INTERNAL AID TO

INTERPRETATION
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
It is with profound gratitude and deep reverence that I complete
this project report today, as it would have not been possible for me
to do so without the indispensable guidance of my Professorms.TanmeetKaur, who not only encouraged me to go forward with
this project report but also propagated all my ideologies and
interpretations about the same. I am also grateful to the many
authors whose books and articles I have used as a valuable
SUBMITTED
resourceTO:
for my work. I hope this project meets everyones
PROF. expectations.
TANMEET KAUR
Thank You

University Institute of Legal Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh

(GURMANAK PAL SINGH)

Table of Contents
TABLE OF CASES:

INTRODUCTION:

Preamble:

Submitted BY:
Gurmanak Pal Singh
Heading:
Roll no. 18/14
Definition or Interpretation
5th semester Clauses :
section-A
Provisos

Marginal Notes

7
8
9

Illustrations:

10

Exceptions and Saving Clauses:

11

Explanations

11

Schedules

12

Punctuation

12

Conclusion:

13

TABLE OF CASES:

Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal

Fisher v. Raven
Burrakur coal Company v. Union of India
Rashtriya Mill MazdoorSangh v. NTC (South

Maharashtra ltd.)
Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar
S.P. Gupta v. President of India
Bhinka v. Charan Singh
M/s. Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Deputy Labour

Commissioner
RamanlalBhailal Patel v. State of Gujrat
Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh
Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras, v. G.R.

Karthikeyan
T.M. Kanniyan v. Income-tax Officer, Pondicherry
Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad
State of Punjab v. KailashNath
ShambhuNath v. State of Ajmer
Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumari Sharma
Flower Freight Company Limited v. Hammond
M/s. Aphali Pharmaceuticals Limited v. State of

Maharashtra
Aswini Kumar v. Arbinda Bose
Mohammad Shabbir v. STate of Maharashtra
Dadaji v. Sukhdeobabu

INTRODUCTION:
In construing a statutory provision, first and the foremost rule of
construction is the literary construction. The other rules of
construction are called into aid only when the legislative intention
is not clear.
An Aid is a device that helps or assists. For the purpose of
construction or interpretation, the court has to take recourse to
various internal and external aids.
Internal aids means those materials that are available I the
statute itself, though they may not be the part of the enactment.
These internal aids include, long title, preamble, headings,
marginal notes, illustrations, schedules etc. when internal aids are
not adequate then the courts have to take recourse to external
aids. External aids may be parliamentary material, historical
background, reports of a committee or a commission, official
statement, dictionary meanings, foreign decisions etc.

Long Title:
A statute is headed by a long title whose purpose is to give a
general description about the object of the Act. Normally, it begins
with the words An actto. For instance, the long title of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 says: An Act to consolidate and amend
the law relating to criminal procedure, and that of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 says: 'An Act to consolidate and amend the
law relating to the prevention of corruption and for matters
connected therewith.'
In the olden days the long title was not considered a part of the
statute

and

was,

therefore,

not

considered

an

aid

while

interpreting it. There has been a change in the thinking of the

courts in recent times and there are numerous occasions when

help has been taken from the long title to interpret certain
provisions of the statute but only to the extent of removing
confusions and ambiguities. If the words in a statute are
unambiguous, no help is derived from the long title.
In KedarNath v. State of West Bengal1, interpretation of Section 4
of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act. 1949 was
involved.

Under

this

section,

the

State

Government

was

empowered to choose as to which particular case should go for

reference to the Special Court to be tried under a special
procedure. This was challenged as violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court rejected the contention and held,
inter alia, that the long title of the Act which said An Act to provide
for the more speedy trial and more effective punishment of certain
Offences was clear enough to give the State Government a
discretion as to which offences deserved to be tried by the
specialcourts under a special procedure.
In Fisher v. Raven2, interpretation of the words 'obtained credit in
Section 13 (1) of the Debtor's Act. 1869 was involved. The House
of Lords looked at the long title of the Act which reads 'An Act for
the Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt, for the punishment of
fraudulent debtors, and for other purposes' and held that the
words refer to credit for the payment of money.

Preamble:
Preamble contains the main objects of the Act and is, therefore, a
part of the statute. On the basis of this reason, it deserves to be
1 AIR 1953 SC 404
2 1964 AC 210 (HL)

considered by the courts as an internal aid to interpretation It is

said that preamble is the key to open the mind of the legislature. It
has, however, been unequivocally observed that if the language of
an enactment is clear and unambiguous, use preamble has no part
to play in interpretation. But if more than one interpretation are
possible of a particular provision then help can be taken from the
preamble of the Act to find out its true meaning, The modem trend
generally is not to have a preamble in an Act. As a consequence,
the importance of preamble as an aid to construction is declining.
In Burrakur coal Company v. Union of India 3, the Supreme Court
was required to interpret Section 4 (1) of the Coal Bearing Act
(Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 according to which
'whenever it appears to the Central government that coal is likely
to be obtained from land in any locality, it may by notification in
the official gazette, give notice of its intention to prospect for coal
therein'. The preamble of the Act, however, reads, 'An Act to
establish in the economic interest of India greater public control
over the coal mining industry and its development providing for
the acquisition by the State of unworked land containing or likely
to contain coal deposits or of rights in or over such land for the
existinguishment or modification of such rights accruing by virtue
of any agreement, lease, licence or otherwise, and for Matters
connected therewith. It was argued that on the basis of Section 4
(1) acquisition of only virgin land could be begun in view of the use
of the words unworked land in the preamble. Rejecting the
argument it was held that help from the preamble could not be
taken to distort the clear intention of the legislature found out from
the unambiguous language of the provision. Therefore, the
provision empowers the government to issue notification showing
its Intention to prospect any land including virgin land.

3 AIR 1961 SC 954

5

Rashtriya Mill MazdoorSangh v. NTC (South Maharashtra ltd.) 4, the

Supreme Court while interpreting certain provisions of the Textile
Undertakings (Take over of Management) Act, 1983 held that when
the language of an Act is clear, preamble cannot be invoked to
curtail or restrict the scope of an enactment.

Marginal Notes
Marginal notes are those notes which are inserted at the side of
the sections in an Act and express the effect of the sections. These
an also known as side notes. In the olden times help used to be
taken sometimes from the marginal notes when the clear meaning
of an enactment was in doubt. But the modern view of the courts
is that marginal notes should have no role to play while
interpreting a statute. The basis of this view is that the marginal
notes are not parts of statute because they are not inserted by the
legislators nor an they printed In the margin under the instructions
or authority of the legislature. These notes an inserted by the
drafters and many times they may be inaccurate too. However,
there may be exceptional circumstances when marginal notes are
Inserted by the legislatures and, therefore, while interpreting such
an enactment help can be taken from such marginal notes. The
Constitution of India is such a case. The marginal notes were
inserted by the Constituent Assembly and, therefore, while
interpreting the Indian Constitution, it is always permissible to
seek guidance and help from the marginal notes.
In Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar5, the Supreme Court
by a majority, held that the marginal notes to Article 286 of the
Constitution was part of the Constitution and, therefore, it could be
relied on to furnish a clue to the purpose and meaning of that
4 AIR 1996 SC 710
5 AIR 1955 SC 661
6

article. The marginal note to Article 266 of the Constitution is :

Restrictions as to imposition of tax on sale or purchase of goods,
which, unlike the marginal notes in the Acts, in the British
Parliament, is part of the Constitution as passed by the Constituent
Assembly, and prime facie, furnishes some clue as to the meaning
and purpose of the Article. However, justice VenkataramaAyyar, in
his minority judgment held that the marginal note to Article 286 (I)
(a) cannot be referred to for construing the explanation and is
clearly inadmissible for cutting down the plain meaning of the
words of the Constitution.
In S.P. Gupta v. President of India6the Supreme Court held that If
the relevant provisions in the body of a statute firmly point
towards a construction which would conflict with the marginal
note, the marginal note has to yield. If there is any ambiguity in
the meaning of the provisions in the body of the statute, the
marginal note may be looked into as an aid toconstruction.

Heading:
Headings are prefixed to sections or a group or a set of sections.
These headings have been treated by courts as preambles to
those sections or set of sections. Naturally, the rules applicable to
the preamble are followed in case of headings also while
interpreting an enactment. Therefore, if the plain meaning of an
enactment is clear, help from headings cannot be taken by the
courts. However, if more than one conclusion are possible while
interpreting a particular provision, the courts may seek guidance
from the headings to arrive at the true meaning. Ambiguity in the
meaning of a provision can be removed with the aid of the
6 AIR 1982 SC 149
7

heading, but where the meaning of an enactment is clear and

unambiguous, heading has no role to play in its interpretation. A
heading to one set of sections cannot act as an aid to interpret
another set of section. But chapter heading can be used to
interpret ambiguous provisions.
In Bhinka v. Charan Singh7, the appellant was the tenant of the
respondent landlord. The respondent sought to evict the appellant
under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. The section
reads:'A person taking or retaining possession of a plot of land
without the consent of the person entitled to admit him and
otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the
time being in force shall be liable to ejectment.' The Supreme
Court, agreeing with the contention of the appellant that Section
180 of the Act of 1939 has no application here because he was in
possession under an order under Section 145, Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 held that Section 180 applies only in those cases
where the landlord seeks to evict a person who has no right of
possession. This is further reiterated by the heading of this section
which reads: Ejectment of person occupying land without title.

Definition or Interpretation Clauses :

Definition or interpretation clauses are generally included in a
statute with the purpose of extending the natural meaning of some
words as per the definition given or to interpret such words, the
meanings of which are not clear, by assigning them the
meaninggiven in the definition clause. Generally. the meaning
given to a particular word in the interpretation clause will be given
to that word wherever it is used in that statute. The Only exception
to this rule is that if the court feels that in the contest of a
7 AIR 1959 SC 960
8

particular provision the definition clause, if applied will result in an

absurdity, the court will not apply the definition clause while
interpreting that provision. Similarly, thedefinition clause of one
Act cannot be used to explain the same word used In another
statute. However, if both the statutes are in parimateria and the
word has been defined in one Act, the same meaning may be
assigned to the word in the other Act also.
Whenever the words meant or means and includes are used in
the definition clause, they afford an exhaustive explanation of the
word in the statute. The word includes is generally used in the
definition clause to enlarge the ordinary and natural meaning of
that particular word. In M/s. Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v.
Deputy Labour Commissioner8, the Supreme Court observed that
when an interpretation clause uses the word 'includes', it is prima
facie extensive. When it uses the words 'means and includes, it will
afford an exhaustive explanation to the meaning which for the
purposes of the Act must invariably be attached to the word or
expression.
In RamanlalBhailal Patel v. State of Gujrat9, the Supreme Court
observed that the use of the word 'includes' indicates an intention
to enlarge the meaning of the word used in the statute. The use of
the word denotes in the interpretation clause shows that the
expressions denoted therein are covered within the ambit of that
particular

word.

The

expression

deemed

to

be

in

the

interpretation clause creates a fiction.

In

Mahalakshmi

Oil

Mills

v.

State

of

Andhra

Pradesh 10,

interpretation of the definition of 'tobacco' under Section 4 of the

Central Excises and Salt Act1944 was in question which said
8 AIR 2008 SC 968
9 AIR 2008 SC 1246
10 AIR 1989 SC 335
9

'Tobacco means any form of tobacco whether cured or uncured

and whether manufactured or not and includes the leaf stalks and
stems of the tobacco plant The Supreme Court held the
definition to be exhaustive and refused to include tobacco seeds in
it as they were not mentioned In the inclusive part.
In Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras, v. G.R. Karthikeyan 11,
question was whether prize money received by a participant In a
motr rally was 'income' within the premise of Section 2(21) of the
Income-tax Act,1961. The Supreme Court held that several clauses
in Section 2(24) were not exhaustive in nature and, therefore,
money received under any new head not covered under the
provision in income and so subject to income tax under the law.

Provisos
The insertion of a proviso to a section has the natural presumption
that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would
have Included the subject matter of the proviso. The general rule
about the interpretation of a proviso is that proviso is not to be
taken absolutely in its strict literal sense but is of necessity limited
to the ambit of the section which it qualifies. A proviso cannot be
construed as enlarging the scopeof an enactment when it can be
fairly and properly construed without attributing to it that effect.
However, if it is clear from the language of the proviso that it had a
more extensive operation than the main provision which it
immediately follows, such a wider effect must be given to it. But if
a reasonable interpretation of the proviso leads to the inference
that it is contradicting the main enactment the proviso should
11 AIR 1993 SC 1671
10

prevail over the main enactment on the principle that it speaks the
last intention of the legislature. Unless the words are clear the
court should not so interpret a proviso as to attribute an intention
to the legislature to give with one hand and take away with the
other. A sincere attempt should be made to reconcile the enacting
clause and in proviso and to avoid repugnancy between the two. In
exceptional cases a proviso may even enact substantive provision
itself. It may always be kept in mind that a proviso must be
considered with relation to the matter to which it exists as a
proviso. It has no independent existence of its own; it is dependent
on the main enactment. It must be borne in mind that with the
repeal of the main enactment the proviso is also impliedly
repealed. It has been held in R. v. Leeds12Prison (Governor), that
the main part of an enactment cannot be so interpreted as to
render its proviso unnecessary and Ineffective.
In

T.M.

Kanniyan

v.

Income-tax

Officer,

Pondicherry 13,

interpretation of Article 240 (1) and Its proviso were in question.

The Article reads: -The President may make regulations for the
peace progress and good government of the Union Territory
of.......Provided that when any body is created under Article 239-A
to

function

as

Legislature

for

the

Union

territory

of.....Pondicherry the President shall not make any regulation

for the peace, progress and good government of that Union
territory with effect from the date appointed for the first meeting
of the Legislature..." The Supreme Court held that the language of
the main part of the provision is unambiguous and confers plenary
power to the President to make regulations, and therefore. the
same could not be curtailed by the proviso.

12 1964
13 AIR 1968 SC 637
11

In Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad14, the Supreme Court held that a

proviso cannot be permitted by construction to defeat the basic
intent expressed in the substantive provision.
In State of Punjab v. KailashNath,15 the apparent discrepancy
between the main part of Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules
and Its proviso had to be resolved. The enacting part empowers
the government to withhold or withdraw an officer's pension in
part or in full of order for its recovery if it is found in a
departmental or judicial proceeding that he was guilty of grave
misconduct or negligence in performance of his duties. The proviso
reads, No such judicial proceeding if not instituted while the
officer was In service shall be instituted in respect of a cause of
action which arose or an event which took place more than four
years before such institution." The Supreme Court held that the
proviso is to be read as an exception to the main provision.

Illustrations:
Illustrations are sometimes appended to a section of a statute with
a view to illustrate the provision of law explained therein. A very
large number of Indian Arts have illustrations appended to various
sections. They being the show of mind of the legislature are a good
guide to find out the intention of the framers. But an enactment
otherwise dear cannot be given an extended or a restricted
meaning on the basis of illustrations appended therein.
In ShambhuNath v. State of Ajmer16, the Supreme Court while
discussing burden of proof held that Section 106 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 is an exception to Section 101 and that the
14 AIR 1980 SC 892
15 AIR 1989 SC 558
16 AIR 1965 SC 104
12

latter along with its illustration (a) emphasizes the basic rule of
criminal jurisprudence that it is the prosecution's obligation to
prove a case. Illustration (b) to Section 105 was held to be
applicable to Sections 111 and 113 of the Indian Railways Act
1890. The Court emphasised that an illustration does not exhaust
the full content of the section which it illustrates nor does it curtail
or explainedits ambit.
The Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumari
Sharma17, observed that illustration is part of the section and it
helps to elucidate the principle of the section.

Exceptions and Saving Clauses:

Exceptions are generally added to an enactment with the purpose
of exempting something which would otherwise fall within the
ambit of the main provision. For instance, as many as five
exceptions have been added to Section 300 of the Indian Penal
Code which defines 'murder. The first four exceptions begin with
the words 'culpable homicide is not murder if while the fifth
exception begins with the words 'culpable homicide is not murder
when'. An exception affirms that the things not exempted are
covered under the main provision. In ease a repugnancy between
an operative part and an exception, the operative part must be
relied on. Some decisions have, however, been given on the
principle that an exception, being the latter will of the legislature,
must prevail over the substantive portion of the enactment.
Saving clauses are generally appended in cases of repeal and reenactment of a statute. By this the rights already created under
repealed enactment are not disturbed nor new rights are created
17 AIR 1996 SC 869
13

by it. A saving clause is normally inserted in the repealing statute.

In case of a clash between the main part of statute and a saving
clause, the saving clause has to be rejected.

Explanations
Explanations are inserted with the purpose of explaining the
meaning of a particular provision and to remove doubts which
might creep up if the explanation had not been inserted. It does
not expand the meaning of the provision to which it is added but
only ties to remove confusion, if any, In the understanding of the
true meaning of the enactment. A large number of Indian Acts
have explanations attached to various sections. For instance,
Section 108 of the Indian Penal Code which defines the word
'abettor'

has

five

explanations

attached

to

it.

Sometimes,

explanations are inserted not at the time of enactment of a statute

but at a later stage. For instance, the two explanations to Section
105 of the Indian Penal Code, which defines the crime of 'Criminal
breach of trust', were inserted in 1973 and 1975 respectively.
There may be a case where in spite of many clauses in a section
only one explanation is attached to the section as is the case with
Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In such a case it
must be seen as to which clause the explanation is connected
with.

Schedules
Schedules attached to an Act generally deal with as to how claims
or rights under the Act are to be asserted or as to how powers
conferred under the Act are to be exercised. Sometimes, a

14

schedule may contain some subjects in the form of list as is the

case with the Constitution of India to enable the Union and the
states to legislate in their respective fields. Schedules are parts of
the Statute itself and may be looked into by the courts for the
purpose of interpreting the main body of the statute. Similarly,
while interpreting the schedules help may always be taken from
the main body of the Act to find out the true spirit of the Act.
Sometimes, a schedule may contain transitory provisions also to
enable an Act to remain in existence till the main provisions of the
Act begin to operate, such as the Ninth Schedule of the
Government of India Act 1915.
In the English case of Flower Freight Company Limited v.
Hammond18,

the

question

was

whether

motor

vehicle

constructed or adapted for use for the carriage of goods is a

'goods vehicle' within the meaning of Section 191(1) of the Road
Traffic Act 1960. The Court looked at the schedule wherein vehicles
constructed solely for the carriage of passengers and their effects
are called 'passenger vehicles' and vehicles constructed or
adapted for use for the conveyance of goods or burden of any
description are called goods vehicle. It was held that even though
the words 'goods of burden of any description' are very wide and
would include passengers effects, the legislature did not intend to
include such vehicles as goods vehicle.
In M/s. Aphali Pharmaceuticals Limited v. State of Maharashtra 19,
the Supreme Court held that in Case of a clash between the
schedule and the main body of an Act, the main body prevails and
the schedule has to be rejected. The court decided that
Ashvagandharist, an ayurvedic medicinal preparation containing

18 AIR 2007 SC 839

19 AIR 2011 SC 3189
15

self generated alcohol but not capable of being consumed as

ordinary alcoholic beverage, would be exempt from excise duty.

Punctuation
In the ancient times, statutes were passed without punctuations
and naturally, therefore, the courts were not concerned with
looking at punctuations. But in the modern times statutes contain
punctuations. Therefore, whenever a matter comes before the
courts for interpretation, the courts first look at the provision as
they are punctuated and if they feel that there is no ambiguity
while interpreting the punctuated provision, they shall so interpret
it. However, while interpreting the provision in the punctuated
form if the court feels repugnancy or ambiguity, the court shall
read the whole provision without any punctuations and if the
meaning is clear will so interpret It without attaching any
importance whatsoever to the punctuations.
In Aswini Kumar v. Arbinda Bose20, the Supreme Court held that a
punctuation cannot be regarded as a controlling element and
cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of a text.
In Mohammad Shabbir v. STate of Maharashtra 21, interpretation of
Section 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940 was in question.
This provision says that whoever 'manufactures for sale, sells,
stocks or exhibits for sale or distributes' a drug without license
would be liable to punishment. The Supreme Court held that mere
stocking of a drug is not an offence and an offence is made out
only when stocking is for sale. There is no comma after the word
'stocks' which means that the words 'stocks or exhibits' are both
qualified by the words 'for sale' used thereafter.
20 AIR 1952 SC 369
21 AIR 1979 SC 564
16

In Dadaji v. Sukhdeobabu22, the Supreme Court held that the

punctuation marks by themselves do not control the meaning of a
statute where its meaning is otherwise obvious.

Conclusion:
These are the main sources of internal aid to interpretation. When
the legislative intent of the makers/drafters is not clear, then these
sources of aid to interpretation of statute come into play. The use
of these aids to interpretation ensure that the purpose of the
statute is fulfilled by giving the correct interpretation of the
statute. Apart from these the external aids to interpretation may
be considered for correct interpretation of the statute, which
mainly includes, parliamentary material, historical background,
reports of a committee or a commission, official statement,
dictionary meanings, foreign decisions etc.

BIBLIOGRAPHY :

Bhattacharya, Prof. T., The Interpretation Of Statutes, Central

Law Agency, 9th edition, 2014

22 AIR 1980 SC 150

17

Jain,

Dr.

Ashok

K.,

Interpretation

Of

Statutes,

Ascent

Publications, 2nd edition, 2014

http://www.taxdose.com/internal-aids-in-interpretation/

http://www.caaa.in/Image/Interpretation%20of
%20Statutes.pdf

http://www.lawnotes.in/Interpretation_of_Statutes

18