from questions such as those that perplexed Marx: What causes
something as self-contained as God (or the Idea) to issue forth
in Nature? H o w can God "in determining Himself, remain equal
to Himself?"
How does the universal determine itself? How does the infinite become finite? A more concrete form of the question is: How has
God come to create the world? God is, of course, conceived to be a
subject, a self-subsistent actuality far removed from the world; but
such an abstract infinity, such a universality which had the particular outside it, would itself be only one side of the relation, and
therefore itself only a particular and finite: it is characteristic of the
Understanding that it unwittingly nullifies the very determination
it posits and thus does the very opposite of what it intends. The
particular is supposed to be separate from the universal, but this
very separateness, this independence, makes it a (concrete) universal, and so what is present is only the unity of the (abstract) universal and the particular. (Philosophy of Nature, #246 Zusatz)
Though in both natural philosophy and philosophy of nature the object is the universal, in the former it is the abstract
and in the latter the concrete universal. In the former case the
abstract universal can be used outside the syllogistic structure
for an application to a sensuously concrete (i.e., empirical) content. In the latter case it cannot be conceived outside of that
structure since the polar categories representing external application e.g., inner-outer, mental-physical, subject-object, and
theory-practice have been sublated, so that the syllogistic
structure represents the internal articulation of the self-containment of the Notion. This is the logical background of Hegel's
claim on behalf of the Absolute Idea at the end of the Logic to
"resolve to let the ' m o m e n t ' of its particularity, or of the first
characterization and other-being, the immediate Idea, as the reflected image, go forth freely as Nature." This is w h y it is possible in #247 (quoted by Marx at the opening of this Chapter) for
"Nature (to have) presented itself as the Idea in the form of otherness," much to his exasperation. For the same reason it is possible for Hegel to argue, w i t h an added touch of Cunning of
Reason, in the last quoted paragraph, that in its self-concealment the Understanding is led to treat God as if he were external to his creation; and to deal with the concrete universality of
the Notion as if it were a theoretical construct to be externally
applied to the empirical domain of particularity and finitude.
But it is precisely because of "this very separateness, this independence" of the universal, representing "the labor of the negative" contributed "unwittingly" by the Understanding, that w e
can end up with the concrete universal which is the mediated
"unity of the (abstract) universal and the particular."
Hegel's concrete
universality as the
guide for a genuine
synthesis of theorypractice.
In terms of the final synthesis of theory and practice, the distance telescoped in the final sentence of the last quotation is that
which is between the Idea of the True and the Absolute Idea in
the Science of Logic. The Theoretical Idea, it may be recalled, had
encountered difficulties in its synthetic effort because of the undue confidence it had placed on the (abstract) universality of
thought (in separation from "particularizing" action) as the unifying element. The transition to the Practical Idea came with the
realization that there is a posit (an action-element also present
in thought) which, far from being ultimately disruptive to universality, added to the latter the feature of (dialectical) concreteness which it lacked qua abstract universality. The Theoretical
Idea had originally staked its quest on the supposition that anything particular was external to it, to be subsumed under its
conception of abstract universality. But in pursuing its task, the
Theoretical Idea gradually came to the realization that what it
had been subsuming all along was not external but part of itself.
Like its theological analogue above, the Theoretical Idea had
been unintentionally pursuing a more sophisticated version of
its own ideal of universality, the concrete universal or "the unity
of the universal and the particular." And, alternatively in the
Logic, "in its starting-point Cognition had a given and contingent
content; but now at the close of its movement, it knows its content to be necessary." Or, back to the conclusion of the Science of
Logic, "the pure Idea in which the determinateness or reality of
the Notion is itself raised into Notion, is an absolute liberation for
which there is no longer any immediate determination that is
not equally posited and itself Notion."
Hegel, of course, is not merely restating the obvious that the
singular (or logical individual) is the result of the union of universal and particular. Nor is he repeating the parallel he drew
between syllogistic figures and structures of action in Teleology.
H o w e v e r useful syllogistic structure might be as a model for
self-containment, and therefore of the Notion itself in illuminating the shortcomings of dialectical synthesis through teleo-
Examples of concrete
universality encountered so far.
logical discourse is that operating immanently, through the cognitive apparatus and set of values of a given historical period or
culture, is indispensable to its understanding. History and cultural anthropology, corresponding as they do to the more advanced categories of the Logic, provide us with the best illustrations of concrete universality qua synthesis of the abstract universality and particularity of the units of discourse in question.
Substituting again "Spirit" for "culture" and recalling that Idea
is the logical counterpart for concrete Spirit, w e have still another v i e w of the Idea as embodying concrete universality par
excellence, in sharp contrast to the charges Marx has been heaping against it. The Idea, as already quoted, is
the absolute unity of the Notion and objectivity. Its 'ideal' (i.e., abstract when viewed in its one-sidedness) content is nothing but the
Notion in its detailed terms: its 'real' (i.e., equally abstract when
viewed through one-sidedness) content is only the exhibition
which the Notion gives itself in the form of external existence,
whilst yet, by enclosing this shape (i.e., 'of external existence') in
its ideality, it keeps it in its power, and so keeps itself in it.
Marx's gross misunderstanding of the
dialectic of nature.
clearly tells us that this is not a case where the Idea being "the
negative of itself, or... external to itself Nature is... merely external in relation to this Idea." Had this been the case, the duality
of this and the other side of externality would be reconstituted
(here between self-external Idea and nature) and the result of
the toil of the Notion would have been wiped out in one stroke.
"The truth is rather that (self-) externality (of the Idea) constitutes the specific character in which Nature as Nature, exists."
Marx's opening comment, after quoting #247, can be made true
to Hegel's meaning by removing "not" and having it read as exactly the opposite of what he intended: "Externality here is to be
understood as the self-externalizing world of sense open to the
light, open to the man endowed with senses." The self-alienation of the Idea is not "a mistake, a defect, which ought not to
be," as Marx claims is the case for Hegel, for the same reason
that "God, as an abstraction, is not the true God, but only as the
living process of positing His Other, the world." This self-externalization, or self-alienation, is what propelled the dialectic to
the concrete universal, the same reason that "estranged from
the Idea, Nature is only the corpse of the Understanding." If
alienation and self-diremption were for Hegel mistakes and defects "which ought not to be," the whole dialectic should have
been written off by him as a huge blunder, since what it consists of is precisely a circular chain of self-diremptions and reconciliations in the way in which they are inseparable from each
other. The statement that "since abstract thought is the essence,
that which is external to it is by its essence something merely
external," can only be taken to describe the Understanding. To
use it, as Marx does, in the context of the Idea, illustrates the
most gross misunderstanding of what the dialectic is all about.
which these objects are estranged and which they confront with
their arrogation of reality. The philosopher sets up himself (that is,
one who is himself an abstract form of estranged man) as the measuring-rod of the estranged world. The whole history of the alienationprocess and the whole process of the retraction of the alienation is
therefore nothing but the history of the production of abstract (i.e., absolute) thought of logical, speculative thought. The estrangement,
which therefore forms the real interest of this alienation and of the
transcendence of this alienation, is the opposition of in-itself and foritself, of consciousness and self-consciousness, of object and subject that
is to say, it is the opposition, within thought itself, between abstract
thinking and sensuous reality or real sensuousness...
The appropriation of man's essential powers, which have become
objects indeed, alien objects is thus in the first place, only an
appropriation occurring in consciousness, in pure thought i.e., in abstraction: it is the appropriation of these objects as thoughts and as
movements of thought. Consequently, despite of its thoroughly negative and critical appearance and despite the criticism really contained in it, which often anticipates far later development, there is
already latent in the Phenomenology as a germ, a potentiality, a secret, the uncritical positivism and the equally uncritical idealism of
Hegel's later works that philosophic dissolution and restoration
of the existing empirical world. In the second place: the vindication
of the objective world for man for example, the realization that
sensuous consciousness is not an abstractly sensuous consciousness
but a humanly sensuous consciousness that religion, wealth, etc.,
are but the estranged world of human objectification, of man's essential powers given over to work and they are therefore but the
path to the true human world this appropriation or the insight
into this process consequently appears in Hegel in this form, that
sense, religion, state-power, etc., are spiritual entities; for only mind
is the true essence of man, and the true form of mind is thinking
mind, the logical, speculative mind. (Manuscripts, pp. 147-50;
parentheses in the text)
Marx's mistaking
Marx's critique of the Phenomenology is pervaded by the same
of Spirit for a
misconceptions as that of the Logic earlier. To his previous condematerialized
fusion of identities among fundamental Hegelian concepts is
entity.
n o w added the most comprehensive, and therefore, for the dialectician, the most fatal of all: the substitution of reason for
Reason and of (individual) m i n d for Spirit (or M i n d ) . As w e
n o w m o v e at the level of sensuously concrete Spirit o f t e n
obscured by the rendition of Geist as M i n d or e v e n " m i n d "
Marx's earlier misconceptions in connection w i t h his criticism
of the Logic, can be brought into sharper focus. Contrary to
what M a r x thinks, it did not happen that Hegel, c o n f r o n t e d
with a choice between nature and mind, b e t w e e n externality
and abstraction, between "sensuousness externality in contrast
to thought weaving within itself opted for the latter. Rather, it
is that, w i t h these polarities already sublated b e f o r e the ad-
The underlying
epistemological
dualism is behind
Marx's misconception of Spirit.
The externality of
the epistemologically
realist context does
not vanish in the
dialectical context.
A being who is objective acts objectively, and he would not act objectively if the objective did not reside in the very nature of his being. He creates or establishes only objects, because, he is established
by objects because at bottom he is nature.
Samples of Marx's
undialectical
epistemology.
in its own absolute truth it resolves to let the 'moment' of its particularity, or of the first characterization and other-being, the immediate Idea, as its reflected image, go forth freely as Nature.
As it has, one hopes, become clear in the preceding pages,
this transition is crucial for the comprehension of Hegel's effort
to overcome the epistemological standpoint with particular reference to a mindful approach to nature, and correspondingly,
to Marx's misguided effort to reinstate it. "Thinghood" in the
Phenomenology corresponds Nature in the Logic. Self-consciousness, already a feature of the Absolute Idea in the latter work, is
pre-eminently the locus of dialectical synthesis in the former
one. Finally, alienation in the former corresponds to the whole
" 'moment' of... particularity" of the Absolute Idea, with special
emphasis on its "other-being" in the above quoted transition.
To ensure that there is no ambiguity left on this point, the following opening paragraphs of the concluding chapter of the
Phenomenology, titled "Absolute Knowledge," provide not only
the context for this highly indigestible (for Marx) phrase, but
also the whole basis for the remaining part of his "Critique".
The Spirit manifested in Revealed Religion has not as yet surmounted its attitude of consciousness as such; or, what is the same
thing, its actual self-consciousness is not at this stage the object it is
aware of. Spirit as a whole and the moment distinguished in it fall
within the sphere of figurative thinking, and within the form of
objectivity. The content of this figurative thought is Absolute Spirit.
All that remains to be done now is to cancel and transcend this
bare form; or, better, because the form appertains to consciousness
as such, its true meaning must have already come out in the
shapes or modes consciousness has assumed.
The surmounting of the object of consciousness in this way is not
to be taken one-sidedly as meaning that the object showed itself
returning into the self. It has a more definite meaning: it means
that the object as such presented itself to the self as a vanishing
factor; and, furthermore, that the alienation of self-consciousness
itself establishes thinghood, and that this externalization of selfconsciousness has not merely negative, but positive significance, a
significance not merely for us or per se, but for self-consciousness itself. The negative of the object, its cancelling its own existence,
gets, for self-consciousness, a positive significance; or, self-consciousness knows this nothingness of the object because on the one
hand self-consciousness itself externalizes itself; for in doing so it
establishes itself as object, or, by reason of the indivisible unity
characterizing its self-existence, sets up the object as its self. On the
other hand, there is also this other moment in the process, that
self-consciousness has just as really cancelled and superseded this
self-relinquishment and objedification, and has resumed them into
itself, and is thus at home with itself in its otherness as such. This is
the movement of consciousness, and in this process consciousness
is the totality of its moments.
As is evident from the above, the closing moment of the Phenomenology closely parallels those of the Logic and the Philosophy
of Spirit, the Absolute Idea and Absolute Spirit, respectively. The
Phenomenology forms one more link in the circular chain of the
dialectical system, so that the same final outcome, i.e., the
overcoming of the epistemological standpoint and the establishment of the notional structure, are shown to be operating immanently in different subject matter. Whereas in the Logic selfconsciousness served as an intuitive aid for grasping the logical
structure of the Notion, in the Philosophy of Spirit, but especially
in the Phenomenology, it used sensuously concrete culture as its
embodiment. The latter work solved the perennial epistemological riddle of "How can we, as subjects, come into contact with
objects?" by cutting the categorial Gordian knot of prevailing
epistemological presuppositions. "If w e venture to bridge this
gulf and mislead ourselves along that line (of epistemology)
and so (dualistically) think this Nature, w e make Nature, which
is an Other than we are, into an Other than she is." Inasmuch as the
epistemological riddle in the Phenomenology exemplified itself in
the apparent gap between consciousness and culture, the Gordian knot was cut in this case by setting the former in the context of the latter f r o m the outset, so that the stages of consciousness, writ large in phases of culture, constitute the very
subject matter of the dialectic of culture. The Phenomenology culminates in a synthesis of theory and practice in the shape of an
elevated self-consciousness, in the same way that the Logic concludes in the same synthesis in the form of the trans-individual
subjectivity of the Idea. The scandalous (for Marx) "alienation
of self-consciousness" turned into "thinghood," before synthesizing into Absolute Knowledge, is the counterpart in the Phenomenology of theory and practice having their last bout of opposition in the Logic as Theoretical and Practical Idea, before
their final synthesis in the Absolute Idea.
In this sense, Revealed Religion, the moment immediately
preceding Absolute Knowledge and about to be sublated in the
Marx's branding of
Hegel's dialectic as
accommodationist.
On the other hand, says Hegel, there is at the same time this other
moment in this process, that consciousness has just as much annulled and superseded this externalization and objectivity and resumed them into itself, being thus at home in its other-being as such.
In this discussion are brought together all the illusions of
speculations.
First of all: consciousness self-consciousness is at home with itself
in its other-being as such. It is therefore or if we here abstract from
the Hegelian abstraction and put the self-consciousness of man instead of Self-consciousness it is at home with itself in its other-being
as such. This implies, for one thing that consciousness (knowing as
knowing, thinking as thinking) pretends to be directly the other of
itself to be the world of sense, the real world, life thought
over-reaching itself in thought (Feuerbach). This aspect is contained
herein, inasmuch as consciousness as mere consciousness takes offense not at estranged objectivity, but at objectivity as such.
Secondly, this implies that self-conscious man, in so far as he has
recognized and annulled and superseded the spiritual world (or his
world's spiritual, general mode of being) as self-alienation, nevertheless again confirms this in its alienated shape and passes it off as
his true mode of being re-establishes it, and pretends to be at
home in his other-being as such. Thus, for instance, after annulling
and superseding religion, after recognizing religion to be a product
of self-alienation, he yet finds confirmation of himself in religion as
religion. Here is the root of Hegel's false positivism, or of his merely
apparent criticism: this is what Feuerbach designated as the positing, negating and re-establishing of religion or theology but it
has to be grasped in more general terms. Thus reason is at home in
unreason as unreason. The man who has recognized that he is
leading an alienated life in politics, law, etc., is leading his true human life in this alienated life as such. Self-affirmation, in contradiction with itself in contradiction both with the knowledge of and
with the essential being of the object is thus true knowledge and
life.
There can therefore no longer be any question about an act of accommodation of Hegel's part vis-a-vis religion, the state, etc., since
this lie is the lie of his principle. (Manuscripts, pp. 160-1; parentheses in the text)
Marx's philosophical
derivation of Hegel's
accommodationism
is the result of compounded errors
about the dialectic.
Implications of
Marx's charges
against Hegel for
accommodation
and alienation.
Essence, seems the obvious w a y to cancel this unpleasant condition and it is no accident that those most vulnerable to it settle for this cure: cancel infinite regress by introducing an irreducible entity, something "really real" in the system, so that
one can, in turn, deduce from it other less real features of reality, such as appearances. Having g o n e through Essence in the
Logic and the corresponding moments in the Philosophy of Spirit,
w e n o w k n o w that this is not the solution either, since essentialism is also an unstable position.
Instead of dealing with conceptual difficulties generated by
an unexamined categorial apparatus under the light of the Notion, Marx dismisses the latter and settles for his o w n version of
Essence: productive forces as the "really real." Or, instead of
facing up to the inevitable issue of categorial meaning, he deals
with the Notion as if it were an empirically verifiable concept, a
construct which failed to do justice to reality. Thus conceived,
the N o t i o n must h a v e appeared as a dismal failure because,
though it was supposed to have dialectically incorporated the
"ought to be," it did not produce a situation in which it could
be realized into a future "is". Thus, in terms of M a r x and his
fellow Young Hegelians, philosophy would inevitably lead into
action. Instead, the "ought to be" appeared in their eyes to have
collapsed into an identity with the "is," a sheer accommodation
with the status quo. So he felt entitled to call Hegel's position
"false positivism" and seek a remedy whereby the "ought to be"
could be predictably realized into an "is," and philosophy would
indeed lead to action. But in order to accomplish this, both the
"is" and the "ought to be" had to be brought under a common
set of underlying principles which w e r e "empirically verifiable
and bound to material premises." In short, the "predictably"
above had to be translated into the detail of the familiar predictive logic of the Understanding. The price for attempting an activistic reconstruction of philosophy through bypassing the Notion, resulted in a relapse to Essence: a search for those "material premises" behind the surface of the "mental productions" of
German philosophy.
The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable
and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all
the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness,
thus no longer retain the semblance of independence...
Where speculation ends in real life there real, positive science
begins. (Emphases added in this instance)
W e are back on the dualistic track of m a t e r i a l - m e n t a l of
Essence, n o w in the guise of material (premises)mental (pro-
Marx's misplacement
of his "synthesis"
through praxis in
the dualistic frames
of action and time.
The philosophical
context of Marx's
priority of practice.
(i.e., the practice of dialectical t r a n s c e n d e n c e ) , his " m e t a physics," for traditional dogmatic metaphysics, or the positing of
transcendent entities b e y o n d the reach of empirical support.
Thus, having mistaken "meta-physical" discourse for traditional
metaphysics and "speculative method" for empirically groundless speculation, he proceeded to supply his o w n cure: "Where
speculation ends in real life there real, positive science begins." The problematic nature of scientistic dualism and essentialism, which are the main targets of Hegel's notional discourse,
is being bypassed in the interest of what Marx conceived to be
the overcoming of metaphysics and the establishment of positive
science. The traditionally or dogmatically metaphysical nature of
his position, i.e., his allowing of the "categories of Understanding...rudely to apply, (where they) have lost all authority," is obscured for the undialectical reader by the scientistic garb in
which his argument remains wrapped. Synthesis-in-the-future
is inferred f r o m alienation-in-the-present via the essentialist
functional relationship b e t w e e n property and consciousness,
"material premises" and "mental productions." Such formulation is sure to have earned the scorn which IJegel reserved for
those w h o tried to put philosophy in the service of managing
the future, which he thought to be not the object of philosophical knowledge, but the domain of hopes and fears.
M a r x ' s c o n f i d e n c e in practice as the locus of synthesis of
( e c o n o m i c ) reality and (philosophical) consciousness has its
premise in his theory about the functional relationship between
such reality and consciousness. " W h e n reality is depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of activity loses its medium
of existence." But for "reality (to be) depicted" in a form which
shows the dependence of consciousness on reality, and destroys
the independence of philosophy by undercutting its alienated
discursive medium, it is necessary that action be used to change
the present form of reality.
The transcendence of property is therefore the complete emancipation of all human senses and attributes...
It will be seen how the resolution of the theoretical antitheses is only possible in a practical way, by virtue of the practical energy of
man. Their resolution is therefore by no means merely a problem
of knowledge, but a real problem of life, which philosophy could
not solve precisely because it conceived this problem as merely a
theoretical one.
This is the c o r e of w h a t has be v a r i o u s l y i n t e r p r e t e d as
Marx's priority of practice over theory, his dialectical synthesis
through praxis, or his materially-based dialectic, or philosophy
being dialectically transcended by praxis. A more epigrammatic
Marx's synthetic
effort is doomed
by the underlying
dualism of his
priority of practice.
thought: but he does not understand human activity itself as objective activity." By contrast to this "contemplative" or "old type"
materialism, whose "highest point" of attainment "is the contemplation of separate individuals and of civil society," the
"standpoint of the new materialism (of Marx) is human society
or social humanity." By " n e w materialism" Marx means his
o w n view of praxis "as sensuous human activity, as practice," his
brand of synthesis of consciousness and being, of humanity and
nature the "naturalism of man and the humanism of nature"
of the Manuscripts where "the eye has become a human eye, just
as its object has become a social, human object...(and) the senses
have therefore become directly in their practice theoreticians."
By emphasizing what he calls "active," as against Feuerbach's
passive or "contemplative" side of the subject-object relationship, Marx claims to have effected the synthesis that both oldfashioned materialism (i.e., Feuerbach, among others) and idealism (i.e., Hegel) failed to achieve for different reasons
Hegel for missing the "sensuous activity as such," and Feuerbach for missing it in subjectivity.
It does not take long to see how, under these conditions,
Marx's attempt at a dialectical synthesis is doomed to failure. As
w e are well aware by now, no such synthesis is possible on the
basis of one of its terms, without the tacit reinjection of the other term and, thus, the reintroduction of dualism. A genuine dialectical synthesis involves a change in the categorial apparatus
or the rules of the game, so that the two previously incompatible terms can now be accommodated under a new category. No
matter how much the "active" or practical term of the subjectobject relationship is emphasized, and an e f f o r t made (on
Marx's part) to make it the locus of his synthesis, it basically remains on the other side of the "contemplative" or "theoretical"
term of the polarity without which it is untenable. Any concern
with the modification of external circumstances, of which the
Theses are dramatic illustrations, presupposes some form of duality, which it is the task of the dialectical philosopher to make
explicit ex post facto in the process of his categorial scrutiny, before showing that the radical action involved has indeed constituted a dialectical synthesis of the terms. As Hegel would have
put it, the Practical Idea is "particularizing," no matter h o w
loud its totalizing claims. However, this insight only follows the
"toil of the Notion," which includes the "recollection," or incorporation of the Theoretical Idea into the Practical Idea. But this
is the A b s o l u t e Idea w h i c h M a r x has so c o n t e m p t u o u s l y
brushed aside throughout the Manuscripts. His desperate effort
to accomplish the desired synthesis by somehow endowing the
human body directly with theoretical insight "the senses... becoming)... directly in their practice theoreticians" is a relapse
into the categories of Soul and symptomatic of his failure as a
dialectician. Talking, as Marx does, about the "naturalism of
m a n " or the "humanism of nature" without the categorial
groundwork, is like placing the cart before the horse, positing
the synthesis before the dialectical toil. Indeed, by envisioning
the outcome of his project in the future, and thus placing it
within the predictive parameters of Essence, he undercut the
possibility of it ever becoming a genuine dialectical synthesis of
theory and practice.
The diagnosis of
If theory is reduced to practice and vice versa without
Marx's dialectical
mediation, and with no residue left to sustain the tension between the polar terms until an expanded context of meaning can failure reinforced
through recollection
provide a basis for their synthesis, the ground is being removed
of the paradigms of
from underneath practice, thus eliminating its raison d'etre. In
Part I.
other words, the dialectical process does not proceed through reduction, but through mediation which is kept going by an unsublated residue until the final moment. This is the same ingredient which supplied the radical impetus in the early paradigms of
Part I, variously referred to as the experiential, the undomesticated, the pre-reflective, or irrational element in the dialectical synthesis of action. It accounts for the injection of novelty or what
has also been called a "leap." But w e may also recall that the determination of whether this is a creative or a crazy "leap" like
the similarly structured contingency-generating "particularization" of action is a matter to be determined after the fact and
cannot be left to wishful thinking. Neither can it be left to scientistic inference without relapsing to the status quo ante in Part I,
nor to Essence once w e have reached the Notion. Inference
would, in effect, pave the way for trying to predict the next step
which would be the ultimate negation of the dialectic.
For example, a "leap" inferred by the rules of theory-practice of Essence or dictated by conscience would be no dialectical
"leap," inasmuch as it would amount to deriving the next step
by the rules of the previous moment. The certification of the
"leap" as such by the Notion ex post facto is necessary because
the categories of Essence and Moralitat have become problematic beyond their respective ranges of competence. Given the nature of the element of contingency noted above, the determination of whether the "leap" is dialectically creative, or the result
of mere caprice or craziness, lies ultimately with the Notion. In
this light, Marx's alleged synthetic "leap" effected through revolutionary praxis and signified by such phrases as "humanized
nature," "human ear," "social organs," "human object," and "the
The Idea is truth in-itself and for-itself, the absolute unity of the
Notion and Objectivity. Its 'ideal' content is nothing but the Notion
in its detailed terms: its 'real' content is only the exhibition which
the Notion gives itself in the form of external existence, whilst yet,
by enclosing this shape in its ideality, it keeps it in its power, and
so keeps itself in it.
Marx's synthetic
failure traced to his
overlooking of Idea's
function as a higher
context of meaning.
Inadequacy of the
historical process
(short of the Idea)
to sustain the final
synthesis of theorypractice.
The much maligned (by Marx) Idea has become the key to
the dialectical synthesis, as the discourse shifts away from the
pursuit of an ever receding "real," to one concerned with categorial meaning. This shift results in bringing the subjective and
the objective, the "ideal" and the "real," elements together in
the Idea. The same shift can be seen as the outcome of self-transcendence. Whereas, prior to the Idea it was the subject or individual self w h o stated the proposition about synthesis, while
taking his position as an outsider for granted, now it is self-transcendence qua trans-individual subject, or the Idea, which includes him in itself. The same result can be stated in terms of the
above quoted transition to the Idea by way of the Notion which,
in being only a structure of self-completeness still in want of
concreteness by way of self-transcendence, resembles individual
subjectivity. The Notion, "by enclosing this shape (of external
existence) in its ideality (i.e.,its relatively abstract structure due
to excluding the object or external reality), it (the Notion) keeps
it (the externality of the object) in its power, and so keeps itself
in it." Marx's target, the Idea, is the key to the synthesis he is after without having to resort to those inanities about "the senses
(turned) directly in their practice theoreticians." By shifting the
discourse to the level of (categorial) meaning, instead of holding
on to the object-level of epistemological realism, the sense in
which w e can talk about synthesis of the subjective and the objective, the "ideal" and the "real," becomes explicit in the context of the Idea. This process of making meaning explicit can also be viewed as the familiar (from the dialectical concept of freedom) process of self-transcendence being co-extensive with selfrealization. For example, in the case of history, its most dialectically advanced or explicit meaning is found in the categorial setting beyond that of Universal History in Hegel's terminology
the "truth" of time-bound Universal History is found in the eternity of the Absolute Idea, or Absolute Spirit.
The idea of a dialectical process, as exemplified in the temporality of Universal History, appealed to Marx and he thought
he could retain it, after stripping it of the Idea's idealist trappings, and adapt it to material conditions. In the Preface to the
second edition of the Capital, written nearly thirty years after
the Manuscripts, Marx estimates his own contribution to the dialectic as follows:
Dismissal of the
proletariat as an
agent for effecting
the synthesis of
theory-practice.
Hegel is supposed to have removed "the whole body of mate- No final synthesis
rialistic elements" from history and to have given "full rein... to
is possible without
the speculative steed." He is being charged with concealing the self-transcendence
real forces of history behind "the mystical appearance of this
involving Spirit.
'self-determining Notion'" and, at the same time, of using a trick
to conceal his concealment by making it "appear thoroughly
materialistic." As in most of the Theses, the pre-notional framework is set up by the way the question is posed from the outset.
In a dualistically presupposed world of mind-matter Hegel "has
considered the progress of the Notion only," trying to hide his
neglect of matter, while Marx emphasized matter by "go(ing)
back to the 'producers of the Notion'," thus unmasking the former's tricks and setting things straight. At this point there is no
need to further insist that what Marx perceives as a step forward, and a remedy of Hegel's alleged idealistic one-sidedness of
the Notion, is, in fact, a relapse to the matter-mind polarity of
Essence long since sublated. Without self-transcendence, the final synthesis of theory and practice whether through industry or proletarian labor, or even revolutionary praxis is bound
to remain external to the subject, thus dooming it to its state in
Actuality prior to the undertaking of the synthesis of subject and
object at the opening of the Notion. In the sense that he remains
an outsider to the synthesis he is describing, Marx's position is
no different than that of Feuerbach whom he criticizes for failing to go beyond the theoretical standpoint of "contemplative
materialism." Marx's own "active" standpoint of "new materialism" is no less one-sidedly theoretical if the overcoming of dualism of theory-practice is the criterion of success in this endeavor.
To put it in a way which perhaps highlights the untranscended
dualism that mars all his efforts at a dialectical synthesis: When
Marx emphasizes the material or "sensuous" term of the polarity
as the locus for the synthesis, he is also pari passu emphasizing
the polarity itself in this case material-mental or sensuous
non-sensuous through which the first members of the pair are
defined by reference to their opposites. Nor is there much of a
dialectical advance in his synthetic effort when he speaks of "reality, what we apprehend through our senses" not only "in the
form of the object or contemplation" but also subjectively "as sensuous human activity, as practice." For, now it is the untranscended
subject-object, or his lack of self-transcendence his rejection
of Spirit as "phantom of the human brain" which comes back
to haunt him as unresolved dualism. His pseudo-dialectic lacking mediation between the terms of polarity is even more discernible in Thesis III.
The materialistic doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and education forgets that circumstances are changed by
men and that the educator himself must be educated. This doctrine has therefore to divide society into two parts, one of which is
superior to society.
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human
activity or self-changing can only be comprehended and rationally
understood as revolutionary practice. {German Ideology, pp. 197-98)
This and similar passages quoted earlier regarding "circumstances mak(ing) men as much as men making circumstances,"
have been variously identified by interpreters of Marx as specimen of dialectical self-transcendence e.g., self-creation of
man, self-constitution through his activity or labor, self-formation process, and so on exemplifying dialectical synthesis
through praxis. But, as Hegel would have readily noted, externality cannot be ultimately overcome outside of the confines of
Spirit. Thus, what poses as self-transcendence and a synthesis
of theory and practice at this level, is, at best, a relatively crude
form of interactionism described more accurately by the familiar muddled "both" of Correlation in the middle of Essence.
Contemporary Applications
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Resumption of the
sensuous concreteness of Part I with
the benefit of what
has intervened.
Humanitarianism as
a paradigm of unityin-opposition and
associated self-concealment, within
the framework of
institutionalization.
Spirit in conjunction with the surrogate polarities of immediacy-mediation and abstract-concrete. For example, as divorced
from the concreteness of Sittlichkeit, the abstract (unmediated)
"good," as represented by Kant's good will, could, because of
lack of sufficient determinacy or dialectical totalization, issue
indifferently in good or evil. Or, as Hegel put it in the familiar
passage from Moralitat,
The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for
the agent, who can therefore decide on something opposite to the
good, (and) can be wicked... This pure self-certitude (in the absence
of a firm institutional setting safeguarding the externalization of the
good will), rising to its pitch, appears in the two directly interchanging forms of (the morality of) Conscience and Wickedness.
The built-in potential for evil in (abstractly formulated) lofty
principles was taken up by Hegel in Phenomenology in some of
the most beautifully written pages of philosophy-brought-tolife. Centering on the French Revolution, Hegel incorporated
this insight under the dialectically appropriate (qua inclusive of
both good and evil) title, Absolute Freedom and Terror. Assuming modern liberalism to be the cultural heir of the eighteenth
century's Revolutions, these passages also supply the key to our
illustrations from contemporary liberal culture. As in the case
of the confrontation between the radical and the liberal of our
paradigm, immediacy in the f o r m of the principles of utility,
and subsequently of absolute (or universal) freedom, was used
by the philosophical radicals of the A g e of Reason to criticize
and eventually subvert the institutions of the Old Regime.
Hegel's paradigm of
institutionalization
of unity-in-opposition as an aid to our
domestication of
dialectical categories.
Domestication of the
triad of immediacy
for application to social change, and revolution, in particular.
Immediacy of Utility
and Absolute Freedom as agents of social change through
the erosion of antiquated institutions.
...The sole work and deed of universal freedom (or of any other
abstract principle) is therefore death, a death too which has no inner significance or filling, for what is negated is the empty point of
the absolutely free self. It is thus the coldest and meanest of all
deaths, with no more significance than cutting off a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water. (Hegel's Phenomenology,
pp. 358-60)
The dialectical net of immediacy spreads as the revolution of
consciousness reaches out to include "the actual revolution of the
actual world." In this highly anticipatory formulation of things to
come, cultural categories are dialectically prior to political ones,
as politics alongside morality turns out to be an exoteric manifestation of a more basic form of consciousness. This "actual world"
contains institutions which, by virtue of their nature as 'thoughtthings,' incorporate earlier forms of consciousness. Now, on the
verge of an "inner revolution" of consciousness, these institutions
are about to be confronted in what turns out to be "an actual
revolution of the actual world." This "inner revolution" is exemplified in this historical juncture by the moral-turned-political
ideal of "absolute freedom" (or consciousness known to itself as
universal will) willing the universality of freedom and illustrated
by Hegel through Rousseau's totalitarian "general will," (as opposed to his more democratic-utilitarian "will of all"). But the
implementation of this ideal requires by its very nature as an
admixture of matter ('mass') and thought as embodied in an ideal ("Spirit") the participation of "thought-things" in the form
of institutions. Without the mediation of the latter the ideal cannot be converted "immediately" into social reality without causing "the fury of destruction."
The indispensability
of consciousness
for both cohesion
and erosion of
institutions.
Absolute Freedom's
change into its opposite, Absolute Terror.
cial components of their respective development and aid strategies p r o v e d also unsurprisingly similar: " m o d e r n i z a t i o n , "
"progress," and the "historical process" for both liberal democracies and socialist states, allowing for some differences regarding
the nature of the laws of historical development. Their common
social cost-and-benefit balance sheet rested on the same Benthamite abstract ("lollipop") principle of the "greatest happiness
of the greatest number," sharp ideological differences between
Marxism and laissez-faire political and economic theory, notwithstanding. The same abstract universal principle of utility underlies both capitalist "progress" via accumulation of capital, and
Marxist "laws of social development" again via accumulation
of capital, but with an eye on building socialism, as a stepping
stone toward the more remote state of communism.
Like the principle of universal freedom, that of universal hap- Institutional violence
piness remained an abstraction even for the majority of the peolaid bare by way of
ple of the humanitarian providers. This is to say nothing of the
the dialectic of imculturally alien recipients, as its universality ran aground in the mediacy and related
capitalist and, in a different way, the socialist economic institucultural analysis.
tions of production and property. The spiritual, and ultimately
physical, violence inherent in the aggregation process by which
"the greatest number" was arrived at, was thus exacerbated by
including both the large expansive Western societies and the
small non-Western ones under the same column, with no consideration of their relative strengths and radically different institutions. For, w h e n the "price of modernization," or the "inevitability of the laws of social development," are measured
against the "cultural costs" incurred by non-Western cultures,
the gauge selected to reduce the two aggregates to commeasurability is the very principle of Western-conceived utility, the hallmark of liberal culture and the same Utility principle, which
marked the transition of institutions from tradition to modernity. Finally, should a recent historical example be necessary to
highlight the common failure of these ideological foes to properly diagnose their common social malaise, let them recall the insights of apolitical cultural radicalism of the 1960s in terms of a
revolution of consciousness Hegel's "inner revolution (of consciousness from which) emerges the actual revolution of the actual world" overriding a merely political-economic solution.
While the phase of immediate violence of the Reign of Terror is instructive for our soul-searching Marxist, the Napoleonic phase of mediated (or institutional) violence, associated with
his socialization of France's new atomized society and the export of its constitutional ideology to the rest of Europe, is particularly instructive for contemporary exporters of liberal cul-
Inferences from
the dialectic of
immediacy for
conservative
ideology.
The sole work and deed of universal freedom (or of any other abstract principle, in the absence of an institutional embodiment corresponding to it) is therefore death, a (cultural) death too which
has no inner significance or (institutional) filling, for what is negated is the empty point of the absolutely free self. It is thus the coldest and meanest of all deaths, with no more significance than cutting off a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water.
There should be no doubt left, following the unveiling of
those high humanitarian and democratic principles, that they are
indeed abstractions for foreign cultures, especially when they
continue to be abstractions for large segments of our population.
The reformulated moral options can then be put in Hegel's stark
terms by asking whether the "cutting off ...(of a quarter of million Iraqi) head(s) of cabbage" is a good price for implementing
liberal freedom in the Gulf area? Or, how does the "fury of destruction" in Vietnam, or the financing of aggression in the Middle East by bolstering up the "defenses" of our democratic
"friends" in the region, stack up in the dialectical (moral) accounting, according to which "the sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore (cultural) death... the coldest and meanest of all deaths"? Clearly, in the light of what has been said
about violence by way of universalization, the implication of this
passage extends to the invisible and unadvertised "coldest and
meanest of all deaths," through institutional violence preceded
by alienation "the (familiar) restriction o f ) the activity and
being of (self-realization o f ) the personality," which is being
ceaselessly perpetrated in our very own domestic backyard.
Contrary to the common perception that the enemy of one's
enemy is pari passu one's friend, conservatives can derive no solace for their commitment to the preservation of the status quo
from Hegel's critique of liberal abstract universalism coupled
as it comes with his respect for institutions and his meticulous
abstention from speculations about the future. Rather than interpret his position as a counsel for political acquiescence, it
should be taken as exactly the opposite, i.e., the limitation of
philosophical thought to the interpretation of the past, so that
the green light is given to those committed to action without
h o p e , or e x p e c t a t i o n , of f i n d i n g m o r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n or
intellectual backing from philosophy, to say nothing of science.
This, of course, does not mean that one cannot learn from philosophy, history, or science, but simply that the fundamental
(meta-)knowledge about creating or breaking values is qualitatively different from the predictively oriented knowledge of scientism, or the insight derived from the study of history. Such
conclusion is consistent with the deeper logical incompatibility
encountered in the dialectic of the Idea and exemplified here
in Hegel's Absolute Freedom (turning by its own logic into) Terror according to which knowledge is cast in terms of logical
universality, whereas action is associated with particularization.
The destructive outcome of culture enforcement or transmission is the result of re-immediation, i.e., of cultural confrontation on the level of immediacy of different institutions
which, in their nature as "thought-things," are on both sides
products of mediation. Inasmuch as culture is governed mostly
by the unself-conscious processes of habituation and institutionalization, the violence perpetrated against small non-West-,
ern societies, as well as against domestic minorities and sub-cultures, has been predominantly institutional, rather than outright physical. As such, it is not consciously intended as destructive, but, more paradoxically (or better, dialectically), intended as humanitarian. This is perfectly consistent with the
characterization of liberal culture as one whose entrenchment
of its o w n moral categories remains unexamined because of
lack of self-consciousness. Both foreign and domestic forms of
destructiveness fall under the familiar dialectic of dehumanization through universalization. The liberal version is more insidious than the aggressively religious or militaristic one because it
is able to disguise its destructiveness under the veil of humanitarianism. The liberal version, like the explicitly non-humanitarian one (e.g., tribal, ethnic, or religious), raises its o w n values to universality but, unlike the latter, flaunts its humanitarian motives which, precisely because of being culturally embedded, are not open to unveiling even to the perpetrators themselves. On the surface, humanitarian principles are unquestionably laudable since hardly anyone can object to introducing humanitarian measures such as time-saving technologies, feeding
hungry children, or inoculating populations at risk. Yet, if w e
recall Hegel's admonition, "universal freedom (or, for that matter, any value cast in universal terms) can produce neither a
positive work nor a deed; there is left for it only negative action;
it is merely the fury of destruction." As universal principles cannot be implemented immediately in the absence of appropriate mediating institutions of the recipient pre-modern societies
destruction is unleashed and the principle of humanitarianism turns into its opposite.
The conclusion of the dialectic of immediacy, as exemplified
in Hegel's treatment of the Reign of Terror, has been that absolute freedom, or any universalized moral principle, cannot be
realized through the mediating function of pre-existing institutions, w i t h o u t being c o - o p t e d because of their nature as
"thought-things" belonging to the very same social order that
Self-concealment
(not conspiracy) as
the key accessory
to institutional
violence.
Implications of the
dialectic offreedom
for institutionalization and transmission of culture, and
vice versa.
count for the will giving its decision for the one and not the other
of the two alternatives.
In the absence of self-consciousness, Third World Soul remains defenseless vis-a-vis Western f r e e d o m of choice masquerading as genuine freedom. The Section appropriately titled
Soul as the Pre-Existing Unity of Theory-Practice, pointed to
Soul as Spirit in potentia with the moment of Consciousness mediating between Soul and Mind and, by extension, between
the pre-existing (or original) unity of theory and practice in
Soul, and their final synthesis in Mind. Our recurring expression
"pre-existing unity," and Hegel's equivalent of "original unity,"
as applied to Spirit in general, reflect the circular rhythm of the
dialectic whereby one rediscovers, through mediation, that
which had lain implicit in what (as in the case of Being, or the
radical immediacy of action corresponding to it) originally
seemed to be an unmediated beginning. Thus, in the pre-existing unity of Soul, were found in potentia all the self-diremptive
forces which surfaced openly in Consciousness and Self-consciousness (or, correspondingly, in Essence and the Notion of the
Logic) later. In the anthropologically concrete language of culture, w e are gradually becoming aware of what had been hidden from us in the immediacy-laden course of our long social
existence: since w e are the unself-conscious creators of our culture, w e can n o w in our newly acquired freedom through
self-consciousness take charge of our destiny and change it.
We may recall that in exploring the similarities between a
Western and a Third World activist, with respect to the dialectic
of freedom in the course of our discussion of Soul, w e had endowed the latter with the same degree of self-consciousness in
facing the dilemmas of modernization, as w e had the former
(our radical of the political paradigm) in confronting liberal culture: Whether or not the determination to tear down one's traditional culture for the sake of modernization Western-style
constituted an act of genuine freedom qua self-realization. Like
the self-reflecting Western radical who, on the eve of a violent
day, may be wondering whether his action will result in a genuine dialectical synthesis (re-immediation), or a mere immediacy of action; so may the Third World activist be agonizing over a
similar dilemma about the potential for genuine freedom in the
traditional institutions he is about to tear down. In other words,
whereas lack of self-consciousness about his traditional culture
had reduced his conception of freedom to liberal freedom of
choice, the presence of self-consciousness had upgraded his freedom to the potential of self-realization, with the freedom of
choice "as suspended" within a more meaningful set of options.
tural revolution of the 1960s, reverberate through this domesticated rendition of dialectical freedom.
In order to clarify the difference made in the case of freedom
by the presence of self-consciousness, it is worth citing a case of
cultural contact between East and West just prior to the reunification of Germany. During the time the Wall was being torn
down, an American television correspondent interviewed a
young German from East Berlin. Asked for his thoughts about
the wealth of consumer goods on which he had just spent his
West German allotment, the East Berliner answered, "It is nice,
but I am not sure whether 30 different kinds of salami are really
necessary." The polarity of freedom freedom as choicefreedom as self-realization (inclusive of freedom of choice in sublated form) immediately suggests itself as a dialectical framework within which liberal freedom of choice can be understood
as subserving genuine freedom as self-realization. In order to
complete the picture, one has to recall from the dialectic of Actuality that genuine freedom cannot be actualized short of totalization wherein contingency the persistent adversary of freedom, if viewed as its irreconcilable opposite has been finally
overcome. This means that freedom qua choice which accurately
describes the contingency "the conceit that it (i.e., the will)
might, if it had so pleased, had decided in favor of the reverse
course" is a necessary ingredient in the process of totalization.
Only in the context of the latter, as a result of consciousnessraising (or heightened self-consciousness in the manner of the
young East Berliner), can one uncover the False Infinite of consumerism behind the facade of liberal culture's f r e e d o m of
choice. The adaptation of the young Berliner's newly heightened
consciousness to our oft-quoted formulation of genuine freedom
could read as follows:
The genuinely free will which includes free (consumer) choice as
suspended, is conscious to itself (about what is truly required for its
self-realization so) that its content (in terms of its actual choice) is
intrinsically firm and fast, and knows it at the same time to be
thoroughly its own (and not the product of West Berlin's opinion
makers and engineers of consent).
The difference between the two cultural settings of East and
West Germany had created for our young man conditions of
consciousness-raising under which he could begin to transcend
formal freedom of choice: His "genuine free will which includes
free choice (from 30 different kinds of salami) as suspended, is
( n o w as a result of consciousness-raising) conscious to itself
that its content (his actual choice out of such meaningless variety) is firm and fast (and not as if he 'might, if [ h e ] had so
Contemporary
application of
the criterion of
dialectical freedom.
The dialectic of
Universal History'
applied to intercultural conlict.
of the radical presuppositional challenge, the liberal establishment has been shifted back to the moment of Abstract Universality, where it remains vulnerable to the experiential elements
it has left undomesticated by its abstractive tendencies the
moments representing "particularization" and "finitude" of action short of the Absolute Idea. As w e may recall, a presuppositional challenge involves a new level of coherence, according to
which the prevailing presuppositions have been reduced to the
status of a new content (along with the facts that they have ordered) to be reconstituted at a new level of coherence. In other
words, the radical challenge has disrupted the prevailing coherence, forcing its reconstitution at a n e w context of meaning.
Restated in terms of the dialectic of content and form, which also allows for our injection of "finitude" of action, the radical
challenge translates as follows: Liberalism's claim to represent
concrete universality (or true individuality) has lost its ground,
as the dialectical scrutiny of the prevailing context of meaning
has unveiled that the moment of Content (Particularity) is the
result of self-selection of content on the part of Form (Abstract
Universality). The claim of the present synthesis to represent
Concrete Universality is invalid since it has left out elements
from radical "irrational" experience by way of the process of
self-selection.
In this process of reconstitution, Particularity is not only recognizable as the propelling force of the dialectic, but also as our
early insight about the source of radical challenge being experiential rather than intellectual. In the syllogistic f o r m of the
above triad, the "irrational" or experiential element is represented by Particularity to be subsumed (domesticated or co-opted, in the language of the political paradigm) under the rationality of Abstract Universality. But Particularity also poses a
challenge to Abstract Universality to change its rules in order to
be accommodated. The full import of our insistence, beginning
with Part I, that a genuine radical challenge can only be rooted
in what w e variously referred to as the experiential, the irrational, the ineffable, the undomesticated, the unclassifiable, and
the outright physical, can now be better understood in the light
of the dialectical v i e w of reality as reflected in this syllogistic
structure. As w e proceeded into the formal exposition of the dialectic these recalcitrant elements continued under the guise of
built-in "contingency" which, by generating difficulties for coherence, propelled the dialectic by way of forcing a reconstitution of coherence at each level of meaning. These "irrational"
elements persisted throughout the Idea under different labels
such as "finitude" or "particularization" of action in the Idea's
Particularity as the
"irrational," or radical, face of Spirit.
practical moment, until they were finally overcome in the Absolute Idea.
Similarly, the dialectic is the logic of freedom in the fundamental sense of allowing the untried moment (the radical face
of Spirit) to challenge what is established (its conservative face)
in the interest of totalization, which is indispensable for the realization of freedom. Irrationality and, by extension, physicality
and violence, inasmuch as rationality has already been incorporated in physical structures and institutions through the domesticating operation of Abstract Universality is a necessary element in the process of totalization. This is not to be interpreted
as if the dialectic offers itself as a substitute for the internal logic
of the system (moment) challenged, nor that it can serve as an a
priori account for the transition from one moment to another.
Rather, it gives the green light to the "irrational" moment (or
immediacy of practice) to challenge, and then allow, dialectical
philosophy to sort out the outcome ex post facto. Rational practice, w e recall, cannot pose a fundamental challenge to theory
because the latter, itself, has set the conditions under which experience can be construed as a challenge within its context of
meaning. The saying that theory is sterile without practice, and
that the latter is blind without theory, contains an important, if
only half, truth. Theory is indeed uncreative without practice,
but the latter must also be blind (or irrational) according to the
specifications of theory, if it is not to be reduced to a mirror-image of theory, thus sealing its sterility. The lesson, from the important dialectic of Reflection, that theory has to assume a
stance of independence (or disinterestedness) from practice if it
is to perform its creative role, holds pari passu for practice vis-avis theory as well, if it is to fulfill its radical function. It has been
the merit of German idealism, and Hegel in particular, to have
reconstituted the "practical" from the level of subordination to
theorizing carried on by a subject to that of a subject imposing
its rules. This was done by Hegel not only on a compartmentalized moral-practical sphere (Kant), but also to extend to the
rule-creating function through the dialectic over the whole
range of both compartments of human experience. To the original idealist position the dialectic added the crucial insight about
continuity of the two meanings of "practical" and what follows
from that in terms of the relative independence of the polar
terms: unless the independent footing of the "practical" is also
retained, as was the corresponding footing of the "theoretical,"
its creative dimension as radical challenge is lost and it devolves
into routine technological-bureaucratic practice.
Particularity and Universality also have their modern sociocultural counterparts in particulars! and universalis! ideologies
and movements. In the first category belong nationalism, fascism, national socialism, and particularist (and especially fundamentalist) religious movements. In the latter are included classical liberalism, Marxist socialism, and religious universalism.
National socialism exhibits, in a most v i r u l e n t l y condensed
form, the features of particularism in the service of a challenge
against universalism. Hitler managed to summon the full potential of the German nation by recouping the potency of the
"irrational" implicit in pre-bourgeois tribal forms of community,
while retaining the advantages from technological and bureaucratic efficiency characteristic of a modern society. He enhanced
the cohesiveness of this otherwise self-contradictory amalgam
of a communally conceived industrial society, by targeting his
challenge against Abstract Universality, the "logical e n e m y " of
Particularity which Nazi Germany represented. This enemy was
perceived as a composite of universalist elements: international
capital consisting of the precursors of modern multinationals,
an international political order pursued by both liberalism and
communism, and internationalist Jewry conveniently doubling
also as an internal enemy. The devastating outcome is too familiar and well documented to recount, but what is less publicized is that the lessons to be d r a w n are t o o i m p o r t a n t t o
shroud under facile explanations, such as Hitler's work was that
of the devil, or a madman, or that Nazism was an aberration of
history. In its one-sidedness, Abstract Universality is as logically
incomplete and unstable as Particularity. In their socio-historical manifestations, they have both been culturally wasteful and
inhumane. For liberalism, as well as for socialism, the unit of
totalization in their pursuit of freedom was, at least in principle,
if not always in practice, global universalism, which made them
veer toward convergence on important matters behind the political and ideological surface. For the varieties of fascism, on
the other hand, of which nationalism can be taken as a less virulent version, it is the particularism of the group ethnic, cultural, racial, and more recently tribal and religious which is
the focus of totalization. The dangers f r o m the latter are all
equally familiar, following the crumbling of the historic forms
of socialism and the disintegration of polyethnic states generated under the auspices of liberal international order and justified
by the doctrine of balance of power.
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Particularity and Universality also have their modern sociocultural counterparts in particularist and universalist ideologies
and movements. In the first category belong nationalism, fascism, national socialism, and particularist (and especially fundamentalist) religious movements. In the latter are included classical liberalism, Marxist socialism, and religious universalism.
National socialism exhibits, in a most virulently condensed
form, the features of particularism in the service of a challenge
against universalism. Hitler managed to summon the full potential of the German nation by recouping the potency of the
"irrational" implicit in pre-bourgeois tribal forms of community,
while retaining the advantages from technological and bureaucratic efficiency characteristic of a modern society. He enhanced
the cohesiveness of this otherwise self-contradictory amalgam
of a communally conceived industrial society, by targeting his
challenge against Abstract Universality, the "logical enemy" of
Particularity which Nazi Germany represented. This enemy was
perceived as a composite of universalist elements: international
capital consisting of the precursors of modern multinationals,
an international political order pursued by both liberalism and
communism, and internationalist Jewry conveniently doubling
also as an internal enemy. The devastating outcome is too familiar and well documented to recount, but what is less publicized is that the lessons to be drawn are too important to
shroud under facile explanations, such as Hitler's work was that
of the devil, or a madman, or that Nazism was an aberration of
history. In its one-sidedness, Abstract Universality is as logically
incomplete and unstable as Particularity. In their socio-historical manifestations, they have both been culturally wasteful and
inhumane. For liberalism, as well as for socialism, the unit of
totalization in their pursuit of freedom was, at least in principle,
if not always in practice, global universalism, which made them
veer toward convergence on important matters behind the political and ideological surface. For the varieties of fascism, on
the other hand, of which nationalism can be taken as a less virulent version, it is the particularism of the group ethnic, cultural, racial, and more recently tribal and religious which is
the focus of totalization. The dangers from the latter are all
equally familiar, following the crumbling of the historic forms
of socialism and the disintegration of polyethnic states generated under the auspices of liberal international order and justified
by the doctrine of balance of power.
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The polarity of Good-Evil is only one of many manifestations of unity-in-opposition, or invisibility of links behind-thesurface responsible for obfuscating through abstractiveness the
understanding of liberal as well as any other, culture. But it assumes a special interest for our project because its relatively (dialectically) abstract nature, evidenced by the polar structure of
Good-Evil, invites the agent to remedy the apparently irremediable opposition of the terms by acting immediately (i.e., without mediation) to overcome the evil. The vagaries of one-sidedness of immediacy (of action) are all too familiar, beginning
with the radicalism of the paradigms in Part I, and frequently
resurfacing, most recently in the case of humanitarianism.
However, the accent in this Chapter is not so much on the destructive effects of action based on immediacy, but on the shortcomings of knowledge leading to such action. Ignorance of the
behind-the-surface links created the illusion that the situation
could have been different.
In order to understand these difficulties due to the one-sidedness of abstraction of evil and by extension of the good,
as exemplified in the immediacy of moralism and radical action
w e had to unveil the ontological links behind the surface of
the polarity of Good-Evil. In its abstractiveness what Hegel
calls "other-being" in a previously quoted passage from #212
Zusatz in the Logic evil is as indispensable part of the good, as
are the more generic categories of Nothingness and the Negative in grounding progressively advanced concepts of reality in
the course of Being and Essence. The Good, as did the True,
went through a succession of oppositions, wherein the opposed
terms were encountered as forms of externality or indifference.
By the time w e reached the Notion it had become increasingly
obvious that the issue of externality could not be resolved apart
from the resolution of the persisting externality between subject and object. The dialectical process confirmed what w e had
suspected f r o m the outset about the ontologically grounded
connection between the "ought" and the "is" in the course of
Being: Their interplay, i.e., "reversal of polarity" in Subjective
Spirit, or their interchange in Objective Spirit, in which the "is"
in Moralitat assumed the role of the villain, and the "ought" that
of the hero only to reverse their roles once more in Sittlichkeit. M o r a l categories w e r e f o u n d to be o n t o l o g i c a l l y
grounded, thus adducing more evidence for the continuity bet w e e n the "is" and the " o u g h t " and the underlying link between them; though, again, a full disclosure of this required the
mediating toil of the Notion. Every effort to seal the gap between the "is" and the "ought" within Objective Spirit (or cor-
Misleading reading
of history as a result
of the abstractiveness
of evil.
Structuralization
of Stalin's responsibility along the
phases of Spirit.
Further illustrations
ofdistortive effects of
abstractive polarization of good-evil.
Recapitulation
of our thesis that
radical (presuppositional) challenge
is essentially cultural
in nature (Spirit).
Self-concealment
regarding contemporary affairs
correlated with
the teleological
path of Spirit.
suggests that what is meant by "application" of dialectical philosophy to contemporary affairs, or bringing it to bear on everyday life, is precisely the correlation of the levels of surface and
behind-the-surface, which run through its whole course of its
categories, by w a y of " u n v e i l i n g . " W e are still w i t h i n the
boundaries of Hegel's familiar proposition that "philosophy...
advances nothing new; and our present discussion has led us to
the c o n c l u s i o n w h i c h agrees w i t h the natural b e l i e f of
mankind," though it might appear that w e are being transported, unawares, to the high clouds of philosophical theology. The
reflective reader, w h o has patiently f o l l o w e d the argument
about the function of the polarity of Good-Evil in providing the
impetus for immediacy of action, is now entitled to ask, " W h y
confront evil w h e n it has such a constructive role to play in
propelling the dialectic forward?" The layperson is asking essentially the same question in the context of religious belief,
when he agonizes over the perennial problem of w h y God, in
his infinite power and goodness, allows evil to exist. Or, more
impatiently, " W h y are all these tricky games by God necessary?" The sociologist of religion, w h o is approaching the problem of theodicy through social institutions as suppliers of the
bonding of individuals into groups, is much closer to a common
understanding with the believer than is apparent. The answer
rests with a discourse (involving different rules) beyond individual minds, whether such discourse is socially constructed,
imported, or divinely posited whether it is called Divine
Providence, social Mind, culture, Spirit, Invisible Hand, or God.
What is required to render these apparently ("on-the-surface")
discrepant explanations into a consistent whole is an interpretation of the seemingly disjointed discourses in terms of an allinclusively coherent one what w e have called "the context
of contexts"of meaning. Recalling Hegel's philosophical vindication of the "natural belief of mankind" earlier, "the business of
(coherence-seeking dialectical) philosophy is only to bring
(through unveiling of what lies behind the surface) into explicit
consciousness what the world in all ages has believed (in its
seeming incoherence, due to abstractiveness, of discourses on
the surface) about thought."
In these situations connections between seemingly irreconcilable terms in this case means and end seem both long
and behind the surface. The dialectic is particularly useful in
providing the needed transparency of the behind-the-surface
links frequently referred to as links forward and backward
on the circular path of Spirit between apparently irreconcilable opposites. The main illustration of the dialectic of Means
uals and groups. As suggested by Hegel's critique of Kant's compartmentalization of theoretical and practical reason, this distinction is valid and useful as far as it goes, but it does not go far
enough. A n important lesson from the dialectic of Objective
Spirit is that substantive (including those self-given values
falling under Kant's practical reason), as well as instrumental
rationality, are subject to such "debasing" processes as embodiment and sedimentation. They are, therefore, as much in need
of unveiling, or desedimentation, if self-concealment is to be
avoided. In dialectical terms, instrumental and substantive rationality qua polar expressions, like good and evil, are not only
linked behind-the-surface through their common feature of
embodiment logically grounded in the familiar Identity-inDifference, or Unity-in-Difference but it is such commonality
that puts them in an institutional setting where they find themselves in competition for social space.
The infection of the end by the means, to which w e referred
in the dialectic of Means-End, was precisely the byproduct of
competition of different forms of institutionalized rationalities
for social space. The noble end of human self-realization advanced by socialism was ultimately subverted by pursuing it
through an instrumental rationality of inherently capitalistic
nature e.g., scientistic, competitive, consumerist, and individualistic fundamentally alien to the communist vision. The
substantive end of creating Marx's and Lenin's " n e w communist man" through socialization, was replaced by an individual
socialized by instrumental rationality (in an effort to build up
the economic foundations of socialism) to become an externally
motivated, selfish consumerist, w h o finally toppled the political-ideological infrastructure. W h o e v e r pursues a noble end
with means alien to it has, because of the culturally concrete
(linked behind-the-surface) opposed terms, defaulted on his
noble aim by allowing the end to be infected by the means. As
the means are of a concrete nature, i.e., replete with embodiments of economic, technocratic, bureaucratic, and psychological values, they fill up the social space, thus displacing a potential alternative institutional network which would have served
as support for the "new communist man."
Similarly, the institutionalized embodiments of the instrumental rationality of our domestic scene displace any potential
embodiments of substantive rationality representing values
(such as self-realization) from social space. For example, the "intelligent systems" and "smart machines" behind the bombing of
Iraq, which elicited the awe of the efficiency-minded during the
Gulf War, are the same embodiments (Hegel's "thought-things"
The convergence of
biological, cultural,
and theological
worldviews under
the auspices of
holistic Spirit.
Thefiercelysubversive role of
seemingly tame
self-consciousness.
Particularity as the
locus of the "irrational" challenge
to the "rationality"
of Abstract
Universality.
(dialectical) Reason all those negative terms of our familiar polarities that had been left outside it as rationally unbridgeable
by the non-dialectical reason (the logic of Identity). All domestications of the dialectic, through seeking the invisible link bet w e e n apparently unbridgeable oppositions Evil-Good,
Means-End, Finite-Infinite Design, Choice-Freedom, and most
recently "taking sides"being a "retrospective philosopher"
of this Chapter, are variations of this linking through self-consciousness of our roles as creators and as mere pawns of culture. The f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g , or action-oriented, side of the
Janus-faced Spirit is, by definition, contingency-ridden by contrast to the reflection-oriented, or footprint-unveiling face of it,
w h i f h is animated by a quest for knowledge of actuality.
As w e are well familiar by now, Hegel gave the green light to
("irrational") radical action by assigning self-consciousness as
the distinguishing feature of Reason in the final (absolute) moment of the dialectic. The seemingly harmless by virtue of its
retrospective contemplative nature concept of self-consciousness assumes threateningly radical proportions for the status quo
once it is recognized as the very tool capable of unveiling those
behind-the-surface links between culture as our doing and culture as given. As the distinguishing feature of the absolute moment, self-consciousness supplies the link between the apparently irreconcilable opposition which divides the "harmless" retrospective philosopher corresponding to the Absolute Idea and
the fiery radical representing the Practical Idea. Since contingency (as "particularization of action" characteristic of the Practical Idea) is a built-in feature of all action, the success (or failure) of "irrationality" in subverting the "rationality" of the establishment cannot be identified beforehand, for the same reason that it is impossible to predict which particular form of rulebreaking will eventually be incorporated in the Absolute Idea.
The "go ahead" has been given to us (consistent with self-realization whose success cannot be finalized before the Absolute
Idea) with no illusions about the coincidence between our intentions and the final outcome of our actions.
The moment of Particularity as the seat of the "irrational"
probing the possibility of its inclusion in the next round of Concrete Universality, provides also the rationale behind the claim
that guerrilla warfare or terrorism are poor man's weapons.
This follows from the fact that the challenge has to be mounted
from within the interstices of established rationality of both the
scientistic and moral order. The tragic-heroic feature of the radical challenge, made in the absence of a rational justification of
its grounds, is the other side of the vulnerability of the estab-
lishment, since such absence makes it difficult to identify a potentially good challenge to it. Our suggestion in Part I, that the
security of the challenged behind the logically shielded concreteness of the status quo is the other side of its vulnerability,
can be better appreciated in the light of what has intervened
between now and then regarding the many dialectical faces of
contingency. Even with the best institutionalized "rationality"
in the form of government intelligence, Batista could not have
foreseen Castro's challenge as the fatal one among an assortment of similar "harebrained" operations. Nor could the sophisticated "rationality" of the CIA save the Shah's regime from the
"irrational" challenge of Ayatollah Khomeini.
W e can recapitulate the unlikely (on-the-surface) connection between Spirit's crooked path and the cultural legitimacy
of radical ("irrational") action by way of the mundane language
of physical anthropology. Culture's (Spirit's) crooked path finds
its counterpart in the kinky path of biological evolution which
accommodates both m o v e m e n t w i t h i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t of
meaning (span between kinks) and "leaps" between contexts
(spanning of kinks). In this sense mutations (kinks) represent
the radical element (of immediacy) of action which has been
assured a place in the dialectical synthesis in dialectical language, one which deserves the mark of Actuality, rather than
that of mere Existence. As in the case of evolution, wherein for
every mutation with a successful match in the environment
there are countless which have been banished to oblivion; so in
the case of culture, for every radical whose "ought" has been
incorporated in concrete Spirit there is a myriad of challenges
(beginning with those of the "madman" of early Soul) which
have been relegated to the dustbin of history. Similarly, in both
biological evolution and culture, the element of contingency is
not generated out of the blue, but from a given level of concreteness which differs according to the level attained by the dialectic up to that point. The reopening of contingency, along
with externality and dualism in general, at each moment short
of the concluding one, points to the important fact that irrationality is not only inseparable from rationality, but it is equally structuralized along the dialectical path.
We have come to understand that what cultural revolutions
have in common is the radicalization of the prevailing conception of revolution as v i e w e d through socio-economic categories. There are examples of this in the countercultural movements in recent history: the Maoist attempt to deal with the
stagnation of socialism by grappling with its cultural foundations in the East; the distinctiveness of the Cuban Revolution
vis-a-vis the old socialist regimes of eastern Europe; and the recent resurgence of particularism in the form of ethnicity and religious fundamentalism in eastern Europe and the Middle East.
In all these cases cultural radicalism carried the burden of presuppositional challenge in the name of the (logical) Particular
in confrontation with the Abstract Universal: the "experiential"
of Part I, the "irrational" throughout this study, the victims of
universalist liberal culture of last Chapter, and the contingent of
Part III. In the secondary sense that universalized bourgeois political categories may be superseded by more deeply embedded
cultural forms, history qua struggle within a political context of
meaning may indeed be understood as coming to an end. But
in the higher plateau of understanding history (with Hegel) as
the story of realization of freedom qua self-realization for all,
history does not end w i t h the s e l f - g e n e r a t e d restriction of
meaningless bourgeois choice from, say, the choice from 30
kinds of salami to 3 but only when the choice of the young
Berliner of our earlier example coincides with that of his enlightened community. Even then, it may still be possible to retain freedom of choice from 30 different brands in the form of a
fossilized democratic ritual not unlike the ways we now pay
homage to royal personages retaining all sorts of paraphernalia
as titular heads of state. But in the more substantial sense of a
category of Spirit (culture), i.e., as Universal History incorporating within itself political history as sublated or, correspondingly in the Logic, as the element of contingency exemplified in
the " f i n i t u d e " or "particularization" of action in general in
Idea's practical moment history cannot end short of the casting off of the props of time and space in the Absolute Idea.
In drawing a balance-sheet of terror in the last Chapter w e
had to keep in mind the role of both immediacy in making terror visible through the media and the role of mediation concealing it under the practice of institutional violence. By our dialectical rules of the game, the dividing line was not drawn on
the basis of the political left-to-right axis, but by the surface-tobehind-the-surface cultural plane under the guidance of the triad of Concrete Universality. This meant that w e had to transpose ourselves in the role of the Third World radical earlier in
Soul wherein, armed with the technique of unveiling, we were
determining, not only the explicit political and economic costs
of adopting a universalist approach, but also those hidden injuries of culture. In applying the freedom qua self-realization
test on culture, this often resulted in shifting the focus from
bourgeois freedoms and rights to pre-bourgeois, or even pre-literate, values of community. The latter were recognizable in the
agendas of the 1960s, but seemed unrealizable in equally universalis! liberal and authoritarian cultures. It is, therefore, no
accident that particularism is also on the rise within large industrialized societies in the f o r m of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m
whether based on religion, ethnicity, gender, or race. Universalis! mass cultures such as the U.S., have become living laboratories for observing what happens when internal social controls,
which are inherent in communities, are being replaced by external controls (constitutional and legal safeguards for homogenized humanity) peculiar to large societies, or "melting pots."
One may begin to form a sense of the forces behind the resurgence of particularism by observing the rise in marginal social
costs from the replacement of communal by (universalist) societal values: supervisors for work ethic in the work place; police
enforcement for socialization in public space; self-interest for
civic duty in politics; and study for "making a living" instead of
"putting one's life together as a whole" in education. These universalist trends are, of course, not unique to our American
"melting pot" but intrinsic to industrial societies, though the
U.S. can claim the distinction of having exported them to the
rest of the world through consumerist consciousness-raising. If
the anomie generated in the industrial mass societies of the
West, and the unsuccessful effort to combat it with external
controls in this country, is any indication of the social costs involved, a shift toward of particularism seems inevitable.
Yet, one cannot deny the power of the Universal to advance
the very same presuppositional challenges that were served so
effectively by Particularity in the preceding paragraphs. What is
a more pertinent case of a revolution "originat(ing) solely from
the fact that Spirit... has changed its categories," than the explosive potential of Abstract Universality, as expressed in pronouncements of human rights of freedom and equality? This
apparent contradiction points once more to cultural links (established by Spirit) behind the legal (constitutional) and political surface between seemingly irreconcilable polar terms. The
unveiling of the underlying link can be done through the dialectic of Content and Form, wherein these seemingly bare abstractions can accommodate a succession of contents with increasingly radical outcome say, being progressively led from
the conception of legal to political, and from there to economic
(or even social) equality. On this issue of exposing forms of
consciousness (Spirit's changing "categories") as hidden parameters of revolution, Hegel was far ahead of both the liberal
critics w h o accused him of conservatism, and the Marxists
charging him with an idealist neglect of the material side of social development.
That the citizens are equal before the law contains a great truth,
but which so expressed is a tautology: it only states that the legal
status in general exists, that the laws rule. But, as regards the concrete, the citizens besides their personality are equal before
the law only in these points when they are equal outside the law.
(Philosophy of Spirit, #539; emphasis in the original)
Domestication of the
dialectic of ContentForm through the
concept of racism.
Institutional racism
as a case in self-concealment regarding
behind-the-surface
links between objectified and pronounced values.
Self-concealment
about underlying institutional links elucidated by way of
contrast between
racism and antiSemitism.
liberal arts and career programs," are coined and embedded into
'things,' such as memoranda, software, deanships and department titles, fields of specializations, catalogue-listings, even interior and architectural forms. Acting in their self-perception as
trustees of tax-payers' money and guardians of the welfare of
the disadvantaged, educational bureaucrats with jurisdictions
encompassing both educational and welfare matters, take charge
of the education of students of color, coded as "diverse student
body." And to cap it all comes the "holy cow" of liberal culture
science with its remarkable capacity for drawing "valuefree" statistical inferences from events of the past for the benefit
of those who wish to implement humanitarian ideals by manipulating the future.
It should not escape notice that social application of statistics
presupposes an atomized society, which it then reinforces by
dealing with individuals qua abstract "plurality," rather than concrete individuality. Not surprisingly, the result is a reduplication
of past iniquities under the blessing of scientific objectivity. Inasmuch as it is the liberal art 'thought' component which provides
the ingredient of self-consciousness necessary to expose institutional racism, the "mix of liberal arts and career programs" virtually guarantees that the hidden agenda of institutional racism
will never surface seriously in the deliberations of the faculties
(to say nothing of the students) of vocational studies in which
black students are tracked.
The domestication of the dialectic of Content and Form can be
taken one step further by comparing racism and anti-Semitism,
which have usually been treated similarly from a universalist human rights point of view. The two can be equated to the extent
that human rights and constitutional guarantees apply equally to
both cases to the extent that "the legal status general exists,
that the laws rule." However, such a legalistic on-the-surface
by way of clinging to form, or stereotyping approach of an essentially social problem, such as stratification by color, is symptomatic of the methodological self-concealment of liberal social science. As soon as one attempts to probe behind the surface for
cultural (institutional) links incorporating a synthesis of content
and form, the similarity between the two cases ends and they begin to diverge radically. Returning to our educational institutional
setting for illustration, Jewish students are expected to perform
academically better than blacks. Hence, the "mix of liberal arts
and career programs" prescribed for black students by enlightened educational administrators are deemed inappropriate for
Jewish students w h o can afford "pure" liberal arts, both financially and intellectually. So-called realism, based on statistical in-
479
The dialectic of
Content-Form in
the service of illuminating the distinction between formal
and substantive
inequality.
mentation of these rights is carried out through existing institutions where educational philosophies, scientistic ideologies,
classroom values and practices, budgetary priorities, bureaucratic norms about success, and legislators' perceptions about
civic duties, among others, find themselves embedded in the
way described. In the absence of an investigation of the institutional counterpart to the abstract rights approach, the same
misconceptions about the remedial effects of this approach in
the social domain are generated in the case of anti-Semitism.
The fight against the evil of anti-Semitism has not only been
institutionalized in universal rights, but has been socially and
morally constructed into an absolute evil through a powerful
network of institutions Anti-Defamation Leagues, Holocaust
Museums and studies, media and entertainment saturation coverage, to say nothing Political Action Committees. As such, the
fight against anti-Semitism has not been merely universalized
through becoming a right, but beyond that into becoming an
absolute (not-to-be-relativized) moral duty and, in turn, institutionalized into a powerful business that has been used as a
political weapon. Like its counterpart of bourgeois universalization of moral principles earlier, moral absolutism creates an atmosphere of intimidation which exempts from criticism issues
that expose the privileged status of the absolutizers. In conjunction with social power, moral absolutism shields from public
view causes that have an equal, if not stronger, social claim. In
short, unless the war against the evil of anti-Semitism is shifted
(through an investigation of the institutional embodiments of
abstract rights, as in the case of racism earlier) from the surface
to the underlying links between seeming unrelated concepts, it
degenerates into another variation of the Hegelian Absolute
Freedom and Terror n o w recast as a Manichaean Absolute
Dualism of Good-Evil and Terror. As the institutionalization of
absolute freedom turned into political terror in Hegel's example
from the French Revolution earlier, so does the universalization
of the fight against the absolute evil of anti-Semitism turn into
moral terrorism in our times.
The historical path of liberal culture from the bourgeois revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the
present, and indeed of every group which has attained power
by rallying the powerless on its side, through the use of (abstract) universals, exemplifies the dialectic of Content-Form as
it applies to the distribution of power. In the last Chapter w e
followed the bourgeoisie on the same path of morally shielding
its position of superiority. It did so through the rallying of the
non-privileged groups under its banner of humanitarianism, its
assessment of institutions by utility, and its assortment of universal rights and freedoms. The latter were inscribed on banners and constitutional documents in order to command the
unquestioned allegiance of the masses. Similarly, Marx and his
successors treated the values and aspirations of the proletariat
as coextensive with those of humanity at large during and following the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie. In both cases
the enforcement of universal principles entailed physical, as
well as psychological, terror by the very nature of the operation; while the moral and ideological mechanisms incorporated
in universal principles functioned as smoke screens for their respective positions of power. The two-pronged instrument of violence implicit in humanitarianism as mediated through its
institutions (institutional violence) and as immediacy of action
springing from moral outrage (moral intimidation) is a clear
exemplification of the same process. The Jews are no different
than other privileged groups, or sub-cultures, in socially constructing their moral categories, history, language, and education, and, in turn, raising them to universal principles in order
to serve their particular ends.
In our most recent efforts to apply the dialectic w e have witnessed the convergence of the dialectic of freedom with those of
Content (and Matter) and Form, Means and Ends, Universality
and Particularity, held together by the power of negativity operating through their polar terms. The superiority of the negativity
of the dialectic over the logic of Identity manifested itself in exposing the vagaries of universal rights as remedial of social inequality and injustice. This was accomplished by ferreting out,
through negativity, what lies behind the surface, in the sense of
forcing through mediation, these polar categories to show their
negative (concealed behind the surface) term or ugly side of (the
on-the-surface) reality. In the two most recent examples of the
hidden side of social reality, social inequalities implicit in the institutional setting are kept out of sight by (formal) equality before constitutionally safeguarded human and civil rights for all
citizens. The use of dialectical method in eliciting the negative
side, and rounding off the picture of social reality, was detailed
in the dialectic of Objective Spirit, wherein the abstractive nature of rights was exposed side by side with the process of their
progressive embeddedness in institutional life. The terms "institutional racism" and "institutionalized fight against anti-Semitism" already betray social inequality Hegelian inequality
"outside the law." In the former, racism is more widely institutionalized than is the fight against it; while in anti-Semitism, the
reverse is the case. Our treatment of racism and anti-Semitism
The seemingly
abrupt change of
quantity into quality
and value into its
opposite, as symptomatic of selfconcealment and
unfreedom.
The countercultural
ideals of Part I revisited in light of the
findings of Part III.
485
The traditional
classroom as a microcosm of the vital
socialization space
of liberal culture.
Critical assessment of
Radicals were not free of a similar confusion by erring on
the countercultural
the opposite end of the spectrum (i.e., unmediated practice)
challenge in terms of
when they insisted that the university be bent to "applied" venstructuralized Spirit.
tures and the "service to the community." As in the case of the
radical of the political paradigm, they were ignoring the important lesson of the dialectic of Reflection that theory depends on
practice, but such dependence is fatal to both unless the former
Of course the quest for freedom does not end with classical
antiquity. Re-immediation recurs at a higher level in Mind at the
end of Subjective Spirit after its phase of self-diremption in its
middle moment of Consciousness, which corresponds historically to the modern era between the Cartesian revolution and the
Hegelian synthesis. This middle moment is also the point at
which all these mediating elements in both the mental and social apparatus which radicals often tried to bypass instead of
mediating are being interposed between theory and practice,
following their original unity in Soul. By the time their unity is
re-established at the mental level in Mind, and ultimately, at
both the mental and institutional levels in the Idea, it has become clear that their synthesis is, in effect, a ^appropriation of
their original or pre-existing unity in Soul. In other words, the
explanation of our surprise when confronted with the fully developed Objective Spirit at the end of Mind (in terms of the simultaneous build-up of concreteness of the objective term) is
nothing more than making explicit the underlying original unity
of theory and practice, which was temporarily out of sight in the
moment of Consciousness. Thus, the countercultural vision of
unity of theory and practice is an attempt to recapture the unitary achievement of Actual Soul in the context of self-diremptive post-Cartesian culture. Its "consciousness-raising" one of
many enriching additions to our vocabulary is both an indirect admission of the prevailing low grade of self-consciousness
and a strong indication that an upgrading of the same is necessary if the implicitness of this unity is to be brought into explicit ness. This is consistent with the circularity of the dialectic and
the corresponding coincidence of presupposition and outcome.
It is no less consistent with the way the radical and conservative
faces of Spirit (or culture) are brought into unity by way of dialectical Identity (inclusive of Contradiction).