04 Dizon vs. People

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 170723. March 3, 2008.]

GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MICHELINA S.
AGUIRRE-OLONDRIZ, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, DR. JUVIDO
AGATEP and DR. MARISSA B. PASCUAL, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J :
p
In this petition for review on certiorari 1(1) under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, petitioner Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre (Gloria Aguirre) seeks the
reversal of the 21 July 2005 Decision 2(2) and 5 December 2005 Resolution, 3(3)
both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88370, entitled "Gloria Pilar S.
Aguirre v. Secretary of the Department of Justice, Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz,
Dr. Juvido Agatep, Dra. Marissa B. Pascual, Pedro B. Aguirre and John and Jane
Does".
The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) when the latter issued the twin
resolutions dated 11 February 2004 4(4) and 12 November 2004, 5(5) respectively,
which in turn affirmed the 8 January 2003 Resolution 6(6) of the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City.
The Assistant City Prosecutor for the OCP of Quezon City recommended
the dismissal of the criminal complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 02-12466, for
violation of Articles 172 (Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified
Documents) and 262 (Mutilation), both of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as "Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act", for insufficiency of evidence.
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner Gloria Aguirre
against respondents Pedro B. Aguirre (Pedro Aguirre), Michelina S.
Copyright 1994-2016
CD Technologies Asia, Inc.
Jurisprudence 1901 to 2016
Aguirre-Olondriz (Olondriz), Dr. Juvido Agatep (Dr. Agatep), Dr. Marissa B.

Pascual (Dr. Pascual) and several John/Jane Does for falsification, mutilation and
child abuse.
The antecedents of the present petition are:
Laureano "Larry" Aguirre 7(7) used to be a charge of the Heart of Mary
Villa, a child caring agency run by the Good Shepherd Sisters and licensed by the
Department of Social Work and Development (DSWD). Sometime in 1978,
respondent Pedro Aguirre; the latter's spouse, Lourdes S. Aguirre (Lourdes
Aguirre); and their four daughters, who included petitioner Gloria Aguirre and
respondent Olondriz, came to know Larry, who was then just over a year old. The
Aguirres would have Larry spend a few days at their home and then return him to
the orphanage thereafter. In June 1980, Larry, then two years and nine months of
age, formally became the ward of respondent Pedro Aguirre and his spouse
Lourdes Aguirre by virtue of an Affidavit of Consent to Legal Guardianship
executed in their favor by Sister Mary Concepta Bellosillo, Superior of the Heart
of Mary Villa. On 19 June 1986, the Aguirre spouses' guardianship of Larry was
legalized when the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan,
duly appointed them as joint co-guardians over the person and property of Larry.
As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses and their children noticed
that his developmental milestones were remarkably delayed. His cognitive and
physical growth did not appear normal in that "at age 3 to 4 years, Larry could
only crawl on his tummy like a frog . . .;" 8(8) he did not utter his first word until he
was three years of age; did not speak in sentences until his sixth year; and only
learned to stand up and walk after he turned five years old. At age six, the Aguirre
spouses first enrolled Larry at the Colegio de San Agustin, Dasmarias Village,
but the child experienced significant learning difficulties there. In 1989, at age
eleven, Larry was taken to specialists for neurological and psychological
evaluations. The psychological evaluation 9(9) done on Larry revealed the latter to
be suffering from a mild mental deficiency. 10(10) Consequent thereto, the Aguirre
spouses transferred Larry to St. John Ma. Vianney, an educational institution for
special children.
In November of 2001, respondent Dr. Agatep, a urologist/surgeon, was
approached concerning the intention to have Larry, then 24 years of age,
vasectomized. Prior to performing the procedure on the intended patient,
respondent Dr. Agatep required that Larry be evaluated by a psychiatrist in order
to confirm and validate whether or not the former could validly give his consent to
the medical procedure on account of his mental deficiency.
In view of the required psychiatric clearance, Larry was brought to
respondent Dr. Pascual, a psychiatrist, for evaluation. In a psychiatric report dated
Copyright 1994-2016
21 January 2002, respondent Dr. Pascual made the following recommendation:

[T]he responsibility of decision making may be given to his parent or
guardian. 11(11)
the full text of which reads

PSYCHIATRY REPORT
21 January 2002
GENERAL DATA
LAUREANO AGUIRRE, 24 years old, male, high school graduate
of St. John [Marie Vianney], was referred for psychiatric evaluation to
determine competency to give consent for vasectomy.
CLINICAL SUMMARY
Larry was adopted at age 3 from an orphanage and prenatal history is
not known to the adoptive family except that abortion was attempted.
Developmental milestones were noted to be delayed. He started to walk and
speak in single word at around age 5. He was enrolled in Colegio de San
Agustin at age 6 where he showed significant learning difficulties that he
had to repeat 1st and 4th grades. A consult was done in 1989 when he was
11 years old. Neurological findings and EEG results were not normal and he
was given Tecretol and Encephabol by his neurologist. Psychological
evaluation revealed mild to moderate mental retardation, special education
training was advised and thus, he was transferred to St. John Marie Vianney.
He finished his elementary and secondary education in the said school. He
was later enrolled in a vocational course at Don Bosco which he was unable
to continue. There has been no reported behavioral problems in school and
he gets along relatively well with his teachers and some of his classmates.
Larry grew up with a very supportive adoptive family. He is the
youngest in the family of four sisters. Currently, his adoptive parents are
already old and have medical problem and thus, they could no longer
monitor and take care of him like before. His adoptive mother has Bipolar
Mood Disorder and used to physically maltreat him. A year ago, he had an
episode of dizziness, vomiting and headaches after he was hit by his
adoptive mother. Consult was done in Makati Medical Center and several
tests were done, results of which were consistent with his developmental
problem. There was no evidence of acute insults. The family subsequently
decided that he should stay with one of his sisters to avoid similar incident
and the possibility that he would retaliate although he has never hurt
anybody. There has been no episode of violent outburst or aggressive
behavior. He would often keep to himself when sad, angry or frustrated.
He is currently employed in the company of his sister and given
Copyright 1994-2016
assignment to do some photocopying, usually in the mornings. He enjoys

playing billiards and basketball with his nephews and, he spends most of his
leisure time watching TV and listening to music. He could perform activities
of daily living without assistance except that he still needs supervision in
taking a bath. He cannot prepare his own meal and never allowed to go out
and run errands alone. He does not have friends and it is only his adoptive
family whom he has significant relationships. He claims that he once had a
girlfriend when he was in high school who was more like a best friend to
him. He never had sexual relations. He has learned to smoke and drink
alcohol few years ago through his cousins and the drivers. There is no
history of abuse of alcohol or any prohibited substances.
MEDICAL STATUS EXAMINATION
The applicant was appropriately dressed. He was cooperative and he
had intermittent eye contact. Speech was spontaneous, soft, and relevant. He
responded to questions in single words or simple sentences. He was anxious
specially at the start of the interview, with full affect appropriate to mood
and thought content. There was no apparent thought or perceptual
disturbance. No suicidal/homicidal thoughts elicited. He was oriented to
time, place and person. He has intact remote and recent memory. He could
do simple calculation. He could write his name and read simple words. His
human figure was comparable to a 7-8 year old. He demonstrated fair
judgment and poor insight. He had fair impulse control.
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS
Psychological tests done on March 6, 1990 (Dr. Lourdes Ledesma)
and on August 4, 2000 (Dr. Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villaosor) consistently
revealed mild to moderate mental deficiency.
SIGNIFICANT LABORATORY EXAMS RESULTS
CT scan done 09 January 2001 showed nonspecific right deep
parietal subcortical malacia. No localized mass lesion in the brain.
MRI done on 10 January 2001 showed bilateral parietal . . . volume
loss, encephalomalacia, gliosis and ulegyria consistent with sequela of
postnatal or neonatal infarcts. Ex-vacuo dilatation of the atria of lateral
ventricles associated thinned posterior half of the corpus callosum.
ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION
Axis I
Axis II
Axis III
Axis IV
Axis V
Copyright 1994-2016
None
Mental Retardation, mild to moderate type
None
None at present
Current GAF = 50-60
Larry's mental deficiency could be associated with possible perinatal

insults, which is consistent with the neuroimaging findings. Mental
retardation associated with neurological problems usually has poorer
prognosis. Larry is very much dependent on his family for his needs,
adaptive functioning, direction and in making major life decisions. At his
capacity, he may never understand the nature, the foreseeable risks and
benefits, and consequences of the procedure (vasectomy) that his family
wants for his protection. Thus, the responsibility of decision making may be
given to his parent or guardian.
Marissa B. Pascual, M.D.
Psychiatrist 12(12)
Considering the above recommendation, respondent Pedro Aguirre's written

consent was deemed sufficient in order to proceed with the conduct of the
vasectomy. Hence, on 31 January 2002, respondent Dr. Agatep performed a
bilateral vasectomy on Larry.
On 11 June 2002, petitioner Gloria Aguirre, respondent Pedro Aguirre's
eldest child, instituted a criminal complaint for the violation of the Revised Penal
Code, particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act No. 7610
against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several
John/Jane Does before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The Complaint Affidavit, 13(13) docketed as I.S. No. 02-12466, contained the
following allegations:
2.
. . . Dr. Agatep and Dra. Pascual were (sic) medical
practitioners specializing in urology and psychiatry respectively; while
respondent Pedro B. Aguirre is my father; Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz is
my sister, and the victim Laureano "Larry" Aguirre . . . is my common law
brother. JOHN and JANE DOES were the persons who, acting upon the
apparent instructions of respondents Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz and/or
Pedro B. Aguirre, actually scouted, prospected, facilitated, solicited and/or
procured the medical services of respondents Dra. Pascual and Dr. Agatep
vis--vis the intended mutilation via bilateral vasectomy of my common law
brother Larry Aguirre subject hereof.
xxx
xxx
xxx
4.
Sometime in March 2002, however, the Heart of Mary Villa of
the Good Shepherd Sisters was furnished a copy of respondent Dra.
Pascual's Psychiatry Report dated 21 January 2004 by the "DSWD", in
which my common law brother "Larry" was falsely and maliciously declared
incompetent and incapable of purportedly giving his own consent to the
MUTILATION VIA BILATERAL VASECTOMY intended to be
Copyright 1994-2016
performed on him by all the respondents.

xxx
xxx
xxx
6.
Based on the foregoing charade and false pretenses invariably
committed by all of the respondents in conspiracy with each other, on 31
January 2002, my common law brother Larry Aguirre, although of legal age
but conspiratorially caused to be declared by respondents to be "mentally
deficient" and incompetent to give consent to his BILATERAL
VASECTOMY, was then intentionally, unlawfully, maliciously, feloniously
and/or criminally placed thereafter under surgery for MUTILATION VIA
"BILATERAL VASECTOMY" . . ., EVEN WITHOUT ANY
AUTHORIZATION ORDER from the GUARDIANSHIP COURT, nor
personal consent of Larry Aguirre himself.
In addition to the above, the complaint included therein an allegation that
v.
. . . without a PRIOR medical examination, professional interview of

nor verification and consultation with my mother, Lourdes
Sabino-Aguirre, respondent Dra. Pascual baselessly, fraudulently and
with obvious intent to defame and malign her reputation and honor,
and worse, that of our Sabido family, falsely concluded and
diagnosed, via her falsified Psychiatry Report, that my mother
Lourdes Sabido-Aguirre purportedly suffers from "BIPOLAR
MOOD DISORDER" . . . .
To answer petitioner Gloria Aguirre's accusations against them, respondents

Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual submitted their respective
Counter-Affidavits.
In her defense, 14(14) respondent Olondriz denied that she "prospected,
scouted, facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement, mutilated or
abused" her common-law brother, Larry Aguirre. Further, she countered that:
3.
. . . While I am aware and admit that Larry went through a

vasectomy procedure, there is nothing in the Complaint which
explains how the vasectomy amounts to a mutilation.
xxx
xxx
xxx
5.
In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state with
complete confidence that I did not participate in any way in the
alleged mutilation.
6.
Neither did I procure or solicit the services of the physician who

performed the vasectomy, Dr. Juvido Agatep . . . . It was my father,
Copyright 1994-2016
Pedro Aguirre, Larry's guardian, who obtained his services. I merely

acted upon his instructions and accompanied my brother to the
physician, respondents Dra. Marissa B. Pascual . . . .
xxx
10.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Again, I had no participation in the preparation of the report of Dr.

Pascual . . . .
xxx
17.
xxx
. . . the Complaint does not even state what alleged participation was
falsified or the portion of the psychiatric report that allegedly states
that someone participated when in fact that person did not so
participate.
xxx
15.
xxx
Neither does the Complaint explain in what manner the Complainant

is authorized or has any standing to declare that Larry's consent was
not obtained. Complainant is not the guardian or relative of Larry.
While she argues that Larry's consent should have been obtained the
Complaint does not dispute the psychiatrist's findings about Larry's
inability to give consent.
xxx
13.
xxx
xxx
xxx
. . . the Complaint does not dispute that he (Larry) is mentally

deficient or incompetent to give consent.
xxx
xxx
xxx
19.
. . . I verified that the effect of a vasectomy operation was explained

to him (Larry) by both respondent doctors.
20.
. . . I accompanied Larry and obeyed my father on the belief that my

father continues to be the legal guardian of Larry. I know of no one
else who asserts to be his legal guardian . . . . 15(15)
Alleging the same statement of facts and defenses, respondent Pedro

Aguirre argues against his complicity in the crime of mutilation as charged and
asserts that:
5.
In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state with
complete confidence that I did not participate in any way in the
alleged mutilation. 16(16)
Nevertheless, he maintains that the vasectomy performed on Larry does not in any
Copyright 1994-2016
way amount to mutilation, as the latter's reproductive organ is still completely

intact. 17(17) In any case, respondent Pedro Aguirre explains that the procedure
performed is reversible through another procedure called Vasovasostomy, to wit:
8.
I understand that vasectomy is reversible through a procedure called

Vasovasostomy. I can also state with confidence that the procedure
enables men who have undergone a vasectomy to sire a child. Hence,
no permanent damage was caused by the procedure.
Respondent Pedro Aguirre challenges the charge of falsification in the

complaint, to wit:
14.
. . . I did not make it appear that any person participated in any act or
proceeding when that person did not in fact participate . . . .
xxx
16.
xxx
. . . I had no participation in the preparation of the report of Dra.

Pascual. She arrived at her report independently, using her own
professional judgment . . . .
xxx
31.
xxx
xxx
xxx
What I cannot understand about Petita's Complaint is how Larry is

argued to be legally a child under the definition of one law but
nonetheless and simultaneously argued to be capacitated to give his
consent as fully as an adult. 18(18)
Respondent Pedro Aguirre further clarifies that co-guardianship over Larry

had been granted to himself and his wife, Lourdes Aguirre, way back on 19 June
1986 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan. Respondent Pedro
Aguirre contends that being one of the legal guardians, consequently, parental
authority over Larry is vested in him. But assuming for the sake of argument that
Larry does have the capacity to make the decision concerning his vasectomy,
respondent Pedro Aguirre argues that petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no legal
personality to institute the subject criminal complaint, for only Larry would have
the right to do so.
Just as the two preceding respondents did, respondent Dr. Agatep also
disputed the allegations of facts stated in the Complaint. Adopting the allegations
of his co-respondents insofar as they were material to the charges against him, he
vehemently denied failing to inform Larry of the intended procedure. In his
counter-statement of facts he averred that:
(b) . . . I scheduled Larry for consultative interview . . . wherein I
painstakingly explained what vasectomy is and the consequences thereof;
Copyright 1994-2016
but finding signs of mental deficiency, . . . I advised his relatives and his
nurse who accompanied him to have Larry examined by a psychiatrist who
could properly determine whether or not Larry . . . can really give his
consent, thus I required them to secure first a psychiatric evaluation and
clearance prior to the contemplated procedure.
(c) On January 21, 2002, I was furnished a copy of a psychiatric
report prepared by Dr. Marissa Pascual . . . . In her said report, Dr. Pascual
found Larry to suffer from "mental retardation, mild to moderate type" and
further stated that "at his capacity, he may never understand the nature, the
foreseeable risks and benefits and consequences of the procedure
(vasectomy) . . ., thus the responsibility of decision making may be given to
his parent or guardian . . . ."
(d) . . . I was likewise furnished a copy of an affidavit executed by
Pedro Aguirre stating that he was the legal guardian of Larry . . . Pedro
Aguirre gave his consent to vasectomize Larry . . . .
(e) Only then, specifically January 31, 2002, vasectomy was
performed with utmost care and diligence. 19(19)
In defense against the charge of falsification and mutilation, respondent Dr.

Agatep argued that subject complaint should be dismissed for the following
reasons:
1.
The complainant has no legal personality to file this case. As
mentioned above, she is only a common law sister of Larry who has a legal
guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre, one of the herein respondents . . . .
2.
. . . [t]he allegations in the complaint clearly centers on the
condition of complainant's mother, Lourdes Aguirre, her reputation, and
miserably fails to implicate the degree of participation of herein respondent.
...
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b) Falsification. . . . I strongly aver that this felony does not apply
to me since it clearly gives reference to co-respondent, Dr. Marissa Pascual's
Psychiatry Report, dated January 21, 2002, in relation with her field of
profession, an expert opinion. I do not have any participation in the
preparation of said report, . . . neither did I utilized (sic) the same in any
proceedings to the damage to another. . . . I also deny using a falsified
document . . . .
(c) Mutilation. . . . Vasectomy does not in anyway equate to
castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an organ in
the context of law and medicine, it is quite remote from the penis . . . .
Copyright 1994-2016
(d) Child Abuse. . . . the complaint-affidavit is very vague in

specifying the applicability of said law. It merely avers that Laureano
"Larry" Aguirre is a child, and alleges his father, Pedro Aguirre, has parental
authority over him . . . . 20(20)
Similarly, respondent Dr. Pascual denied the criminal charges of

falsification and mutilation imputed to her. She stands by the contents of the
assailed Psychiatric Report, justifying it thus:
. . . My opinion of Larry Aguirre's mental status was based on my
own personal observations, his responses during my interview of him, the
results of the two (2) psychological tests conducted by clinical
psychologists, the results of laboratory tests, including a CT Scan and MRI,
and his personal and family history which I obtained from his sister,
Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz . . . .
5.
. . . the reference in my report concerning Mrs. Lourdes
Aguirre is not a statement of my opinion of Mrs. Aguirre's mental status, . . .
. Rather, it is part of the patient's personal and family history as conveyed to
me by Mrs. Aguirre-Olondriz.
6.
. . . An expression of my opinion, especially of an expert
opinion, cannot give rise to a charge for falsification. A contrary opinion by
another expert only means that the experts differ, and does not necessarily
reflect on the truth or falsity of either opinion . . . .
7.
did . . . .
. . . I never stated that I examined Mrs. Aguirre, because I never
8.
I had no participation in the surgery performed on Larry
Aguirre except to render an opinion on his capacity to give informed consent
to the vasectomy . . . .
9.
Without admitting the merits of the complaint, I submit that
complainants are not the proper persons to subscribe to the same as they are
not the offended party, peace officer or other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated . . . . 21(21)
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the circumstances attendant to the
case did not amount to the crime of falsification. He held that
[T]he claim of the complainant that the Psychiatric Report was
falsified, because consent was not given by Larry Aguirre to the vasectomy
and/or he was not consulted on said operation does not constitute
falsification. It would have been different if it was stated in the report that
consent was obtained from Larry Aguirre or that it was written therein that
he was consulted on the vasectomy, because that would mean that it was
Copyright 1994-2016
10
made to appear in the report that Larry Aguirre participated in the act or
proceeding by giving his consent or was consulted on the matter when in
truth and in fact, he did not participate. Or if not, the entry would have been
an untruthful statement. But that is not the case. Precisely (sic) the report
was made to determine whether Larry Aguirre could give his consent to his
intended vasectomy. Be that as it may, the matter of Larry's consent having
obtained or not may nor be an issue after all, because complainant's (sic)
herself alleged that Larry's mental condition is that of a child, who can not
give consent. Based on the foregoing consideration, no falsification can be
established under the circumstances. 22(22)
Even the statement in the Psychiatric Report of respondent Dr. Pascual that
Lourdes Aguirre had Bipolar Mood Disorder cannot be considered falsification
since
The report did not state that Lourdes Aguirre was in fact personally
interviewed by respondent Dr. Pascual and that the latter concluded that
Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder. The report merely quoted
other sources of information with respect to the condition of Lourdes
Aguirre, in the same manner that the fact that Lourdes Aguirre was
physically abusing Larry Aguirre was also not of Dra. Pascual personal
knowledge. But the fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is not of her
own personal knowledge in her report does not mean that she committed
falsification in the process. Her sources may be wrong and may affect the
veracity of her report, but for as long as she has not alleged therein that she
personally diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation would not then be
true, she cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it goes without saying
that if the author of the report is not guilty, then with more reason the other
respondents are not liable. 23(23)
Respecting the charge of mutilation, the Assistant City Prosecutor also held
that the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and
penalized under Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., "[t]he vasectomy
operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which
is still very much part of his physical self." He ratiocinated that:
While the operation renders him the inability (sic) to procreate, the
operation is reversible and therefore, cannot be the permanent damage
contemplated under Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code. 24(24)
The Assistant City Prosecutor, 25(25) in a Resolution 26(26) dated 8 January

2003, found no probable cause to hold respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr.
Agatep and Dr. Pascual liable for the complaint of falsification and mutilation,
more specifically, the violation of Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal Code,
in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. Accordingly, the Assistant City Prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of petitioner Gloria Aguirre's complaint for
Copyright 1994-2016
11
insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, it is recommended that the above-entitled case be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. 27(27)
On 18 February 2003, petitioner Gloria Aguirre appealed the foregoing

resolution to the Secretary of the DOJ by means of a Petition for Review. 28(28)
In a Resolution dated 11 February 2004, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito
R. Zuo, for the Secretary of the DOJ, dismissed the petition. In resolving said
appeal, the Chief State Prosecutor held that:
Under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of Department Circular
No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, the Secretary of Justice may, motu proprio,
dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing of any reversible error in
the questioned resolution or finds the same to be patently without merit.
We carefully examined the petition and its attachments and found no
error that would justify a reversal of the assailed resolution which is in
accord with the law and evidenced (sic) on the matter. 29(29)
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied

with finality by the DOJ in another Resolution dated 12 November 2004.
Resolute in her belief, petitioner Gloria Aguirre went to the Court of
Appeals by means of a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
On 21 July 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing
petitioner Gloria Aguirre's recourse for lack of merit.
The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consequently, the assailed Resolutions dated February 11, 2004 and
November 12, 2004 of the Secretary of Justice in I.S. No. 02-12466 are
hereby AFFIRMED. 30(30)
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre's motion for reconsideration proved futile as it

was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 5 December 2005.
Hence, the present petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, premised on the following arguments:
I.
Copyright 1994-2016
12
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS, GRAVE

AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT CONCLUDED,
BASED PURPORTEDLY ON THE INTERNET WHICH RUNS AMUCK
WITH OUR SYSTEM OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD, THAT BILATERAL VASECTOMY IS PURPORTEDLY
100% REVERSIBLE BY A FUTURE MEDICAL PROCEDURE HENCE
NOT AMOUNTING TO MUTILATION, . . .; AND
xxx
xxx
xxx
II.
WORSE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE,
SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT REFUSED
TO DIRECT THE INDICTMENT OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
FOR MUTILATION AND FALSIFICATION DESPITE THE EXISTENCE
OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE THEREFOR . . . . 31(31)
The foregoing issues notwithstanding, the more proper issue for this Court's
consideration is, given the facts of the case, whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when the latter affirmed the public prosecutor's
finding of lack of probable cause for respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr.
Agatep and Dr. Pascual to stand trial for the criminal complaints of falsification
and mutilation in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
In ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals explained that:
Evidently, the controversy lies in the permanency of sterilization as a
result of a vasectomy operation, and the chances of restoring fertility with a
reversal surgery . . . .
We sustain the DOJ in ruling that the bilateral vasectomy performed
on Larry does not constitute mutilation even if intentionally and purposely
done to prevent him from siring a child.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Sterilization is to be distinguished from castration: in the latter act

the reproductive capacity is permanently removed or damaged. 32(32)
It then concluded that:

The matter of legal liability, other than criminal, which private
respondents may have incurred for the alleged absence of a valid consent to
the vasectomy performed on Larry, is certainly beyond the province of this
Copyright 1994-2016
13
certiorari petition. Out task is confined to the issue of whether or not the
Secretary of Justice and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
committed grave abuse of discretion in their determining the existence or
absence of probable cause for filing criminal cases for falsification and
mutilation under Articles 172 (2) and 262 of the Revised Penal Code. 33(33)
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, contends that the Court of Appeals and
the DOJ failed to appreciate several important facts: 1) that bilateral vasectomy
conducted on petitioner's brother, Larry Aguirre, was admitted; 34(34) 2) that the
procedure caused the perpetual destruction of Larry's reproductive organs of
generation or conception; 35(35) 3) that the bilateral vasectomy was intentional and
deliberate to deprive Larry forever of his reproductive organ and his capacity to
procreate; and 4) that respondents, "in conspiracy with one another, made not only
one but two (2) untruthful statements, and not mere inaccuracies when they made
it appear in the psychiatry report" 36(36) that a) Larry's consent was obtained or at
the very least that the latter was informed of the intended vasectomy; and b) that
Lourdes Aguirre was likewise interviewed and evaluated. Paradoxically, however,
petitioner Gloria Aguirre does not in any way state that she, instead of respondent
Pedro Aguirre, has guardianship over the person of Larry. She only insists that
respondents should have obtained Larry's consent prior to the conduct of the
bilateral vasectomy.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for public respondent
DOJ, argues that "the conduct of preliminary investigation to determine the
existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing (an) information is the
function of the public prosecutor". 37(37) More importantly, "the element[s] of
castration or mutilation of an organ necessary for generation is completely absent
as he was not deprived of any organ necessary for reproduction, much less the
destruction of such organ". 38(38)
Likewise, in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals, respondents
Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz assert that, fundamentally, petitioner Gloria Aguirre
has no standing to file the complaint, as she has not shown any injury to her
person or asserted any relationship with Larry other than being his "common law
sister"; further, that she cannot prosecute the present case, as she has not been
authorized by law to file said complaint, not being the offended party, a peace
officer or a public officer charged with the enforcement of the law. Accordingly,
respondents Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz posit that they, together with the other
respondents Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual, may not be charged with, prosecuted for
and ultimately convicted of: 1) "mutilation . . . since the bilateral vasectomy
conducted on Larry does not involve castration or amputation of an organ
necessary for reproduction as the twin elements of the crime of mutilation . . . are
absent"; 39(39) and 2) "falsification . . . since the acts allegedly constituting
falsification involve matters of medical opinion and not matters of fact", 40(40) and
Copyright 1994-2016
14
that petitioner Gloria Aguirre failed to prove damage to herself or to any other
person.
Respondent Dr. Agatep, in the same vein, stresses that vasectomy is not
mutilation. He elucidates that vasectomy is merely the "excision of the vas
deferens, the duct in testis which transport semen"; 41(41) that it is the penis and the
testis that make up the male reproductive organ and not the vas deferens; and
additionally argues that for the crime of mutilation to be accomplished, Article 262
of the Revised Penal Code necessitates that there be intentional total or partial
deprivation of some essential organ for reproduction. Tubes, seminal ducts, vas
deferens or prostatic urethra not being organs, respondent Dr. Agatep concludes,
therefore, that vasectomy does not correspond to mutilation.
Anent the charge of falsification of a private document, respondent Dr.
Agatep asseverates that he never took part in disclosing any information, data or
facts as contained in the contentious Psychiatric Report.
For her part, respondent Dr. Pascual insists that the assailed Psychiatry
Report was the result of her independent exercise of professional judgment.
"Rightly or wrongly, (she) diagnosed Larry Aguirre to be incapable of giving
consent, based on interviews made by the psychiatrist on Larry Aguirre and
persons who interacted with him". 42(42) And supposing that said report is flawed, it
is, at most, an erroneous medical diagnosis.
The petition has no merit.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted. 43(43) The term does not mean "actual and
positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. 44(44) It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief; 45(45) that is, the belief that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable cause merely
binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. 46(46)
The executive department of the government is accountable for the
prosecution of crimes, its principal obligation being the faithful execution of the
laws of the land. A necessary component of the power to execute the laws is the
right to prosecute their violators, 47(47) the responsibility of which is thrust upon
the DOJ. Hence, the determination of whether or not probable cause exists to
warrant the prosecution in court of an accused is consigned and entrusted to the
DOJ. And by the nature of his office, a public prosecutor is under no compulsion
to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has
evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a
Copyright 1994-2016
15
different conclusion.
Put simply, public prosecutors under the DOJ have a wide range of
discretion, the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of
which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by (public)
prosecutors. 48(48) And this Court has consistently adhered to the policy of
non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to leave to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of
what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing
of an information against the supposed offender. 49(49)
But this is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on
the part of the prosecutor. It is entirely possible that the investigating prosecutor
may erroneously exercise the discretion lodged in him by law. This, however, does
not render his act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction. 50(50)
Prescinding from the above, the court's duty in an appropriate case,
therefore, is confined to a determination of whether the assailed executive
determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction
resulting from a grave abuse of discretion. For courts of law to grant the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, so as to justify the reversal of the finding of
whether or not there exists probable cause to file an information, the one seeking
the writ must be able to establish that the investigating prosecutor exercised his
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and it must be patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a
unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
Grave abuse of discretion is not enough. 51(51) Excess of jurisdiction signifies that
he had jurisdiction over the case but has transcended the same or acted without
authority. 52(52)
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of
the Assistant City Prosecutor in dismissing the criminal complaints for
falsification and mutilation, as affirmed by the DOJ, is determinative of whether or
not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
In ruling the way he did that no probable cause for falsification and
mutilation exists the Assistant City Prosecutor deliberated on the factual and
legal milieu of the case. He found that there was no sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case for the crimes complained of as defined and punished under
Articles 172, paragraph 2, and 262 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610, respectively. Concerning the crime of falsification of a
Copyright 1994-2016
16
private document, the Assistant City Prosecutor reasoned that the circumstances
attendant to the case did not amount to the crime complained of, that is, the lack of
consent by Larry Aguirre before he was vasectomized; or the fact that the latter
was not consulted. The lack of the two preceding attendant facts do not in any way
amount to falsification, absent the contention that it was made to appear in the
assailed report that said consent was obtained. That would have been an untruthful
statement. Neither does the fact that the Psychiatric Report state that Lourdes
Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder by the same token amount to falsification
because said report does not put forward that such finding arose after an
examination of the concerned patient. Apropos the charge of mutilation, he
reasoned that though the vasectomy rendered Larry unable to procreate, it was not
the permanent damage contemplated under the pertinent provision of the penal
code.
We agree. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the DOJ and the Assistant City Prosecutor was not
shown in the present case.
In the present petition, respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep
and Dr. Pascual are charged with violating Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. Article 172, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, defines the crime of falsification of a private document, viz
Art. 172.
Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified
documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon:
xxx
xxx
xxx
2.
Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the
intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of
the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre charges respondents with falsification of a private

document for conspiring with one another in keeping Larry "in the dark about the
foregoing (vasectomy) as the same was concealed from him by the respondents . .
.," 53(53) as well as for falsely concluding and diagnosing Lourdes Aguirre to be
suffering from Bipolar Mood Disorder.
A scrutiny, however, of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code which
defines the acts constitutive of falsification, that is
Art. 171.
Copyright 1994-2016
. . . shall falsify a document by committing any of the
17
following acts:
1.
Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or
rubric;
2.
Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3.
Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4.
Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5.
Altering true dates;
6.
Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document
which changes its meaning;
7.
Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a
copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in
such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine
original; or
8.
Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance
thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
vis--vis the much criticized Psychiatric Report, shows that the acts complained of
do not in any manner, by whatever stretch of the imagination, fall under any of the
eight (8) enumerated acts constituting the offense of falsification.
In order to properly address the issue presented by petitioner Gloria
Aguirre, it is necessary that we discuss the elements of the crime of falsification of
private document under the Revised Penal Code, a crime which all the respondents
have been accused of perpetrating. The elements of said crime under paragraph 2
of Article 172 of our penal code are as follows: 1) that the offender committed any
acts of falsification, except those in par. 7, enumerated in Article 171; 2) that the
falsification was committed in any private document; and 3) that the falsification
caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with
intent to cause such damage. Under Article 171, paragraph 2, a person may
commit falsification of a private document by causing it to appear in a document
that a person or persons participated in an act or proceeding, when such person or
persons did not in fact so participate in the act or proceeding. On the other hand,
falsification under par. 3 of the same article is perpetrated by a person or persons
who, participating in an act or proceeding, made statements in that act or
proceeding and the offender, in making a document, attributed to such person or
persons statements other than those in fact made by such person or persons. And
Copyright 1994-2016
18
the crime defined under paragraph 4 thereof is committed when 1) the offender
makes in a document statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation
to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and 4) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts
was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
Applying the above-stated elements of the crime to the case at bar, in order
that respondent Dr. Pascual, and the rest acting in conspiracy with her, to have
committed the crime of falsification under par. 3 and 4 of Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is essential that that there be prima facie evidence to show
that she had caused it to appear that Larry gave his consent to be vasectomized or
at the very least, that the proposed medical procedure was explained to Larry. But
in the assailed report, no such thing was done. Lest it be forgotten, the reason for
having Larry psychiatrically evaluated was precisely to ascertain whether or not he
can validly consent with impunity to the proposed vasectomy, and not to obtain his
consent to it or to oblige respondent Dr. Pascual to explain to him what the import
of the medical procedure was. Further, that Larry's consent to be vasectomized
was not obtained by the psychiatrist was of no moment, because nowhere is it
stated in said report that such assent was obtained. At any rate, petitioner Gloria
Aguirre contradicts her very own allegations when she persists in the contention
that Larry has the mental age of a child; hence, he was legally incapable of validly
consenting to the procedure.
In the matter of the supposed incorrect diagnosis of Lourdes Aguirre, with
regard to paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, we quote with
approval the succinct statements of the Assistant City Prosecutor:
[T]he fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is not of her own
personal knowledge in her report does not mean that she committed
falsification in the process. Her sources may be wrong and may affect the
veracity of her report, but for as long as she has not alleged therein that she
personally diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation would not then be
true, she cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it goes without saying
that if the author of the report is not guilty, then with more reason the other
respondents are not liable. 54(54)
As to the charge of mutilation, Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code defines
the crime as
Art. 262.
Mutilation. The penalty of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall intentionally
mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of some
essential organ for reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor
Copyright 1994-2016
19
in its medium and maximum periods.
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements

of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code
to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for
generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is,
to deprive the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. According
to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation
as defined and penalized above, i.e., "[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any
way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of
his physical self". Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, would want this Court to
make a ruling that bilateral vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation.
55(55)
This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be contrary to the

intentions of the framers of our penal code.
A fitting riposte to the issue at hand lies in United States v. Esparcia, 56(56)
in which this Court had the occasion to shed light on the implication of the term
mutilation. Therein we said that:
The sole point which it is desirable to discuss is whether or not the
crime committed is that defined and penalized by article 414 of the Penal
Code. The English translation of this article reads: "Any person who shall
intentionally castrate another shall suffer a penalty ranging from reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua". The Spanish text, which should govern,
uses the word "castrare", inadequately translated into English as "castrate".
The word "capar", which is synonymous of "castrar", is defined in the Royal
Academic Dictionary as the destruction of the organs of generation or
conception. Clearly it is the intention of the law to punish any person who
shall intentionally deprived another of any organ necessary for reproduction.
An applicable construction is that of Viada in the following language:
"At the head of these crimes, according to their order of gravity, is
the mutilation known by the name of 'castration' which consists of the
amputation of whatever organ is necessary for generation. The law could not
fail to punish with the utmost severity such a crime, which, although not
destroying life, deprives a person of the means to transmit it. But bear in
mind that according to this article in order for 'castration' to exist, it is
indispensable that the 'castration' be made purposely. The law does not look
only to the result but also to the intention of the act. Consequently, if by
reason of an injury or attack, a person is deprived of the organs of
generation, the act, although voluntary, not being intentional to that end, it
would not come under the provisions of this article, but under No. 2 of
article 431." (Viada, Codigo Penal, vol. 3, p. 70. See to same effect, 4
Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 525.)
Copyright 1994-2016
20
Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a man, totally or partially, of
some essential organ of reproduction? We answer in the negative.
In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular passage, called
the vas deferens, through which the sperm (cells) are transported from the testicle
to the urethra where they combine with the seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is
divided and the cut ends merely tied. 57(57) That part, which is cut, that is, the vas
deferens, is merely a passageway that is part of the duct system of the male
reproductive organs. The vas deferens is not an organ, i.e., a highly organized unit
of structure, having a defined function in a multicellular organism and consisting
of a range of tissues. 58(58) Be that as it may, even assuming arguendo that the
tubular passage can be considered an organ, the cutting of the vas deferens does
not divest or deny a man of any essential organ of reproduction for the simple
reason that it does not entail the taking away of a part or portion of the male
reproductive system. The cut ends, after they have been tied, are then dropped
back into the incision. 59(59)
Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction,
such procedure does not deprive him, "either totally or partially, of some essential
organ for reproduction". Notably, the ordinary usage of the term "mutilation" is
the deprivation of a limb or essential part (of the body), 60(60) with the operative
expression being "deprivation". In the same manner, the word "castration" is
defined as the removal of the testes or ovaries. 61(61) Such being the case in this
present petition, the bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted
to the crime of mutilation as defined and punished under Article 262, paragraph 1,
of the Revised Penal Code. And no criminal culpability could be foisted on to
respondent Dr. Agatep, the urologist who performed the procedure, much less the
other respondents. Thus, we find sufficient evidence to explain why the Assistant
City Prosecutor and the DOJ ruled the way they did. Verily, We agree with the
Court of Appeals that the writ of certiorari is unavailing; hence, should not be
issued.
It is once more apropos to pointedly apply the Court's general policy of
non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations. As it has been oft
said, the Supreme Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom
the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie
case. 62(62) The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but, as a rule, have no
part in the initial decision to prosecute him. 63(63) The possible exception to this
rule is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that will justify judicial intrusion into
the precincts of the executive. But that is not the case herein.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for
Copyright 1994-2016
21
lack of merit. The assailed 21 July 2005 Decision and 5 December 2005
Resolution, both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88370 are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Gloria Aguirre.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona *(64) and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
Rollo, pp. 39-89.

Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with
Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring;
Annex "A" of the Petition; id. at 90-108.
Annex "A-1"; id. at 110.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 159.
Annex "B" of the Petition; id. at 161-163.
Originally named as Jose Miguel Garcia.
Report of Neuropsychological Evaluation conducted by Lourdes K. Ledesma,
Ph.D.; rollo, pp. 299-304.
Conducted by Dr. Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villasor, a clinical psychologist. Id. at
294-298.
Id.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 230-232.
Id. at 212-224.
Id. at 275-278.
Id.
Id. at 287.
Id.
Id. at 288-291.
Id. at 314-316.
Id. at 309-312.
Id. at 279-281.
Id. at 162.
Id.
Id.
Gibson T. Araula, Jr.
Rollo, pp. 161-163.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 164-206.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 51-54.
Id. at 105-106.
Id. at 107.
Copyright 1994-2016
22
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
*
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 764-765.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 863.
Id. at 733.
R.R. Paredes v. Calilung, G.R. No. 156055, 5 March 2007, 517 SCRA 369, 394.
Id.
Id.
Webb v. Hon. De Leon, 317 Phil. 758, 789 (1995).
R.R. Paredes v. Calilung, supra note 43 at 394.
Webb v. Hon. De Leon, supra note 46 at 800.
Andres v. Cuevas, G.R. No. 150869, 9 June 2005, 460 SCRA 38, 52.
D.M. Consuji, Inc. v. Esguerra, 328 Phil. 1168, 1185 (1996).
Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 154239-41, 16 February 2005, 451
SCRA 533, 549.
Rollo, pp. 235-243.
Id. at 208.
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two (13th ed.), p. 457.
36 Phil. 840, 840-841 (1917).
Solis, Legal Medicine (1987 ed.), p. 623.
Clugston, Dictionary of Science (1998 ed.), p. 558.
Schwartz, Shires, Spencer, Storer, Principle of Surgery, Vol. Two (4th ed.), pp.
1729-1730.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993 ed.), p. 1493.
Id. at 349.
Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, 9 November 1993, 227 SCRA 627,
643.
Id.
Justice Renato C. Corona was designated to sit as additional member replacing
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 10 December 2007.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 168486. June 27, 2006.]
Copyright 1994-2016
23
NOE S. ANDAYA, petitioner,

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J :
p
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the September 29, 2004
Decision 1(65) of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26556, affirming the
January 29, 2002 Decision 2(66) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104 of
Quezon City in Criminal Case No. 92-36145, convicting petitioner Noe S. Andaya
of falsification of private document, and the April 26, 2005 Resolution 3(67)
denying the motion for reconsideration.
Complainant Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(AFPSLAI) is a non-stock and non-profit association authorized to engage in
savings and loan transactions. In 1986, petitioner Noe S. Andaya was elected as
president and general manager of AFPSLAI. During his term, he sought to
increase the capitalization of AFPSLAI to boost its lending capacity to its
members. Consequently, on June 1, 1988, the Board of Trustees of AFPSLAI
passed and approved Resolution No. RS-88-006-048 setting up a Finder's Fee
Program whereby any officer, member or employee, except investment
counselors, of AFPSLAI who could solicit an investment of not less than
P100,000.00 would be entitled to a finder's fee equivalent to one percent of the
amount solicited.
In a letter 4(68) dated September 1991, the Central Bank wrote Gen.
Lisandro C. Abadia, then Chairman of the Board of Trustees, regarding the
precarious financial position of AFPSLAI due to its alleged flawed management.
As a result, Gen. Abadia requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct an investigation on alleged irregularities in the operations of AFPSLAI
which led to the filing of several criminal cases against petitioner, one of which is
the instant case based on the alleged fraudulent implementation of the Finder's Fee
Program.
On October 5, 1992, an information for estafa through falsification of
commercial document was filed against petitioner, to wit:
Copyright 1994-2016
24
The undersigned accuses NOE S. ANDAYA of the crime of Estafa

thru Falsification of Commercial Document, committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of April, 1991 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, with intent to gain, by means of
deceit, false pretenses and falsification of commercial document, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the ARMED
FORCES AND POLICE SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by its Chairman of the Board of Director[s], Gen. Lisandro C.
Abadia, AFP, in the following manner, to wit: on the date and in the place
aforementioned the said accused being then the President and General
Manager of the Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association,
Inc., caused and approved the disbursement of the sum of P21,000.00,
Philippine Currency, from the funds of the association, by then and there
making it appear in Disbursement Voucher No. 58380 that said amount
represented the 1% finder's fee of one DIOSDADO J. GUILLAS [Guilas];
when in truth and in fact accused knew fully well that there was no such
payment to be made by the association as finder's fee; that by virtue of said
falsification, said accused was able to encashed (sic) and received (sic)
MBTC Check No. 583768 in the sum of P21,000.00, which amount once in
his possession, misapplied, misappropriated and converted to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party in the aforesaid sum of P21,000.00, Philippine Currency.
DISHEA
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5(69) (Emphasis supplied)
The case was raffled to Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-36145. On May 30, 1994, petitioner
was arraigned 6(70) and pleaded not guilty to the charge, after which trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely, Diosdado Guilas and
Judy Balangue.
Guilas, a general clerk of AFPSLAI's Time Deposit Section, testified that
on April 8, 1991, he was informed by Tini Gabriel and Julie Alabansa of the
Treasury Department that there was a finder's fee in the amount of P21,000.00 in
his name. Subsequently, Judy Balangue, an investment clerk of the Time Deposit
Section, told him that the finder's fee was for petitioner. When Guilas went to
petitioner's office to inform him about the finder's fee in his (Guilas') name,
petitioner instructed him to collect the P21,000.00 and turn over the same to the
latter. Guilas returned to the Treasury Department and signed Disbursement
Voucher No. 58380 7(71) afterwhich he was issued Metrobank Check No. 683768
8(72) for P21,000.00. After encashing the check, he turned over the proceeds to
Copyright 1994-2016
25
petitioner. On cross-examination, Guilas admitted that there was no prohibition in

placing the finder's fee under the name of a person who did not actually solicit the
investment.
Balangue also testified that on April 3, 1991, petitioner instructed him to
prepare Certificate of Capital Contribution Monthly No. 52178 9(73) in the name
of Rosario Mercader for an investment in AFPSLAI in the amount of
P2,100,000.00 and to inform Guilas that the finder's fee for the aforesaid
investment will be placed in the latter's name. On cross-examination, Balangue
confirmed that a P2,100,000.00 worth of investment from Rosario Mercader was
deposited in AFPSLAI. He further acknowledged that the Finder's Fee Program
did not prohibit the placing of another person's name as payee of the finder's fee.
The defense presented three witnesses, namely, Emerita Arevalo, Ernesto
Hernandez and petitioner.
Arevalo, secretary of petitioner in AFPSLAI, explained that the finder's fee
was for the P2,100,000.00 investment solicited by Ernesto Hernandez from
Rosario Mercader. The finder's fee was placed in the name of Guilas upon request
of Hernandez so that the same would not be reflected in his (Hernandez's) income
tax return. She alleged that Guilas consented to the arrangement of placing the
finder's fee in his (Guilas') name. She also claimed that there was no prohibition in
the Finder's Fee Program regarding the substitution of the name of the solicitor as
long as there was no double claim for the finder's fee over the same investment.
Hernandez, an associate member of AFPSLAI and vice president of
Philippine Educational Trust Plan, Inc. (PETP Plans), testified that sometime in
1991, he was able to solicit from Rosario Mercader an investment of
P2,100,000.00 in AFPSLAI. He also asked petitioner to place the finder's fee in
the name of one of his employees so that he (Hernandez) would not have to report
a higher tax base in his income tax return. On April 8, 1991, petitioner handed to
him the finder's fee in the amount of P21,000.00.
Petitioner denied all the charges against him. He claimed that the
P21,000.00 finder's fee was in fact payable by AFPSLAI because of the
P2,100,000.00 investment of Rosario Mercader solicited by Ernesto Hernandez.
He denied misappropriating the P21,000.00 finder's fee for his personal benefit as
the same was turned over to Ernesto Hernandez who was the true solicitor of the
aforementioned investment. Since the finder's fee was in fact owed by AFPSLAI,
then no damage was done to the association. The finder's fee was placed in the
name of Guilas as requested by Hernandez in order to reduce the tax obligation of
the latter. According to petitioner, Guilas consented to the whole setup.
DTaSIc
Petitioner also claimed that Hernandez was an associate member of

Copyright 1994-2016
26
AFPSLAI because his application for membership was approved by the

membership committee and the Board of Trustees and was in fact issued an I.D.
There was no prohibition under the rules and regulation of the Finder's Fee
Program regarding the substitution of the name of the solicitor with the name of
another person. On cross-examination, petitioner claimed that he merely approved
the substitution of the name of Hernandez with that of Guilas in the disbursement
voucher upon the request of Hernandez. He brushed aside the imputation of
condoning tax evasion by claiming that the issue in the instant proceedings was
whether he defrauded AFPSLAI and not his alleged complicity in tax evasion.
After the defense rested its case, the prosecution presented two rebuttal
witnesses, namely, Ma. Victoria Maigue and Ma. Fe Moreno.
Maigue, membership affairs office supervisor of AFPSLAI, testified that
Hernandez was ineligible to become a member of AFPSLAI under sections 1 and
2 of Article II of the association's by-laws. However, she admitted that the
application of Hernandez as member was approved by the membership committee.
Moreno, legal officer of AFPSLAI at the time of her testimony on January
25, 2000, stated that there are eight criminal cases pending against the petitioner in
various branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In one case decided
by Judge Bacalla of Branch 216, petitioner was convicted of estafa through
falsification involving similar facts as the instant case. She further stated that
Hernandez was not a member of AFPSLAI under sections 1 and 2 of Article II of
the by-laws. On cross-examination, she admitted that the case decided by Judge
Bacalla convicting petitioner was on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
The defense dispensed with the presentation of Mercader in view of the
stipulation of the prosecution on the fact that Mercader was a depositor of
AFPSLAI and that she was convinced to invest in the association by Ernesto
Hernandez. 10(74)
On June 20, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision 11(75) convicting
petitioner of falsification of private document. On July 5, 2001, petitioner filed a
motion for new trial. 12(76) In an Order 13(77) dated December 20, 2001, the trial
court ruled that the evidence submitted by petitioner in support of his motion was
inadequate to conduct a new trial, however, in the interest of substantial justice,
the case should still be reopened pursuant to Section 24, 14(78) Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
Petitioner proceeded to submit documentary evidence consisting of the
financial statements of AFPSLAI from 1996 to 1999 to show that AFPSLAI did
not suffer any damage from the payment of the P21,000.00 finder's fee. He
likewise offered the testimony of Paterno Madet, senior vice president of
Copyright 1994-2016
27
AFPSLAI, who testified that he was personally aware that Rosario Mercader
invested P2,100,000.00 in AFPSLAI; that Hernandez was a member of AFPSLAI
and was the one who convinced Mercader to invest; that the finder's fee was
placed in the name of Guilas; that petitioner called him to grant the request of
Hernandez for the finder's fee to be placed in the name of one of the employees of
AFPSLAI; that there was no policy which prohibits the placing of the name of the
solicitor of the investment in the name of another person; that the substitution of
the name of Hernandez with that of Guilas was approved by petitioner but he
(Madet) was the one who approved the release of the disbursement voucher.
On January 29, 2002, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision
convicting petitioner of falsification of private document based on the following
findings of fact: Hernandez solicited from Rosario Mercader an investment of
P2,100,000.00 for AFPSLAI; Hernandez requested petitioner to place the finder's
fee in the name of another person; petitioner caused it to appear in the
disbursement voucher that Guilas solicited the aforesaid investment; the voucher
served as the basis for the issuance of the check for P21,000.00 representing the
finder's fee for the investment of Mercader; and Guilas encashed the check and
turned over the money to petitioner who in turn gave it to Hernandez.
SITCcE
The trial court ruled that all the elements of falsification of private
document were present. First, petitioner caused it to appear in the disbursement
voucher, a private document, that Guilas, instead of Hernandez, was entitled to a
P21,000.00 finder's fee. Second, the falsification of the voucher was done with
criminal intent to cause damage to the government because it was meant to
lower the tax base of Hernandez and, thus, evade payment of taxes on the finder's
fee.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied by the trial court in an
Order 15(79) dated May 13, 2002. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court and denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration; hence, the instant petition challenging the validity of his
conviction for the crime of falsification of private document.
Preliminarily, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals contradicted the
ruling of the trial court. He claims that the Court of Appeals stated in certain
portions of its decision that petitioner was guilty of estafa through falsification of
commercial document whereas in the trial court's decision petitioner was
convicted of falsification of private document.
A close reading of the Court of Appeals' decision shows that the alleged
points of contradiction were the result of inadvertence in the drafting of the same.
Read in its entirety, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court and, necessarily, it affirmed the conviction of petitioner
Copyright 1994-2016
28
for the crime of falsification of private document and not of estafa through
falsification of commercial document.
In the main, petitioner implores this Court to review the pleadings he filed
before the lower courts as well as the evidence on record on the belief that a
review of the same will prove his innocence. However, he failed to specify what
aspects of the factual and legal bases of his conviction should be reversed.
Time honored is the principle that an appeal in a criminal case opens the
whole action for review on any question including those not raised by the parties.
16(80) After a careful and thorough review of the records, we are convinced that
petitioner should be acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172,
paragraph 2 17(81) in relation to Article 171 18(82) of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification under Article 171 which,
in the case at bar, falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to appear
that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate; (2) the falsification was committed on a private document; and (3) the
falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to cause damage to a
third party.
Although the public prosecutor designated the offense charged in the
information as estafa through falsification of commercial document, petitioner
could be convicted of falsification of private document, had it been proper, under
the well-settled rule that it is the allegations in the information that determines the
nature of the offense and not the technical name given by the public prosecutor in
the preamble of the information. We explained this principle in the case of U.S. v.
Lim San 19(83) in this wise:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no
concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he
stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. . . . That to
which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things
else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not
did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name,
but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the
manner therein set forth. . . . The real and important question to him is, "Did
you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?" not, "Did you commit a
crime named murder?" If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner
stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the
penalty therefor. . . . If the accused performed the acts alleged in the manner
alleged, then he ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever
may be the name of the crime which those acts constitute. 20(84)
Copyright 1994-2016
29
The facts alleged in the information are sufficient to constitute the crime of
falsification of private document. Specifically, the allegations in the information
can be broken down into the three aforestated essential elements of this offense as
follows: (1) petitioner caused it to appear in Disbursement Voucher No. 58380
that Diosdado Guillas was entitled to a finder's fee from AFPSLAI in the amount
of P21,000.00 when in truth and in fact no finder's fee was due to him; (2) the
falsification was committed on Disbursement Voucher No. 58380; and (3) the
falsification caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00.
AHDTIE
The first element of the offense charged in the information was proven by
the prosecution. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, namely, Diosdado
Guilas and Judy Balangue, as well as the presentation of Disbursement Voucher
No. 58380 established that petitioner caused the preparation of the voucher in the
name of Guilas despite knowledge that Guilas was not entitled to the finder's fee.
Significantly, petitioner admitted his participation in falsifying the voucher when
he testified that he authorized the release of the voucher in the name of Guilas
upon the request of Ernesto Hernandez. While petitioner did not personally
prepare the voucher, he could be considered a principal by induction, had his
conviction been proper, since he was the president and general manager of
AFPSLAI at the time so that his employees merely followed his instructions in
preparing the falsified voucher.
The second element of the offense charged in the information, i.e., the
falsification was committed in Disbursement Voucher No. 58380, a private
document, is likewise present. It appears that the public prosecutor erroneously
characterized the disbursement voucher as a commercial document so that he
designated the offense as estafa through falsification of commercial document in
the preamble of the information. However, as correctly ruled by the trial court,
21(85) the subject voucher is a private document only; it is not a commercial
document because it is not a document used by merchants or businessmen to
promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions 22(86) nor is it defined and
regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law. 23(87) Rather, it is
a private document, which has been defined as a deed or instrument executed by a
private person without the intervention of a public notary or of other person
legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced
or set forth, 24(88) because it acted as the authorization for the release of the
P21,000.00 finder's fee to Guilas and as the receipt evidencing the payment of this
finder's fee.
While the first and second elements of the offense charged in the
information were satisfactorily established by the prosecution, it is the third
element which is decisive in the instant case. In the information, it was alleged that
petitioner caused damage in the amount of P21,000.00 to AFPSLAI because he
Copyright 1994-2016
30
caused it to appear in the disbursement voucher that Diosdado Guilas was entitled
to a P21,000.00 finder's fee when in truth and in fact AFPSLAI owed no such sum
to him. However, contrary to these allegations in the information, petitioner was
able to prove that AFPSLAI owed a finder's fee in the amount of P21,000.00
although not to Guilas but to Ernesto Hernandez.
It was positively shown that Hernandez was able to solicit a P2,100,000.00
worth of investment for AFPSLAI from Rosario Mercader which entitled him to a
finder's fee equivalent to one percent of the amount solicited (i.e., P21,000.00)
under the Finder's Fee Program. The documentary evidence consisting of the
Certificate of Capital Contribution Monthly No. 52178 25(89) which was
presented by the prosecution categorically stated that Rosario Mercader deposited
P2,100,000.00 worth of investment in AFPSLAI. In fact, Rosario Mercader was
no longer presented as a defense witness in view of the stipulation by the
prosecution on the fact that Mercader was a depositor of AFPSLAI and that
Hernandez was the one who convinced her to make such deposit. 26(90)
Moreover, the defense showed that the disbursement voucher was merely placed
in the name of Guilas upon the request of Hernandez so that he would have a
lower tax base. Thus, after Guilas received the P21,000.00 from AFPSLAI, he
gave the money to petitioner who in turn surrendered the amount to Hernandez.
It was further established that Hernandez was an associate member of
AFPSLAI and, thus, covered by the Finder's Fee Program. The prosecution tried to
cast doubt on the validity of Hernandez's membership in the association but it
merely relied on the unsubstantiated claims of its two rebuttal witnesses, namely,
Ma. Victoria Maigue, membership affairs office supervisor of AFPSLAI and Ma.
Fe Moreno, legal officer of AFPSLAI, who claimed that Hernandez was
disqualified from being an associate member under AFPSLAI's by-laws. However,
except for a recital of certain provisions of the by-laws, they failed to support their
claims with documentary evidence clearly showing that Hernandez was
disqualified from being an associate member. Significantly, Maigue admitted on
cross-examination that Hernandez's membership was approved by AFPSLAI's
membership committee and was issued an AFPSLAI I.D. card. 27(91)
Documentary evidence consisting of Hernandez's I.D. card as well as the oral
testimonies of petitioner, Arevalo and Hernandez, and the admission of Maigue on
cross-examination, support the claim of the defense that Hernandez was an
associate member of AFPSLAI.
cSaADC
Considering that Hernandez was able to solicit a P2,100,000.00 investment

from Mercader, it follows that he was entitled to receive the finder's fee in the
amount of P21,000.00. AFPSLAI suffered no damage because it really owed the
P21,000.00 finder's fee to Hernandez albeit the sum was initially paid to Guilas
and only later turned over to Hernandez. Clearly then, the third essential element
Copyright 1994-2016
31
of the offense as alleged in the information, i.e., the falsification caused damage to
AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00, was not proven by the prosecution.
In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 28(92) It has the duty
to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to
warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for any other crime necessarily
included therein. However, in the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove the
third essential element of the crime charged in the information. Thus, petitioner
should be acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence.
The trial court convicted petitioner of falsification of private document,
while conceding that AFPSLAI suffered no damage, however, the court reasoned
that the third essential element of falsification of private document was present
because the falsification of the voucher was done with criminal intent to cause
damage to the government considering that its purpose was to lower the tax base
of Hernandez and, thus, allow him to evade payment of taxes on the finder's fee.
We find ourselves unable to agree with this ratiocination of the trial court
because it violates the constitutional right 29(93) of petitioner to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As early as the 1904 case of
U.S. v. Karelsen, 30(94) the rationale of this fundamental right of the accused was
already explained in this wise:
The object of this written accusation was First. To furnish the
accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him
to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and
third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether
they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
(United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.) In order that this requirement
may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is
made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint
with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant),
and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation
of every fact and circumstances necessary to constitute the crime charged.
31(95) (Emphasis supplied)
It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be

alleged in the information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of
a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare
his defense because he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts
that constitute the offense. 32(96) The allegations of facts constituting the offense
charged are substantial matters and an accused's right to question his conviction
Copyright 1994-2016
32
based on facts not alleged in the information cannot be waived. 33(97) No matter
how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be
convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the information on which he is
tried or is necessarily included therein. 34(98) To convict him of a ground not
alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would
plainly be unfair and underhanded. 35(99) The rule is that a variance between the
allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the
criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it
affects his substantial rights. 36(100)
Thus, in Alonto v. People, 37(101) Dico v. Court of Appeals 38(102) and
Ongson v. People, 39(103) we acquitted the accused for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 ("The Bouncing Checks Law") because there was a variance
between the identity and date of issuance of the check alleged in the information
and the check proved by the prosecution during trial:
This Court notes, however, that under the third count, the
information alleged that petitioner issued a check dated May 14, 1992
whereas the documentary evidence presented and duly marked as Exhibit "I"
was BPI Check No. 831258 in the amount of P25,000 dated April 5, 1992.
Prosecution witness Fernando Sardes confirmed petitioner's issuance of the
three BPI checks (Exhibits "G," "H," and "I"), but categorically stated that
the third check (BPI Check No. 831258) was dated May 14, 1992, which
was contrary to that testified to by private complainant Violeta Tizon, i.e.,
BPI check No. 831258 dated April 5, 1992. In view of this variance, the
conviction of petitioner on the third count (Criminal Case No. Q-93-41751)
cannot be sustained. It is on this ground that petitioner's fourth assignment
of error is tenable, in that the prosecution's exhibit, i.e., Exhibit "I" (BPI
Check No. 831258 dated April 5, 1992 in the amount of P25,000) is
excluded by the law and the rules on evidence. Since the identity of the
check enters into the first essential element of the offense under Section 1 of
B.P. 22, that is, that a person makes, draws or issues a check on account or
for value, and the date thereof involves its second element, namely, that at
the time of issue the maker, drawer or issuer knew that he or she did not
have sufficient funds to cover the same, there is a violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged in
view of the aforesaid variance, thereby rendering the conviction for the third
count fatally defective. 40(104) (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the case of Burgos v. Sandiganbayan, 41(105) we upheld the

constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the accusation against him in
a case involving a variance between the means of committing the violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 alleged in the information and the means found by the
Sandiganbayan:
Copyright 1994-2016
33
Common and foremost among the issues raised by petitioners is the

argument that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting them on a finding of
fact that was not alleged in the information. They contend that the
information charged them with having allowed payment of P83,850 to
Ricardo Castaeda despite being aware and knowing fully well that the
surveying instruments were not actually repaired and rendered
functional/operational. However, their conviction by the Sandiganbayan was
based on the finding that the surveying instruments were not repaired in
accordance with the specifications contained in the job orders.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In criminal cases, where the life and liberty of the accused is at stake,
due process requires that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense
unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him
of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would
be a violation of this constitutional right.
The important end to be accomplished is to describe the act with
sufficient certainty in order that the accused may be appraised of the nature
of the charge against him and to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to
injustice. Otherwise, the accused would be left in the unenviable state of
speculating why he is made the object of a prosecution.
xxx
xxx
xxx
There is no question that the manner of commission alleged in the

information and the act the Sandiganbayan found to have been committed
are both violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Nonetheless, they are and
remain two different means of execution and, even if reference to Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019 has been made in the information, appellants' conviction
should only be based on that which was charged, or included, in the
information. Otherwise, there would be a violation of their constitutional
right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against them.
HIcTDE
In Evangelista v. People, a judgment of conviction by the

Sandiganbayan, for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, was reversed by the Court on the ground that accused was
made liable for acts different from those described in the information. The
accused therein was convicted on the finding that she failed to identify with
certainty in her certification the kinds of taxes paid by Tanduay Distillery,
Inc., although the information charged her with falsifying said certificate.
The Court said that, constitutionally, the accused has a right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. To convict her of an
offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a
violation of this constitutional right.
Copyright 1994-2016
34
Contrary to the stand of the prosecution, the allegations contained in

the information and the findings stated in the Sandiganbayan decision are
not synonymous. This is clearly apparent from the mere fact that the
defenses applicable for each one are different. To counter the allegations
contained in the information, petitioners only had to prove that the
instruments were repaired and rendered functional/operational. Under the
findings stated in the Sandiganbayan decision, petitioners' defense would
have been to show not only that the instruments were repaired, but were
repaired in accordance with the job order.
xxx
xxx
xxx
This is not to say that petitioners cannot be convicted under the

information charged. The information in itself is valid. It is only that the
Sandiganbayan erred in convicting them for an act that was not alleged
therein. . . . . 42(106) (Underscoring supplied)
As in the Burgos case, the information in the case at bar is valid, however,
there is a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced
during trial with respect to the third essential element of falsification of private
document, i.e., the falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to
cause damage to a third party. To reiterate, petitioner was charged in the
information with causing damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00
because he caused it to appear in the disbursement voucher that Guilas was
entitled to a P21,000.00 finder's fee when in truth and in fact AFPSLAI owed no
such amount to Guilas. However, he was convicted by the trial court of falsifying
the voucher with criminal intent to cause damage to the government because the
trial court found that petitioner's acts were designed to lower the tax base of
Hernandez and aid the latter in evading payment of taxes on the finder's fee.
We find this variance material and prejudicial to petitioner which, perforce,
is fatal to his conviction in the instant case. By the clear and unequivocal terms of
the information, the prosecution endeavored to prove that the falsification of the
voucher by petitioner caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00
and not that the falsification of the voucher was done with intent to cause damage
to the government. It is apparent that this variance not merely goes to the identity
of the third party but, more importantly, to the nature and extent of the damage
done to the third party. Needless to state, the defense applicable for each is
different.
More to the point, petitioner prepared his defense based precisely on the
allegations in the information. A review of the records shows that petitioner
concentrated on disproving that AFPSLAI suffered damage for this was the charge
in the information which he had to refute to prove his innocence. As previously
Copyright 1994-2016
35
discussed, petitioner proved that AFPSLAI suffered no damage inasmuch as it

really owed the finder's fee in the amount of P21,000.00 to Hernandez but the
same was placed in the name of Guilas upon Hernandez's request. If we were to
convict petitioner now based on his intent to cause damage to the government, we
would be riding roughshod over his constitutional right to be informed of the
accusation because he was not forewarned that he was being prosecuted for intent
to cause damage to the government. It would be simply unfair and underhanded to
convict petitioner on this ground not alleged while he was concentrating his
defense against the ground alleged.
SDHTEC
The surprise and injustice visited upon petitioner becomes more evident if
we take into consideration that the prosecution never sought to establish that
petitioner's acts were done with intent to cause damage to the government in that it
purportedly aided Hernandez in evading the payment of taxes on the finder's fee.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue was never made a party to this case. The income
tax return of Hernandez was, likewise, never presented to show the extent, if any,
of the actual damage to the government of the supposed under declaration of
income by Hernandez. Actually, the prosecution never tried to establish actual
damage, much less intent to cause damage, to the government in the form of lost
income taxes. There was here no opportunity for petitioner to object to the
evidence presented by the prosecution on the ground that the evidence did not
conform to the allegations in the information for the simple reason that no such
evidence was presented by the prosecution to begin with.
Instead, what the trial court did was to deduce intent to cause damage to the
government from the testimony of petitioner and his three other witnesses, namely,
Arevalo, Hernandez and Madet, that the substitution of the names in the voucher
was intended to lower the tax base of Hernandez to avoid payment of taxes on the
finder's fee. In other words, the trial court used part of the defense of petitioner in
establishing the third essential element of the offense which was entirely different
from that alleged in the information. Under these circumstances, petitioner
obviously had no opportunity to defend himself with respect to the charge that he
committed the acts with intent to cause damage to the government because this
was part of his defense when he explained the reason for the substitution of the
names in the voucher with the end goal of establishing that no actual damage was
done to AFPSLAI. If we were to approve of the method employed by the trial
court in convicting petitioner, then we would be sanctioning the surprise and
injustice that the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him precisely seeks to prevent. It would be plain
denial of due process.
In view of the foregoing, we rule that it was error to convict petitioner for
acts which purportedly constituted the third essential element of the crime but
Copyright 1994-2016
36
which were entirely different from the acts alleged in the information because it
violates in no uncertain terms petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
No doubt tax evasion is a deplorable act because it deprives the government
of much needed funds in delivering basic services to the people. However, the
culpability of petitioner should have been established under the proper information
and with an opportunity for him to adequately prepare his defense. It is worth
mentioning that the public prosecutor has been apprised of petitioner's defense in
the counter-affidavit 43(107) that he filed before the NBI. He claimed there that
AFPSLAI really owed the P21,000.00 finder's fee not to Guilas but to Hernandez
and that the finder's fee was placed in the name of Guilas under a purported
financial arrangement between petitioner and Guilas. Yet in his Resolution
44(108) dated September 14, 1992, the public prosecutor disregarded petitioner's
defense and proceeded to file the information based on the alleged damage that
petitioner caused to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 representing
unwarranted payment of finder's fee. 45(109) During the trial proper, the
prosecution was again alerted to the fact that AFPSLAI suffered no actual damage
and that the substitution of the names in the voucher was designed to aid
Hernandez in evading the payment of taxes on the finder's fee. This was shown by
no less than the prosecution's own documentary evidence the Certificate of
Capital Contribution Monthly No. 52178 in the amount of P2,100,000.00 issued to
Rosario Mercader which was prepared and identified by the prosecution witness,
Judy Balangue. Later on, the testimonies of the defense witnesses, Arevalo,
Hernandez, Madet and petitioner, clearly set forth the reasons for the substitution
of the names in the disbursement voucher. However, the prosecution did not take
steps to seek the dismissal of the instant case and charge petitioner and his cohorts
with the proper information before judgment by the trial court as expressly
allowed under Section 19, 46(110) Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. 47(111)
Instead, the prosecution proceeded to try petitioner under the original information
even though he had an adequate defense against the offense charged in the
information. Regrettably, these mistakes of the prosecution can only benefit
petitioner.
EIDaAH
In closing, it is an opportune time to remind public prosecutors of their

important duty to carefully study the evidence on record before filing the
corresponding information in our courts of law and to be vigilant in identifying
and rectifying errors made. Mistakes in filing the proper information and in the
ensuing prosecution of the case serve only to frustrate the State's interest in
enforcing its criminal laws and adversely affect the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2004
Decision and April 26, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
Copyright 1994-2016
37
No. 26556 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED based on
reasonable doubt. The Bail Bond is CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
Rollo, pp. 82-100. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and

concurred in by Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Vicente S.E. Veloso.
Id. at 25-61. Penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada.
Id. at 16-18.
Records, pp. 44-47.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 411-413.
Id. at 460-461.
SEC. 24. Reopening. At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction,
the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen
the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be
terminated within thirty (30) days from the order granting it.
Rollo, pp. 520-521.
People v. Yam-id, 368 Phil. 131, 137 (1999).
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. The
penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of
not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
xxx
xxx
xxx
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause
such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in the next preceding article.
xxx
18.
xxx
xxx
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic

minister. The penalty of prisin mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of
the following acts:
1.
Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2.
Copyright 1994-2016
38
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

3.
Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding
statements other than those in fact made by them;
4.
5.
6.
Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which
changes its meaning;
7.
Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy
of an original document when no such original exits, or including in such copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8.
Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof
in a protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who
shall commit any of the offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraph of this
article, with respect to any record or document of such character that its
falsification may affect the civil status of persons.
17 Phil. 273 (1910).
Id. at 278-279.
Citing People v. Francisco, C.A. No. 05130-41-CR, August 23, 1966, 64 O.G.
537, 541, cited in Luis B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book II (14th
ed., 1998), p. 234. In People v. Francisco, the Court of Appeals ruled that "the
cash disbursement vouchers here in question are not negotiable instruments nor
are they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce. They are nothing more
than receipts evidencing payment to borrowers of the loans extended to them and
as such are private documents only."
Monteverde v. People, 435 Phil. 906, 921 (2002), citing Luis B. Reyes, THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, Book II (14th ed., 1998), p. 236, citing People v.
Lizares, C.A., 65 O.G. 7174.
Luis B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book II (14th ed., 1998), p. 235,
citing People v. Co Beng, C.A., 40 O.G. 1913.
U.S. v. Orera, 11 Phil. 596, 597 (1907).
Records, p. 186.
Id. at 320.
TSN, July 20, 1999, pp. 12-13, 16.
People v. Caigat, 426 Phil. 782, 792 (2002).
CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 14(2).
3 Phil. 223 (1904).
Id. at 226.
Balitaan v. Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, 201 Phil. 311, 323
(1982).
Burgos v. Sandiganbayan, 459 Phil. 794, 810 (2003).
U.S. v. Campo, 23 Phil. 368, 371 (1912).
People v. Pailano, G.R. No. 43602, January 31, 1989, 169 SCRA 649, 654.
41 Am Jur 2d 259, pp. 863-864.
G.R. No. 140078, December 9, 2004, 445 SCRA 624.
G.R. No. 141669, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 441, 454-456.
Copyright 1994-2016
39
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
G.R. No. 156169, August 12, 2005, 466 SCRA 656, 669-671.
Alonto v. People, supra at 640-641.
Supra note 34.
Id. at 804-810.
Records, pp. 19-20.
Id. at 3-7.
The public prosecutor reasoned thus: "We cannot give credence to the protestation
of witness for respondent[,] Hernandez[,] that he was able to convince and solicit
money from Mrs. Rosario Mercader. We may still believe this if it were a
transaction done singly or a couple of times, but the records show that this has
become a plan, a scheme through deceitful means to obtain money thus through
the years caused a drain to AFPSLAI of its much needed funding. Because of this,
Central Bank of the AFPSLAI commenting adversely upon respondent's
actuations in allowing the dissipation of the Association's assets thus resulting in a
few years of its total collapse. Mrs. Mercader was not called upon to explain if
she really was an investor. In cases where corroboration is required, it must be
done, otherwise the party will lose his cause where the testimony of a witness is
contradicted and the fact sought to be proved is important, corroboration is
necessary . . . ."
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. When it
becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense
charged or of any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not
be discharged if there appears to be good cause to detain him. In such case, the
court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the
original case upon the filing of the proper information.
See People v. Uba, 99 Phil. 134 (1956).
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144026. June 15, 2006.]
FERNANDO S. DIZON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Gutierrez Sundiam Villanueva & Doronilla and Ruben L. Almadro for
petitioner.
Copyright 1994-2016
40
The Solicitor General for respondent.

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENT;
ARTICLE 171 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE; PARAGRAPH 2 THEREOF,
ELEMENTS. In order to properly address the issues presented by petitioner, it
is necessary that we discuss the elements of the crime of Falsification of Private
Document under the Revised Penal Code which the petitioner has been accused of
perpetrating. The elements of Falsification under Paragraph 2 of Article 172 are as
follows: 1. That the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except
those in par. 7, enumerated in Art. 171; 2. That the falsification was committed in
any private document; 3. That the falsification caused damage to a third party or at
least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.
2. ID.; ID.; NOT PROVED IN CASE AT BAR. By and large, there
was no competent evidence to prove the allegation of the officers of Titan
Construction Corporation that the signature affixed on the certification was not
that of Vicente Liwag, thus making the issuance of the certification unauthorized.
The prosecution did not present Mr. Vicente Liwag, or any other knowledgeable
witness to testify whether the signature appearing on said certification was indeed
not by Mr. Liwag, thus establishing the fact that the certification was falsified by
making it appear that the issuance was actually consented to by the president of
Titan Construction Corporation. Absent clear proof that Vicente Liwag did not
sanction the issuance of said certification, the Information that petitioner has
committed falsification of private document under Article 172, in relation to par.
2, Article 171, cannot be considerably proved.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS OF PARAGRAPH 4 THEREOF. Under
Article 171, par. 2, a person may commit falsification of a private document by
causing it to appear in a document that a person or persons participated in an act or
proceeding, when such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the act or
proceeding. On the other hand, falsification under par. 4 of Article 171 is
perpetrated by a person who, having a legal obligation to disclose the truth, makes
in a document statements in a narration of facts which are absolutely false with the
wrongful intent of injuring a third person. With respect to par. 4 of Article 171,
what is sought to be penalized is the act of making in a document of utterly false
narration of facts by a person who has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
said facts, thereby causing injury to a third party. And in the case at bar, in order
that petitioner may be penalized under par. 4, it is necessary that the allegations in
the Information that ". . . accused, with intent to damage Titan Construction
Corporation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously prepare a
Copyright 1994-2016
41
document, to wit: a certification dated July 10, 1986, by stating and making it
appear in said document that the First United Construction Corporation has
undertaken building construction, sewage, water, and other civil works, for the
following projects of Titan Construction Corporation: 1. Calapan Super Area Shop
P8,900,000.00; 2. Masbate Super Area Shop P9,800,000.00; 3. Catarman
Super Area Shop P12,000,000.00 . . ., when in truth and in fact, as said accused
well knew . . . that it is false because First United Construction Corporation never
had any participation of the projects listed therein which were undertaken by Titan
Construction Corporation . . ., to the damage and prejudice of Titan Construction
Corporation" be proved.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PROVED IN CASE AT BAR. In the case
at bar, the circumstances relied upon by the trial court do not lead to an inference
exclusively consistent with the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution failed to prove that it was indeed petitioner who prepared the
document nor that he was the one who provided the facts contained in the
certification. Even from the admissions of both petitioner and his father, what can
only be established is that petitioner requested his father to secure a certification
that they had done some construction work for Titan Construction Corporation.
Nothing in said testimony indicates that petitioner had asked his father to commit
any falsification. Petitioner did not provide nor even suggest what detailed
information will be included in said certification. The testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses merely inferred that by virtue of petitioner's position as
Executive Vice President of First United Construction Corporation, he was in
possession of said document and thus can be presumed to be the author of said
falsification. There is nothing in the evidence to support a positive conclusion that
petitioner was actually in possession of the falsified document.
ACcaET
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION THAT THE PERSON WHO IS

BENEFITED BY THE FALSIFIED DOCUMENT IS PRESUMED TO BE THE
AUTHOR, NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. Even the presumption
that the person who is benefited by the falsified document is presumed to be the
author, cannot be applied in this case. Petitioner was not directly benefited by the
certificate. It must be pointed out here that the said certification benefited First
United Construction Corporation which was granted the construction project, and
petitioner was merely an officer of said company and any benefit he may have
received from said project would only have been incidental.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; FINDINGS OF FACT BY THE
TRIAL COURT, AS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIVEN
GREAT RESPECT AND EVEN REGARDED WITH FINALITY;
EXCEPTIONS. As a general rule, findings of fact by the trial court, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are given great respect and even regarded with finality by
Copyright 1994-2016
42
this Court; however, this rule accepts of certain exceptions, such as 1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; 2) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; 4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) when in making its findings,
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; 7) when the
findings are contrary to the trial court; 8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; 10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or 11)
when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. Particularly in criminal cases where the accused stands to lose his
liberty upon conviction, the Court must be content that the findings of fact and the
conclusions drawn by the lower courts leading to his conviction must satisfy the
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
7. ID.; EVIDENCE; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
CONVICTION FOR A CRIMINAL OFFENSE MUST BE BASED ON A
CLEAR AND POSITIVE EVIDENCE AND NOT ON MERE ASSUMPTIONS.
From the foregoing it is clear that Atty. Linsanagan and Jose Caneo had no
personal knowledge as to the matter they testified to. The testimony of Atty.
Linsanagan merely established that he was informed by certain officers of Titan
Construction Corporation that the signature of Vicente Liwag appearing on the
certification was forged, however, the said officers were never presented during
trial to prove such claim of forgery. When evidence is based on what was
supposedly told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight being
patently hearsay. On the other hand, the testimony of Jose Caneo was based on
mere presumptions and speculations, and bare assumptions and speculations
cannot be bases of conviction. A conviction for a criminal offense must be based
on clear and positive evidence and not on mere assumptions. Thus, the reliance by
the lower court on the hearsay and speculative testimonies of the abovecited
witnesses, is misplaced.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE DEGREE OF MORAL CERTAINTY FOR
CONVICTION NOT MET IN CASE AT BAR; ACCUSATION IS NOT
SYNONYMOUS WITH GUILT. From the totality of evidence presented
before the Court, it cannot, with propriety and due respect for the law, be held that
there is sufficiency of competent evidence on which to base an affirmative finding
of guilt in relation to the requisite degree of moral certainty. The Court finds the
testimonies and documents for the prosecution rather weak. While there may be
Copyright 1994-2016
43
inherent weaknesses for the defense, at most, the proofs in this case only cast
suspicion on petitioner. The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench
and the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt.
While the Court is not inclined to hold that the evidence is conclusive that he is
not guilty, neither is it convinced that he is so, based on the circumstances of this
case. The Court is, thus, under a long standing legal injunction to resolve the doubt
in favor of herein petitioner. So long as the acts of the petitioner and the
circumstances can be explained upon any other reasonable hypothesis inconsistent
with his guilt, he must be acquitted.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST OF MORAL CERTAINTY. To
emphasize, the foundation of the ruling of acquittal is reasonable doubt, which
simply means that the prosecution's evidence was not sufficient to sustain the guilt
of the petitioner beyond the point of moral certainty certainty that convinces
and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it. It is
such proof to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of
innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given
to support it. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the
accused's innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the
strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.
And, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction, and, thus, that which is
favorable to the accused should be considered.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J :
p
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision 1(112) of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Decision 2(113) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City,
Branch 109, finding petitioner Fernando S. Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Falsification of Private Document as defined and penalized under
Art. 172, par. 2, in relation to Art. 171, pars. 2 and 4 thereof of the Revised Penal
Code.
Petitioner was charged with falsification of a private document under the
Copyright 1994-2016
44
following information:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July, 1986, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, Fernando S. Dizon, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously commit falsification of a private
document, to wit: Said accused, with intent to damage Titan Construction
Corporation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare
a document, to wit: a certification dated July 10, 1986, by stating and
making it appear in said document that the First United Construction
Corporation has undertaken building construction, sewage, water, and other
civil works, for the following projects of Titan Construction Corporation:
Title
1.
2.
3.
Cost
Calapan Super Area Shop

Masbate Super Area Shop
Catarman Super Area Shop
P8,900,000.00
9,800,000.00
12,000,000.00
and that the same was executed and signed by the President of Titan
Construction Corporation, when in truth and in fact, as said accused well
knew that said certification was not issued nor authorized to be issued by
Titan Construction Corporation and that it is false because First United
Construction Corporation never had any participation of the projects listed
therein which were undertaken by Titan Construction Corporation and that
the signature appearing in said certification as being that of Titan
Construction Corporation's President is false and a forgery since it was not
signed by its President, to the damage and prejudice of Titan Construction
Corporation. 3(114)
Under arraignment on 17 May 1991, accused petitioner pleaded not guilty

to the offense charged.
cTEICD
This criminal case against petitioner originated from a civil action 4(115)
for prohibition, damages with petition for the issuance of temporary restraining
order/preliminary injunction filed by Titan Construction Corporation and
Fernando M. Sopot on 25 January 1991 against the members of the Pre-Post
Qualification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) and the Public Estates
Authority (PEA). In said civil case, plaintiffs maintained that the members of the
PBAC and the PEA erroneously awarded to First United Construction
Corporation, in a bidding held on 30 October 1990, the contract for the
construction of the Bahay Pangarap Project of the PEA.
A witness for the prosecution, Atty. Jaime Linsangan, counsel for Titan
Construction Corporation, presented certain documents submitted by First United
Construction Corporation during the bidding conducted on the Bahay Pangarap
Copyright 1994-2016
45
Project. Among those presented as evidence in court was the alleged

"Certification" dated 10 July 1986 issued by Titan Construction Corporation
which reads as follows:
July 10, 1986
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that FIRST UNITED CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION has undertaken building const'n, sewerage, water, and
other civil works for the following on-going projects of Titan Construction
Corporation
1.
2.
3.
Title
Cost
Calapan Super Area

Masbate Super Area
Catarman Super Area
P8,900,000.00
9,800,000.00
12,000,000.00
Titan Construction Corporation
by:
(Sgd.)
President 5(116)
According to Atty. Linsangan, he had presented a copy of said certification

to the officers of Titan Construction Corporation, and upon verification learned
that the projects mentioned in said certification were never undertaken by First
United Construction Corporation. He was likewise informed by the same officers
that the signature on the said certification was not the signature of the former
President of Titan Construction Corporation, Vicente Liwag.
Another witness, Jose Caneo, testified that he is the Vice President for
Special Projects of Titan Construction Corporation since 1981 and that petitioner
and his father, Felipe Dizon, were his former co-employees and had worked with
them. He alleged that petitioner, as the possessor of the questioned certification,
which petitioner himself submitted to the PEA in support of their bid, must be
presumed to be the author and/or perpetrator of the falsification, and that he
presumes it must be the petitioner who delivered the certification to the PEA as the
certification was among the records of the First United Construction Corporation
where the petitioner was one of its officers. He further claimed that he has no
personal knowledge as to who affixed the forged signature on the document.
cADEIa
For the defense, petitioner and his father testified. From their testimonies, it
was discerned that petitioner is a civil engineer by profession and had worked with
the National Housing Authority from 1978 to 1981. He was likewise an employee
of Titan Construction Corporation as office engineer before he accepted overseas
Copyright 1994-2016
46
employment in Saudi Arabia. Upon his return in 1985, he worked with some
friends and organized their own construction company now known as First United
Construction Corporation. Petitioner had discussed with his father his plans to
participate in government projects and thus, requested the latter to secure a
certification from the Titan Construction Corporation attesting that they had done
some construction works for said company. Thereafter, his father gave him the
certification he requested.
The petitioner claimed that he had no part in the preparation of said
document, and neither does he have knowledge as to who signed said certification,
as his father only informed him that the certification came from Jose Caneo. He
also disclosed that he does not know Mr. Vicente Liwag. Petitioner also admitted
that the First United Construction Corporation had no part in the completion of the
three projects referred to in the certification, but nonetheless allowed his
engineers, specifically, Myleen Hizon, to include said certificate in the documents
submitted for their pre-qualification bid thinking that the signature appearing
therein was genuine. According to petitioner, he only used the questioned
certification due to the belief that the Titan Construction Corporation had
authorized its use, and only came to know of the alleged forgery of the signature
appearing in said document when the criminal case was filed against him.
Furthermore, petitioner maintained that the reason the criminal case was filed
against him was due to his refusal to pay the ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00)
demanded of him by Jose Caneo and Benito Yao, said amount representing the
expected profit from the Bahay Pangarap Project.
Felipe Dizon, father of the petitioner, on his part, testified that he was
employed by Titan Construction Corporation from 1981 until 1991, and was both
vice president and project manager of said corporation in 1986. He stated that his
son requested him to secure a certification to the effect that he had done some
construction work in order to help him take part in public biddings, and explained
that he found nothing wrong with this request as this was an ordinary practice of
construction companies, the same having been done by Titan Construction
Corporation when it was starting. In order to secure said certification, he
approached Jose Caneo and conveyed his son's request. Jose Caneo then told him
to prepare the certification and he will have the same signed by Vicente Liwag.
Thereafter, he asked one of the employees of Titan Construction Corporation to
type said certification, choosing the projects to be mentioned therein as said
projects were known to him as vice president and project manager. He asserted
that when Jose Caneo gave him the certification two weeks later, he was of the
belief that the signature appearing thereon was genuine; otherwise, he would not
have given the same to his son. Also, Felipe Dizon claimed that the case was filed
as a result of the disqualification of Titan Construction Corporation from the
public bidding for the Bahay Pangarap Project, and that he was informed by
Copyright 1994-2016
47
Benito Yao that the case will be withdrawn if his son paid ten million pesos
representing the expected profit from said project.
On rebuttal, Jose Caneo countered that he was never approached by Felipe
Dizon to have any certification signed by Vicente Liwag and likewise denied
demanding any amount from the petitioner for the withdrawal of the case.
STcDIE
After trial and a perusal of the evidence presented, the trial court concluded
that petitioner, then the Executive Vice President of First United Construction
Corporation, in his desire to join public biddings, requested his father to secure a
certification that would show that he had participated in some of the projects of
Titan Construction Corporation, knowing fully well that he in fact had not
participated in any of Titan Construction Corporation's projects. His father, in turn
gave the petitioner a certification allegedly from Titan Construction Corporation
declaring that First United Construction Corporation had participated in the
construction of the three projects mentioned therein. The said certification was
material to enable First United Construction Corporation to qualify for the
pre-qualification bid for the Bahay Pangarap Project of the PEA. As a result of
the submission of said certification, First United Construction Corporation
pre-qualified and was thereafter awarded the project, causing the other bidders,
including Titan Construction Corporation, to lose and thus, sustain loss.
Consequently, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction on 22 April
1993. According to the court a quo:
From the foregoing evidences (sic) it would appear that the accused
Fernando Dizon caused it to appear in the certification that the President of
Titan Construction Corporation, Mr. Vicente Liwag participated in the act of
issuing the said document. His admission to the effect that he caused the
securing of the certification for the purpose of submitting the same to the
Public Estates Authority (PEA) as part of the pre-qualification requirements
in the bidding. In the case of People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil 28; People vs.
Manansala, 105 Phil 1253, the possessor of the falsified document is
presumed to be the author thereof, and the one who stands to benefit
therefrom is presumed to be the author thereof. He admitted requesting his
father to secure the said certification. He likewise admitted that he has no
participation in anyone of the projects mentioned therein. That despite such
knowledge of falsity of the contents of the document he accepted and
allowed the same to be used for the pre-qualification bidding before the
PEA.
His admission to the effect that said certification was necessary to
pre-qualify his company to participate in the bidding for government
projects knowing fully well its falsity shows his intent to misrepresent facts
and/or pervert the truth in the narration of fact contained in the certification
Copyright 1994-2016
48
with a wrongful intent to injure and/or damage third person.

The Court hardly believe[s] the defense of the accused that one
Benito Yao was extorting money from him in the amount of P10,000,000.00
on the promise that the case would be withdrawn. The records of the Titan
Construction Corporation duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission does not show on record that Benito Yao is a stockholder,
director, or officer of the said company.
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
FERNANDO S. DIZON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Falsification of Private Document as defined and penalized under Art. 172,
par. 2 in relation to Art. 171, par. 2 and 4 thereof and hereby sentences him
to imprisonment of Two (2) YEARS, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to
Six (6) Years and a fine of P5,000.00. 6(117)
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the conviction before the Court of Appeals.

On 29 November 1999, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision
affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification of the penalty, the
dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that, absent any aggravating nor mitigating circumstance,
appellant FERNANDO S. DIZON is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor, minimum
term, to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS and TEN (10) DAYS of
prision correccional, as maximum term. All other aspects of the appealed
decision stay. 7(118)
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied; hence,

the instant petition.
DCATHS
Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment
of conviction because the prosecution failed to adduce any proof to substantiate
the allegation that petitioner was involved in the preparation of the falsified
certification, and that the sole basis of the conviction was the legal presumption
that the possessor of the falsified document is presumed to be the author thereof.
Petitioner argues that for said presumption to take hold, it must first be shown that
the questioned document is a forgery or was indeed falsified. According to
petitioner, the foregoing is not true in the instant case because the State failed to
introduce satisfactory evidence of the forgery or falsification of the certification, as
well as to establish that the said certification was unauthorized. Petitioner
rationalizes that while it is true that, other than the signature of the president of
Titan Construction Corporation, the representations made in the certification are
false, it does not necessarily follow that its execution was unauthorized by Titan
Copyright 1994-2016
49
Construction Corporation. He further justifies that there is evidence in record that

attests to a furtive practice in the construction industry where certifications, of the
kind involved in this case, are issued by established construction corporations to
assist new construction firms to pre-qualify in public biddings.
Petitioner also stresses that, based on his testimony and that of his father, it
has been satisfactorily shown that he had no participation in the drafting and
issuance of the certification. Petitioner explains that the certification was prepared
by his father, Felipe Dizon, who was then still an officer of Titan Construction
Corporation, and that through an intermediary, Felipe Dizon arranged to have the
certification signed by the president of Titan Construction Corporation, Vicente
Liwag. Thereafter, Felipe Dizon delivered the signed certification to his son.
Petitioner maintains that with his father's admission of complicity, it was tenuous
for both the trial court and the appellate court to hold that petitioner is the forger of
the certification.
In order to properly address the issues presented by petitioner, it is
necessary that we discuss the elements of the crime of Falsification of Private
Document under the Revised Penal Code which the petitioner has been accused of
perpetrating. The elements of Falsification under Paragraph 2 of Article 172 are as
follows:
1.
That the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except

those in par. 7, enumerated in Art. 171;
2.
That the falsification was committed in any private document;
3.
That the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the

falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.
Under Article 171, par. 2, a person may commit falsification of a private

document by causing it to appear in a document that a person or persons
participated in an act or proceeding, when such person or persons did not in fact so
participate in the act or proceeding. On the other hand, falsification under par. 4 of
Article 171 is perpetrated by a person who, having a legal obligation to disclose
the truth, makes in a document statements in a narration of facts which are
absolutely false with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
In order that petitioner may be convicted of falsification under par. 2 of
Article 171, it is essential that it be proved beyond reasonable doubt that he had
caused it to appear that Mr. Vicente Liwag had authorized the issuance of said
certification, when in truth, Mr. Liwag did not partake in said issuance of the
certificate. Stated differently, for petitioner to be convicted of falsification under
par. 2, the allegation in the Information that he "willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously prepare a document, to wit: a certification dated July 10, 1986, by
Copyright 1994-2016
50
stating and making it appear in said document . . . that the same was executed and
signed by the President of Titan Construction Corporation, when in truth and in
fact, as said accused well knew that said certification was not issued nor
authorized to be issued by Titan Construction Corporation . . . and that the
signature appearing in said certification as being that of Titan Construction
Corporation's President, . . ." must be clearly established.
TSEHcA
The threshold issue then is whether the signature of Mr. Vicente Liwag was
forged. Contrary to the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate
court, this Court deems that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Atty.
Jaime Linsangan and Jose Caneo, failed to prove with moral certainty that Mr.
Liwag did not authorize the issuance of the certification.
As a general rule, findings of fact by the trial court, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are given great respect and even regarded with finality by this
Court; however, this rule accepts of certain exceptions, such as 1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; 2) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; 4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) when in making its findings,
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; 7) when the
findings are contrary to the trial court; 8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; 10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or 11)
when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. 8(119) Particularly in criminal cases where the accused stands to lose
his liberty upon conviction, the Court must be content that the findings of fact and
the conclusions drawn by the lower courts leading to his conviction must satisfy
the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The conviction of petitioner was anchored on the testimonies of Atty.
Linsangan that he was informed by the officers of Titan Construction Corporation
that the signature appearing on the certification was not the signature of the
corporation president Vicente Liwag; and of Jose Caneo that he has no personal
knowledge as to who actually affixed the signature on the certification and that he
presumes it to be the petitioner. He (Caneo) assumes that it must be petitioner who
was in possession of the document as he presumes that it must be petitioner who
delivered the certification to the PEA as the certification was among the records
submitted by First United Construction Corporation, where the petitioner was one
Copyright 1994-2016
51
of the officers.
From the foregoing, the Court holds that the prosecution fell short of
sufficiently ascertaining that the signature appearing in the certification was, in
fact, not that of Mr. Vicente Liwag, much less, that petitioner is the author of the
certification. Atty. Linsangan was merely informed that the signature appearing in
the certification was not that of Mr. Liwag. On the other hand, Jose Caneo only
presumed that petitioner was the possessor of the alleged falsified document as he
assumed that it was petitioner who delivered the certification to the PEA. Jose
Caneo's presumption was, however, directly demolished by the cross-examination
of Atty. Crescini:
Atty. Crescini:
Mr. Caneo, I address your attention to paragraph 8 of your affidavit
complaint which reads: "that being in possession of the said
certification which he himself submitted to the PEA in support of
their bid, the said Fernando S. Dizon is presumed to be the
author/perpetrator of the said falsification." You remember this
allegation of this affidavit-complaint?
SDAaTC
Mr. Caneo:
Yes, sir.
Q:
I understand and take it therefore that your only conclusion in

believing that the certification Annex A of your affidavit complaint
was falsified by the accused is because he was allegedly in
possession of the same?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
It actually therefore also goes [to say that] you did not actually see
him prepare physically the certification Annex A, you did not see it?
A:
I did not see.
Q:
You have no personal knowledge as to who affix(ed) the signature

on Annex A purporting to be the signature of the President. You did
not see it also?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
You have no personal knowledge of who affix(ed) the signature?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
As a matter of fact, when you claimed that Mr. Dizon was the one
Copyright 1994-2016
52
who himself submitted to the PEA this certification, Annex A, you

only presumed it was he who personally delivered it?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
You did not see him in person actually in the act of delivering that
certification to the PEA?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
You only presumed he was the one who delivered it because the
certification was among the records of the FUCC?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
And you further made the presumption because Mr. Dizon is an

officer of FUCC?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
That's all you know, your presumptions?
A:
Yes, sir. 9(120)
Thus, the presumption then of Jose Caneo is totally devoid of any basis.
From the foregoing it is clear that Atty. Linsangan and Jose Caneo had no
personal knowledge as to the matter they testified to. The testimony of Atty.
Linsangan merely established that he was informed by certain officers of Titan
Construction Corporation that the signature of Vicente Liwag appearing on the
certification was forged, however, the said officers where never presented during
trial to prove such claim of forgery. When evidence is based on what was
supposedly told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight being
patently hearsay. 10(121) On the other hand, the testimony of Jose Caneo was
based on mere presumptions and speculations, and bare assumptions and
speculations cannot be bases for conviction. 11(122) A conviction for a criminal
offense must be based on clear and positive evidence and not on mere
assumptions. 12(123) Thus, the reliance by the lower court on the hearsay and
speculative testimonies of the abovecited witnesses, is misplaced.
acITSD
By and large, there was no competent evidence to prove the allegation of

the officers of Titan Construction Corporation that the signature affixed on the
certification was not that of Vicente Liwag, thus making the issuance of the
certification unauthorized. The prosecution did not present Mr. Vicente Liwag, or
any other knowledgeable witness to testify whether the signature appearing on
said certification was indeed not by Mr. Liwag, thus establishing the fact that the
Copyright 1994-2016
53
certification was falsified by making it appear that the issuance was actually
consented to by the president of Titan Construction Corporation. Absent clear
proof that Vicente Liwag did not sanction the issuance of said certification, the
Information that petitioner has committed falsification of private document under
Article 172, in relation to par. 2, Article 171, cannot be considerably proved.
With respect to par. 4 of Article 171, what is sought to be penalized is the
act of making in a document of utterly false narration of facts by a person who has
a legal obligation to disclose the truth of said facts, thereby causing injury to a
third party. And in the case at bar, in order that petitioner may be penalized under
par. 4, it is necessary that the allegations in the Information that ". . . accused, with
intent to damage Titan Construction Corporation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously prepare a document, to wit: a certification dated July
10, 1986, by stating and making it appear in said document that the First United
Construction Corporation has undertaken building construction, sewage, water,
and other civil works, for the following projects of Titan Construction
Corporation: 1. Calapan Super Area Shop P8,900,000.00; 2. Masbate Super
Area Shop P9,800,000.00; 3. Catarman Super Area Shop P12,000,000.00 . .
., when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew . . . that it is false because
First United Construction Corporation never had any participation of the projects
listed therein which were undertaken by Titan Construction Corporation . . ., to the
damage and prejudice of Titan Construction Corporation" be proved.
According to the court a quo, it has been substantially gathered from the
evidence adduced in trial that:
. . . [A]ccused Fernando Dizon, then the Executive Vice-President of the
First United Construction Corporation, in his desire to be able to join public
biddings, requested his father Felipe Dizon to secure a certification to the
effect that he has participated in certain projects of the Titan Construction
Corporation, knowing fully well that he has no participation whatsoever on
said projects. That the father in turn gave the son a certification from the
Titan Construction Corporation to the effect that he has participated in the
construction of the three (3) projects mentioned therein. That the said
certification is material to enable him to qualify the pre-qualification bid for
the Bahay Pangarap Project. That because of the certification submitted, he
actually pre-qualified and was awarded the project. That the same caused the
other bidders to lose in the bid, hence damage is present. 13(124)
From the foregoing, the trial court concluded that the elements of the crime
of falsification under par. 4 of Article 171 necessary to convict petitioner,
particularly that a) the offender makes in a document statements in a narration of
facts; b) that he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by
him; c) that the fact narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and d) that the
Copyright 1994-2016
54
perversion of the truth in the narration of fact was made with the wrongful intent
of injuring a third person are present in the instant case.
THaDEA
The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the trial court, further stressed that
petitioner admitted in court that he had requested his father to secure a certification
from the Titan Construction Corporation declaring that First United Construction
Corporation had done some construction work for the former; that said
certification was necessary for First United Construction Corporation to qualify in
public biddings for government projects; and that petitioner knew fully well the
falsity in said statements. Said acts of the accused caused damage not only to Titan
Construction Corporation which suffered when it lost in the bidding, but also to
the State which expected faithful compliance with the requirements of
prequalification, bids, and awards on government infrastructure contracts as
provided under Presidential Decree No. 1594.
This Court is not convinced. In the case at bar, the circumstances relied
upon by the trial court do not lead to an inference exclusively consistent with the
guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to prove
that it was indeed petitioner who prepared the document nor that he was the one
who provided the facts contained in the certification. Even from the admissions of
both petitioner and his father, what can only be established is that petitioner
requested his father to secure a certification that they had done some construction
work for Titan Construction Corporation. Nothing in said testimony indicates that
petitioner had asked his father to commit any falsification. Petitioner did not
provide nor even suggest what detailed information will be included in said
certification.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses merely inferred that by virtue
of petitioner's position as Executive Vice President of First United Construction
Corporation, he was in possession of said document and thus can be presumed to
be the author of said falsification. There is nothing in the evidence to support a
positive conclusion that petitioner was actually in possession of the falsified
document.
Even the presumption that the person who is benefited by the falsified
document is presumed to be the author, cannot be applied in this case. Petitioner
was not directly benefited by the certificate. It must be pointed out here that the
said certification benefited First United Construction Corporation which was
granted the construction project, and petitioner was merely an officer of said
company and any benefit he may have received from said project would only have
been incidental.
From the totality of evidence presented before the Court, it cannot, with
propriety and due respect for the law, be held that there is sufficiency of competent
Copyright 1994-2016
55
evidence on which to base an affirmative finding of guilt in relation to the

requisite degree of moral certainty. The Court finds the testimonies and documents
for the prosecution rather weak. While there may be inherent weaknesses for the
defense, at most, the proofs in this case only cast suspicion on petitioner. The
principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this
jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt. While the Court is not
inclined to hold that the evidence is conclusive that he is not guilty, neither is it
convinced that he is so, based on the circumstances of this case. The Court is, thus,
under a long standing legal injunction to resolve the doubt in favor of herein
petitioner. So long as the acts of the petitioner and the circumstances can be
explained upon any other reasonable hypothesis inconsistent with his guilt, he
must be acquitted.
HDITCS
To emphasize, the foundation of the ruling of acquittal is reasonable doubt,

which simply means that the prosecution's evidence was not sufficient to sustain
the guilt of the petitioner beyond the point of moral certainty certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon
it. 14(125) It is such proof to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the
presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that
which it is given to support it. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper
even though the accused's innocence may be doubted, 15(126) for a criminal
conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the defense. 16(127) And, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction, 17(128) and, thus, that which is favorable to the accused should be
considered. 18(129)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20143,
dated 29 November 1999, affirming the Decision dated 22 April 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay, Branch 109, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Instead, a new one is entered ACQUITTING petitioner Fernando S.
Dizon of the crime of Falsification of Private Document as defined and penalized
under Art. 172, par. 2, in relation to Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, on
reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
Copyright 1994-2016
56
Footnotes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
CA-G.R. CR No. 20143, dated 29 November 1999, penned by Associate Justice

Ruben T. Reyes (now Presiding Justice) with Associate Justices Jainal D. Rasul
and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring.
Crim. Case No. 91-0716 dated 22 April 1993.
Rollo, pp. 114-115.
Civil Case No. 91-213 entitled, "Titan Construction Corporation and Fernando
M. Sopot v. Atty. Luis B. Pangilinan, Jr., as Chairman, Engineer Manuel Berina,
Atty. Dan Amosin and Mr. Pelayo Laplap, as members of the Pre-Post
Authority."
Rollo, p. 116.
RTC Decision, pp. 11-13; rollo, pp. 124-126.
CA Decision, p.18; rollo, p. 92.
Spouses Almendrala v. Spouses Wing On Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30 September
2005, 471 SCRA 311, 322.
TSN, 31 July 1991, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 39-41.
People v. Sarabia, 376 Phil. 32, 43 (1999).
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, 357 Phil. 762, 808 (1998).
Gaerlan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57876, 6 November 1989, 179 SCRA 20,
25.
Rollo, p. 123.
People v. Salguero, G.R. No. 89117, 19 June 1991, 198 SCRA 357, 377.
People v. Fronda, 384 Phil. 732, 743 (2000).
Id., pp. 743-744.
People v. Ale, 229 Phil. 81, 93-94 (1986).
People v. Bautista, 81 Phil. 78, 80 (1948).
Copyright 1994-2016
57
Endnotes
1 (Popup - Popup)
1.
Rollo, pp. 39-89.
2 (Popup - Popup)
2.
Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with

Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring;
Annex "A" of the Petition; id. at 90-108.
3 (Popup - Popup)
3.
Annex "A-1"; id. at 110.
4 (Popup - Popup)
4.
Id. at 157.
5 (Popup - Popup)
5.
Id. at 159.
6 (Popup - Popup)
6.
Annex "B" of the Petition; id. at 161-163.
7 (Popup - Popup)
7.
Originally named as Jose Miguel Garcia.
8 (Popup - Popup)
8.
Report of Neuropsychological Evaluation conducted by Lourdes K. Ledesma,

Ph.D.; rollo, pp. 299-304.
9 (Popup - Popup)
9.
Conducted by Dr. Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villasor, a clinical psychologist. Id. at

294-298.
Copyright 1994-2016
58
10 (Popup - Popup)
10.
Id.
11 (Popup - Popup)
11.
Id. at 232.
12 (Popup - Popup)
12.
Id. at 230-232.
13 (Popup - Popup)
13.
Id. at 212-224.
14 (Popup - Popup)
14.
Id. at 275-278.
15 (Popup - Popup)
15.
Id.
16 (Popup - Popup)
16.
Id. at 287.
17 (Popup - Popup)
17.
Id.
18 (Popup - Popup)
18.
Id. at 288-291.
19 (Popup - Popup)
Copyright 1994-2016
59
19.
Id. at 314-316.
20 (Popup - Popup)
20.
Id. at 309-312.
21 (Popup - Popup)
21.
Id. at 279-281.
22 (Popup - Popup)
22.
Id. at 162.
23 (Popup - Popup)
23.
Id.
24 (Popup - Popup)
24.
Id.
25 (Popup - Popup)
25.
Gibson T. Araula, Jr.
26 (Popup - Popup)
26.
Rollo, pp. 161-163.
27 (Popup - Popup)
27.
Id. at 163.
28 (Popup - Popup)
28.
Id. at 164-206.
Copyright 1994-2016
60
29 (Popup - Popup)
29.
Id. at 157.
30 (Popup - Popup)
30.
Id. at 107.
31 (Popup - Popup)
31.
Id. at 51-54.
32 (Popup - Popup)
32.
Id. at 105-106.
33 (Popup - Popup)
33.
Id. at 107.
34 (Popup - Popup)
34.
Id. at 53.
35 (Popup - Popup)
35.
Id.
36 (Popup - Popup)
36.
Id.
37 (Popup - Popup)
37.
Id. at 659.
38 (Popup - Popup)
38.
Id. at 660.
Copyright 1994-2016
61
39 (Popup - Popup)
39.
Id. at 764-765.
40 (Popup - Popup)
40.
Id. at 765.
41 (Popup - Popup)
41.
Id. at 863.
42 (Popup - Popup)
42.
Id. at 733.
43 (Popup - Popup)
43.
R.R. Paredes v. Calilung, G.R. No. 156055, 5 March 2007, 517 SCRA 369, 394.
44 (Popup - Popup)
44.
Id.
45 (Popup - Popup)
45.
Id.
46 (Popup - Popup)
46.
Webb v. Hon. De Leon, 317 Phil. 758, 789 (1995).
47 (Popup - Popup)
47.
48 (Popup - Popup)
Copyright 1994-2016
62
48.
Webb v. Hon. De Leon, supra note 46 at 800.
49 (Popup - Popup)
49.
Andres v. Cuevas, G.R. No. 150869, 9 June 2005, 460 SCRA 38, 52.
50 (Popup - Popup)
50.
D.M. Consuji, Inc. v. Esguerra, 328 Phil. 1168, 1185 (1996).
51 (Popup - Popup)
51.
52 (Popup - Popup)
52.
Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 154239-41, 16 February 2005, 451

SCRA 533, 549.
53 (Popup - Popup)
53.
Rollo, pp. 235-243.
54 (Popup - Popup)
54.
Id. at 208.
55 (Popup - Popup)
55.
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two (13th ed.), p. 457.
56 (Popup - Popup)
56.
36 Phil. 840, 840-841 (1917).
57 (Popup - Popup)
57.
Solis, Legal Medicine (1987 ed.), p. 623.
Copyright 1994-2016
63
58 (Popup - Popup)
58.
Clugston, Dictionary of Science (1998 ed.), p. 558.
59 (Popup - Popup)
59.
Schwartz, Shires, Spencer, Storer, Principle of Surgery, Vol. Two (4th ed.), pp.
1729-1730.
60 (Popup - Popup)
60.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993 ed.), p. 1493.
61 (Popup - Popup)
61.
Id. at 349.
62 (Popup - Popup)
62.
Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, 9 November 1993, 227 SCRA 627,
643.
63 (Popup - Popup)
63.
Id.
64 (Popup - Popup)
*
Justice Renato C. Corona was designated to sit as additional member replacing

Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 10 December 2007.
65 (Popup - Popup)
1.
Rollo, pp. 82-100. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and

concurred in by Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Vicente S.E. Veloso.
66 (Popup - Popup)
2.
Copyright 1994-2016
64
67 (Popup - Popup)
3.
Id. at 16-18.
68 (Popup - Popup)
4.
Records, pp. 44-47.
69 (Popup - Popup)
5.
Id. at 1-2.
70 (Popup - Popup)
6.
Id. at 116.
71 (Popup - Popup)
7.
Id. at 181.
72 (Popup - Popup)
8.
Id. at 182.
73 (Popup - Popup)
9.
Id. at 186.
74 (Popup - Popup)
10.
Id. at 320.
75 (Popup - Popup)
11.
76 (Popup - Popup)
12.
Id. at 411-413.
Copyright 1994-2016
65
77 (Popup - Popup)
13.
Id. at 460-461.
78 (Popup - Popup)
14.
SEC. 24. Reopening. At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction,
the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen
the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be
terminated within thirty (30) days from the order granting it.
79 (Popup - Popup)
15.
Rollo, pp. 520-521.
80 (Popup - Popup)
16.
People v. Yam-id, 368 Phil. 131, 137 (1999).
81 (Popup - Popup)
17.
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. The
penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of
not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
xxx
xxx
xxx
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause
such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in the next preceding article.
xxx
xxx
xxx
82 (Popup - Popup)
18.
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic

minister. The penalty of prisin mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of
the following acts:
1.
Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2.
3.
Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding
Copyright 1994-2016
66
statements other than those in fact made by them;

4.
5.
6.
Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which
changes its meaning;
7.
Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy
of an original document when no such original exits, or including in such copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8.
Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof
in a protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who
shall commit any of the offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraph of this
article, with respect to any record or document of such character that its
falsification may affect the civil status of persons.
83 (Popup - Popup)
19.
17 Phil. 273 (1910).
84 (Popup - Popup)
20.
Id. at 278-279.
85 (Popup - Popup)
21.
Citing People v. Francisco, C.A. No. 05130-41-CR, August 23, 1966, 64 O.G.
537, 541, cited in Luis B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book II (14th
ed., 1998), p. 234. In People v. Francisco, the Court of Appeals ruled that "the
cash disbursement vouchers here in question are not negotiable instruments nor
are they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce. They are nothing more
than receipts evidencing payment to borrowers of the loans extended to them and
as such are private documents only."
86 (Popup - Popup)
22.
Monteverde v. People, 435 Phil. 906, 921 (2002), citing Luis B. Reyes, THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, Book II (14th ed., 1998), p. 236, citing People v.
Lizares, C.A., 65 O.G. 7174.
87 (Popup - Popup)
23.
Luis B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book II (14th ed., 1998), p. 235,
citing People v. Co Beng, C.A., 40 O.G. 1913.
Copyright 1994-2016
67
88 (Popup - Popup)
24.
U.S. v. Orera, 11 Phil. 596, 597 (1907).
89 (Popup - Popup)
25.
Records, p. 186.
90 (Popup - Popup)
26.
Id. at 320.
91 (Popup - Popup)
27.
TSN, July 20, 1999, pp. 12-13, 16.
92 (Popup - Popup)
28.
People v. Caigat, 426 Phil. 782, 792 (2002).
93 (Popup - Popup)
29.
CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 14(2).
94 (Popup - Popup)
30.
3 Phil. 223 (1904).
95 (Popup - Popup)
31.
Id. at 226.
96 (Popup - Popup)
32.
Balitaan v. Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, 201 Phil. 311, 323
(1982).
Copyright 1994-2016
68
97 (Popup - Popup)
33.
Burgos v. Sandiganbayan, 459 Phil. 794, 810 (2003).
98 (Popup - Popup)
34.
U.S. v. Campo, 23 Phil. 368, 371 (1912).
99 (Popup - Popup)
35.
People v. Pailano, G.R. No. 43602, January 31, 1989, 169 SCRA 649, 654.
100 (Popup - Popup)

36.
41 Am Jur 2d 259, pp. 863-864.
101 (Popup - Popup)

37.
G.R. No. 140078, December 9, 2004, 445 SCRA 624.
102 (Popup - Popup)

38.
G.R. No. 141669, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 441, 454-456.
103 (Popup - Popup)

39.
G.R. No. 156169, August 12, 2005, 466 SCRA 656, 669-671.
104 (Popup - Popup)

40.
Alonto v. People, supra at 640-641.
105 (Popup - Popup)

41.
Supra note 34.
106 (Popup - Popup)

42.
Id. at 804-810.
Copyright 1994-2016
69
107 (Popup - Popup)

43.
Records, pp. 19-20.
108 (Popup - Popup)

44.
Id. at 3-7.
109 (Popup - Popup)

45.
The public prosecutor reasoned thus: "We cannot give credence to the protestation
of witness for respondent[,] Hernandez[,] that he was able to convince and solicit
money from Mrs. Rosario Mercader. We may still believe this if it were a
transaction done singly or a couple of times, but the records show that this has
become a plan, a scheme through deceitful means to obtain money thus through
the years caused a drain to AFPSLAI of its much needed funding. Because of this,
Central Bank of the AFPSLAI commenting adversely upon respondent's
actuations in allowing the dissipation of the Association's assets thus resulting in a
few years of its total collapse. Mrs. Mercader was not called upon to explain if
she really was an investor. In cases where corroboration is required, it must be
done, otherwise the party will lose his cause where the testimony of a witness is
contradicted and the fact sought to be proved is important, corroboration is
necessary . . . ."
110 (Popup - Popup)

46.
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. When it
becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense
charged or of any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not
be discharged if there appears to be good cause to detain him. In such case, the
court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the
original case upon the filing of the proper information.
111 (Popup - Popup)

47.
See People v. Uba, 99 Phil. 134 (1956).
112 (Popup - Popup)

1.
CA-G.R. CR No. 20143, dated 29 November 1999, penned by Associate Justice
Copyright 1994-2016
70
Ruben T. Reyes (now Presiding Justice) with Associate Justices Jainal D. Rasul
and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring.
113 (Popup - Popup)

2.
Crim. Case No. 91-0716 dated 22 April 1993.
114 (Popup - Popup)

3.
Rollo, pp. 114-115.
115 (Popup - Popup)

4.
Civil Case No. 91-213 entitled, "Titan Construction Corporation and Fernando M.
Sopot v. Atty. Luis B. Pangilinan, Jr., as Chairman, Engineer Manuel Berina,
Atty. Dan Amosin and Mr. Pelayo Laplap, as members of the Pre-Post
Authority."
116 (Popup - Popup)

5.
Rollo, p. 116.
117 (Popup - Popup)

6.
RTC Decision, pp. 11-13; rollo, pp. 124-126.
118 (Popup - Popup)

7.
CA Decision, p.18; rollo, p. 92.
119 (Popup - Popup)

8.
Spouses Almendrala v. Spouses Wing On Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30 September

2005, 471 SCRA 311, 322.
120 (Popup - Popup)

9.
TSN, 31 July 1991, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 39-41.
Copyright 1994-2016
71
121 (Popup - Popup)

10.
People v. Sarabia, 376 Phil. 32, 43 (1999).
122 (Popup - Popup)

11.
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, 357 Phil. 762, 808 (1998).
123 (Popup - Popup)

12.
Gaerlan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57876, 6 November 1989, 179 SCRA 20,
25.
124 (Popup - Popup)

13.
Rollo, p. 123.
125 (Popup - Popup)

14.
People v. Salguero, G.R. No. 89117, 19 June 1991, 198 SCRA 357, 377.
126 (Popup - Popup)

15.
People v. Fronda, 384 Phil. 732, 743 (2000).
127 (Popup - Popup)

16.
Id., pp. 743-744.
128 (Popup - Popup)

17.
People v. Ale, 229 Phil. 81, 93-94 (1986).
129 (Popup - Popup)

18.
People v. Bautista, 81 Phil. 78, 80 (1948).
Copyright 1994-2016
72

04 Dizon vs. People

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

04 Dizon vs. People

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 170723. March 3, 2008.]

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2016

Aguirre-Olondriz (Olondriz), Dr. Juvido Agatep (Dr. Agatep), Dr. Marissa B.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2016

21 January 2002, respondent Dr. Pascual made the following recommendation:

the full text of which reads

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2016

assignment to do some photocopying, usually in the mornings. He enjoys

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Larry's mental deficiency could be associated with possible perinatal

Considering the above recommendation, respondent Pedro Aguirre's written

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2016

performed on him by all the respondents.

In addition to the above, the complaint included therein an allegation that

. . . without a PRIOR medical examination, professional interview of

To answer petitioner Gloria Aguirre's accusations against them, respondents

. . . While I am aware and admit that Larry went through a

Neither did I procure or solicit the services of the physician who

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2016

Pedro Aguirre, Larry's guardian, who obtained his services. I merely

Again, I had no participation in the preparation of the report of Dr.

Neither does the Complaint explain in what manner the Complainant

. . . the Complaint does not dispute that he (Larry) is mentally

. . . I verified that the effect of a vasectomy operation was explained

. . . I accompanied Larry and obeyed my father on the belief that my

Alleging the same statement of facts and defenses, respondent Pedro

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2016

way amount to mutilation, as the latter's reproductive organ is still completely

I understand that vasectomy is reversible through a procedure called

Respondent Pedro Aguirre challenges the charge of falsification in the

. . . I had no participation in the preparation of the report of Dra.

What I cannot understand about Petita's Complaint is how Larry is

Respondent Pedro Aguirre further clarifies that co-guardianship over Larry

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2016

In defense against the charge of falsification and mutilation, respondent Dr.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2016

(d) Child Abuse. . . . the complaint-affidavit is very vague in

Similarly, respondent Dr. Pascual denied the criminal charges of

. . . I never stated that I examined Mrs. Aguirre, because I never

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2016

The Assistant City Prosecutor, 25(25) in a Resolution 26(26) dated 8 January

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2016

insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:

On 18 February 2003, petitioner Gloria Aguirre appealed the foregoing

Petitioner Gloria Aguirre's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied

Petitioner Gloria Aguirre's motion for reconsideration proved futile as it

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2016

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS, GRAVE

Sterilization is to be distinguished from castration: in the latter act

It then concluded that:

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2016