I.

Impeachment
FRANCISCO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES | Carpio-Morales, 2003
FACTS

According to Art. 11, Sec. 8 of the Constitution Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this Section.

November 2001 - 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules)
superseding the Rules approved by 11th Congress

Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified
complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are
deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance,
or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in
substance. In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the
House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.

Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official.

July 2002 House of representatives adopted a Resolution directing Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation in aid of legislation on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Judiciary Development Fund

June 2003 Pres. Estrada filed the first impeachment complaint against Davide and 7 associate justices for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and
other high crimes; endorsed by Rep. Suplico, Zamora, and Dilangalen House Committee on Justice dismissed the complain because insufficient in substance

October 2003 Rep. Teodoro and Fuentebella filed second impeachment complaint founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry; resolution of
endorsement/impeachment was signed by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES
(1) WON the issue is justiciable.
(2) WON the Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings adopted by 12th Congress is constitutional.
(3) WON the second impeachment complaint is valid.
HELD/RATIO
(1) YES. Resolution sponsored by Rep. Fuentebella, directing the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

Former Pres. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against CJ Davide Jr. and seven Assoc. SC Justices culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.endorsed by Reps. Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice

House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in substance. To date,
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

4 months and 3 weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the
second impeachment complaint was filed with the Sec Gen of HS Reps. Gibo Teodoro and Fuentebella against CJ Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members
of the House of Representatives.

Thus arose the instant petitions against the HR, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates
the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that *n+o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year.

HRs comment on the petitions filed against them: SC has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the HR, which is an independent and co-equal branch of
government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases.

Senator Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela) and Comment: PRAYER: consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and
decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution.

Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Drilon, filed a Manifestation: Insofar as it is concerned, petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact,
adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since
(1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and
(2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the HR.
(2) NO. House of Representatives says: S16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI Constitution.

The term initiate does not mean to file;

S3 (1) is clear in that it is the HR, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

Initiate could not possibly mean to file because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be
accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House.
The 1 year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the
impeachment complaint against CJ Davide and 7 Assoc. SC Justices had not been initiated as the HR, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
Interpretation of the term initiate
Commissioner Regalados take on the meaning of initiate as tofile: The act of initiating included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, indeed the word
initiate as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.

Initiate of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Websters Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language concisely puts it, it means to perform or facilitate the first action.

Father Bernas: Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal
of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or
the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.

The House Rule relied upon by Reps. Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is deemed initiated when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or
when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee.

The Rule does not say impeachment proceedings are initiated but rather are deemed initiated. The language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal
fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation.

Citing from ConCom deliberations: HR is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. The initiation, as far as the HR of the US is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution toimpeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment.

Father Bernas during oral arguments: The word initiate, appearing in the constitutional provisionon impeachment refers to two objects, impeachment case and
impeachment proceeding.

In these two provisions, the common verb is to initiate. The object in the first sentence is impeachment case. The object in the second sentence is impeachment
proceeding. Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term cases must be distinguished from the term proceedings. An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. The House,byavoteof1/3ofallitsmembers,canbringacasetotheSenate. It is in that sense that the House has exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a proceeding must be followed to arrive at
a conclusion. A proceeding must be initiated. To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It
has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps:
(1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives;
(2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it;
(3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and
(4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary
resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by
the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House
of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as
they give the term initiate a meaning different from filing.
(3) NO. Initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former Pres. Estrada against CJ Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003
and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Reps. Gibo Teodoro, Jr. and Felix Fuentebella against the CJ on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one- year period.
J. Abolition of Office
K. Conviction of Crime
GARCIA V. COA | Bellosillo, 1993
FACTS

Vicente Garcia was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City.

He was summarily dismissed from the service on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with the decision of the then Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications in Adm. Case No. 975 for the loss of several telegraph poles which were located at the Sariaya-Lucena City and Mauban-Sampaloc, Quezon, telecom lines.
Petitioner did not appeal from the decision.

A criminal case for qualified theft was filed against petitioner with the then Court of First Instance. The trial court rendered its decision acquitting petitioner of the offense
charged.
Consequently, petitioner sought reinstatement to his former position in view of his acquittal in the criminal case. This was denied by the Bureau of Telecommunications.
Hence, petitioner pleaded to the President of the Philippines for executive clemency.
Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., by authority of the President, granted executive clemency to petitioner.
Petitioner thereafter filed with respondent COA a claim for payment of back salaries effective 1 April 1975, the date of his dismissal from the service. This was denied by the
COA on the ground that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide for the payment of back salaries and that he has not been reinstated in the service.
Petitioner again filed a claim to recover his back salaries for the period from 1 April 1975, the date of his dismissal, to 12 March 1984, when he was reinstated. COA denied
the claim stating that the executive clemency was silent on the payment of back wages and that he had not rendered service during the period of his claim.
Petitioner appealed the COA decision to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., by authority of the President, denied the appeal
"due to legal and constitutional constraint," holding that the SC is the proper forum to take cognizance of the appeal on certiorari from the decision of the COA.

ISSUE
WON Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.
HELD/RATIO
YES. Every civilized country recognizes, and has therefore provided for, the pardoning power to be exercised as an act of grace andhumanity, in proper cases. Without such a
power of clemency, to be exercised by some department or functionary of a government, a country would be most imperfect and deficient in its political morality and in that
attribute of Deity whose judgments are always tempered with money.

From among the different acts of executive clemency spelled out above, the clemency granted to petitioner in the instant case partakes of the nature of an executive pardon.

Citing Monsanto v. Factoran: General rule: While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as
innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not
forgetfulness. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores to him all his civil rights. Unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The
pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally
result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the
offense charged. When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act,
thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

Petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty and consequently dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the trial court of the charge of
qualified theft based on the very same acts for which he was dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable
doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his
concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner's innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable
recommendations for his reinstatement by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Civil

Service Commission. - The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision

which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the
administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to
be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.

This automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. It is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make
reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of the executive clemency, i.e., to
give justice to petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise
acquitted of the charges against them. No doubt that petitioner's case falls within the situations aforementioned to entitle him to back wages.

It is worthy to note that the dismissal of petitioner was not the result of any criminal conviction that carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public office, but is the direct
consequence of an administrative decision of a branch of the Executive Department over which the President, as its head, has the power of control. The President's control
has been defined to mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to the
judgment of the former for the latter. In pardoning petitioner and ordering his reinstatement, the Chief Executive exercised his power of control and set aside the decision of
the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. The clemency nullified the dismissal of petitioner and relieved him from administrative liability. The separation of the
petitioner from the service being null and void, he is thus entitled to back wages.

After having been declared innocent of the crime of qualified theft, which also served as basis for the administrative charge, petitioner should not be considered to have left
his office for all legal purposes, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrued to him by virtue of the office held, including back wages.
L. Recall
GARCIA V. COMELEC | Puno, 1993

FACTS

Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan in the May 11, 1992 elections.

In the early evening of July 1, 1993, some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province met at the National
Power Corporation compound in Bagac, Bataan.

At about 12:30 A.M. of the following day, July 2, 1993, they proceeded to the Bagac town plaza where they constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to
initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia.

Thereafter, the Vice-Mayor of Limay, the Honorable Ruben Roque, was recognized and he moved that a resolution be passed for the recall of the petitioner Garcia on the
ground of "loss of confidence." The motion was "unanimously seconded."

Petitioners filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition to deny due course to said Resolution No. 1. Petitioners alleged that the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive
and procedural requirements" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

COMELEC dismissed the petition and scheduled the recall elections for the position of Governor of Bataan on October 11, 1993. Petitioners then filed with Us a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the said Resolution of the respondent COMELEC. SC granted the petition.

Honorable Mayor of Dinalupihan, Oscar de los Reyes again sent Notice of Session to the members of the PRAC to "convene in session on September 26, 1993 at the town
plaza of Balanga, Bataan at 8:30 o'clock in the morning." From news reports, the PRAC convened in session and eighty-seven (87) of its members once more passed a
resolution calling for the recall of petitioner Garcia.

petitioners filed with Us a Supplemental Petition and Reiteration of Extremely Urgent Motion presiding for a resolution of their contention that section 70 of R.A. 7160 is
unconstitutional.
ISSUE
WON Sec. 70 on recall is constitutional.
HELD/RATIO
YES. Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The people's prerogative to remove a
public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. Such power has been held
to be indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy.

Recall is a mode of removal of elective local officials made its maiden appearance in our 1973 Constitution. It was mandated in section 2 of Article XI entitled Local
Government. The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337 entitled "The Local Government Code of 1983." Section 54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one mode of initiating
the recall elections of local elective officials, i.e., by petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit
concerned.

The successful use of people power to remove public officials who have forfeited the trust of the electorate led to its firm institutionalization in the 1987 Constitution. Its
Article XIII expressly recognized the Role and Rights of People's Organizations: Sec. 15. The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the
people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means. People's
organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.
AND Sec. 16. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not
be abridged. The State shall, by laws, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.

Section 3 of its Article X also reiterated the mandate for Congress to enact a local government code which "shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum...

In response, Congress provided in the LGC for a second mode of initiating the recall process through a preparatory recall assembly which in the provincial level is composed
of all mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities. SEE CHAPTER V: SEC. 69-74

A reading of the legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal that the idea of empowering a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from office of local
elective officials originated from the House of Representatives
The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating
the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.
Our lawmakers took note of the undesirable fact that the mechanism initiating recall by direct action of the electorate was utilized only once in the City of Angeles,
Pampanga, but even this lone attempt to recall the city mayor failed. Former Congressman Wilfredo Cainglet explained that this initiatory process by direct action of the
people was too cumbersome, too expensive and almost impossible to implement. Consequently, our legislators added in a second mode of initiating the recall of local officials
thru a preparatory recall assembly. They brushed aside the argument that this second mode may cause instability in the local government units due to its imagined ease.

Petitioner says: Right to recall does not extend merely to the prerogative of the electorate to reconfirm or withdraw their confidence on the official sought to be recalled at a
special election. Such prerogative necessarily includes the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceedings or not.

SCsays: There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding.
The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall
elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . By this constitutional
mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. The power given was to select which among the
means and methods of initiating recall elections are effective to carry out the judgment of the electorate. Congress was not straightjacketed to one particular mechanism of
initiating recall elections. What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using

its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct
action of the people. Congress has made its choice as called for by the Constitution and it is not the prerogative of this Court to supplant this judgment. The choice may be
erroneous but even then, the remedy against a bad law is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that
determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.
Petitioner says: In passing Resolution 1, the Bataan PRA did not only initiate the process of recall but had de facto recalled petitioner Garcia from office, a power reserved to
the people alone. The PRA resolution of recall is the recall itself! The initiation of a recall through the PRA effectively shortens and ends the term of the incumbent local
officials. Precisely, in the case of Gov. Garcia, an election was scheduled by the COMELEC to determine who has the right to assume the unexpired portion of his term of office
which should have been until June 1995. Having been relegated to the status of a mere candidate for the same position of governor (by operation of law) he has, therefore,
been effectively recalled."
SC says: Misconstrued the nature of the initiatory process of recall by the PRAC i.e. initiation by the PRAC is not initiation by the people. This is a misimpression for initiation
by the PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly through their representatives. It is not constitutionally impermissible for the people to act through their
elected representatives. Nothing less than the paramount task of drafting our Constitution is delegated by the people to their representatives, elected either to act as a
constitutional convention or as a congressional constituent assembly. The initiation of a recall process is a lesser act and there is no rhyme or reason why it cannot be
entrusted to and exercised by the elected representatives of the people. More far out is petitioners' stance that a PRA resolution of recall is the recall itself. It cannot be
seriously doubted that a PRA resolution of recall merely, starts the process. It is part of the process but is not the whole process. This ought to be self evident for a PRA
resolution of recall that is not submitted to the COMELEC for validation will not recall its subject official. Likewise, a PRA resolution of recall that is rejected by the people in
the election called for the purpose bears no effect whatsoever. The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official concerned to appear before the tribunal of the
people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. Before the people render their sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in office but his
right to continue in office is subject to question. This is clear in Sec. 72 LGC which states that "the recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election
and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall."
Petitioners' argument does not really assail the law but its possible abuse by the members of the PRAC while exercising their right to initiate recall proceedings. More
specifically, the fear is expressed that the members of the PRAC may inject political color in their decision as they may initiate recall proceedings only against their political
opponents especially those belonging to the minority. A careful reading of the law, however, will ineluctably show that it does not give an asymmetrical treatment to locally
elected officials belonging to the political minority.
Politically neutral composition of the preparatory recall assembly. Under the law, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities and component
cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the
political affiliation of its members. 2. The preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their
number, the greater probability is that no one political party can control its majority.
Sec. 69 provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in
representation of their political parties but as representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in political
party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic
system.
Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority. The fear that a preparatory recall assembly may be
dominated by a political party and that it may use its power to initiate the recall of officials of opposite political persuasions, especially those belonging to the minority, is not
a ground to strike down the law as unconstitutional. To be sure, this argument has long been in disuse for there can be no escape from the reality that all powers are
susceptible of abuse. The mere possibility of abuse cannot, however, infirm per se the grant of power to an individual or entity. To deny power simply because it can be
abused by the grantee is to render government powerless and no people need an impotent government. There is no democratic government that can operate on the basis of
fear and distrust of its officials, especially those elected by the people themselves. On the contrary, all our laws assume that officials, whether appointed or elected, will act in
good faith and will perform the duties of their office. Such presumption follows the solemn oath that they took after assumption of office, to faithfully execute all our laws.
The law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. As explained
above, the diverse and distinct composition of the membership of a preparatory recall assembly guarantees that all the sectors of the electorate province shall be heard. It is
for this reason that we held that notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a
qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public place. It also requires that the recall resolution by the said majority
must be adopted during its session called for the purpose. The underscored words carry distinct legal meanings and purvey some of the parameters limiting the power of the
members of a preparatory recall assembly to initiate recall proceedings. Needless to state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid
resolution of recall which can be given due course by the COMELEC.
Citing Evardone vs. COMELEC: Loss of confidence as a ground for recall is a political question WON the electorate of the municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the
incumbent mayor is a political question.
Petitioner says: The resolution of the members of the preparatory recall assembly subverted the will of the electorate of the province of Bataan who elected petitioner Garcia
with a majority of 12,500 votes.
SC says: The contention proceeds from the erroneous premise that the resolution of recall is the recall itself. It refuses to recognize the reality that the resolution of recall is a
mere proposal to the electorate of Bataan to subject petitioner to a new test of faith. The proposal will still be passed upon by the sovereign electorate of Bataan. As this
judgment has yet to be expressed, it is premature to conclude that the sovereign will of the electorate of Bataan has been subverted. The electorate of Bataan may or may
not recall petitioner Garcia in an appropriate election. If the electorate re-elects petitioner Garcia, then the proposal to recall him made by the preparatory recall assembly is
rejected. On the other hand, if the electorate does not re-elect petitioner Garcia, then he has lost the confidence of the people which he once enjoyed. The judgment will write

finis to the political controversy. For more than judgments of courts of law, the judgment of the tribunal of the people is final for "sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
ANGOBUNG V. COMELEC | Hermosisima, 1997
FACTS

Ricardo Angobung won as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the local elections of 1995. He garnered 55% of all the votes cast. Private
respondent de Alban was also a candidate in said elections.

private respondent filed with the Local Election Registrar of Tumauini, Isabela, a Petition for Recall 3 against petitioner. Subsequently said petition was forwarded to the
Regional Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan and then to the main office of COMELEC in Manila, for approval.

the COMELEC en banc issued the herein assailed Resolution which (1) approved the Petition for Recall filed and signed by only one registered voter herein private respondent
Ma. Aurora Siccuan de Alban, against petitioner incumbent Mayor Ricardo Angobung; (2) set the further signing of said petition by the rest of the registered voters of
Tumauini, Isabela on November 9, 1996; and (3) in case the said petition is signed by at least 25% of the total number of registered votes in Tumauini, Isabela, scheduled the
recall election on December 2, 1996.

Petitioner now attacks the aforementioned resolution as being unconstitutional and therefore invalid, on two main grounds: (1) that the resolution approved the Petition for
Recall albeit same was signed by just one person in violation of the statutory 25% minimum requirement as to the number of signatures supporting any petition for recall;
and (2) that the resolution scheduled the recall election within one (1) year from the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections.
ISSUE
WON Sec. 69(d) of LGC is constitutional.
HELD/RATIO
NO. In Sanchez and Evardone, the COMELEC prescribed procedure of (1) allowing the recall petition to be filed by at least one person or by
less than 25% of the total number of registered voters and then (2) inviting voters to sign said petition on a date set for that purpose, was never put to issue. As this is the crux of
the present constitutional challenge, the proper time has come for this court to issue a definitive ruling on the matter.

Law as it stands: While the initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the signatures of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters, the petition must contain the
names of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in whose behalf only one person may sign the petition in the meantime.

We cannot sanction the procedure of the filing of the recall petition by a number of people less than the foregoing 25% statutory requirement, much less, the filing thereof by
just one person, as in the instant case, since this is indubitably violative of clear and categorical provisions of subsisting law.

Our legislators did not peg the voter requirement at 25% out of caprice or in a vacuum. They knew that this is the requirement under a majority of the constitution and recall
statutes in various American states to the same extent that they were aware of the rationale therefor. While recall was intended to be an effective and speedy remedy to
remove an official who is not giving satisfaction to the electorate regardless of whether or not he is discharging his full duty to the best of his ability and as his conscience
dictates, it is a power granted to the people who, in concert, desire to change their leaders for reasons only they, as a collective, can justify. In other words, recall must be
pursued by the people, not just by one disgruntled loser in the elections or a small percentage of disenchanted electors. Otherwise, its purposes as a direct remedy of the
people shall be defeated by the ill motives of a few among them whose selfish resort to recall would destabilize the community and seriously disrupt the running of
government.

Court cited several US cases re: rationale underlying the time bar provisions and the percentage of minimum voter requirement in American recall statutes, unmistakably
reveals the vigilance of lawmakers against the abuse of the power of recall.

In the instant case, this Court is confronted with a procedure that is unabashedly repugnant to the applicable law and no less such to the spirit underlying that law. Private
respondent who is a lawyer, knows that Section 69(d) of the Local Government Code plainly provides that recall is validly initiated by a petition of 25% of the total number of
registered voters. Notwithstanding such awareness, private respondent proceeded to file the petition for recall with only herself as the filer and initiator. She claims in her
petition that she has, together with many others in Tumauini, Isabela, lost confidence in the leadership of petitioner. But the petition does not bear the names of all these
other citizens of Tumauini who have reportedly also become anxious to oust petitioner from the post of mayor. There is no doubt that private respondent is truly earnest in
her cause, and the very fact that she affixed her name in the petition shows that she claims responsibility for the seeming affront to petitioners continuance in office. But the
same cannot be said of all the other people whom private respondent claims to have sentiments similar to hers.
While the people are vested with the power to recall
their elected officials, the same power is accompanied by the concomitant responsibility to see through all the consequences of the exercise of such power, including rising
above anonymity, confronting the official sought to be recalled, his family, his friends, and his supporters, and seeing the recall election to its ultimate end. The procedure of
allowing just one person to file the initiatory recall petition and then setting a date for the signing of the petition, which amounts to inviting and courting the public which may
have not, in the first place, even entertained any displeasure in the performance of the official sought to be recalled, is not only violative of statutory law but also tainted with
an attempt to go around the law. We cannot and must not, under any and all circumstances, countenance a circumvention of the explicit 25% minimum voter requirement in
the initiation of the recall process.
Disciplinary cases:
OMBUDSMAN V. CA | Carpio, 2007

FACTS

Melly Magbanua was the Local Treasury Operations Assistant of the City Treasurers Office in Bacolod City. On 27 February 1998, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted
an examination of respondents cash and account. The examination disclosed a shortage of P265,450. Upon demand, respondent failed to produce the missing amount.

Respondent alleged that the shortage was due to the machinations and dishonest acts of Cash Clerk I Monina Baja (Baja).

Baja was impleaded in the case before the Ombudsman Visayas.

Ombudsman Visayas found respondent guilty of Neglect of Duty, and Baja guilty of Dishonesty. recommended that respondent MA. MELLY JAUD MAGBANUA be meted the
penalty of SUSPENSION for SIX (6) MONTHS WITHOUT PAY for NEGLECT OF DUTY. For having been found guilty of DISHONESTY, respondent MONIN[]A BAJA is meted the
penalty of DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL BENEFITS AND DISQUALIFICATION TO HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE.

Petitioner reviewed the Decision of the Ombudsman Visayas and imposed upon both respondent and Baja the penalty of dismissal from the service.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by petitioner.

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals ruled that while petitioners findings were correct, petitioner has no power to impose directly sanctions against government officials and employees who
are subject of its investigation. Citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners power is limited and it may only recommend, not
impose, the appropriate sanctions.
ISSUE
WON the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to impose directly administrative penalties on public officials or employees.
HELD/RATIO
YES. Ombudsmans authority is not merely recommendatory. The Tapiador case was an obiter dictum which has been clarified in a number of subsequent cases such as Ledesma.

Basis for the powers of Ombudsman: Article XI of the 1987 Constitution: exercise such other powers or performs such functions or duties as may be provided by law.

RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions ad duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it
may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; x x x
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section
21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said
officer. x x x
SEC. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of
the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. X x x
SEC. 25. Penalties. (1) In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807, the penalties and rules provided therein shall be applied. (2) In other
administrative proceedings, the penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the Ombudsman, taking into consideration circumstances that mitigate or
aggravate the liability of the officer or employee found guilty of the complaint or charges.

Anent reliance on Ledesma v CA:

The main issue in Tapiador was the failure of the complainant to present substantial evidence to prove the charges in the
administrative case. The Court ruled that the reference in Tapiador to the power of the Ombudsman is at best merely an obiter dictum. SC ruled that the statement on the
Ombudsmans power was not supported by sufficient explanation and was susceptible to varying interpretations. It categorically stated that the statement cannot be cited as
a doctrinal declaration of the Court. SC recognized the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman under Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770, thus: It has long
been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman recommends the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee,
the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer x x x. It is thus clear that the framers of
our Constitution intended to create a stronger and more effective Ombudsman, independent and beyond the reach of political influences and vested with powers that are not
merely persuasive in character. The Constitutional Commission left to [the] Congress to empower the Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did when RA 6770 was
enacted. x x x.

Citing Ombudsman v CA: [The] provisions in RA 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full
administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints,
conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive
suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the
evidence, and necessarily, impose the said penalty. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be an activist watchman, not merely a passive one.

The Court ruled in Estarija that under RA 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring
public official, other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.

Citing Barillo v Gervasio: While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to recommend x x x removal, suspension, demotion x x x of
government officials and employees, the same Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section

21 of RA 6770.
power.

The word or in Section 15(3) before the phrase enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 grants the Ombudsman this alternative

MAROHOMSALIC V. COLE | Corona, 2008

FACTS

Romulo J. Marohomsalic was employed as Special Land Investigator I of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (PENRO-DENR) in Koronadal City.

Respondent Reynaldo D. Cole had a pending land dispute case in the PENRO-DENR in Koronadal City. he went to said office to inquire on the status of his case. He met
Marohomsalic and asked him for assistance as he was not from Koronadal but from General Santos City.

Marohomsalic, on one hand, asserted that on March 8, 2001, Cole gave him cash purportedly to cover the expenses for photocopying the documents needed in the case. On
the other hand, Cole claimed (and the Ombudsman affirmed) that Marohomsalic demanded P15,000 to secure the reversal of the PENRO-DENR decision against him (Cole).
Cole sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation to entrap Marohomsalic. On March 8, 2001, Marohomsalic was caught in flagrante delicto receiving bribe
money of P2,700 from Cole.

An administrative complaint for grave misconduct was filed against Marohomsalic in the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. Ombudsman found Marohomsalic guilty and
dismissed him from the service.

Marohomsalic appealed to the CA, dismissed. He then filed this petition for review on certiorari.

Marohomsalic claims that his right to due process was violated by both the Ombudsman and the CA.
ISSUES
(1) WON CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed his petition for review on technical grounds.
(2) WON his right to due process was violated by both the Ombudsman and the CA when his case was set neither for preliminary investigation nor for preliminary conference.
HELD/RATIO
(1) NO. The Ombudsman has the power to order the dismissal of a public officer.

The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over disciplinary cases against government employees is vested by no less than Sec 12, Art XI of the Constitution. Part of such disciplinary
authority in administrative cases is the power to investigate and prosecute, in accordance with the requirements laid down by law. One such requirement is that substantial
evidence must always support any finding.

One of the grounds for an administrative complaint cognizable by the Ombudsman is an act or omission contrary to law or regulations like grave misconduct. It is
characterized by the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct
includes the act of an official who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself, contrary to the rights of others.

The Ombudsman found that Marohomsalic directly requested and received money from Cole in connection with a transaction in which he was involved in his official capacity.
It concluded that Marohomsalics act constituted grave misconduct. An analysis of the assailed decision of the Ombudsman-Mindanao shows that there was substantial
evidence to sustain such finding.

Except in cases when there is grave abuse of discretion [in the exercise of its discretion], which is absent in [this] case, Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the
exercise of the Ombudsmans constitutionally mandated powers on this matter.

Corollary to the Ombudsmans disciplinary authority is his authority to dismiss. RA 6770, which provides for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman, was passed by Congress to deliberately endow the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees to make him
a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. Moreover, Congress granted the Ombudsman broad powers to implement his own
actions.
(2) NO. Section 4 of Administrative Order No. 7, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, provides: [The rules] shall govern all cases brought after they take effect and to
further proceedings in cases then pending, except to the extent that their application would not be feasible OR would cause injustice to any party.

Since the subject of this petition is an administrative complaint, not a criminal complaint, this case is not subject to criminal laws and procedure, or principles applicable only
thereto. More importantly, he must not be allowed to hide behind the cloak of liberal construction favoring the accused, if at all this principle finds application in this case. To
permit him to do so will be a mockery of public trust and accountability.
JOSON V. TORRES | Puno, 1998
FACTS

The validity of the suspension from office of petitioner Eduardo Nonato Joson as Governor of the province of Nueva Ecija. Private respondent Oscar C. Tinio is the ViceGovernor of said province while private respondents Loreto P. Pangilinan, Crispulo S. Esguerra, Solita C. Santos, Vicente C. Palilio and Napoleon G. Interior are members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

private respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint charging petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Private respondents alleged that
they were at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when petitioner belligerently barged into the Hall; petitioner
angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at them; close behind petitioner were several men with long and short firearms who encircled the

area. Private respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija
obtain a loan of P150 million from the Philippine National Bank; that petitioner's acts were intended to harass them into approving this loan.
Private respondents prayed for the suspension or removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of the provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review of the proposed
loan in light of the financial condition of the province.
The President acted on the complaint: President Ramos noted that the situation of "12 Sep at the Session Hall," i.e., the refusal of the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to approve the proposed loan, did not appear to justify "the use of force, intimidation or armed followers." He thus instructed the then Secretary of the Interior
and Local Governments (SILG) Robert Barbers to "[t]ake appropriate preemptive and investigative actions," but to "[b]reak not the peace."
Acting upon the instructions of the President, Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case against him and attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and its annexes.
Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned petitioner and private respondents to a conference to settle the controversy. The parties entered into an
agreement whereby petitioner promised to maintain peace and order in the province while private respondents promised to refrain from filing cases that would adversely
affect their peaceful co-existence.
The peace agreement was not respected by the parties and the private respondents reiterated their letter-complaint. Petitioner was again ordered to file his answer to the
letter-complaint within fifteen days from receipt.
petitioner requested for an extension of thirty (30) days to submit his answer The DILG granted the request for extension "for the last time up to January 13 only."
petitioner requested for another extension of thirty (30) days to file his answer. The DILG granted petitioner's request "for the last time" but gave him an extension of only ten
(10) days from January 13, 1997 to January 23, 1997. The DILG also informed him that his "failure to submit answer will be considered a waiver and that the plaintiff [shall] be
allowed to present his evidence ex-parte."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. He reiterated his prayer for an extension of thirty (30) days
Three months later, on April 22, 1997, Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, then Acting Secretary of the DILG, issued an order declaring petitioner in default and to have waived
his right to present evidence. Private respondents were ordered to present their evidence ex-parte.
Two days later, on April 24, 1997, the law firm of Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion, representing petitioner, filed with the DILG an "Entry of Appearance with Motion for
Time to File Answer Ad Cautelam."
Undersecretary Sanchez issued an order stating that petitioner's counsel, whose office is in Manila, should have received a copy of the May 19, 1997 order ten days after
mailing on May 27, 1997. Since petitioner still failed to file his answer, he was deemed to have waived his right to present evidence in his behalf. Undersecretary Sanchez
reinstated the order of default and directed private respondents to present their evidence ex-parte
petitioner, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss."
on recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner under preventive suspension for
sixty (60) days pending investigation of the charges against him.
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension and the order of default.
Petitioner alleged that subsequent to the institution of this petition, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments rendered a resolution on the case finding him guilty
of the offenses charged. His finding was based on the position papers and affidavits of witnesses submitted by the parties. The DILG Secretary found the affidavits of
complainants' witnesses to be "more natural, reasonable and probable" than those of herein petitioner Joson's. 30 January 8, 1998, the Executive Secretary, by authority of
the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without pay.

ISSUES
(1) WON
(2) WON
(3) WON
(4) WON

the formal defects in the verification was fatal to the case.

DILG Secretary had jurisdiction and authority over the case.
the preventive suspension was validly imposed.
petitioner had the right to formal investigation.

HELD/RATIO
(1) NO. Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials are governed by the LGC of 1991, the Rules and Regulations

Implementing the LGC of 1991, and Administrative Order No. 23 entitled Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on the Investigation of Administrative Disciplinary Cases
Against Elective Local Officials of Provinces, Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Cities and Municipalities in Metropolitan Manila. In all matters not
provided in A.O. No. 23, the Rules of Court and the Administrative Code of 1987 apply in a suppletory character.

Grounds for which an elective local official may be disciplined, suspended or removed from office is enumerated in Section 60 of Chapter 4, Title II, Book I of the LGC.

Section 61 of Chapter 4, Title II, Book I of the LGC: When an elective local official commits an act that falls under the grounds for disciplinary action, the administrative
complaint against him must be verified and filed with the proper government office. A complaint against an elective provincial or city official must be filed with the Office of
the President. A complaint against an elective municipal official must be filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan while that of a barangay official must be filed before the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan.

In the instant case, Joson is an elective official of the province of Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed with the Office of the President.

Petitioner argues: The letter-complaint failed to conform with the formal requirements set by the Code: Complaint was not verified by private respondents and was not
supported by the joint affidavit of the two witnesses named therein; that private resp later realized these defects and surreptitiously inserted the verification and sworn
statement while the complaint was still pending with the OP.

Assuming, nonetheless, that the letter-complaint was unverified when submitted to the OP, the defect was not fatal. The requirement

of verification was deemed waived by the President himself when he acted on the complaint.
Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. Verification is mainly intended to secure an assurance that the allegations therein made are done in good faith or are true
and correct and not mere speculation. The lack of verification is a mere formal defect. The court may order the correction of the pleading, if not verified, or act on the
unverified pleading if the attending circumstances are such

that a strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served.
(2) YES. Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority.
Sec. 2. Disciplining Authority. All administrative complaints, duly verified, against elective local officials mentioned in the preceding Section shall be acted upon by the President.
The President, who may act through the Executive Secretary, shall hereinafter be referred to as the Disciplining Authority. Sec. 3. Investigating Authority. The Secretary of the ILG
is hereby designated as the Investigating Authority. He may constitute an Investigating Committee in the DILG for the purpose. The Disciplining Authority may, however, in the
interest of the service, constitute a Special Investigating Committee in lieu of the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government.

Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the DILG is the Investigating
Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the
DILG Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may designate a Special Investigating Committee.

The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local governments.

Constitutional basis: Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with
respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are
within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

The power of supervision means overseeing or the authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the subordinate officers fail or neglect
to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. The President's power of general supervision means no
more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, OR that subordinate officers act within the law. Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the
power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local
officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

Citing Villena case: Independently of any statutory provision authorizing the President to conduct an investigation of the nature involved in this proceeding, and in view of
the nature and character of the executive authority with which the President of the Philippines is invested, the constitutional grant to him of power to exercise general
supervision over all local governments and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize him to order an investigation of the act or conduct
of the petitioner herein. Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts
and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a
knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation.

The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate.

As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to
investigate complaints against local government officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may
be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to Joson's claim. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the
power to investigate, not the power to discipline

The doctrine of qualified political agency (alter-ego) is corollary to the control power of the President.. -The procedure how the Disciplining and Investigating Authorities
should exercise their powers is distinctly set forth in the LGC and A.O.

No. 23. When an administrative complaint is therefore filed, the Disciplining Authority shall issue an order requiring the respondent to submit his verified answer within 15
days from notice. Upon filing of the answer, the Disciplining Authority shall refer the case to the Investigating Authority for investigation.

Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the President did not comply with the provisions of A.O. No. 23. The Office should have first required petitioner to file his answer.
Thereafter, the complaint and the answer should have been referred to the Investigating Authority for further proceedings. Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is not fatal.
The filing of the answer is necessary merely to enable the President to make a preliminary assessment of the case. The President found the complaint sufficient in form and
substance to warrant its further investigation.
(3) YES. In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did not err in recommending to the Disciplining Authority his preventive suspension during the
investigation. Preventive suspension is authorized under Section 63 of the LGC.

When may preventive suspension be imposed by the Disciplining Authority? At any time... (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c)
given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence.

Requisites for preventive suspension had been complied with in this case i.e. failure to file an answer = waiver of right to present evidence AND history of violent
confrontational politics in the province.
(4) YES. Validity of the Executive Secretarys Resolution finding petitioner guilty as charged and imposing on him the penalty of suspension from office for 6 months from office
without pay.

DILGs basis for denying his Motion To Conduct Formal Investigation: Before there shall be a formal investigation, joinder of issues must already be present or respondent's
answer has already been filed. In the case at bar, the admission of respondent's answer after having been declared in default was conditioned on the fact of submission of
position papers by the parties, after which, the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.

The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process. - Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 - at the preliminary conference, the Investigating
Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether

they desire a formal investigation. This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a

formal investigation would be conducted. - The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. As respondent, he is accorded several rights under the law.
Sec. 65. Rights of Respondent. -- The respondent shall be accorded full opportunity to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel,
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of
documentary evidence in his favor through compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum. An erring elective local official has rights akin to the
constitutional rights of an accused. These rights are essentially part of procedural due process. The local elective official has the (1) right to appear and defend himself in
person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production of documentary evidence. These rights are reiterated
in the Rules Implementing the Local Government Code and in A.O. No. 23. Well to note, Joson formally claimed his right to a formal investigation after his Answer Ad Cautelam
has been admitted by Undersecretary.
Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on the basis of position papers. There is nothing in the Local
Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the
basis of position papers.
The jurisprudence cited by the DILG in its order denying petitioner's motion for a formal investigation applies to appointive officials and employees. Administrative disciplinary
proceedings against elective government officials are not exactly similar to those against appointive officials. In fact, the provisions that apply to elective local officials are
separate and distinct from appointive government officers and employees. This can be gleaned from the Local Government Code itself.
The grounds for administrative disciplinary action in Book V are much more in number and are specific than those enumerated in the Local Government Code against elective
local officials.
The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials are markedly different from appointive officials. The rules on the removal and suspension
of elective local officials are more stringent. The procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to
appointive officials but not to those elected. An elective official, elected by popular vote, is directly responsible to the community that elected him. The official has a definite
term of office fixed by law which is relatively of short duration. Suspension and removal from office definitely affects and shortens this term of office. When an elective official
is suspended or removed, the people are deprived of the services of the man they had elected. Implicit in the right of suffrage is that the people are entitled to the services of
the elective official of their choice. Suspension and removal are thus imposed only after the elective official is accorded his rights and the evidence against him strongly
dictates their imposition.

SOCRATES V. SANDIGANBAYAN | Regalado, 1996

FACTS

Socrates who is the incumbent governor of Palawan, was first elected governor of the said province in 1968 and was again reelected in both the 1971 and 1980 elections,
until he was replaced by private complainant Victoriano Rodriguez as Officer-In-Charge Governor after the EDSA Revolution in February 1986. Subsequently, both petitioner
and Rodriguez ran for governor in the 1988 elections where the latter emerged victorious. In the 1992 synchronized national and local elections, the two again contested the
gubernatorial post; and this time, it was petitioner who won.

at the time Rodriguez was still the OIC Governor of the province, the Provincial Government of Palawan, as represented by Rodriguez and the Provincial Board Members of
Palawan, filed before the Office of the Tanodbayan two (2) complaints. The first complaint charged petitioner with violation of Section 3(b) of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and the second charged petitioner, together with several other provincial officers, with violation of Section 3(a) and (g).

Instead of filing a counter-affidavit as directed, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation on the ground that upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
the present Tanodbayan has been transformed into the Office of the Special Prosecutor and has, therefore, lost his power to conduct preliminary investigation.

Based on the Resolution of Special Prosecution Officer I Wendell Barreras-Sulit, which affirmed the Resolution rendered by Ombudsman Investigator Ernesto Nocos
recommending the filing of appropriate charges against petitioner, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed with the respondent Court two (2) Informations against petitioner,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028. The first was for violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the second for violation of Section 3(e).

Arguments: (1) He may not be suspended while the issue on the validity of the informations filed against him is still pending review before the SC; and (2) Section 13 of RA
3019, which forms the basis of the order of suspension, is unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes an undue delegation of the authority to suspend which is
essentially an executive power.
ISSUE
WON the imposition of the preventive suspension was valid.
HELD/RATIO
YES. Sec. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this [1] Act OR [2] under Title
7, Book II of the RPC OR [3] for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

SC has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a presuspension hearing conducted for that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine basically the validity of the information, from which the court can

have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, OR correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. The hearing
may be treated in the same manner as a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.
Citing Luciano v Mariano: Guidelines in exercises of power of suspension: (c) By way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension from
office of public officers charged under a valid information under the provisions of RA 3019 or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant to Section
13 of said Act, it may be briefly stated that upon the filing of such information, the TC should issue an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at
a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution
seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension OR the accused in turn files a motion to quash the information OR challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order
of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the
information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order or suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or withhold such suspension in
the contrary case. (d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for
which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of RA 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the RPC which would warrant his mandatory suspension from
office under Section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The mandatory
suspension decreed by the Act upon determination of the pendency in court of a criminal prosecution for violation of the Anti-Graft Act or for bribery under a valid information
requires at the same time that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act. Hence, if the TC, say,
finds the ground alleged in the quashal motion not to be indubitable, then it shall be called upon to issue the suspension order upon its upholding the validity of the
information and setting the same for trial on the merits.
Upon a proper determination of the validity of the information, it becomes mandatory for the court to immediately issue the suspension order. The rule on the matter is
specific and categorical. It leaves no room for interpretation. It is not within the court's discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused officer on the pretext that
the order denying the motion to quash is pending review before the appellate courts.
Its discretion lies only during the pre-suspension hearing where it is required to ascertain whether or not: (1) the accused had been afforded due preliminary investigation
prior to the filing of the information against him, (2) the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the provision s of
Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or (3) the informations against him can be quashed, under any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Cou rt.
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the court must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about
it. This is because a preventive suspension is not a penalty. It is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. In view of this latter provision, the accused elective public officer does not stand
to be prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the suspension order in the event that the information is subsequently declared null and void on appeal and the case
dismissed as against him. Taking into consideration the public policy involved in preventively suspending a public officer charged under a valid information, the protection of
public interest will definitely have to prevail over the private interest of the accused.
To further emphasize the ministerial duty of the court under Section 13 of RA 3019, it is said that the court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine WON a
preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in
office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that
upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.
Petitioners position re: constitutionality of Sec. 13: The power of suspension, which is an incident of the power of removal, is basically administrative and executive in nature.
The power of removal vested in the court under Section 9 of RA 3019 is an incident of conviction, that is, it can only be exercised after a conviction has been handed down.
Hence, since the power to suspend is merely incidental to the power of removal, the former can only be exercised as an incident to conviction. Also, considering that Section
13 authorizes the court to exercise the power of suspension even prior to conviction of the accused, it cannot be considered as an exercise of judicial power because it is not
within the ambit of the court's power of removal. In addition, he avers that Sec. 13 is arbitrary and discriminatory because it serves no purpose at all, in that it does not
require a proceeding to determine if there is sufficient ground to suspend, except for the fact that it is required by law.
Court's power of suspension under Section 13 as discussed in Luciano v Mariano: Suspension is not automatic, but who should exercise the mandatory act of suspension
under Section 13? Suspensions by virtue of criminal proceedings are separate and distinct from suspensions in administrative cases. An accurate reading of Section 13 yields
two methods of investigation, one separate from the other: one criminal before the courts of justice, and the other administrative. This is the plain import of the last sentence
of Section 13, which says that if acquitted, defendant in an Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices case shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. Our interpretation but preserves, as it should, the
substantial symmetry between the first part of Section 13 and the last part thereof just quoted. There is in this legal provision a recognition that once a case is filed in court,
all other acts connected with the discharge of court functions which here include suspension should be left to the court.
Since removal from office then is within the power of the court, no amount of judicial legerdemain would deprive the court of the power to suspend. Reason for this is that
suspension necessarily is included in the greater power of removal. It is without doubt that Congress has power to authorize courts to suspend public officers pending court
proceedings for removal and that the congressional grant is not violative of the separation of powers.
Congress did really apprehend danger should the power of suspension in consequence of a criminal case under RA 3019 be lodged in any authority other than the court.
Quite apart from the fact that the court has a better grasp of the situation, there is one other factor, and that is, the rights of the person accused. The court could very well
serve as a lever to balance in one equation the public interests involved and the interests of the defendant. And then, there is the danger that partisan politics may creep in.

LAYUS V. SANDIGANBAYAN | Davide, 1999

FACTS

Celia T. Layus, the elected Mayor of the Municipality of Claveria, Province of Cagayan, was charged with estafa through falsification of public documents before public
respondent Sandiganbayan.

The Information stemmed from a complaint for estafa through falsification of public documents and for violation of Section 3(e) and (h), and Section 4 of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed against LAYUS and Pedro V. Layus, Henjie C. Layus and Arnold V. Layus. After preliminary
investigation, Graft Investigation Officer II Jose D. Carlos of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in a Joint Resolution dated 21 November 1996, recommended the
filing of an information against LAYUS for the first charge and the dismissal of the charges against all of the original respondents for the second. The resolution had the
concurrence of Director Ernesto Nocos and was approved by the Ombudsman.

A warrant of arrest was served on LAYUS. She filed a cash bond for her temporary liberty. She also filed a motion to lift the travel ban imposed on her, considering that she
was scheduled to leave the country.

The motion to lift the travel ban was set for hearing on 18 April 1997. On that date, however, the Sandiganbayan required her to enter a plea before lifting the travel
restriction. On account of her impending trip, she acceded and entered a plea of not guilty on condition that her plea not be deemed to be a waiver of her right to file a
motion for reinvestigation and a motion to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan recognized such right until the Ombudsman resolved her pending
motion.

On the first day set by the Sandiganbayan for the trial of the case, LAYUS informed the court of the prior filing of her motion for reinvestigation which was allegedly sent by
registered mail, but the Sandiganbayan had not received any copy of it.

LAYUS filed a motion to quash the Information. In the meantime, with appropriate leave, LAYUS served and filed an Omnibus Motion reiterating her right to reinvestigation.
This was, however, denied by the Sandiganbayan. LAYUS motion to reconsider the denial likewise failed.

Sandiganbayan denied LAYUS motion to quash and ruled that the alleged irregularities in the preliminary investigation were not proper grounds for quashing the Information.

the prosecution filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite, which LAYUS opposed. The resolution of said motion was held in abeyance in light
of the May 1998 elections and the prohibition under Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Sandiganbayan eventually
granted the motion to suspend LAYUS.

LAYUS filed the instant petition.

ISSUE
(1) WON SB has jurisdiction over mayor of 5th class municipality.
(2) WON SB correctly denied her motion for reinvestigation in view of regular COA report.
(3) WON Layug was validly suspended.
HELD/RATIO
(1) YES. Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan doctrine on actual salary received is not controlling.

The contention that a prior COA Report is necessary to determine Layus culpability is without merit. Under RA 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and
prosecute individuals on matters and complaints referred to or filed before it. Such power is plenary.

A COA approval of a government official's disbursement only relates to the administrative aspect of his accountability, but it does not foreclose the Ombudsman's authority to
investigate and determine whether there is a crime to be prosecuted for which such official may be answerable. For, while the COA may regard a government official to have
substantially complied with it's accounting rules, this fact is not sufficient to dismiss the criminal case.

Sec. 13 of RA 2019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer who has been validly charged with a violation of RA 3019, as amended, or Book
II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property. This is based on the presumption that unless the public
officer is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution OR commit further acts of malfeasance OR both.
(2) YES. The imposition of the suspension, however, is not automatic or self-operative. There must first be a valid information, determined at a pre-suspension hearing, where the
court is furnished with the basis to suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or refuse suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or
correct any part of the proceedings which impairs its validity.
(3) YES. In the instant case, the records show that Layus was given adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against her. Since the required presuspension hearing was complied with and the information was deemed valid, it then becomes the ministerial duty of the Sandiganbayan to forthwith issue the order of
preventive suspension which, however, may not be for an indefinite duration or an unreasonable length of time. Thus, in Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that preventive
suspension may not exceed 90 days in consonance with PD 807 (the Civil Service Decree), now Section 52 of the Admin Code of 1987.
CASTRO V. GLORIA | Sandoval-Guttierez, 2001
FACTS

Porfirio Gutang, Jr. filed with DECS a complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct against petitioner Gualberto Castro, a teacher in Guibuangan Central School, Barili, Cebu.
It was alleged that he has an illicit affair with Gutangs wife, petitioners co-teacher at the same school.

DECS Regional Office VII, through Assistant Superintendent Francisco B. Concillo, rendered a decision declaring petitioner guilty of the offense charged. He was meted the
penalty of dismissal from the service. DECS Central Office affirmed Concillos decision.

petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Instead of resolving the motion, the DECS Central Office directed the School Division of Cebu to comment on the motion. The
School Division Superintendent recommended that the motion be resolved favorably. However, the recommendation was opposed by the DECS Region VII.
petitioner filed with the DECS Central Office a "Motion for Review Setting Aside/Modifying the Decision of Regional Director of DECS Region VII. DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria
(respondent) referred the motion to the Regional Director of Region VII for comment. Regional Director Eladio C. Dioko issued a 2nd Indorsement sustaining the decision of
Assistant Superintendent Concillo. respondent Secretary denied petitioner s motion for review.
petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC imploring that judgment be rendered ordering respondent Secretary or anyone who may have assumed the duties and
functions of his office (1) to reduce his penalty from dismissal to one (1) year suspension; 2) to consider the one (1) year suspension as already served considering that he
has been out of the service for more than ten (10) years; 3) to reinstate him to his former position; and 4) to pay is back salaries. The trial court rendered the herein assailed
decision dismissing the petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. It ruled that petitioner should have appealed to the Civil Service Commission
before coming to court.

ISSUE
WON mandamus lies to compel reduction of penalty from dismissal to 1 year.
HELD/RATIO
YES. A petition for mandamus is premature if there are administrative remedies available to petitioner. But where the case involves only legal questions, the litigant need not
exhaust all administrative remedies before such judicial relief can be sought.

The resolution of this case hinges on whether or not the following is a question of law or a question of fact Is dismissal from the service the proper penalty for the 1st
offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct?

Petitioner no longer disputes the administrative finding of his guilt for the offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct. What petitioner only impugns is the correctness of the
penalty of dismissal from the service. He is convinced that the proper penalty for the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is only suspension from the service.
Undoubtedly, the issue here is a pure question of law. We need only to look at the applicable law or rule and we will be able to determine whether the penalty of dismissal is
in order.

Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292: Administrative offenses with its corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less
grave, and light depending on the gravity of its nature and effects of said acts on the government service. The following are grave offenses with its corresponding penalties: X
X X (o) Disgraceful and immoral conduct <1st Offense, Suspension for 6 months and 1 day to 1 year; 2nd Offense, Dismissal.>
Anent petitioner's prayer for the payment of back salaries -> without legal basis.

Such payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges. However, if the
employee is not completely exonerated of the charges such as when the penalty of dismissal is reduced to mere suspension, he would not be entitled to the payment of his
back salaries.

The general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service. As he works, he shall earn. Since petitioner did not work
during the period for which he is now claiming salaries, there can be no legal or equitable basis to order the payment of such salaries.
CANIETE V. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION | Kapunan, 2000
FACTS

Herman Caniete and Wilfredo Rosario are public school teachers at the Juan Sumulong High School in Quezon City. For being absent on 20 and 21 September 1990, they were
charged by Secretary Isidro Cario, then Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, with alleged participation in the mass actions/strikes on said dates.
Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension.

Secretary Cario found petitioners "guilty as charged" and dismissed them from the service "effective immediately." The said decisions of Secretary Cario, however, were set
aside by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) when the case was brought to it on appeal. The MSPB found that petitioners were guilty only of Gross Violation of Existing
Civil Service Law and Rules and suspended them for three (3) months without pay.

(CSC) modified the decision of the MSPB. The CSC found that petitioners were only guilty of being absent on 20 and 21 September 1990 without the necessary leave of
absence, and not as charged by Secretary Cario of participating in the mass actions/strikes on said dates. Accordingly, petitioners were meted out the penalty of reprimand.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the CSC resolution insofar as it disallowed the payment of their back salaries. The CSC denied their motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA but the latter affirmed the decision of the CSC.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same.
ISSUE
WON petitioners, who were earlier dismissed for allegedly participating in mass actions/strikes, are entitled to their back salaries upon their reinstatement after they were found
guilty only of violating reasonable office rules and regulations and penalized only with reprimand.
HELD/RATIO
YES. Employees who are preventively suspended pending investigation are NOT entitled to the payment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, BUT they become entitled to
compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually they are found innocent.

Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code) on preventive suspension: SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees
under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days
salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the
Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the
Secretary concerned.
(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal. SEC 51. Preventive Suspension.- The proper disciplining authority may preventively
suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.
SEC. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation.- When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not
finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the
respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending
investigation (51) and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the
respondent is exonerated (47[4])

Citing Gloria: The employee who is placed under preventive suspension pending investigation is not entitled to compensation because such suspension is not a penalty but
only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. Upon the other hand, there is right to compensation for preventive suspension
pending appeal if the employee is eventually exonerated. This is because "preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently
considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the
suspension.
NALUPTA JR. V. TAPEC | Nocon, 1993
FACTS

Mariano R. Nalupta, Jr. accuses respondent Honesto G. Tapec, Deputy Sheriff of the Regional trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte of immorality by cohabiting with his
paramour Consolacion Inocencio, with whom he had two children, and of discharging the duties of Barangay Captain of Masintoc, Paoay, Ilocos Norte despite holding his
present position. Nalupta filed with OCA a sworn complaint.

An additional information was furnished by Hon. Ariston L. Rubio, Executive Judge and Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 17, Batac, Ilocos Norte, saying that he has already
recommended the dismissal of Honesto Tapec for absence without official leave but as of this time, it has not been acted upon by the Supreme Court.

Thereafter, Judge Agnir submitted his report 2 finding respondent guilty of the charge of immorality and recommending the imposition of an appropriate penalty.

We find Judge Agnir's report to be well supported by the evidence.

Complainant had sufficiently established the charge of immorality against respondent. Noel Rosario, a neighbor of respondent's paramour Consolacion Inocencio at Barangay
Ablan, Batac, Ilocos Norte, testified that he had often seen respondent leaving the house of Inocencio in the morning and returning to the same in the afternoon, and that this
had gone on for quite some time. Moreover, it was well-known in the neighborhood that respondent was married and that Inocencio was merely his paramour.

Similarly established is the fact that the illicit union of respondent and Inocencio had produced two children, Marc Henry Tapec and Joseph Marlou I. Tapec, as shown by the
certified true copies of the children's respective birth certificates. The authenticity of these birth certificates was later verified by Judge Agnir's Branch Clerk of Court.
ISSUE
WON illicit relationship of a public officer subjects him to disciplinary action.
HELD/RATIO
YES. Complainant had sufficiently established the charge of immorality against respondent.

The act of respondent of having illicit relations with Consolacion Inocencio is considered disgraceful and immoral conduct within the purview of Section 36 (b)(5) of PD 807,
for which respondent may be subjected to disciplinary action.

Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989 of the CSC has categorized disgraceful and immoral conduct as a grave offense for which a penalty of suspension for 6 months
and 1 day shall be imposed for the 1st offense, while dismissal is imposed for the 2nd offense.

Inasmuch as the present charge of immorality against respondent constitutes the first charge of this nature, the Court shall at this instance suspend respondent for 6 months
and 1 day. While it is true that during the investigation of this case, respondent has absented himself without official leave, the recommendation of his immediate superior,
Judge Ariston L. Rubio, for his dismissal on this ground has yet to be received by this Court. The Court hereby reserves the right to impose the appropriate penalty upon
respondent for this new offense at the proper time.
OCA V. LIBRADO | Per Curiam, 1996
FACTS

Vicente P. Librado is deputy sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, in Iligan City. He was charged with violation of R.A. No. 6425 in an information filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte, Branch 5, for selling and having in his possession certain quantities of prohibited drugs know as metamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu" and marijuana. He was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to six (6) years of imprisonment.
Office of the Court Administrator filed this administrative complaint against him and on November 23, 1994, he was suspended from office.
Respondent admits that he had been convicted of violation of R.A. No. 6425 and claims that he is now on probation.
Based on the foregoing facts, Judge Valerio M. Salazar, Executive Judge of RTC-Iligan City, to whom this case was referred for investigation, report and recommendation,
recommends that in view of respondent's probation, a penalty short of dismissal be meted out against respondent " to provide him with the incentive and the will to
rehabilitate himself and apply his time to his work as a judicial employee.

ISSUE
WON a judicial employee under probation for a crime involving moral turpitude may be readmitted to public service.
HELD/RATIO
NO. This case involves a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude as a ground for disciplinary action under the Civil Service Law. Under the rules of the CSC, conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude is considered a grave offense punishable, upon first commission, by dismissal. As this Court has held, it alone suffices as a ground for the
dismissal of a civil service employee.

There is no doubt that drug-pushing is a crime which involves moral turpitude and implies everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals
including acts of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of
right and duty between man and man. Indeed nothing is more depraved than for anyone to be a merchant of death by selling prohibited drugs.

The image of the judiciary is tarnished by conduct, which involves moral turpitude. While indeed the purpose of the Probation Law is to save valuable human material, it must
not be forgotten that unlike pardon probation does not obliterate the crime of which the person under probation has been convicted. The reform and rehabilitation of the
probationer cannot justify his retention in the government service. He may seek to reenter government service, but only after he has shown that he is fit to serve once again.
It cannot be repeated too often that a public office is a public trust, which demands of those in its service the highest degree of morality.
OCA V. JUDGE VENERACION | Pardo, 2000
FACTS

Merlinia C. Santos filed with the Court Administrator, a sworn letter-complaint against Rogelio A. Tria, "Acting Sheriff IV, Branch 47,Regional Trial Court, Manila," assailing the
acts of "Sheriff" Tria in the implementation of a writ of execution in a civil case for support. Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo ordered an investigation of the status of
"sheriff" Tria of RTC, Manila, Branch 47. The investigation revealed that "sheriff" Tria was not an employee of the judiciary at the time he acted as "sheriff" in the Civil Case.
The record showed that Mr. Rogelio A. Tria was appointed process server of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Manila. However, he transferred to the Economic Intelligence
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Department of Finance, as an Intelligence Officer. He was not thereafter re-employed in the judiciary.

The investigation further disclosed that in 1985, Mr. Antonio Velasco was the duly appointed Deputy Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Manila. Subsequently,
however, Judge Veneracion assigned Deputy Sheriff IV Antonio Velasco to the Office of the Clerk of Court in order that Rogelio A. Tria, who was not an employee of the
judiciary, could be designated to perform the functions of "Acting Deputy Sheriff IV" considering the position vacant and authorized to carry out the writ of execution. The
Court Administrator concluded that Judge Veneracion and Branch Clerk of Court Rogelio M. Linatoc had knowledge of the irregularity.

Court Administrator Benipayo recommended that the memorandum report be considered as an administrative complaint against Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion for grave
misconduct and violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.08 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and against Atty. Rogelio M. Linatoc for grave misconduct. Court adopted a resolution
considering the memorandum as an administrative complaint against Judge Veneracion and Atty. Linatoc, and directing them to file their respective answers thereto within
ten (10) days from notice.

Court referred the case to Court of Appeals Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando for investigation, report and recommendation.

Justice Fernando submitted her final report and recommendation, that respondents, Judge Lorenzo Veneracion and Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Rogelio Linatoc be dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to re-employment with any other branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.
ISSUE
WON an employee of EIIB, an agency under the Department of Finance, of the executive branch of the government, may be assigned by that agency on detail with the judiciary,
specifically to the RTC as deputy sheriff, upon the request of the presiding judge of the court without the authority of the SC.
HELD/RATIO
NO. Judge Veneracions repeated requests for Tria's detail with the RTC as Acting Deputy Sheriff IV, a position that was not vacant,
contravened Article VIII, Section 5 (6) of the Constitution, SC Administrative Circular No. 07 (re: appointments to vacant positions in the judiciary), and Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 12 addressed to all judges and clerks of court of the RTC, prescribing guidelines and procedure in the service and execution of court writs and
processes.

Administrative Circular No. 12 provides that "in the absence of deputy sheriff appointed and assigned in his sala" the judge may at any time designate any of the deputy
sheriffs in the office of the clerk of court. However, the judge shall not be allowed to designate the deputy sheriff of another branch without first securing the consent of the
presiding judge thereof.

Judge Veneracion failed to observe the Constitutional and regulatory prescriptions. Judge Veneracion had no power to assign on temporary detail his duly appointed sheriff to
the office of the clerk of court. The authority to detail employees of his branch to the office of the clerk of court is vested in the executive judge. Hence, there was no vacancy
even temporarily in the office of branch sheriff of Branch 47, and the judge can not appoint or designate any person of his choice to act as sheriff. His action showed
persistent disregard of the rule in the designation of acting sheriffs. This act constitutes usurpation of the appointing authority of the SC amounting to grave misconduct in
office.

What is required of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges can innovate at pleasure, roaming at will in pursuit of their own ideals of beauty
or of goodness. They are bound by limitations on their authority, by substantive and procedural rules of law, more importantly by Constitutional precepts and the recognition
of their places in the hierarchy of courts.

Judge Veneracions outright disregard of the well-established separation of powers of the three great departments of government and his exercise of powers beyond his
judicial competence and in defiance of directives of the Supreme Court undermined the independence of the judiciary.
PROPRIETY OF THE PENALTIES:

Judge Veneracion: tempers the severity of the recommended dismissal of respondent judge considering his long service in thegovernment and the judiciary and his obedience
to the order of the Court Administrator directing him to terminate the questioneddesignation of sheriff Tria, thus, evincing remorse and repentance for his unauthorized
acts.

Atty. Linatoc: Dismissal from the service as too harsh a penalty. His fault was in following blindly the orders of the respondent judge,even though these violated the
Constitution and circulars of the Supreme Court.
RTC MAKATI MOVEMENT AGAINST GRAFT AND CORRUPTOIN V. DUMLAO | Kapunan, 1995
FACTS

Atty. Inocencio E. Dumlao, then Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, was charged by the RTC Makati Movement against Graft & Corruption
for allegedly engaging in usurious activities, immorality and violation of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019, as amended). The complaint alleged that
Respondent withheld the salary checks of all RTC Makati employees to compel them to borrow money from him at usurious rates, as evidenced by Trust Agreements. The
amounts loaned are collected through his alleged paramour, Ms. Piedad Rufo (now Piedad R. Cruz), a clerk employed at the Cash Section of the Office of the Clerk of Court,
RTC Makati. Respondent was also charged with allegedly demanding money from party litigants and lawyers in exchange for favorable action on their cases.

Office of the Chief Justice received another letter-complaint against Respondent signed by Susan B. Quinto for: 1) Corruption and dereliction of duty for exacting money from
court litigants in the pretext that the amounts exacted are his commissioner's fees, yet, he does not prepare his reports. 2) For operating a lending agency, with the use of
the facilities of the court and for exacting from court employees usurious interest. 3) For criminal negligence in the performance of his duties as Branch Clerk of Court of RTC,
Branch 234, Makati, Metro Manila.

cases were consolidated and referred to Executive Judge Salvador Abad Santos of the RTC, Makati, Metro Manila, for investigation, report and recommendation.

Executive Judge Abad Santos recommended the dismissal of Respondent from service on grounds of grave misconduct and dishonesty prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and acts unbecoming a court officer.
ISSUE
WON Dumlaos acts warrant his dismissal.
HELD/RATIO
YES. Public service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. The administration of
justice is a sacred task. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle solemnly
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution that a public office is a public trust; and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding
judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum
but, above all else, must be above suspicion. Indeed, every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.

The particular public officer concerned is a Branch Clerk of a court of justice who is described as an essential officer in any judicial system, whose office is the hub of
activities, both adjudicative and administrative and who occupy a position of great importance and responsibility in the framework of judicial administration. Clerks of Court
are, thus, required to be individuals of competence, honesty and probity specifically mandated to safeguard the integrity of the court and its proceedings, to earn respect
therefor, to maintain loyalty thereto and to the judge as the superior officer, to maintain the authenticity and correctness of court records and to uphold the confidence of the
public in the administration of justice.

Respondent's ignorance of the existence and contents of the Manual for Clerks of Court clearly demonstrates how grossly remiss he has been in the performance of his duties
as Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 134 RTC-Makati. He cannot rely on his thirteen (13) years of experience alone, vast though it may seem, because the law is constantly
evolving. As a court officer, he should keep abreast of the various changes and amendments of the law.

The documentary exhibits presented by Complainant leave no doubt as to the existence of Respondent's lending operation, some ofwhich even led to the filing (by
Respondent) of criminal charges against borrowers who failed to pay their loans under the so-called trust agreements. Such despicable acts cannot be tolerated by this Court.

His reliance on CB Circular No. 905 implementing MB Resolution No. 225 which effectively suspended the provisions of the Usury Law is misplaced. Although he may not be
criminally or civilly liable, he is still administratively liable under the Civil Service Law where lending money at usurious rates of interests is specifically listed as grounds for
disciplinary action. Courts are not lending institutions. By engaging in lending activities, Dumlao has caused dishonor to courts of justice.
NIEVA V. ALVAREZ-EDAD | Sandoval-Guttierez, 2005
FACTS

This is an administrative complaint filed by Maritoni M. Nieva, former legal researcher of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 32, Quezon City, charging Saturnina
Alvarez-Edad, Branch Clerk of Court, also of the same Branch, with the following administrative offenses:
1) Falsification of daily time records; 2) Dishonesty; 3) Demanding or receiving commissioners fee for reception of evidence ex-parte; 4) Conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service; 5) Issuing certified true copies of warrant of arrest without payment of the corresponding fees; and 6) Discourtesy in the conduct of official business.

We issued a Resolution referring the case to the Executive Judge, MeTC, Quezon City, for investigation, report, and recommendation. Executive Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit
exonerated respondent from all the charges, except for dishonesty.

Investigating Judge Dayrit found that respondent demanded from the representative of Unifunds P1,500.00 as commissioners fee and received P500.00 in the guise of
payment for stenographic notes. She kept P300.00 for herself without the consent of Judith Cueto, a stenographer. Judge Dayrit then recommended that respondent be
found guilty of two (2) counts of dishonesty and be suspended from the service for one (1) year without pay and be disqualified for promotion or from receiving any increase
in salary during the pendency of the suspension.

We referred the Report of Executive Judge Dayrit to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Christopher O. Lock submitted to this Court his Evaluation and Recommendation:
Xxx the facts do not warrant respondents dismissal from the service considering that out of the seven (7) charges, complainant was able to prove only one (1) of the
charges.
Xxx The recommended penalty of the investigating judge which is suspension from the service for one (1) year without pay and be disqualified for promotion or any increase
in salary during the period she is under suspension, is
too stiff to the administrative offense committed by the respondent. Records in the Docket & Clearance Division,
Legal Office, OCA show that this is the first time that respondent was administratively charged after serving the judiciary for ten (10) years.
Xxx Thus, this Office believes that a lesser penalty, which is commensurate under the circumstances of this case, should be imposed upon the respondent.
Xxx this Office recommends that a FINE be imposed upon the respondent in the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) and that she is SEVERELY REPRIMANDED with
WARNING that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent should also be REMINDED to strictly follow Section 9, Rule 30, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and Supreme Court Circular No. 50-2001 dated 17 August 2001, Section B, Chapter II (p. 36), Section D.7, Chapter IV (p. 74) of the Manual for Clerks of Court to
avoid similar violations.
ISSUE
WON Edad deserves the penalty.
HELD/RATIO
NO. Court adopted the evaluation and recommendation of Deputy Court Administrator: Records show that complainant failed to prove by substantial evidence to hold respondent
administratively liable. As found by the investigating judge, the other charges were notproven.

Respondent did not commit dishonesty when she demanded commissioners fee from the Unifunds. As shown by the evidence established by the complainant, it shows
that respondent is actually guilty of Violation of the Manual for Clerks of Court, specifically under the following provisions: (a) Section B, Chapter II (p. 36), which states that:
No Branch Clerk of Court shall demand and/or receive commissioners fees for reception of evidence ex-parte;' and (b) Section D.7, Chapter IV(p. 74), which states that: The
Court shall allow the commissioner, other than an employee of the Court, such reasonable compensation as the circumstances of the case warrant to be taxed as costs
against the defeated party, or apportioned, as justice requires. Clearly, the intent or motive to gain out of Cuetos collectibles for the payment of TSN is totally absent. In
fact, it was established during the investigation that respondent collected the sum of P500.00 in the presence of the other staff and especially Court Stenographer Judith
Cueto. The latter, upon receipt of the P200.00 pesos, did not object or complain. Presumably, respondent and Court Stenographer had a previous understanding or some sort
of an agreement to this kind of arrangement, which they call it a package deal when conducting ex-parte hearing.

Citing RTC of Makati v Dumlao re prohibition on Clerk of Courts to collect compensation for services rendered as commissioners in ex- parte proceedings: The Court shall
allow the commissioner, other than an employee of the court, such reasonable compensation as the circumstances of the case warrant.

The administration of justice, by its very nature, is a sacred task, circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. All those involved in its dispensation from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk should live up to the strictest standards of competence, honesty and integrity in the public service. Their conduct, at all times, must not
only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be above suspicion. No other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the Judiciary.

Clerks of court, like the respondent herein, are important officers in the judicial system. Their administrative functions are vital to the prompt and sound administration of
justice. They cannot be allowed to overstep their powers and responsibilities. Their office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes and judicial concerns.
They perform a very delicate function as custodian of the courts funds, revenues, records, property and premises. They are specifically imbued with the mandate to
safeguard the integrity of the court as well as the efficiency of its proceedings, and to uphold the confidence of the public in the administration of justice. Thus, they are
required to be persons of competence, honesty and probity.

SANTOS V. MACARAIG | Grino-Aquino, 1992

FACTS

Rosalinda de Perio-Santos, a career service officer with the rank of Chief of Mission II and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, was appointed on July 24, 1986, by
her Excellency, President Corazon C. Aquino, to the position of Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the Philippine Mission to the United Nations and other
International Organizations with station in Geneva, Switzerland.

petitioner sought a leave of absence from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to spend the Easter Holidays in New York, U.S.A., with her mother, brothers and sisters at
no expense to the Government. She bought two (2) non-transferable, non-refundable discounted tickets costing SFr. 1,597 for herself and her adopted daughter Pia.

Before they could leave Geneva, petitioner received instructions from the home office directing her to proceed to Havana as a member of the Philippine delegation to the
UNCTAD G-77 Preparatory Conference.

For the official trip outside her station, she was entitled, under the "Foreign Service Personnel Manual on Travel, Per Diems, and Daily Allowance Abroad," for the cost of
economy roundtrip fare from Geneva-New York-Geneva portion of her Geneva-New York-Havana-New York-Geneva trip.

Instead of buying an economy roundtrip ticket, she used for the Geneva-New York-Geneva portion of her trip the two (2) discounted tickets costing only SFr. 1,597 for herself
and her daughter Pia. They left Geneva for New York en route to Havana on April 15, 1987. On the same day, the DFA approved her application for a leave of absence with
pay from April 27 to May 1, 1987.

After the Havana Conference, she and her daughter spent her vacation leave in New York before returning to Geneva.

Instead of claiming reimbursement for SFr. 2,996, she requested, and received, reimbursement of only SFr. 1,597 which she spent for the Geneva to New York, and New York
to Geneva portion of her trip, thereby effecting savings of SFr. 1,399 for the Government.

DFA sent her a cable (GE-202/87) requesting clarification on "why Mission paid for plane ticket of infant Pia de Perio-Santos (petitioner's daughter) Geneva-New York-Geneva
per CV 216/87 when she was not authorized to accompany her adopting mother at government expense."

Petitioner replied that the air fare tickets were for her only and did not include her daughter whose trip was paid from her personal funds.

DFA required her to refund the amount representing her daughter's round-trip ticket.

Instead of refunding only the sum of Sfr. 673 to the Government, petitioner returned the full amount of SFr. 1,597. She thereafter claimed payment for one round-trip
economy plane ticket (Geneva-New York-Geneva) in the amount of SFr. 2,996 to which she was entitled under the Foreign Service Personnel Manual on Travel, Per Diems and
Daily Allowance Abroad.

Deputy Armando Maglaque, and some MISUNPHIL employees filed administrative charges against her for "incompetence; inefficient; corrupt and dishonest activities; rude
and uncouth manners; abusive and high-handed behavior; irregular and highly illegal transactions involving funds of the mission." The charges were referred to Ambassador
Luis Ascalon for initial investigation.

Ambassador Ascalon submitted his findings which, with the complaints, were referred to a 5-man Ad Hoc Investigation Committee for preliminary investigation.

The Committee found a prima facie case against petitioner for (1) dishonesty; (2) violation of existing rules and regulations; (3) incompetence and inefficiency; and (4)
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Ambassador Eduardo Rosal also charged her with estafa before the Tanodbayan. The case was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.

Board of Foreign Service Administration (BFSA) constituted a new 5-man investigating committee to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties. Three (3) members of
the committee found her liable for misconduct only, and recommended dismissal of the other charges. They also recommended that she be reprimanded and recalled to
Manila. Ambassador Arague dissented with respect to the penalty, which he thought should include a six-month suspension. Atty. De Vera found all the charges against
Ambassador de Perio-Santos "to be unmeritorious."

BFSA, through its Chairman, Undersecretary Jose D. Ingles, submitted a memorandum to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (SFA), adopting the findings and recommendations of
the investigating committee.

Secretary of Foreign Affairs affirmed the BFSA's recommendation declaring Ambassador de Perio-Santos guilty of the lesser offense of misconduct, instead of dishonesty,
meted to her the penalty of reprimand, and recalled her to the home office.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that she was denied due process when she was declared guilty of misconduct although it was not one of the
charges against her. Conceding that point, the Secretary ordered the records remanded to the BFSA for hearing to give petitioner an opportunity to defend herself against the
charge of misconduct which was deemed to have been filed by the Secretary himself since an administrative complaint can be initiated directly by the Department Head.

petitioner refused to attend the hearing. Consequently, Secretary Manglapus declared his decision "final and executory, effective immediately."

Petitioner appealed that resolution to the Office of the President.

President Aquino nominated Narcisa L. Escaler as Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations and other International Organizations in Geneva in lieu of
the petitioner. The nomination was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

President Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 122 finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty (instead of misconduct) and imposed upon her the penalty of reprimand, with
recall to the home office.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., by authority of the President, denied the motion for reconsideration.

she filed this petition for certiorari alleging that the President's "reprimand and recall orders are not supported by substantial evidence and were issued with gross abuse of
discretion and serious error of law"
ISSUE

Whether Santos was guilty of dishonesty or misconduct.

HELD/RATIO
NEITHER. A careful review of the records fails to yield any evidence of dishonesty on the part of the petitioner, or an intent to cheat and defraud the government. Her failure to
disclose the fact that her discounted tickets included the fare for her child, was harmless and inconsequential as the 2 discounted Geneva-New York-Geneva tickets for herself and
her daughter were in fact inseparable, intransferable, non-cancellable and non-refundable, in effect one whole fare only, for purposes of the discount. The mother and daughter
tickets were, in the words of the petitioner, married to each other. One without the other would not have been entitled to the discount. And if she left her daughter behind, it
would have made no difference in the fare because the ticket was not refundable.

Using the discounted tickets was beneficial to the Government for they cost 50% less than an economy roundtrip ticket that the petitioner was entitled to purchase for the
same trip if she travelled alone. She obviously saved money (SFr.1,399) for the government by using her discounted tickets even if her daughter's fare was included therein.

Since petitioner was moved by the best of motives in using the discounted tickets which she had purchased before she received the order to attend the UNCTAD conference
in Havana, her action should be commended instead of condemned.

Petitioner's problems probably would not have arisen if before embarking on the Havana trip she had asked DFA for permission to use the 2 discounted round-trip tickets for
the Geneva-NY-Geneva portion of her trip. Her inadvertence was construed by the Government as lack of candor and honesty on her part. The Court believes however that
she did not intend to falsify or conceal the truth when she filed a claim for the refund of the total cost of her discounted tickets (SFr.1,597). Her claim for the whole discounted
fare was based on the fact that her daughter's ticket was inseparable from her own fare. They had to go together to be entitled to the special discount. Their fare was
indivisible, hence, the Government's offer to shoulder only the petitioner's portion of the discounted fare (SFr. 950), excluding her daughter's portion (SFr. 647) was neither
fair nor reasonable.

On appeal to the Office of the President, the latter ironically found her guilty of the more serious offense of dishonesty, reprimanded her therefor, and recalled her to Manila.
We hold that under the circumstances above narrated, the petitioner's actuation constituted neither dishonesty nor misconduct, hence, the reprimand that was meted to her
was unmerited.
GARCIANO V. OYAO | Makasiar, 1981
FACTS

Wilfredo Oyao was originally Docket Clerk turned Clerk of Court of CFI Cebu. Garciano wanted to collect the P300 due him.

Oyao initially signed a promissory note with special power of attorney authorizing respondent to collect his first quincena salary until his indebtedness is fully paid but,
instead, the Oyao collected in advance his salary checks so Garciano was unable to collect a singlecheck by way of payment of the indebtedness.

Oyao employed all sorts of tactics and manipulations to evade payment of his obligations but due to the persistent demands of Garciano, the sum of P268 was paid leaving a
balance of P300.00.
ISSUE
WON Oyao's act in wilfully refusing to settle his obligation is a violation of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations which would subject him to punishment.
HELD/RATIO
YES. His alleged obvious financial set-backabout which no proof was submittedcannot justify the unnecessary inconvenience he caused to the complainant. The
indebtedness was incurred as early as February, 1968. Oyao executed a promissory note in favor of the Garciano and also a special power of attorney authorizing herein
complainant to collect respondent's first quincena salary until the indebtedness was fully paid. But Garciano could not collect the first 15-day salary of respondent, for the latter
always collected it ahead of complainant. Oyaos execution of the aforesaid documents in favor of the complainant induced the latter to grant the said loan. Hence, it is clearly
unfair to the complainant as well as unethical for Oyao to welch on his promise.

Oyaos personal file betrayed him. He falsely averred that, being the sole bread winner of a big family he cannot pay with his monthly salary of P273.00 Garciano in a lump
sum the remaining balance of P300.00. He has only one daughter and for seven years after he incurred the indebtednesshe has been receiving a monthly salary of P435.16.

Avoid so far as reasonably possible a situation which would normally tend to arouse any reasonable suspicion that he is utilizing his official position for personal gain or
advantage to the prejudice of party litigants or the public in general. There may be occasion then where the needs of the collectivity that is the government may collide with
his private interest as an individual. His improper conduct unavoidably stains the image of the judiciary. Court personnel must comply with just contractual obligation, act
fairly and adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the court's integrity. Although an ordinary court employee, should not, like judges, incur obligations which will in any
way interfere, directly or indirectly, with his function as such. He should be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to generate the suspicion that
his relations with others constitute an element in the determination of the course of action that the court to which he belongs, will take in a pending case.

To emphasize the warning, Section I of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended by RA 3047) states: It is the policy of the Philippines (Government in
line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers, and private persons alike which constitute graft and corrupt practices or
which may lead thereto.

Although the actuation of the respondent in the present case may not clearly fall under any of the graft and corrupt practices defined by law, the impropriety of the same is
evidently unquestionable for it may lead to any of those prohibited acts.