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Accounting Forum 40 (2016) 2944

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Accounting Forum
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/accfor

Institutional formations and the Anglo-Americanization


of local auditing practices: The case of Greece
Emmanouil Dedoulis
Department of Business Administration, Athens University of Economics and Business, 76, Patission Street, 104-34 Athens, Greece

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history:
Received 16 April 2015
Received in revised form
11 November 2015
Accepted 14 November 2015
Available online 12 December 2015
Keywords:
Institutional formation
Isomorphism
Auditing profession
Anglo-American practices

a b s t r a c t
Following inuential studies on the operation of the world economic system and the
development of accounting, this paper synthesizes elements of political economy and institutional theories to illuminate the processes which have led to the Anglo-Americanization
of local auditing practices. By focusing on the history of modern Greece, this paper
demonstrates how broader politico-economic ties created the backdrop for the development of coercive, mimetic and normative processes whose intertwinement gave rise
to a professional cognitive basis and organizational practices conducive to the dominant
Anglo-American models, long before the emergence of inuential international accountancy organizations.
2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
In 1975, two years after the establishment of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), Lord Henry Benson (then Chairman of the Committee), referring to the internationalization of accounting and auditing practice, stated: We
will see, during the next ve years, great successes, the effects of which will not make themselves felt until the year 20001 .
Indeed, facilitated by the increased globalization of business in the latter half of the 20th century and the catalytic role of
supranational organizations (such as the International Monetary Fund, International Federation of Accountants, International Accounting Standards Board and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board) and politico-economic
blocs (such as the European Union), the process of accounting and auditing standardization has intensied, consolidating
the prominence of Anglo-American institutions at the global level (Arnold, 2009, 2012; Power, 2009). This development
has captured the interest of researchers who have, inter alia, investigated the impact of such processes on local institutional
settings and regulatory arrangements (Erlend & Nobes, 2010; Guerreiro, Rodrigues, & Craig, 2012; Irvine, 2008; Nobes, 2011;
Nobes & Parker, 2008).
However, inuential scholars underscore the importance of exploring how and why accounting in different localities
ever looked similar in the rst place (Arnold, 2009, 2012; Power, 2009), suggesting that, we need to redene the starting
point [. . .] for understanding the development of nancial accounting practice (Power, 2009, p. 325). Acknowledging that
delving into history is a way of enhancing understandings of present developments (Carnegie & Napier, 1996; Jones &

Tel.: +30 210 820 3453; fax: +30 210 823 0966.
E-mail address: ededoulis@aueb.gr
1
Quoted in Michel Pradas 2013 Chairman of the Trustees speech at the Financial Accounting Standards Foundation in Tokyo, Japan: la
carte accounting will not deliver globally consistent standards available at http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Members-of-the-IASB/IASB-speeches/
Pages/IASB-speeches.aspx.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2015.11.003
0155-9982/ 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

30

E. Dedoulis / Accounting Forum 40 (2016) 2944

Oldroyd, 2009; Walker, 2008), this paper focuses on a particular episode in the history of the institution of auditing by
bringing to the fore the development of auditing in modern Greece. Although Greece has a very long and rich history as an
inuential civilization, characterized by varying systems of economic surveillance and accountability at different historical
times2 , this paper focuses on the period from the early 19th century (when it actually became an independent state) until
the end of the 20th century. By narrowing down the focus to this relatively recent period, this paper seeks to make sense
of the development of auditing as a modern practice which has been inextricably intertwined with the development and
predominance of capitalism in the aftermath of the industrial revolution in Western Europe (Armstrong, 1987; Bryer, 1993;
Chiapello, 2007).
The history of auditing practice in modern Greece is an important case to examine for two reasons. First, it shows how
close ties with inuential Western countries shaped the development of the local institution and created the background
for a particular pro-Western professional mentality to prevail with concepts such as modern, rational and effective to
be associated with Western institutions, practices and operations. Second, by delving into the historical details, this case
demonstrates an important historical complexity. While, inuenced by the German tradition, the state initially incorporated
the auditing profession into its own hierarchical system of regulation3 (Caramanis & Dedoulis, 2011; Dedoulis & Caramanis,
2007), local professionals introduced and applied Anglo-American standards of practice.
To illuminate this historical complexity, this paper brings elements of institutional theory to the fore to shed light upon
isomorphic processes (Albu, Albu, & Alexander, 2014; Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). It is
demonstrated that, throughout the 19th century up until the aftermath of World War II, the coercive role of the Greek
state was predominant, leading to the establishment of a corporatist body of auditors in the mid-1950s. However, from
the 1960s onwards, mimetic and normative institutional mechanisms started acquiring a dominant character within the
professional context. The uncertainty that professionals encountered during the rst years of the professions operation
led them to develop strong educational ties and networks with Anglo-American professional associations. This, in turn,
facilitated the development of particular professional mentalities and orientations in Greece long before the emergence of
powerful international organizations and professional bodies which standardized accountancy across the globe.
This historical analysis is located within the broader political-economy paradigm (Arnold, 2009, 2012; Hopwood, 2000;
Power, 2009). The paper builds upon the premise that modern auditing constitutes an indispensable component of the
institutional arrangements that govern capitalist economies and the world economy as a whole. It brings to the fore the
role of political and economic interactions between states and inuential organizations in creating the backdrop for the
emergence of certain institutional formations at the local level in the realm of auditing.
Acknowledging that, due to institutional constraints, externally-induced accountancy reforms do not automatically translate into concrete benets in local contexts (Caramanis, Dedoulis, & Leventis, 2015), this paper moves beyond an examination
of their effectiveness and attempts to make sense of the historical processes that have given rise to the diachronic tendency
of imitation which characterizes the operation of local institutions. This paper extends the critical stream of literature by
providing insights into the simultaneous operation of institutional mechanisms which set the scene for the development
of the institution of auditing. To this end, it pays particular attention to illuminating the varying degrees of dominance of
coercive, mimetic and normative inuences at different historical times.
The study is organized into the following sections: Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework upon which this study
is built. Section 3 sketches the political and economic ties between Western nations, politico-economic blocs and Greece.
Section 4 provides insights into the coercive attempts and pressures exerted by the Greek state which led to the establishment
of the corporatist body of auditors. Sections 5 and 6 present the main empirical material regarding the development of
auditing practice in Greece. Section 7 contains the summary and discussion.
2. Theoretical framework
Inuential scholars have demonstrated that nancial accounting and auditing are the outcomes of the dissemination
of certain norms and practices through a global system which has developed over the last two centuries and signicantly
intensied in the latter half of the 20th century, as a result of the increased globalization of business (Arnold, 2009, 2012;
Power, 2009). Underlying this process is argued to be the expansion of a universalistic commercial culture which has also
been at work for the last two centuries. Power (2009) suggests that key accounting concepts such as income, expenses,
assets and liabilities circulated and became more highly-rationalized at a transactional level before they were ever an object
of explicit national interest:
These key features give nancial accounting statements in different jurisdictions their family resemblance and may
even be one of the major global accomplishments of the modern period grounded on centuries of diffusion, adaptation,

2
Ballas (1994) illustrates that auditing and accounting techniques, in various forms, had been invented and were employed in various eras throughout
the Greek civilization. There is evidence to suggest that, as early as the Minoan era, accounting techniques were introduced to facilitate commercial and
other economic transactions. More sophisticated techniques were developed in the 5th century BC and later during the dominance of the Byzantine Empire.
However, these techniques bore little resemblance to modern accounting and auditing practices.
3
The profession was established in 1955 and operated as a corporatist institution until the early 1990s. In the 1990s, the profession was reorganized
into an associationist body (see Caramanis, 1996; Caramanis and Dedoulis, 2011; Dedoulis, 2006).

E. Dedoulis / Accounting Forum 40 (2016) 2944

31

and mobilization as part of empire building and commercial expansion. Indeed, it is this process of development at
the non-nation state level which has enabled and conditioned both the increased formal codication of accounting
norms by states and recent discussions about the source of national variation. In short, before formal and explicit
standardization institutions for accounting took shape from the mid-twentieth century onwards, the key elements of
nancial accounting had been established as part of a practical and universalistic commercial culture (p. 325).
Hopwood (2000) attributes this process to the relentless expansion of Western empires and markets. He maintains that
accounting practices and practitioners have travelled along market routes and followed the expansionist tendencies of the
West: Much of the contemporary landscape of accounting reects these tendencies [. . .]. They also point to continuities
between the past and present as far as the histories of accounting movement and standardization are concerned (p. 764).
In the same vein, Power (2009) suggests that attention should be paid to the effects of patterns of trade, wars and colonial
inuences. Particularly with regard to developing economies, local nancial accounting practices are considered to have
been inevitably shaped by international trade, foreign aid, large consulting rms and banks well before such technologies
acquired a national character.
Arnold (2012) maintains that, although the universalistic and stateless commercial culture of accounting suggested by
Power (2009) constitutes an inspiring starting point for research, a politico-economic perspective must also acknowledge
that the global system is organized as an inter-state system. That is, a system where geo-politics, inter-capitalist rivalries,
economic conicts between nations at the core and periphery of the world system, and the pivotal role played by states,
such as Britain in the 19th century and the United States in the 20th century, in organizing capitalism on a world scale are
critical components of this analysis (Arnold, 2012, p. 363). In this sense, Arnold underlines the importance of the terms
Anglo-American capitalism and Anglo-American accounting which can be interpreted as roughly synonymous with
international capitalism and global accounting as they have developed over the past two centuries, rst under British and
then under US sponsorship:
From a world system perspective, Anglo-American capitalism is not an expression of US or British national culture,
but rather an essentially internationalist project that has been spread by way of colonial conquests, imperialism, and
neo-colonial ventures. As a result, the institutional arrangements governing the international economy have been
largely shaped by the organizing centres of capital accumulation and often, although not necessarily, reect norms
and practices developed in Britain and America (Arnold, 2012).
In particular, attention is drawn to the role of inuential Anglo-American professional rms and organizations which were
the main source of expansion for practical accounting norms in the 19th and 20th centuries. As noted by Power (2009, p. 329),
these organizations have been critical carriers and standardizers, via guidance and the implementation of best practice, in
achieving the promotion and articulation of auditing as state-independent, technically neutral norms of procedure.
Institutional theory provides insights into how best practices are disseminated and institutionalized, paving the way
for the emergence and formation of institutions4 (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). It places emphasis on the interactions between
entities and their institutional context (Albu et al., 2014; Dillard et al., 2004; Rodrigues & Craig, 2007; Touron, 2005) and, in
particular, on the role of institutional inuences and pressures in creating the conditions for the development of organizations
and practices characterized by homogeneity rather than heterogeneity (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Lounsbury, 2008). The concept of organizational homogeneity results from the idea that organizations seek to attain, maintain
and extend their legitimacy and, therefore, adopt structures and practices that are socially, politically and economically
endorsed (Ball & Craig, 2010; Carpenter & Feroz, 2001). Institutional efforts to morph with broadly-endorsed patterns
were termed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) as isomorphism. The authors identify three mechanisms of institutional
isomorphic change: coercive, mimetic and normative.
Coercive isomorphism captures broader organizational pressures on the focal organization to behave and structure itself
in a certain way. These external pressures often stem from legislative frameworks introduced by the state. Mimetic isomorphism concerns the ways in which organizations mimic the actions of similar organizations in the case of uncertainty,
i.e. when organizations face a problem with ambiguous causes or unclear solutions: Modelling, as we use the term, is a
response to uncertainty [. . .], models may be diffused unintentionally, indirectly through transfer or turnover, or explicitly
by organizations such as consulting rms or industry trade associations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 151). Uncertainty
is therefore acknowledged to be a driving force for entities. Hence, when organizations encounter situations where there is
no clear cut best course of action, they may limit the selection of structures or practices to those structures or practices that
are being used by organizations who they view as being successful in the institutional environment (Carpenter and Feroz,
2001, p. 571).
Normative isomorphism is associated with professionalization and refers to how a cognitive base, shared orientations
and organizational practices are disseminated. The mechanism explains how normative pressures affect individuals and it
provides insights into how the individual is inuenced by the institutions, transferring the preferences from an exogenous

4
Dillard et al. (2004, p. 508) provide the following denitions with regard to the terms institution and institutionalization: An institution is an
established order comprising rule-bounded and standardized social practices. Institutionalization is the process whereby the practices expected in various
social settings are developed and learned.

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E. Dedoulis / Accounting Forum 40 (2016) 2944

to an endogenous factor [. . .]. This implies that institutions not only direct human interaction in creating legitimacy, but
are inuential on the very shaping of human preferences (Collin, Tagesson, Andersson, Cato, & Hansson, 2009, p. 152).
The transmission of norms is primarily achieved through formal education and training and the growth and elaboration of
professional networks. Thus, besides universities, the emergence of professional associations and training institutions are
argued to be very important as vehicles for the denition and promulgation of normative rules surrounding organizational
and professional norms and attitudes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 152).
In practice, however, the coercive, mimetic and normative mechanisms which lead to institutional isomorphism may
not always be distinguishable (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Two or more of these isomorphic pressures may be operating
simultaneously, making it nearly impossible to identify which form of institutional inuence is more potent in every case
(Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Dillard et al., 2004). Additionally, the power of the various institutional isomorphic pressures
may vary over time and may acquire a latent or dominant character. Hence, institutional methodology prescribes two main
levels of analysis for making sense of inuences and pressures (Albu et al., 2014; Ball & Craig, 2010). At one level, a focus
on the institutional context, both local and global, is required. Emphasis should be placed on the inuences and pressures
stemming from international organizations and states, and their interactions with and impact upon local institutions. This
interactivity creates the conditions within which entities emerge and develop. Accordingly, the literature on accounting and
auditing has drawn attention to the role of the International Monetary Fund, the International Federation of Accountants,
the International Accounting Standards Board, and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, as well as
politico-economic blocs such as the European Union, and these entities interactions with states and local institutions (Albu
et al., 2014; Arnold, 2012; Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Rodrigues & Craig, 2007; Touron, 2005).
At another level, institutional approaches draw attention to interactions within the organizational context, i.e. the interactions between individuals and organizations which are also considered as critical motors of causality (Ball & Craig, 2010).
For instance, a number of studies on accounting and auditing have underlined the importance of examining and understanding the actions of eminent professionals who, through participating in the supervisory, administrative and disciplinary
institutions of the accounting profession, formulate the policies, articulate the interests of the profession and seek to ensure
a consistency of behavior within it (Cooper, Puxty, Lowe, & Willmott, 1989; Sikka & Willmott, 1995; Willmott, 1986).
The empirical part of this study is based on a mix of data sources and triangulation research methodology (Denzin,
1978; Jick, 1979). The data sources include a wealth of published (e.g. laws, ministerial decisions, articles in the press
and professional journals) and unpublished (e.g. minutes of professional meetings, and professional reports submitted by
eminent professionals and the British Accountants) material through which institutions and institutionalization processes
are made sense of. The primary and secondary archival material is also supplemented with 10 semi-structured personal
interviews (see Appendix A for the list of interviewees) which illuminate important aspects of organizational operations
and peculiarities. Specically, depending on the interviewees personal knowledge, the interviews covered a series of issues
relating to the establishment and development of the profession and professional standards. All interviews were recorded
and transcribed. The interviewees were eminent professionals who had been recruited during the 1950s and 1960s and who
later played key roles in the supervisory, administrative and disciplinary organs of the profession. As a result, they were
knowledgeable of the processes and practices of the, then newly-established, profession.

3. The political and economic context of modern Greece


Having being under Ottoman5 rule for nearly 400 years (14531820s), Greece sought assistance from three powerful
nations Britain, France and Russia, the so-called Great Powers to gain its independence. As a Christian nation occupied
by Ottoman Muslims, Greece relied on these Great Powers as they were considered natural allies due to religious afliation.
The Great Powers saw Greece as an emerging force that could limit the expansionist tendencies of the Ottoman Empire. They
openly intervened during the Greek war of independence, assisting Greece in gaining its autonomy in 1828 and becoming
an independent state in 1831 (Freris, 1986, p. 12).
The establishment of relationships with these Great Powers inuenced the shaping of local institutions. It is indicative
that the rst parties to emerge on the Greek political scene were known as the English, French and Russian parties and
were directly guided by these countries (Loverdos, 2001). These parties dominated Greek politics in the rst twenty years
after independence and made for a massive, institutionalized and lasting foreign presence in Greek affairs (Diamantouros,
1983, p. 49). Concerned with effectively controlling developments in Greece, the Great Powers imposed an authoritarian
regime when the rst elected governor of Greece, Capodistrias, was assassinated in 1832. The Great Powers transformed the

5
The Ottoman Empire remained the predominant power in the geographical area of south-eastern Europe, Asia Minor and beyond between 1299
and 1922. It had introduced and developed a sophisticated accounting and auditing method, the Stairs (Merdiban) Method, which, however, bore no
resemblance to modern accountancy practices (Gvemli & Gvemli, 2006; Mert, 2013). The Stairs Method was primarily aimed at serving state purposes,
inter alia, the collection of taxes and the distribution and allocation of state funding for payment of employee salaries and military campaigns and, therefore,
particular focus was placed on keeping careful records of the components of tax revenues (Elitas et al., 2008; Gvemli & Gvemli, 2006; Mert, 2013). The
same system was used by all economic entities within the Ottoman Empire which were considered the property of the Ottoman Emperor (Gvemli &
Gvemli, 2006; Mert, 2013).

E. Dedoulis / Accounting Forum 40 (2016) 2944

33

Greek state from a republic into a monarchy, managing to control internal developments and inciting a prolonged period of
political instability and turmoil6 (Diamantouros, 1983; Loverdos, 2001; Mouzelis, 1978).
At the same time, a massive importation of Western, liberal political institutions of primarily British (parliamentary
system) and French (administration) inspiration took place (Diamantouros, 1993, pp. 23). Despite the organized state
effort to import Western institutions, during the 19th and rst half of the 20th century, Greece remained an underdeveloped
economy, characterized by an industry in infancy (Fotopoulos, 1985; Mouzelis, 1978; Sakellaropoulos, 1991). Mouzelis
(1995) argues that:
[W]henever there has been a serious developmental challengelike the need to modernise the countrys agriculture
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, or the need for intelligent and selective import-substitution industrialisation during the interwar period [. . .] its rigid, overpoliticised and particularistic orientations have made the
country act in ways that simply consolidate Greeces semiperipheral status within the world economy (pp. 2526).
It is indicative that, in the rst half of the 20th century, 2095 industrial establishments were recorded, 90% of which
were small family-owned entities, employing one to four workers using non-mechanized production processes (Mouzelis,
1978). Under these circumstances, Greece was unable to accomplish sustained growth and sought economic and technical
assistance from Western economies (Mouzelis, 1978; Nikolinakos, 1976).
Greeces difculty in achieving political and economic stability was further aggravated in the 1940s. The German occupation (which lasted from 1940 to 1944) and the Civil War that followed, raging on until 1949, devastated the local infrastructure
(Freris, 1986). Economic exhaustion was accompanied by deep social and political divisions which made reconstructing the
shattered social fabric an extremely difcult feat. Eventually, Greece was incorporated into the Western sphere of inuence,
as a result of bargaining between Britain and the Soviet Union. The negotiations culminated in the famous Percentages
Agreement between Stalin and Churchill, according to which Greece was to come under British inuence (Couloumbis,
1966, p. 17). The nancial aid offered by Britain, and later the US, encouraged the gradual reconstruction of the Greek economy and consolidated the establishment of strong political and economic ties with the West (see Dedoulis & Caramanis,
2007, pp. 399400 for a detailed account). This development sealed the countrys trajectory and, to a signicant extent,
shaped the formation of local institutions.
In the late 1950s, Greeces political forces directed their efforts toward achieving incorporation into the newly-established
and inuential economic bloc: the European Economic Community (EEC). In the early 1960s, Greece became an associate
member of the EEC which involved its gradual transformation into an emerging Westernized economy. Incorporated into
the European trade zone under favorable conditions, the Greek economy exhibited growth rates and some signs of capitalist
transformation (Kalamotousakis, 1980; Nikolinakos, 1976; Tridimas, 1996). It grew about one-and-a-half-times as fast
between 1955 and 1975 as the European Community, despite the lower levels of investment in manufacturing (Duchene,
1980, p. vii). Between 1955 and 1961, the real Gross National Product (GNP) increased annually by 6.6%, while the share of
GNP devoted to xed investment rose from 13% to 18%. The industrial contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
increased from 14% to almost 20%, whereas the share of agriculture in the GDP decreased from more than 26% to 14%.
However, although the structure of the GDP changed, the contribution of each sector to its growth did not necessarily
reect the sectors relative position (Freris, 1986, p. 156). The industrial sector still exhibited signs of underdevelopment.
At this point, 50 rms were providing nearly half of the exports and over a third of manufacturing exports were represented
by textiles, clothing and footwear, while all forms of engineering contributed to only 9% of total exports (Duchene, 1980,

6
The Crown was offered to Prince Otto of Bavaria. King Otto was assisted by Western advisers in how to govern Greek affairs while the Greek army was
comprised of Bavarian soldiers. However, the inuence of Britain and France was also catalytic. For instance, during the Crimean War in the 1850s, Britain
and France occupied the port of Piraeus for three years (18541857) to prevent Greeks from ghting against the Turks on the side of Russia (Loverdos,
2001). Moreover, the British incited a revolt against King Otto, who had supported Greeces participation in the Crimean War (ibid.). As a result, King Otto
was dethroned in 1862 (Freris, 1986). The Western powers offered the Crown to the Danish prince, George the First. Surrounded by Western advisers,
George the First was the prince who unconditionally accepted the British position on various political issues (Loverdos, 2001, p. 59). The Monarchy created
great governmental and political instability in Greece throughout the 19th and rst decades of the 20th century. Numerous governments were forced
into resignation because of the Crowns disagreement with their policies. Indicative of the political instability was that, during the periods 18321862
and 18641875, 44 governments were forced into resignation (Loverdos, 2001). Great political instability incited by the Crown was also evident during
the period of World War I. King Constantine the First and the monarchists thought that alliance with Germany could assure victory in the war, whereas
Prime Minister Venizelos, leading the Greek republicans, believed that the war was to be won by the Entente. Under pressure from the Kings opinions,
the government was forced to resign. However, the resignation of the government provoked a national schism, which led to the creation (for a very short
period) of two states with two separate governments, one under the inuence of the King and another headed by Venizelos. Couloumbis (1966, p. 12)
illustrated how the role played by the West incited this national division: The year [1916] was one of a series of limitations for Greece- of the ENTENTEs
interference in the internal affairs of a neutral country becoming more fragrant- of German propaganda casting cloud over Athens of German and Allied
spies competing against each other in sensational discoveries of agitators touring the countryside and inciting the peasantry against their opponents.
Every semblance of freedom was taken away. Anyone in Athens during 1916 might have legitimately wondered who was ruling Greece. The German
Embassy owned three quarters of the daily papers. The French Embassy, through its agents, was organising demonstrations against the government, or
attacks upon Allied citizens in order to force the Allies into action. Greek ships were stopped and searched on the high seas. Cargoes were conscated.
There was the ctitious scare of German submarine bases round the Greek coast, deliberately engineered by the French Embassy. The Ententes victory
was accompanied by strong pressures exerted by Britain and France to dethrone the King who had adopted a pro-German stance during the War. Due to
these Western pressures, in 1917 King Constantine the First left Greece and his brother, Alexander the First, was offered the crown. This interference in
the Crown was also signicant in the second half of the 20th century. Greece became a republic in 1974 as a result of a national referendum.

34

E. Dedoulis / Accounting Forum 40 (2016) 2944

p. viiviii). In this sense, the economys innate structural weakness continued to be evident: [. . .] dependence on the
agricultural sector was still high, absolute industrial production remained low (ASE, 2001, p. 119). However, despite these
inherent difculties, Greeces incorporation into the EEC played a determining role in bringing local organizations and
practices in line with Western institutions.

4. Coercive pressures: The gestation of auditing and the establishment of the corporatist profession in Greece
Scholars have argued that institutional developments and arrangements in Greece can be described by corporatism7
(Charalambis, 1989; Legg, 1969). Mouzelis (1986, pp. 7376) introduced the concept of incorporation, an essential element
of corporatism pertinent to Greece and other emerging economies. Incorporation is the process according to which the state
inhibits the formation of autonomous professional organizations; this phenomenon is observed to vary according to the
degree of political development. It is mostly associated with societies in transition from a relatively underdeveloped economic and political context to an advanced, Western-European type of growth (for an analytical discussion of this transition
from a corporatist perspective see Donnel, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1986).
In corporatist contexts, the state constitutes a key player in shaping the development of the institution of accounting
through legislative intervention (Puxty, Willmott, Cooper, & Lowe, 1987). The state leans on the accounting profession to
realize public agendas, i.e. to smooth out the operation of the market, reduce tax-evasion, and detect and report fraud.
To ensure that the membership of corporatist bodies achieves the aforementioned aims, the state is actively involved in
supervising the accounting professions activities and operations:
The state does not simply license the existence of organised interest groups but incorporates them into its own
centralised, hierarchical system of regulation. In doing so, the state simultaneously recognises its dependence upon
these associations and seeks to use them as an instrument in the pursuit and legitimation of its policies (Puxty et al.,
1987, p. 284).
In the 19th and rst half of the 20th century, the demand for external auditing as an institutional mechanism for ensuring
the reliability of public corporate nancial reporting was almost non-existent, primarily due to the weakness of the local
Greek economy and its fragmentation into small family-owned rms (Mouzelis, 1978; Nikolinakos, 1976). Through legislative
interventions, the state sporadically attempted to import accountancy practices based on Western institutions in order to
facilitate the modernization of the economy; however, these attempts met with limited success before the second half of
the 20th century (ASE, 2001; Caramanis, 1996; Dedoulis, 2004).
The rst attempt took place in 1835, when the Napoleonic Commercial Code was translated into Greek and was introduced
as the Greek Commercial Code8 (Anagnostopoulos, 1937). The Code instituted the legal form of the joint-stock company and
basic principles and concepts of commercial activityincluding merchants, merchandize and bankruptcy (Anagnostopoulos,
1937). However, according to Ministerial Circular 1824/2/21-1-1920, until the late 1910s, no other signicant legislative
intervention took place and, therefore, accountancy matters remained in an anarchic state as many companies had
never taken inventory, never estimated depreciation, had distributed ctitious prots, or had presented misleading nancial
statements (Caramanis, 1996, p. 42).
In 1918, the state enacted Legal Decree 1348/1918 entitled: On the Supervision of the Joint-Stock Company. Acknowledging that the activities of the joint-stock companies should be accounted for, state ofcials enshrined basic accountancy
principles. The legislation regulated important issues such as the estimation of accounting prots. Most importantly, however, following the continental tradition, the law brought all joint-stock companies under close state control by assigning
state accountants to oversee their operations (preamble to Law 2190/1920). The basic objective of the Legal Decree was
to protect the public from proteering and fraud by establishing rules relating to the preparation of nancial statements
(Anagnostopoulos, 1937, p. 27).
However, in 1920, Law 2190/1920 On Joint-Stock Companies was introduced, under which Legal Decree 1348/1918
was abolished. In the preamble to Law 2190/1920, state ofcials criticized Legal Decree 1348/1918 on the grounds that it
placed joint-stock companies under the guardianship and tutelage of the state (see Caramanis, 1996). Inuenced by the
British accountancy tradition of the time, the newly established Law 2190/1920 stipulated that the balance sheet of the
joint-stock company should be checked by at least two independent auditors (article 36), whose main duty would be the
verication of the accuracy and legality of the statements (article 37). The Law left it up to the discretion of shareholders
to appoint the persons appropriate for conducting audits, without determining qualication, knowledge or experience standards (preamble to Law 2190/1920). Auditor appointment and fees were to be determined by the shareholders in the General
Meeting. Commentators underscored that, in an underdeveloped economy fragmented into small family-owned rms, most
companies appointed auditors just to meet the legal requirements (Anagnostopoulos, 1937; Grigorakos, 1964; Tsirintanis,
1960). Managers appointed friendly persons as auditors who merely signed the reports that the managers themselves had

7
Corporatism is conceived of as a set of socio-political ideas which explain how conicting opinions between increasingly organized interest groups are
accommodated and to whose benet.
8
The main principles and concepts of the French Commercial Code remained in effect well into the 20th century.

E. Dedoulis / Accounting Forum 40 (2016) 2944

35

prepared (Grigorakos, 1964). Thus, auditing practice under Law 2190/1920 was viewed as an act of deception toward the
state, shareholders and third parties (Anagnostopoulos, 1937; Grigorakos, 1964).
In the early 1930s, acknowledging that external auditing under Law 2190/1920 had failed, state ofcials sought to establish
a state-regulated Institute of Auditing (Anagnostopoulos, 1937; Campalouris, 1969; Grigorakos, 1964; SOL, 1976). Caramanis
(1996) explains:
It appears that there were at least two different views in the parliament: those who favored tight state control, and
those with a clearly liberal attitude, supporting no or minimal state involvement in corporate matters. The government
decisively stood somewhere in the middle and shifted attention from close intervention to external regular audits
[. . .]. [T]he arguments in the parliamentary discussions were very well advanced and made extensive use of the mode
of regulation, the corporate legislation, and the experience gained in countries such as Germany, Britain, France and
the USA (pp. 48, 49).
Following the parliamentary debate, the state enacted Law 5076/1931 which set up a Body of Auditors whose organization,
function and administration, along with the qualications and incompatibilities of auditors, were to be prescribed later by
Legal Decrees 23-3-32, 28-4-32 and 17-9-32. Caramanis (1996) argues that this Institute had four distinct characteristics:
First, the appointment of corporate auditors from the institute was to be obligatory, but this was anticipated to
become in the future. Second, the new Institute would be governed by a supervisory council appointed by the state
on which representatives of audited companies would participate. Third, audit fees would be determined by the
supervisory council using objective criteria. Finally, the number of certied accountants was to be determined by Law
(p. 49).
In practice, however, the Institute of Auditors never functioned and remained dormant (Campalouris, 1969, p. 79; SOL,
1976). Ballas (1999, p. 354) argues that the Institute did not function because of the intense lobbying on the question of
membership qualications in the parliament. However, Caramanis (1996) provides a different insight into the reasons that
prevented the Institute from functioning:
[S]ome adverse political developments took place. Venizelos (Prime Minister during the discussion and enactment
of Legal Decree 5076/1931) lost the national elections held in 1932, and the administrations which followed did not
pursue the implementation of the new institution. As a result, the Institute did not operate before World War II
(p. 50).
In the aftermath of World War II, the military aid and nancial assistance offered by Britain and the US to Greece for the
reconstruction of the local infrastructure was accompanied by systematic, technical assistance to improve local accountancy
practices (Dedoulis & Caramanis, 2007). In 1946, in the context of this arrangement, the British Government asked partners
in accountancy rms in London to set up a costing section within the British Economic Mission to Greece (Brugge, 1963;
Mattingly, 1964b). H. Butler (partner in Moores, Carson and Watson), R. Castle (partner in Tansley, Witt and Company) and
K. Smith were entrusted with this task: A small section consisting of six or seven British Chartered Accountants and Cost
Accountants was accordingly established and did valuable work in helping to x prices for staple commodities (BAAG,
1959a, p. 1). The rm British Accountants Advisors to Greece (BAAG, hereafter) was established in 1949 and entered into a
three-year contract with the Greek Government. The objectives of BAAG were: rst, to examine the Greek state accounting
procedures and conditions and to advise on their improvement; second, to review and investigate applications for industrial
establishment loans; and, thirdly, to assist in the establishment of a Greek institute and a public accounting profession
(Brugge, 1963; Mattingly, 1964b).
BAAG operated until the mid-1950s, when state ofcials decided to direct their efforts toward setting up a local institute of
auditing which would undertake the tasks of detecting and reporting fraud, controlling the activities of joint-stock companies
and limiting tax evasion in an underdeveloped economy where the demand for external audits was very limited (Dedoulis &
Caramanis, 2007). The auditing profession (SOL is the Greek acronym, 

O


or Body of Sworn-in
Accountants) was established in 1955, under Legal Decree 3329 (Government Gazette, 1955). SOL was organized to operate
as a professional body and audit rm which would house local auditors (Caramanis & Dedoulis, 2011). SOL was assigned
several tasks: rst, to carry out the statutory audits of economic entities which were assigned projects of public interest;
second, to provide an expert opinion on administrative and accountancy issues ordered by state departments or courts;
and, thirdly, to perform management audits of state organizations, public utilities and social security funds (Dedoulis &
Caramanis, 2007).
The main organizational feature of SOL was that state ofcials were involved in monitoring and supervising its activities.
State ofcials were appointed as members of the Supervisory Board by joint decision of the Ministers of Co-ordination,
Finance and Commerce (Article 6, Law 3329/1955), and dealt with examinations, promotions and the issuance of professional
bylaws and regulations. Furthermore, these members of the Supervisory Board controlled the operation and work performed
by SOL and exercised disciplinary power over the membership. Within this legislative arrangement, audit fees and auditor
appointments were determined by the Supervisory Board. This corporatist mode of organization was a policy specically
aimed at ensuring that SOL would limit the diachronic problem of tax-evasion, contribute to the development of the Athens
Stock Exchange and support the broader economy by providing independent nancial audits (Caramanis & Dedoulis, 2011;
Dedoulis & Caramanis, 2007).

36

E. Dedoulis / Accounting Forum 40 (2016) 2944

5. Uncertainty and mimetic and normative isomorphism at work: The emergence of a westernized cognitive basis
A major problem facing SOL in the rst years of its operation was that its original members were totally inexperienced.
Specialized university education or professional training in auditing was almost nonexistent at that time in Greece (Aggelidis,
interview (1), 2003; Grigorakos, interview (3), 2003; Petridis, interview (6), 2003; Protopsaltis, interview (7), 2002; Sakellis,
interview (8), 2003all translated from Greek). In a report entitled The Accounting Profession in Greece: Suggested Plans
for its Future Development, Mattingly, a member of the BAAG, claried the severity of the situation:
There are numerous private schools and colleges in Greece offering specialised tuition in accounting and related
subjects. The quality of tuition offered varies considerably between one school and another. These schools do not
prepare students for any national examination set by recognised independent bodies, mainly for the simple reason
that there are no national institutes to set such examinations [. . .] The general syllabus of courses appropriate for
accountants in these schools covers a wide range of subjects, but includes relatively few lessons in accounting. There
has been practically no training in auditing theory and practice. There is no provision for students to major in
accounting (Mattingly, 1964a, p. 9).
Mattingly also provided insights into the level of auditing knowledge that individuals had in Greece:
At that time there were not many Greeks who had the required high standards of practical experience in public
accounting. Before 1955 most of the auditing in Greece was restricted to the issue of a formal certicate stating that
the balance sheet, etc. were in agreement with the principal accounting records. In making this comment I acknowledge
the high standards of work maintained by personnel of the Taxation authorities, but their type of audit is not the same
as independent auditing (Mattingly, 1964).
In the same vein, Spiliopoulos (then Chairman of the Supervisory Board of SOL) publicly acknowledged that the newlyrecruited members were inexperienced and essentially unaware of the difference between accounting and auditing
practice (Spiliopoulos, 1961, p. 2, trans.). Two of the originally-recruited members of SOL admitted:
When we rst came here [recruited as the rst members of SOL], we had no idea what an audit was about. At that
time, there was no audit tradition in Greece. Audit textbooks and manuals simply did not exist (Grigorakos, interview
(3), 2003, trans., parenthesis added).
We, the rst members of SOL, had never practiced the Chartered Accountancy profession. This created huge problems.
Few of us had an understanding of accounting and absolutely nobody had knowledge of auditing. There was no
bibliography on auditing, nor was there a relevant tradition at that time. Indicative of the situation was that the rst
textbook on auditing was written by the British Chartered Accountant Lesley Mattingly in 1963 (Petridis, interview
(6), 2003, trans.).
Mattingly underlined an additional problem in that no legal framework of auditing practice existed to stipulate the tasks
and duties involved in auditing practice:
The existing Laws did not explain comprehensively the extent to which an auditor should verify his statements or
the quality of workmanship expected of him. Furthermore, [. . .] there had been no Court decisions or interpretations
regarding auditors duties and responsibilities (Mattingly, 1964b, p. 1000).
He also argued that:
As Greece directs its economy towards participation in the European Common Market, the reorganisation of its business becomes of paramount importance. It is apparent that properly trained accountants will be required to perform
duties of ever increasing value to the economy. There is a great need for organising, training, examining, etc. those
accountants (Mattingly, 1964a, p. 8).
This lack of skillful indigenous auditors, and of guidelines relating to auditing procedures, led the Supervisory Board
to reemploy two British Chartered Accountants who had previously assisted in setting up the Greek profession. The main
purpose of the Supervisory Board was, rstly, to make sure that audits were exercised according to international practices
and, secondly, that auditors were adequately trained and had obtained the necessary skills (Petridis, interview (6), 2003,
trans.). Thus, two members of the BAAG, Patrick Preston and Lesley Mattingly, were reemployed as advisers to SOL in order
to assist local auditors in the rst years of practice. The preamble to Law 3329/1955 suggested that, the employment of
British Accountants is necessary for guiding the institution of auditing during the rst years of its operation owing to their
experience and special skills (Preamble to Law 3329/1955, p. 1393, trans.; see also Legal Decree 3329/1955, Article 17). In
fact, their assistance was so vital to the operation of the newly-established institute that, a few years later, the extension
of their employment was considered imperative: [I]t is necessary to immediately approve the Legal Acts determining the
reemployment of the British Chartered Accountants until 1964 (Grigorakos, 1989, p. 97, trans.). Hence, according to the
Legal Acts issued, the British advisers served SOL until 1964:
The Institute of Sworn-in Accountants that was set up under the L.D. 3329/1955 still needs the technical assistance
and guidance of experienced British Chartered Accountants, especially in view of the anticipated expansion of the

E. Dedoulis / Accounting Forum 40 (2016) 2944

37

work of the Institute and the resultant increase in the number of S.I.As [Sworn-in Accountants, auditors and members
of SOL] [. . .]. It approves the employment for two years, commencing from the 1st of July, 1959, of up to three British
Chartered Accountants, to be used as technical advisors of the Institute of Sworn-in Accountants [. . .], participation in
the Supervisory Board [. . .] of a British Chartered Accountant as member will be effective for as long a time as British
Technical Advisors will be with the Institute (Act No. 100, 2nd July, parenthesis added, BAAG, 1959; see also Act No.
1328, 10th July in BAAG, 1957).
The services provided by the British Advisers were argued by eminent British Chartered Accountants in the UK to be of
major importance:
[T]he British Technical Advisor [. . .] maintains a close cooperation with the professional personnel and discusses
with them their work on all assignments. All reports and certicates of opinion on audits are signed by the members of the institute but are submitted to the clients by the Supervisory Board. In each case the Technical Advisor
is required to initial the covering letter indicating that he approves of the report to be submitted (Brugge, 1963,
p. 599).
A detailed account of the work conducted by the British Advisers is given by the BAAG archival records. All auditor reports
had to be translated into English and were then screened by the British Advisers (BAAG, 1957, p. 4; see also BAAG, 1959a).
In most cases, audit reports were very lengthy and could be up to 30 or 40 pages long [. . .] thus they were fundamentally
altered and condensed by the British Advisors in order to be meaningful and specic (Mattingly, interview (5), 1999).
After this, audit reports had to be translated back into Greek to be submitted to clients:
As we had no previous experience, the Supervisory Board decided that audit reports and certicates would be discussed
with the British Advisors [. . .] to make sure that no mistake was made and no deviation from international practices
occurred [. . .]. When we went to the British Advisor, he asked for the audit le, the balance sheet and the working
papers for specic accounts [. . .]. We explained what we had done [. . .]. Then he asked for the audit report and
certicate, requiring us to justify our opinion (Petridis, interview (6), 2003, trans.).
The British Advisors came and built the institution from scratch [. . .] and they were very strict [. . .]. Every afternoon,
they came into our ofces and checked on our work. They were so strict that if there was no task for us to perform
they required us to read relevant books. When we completed the audits, we went to the British Advisors to discuss
them (Maroulis, interview (4), 2003, trans.).
However, the Greek auditors perceived that this arrangement considerably limited their professional autonomy (Mattingly, interview (5), 1999). Petridis argued that auditors wanted to be independent from any supervision and, when the
British Advisers suggested something, they considered it as interfering in their work. The original auditors did not like this
arrangement (Petridis, interview (6), 2003, trans.). Similarly, Grigorakos argued that:
The Chairman and the other members of the Supervisory Board had made a mistake. Instead of assigning the British
Advisor to train us, through seminars and practice, they made him responsible for examining all audit certicates and
everything else we prepared [. . .]. We had many problems because, in particular, one of the British Advisors, Patrick
Preston, just limited himself to an examination of what we did without providing the necessary guidance (Grigorakos,
interview (3), 2003, trans.).
In a similar vein, Tsekouras, a senior member of SOL, pointed out that there were serious disagreements [. . .], we
considered that the British Advisors were employed to teach us the auditing process and to train us and not to tell us what to
write in the audit reports. It was important to teach us how to do things (Tsekouras, interview (10), 2003, trans.). According
to the British Advisers too, their supervisory role provoked resentment in the auditors:
Auditors resented much of the work of the British Advisors in these eldsor rather they would like the British
Advisors to do as they wish, i.e. to be Lecturers on technical subjects and available for information and assistance only
when asked for but without any of the functions of ofce management, job allocation, etc. and without the control
rightly insisted on by the Chairman on all work done and, in particular, on reports. Much of the criticism on the latter
is no more than the usual reaction from anyone whose work has been altered. But for the absolute necessity for this
supervision one has only to refer to the old reports themselves to see the fundamental changes which have been made
in nearly every one of them. The Chairman, too, has pressed for the strengthening of the conclusion of the reports
(BAAG, 1957, p. 4).
Auditor opposition to the British Advisers role had been slowly accumulating, however:
[I]t was accentuated and brought to a head by (i) the request of the Chairman for greater supervisory disciplinein
short, that the auditors should be made to work more [. . .] and (ii) the election of Hasapis as head of the Administrative
Council in place of Athanasiades. Whilst the latter is of the elder statesman type, able to discuss matters quietly and
capable of arbitration and compromise, Hasapis has all the qualities of a demagogue. His method is to canalise dissatisfactions and inate them into complaints as a means of advancing himself. In ignorance, nancial and otherwise,
of the real longer-term interests of the Institute and its members, he seeks to cause trouble largely for the sake of it

38

E. Dedoulis / Accounting Forum 40 (2016) 2944

and certainly for his own benet as leader of the dissentients. By so doing, he persuades the other auditors [. . .] into
following him regardless of their better interests (BAAG, 1957, p. 4).
Grigorakos explained that auditors also turned against the Supervisory Board because according to Law (3329/1955), the
Supervisory Board was obliged to organize the auditing profession according to international standards, thus, it supported
the British Chartered Accountancy methods. This created tension between the auditors and the Board (Grigorakos, interview
(3), 2003, trans.). Mattingly argued that the situation became aggravated when:
auditors maintained that it was wrong to have a British person looking into the accounts, because he could act as
a commercial spy. As a result of this, for a little while they did not want anything to do with the British Chartered
Accountants [. . .]. They also expressed their dislike for the strict control imposed by the Chairman of the Supervisory Board and they wanted to be on their own, to have their own independent ofces (Mattingly, interview (5),
1999).
In 1959, the situation between auditors and the Supervisory Board was so tense that the British Advisers suggested that,
if immediate steps are not taken [. . .] the Institute may well come to an untimely end (BAAG, 1959b, p. 4).
6. The Anglo-Americanization of auditing practice
As a response to the mounting tension and uncertainty, Spiliopoulos, the Chairman of the Supervisory Board, requested
that the British Adviser, Lesley Mattingly, instigate the introduction of a standardized auditing process. Specically,
Spiliopoulos asked Mattingly to conduct an investigation into international sources in order to prepare a process [. . .]
which would present a uniformity of general understanding of audit work and responsibilities (Mattingly, 1963, pp. 1718,
trans.). In carrying out the Chairmans request, Mattingly considered that:
[A]ll the auditing institution needed was standards of practice backed up with a code of ethics which would show
the quality of the people carrying out audits [. . .]. Auditors should operate under the same discipline and the code of
ethics would draw the context of professional conduct required (Mattingly, interview (5), 1999).
Mattingly looked at the frameworks established by the UK professional accountancy body, the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of England and Wales, the French L Ordre des Experts Comptables et des Comptables Agrees Conceil Superieur, and
the American Institute of Certied Public Accountants. He maintained that:
The British did not have, at the time, written rules. However, there were a number of laws and court decisions which
went back almost a century. They constituted a valuable source and a framework of practice for British Chartered
Accountants. The French had well-codied rules, the Code des Devoir Professionnels which, however, deviated from
the auditing tradition in English-speaking countries. In the United States, the standards of auditing practice had
been codied under the title Generally Accepted Auditing Standards by the American Institute of Certied Public
Accountants. Thus, when an auditor signed the report, the interested users knew that the audit had been conducted
in accordance to the accepted standards by the Institute (Mattingly, 1963, p. 19).
The American Institute of Certied Public Accountants had indeed codied their standards of practice and procedures in a booklet entitled Generally Accepted Auditing Standards: their Signicance and Scope (AICPA, 1954) and
had constructed a self-contained Code of Professional Conduct (for instance see Carey, 1956). In drafting the framework, Mattingly (interview (5), 1999) admitted that he was signicantly inuenced by the Generally Accepted American
Standards and Code of Ethics. Mattinglys framework, which comprised of standards of practice and professional ethics,
was translated into Greek and submitted to the Supervisory Board for approval. The Supervisory Board approved it
in January 1961. At the same time, Mattingly (1963) started preparing analytical models and forms of certicates,
technical guidelines and working papers in order to provide insights into auditing procedures and the extent of investigations.
The Greek and American frameworks of practice were almost identical. In fact, the Greek standards constituted a condensed version of the standards of the American institution. The similarities can be identied by comparing the Index to
Auditing Standards Accepted by the Institute of Sworn-in Accountants of Greece (BAAG, 1960, p. 1) and part of the Contents
section of the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards issued by the American Institute of Certied Public Accountants
(AICPA, 1954). The following Table 1 shows the similarities in terms of content:
Mattingly created a framework of practice whose underlying denitions, concepts and language reected the style
of the American Standards. For instance, the denition of the objective of the auditing standards bears a signicant
resemblance:
The purpose of Auditing Standards is to state the basic principles which determine the type and extent of evidence to
be obtained by means of auditing procedures and to present a uniformity of general understanding of audit work and
responsibilities (BAAG, 1960, p. 1).
Auditing standards [. . .] may be regarded as the underlying principles of auditing which control the nature and extent
of the evidence to be obtained by means of auditing procedures (AICPA, 1954, pp. 1213).

E. Dedoulis / Accounting Forum 40 (2016) 2944

39

Table 1
Similarities between the Greek professional standards and the American professional standards.
Auditing Standards Accepted by the Institute
of Sworn-in Accountants of Greece

Generally Accepted Auditing Standards: Their Signicance and Scope

Basic standards
Personal qualications
Attitude of impartiality
Reasonable skill and diligence
Standards of performance
Planning
Audit work

General standards
Training and prociency of the auditor
Independence of auditors mental attitude and approach
Due care in the performance of work
Standards of eld work
Adequacy of preparatory planning
Proper evaluation of the examinees existing internal control for reliance thereon by the auditor
Competence of evidential matter
Standards of reporting
Adherence to generally accepted accounting principles
Observance of consistency in their application
Adequacy of informative disclosures, whether in the nancial statements or in the auditors
report or certicate
References to Standards in accountants report or certicate

Standards of reporting
Principles of reporting
Application of reporting principles

Sources: BAAG (1960, p. 1), AICPA (1954, p. 3).

Moreover, in order to introduce, clarify and explain various concepts, Mattingly incorporated direct quotations from inuential Anglo-American textbooks of the time. Indicatively, he included a quotation to provide insights into what constitutes
reasonable skill and diligence from Cooleys book on torts9 :
In all those employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his services, he is understood as holding himself
out to the public in the same employment, and if his pretentions are unfounded, he commits a species of fraud upon
every man who employs him in reliance on his public profession. But no man, whether skilled or unskilled, undertakes
that the task he assumes shall be performed successfully, and without fault or error; he undertakes for good faith and
integrity, but not for infallibility, and he is liable to his employer for negligence, bad faith, or dishonesty, but not for
losses consequent upon mere errors (BAAG, 1960, pp. 67).
Similarities can also be found between the Greek code of ethics and the American code. These are depicted in the following
Table 2:
The framework which was introduced constituted a context of practice and its importance was widely recognized and
acknowledged by eminent members of the local profession. They considered it indispensable and publicly expressed their
gratitude to the British Advisers who had set the backdrop for Greek auditing practice. For instance, the Chairman of SOL
stated that, the work conducted by the British Chartered Accountant, who served as an adviser and systematically observed
the manner with which auditing was conducted in our country, has covered an undisputed gap (preface written by Spiliopoulos in Mattingly, 1963, p. 3). Similarly, in a pamphlet for the 20th anniversary of SOLs foundation, the employment of foreign
(British) Chartered Accountants, was characterized as being of great importance as, they signicantly supported the institute
with their experience and specialization (SOL, 1976, p. 31, trans).
The auditing framework which was introduced smoothed inter-professional relationships and reduced uncertainty. Most
importantly though, the work conducted by Mattingly created a cognitive basis which made the establishment of links
with professional accounting institutes in the UK and the US possible and paved the way for the introduction of AngloAmericanized professional training and educational programs (Petridis, interview (6), 2003, trans.). By the early 1960s,
seven members of SOL had been sent abroad for professional training in reputable professional institutes, while there was a
plan for the remaining members to be sent at a later stage (SOL, 1961, p. 16). In the mid-1970s, the Greek profession reported
that, apart from sending members abroad for specialized training in the ofces of big audit rms, it was in constant contact
with the Union of European Accountancy Students (SOL, 1976, p. 31). Moreover, it emphasized that:
In line with internationally-accepted principles, SOL has developed questionnaires for assessing the internal control
system of audited companies and audit procedure programs, as well as a great number of guidelines and documents
to make sure that audits are conducted according to the aforementioned principles. Furthermore, taking into consideration that such methods and procedures are constantly improved and standardized at an international level, SOL
follows the work conducted by foreign Institutes of Chartered Accountants, participates in international and European
conferences, and continuously makes sure that members familiarize themselves with any new professional literature
in order to improve the quality of services provided (SOL, 1976, p. 32, trans.).
At the same time, SOL became a member of the International Accounting Standards Committee and played a prominent role in the translation and dissemination of the International Accounting Standards within the Greek industrial and
commercial context (SOL, 1976, pp. 3238). Finally, in the late 1970s, SOL adopted the rst set of International Auditing

Cooley, T. M. Cooley on torts, 4th ed., Vol. 3, Gallahan & Co., No. 61412, Cicero Avenue, Chicago 46, IL, USA, p. 335.

40

E. Dedoulis / Accounting Forum 40 (2016) 2944

Table 2
Similarities between the Greek standards of ethics and the code of the American profession.
The standards of ethics

Relevant rules in the American code of ethics

(2a) A member will not enter into partnership with, or employ


for professional assistance, a person who has not been
approved by the Institute of Sworn-in Accountants of Greece

(1) A rm or partnership, all the individual members of which are


members of the Institute, may describe itself as Members of the
American Institute of Accountants, but a rm or partnership, not all
the individual members of which are members of the Institute, or an
individual practicing under a style denoting a partnership when in fact
there be no partner or partners, or a corporation, or an individual or
individuals practizing under a style denoting a corporate organization
shall not use the designation Members of the American Institute of
Accountants
(2) A member shall not allow any person to practise in his name who is
not in partnership with him or in his employ
(4) A member shall not engage in any business or occupation
conjointly with that of a public accountant, which is incompatible or
inconsistent therewith
(13) A member shall not express his opinion on nancial statements of
any enterprise nanced in whole or in part by public distribution of
securities, if he owns or is committed to acquire a nancial interest in
the enterprise which is substantial either in relation to its capital or to
his own personal fortune, or if a member of his immediate family owns
or is committed to acquire a substantial interest in the enterprise. A
member shall not express his opinion on nancial statements which
are used as a basis of credit if he owns or is committed to acquire a
nancial interest in the enterprise which is substantial either in
relation to its capital or to his own personal fortune or if a member of
his immediate family owns or is committed to acquire a substantial
interest in the enterprise, unless in his report he discloses such interest
(10) A member shall not advertise his professional attainments or
services:
a. The publication of what is technically known as a card is restricted
to an announcement of the name, title (member of American Institute
of Accountants, CPA, or other professional afliation or designation),
class of service, and address of the person or rm, issued in connection
with the announcement of change of address or personnel of rm, and
shall not exceed two columns in width and three inches in depth if
appearing in a newspaper, and not exceed a quarter of a page if
appearing in a magazine or similar publication
b. A paid listing in a directory is restricted to the name, title, class of
service, address and telephone number of the person or rm, and it
shall not appear in bold type, box, or other form of display, or in a style
which differentiates it from other listings in the same directory
(7) A member shall not directly or indirectly solicit clients by circulars
or advertisements, nor by personal communication or interview, not
warranted by existing personal relations

(2b) A member will not engage in any business or activity


which is incompatible or inconsistent with his professional
work
(2c) A member shall not audit the accounts of a concern for
which he is, or has been during the period covered by such
an audit, an ofcial or employee of that concern, neither
should he audit the accounts of a concern in which he, or his
dependents, have a nancial interest which is material
either in relation to the capital of the concern or to his own
family wealth. While acting as an auditor he shall not
directly or indirectly be a party to the purchase of shares or
any similar form of participation in the clients concern. He
should also avoid any nancial relationship with ofcials or
employees of his client such as lending or borrowing
(2d) A member shall not advertise his professional attainments
or services in any way excepting formal notice in small print
of any change of address or partnership and a small name
plate outside his ofce. Such notices should indicate only the
names and professional qualications held by the Sworn-in
Accountants in addition to the names of its members which
constitute the name of the rm

(2e) A member shall not enter into competitive bidding for


professional work, neither shall he solicit clients in any way
not warranted by the degree of his personal relations with
such clients
(2f) A member upon dependence shall not encroach upon the
practice of another Sworn-in Accountant
(Gi) A member may be held guilty of an act discreditable to his
profession if, he is materially negligent in conducting his
work upon which his opinion is based
(Gii) He fails to disclose in his statement of opinion any
material fact known to him, which is not disclosed, or is
mis-stated in the nancial statements, the omission of
which, or mis-statement thereof, he knows to be of such
importance as to render the statement misleading
(Giii) He fails to obtain all the information and explanations
which to the best of his knowledge and belief were
necessary for the purposes of his audit, but expresses an
unqualied opinion on the nancial statements
(Giv) He fails to disclose in his statement of opinion that he has
deviated in any material respect from the auditing standards
prescribed herein
(Gv) A Sworn-in Accountant and his professional assistants
shall not violate the condential relationship between
themselves and the client of the Sworn-in Accountant
Sources: Mattingly (1963, p. 26), Carey, (1956, pp. 213216).

(7) He shall not encroach upon the practice of another public


accountant. A member may furnish service to those who request it
(5c) He is materially negligent in the conduct of his examination or in
making his report thereon
(5a) He fails to disclose a material fact known to him which is not
disclosed in the nancial statements but disclosure of which is
necessary to make the nancial statements not misleading

(5d) He fails to acquire sufcient information to warrant expression of


an opinion, or his exceptions are sufciently material to negative the
expression of an opinion
(5e) He fails to direct attention to any material departure from
generally accepted accounting principles or to disclose any material
omission of generally accepted auditing procedure applicable in the
circumstances
(16) A member shall not violate the condential relationship between
himself and his client

E. Dedoulis / Accounting Forum 40 (2016) 2944

41

Standards, issued at that time by the International Federation of Accountants (Government Gazette, 1979, pp. 96669680,
trans.). Interestingly, there was an important clarication in the text: the newly-introduced standards constituted a continuation and expansion of those accepted by SOL in 1961 (Government Gazette, 1979, p. 9666, trans.). The 1979 standards
were dealt with in four sections. The rst section was entitled 100. Basic Standards and prescribed the objective of an audit
as well as the necessary qualications of auditors and their responsibilities. The second section was entitled 200. Standards
of Performance and determined how audits should be conducted. The third was entitled 300. Standards of Reporting and
referred to audit reports. The last section was entitled 400. Standards of Professional Conduct and contained the rules/code
of conduct. The profession continued to conduct audits on the basis of the International Auditing Standards in the 1980s and
1990s (Dedoulis, 2006) and it adopted the latest version in 2005.
At the end of the 2000s, the Greek accounting profession had systematically invested in building networking programs and
joint educational training and examination programs with internationally-reputable organizations. For instance, it signed an
agreement with the Association of Chartered Certied Accountants (ACCA), according to which successful trainees acquire
professional titles from both institutes (see the Greek professions website www.soel.gr). In 2014, the Greek profession
and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) announced a new joint Accredited Membership
Program, according to which students registering with either SOEL10 [the local institute] or ICAEW may pursue membership
of both bodies, with examinations from the respective bodies being awarded credits for prior learning. It will also mean there
are clear routes for members of both the respective bodies to become auditors registered in Greece and the United Kingdom.
(SOEL, 2014, parenthesis added). The statements of the eminent professionals responsible for the creation of the joint scheme
are revealing. Martin Manuzi, Regional Director of ICAEW Europe, declared:
We are delighted to be launching this initiative with SOEL, which demonstrates the extent to which our two bodies
recognize the quality and rigor of each others training. ICAEW has been working closely with SOEL and the oversight
authority, ELTE, in Greece for a number of years now. The AMP [Accredited Membership Program] marks another step
forward in this close cooperation (SOEL, 2014, parenthesis added).
Charilaos Alamanos, SOELs President, stated:
ICAEW is recognized as a leading global accountancy body with a long and distinguished history. The Accredited
Membership Program opens up new routes for students, and members who qualify through the scheme will have
access to excellent support. SOEL is also committed to working more broadly with ICAEW to advance the accountancy
profession in Europe. For this reason, I am also delighted that ICAEWs innovative Accountancy Profession Strategic
Forum will take place in Athens in 2015, in cooperation with SOEL (SOEL Press Release, 2014).
This has been characterized as a great achievement for the Greek profession which now claims to be an internationallyrecognized professional body (Alamanos, interview (2), trans., 2012; Samothrakis, interview (9), trans., 2012).
7. Conclusion
Responding to calls by inuential scholars who have urged researchers to redene the starting point of the recent rapidity
of nancial reporting internationalization (Arnold, 2009, 2012; Power, 2009), this paper sheds light on the historical processes of the standardization of the institution of auditing in Greece. This historical episode is interpreted by employing a
synthesis of elements of political economy and institutional theories. Within this theoretical framework, auditing practice
is conceptualized as an essential component of the expansionist tendencies of capitalism and its consumerist values. Geopolitics and alliances between core and peripheral nations of the world system, as well as the pivotal role played by dominant
institutions, organizations and eminent professionals, are brought to the fore of the analysis.
At a broader institutional level, this paper illuminates how, throughout Greeces modern history, dependency relationships with inuential Western nations had a catalytic effect on the development of the Greek institution of auditing. It
shows that, inspired by Western institutions, the state took important initiatives to establish auditing principles and practices. However, these efforts had only modest effects and, thus, auditing remained a rather underdeveloped institution until
the rst half of the 20th century. In the aftermath of War World II, it was the establishment of strong political and economic
ties with victorious Western nations, namely Britain and the US, which led to the creation of institutionalized mechanisms
of nancial control. This task was initially assigned to a British accountancy rm. However, it was soon made clear that a
local institution of auditing had to be established to facilitate the operation and growth of the war-ravaged Greek economy.
The state established a corporatist organization. Interestingly, to facilitate the profession in the rst years of its operation,
the state hired British chartered accountants and assigned them with very important advisory roles. The involvement of the
British Advisers set the course for the development of mimetic and normative pressures which shaped the institution of
auditing in Greece according to Anglo-American lines.
At the organizational level, this paper demonstrates the predominant character of mimetic and normative mechanisms
in the aftermath of the establishment of the Greek profession. The early years of the profession were characterized by

10
The profession was renamed SOEL, the Body of Sworn-in Auditors-Accountants (in Greek OE: 

O
E-

),

in 1992
(Caramanis and Dedoulis, 2011).

42

E. Dedoulis / Accounting Forum 40 (2016) 2944

uncertainty, which was mainly the result of the lack of auditing tradition, education and established patterns of practice
to guide the, then newly-recruited, members. To overcome this difculty, the leadership assigned the British Advisers to
standardize professional activities and practices. The set of rules, norms and practices which were introduced bore signicant
resemblance to the dominant Anglo-American models and created the backdrop for the emergence of a professional cognitive
base and shared orientations and understandings with regard to the role of auditing. Professional attitudes and practices were
further consolidated through professional training and networking with globally-inuential professional bodies. Hence, the
mimetic and normative processes at work led the local auditing practice to morph with internationally-dominant models.
This paper extends the critical branch of the literature by synthesizing elements of political economy and institutional
theories to make sense of the processes of auditing standardization in a non-Anglo-American context. It draws attention
to how geo-political and technological dependencies develop and give rise to coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphic
processes, according to which local practices are formed in line with dominant models and practices. Additionally, it illuminates how institutional isomorphic pressures often operate simultaneously, making them practically indistinguishable while
their intensity varies over time, acquiring latent or dominant characters. The historical analysis of the Greek case provides
insights into how the internationalization of Anglo-American standards was made possible within the broader dynamics
of the world economic system in the second half of the 20th century. Auditing standardization does, in fact, have lengthy
historical roots and constitutes the result of complex institutional intertwinements and transformations. Researchers could
adopt similar theoretical frameworks to illuminate the lengthy institutional processes at work in other non-Anglo-American
contexts. Furthermore, additional research could assist in providing: rst, explanations of the processes which have led to
the worldwide dominance of Anglo-American practices; second, insights into how local professions technical dependency
on Western organizations started and developed; and, thirdly, how concepts such as modern, rational and effective
have come to be associated with Western institutions and operations.
Acknowledgments
We acknowledge helpful comments by Costas Caramanis and Stergios Leventis. The paper has also beneted from the
comments of participants at the 51st British Accounting and Finance Association, Manchester 2015. The author would also
like to thank the Institute of Certied Public Accountants of Greece and especially the Chairman, Charilaos Alamanos, for
providing access to the historical records and material.
Appendix A.
Table A1.
Table A1
List of interviewees1 .
Name of interviewee

Year the interview


was conducted

Date recruited and/or position held in the profession

Aggelidis, Evaggelos

2003

2
3

Alamanos, Charis
Grigorakos, Theodoros

2012
2003

Maroulis, Ioannis

2003

5
6

Mattingly, Lesley
Petridis, Charalambos

1999
2003

Protopsaltis, Nicolaos

2002

Sakellis, Emmanouil

2003

9
10

Samothrakis, George
Tsekouras, George

2012
2003

Entered the profession on 5/6/1962 and later became a member of the


Disciplinary Council of the profession
Chairman of the Board of Supervisors of the profession
Entered the profession on 15/1/1957 and became Vice President of the
Scientic Council in the period 19942002
Entered the profession on 5/2/1962 and became Chairman of the profession
from 1988 until 1991
British Adviser to SOL from 19551964
Entered the profession on 20/9/1961 and became Chairman of the profession
from 1982 until 1985
Entered the profession on 5/6/1962 and became a member of the Scientic
Council of the profession from 1994 until 2002
Entered the profession on 5/6/1962 and became Chairman of the Scientic
Council of the profession from 1994 until 1997
Member of the Board of Supervisors of the profession
Entered the profession on 3/1/1958 and became Chairman of the profession
from 1984 until 1989

1
Eight interviews were conducted in the context of the authors PhD and took place between 1999 and 2003 (Dedoulis, 2004), while two were conducted
in 2012. The eight interviews were revisited in the context of institutional theory and extracts were employed to illuminate aspects relating to the mimetic
and normative processes that emerged in the profession.

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