Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc

Divine Command Morality and Jewish Tradition

Author(s): Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman
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Source: The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring, 1995), pp. 39-67
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DIVINE COMMAND MORALITY AND

JEWISH TRADITION
Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman
ABSTRACT

Given the religious appeal of divine commandtheories of morality (DCM),

and given that these theories are found in both Christianity and Islam,
we could expect DCM to be represented in Judaism, too. In this essay,
however, we show that hardly any echoes of support for this thesis can be
found in Jewish texts. We analyze texts that appear to support DCM and
show they do not. We then present a number of sources clearly opposed to
DCM. Finally, we offer a theory to explain the absence of DCM in Judaism, claiming that the rational character ofHalakha, as well as the moral
and rational character of God, does not provide suitable ground for the
growth of DCM theses.

1. Introduction: Divine Command Morality

A widespread religious attitude assumes that "without God, everything is allowed"- that morality depends on God. In our book Religion and Morality (1995), we describe two ways in which morality
might be construed as dependent on religion and name them, respectively, strong and weak dependence. This distinction, although extremely important, often eludes attention. Advocates of strong
dependence claim that morality cannot exist without religion, that
God is both the source of morality and the exclusive basis of its validity. This means that had God commanded us to commit murder, for
instance, murder would become a moral obligation. Similarly, if there
were no God, then nothing at all would be morally wrong. This view of
the relation between religion and morality constitutes one of the horns
in the famous dilemma posed by Socrates in the Euthyphro (henceforth: "the Euthyphro dilemma"). The dialogue concerns the meaning
of piety, and Euthyphro suggests the following definition: "What is
dear to the gods is holy, and what is not dear to them is not holy"
An early version of this article in Hebrewwas published in Sagi and Statman 1993. We
thank Batya Stein for the translation. We are grateful to Eliezer Goldman and to the
anonymous referees of JRE for many helpful comments on earlier drafts.

39

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Journal of ReligiousEthics

(Euthyphro7a). Socratesthen asks:"Isthat whichis holylovedby the

gods becauseit is holy, or is it holy becauseit is loved by the gods?"
(9-10). In moderndiscourse,this dilemmais usually formulatedas
follows:(a) Is an act rightbecause(andonlybecause)Godcommanded
it? Or (b) did Godcommandthis act becauseit is right? Option(a) is
an exact formulationof what we have calledthe strongdependenceof
moralityon religion.
The standard term for theories of strong dependenceis "Divine
CommandTheories"or "DivineCommandMorality"(DCM). This
term refersto a familyof theoriesthat includesextremeand moderate
versions. In the more extremeversions,God'scommandsreflectHis
will; in the moderateversions,God'scommandsreflectHis moralnature but are, nevertheless,the sole basis of moral obligations.1All
these theories acceptoption(a) above:God'scommandis a necessary
conditionfor the existenceof a moralduty. Extremeversionsseem to
be moreprominentin the MiddleAges. In Muslimtheology,DCMis
the dominantview of the Al-Ash'arischool(Frank1983);in Christian
thought,DCMis a traditionof long standing,beginningwith William
of Ockham,Duns Scotus,andothers,continuingthroughthe Reformation in the writingsof MartinLutherand John Calvin,and influencing the philosophyof John Locke,GeorgeBerkeley,and othersin the
modern period. Proponentsof this medieval thesis are also found
among twentieth-centuryphilosophersand theologians, including
Emil Brunerand Karl Barth (Idziak 1979, 1989). Wittgensteinalso
endorsedthis view of the relationbetween God and the moral good,
preferringit to the "shallowand rationalistic"claim that God commands x because x is good (Wittgenstein1965, 15). Moremoderate
versionshave been developedmainlyby contemporary
analyticphilosophers such as RobertAdams (1987, 97-122, 128-43), Philip Quinn
(1978, 1979) and EdwardWierenga(1983, 1984).
DCMhas not been the dominantapproachin the history of religious thought and has usually been rejectedin favorof its opposite.
Nevertheless,and mainlyin its moreextremeversions,DCMcaptures
an importantreligiousintuition. At its core, the strong dependence
thesis emphasizesnotionssuch as that of God'sabsolutesovereignty
and freedom,or that of the humanduty to surrenderto Godand obey
Him unconditionally(Sagi and Statman1995, introductionto part 1).
If God is completelyfree, if He is the only sovereign,He cannot be
subjectto any external law purportingto limit His actions. By the
1 We have opted for the male-gendered reference to God because it accurately reflects the accepted usage in Jewish religious thought. The arguments are not, however,
affected by this decision, and the reader may prefer other images of God.

Divine CommandMoralityand Jewish Tradition

41

same token, when human beings stake a claim to the independent

validityof morallaw, they denyGod'ssupremacyas the onlyKingand
the only worthyobjectof devotion.
DCMmight be easily confusedwith the conflictthesis (Sagi and
Statman 1995, ch. 6), accordingto whichGod'scommandsmight conflictwith the requirementsof morality.Confusionoccursbecauseboth
theses mightbe seen as expressingthe same religiousintuitions;however, this is not the case. In the conflictthesis, God'sabsolutesovereignty would be held to be manifest not in the fact that God
determineswhat is moral(as in DCM),but in the fact that Goddetermines what is to be done, even if immoral. Thus, these theses are
obviouslydistinctand mutuallyexclusive;a conflictbetweenmorality
and religionis possibleonly if moralityis independentof God.
In contrast to DCM, the weak dependencethesis argues that,
althoughthe validity of moralityis independentof God'scommand,
moralitystill dependson Godfor its implementation.This thesis assumes that humanbeings, becauseof their flaws, can neither attain
moral knowledgenor behave in moral ways unless assisted by God
(Sagi and Statman 1995, chaps. 4-5). Thus, whereas accordingto
DCM,moralityitself dependson God,accordingto the weak dependencethesis, humanbeingsdependon Godforthe understandingand
the realizationof morality. In otherwords,theories of strong dependenceclaimthat no act can be listed as a moralobligationunless it is
commandedby God. In weak dependencetheories,an act can be considered a moral obligationeven if not ordainedby God- although,
withoutreligion,actualizingit may not be possible.
An approachsimilarto that of weak dependenceis knownfromthe
literatureon the reasonsfor the commandments(taeameiha-mitsvot).
Commandments(mitsvot) are usually assumed to have a reason,
althoughhuman beings often do not or cannot fully understandit.
This assumptionapplies even to what Saadia Gaon called mitsvot
shim'iyot,namely,commandmentswe cannotgrasp throughour reason.2 These commandments,too, are assumed to have reasons,
thoughof a sort that eludes humangrasp (Saadia 1948, 3:3).
In this article, our focus is on the strong dependencethesis.3 We
examinewhether,and to what extent, DCMtheses featurein Jewish
2 The term shim'iyot is derived from the Hebrew root sham'a (to hear). Accordingto
Saadia, then, we would not have reached many commandmentshad we not heard them
during revelation.
3 Since the classic sources of DCM in Islam and m Christianity rely on extreme versions of this thesis, we use these versions as our point of reference. Hence, our analysis
does not apply to all versions of DCM, and particularly not to all its moderate versions.

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Journal of ReligiousEthics

tradition. As DCMis a prevalentreligioustraditionin Islam and in

in religiousterms,we
Christianity,and as it is also highly"appealing"
would naturallyexpect DCMtheses to appearin Judaism,too. Surprisingly, however, strong dependencetheses are seldom found in
Jewish sources,while weak dependencetheses (which,of course,are
also foundin Christianityand Islam) are quite prevalent. These two
phenomenaseem to be closelyrelated. Froma religiousperspective,
the rejectionof DCMoften leads to the adoptionof some version of
weak dependencebecause, otherwise,God would becometotally redundantin the moralrealm. Theworkof SaadiaGaonillustratesthis
well. On the one hand, Saadia claims that the rational commandments (mitsvotsikhliyyot)do not dependon revelation(see below);on
the other hand, he claims that revelationplays a vital role in moral
thoughtas, withoutit, humanbeingswouldfail to understandthe details of the rational commandments,namely, their concretesignificance (Saadia 1948, 3:3).
1.1 Twersky'sargument
The claimthat DCMis seldomfoundin Jewish traditionchallenges
a view routinelystated in Jewish scholarship,claimingthat in Judaism God is conceivedas the source of morality. I. Twerskyhas recently formulated this view as follows: "Autonomousmorality,
accordingto Kant'sethics, is a human creation;the independenceof
moralitycomesto the fore in the absenceof an inextricablelink between moralityand the divine commands.This view has no parallel
in Judaism. Judaism admits only a heteronomous-theonomic
approach,which views the Creatoras the sourceof morality"(Twersky
1991, 238 n. 237).4 However,we believethat Twerskyfails to distinguish adequatelybetweenthe view that moralitydependson Godand
the requirementto obeyHim;as a result, a certainvaguenessmarks
his discussionof these issues, as well as that of others on whom he
relies (Fox 1972, 35-36). In arguingthat Godis the sourceof morality, Twerskyrelies on the importanceof obedienceto Godin Jewish
rules out
tradition. The requirementof total obedience"unequivocally
authoritativeness
and
for
.
the
.
.
law
for
ground obligation
autonomy
- no Jewish thinkerwoulddisis unquestionablythe divinecommand
4 This passage was added to the Hebrew edition and does not appear in the English
version. All subsequent references to Twersky will be to the English original (Twersky
1980). For many important bibliographicalreferences, see Twersky 1980, 454-59, and
notes; see also Jakobovitz 1976, 16.

Divine CommandMoralityand Jewish Tradition

43

pute this or introducedistinctions"(Twersky 1980, 456-57).5 For

Twersky, then, the duty of unconditional obedience, repeatedly
stressedin Jewish tradition,requiresthe assumptionthat Godis the
only basis of all human obligations.
Yet althoughDCMimplies an emphasison total obedienceto God,
the oppositedoes not hold. An emphasison unconditionalobedience
to Goddoes not implythat divinecommandshave value only because
they have been handeddownby God,as suggestedby DCM. We can
assumethat Godhas commandedcertainacts becauseof their intrinsic moralvalue while assuming,at the same time, that humanbeings
are boundto carryout these acts by a dutyof unconditionalobedience.
Twerskymay have been misled by the logic of a commonlyoffered
argument:
1. Human beings ought to performact x because God has commandedit.
2. Godcommandshumanbeingsto performact x becausethis act is
morallygood.
Therefore,
3. Humanbeingsoughtto do x becausex is morallygood.Conclusion
(3) makesGod'scommandwhollyredundantand,therefore,seems
unacceptablefroma religiouspointof view, forcingus to rejectone
of the two premises. Apparently,the only seriousoptionis to reject (2), andif we dothat, it appearsthat we must holdmoralityto
be dependenton God'scommand.Put simply,if we insist on unconditionalobedienceto God,it seems we must give up the autonomy of morality.
This argument,however,is formallyinvalid, as it is based on the
assumptionthat the term "because"entails a transitive relationnamely,if A becauseof B and B becauseof C, then A becauseof C. As
manyphilosophershave shown,however,this assumptionis false. An
amusingexamplesuggestedby P. Fabershouldhelp clarifythis point:
Suppose that Bill Q. Starr goes to the Hilton because it has a pineappleshaped swimming pool. And it has a pineapple-shaped swimming pool
because the architect idolized his mother, who was pineapple-shaped.
Would one say, therefore, that Bill Q. Starr goes to the Hilton because the
architect idolized his mother? [Faber 1985, 569; see also Brody 1981;
Hanink and Mar 1987, 244].
5 TheoriginalEnglishtext was slightlyrevisedhere,in line with the Hebrewtranslation,whichreflectsthe author'sintentionmoreaccurately.

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Journal of ReligiousEthics

In sum, the claim that humanbeings must obey Godunconditionally and performcertainacts becauseGodhas ordainedthem doesnot
contradictthe claim that God commandsthese acts on the basis of
their intrinsicmoralvalue. Hence,the claimthat the commandments
have reasons does not contradictthe claim that the human duty to
obeythese commandmentsis not contingenton these reasonsbut relies on the acknowledgmentof God'sabsoluteauthority.
1.2 The overlapof divine commandand moralrequirement
We must still explain,however,how exactlythe duty of obedienceis
compatiblewith the autonomyof morality. To do that, we use a version of weak dependence. Since human beings are limited in their
moralunderstandingand in their abilityto pursuea moralactivityin
light of this understanding,only unconditionalobedienceto Godcan
ensure right moralbehavior.
Twerskyis certainlycorrectwhen he arguesthat God'scommandis
a crucialfactorin Judaism,but the questionis: what is the precise
role of this command?Morespecifically,do divine commandsdetermine morality,or do they merelyrevealwhat, independentlyof these
commands,is morallycorrect?Advocatesof the formeroptioncommit
themselvesto a DCMtheory,whereas supportersof the latter reject
DCMand adopt,at best, a thesis of weak dependence.
One cause for mistakemightbe the ambiguityof statementstaking
the form:"Actx is moralbecauseGodhas commandedit."This statement can be interpretedin two ways. One argues that God determines moralityand, therefore,if God commandsx, this necessarily
impliesthat x is moral. Anotherarguesthat, since Godis morallyand
rationally perfect, His commandis, necessarily, morally right. In
other words,whereasthe abovestatementmight be perceivedas implyingstrongdependence,it couldjust as easily be seen as compatible
with a view of moralityas independent.This analysisclarifiesan importantdistinction:while both supportersand opponentsof DCMadmit to a perfectoverlapbetween acts that are morallyrequiredand
acts that are divinelycommanded,they differin their interpretationof
this overlap. Supportersof DCMbelievethat the overlapis explained
by the fact that God determinesmorality;opponentsof DCMargue
that it reflectsthe moraland rationalperfectionof God. The fundamental claim of DCM,then, is not merelythat God'scommandsoverlap moral obligations,but that this overlapis explainedby the fact
that Goddeterminesmorality. Moreformally,DCMdoes not merely
assume a logicalequivalencebetweenGod'scommandsand moralob-

Divine CommandMoralityand Jewish Tradition

45

ligations,but an asymmetricalrelationshipbetweenthem.6
Obviously,then, pointingto sourcesstressinga duty of obedienceto
God, or to sources claimingthat God'scommandsare moral, is not
enoughto lend credenceto the presenceof DCMideas in Jewish tradition. For the purposeof confirmingthis thesis, we wouldneed to find
sourcesarguingthat Goddeterminesmoralityby His free and spontaneous will, as this claim is formulatedin the writings of the Islamic
schoolof Al-Ash'ari,as well as in those of Williamof Ockham,Martin
Luther,and others.
In the secondpart of this article,we analyzeJewish sourceswhich,
prima facie, seem to supportDCM. We seek to demonstratethat a
carefulreadingof these texts fails to supportthis interpretationor, at
least, makesit highly questionable.Wethen pointto sourcesthat explicitly endorsethe autonomyof moralityand the rejectionof DCM.
In the third and last part of the articlewe suggest a theoryto explain
the absence- or the marginality- of the strongdependencethesis in
Judaism.

2. Divine CommandMoralityin Jewish Thought

Ourmain aim in this sectionis to considerwhetherany sourcesin
Jewish thought advocate the thesis that morality depends in the
strong sense on religion. A few methodologicalpoints are in order
beforewe proceedto a detailedanalysis of the texts.
1. Weuse the term"Jewishthought"broadly,to includenot onlysystematic philosophicaldiscussionsbut also other literary genres,
such as commentariesand homilies.
2. The term "morality"(mussar)need not appear explicitly in the
texts examined. For purposesof our inquiry,texts qualifyif they
deal with subjectswe wouldincludeunderthe rubricof morality,
such as virtues andjustice.
3. We do not intend to argue that the sages were aware of the distinctions developedabove,in particularthat between weak and
strongdependence.Ouranalysis of the sourcesis a consciousattempt at reconstructionwhich,we hope, doesjustice to them and
presentsthem in the correctlight.
4. In some cases, we do not conclusivelyrejecta DCMinterpretation
of the sourcesin favorof a weak dependenceone, and we do accept
that alternativereadingsare sometimespossible. This very fact,
however,shows the weakness of the case for DCMin Judaism,
6 For a detailed analysis of the asymmetricalelement in DCM,see Sagi and Statman
1995, ch. 1, sec. 1, and references.

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Journal of Religious Ethics

especially when we compare these texts with those supporting
DCM in Christianity and Islam. Furthermore, since the sources
we cite below explicitly argue for the autonomy of morality, a
heavier onus is placed on those opting for a DCM interpretation of
texts open to more than one reading.

2.1 R. Obadiah ofBertinoro (c. 1450- before 1516)

The first mishna of treatise Avot reads: "Mosesreceived [the Torah]
from Sinai." Bertinoro feels called to clarify why, although this treatise deals only with ethics, it begins by tracing the chain of Torah:
I say that, since this treatiseis not a commentaryon a biblicalcommand,
like the other treatises of the Mishna,but a series of ethicalprinciples,
and since the sages of the worldhave also writtenbookswherethey invented rules to guide humanbeings in their behaviortowardtheir fellows, the tannabeganthis treatiseby saying"Mosesreceived[the Torah]
fromSinai,"to tell you that the ethicalprinciplesin this treatisewerenot
a fabricationof the Mishnaicsages, but they too comefromSinai.
This passage would seem to suggest that no morality exists save for
that ordained at Sinai through revelation- any other morality is a
"fabrication"and, on this understanding, R. Obadiah Bertinoro is advocating DCM.7 This interpretation, however, is far from necessary.
The crucial question is how to interpret Bertinoro's claim that ethical
principles also "come from Sinai." Does this mean that these principles were determined at Sinai by God's will or that, at Sinai, God
merely revealed them to human beings?
While the first option expresses a version of strong dependence, the
second conveys, at best, a version of weak dependence, according to
which revelation is necessary for the attainment of ethical truth. We
contend that the second option is more plausible. Gentile morality is
suggested to be a "fabrication,"not because Bertinoro believes morality depends on religion, but because the non-Jewish sages lack the divine guidance required to understand moral truth. Therefore, we do
not see R. Obadiah Bertinoro as advocating a thesis of strong
dependence.

7 This seems to be the interpretation suggested by Jakobovitz 1976, 116 n. 5,

although he does not rely on our terminology.

Divine CommandMoralityand Jewish Tradition

47

2.2 R. Zevi HirschLevin (1721-1800)

In his commentaryon the same mishna, R. Zevi Hirsch Levin appears to advocateDCMand seems to interpretBertinoro'sviews in
light of a DCMthesis:
"Mosesreceived [the Torah] from Sinai":as R. Obadiah of Bertinoro tells
us, the tanna [referring to the sage of the Mishna] prefaced the treatise
with this introduction to tell us that these principles of ethics rely on the
Torah as it was commanded to us by Moses. Moreover, I say we have
neither morality nor virtue unless a divine religion can be presumed to
exist. I proved this in a debate about virtues and rational commandments
[mitsvot sikhliyyot] that I conducted with a wise man who, after a prolonged discussion, agreed with me. Hence, he [the tanna] first had to lay
the foundation for the divine religion bestowed on us by God through His
prophet and loyal servant, as these are the grounds and the measure for
all the virtues of a Jewish human being. Therefore, the Torah at times
prescribes acts that defy reason and human nature, as it ordered us to
blot out Amalek, destroy both man and beast and bear them a grudge
from generation to generation, because the Lord is a God of knowledge
and Israel are His people, at His command they encamped and at His
command they journeyed. And I have spoken at length about this elsewhere, may it please God, because what is explicitly stated in the Torah
will not be changed, and, even if it appears to challenge morality and reason, do not rebel against it [Levin 1966].

Levinexplicitlyclaimsthat withoutreligionwe have neither morality

nor virtue. His allusionto the commandto blot out Amalekstrengthens this understanding,insofaras Levinsuggests that this command
shows that moralityis determinedby the Torahrather than by independentrationalconsiderations.This,indeed,is Levin'sspecificaddition to Bertinoro'sview: for Levin, the ethical principlesnot only
"comefromSinai"as a matterof fact but, in principle,they couldnot
comefromany other source. Hence,the Torahis not only a sufficient
conditionof morality,but also a necessaryone.
A morescrupulousreading,however,casts doubtson this interpretation of Levin'sclaims. The centralquestionis: how shouldwe interpret Levin'sassertionthat moralityis predicatedon the existenceof a
divine religion? Does he mean that moralityitself dependson God's
command(strongdependence)?Or does he mean that we are incapable of knowingmoralitywithoutrevelation(weak dependence)?
This questionis particularlyrelevantwhen we turn to Levin'sinterpretationof the commandto blot out Amalek. Is he claimingthat because God commandedthe destructionof Amalek'sseed, and only
becauseof this command,this act is justified? Oris he claimingthat,

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Journal of ReligiousEthics

despite our moral objectionsto this command,we can trust God's

goodnessandbe sure that the commandis morallyjustified?This last
optionis consistentwith Levin'squotingthe verse "theLordis a God
of knowledge."This quote suggests that God'scommandsare not
merelybased on His will, but reflectHis "knowledge."In this interpretation,the peopleof Israel"journeyand encampaccordingto God"
becausethey believe in His moralperfection.
Although Levin's claims are slightly ambiguous,we believe it is
more productiveto interpretthem as upholdinga thesis of weak dependence.Furthersupportforourview canbe drawnfromthe debate
that Levintells us he conductedwith a wise man about"virtuesand
Thiswise manhad probablyformulatedhis
rationalcommandments."
claimin terms of a view prevalentin Levin'stimes:there are rational
truths,includingmoraltruths,that humanbeingsapprehendthrough
reason,withoutany need forrevelation. To rejectthis view, Levinacceptedthe claim that moraltruth is independentof God'scommand,
but arguedthat human beings are incapableof graspingit without
divine revelation. Levin couldhardlyhave persuadedthis wise man
by relyingon DCM,since DCMproponentshave no commonbasis for
discussingmoralitywith those who believein the rationalvalidity of
moralobligations. Our interpretationis also morehelpfulin clarifying the final lines of the passage:"evenif it seems to contradictmorality and reason, do not rebel against it." In other words, even when
God's commandappears to contradictreason, we are not to rebel
againstit since,in truth, this commandis consistentwith "themorality of reason."The contradictionis only apparent,even if humanbeings sometimesfail to understandthis.
2.3 R. AurahamYeshayahuKarelitz(Ha-HazonIsh) (1878-1953)
R. Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz, one of the most important
posekim8in the last generation,writes: "Moralduties are at times
synonymouswith halakhic rulings, and Halakha determinesmoral
right and wrong"(Karelitz1952, 21). To prove this point, Karelitz
choosesan examplefromBava Bathra 21b. In a rule devisedto protect their livelihood,artisansand tradespeopleare allowedto prevent
competitorsfromsetting up shop in their vicinity,but this rule does
not applyto teachers,who are not allowedto preventother teachers
fromcompetingwith them for students. Karelitzconcludes:
8 Posekim is a Hebrew term for scholars who concentrate on determining the
Halakha in practice, in contrast with commentators or expounders who apply themselves to study for its own sake.

Divine CommandMoralityand Jewish Tradition

49

All their actions [of the established teachers against the new ones] would
be guiltless, had Halakha ruled in their favor and allowed them to prevent the new ones [from working], and the new ones would [then] be
guilty. . . . But now, that the ruling is that "the jealousy of scribes increaseth wisdom,"and this is considered a higher principle than the livelihood of private people, the guests [new teachers] have followed the
Halakha, and those opposing them "spill innocent blood". . . [21].

Karelitzsuggests a similar argumentregardingrobbery:"Human

beingsdo not decidewhat is robberyandinjustice,onlythe laws of the
Torahdo. Any act opposedto these laws is robbery,even if human
beings agreewith it, and any act within these laws is a fulfillmentof
justice, even if contraryto humanviews"(27).
The first quoteseems to supportstrongdependence- "Halakhadeterminesmoralright and wrong."This seems to be the thrust of the
last passage,too, sinceit arguesthat Halakhadefinesrobbery"evenif
contraryto human views." However,a more careful reading again
showsthat this interpretationis not the only one possible. First, note
the expression"attimes"in the openingsentence. Accordingto DCM,
an act is morallywrongif, and onlyif, Godhas forbiddenit, and no act
canbe considereda moralobligationunless prescribedby God. In contrast, accordingto Karelitz,Halakhadeterminesright andwrongonly
"attimes"(cf.Lichtenstein1977,5-20). Second,Karelitz'sown example showsthis is not a case of strongdependence,since the decisionto
treat teachers differentlyfromother professionalsrests on a central
value- the study of Torah. Improvingeducationand teaching stan- "thejealousy of scribes increaseth
dards requiresfree competition
wisdom."Halakha favorsthe value of Torahstudy over the value of
protectingthe livelihoodof someteachers. The specialrulingregarding teacherscan thus be explainedwithoutresortingto DCM,as simply conveyingthe centralityof study and educationwithin Judaism.
Hence,we claim that Karelitzis suggestinga version of weak dependence:human beings, in their limited understanding,may at
times have difficultydiscerningrightfromwrong,andHalakhashows
them the correctmoralpath. Forinstance,manypeoplewouldtend to
relate to teachersas they wouldto other professionals,and Halakha
correctsthis distortionby pointingto the centralityof educationand
learning. After Halakha has established this principle,we can go
backand see how logical this rulingindeedwas. Admittedly,the last
passageis closerto DCMthan the formerones. Nevertheless,we suggest that, in light of the first passage,the latter, too, shouldbe interpreted as expressing a weak dependencethesis; only God, in His

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Journal of ReligiousEthics

infinite wisdom,knowsthe exact definitionsof robberyand injustice;

these remainthe definitionseven if they conflictwith humanviews.
2.4 R. KlonymusShapira (TheRabbiofPiaseczno)
R. KlonymusShapirawas a Hasidicleaderactivein Warsawduring
the Holocaust.A collectionof his sermonsfromthis periodwas hidden
in the ghetto and recoveredafter the war (see Piekarz 1990, ch. 12).
In these writings,Shapiraattemptsto grapplewith the terrorsof the
Holocaustand their theologicalsignificance,and his theodicyrelies on
the thesis that moralitydependson religion. In a sermondatedon the
eve of the Jewish New Year (October1940),he writes:
The nationsof the world,even the best of them,think that the truth is a
truthbecausethe truthis intrinthingin itself,andthat Godcommanded
the
rational commandments,since
therefore
true.
accept
They
sically
because
them
that
God
ordained
believe
they are true in themselves,
they
such as that we shouldnot steal, rob,and so forth.. . . Not so Israel,who
say "YouGodare truth."He, mayHe be blessed,is truth,andwe have no
truth besideHim, and all the truth foundin the worldis there only becauseGodwishedit and commandedit, and sinceHe, mayHe be blessed,
is truth, this is also true. Stealingis forbiddenbecausethe Godof truth
has commandedit, andbecausethe trueGodhas commandedit, this is an
act of truth. AndwhenGodcommandedthe opposite,that hefkerbeit-din
then this becomestrue
hefker[the courthas the powerof expropriation]
and a person'swealthcan be confiscated.WhenGodorderedAbrahamto
sacrificehis son Isaac,it was true to sacrificehim and, had Godnot said
later "neitherdo anythingto him,"it wouldhave been true to slaughter
him [Shapira1960,68; see also 172].

In this source,the strongdependencethesis is explicitlystated and

contrastedwith the thesis that truth andjustice are independentfrom
God. Accordingto Shapira,as moralnormsderivetheir validityfrom
God'scommands,a change in God'scommandsleads to changes in
moralnorms. This is the only sourcewe have foundexplicitlyendorsing DCM. AdoptingDCMallowsShapirato developa new and daring
model for the justificationof God;once we adopt a thesis of dependence, no conflictcan be presumedbetweenjustice and the divine
commands,as truth and justice are determinedby God. Shapiraindeed says so explicitly:"Wedo not merelysay: we have, Heavenforbid, a question,but the answeris not clear and is beyondour grasp.
Instead, we say we have no truth and justice at all, except for what
God wishes, commands,and does"(Shapira1960, 68-69). Shapira's
interpretationof the sacrificeof Isaacis also worthnotingin this context. Contraryto the well-knownviews of S0ren Kierkegaard(1983)

Divine CommandMoralityand Jewish Tradition

51

and YeshayahuLeibowitz(1993, ch. 1), who believethat the sacrifice

epitomizesthe conflictbetweenreligionand morality,Shapiraargues
that no such conflict exists because God's command determines
morality.
A similar trend in modernphilosophyis representedby Patterson
Brown. Brownalso believesthat DCMis the solutionto the theodicy
problemand, relyingon this thesis, he, too, arguesthat the command
to sacrificeIsaacwas morallyvalid (Brown1967). Brownadmitsthat
Godis a goodGod,but onlyin the sense that He is the criterionforthe
good. Similarly, when Shapira claims that "since He, may He be
blessed,is truth, this is also true,"he apparentlydoes not mean truth
as independentfromGod,sincehe repeatedlymentionsthat truth and
justice flowfromGod;rather,he meansthat Godis truth in the sense
that He determinesit. Brown'sapproachis part of a long-established
Christiantradition;as RonaldBainton(1930) shows, DCMwas one
way of contendingwith the ostensiblyimmoralbehaviorof the patriarchs. Judaism,however,generallyseeks specificjustificationsfor
the sacrificeof Isaac (Green1988, ch. 4; Sagi and Statman 1995, ch.
8). Shapira'sviews, then, are quite exceptional.In turningto DCM,
he expresseshis feeling that the traditionaltheodiciesprovedincapable of coping with the harrowingreality aroundhim. Shapira is
forcedto searchfor a moreradicalapproach,rejectingthe independent existence of truth and justice, thus dismissing the question of
theodicy.
Despite his explicit endorsementof DCMin his sermon, Shapira
elsewhererelies on moretraditionalconceptionsof theodicy,conceptions whichare incompatiblewith DCM. Thus,forinstance,he claims
that the purposeof sufferingis to cleansehumanityfromits sins so as
to bringit closerto God(9), or he claimsthat sufferingis a purifying
experiencethat heraldsthe comingof the Messiah,implyingthese are
the messianic pangs preceding Israel's redemption(106-7). Elsewhere, Shapira argues that we are tested through suffering,"that
man is beingtested fromHeaven,to see whetherhis faith is strengthened"(100). All these argumentsshare the assumptionthat God is
guidedby moralconsiderations,and His acts have a purpose. In other
words,Goddoes not determinemoralitysolelyby His will, but follows
moralstandardsin His actions. Had Shapiraconsistentlyadheredto
a thesis of strongdependence,there wouldhave been no roomfor this
traditionaltheodicy. As indicated,Shapiraacknowledgesthat theses
of strongdependenceprecludequestionsof theodicy. Elsewherein the
bookhe suggestsa similarargument,but on totally differentgrounds:
as we cannotunderstandGod'sactionsbecauseour knowledgeis limited, we have no right to doubtHis justice and His goodness:

52

Journal of ReligiousEthics

Why, indeed, the queries, Heaven forbid, and the misgivings. . . . How
could we wish to understand these acts of God and, Heaven forbid, be
hurt when we do not? If we do not understand a blade of grass created by
God, then we shall certainly be unable to grasp a soul and, all the more
so, an angel and, all the more so, His knowledge, may He be blessed.
How, then, could we wish to understand what He, may He be blessed,
knows and understands [139]?

Following our inquiry into the question of whether any Jewish

sources advocateDCM,we concludethat DCMformulationsare almost non-existentin these texts. Carefulanalysiscasts heavy doubts
on all interpretationspurportingto read certaintexts as supporting
DCM theses, and we have attemptedto show that, at best, these
sourcesrepresentdifferentversionsof weak dependence.The only explicit formulationof DCMappearsin the workof what is certainlya
marginalfigure,R. KlonymusShapira,and, even in his case, his approachto DCMis rathercomplex.The absenceof DCMis even more
conspicuousin light of the prominentrole grantedto the alternative
thesis that stresses the autonomyof morality. A detailedanalysis of
the autonomythesis is beyondthe scopeof this essay, and we confine
ourselvesto a brief review.
3. Anti-DCM Approaches
Saadiawas the first Jewish thinkerto expressstrongoppositionto
DCM. We do not dwell on his well-knownview of rationalcommandments as independentfromrevelation;instead,we have chosena seldom quotedpassage that is highly relevantin the present context:
If however, he [the prophet] were to say to us: "MyLord commands you to
commit adultery and steal" ... we would not ask him for any sign since
what he called upon us to do is not sanctioned by either reason or tradition. Now I have seen one of the proponents of the theory that has just
been discussed go further in the matter and say, "But suppose we note
that the [pretended]prophet pays no attention to us but makes us witness
the miracles and marvels so that we see them perforce. What shall we
say to him in that case?" My answer was that our reply to him should be
the same as that of all of us would be to anyone who would show us miracles and marvels for the purpose of making us give up such rational convictions as that the truth is good and lying reprehensible and the like. He
was therefore compelled to take refuge in the theory that the disapproval
of lying and the approval of truth were not prompted by reason but were
the result of commandments and prohibitions of Scripture, and the same
was true for the rejection of murder, adultery and stealing. When he had
come to that, however, I felt that I needed no longer concern myself with
him and that I had my fill of discussion with him [1948, 3:8].

Divine CommandMoralityand Jewish Tradition

53

Accordingto Saadia, entering a discussion with anyone who has

stoopedso low as to think that moral proscriptionsare merely "the
result of commandmentsand prohibitions"is pointless. Such a position is so outrageousthat it does not merit any seriousconsideration.
R. Judah Halevi,whosegeneraltheoryof the commandmentsdrastically differsfromthat of Saadia, totally agrees with the latter regardingthe autonomyof morality. In his view, moralnormsprecede
religious commandments"in characterand time,"as they are absolutely essential to the existenceof any human society- to the point
where "evena gang of robberscouldnot but acceptthe rule of justice
among themselves"(Halevi 1964, 2:48). Obviously,Judah Halevi
wouldrejectthe idea of DCM.
In his Eight Chapters,Maimonidesadvocates a similar stand.
Althoughhe disagrees with Saadia'sterming the moral commandments "rational,"Maimonidesadmits that acts forbiddenby moral
prohibitionswouldbe wickedeven if not proscribedby the Torah,unlike othercommandmentswhich,"wereit not forthe Torah,wouldnot
be wickedat all"(1966,ch. 6). Onthese grounds,Maimonidesdrawsa
distinctionbetweenthe piouspersonand one who curbshis or her evil
inclination. Regardingthe moral commandments,which proscribe
acts that even without the Torah would be seen as evil, the ideal
humanbeing is the personwho observesthese commandmentsnaturally and without any struggle. However,regardingthe traditional
commandments,the desirablefigure is the one able to curb his evil
inclination(1966,ch. 6). Divinecommandments,
then, are onlynecesrealm Maimonides
moral
in
the
whereas
ritual
sphere,
sary in the
of
thesis
a
autonomy.
adopts
This view, mentionedin passingin Eight Chapters,is developedat
length in the Guide,in the claimthat moralcommandmentsare part
of the amendmentof the body, which is a necessary conditionfor
human natural perfection.The commandmentsof the Torahhave a
rationalbasis and are not merelya productof God'swill (Maimonides
1974, 3:27). Even Twerskywho, as mentioned,does not acceptmoral
autonomyin Judaism,was forcedto admitthat Eight Chaptersoffers
a more autonomousview of morality.9 Maimonides'sobjectionto
9 In Twersky's opinion, this view is incompatible with Maimonides's general approach in the Code of Maimonides (1951) and particularly in the Laws of Kings 8:11
(Twersky 1980, 453-54). This law states that a gentile who observes the Noahide laws
of his own free will rather than because Godhas commandedthem "is not deemed one of
the pious of the gentiles, but one of their wise men." We will not enter here into a
detailed analysis of Maimonides'sLaws of Kings, which have been the object of a great
deal of scholarly attention (Twersky 1980, 455 n. 239), but we do not see a contradiction
between this law and Maimonides'sargument in Eight Chapters. As noted, the duty to

54

Journal of ReligiousEthics

callingthe moralcommandments"rational"
(sikliyyot)does not imply
that he believesthem to be a result of God'sarbitrarywill. Although
Maimonidesis opposedto a particularkind of rationalityregarding
moral duties, he does not rule out the rationalbasis of moralobligations altogether. Quitethe contrary.Moralobligations,as noted, are
a conditionof humanperfection,and the fact that they are definedas
"truisms"(mefursamot)doesnot implythat they dependon God'scommand for their validity,as wouldappearfromDCM.10
This view regardingthe autonomyof moralityis quite widespread
in modernJewish thought- for example,in the work of Moses Mendelsohnand HermannCohen. It is interesting,however,to finda similar position being endorsed by thinkers deeply anchored in the
halakhic world. Followingis a text by R. Moses Samuel Glasner
(Hungary,the nineteenthcentury):
Know that human beings find many acts revolting, even if not forbidden
by the Torah, and anyone engaging in these acts would be more loathsome than one who transgresses an explicit prohibition of the Torah. As
for all things that enlightened people find loathsome, even if not explicitly
forbiddenby the Torah:one who engages in them is worse than one transgressing the laws of the Torah . . . and can no longer be seen as created in
His image [Glasner 1921, preface].11

In sum, not only does DCMenjoyno significantsupportin Judaism,

but the prevalentview in the worldof the sages is that moralityis
autonomous.Even thoughthe sages disagreeon many importantissues and notwithstandingtheir differentculturalsurroundings,they
share a belief in the independentvalidityof morality. In closingthis
section, we quote a highly relevant text written by a modern
halakhist, R. Jacob Harlap (1883-1951). Harlap recasts the
Euthyphrodilemmain specificallyJewish terms:
obey (stressed in the Laws of Kings) and the assumption that morality enjoys an independent status (stated in Eight Chapters)are not mutually contradictory. One who
freely decides to observe moral commandments does not deserve the title "one of the
pious of the gentiles" but certainly belongs in the category of "wise men,"as he is acting
rationally. For a discussion of the problemconcerningthe correctversion of this source
and its philosophical implications, see Levinger 1990, ch. 1.
10 These issues require further discussion, including a careful reading ot the Lruide
(1:1-2). We believe that the distinctions suggested in the introduction to this article
offer a new and fruitful approachto Maimonides.
11 For further sources reflecting support for moral autonomy among Jewish sages,
see R. Nissim Gaon, preface to Sefer Ha-Mafteah; Nahmanides 1971-76, Gen 6:13;
Hazkuni, Commentaryon the Torah, Gen 8:21; Albo 1930, 3:7; Anatoli 1866, 72; Angil
1903, Part 1, 196-97; Hazzan, 1832, 42.

Divine CommandMoralityand Jewish Tradition

55

With respect to the verse "Its ways are ways of pleasantness and all its
paths are peace"(Prov 3:17). Are the ways [of the Torah] pleasant, peaceful and true of their own nature, though we did not know that and God,
may He be blessed, revealed them to us; or, are their pleasantness and
sweetness contingent to our being commanded, and through the command . . . they are pleasant and peaceful ways?12

Harlap adopts the first option and adds to it a thesis of weak

dependence:
They [the ways of the Torah] are pleasant and sweet by their very nature,
but we did not know them, and God, may He be blessed, in His great
mercy and grace, revealed them to us. Hence, not surprisingly, the patriarchs abided by the Torah before it was given, since the Torah's ways
and laws are intrinsically very pleasant and sweet. Only we could not
recognize the ways of the Torah [without revelation]. The patriarchs . . .
did [Hirschensohn 1923, 159].13

The absenceof a DCMthesis in Judaismis surprising,considering

its high religiousappealand its existencein both Christianityand Islam. The explanationof this phenomenonis to be sought in an element germaneto Judaismthat seems to be incompatiblewith DCM
and plays a decisiverolein shapingthe consciousnessof Jewish sages:
Halakha. The next sectiondeals with this issue.

4. Halakha and the StrongDependenceThesis

Developinga comprehensiveand systematictheory of Halakha is
beyondthe scopeof this paper. We confineourselves,then, to several
aspects that seem particularlyrelevant to the present subject. Our
argumentrests on the claim that halakhic decisionsreflect human
discretionand understanding.Halakhicrulings do not merely apply
the written law but entail a large measure of human discretion,a
statementtrue for both halakhicinterpretationand halakhiclegislation. We argue that this phenomenonis best explainedby the idea
that the sages are assumedto possess the abilityto reveal right and
wrongwithoutappealingto a directdivinecommand.This idea runs
counterto the basic intuitionsof DCM,accordingto which right and
wrong are wholly dependenton God'scommands.Furthermore,the
context createdby the rationalistcharacterof halakhic discourseis
antagonisticto the discoursetypical of DCM.
12Harlap sent the question and his response to R. Hirschensohn, and both appear in
Hirschensohn'sbook Malki Ba-Kodesh (1923, 159).
13 Hirschensohn accepted Harlap s position and added that the Torah would never
command anything against reason.

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Journal of ReligiousEthics

We couldthus expectthat some halakhicsourceswill explicitlyobject to DCM,and we considersome of the most relevant ones below.
The sevara, an halakhicnotiondepictingnormsand principlesbased
on reason,makes an excellentcase for the centralrole of human discretion in the shaping of halakhic decisions (Sagi 1991a, 1991b).
Norms based on a sevara are not derivedfrom textual material but
rest on rationalunderstanding.The sages infer both specificrulings
and general moralprinciplesfroma sevara. Sanhedrin74a is an instance of a specificrulinginferredfroma sevara:the decisionto define
homicideas an offenseto be avoidedeven at one's peril rests on an
autonomousreason:"Whois to say that yourbloodis redderthan his
blood?"An instance of a general principlebased on a sevara is the
legal rule:"theonus of proofis on the claimant,"whichis derivedfrom
the sevara:"Isit not commonsense that if a man has a pain he visits
the healer?"(Bava Kamma46b).
These examplesclarifythat a sevara is a productof independent
judgmentratherthan an inferencefroma text or a tradition. In the
wordsof R. ZeviHeyyot,"Allthese principlesare embeddedin human
rationality,and are neitherinferredfromthe Torahnor fromoraltraditions"(1958, 1:313). Even thoughhalakhicrulingsbased on human
understandingare not inferredfromthe Torah,"nevertheless. . . matters inferredthrougha sevara are of equal standingto the Torahitself" (1958, 1:313).
Furthermore,not only are the sages willingto acceptclaimsresting
on sevara,they actuallyview normsbasedon a sevaraas preferableto
those arguedthroughtextual arguments. The Talmudoften claims,
"Whydo I need a text? It is a matter of sevara!"(see Ketuboth28a;
Bava Kamma 46b). Wheneverpossible, norms should be inferred
throughhuman understandingratherthan pinnedon biblicalverses
or other texts. Human discretion is decisive in the shaping of
halakha,even whensevarais not specificallymentionedas a technical
term. Many discussions in talmudic literature are conductedon
purelyrationalgrounds,withoutany recourseto textualmaterial,and
the legitimationgrantedto this type of halakhicactivityis extendedto
the sevara. Evennormsbasedon biblicalverses are not generallyperceived as edicts but as logical andjust laws to be enforcedby logical
and just means.
This idea is well formulatedby R. Abrahamben Mosesben Maimon,
in a responsumregardingthe law of bar-matsra.Accordingto Jewish
law, whoeversells a piece of land has a specialobligationto sell it to
the person whose land borderson the seller's. Furthermore,if the
land has been sold to someoneelse, the neighbor(or bar-matsra)is
entitled to forcethe buyer out of the land. This law is based on the

Divine CommandMoralityand Jewish Tradition

57

verse "thoushalt do whichis right and good"(Deut. 6:18). The ruling

on bar-matsradoesnot applyto wives and orphansand, on this exception, R. Abrahamwrites as follows:
Do you believe that their [the sages'] decision not to apply the ruling on
bar-matsra to wives and orphans was arbitrary or unjustified? Not so, for
everything that is said in the Halakha has clear reasons, obvious to anyone endowed with wisdom and understanding. The ruling on bar-matsra
is canceled in their regard because the main purpose of this ruling is to
comply with the injunction "Andthou shalt do which is right and good in
the sight of the Lord." This is a just and fair principle in all rulings . . .
and the justice involved in finding property for small orphans to ensure
them a source of livelihood from its fruits is greater than the justice attained by enforcing the ruling on bar-matsra [Responsa of R. Abraham
ben Moses ben Maimon, 97].

A responsumby R. David ben Abi Zimra,known as Ha-Radbaz,

merits considerationbecauseof the centralrole he grants to human
reasonin the processof halakhicdecision-making.He was consulted
on the followingcase:"Ifthe authoritiestell a Jew:'Allowus to cut off
one of your limbs without causing your death, or else we shall kill
another Jew'- is one bound to allow this injury to oneself?"HaRadbaz quotes a formalargumentthat shows one is indeed bound,
and then proceedsto rejectit. Followingthe formalhalakhicdiscusit is written,'herways are ways of pleassion, he writes:"Moreover,
our
Torahmust be acceptableto reasonand
of
rules
the
and
antness,'
we
could
How
possiblyimaginethat anyonewouldallowhis eye
logic.
andleg to be cut off,so as to preventsomeone
his
arm
or
to be blinded,
else's killing?"(Responsaof R. Davidben Abi Zimra,1052).
Interpretationsof the Torahmust be consistentwith humanreason.
In this text, "reasonand logic"are synonymouswith moral understandingwhich,as Ha-Radbazsees it, wouldrebel against the notion
of forcinga humanbeing to sacrificea limb in orderto save someone
else'slife. The claimof Davidb. Avi Zimrathen suits option(b)in the
Euthyphrodilemma,whichproclaimsthe autonomyof morality- "the
rules of our Torah"must accordwith "reasonand logic."
Autonomousmoralconsiderationsare particularlyprominentin instances of apparentcontradictionbetweenthe written law and moral
thinking. The matter of the stubbornand rebelliousson illustrates
this well: the disproportionbetween the crime and the punishment
createsa gravemoralinjustice. R. Simeonformulatesthe moraldifficulty entailed by this disproportionas follows:"Becauseone eats a
tartemar[weightmeasure]of meat and drinkshalf a log [liquidmeasure] of Italian wine, shall his father and motherhave him stoned?"

58

Journal of ReligiousEthics

(Sanhedrin71a). The sages suggestedseveral interpretationsof this

passage, designedto "soften"this ruling and present it as consistent
with justice. Some claimedthat the stubbornand rebelliousson is
"judgedby his end,"as he is boundto end by goingforthto the crossroads and robbingothers. Another interpretation,even more farfetched,claims that the whole matter is merelyhypothetical:"Butit
never happenedand never will happen. Whythen was this law written?- That you may study it and receivereward"(Sanhedrin71a).14
This radical interpretationof the Torah, which rests mainly on
moral arguments,is obviouslyhard to reconcilewith DCM. In DCM
terms, if God commandsthe stoning of the stubbornand rebellious
son, then this act is morallycorrectand attemptsto mitigate it have
no place. The explanationsadducedby the sages reflecttheir perception of a conflictbetweenjustice and the Torah,whichthey attemptto
resolveby resortingto exegesis.
As mentionedin the introduction,the very recognitionthat a conflict betweenmoralityand God'scommandsis possiblepresupposesa
denial of DCM. The rabbinicalexegeses of the passage on the stubborn and rebelliousson reflect a phenomenonwidespreadin Jewish
tradition,a phenomenonthat L. Roth(1974,ch. 7) calls moralization,
namely,a tendencyto tone downinstancesof apparentimmoralityin
the sourcesby interpretingthem in ways that seem morallymoreacceptable. Rothillustratesthis with severalexamples,and manymore
couldbe added. This phenomenonis an expressionof the powerand
independencegranted to moral considerationsin the shaping of
Halakha.
The picturewe have drawncouldbe seen as one-sidedor as oblivious to anothertrendpresentin Halakha. Parallelto the stress on the
wide autonomyenjoyedby the posekin his judgments,a conservative
trend aims to restrict this latitude or abolish it completely. Let us
turn once more to the issue of the stubborn and rebellious son.
Againstthose sages who viewedthe whole discussionon the stubborn
and rebellious son as purely an academic exercise, R. Jonathan
claims,"Isaw him and sat on his grave"(Sanhedrin71a). As Urbach
(1984, 87) remarks,R. Jonathanis not reportinga historicalfact, but
is attemptingto convey,in literaryterms,his oppositionto the radical
exegesis adoptedby the sages. This conservativeapproachfoundinthe case of
terestingexpressionin the followingstatement:"Regarding
an agunah [a desertedwife],one shouldnot rule lenientlyon the basis
of a sevara that is not mentionedeither in the Talmud or by the
14 For an extensive discussion of this passage and the moral considerations involved
in its interpretation, see Halbertal 1989, ch. 2.

Divine CommandMoralityand Jewish Tradition

59

posekim; a posek whose sevara is not explicit is not to be relied

upon."15Whereasthe formertrend had stressed the central role of
human discretion,the latter relates to halakhictraditionas a devar
Mishnah,namely,a law that cannotbe disputed. This view is voiced
by an anonymoussage:"TheBaal Maor[R.ZarhiyyaHalevi]may his
memorybe blessed,writes:I have heardfroma great sage that, in our
times, there can be no mistakes of discretion,since we have at hand
all the halakhicrulings,either in the Talmudor in the geonim after
the Talmud . . . hence whoevererrs, errs on a devar Mishnah"(R.
Asher b. Jehiel [Rosh]Sanhedrin4:6).
Weshouldbe cautious,however,aboutassumingthat this conservative trend presupposesDCM. Advocatesof the conservativetrend do
not claim that human discretionshouldbe restrictedbecause Godis
the only legitimatesourcefor determiningright and wrong,as is assumed by DCM. Instead,the conservativeview relies on arguments
characteristicof Halakha as a legal system, including,for instance,
the need to preserveconstancyand uniformity:"Foreveryindividual
will claimthat he is rightandthat the law shall be as he decides. This
would destroythe Torahentirely"(Albo 1930, 3:23). Thus, the conservativetrenddoesnot rule out humandiscretionin favorof the idea
of a divinelaw that determinesgoodand evil, but merelyfavorscertain humanvalues over others. Hence,we cannotinfer fromthe fact
that some sages seek to abstain from certain modes of moralization
that they assume moralitydependson religion. In many cases, the
sages'abstentionfrommoralinterpretationswhichunderminethe literal meaning(peshat)of Scripturerests on the belief that they lack
the authorityto make such a move. They have faith in God'smoral
characterand trust that His commandsreflect His goodness,even
when they do not understandexactlyhow.
Our analysis has emphasizedtwo aspects of halakhicactivity that
seemhardto reconcilewith DCM:its rationalityandthe centralroleit
grantsto moralconsiderations.We have arguedthat, althoughthese
two elementsplay an importantrolein the shapingof halakhicnorms,
they themselves are not derived from halakhic law. The halakhic
sage, even when boundby the general rules of the system, is highly
15EncyclopediaPahad Itshak, under saurei. A similar claim appears in the following passage: "Andwhat you wrote about the sages, whether they now have the power to
make more lenient rulings regardingmatters forbiddenin various writings, it is obvious
they do not. How could anyone dare to dispute writings acceptedby the whole of Israel,
unless he knew from his great teachers that they themselves had not followed [these
writings], as we know was the case in several places. But on his own sevara, never"
(Isserlein 1882, 241).

60

Journal of ReligiousEthics

autonomousin the exerciseof his discretion.Moreover,the moralconsiderationshe appliesin any given situationare not mere amplifications of the writtenlaw and,at times, may evenbecomethe basis for a
new and radicalinterpretationof the law. Given this descriptionof
two of its basic components,halakhicactivityis clearlyhardto reconcile with DCM,whichassumesthat morallaw is determinedby God's
will, thereby making rational considerationsirrelevant. A powerful
expressionof the independentrole of moraldiscretionappearsin the
writings of R. Simeon Skop, a leading Eastern Europeanhalakhist
beforethe SecondWorldWar:
Legal rulings on civil matters are unlike other commandments of the Torah. All the commandments are what the Torah has warned us to do and
not to do, and our duty to follow them is [based] on the principle of observing God's commandments, but this is not so in civil matters. Before a
divine commandto pay or to return something can be enforced,it must be
preceded by a legal obligation. . . . Another fundamental principle is that,
whenever we discuss a person's ownership of a specific object, we are not
considering the observance of a commandmentbut a factual matter- who
does this object belong to, and who is legally entitled to seize it. Therefore, when the rabbis ruled on civil matters, their rulings were obviously
based on rational decisions, as would appear from legal theory [Skop
1980, 5:1; see Sagi 1995].

The independenceof moralconsiderationsfromhalakhiclaw could

not have been formulatedin strongerterms. We thus contendthat
Halakhais not a fertilegroundforthe growthof DCMtheories. Even
barringa logical contradictionbetweenDCMand Halakha,halakhic
activity shapes a type of consciousnessthat tends to opposethe approachemergingfromDCM. Halakhicactivityaccustomsposekimto
exercisetheir autonomousjudgmentand to rely on their own understanding, including moral understanding,when dealing with the
problemsbeforethem. Posekimwho have embracedthe view that favors a seuaraover a text, and reasonover old age (BavaBatra 142b),
will probablyconsiderDCMan alien growththat cannotprosperon
Jewish soil. The followingstatementby R. JudahLoew[Ha-Maharal]
illustrates this type of consciousnesswell:
Although it is to be feared that [the judge] will not follow the path of truth
and will not rule in good faith so that his ruling is true, the judge can still
only rely on what his reason leads him to understand from the Talmud.
Even if his insight and wisdom mislead him, he is still beloved by the
Lord, may He be blessed, when he rules as demanded by his reason. The
judge has nothing but what his eyes see, and he is better than one who,

Divine CommandMoralityand Jewish Tradition

61

when ruling, follows a text without understanding its reasons, who walks
like the blind [Loew 1971, 1:69].

5. DCM and the Image of God

In Religionand Moralitywe showedthat a comprehensiveanalysis
of DCMreveals a series of elementsbearing,on the one hand, on a
certainconceptionof Godand, on the otherhand, on a certainconception of humanbeings. Hence,one can expectthat the absenceof DCM
fromJewish traditionwill cometo the forein the rejectionof some of
DCM'sconstitutiveelements. Giventhe scopeof this paper,we confine ourselvesto an analysis of some preliminaryguidelinesconcerning one element only, the image of God. Our contentionis that the
imageof Godemergingfromhalakhicsourcesis hardto reconcilewith
the one suggestedby DCM. WhileDCMtheoriestend to pictureGod
as voluntaristic,commandingparticularacts not becausethey are intrinsicallyvaluablebut merelybecauseHe wishes them, the image of
Godfoundin halakhicsourcesis that of a rational God acting upon
reasons. SinceHalakhawas traditionallyunderstoodas a humanextension of a divinelyrevealedlaw, it reflects,not surprisingly,the rational and moralcharacterof God.
The rational characterof God emerges in Maimonides'sCommentary to the Mishna (1968, Kelim 12:7),where he stronglycondemns
instancesof deceitandtheft fromgentiles:"ThatHe has attested,may
He be blessed,that He abhorsthem as such, whatevertheir object,as
we are told Tor all that do such things, and all that do unrighteously,
are an abominationto the Lordthy God'(Dt 25:16)"(our emphasis).
Not merelybecauseof His will does Godforbidus to deceivegentiles,
but because these acts, as such, are disgraceful. This is consistent
with the secondoptionin Euthyphro'sdilemma:Godabhorssome acts
and forbidsthem because of their intrinsic negative value. In his
halakhicwritings,Maimonidesrepeatedlyrelies on God'smoralcharacteras the basis of severalnorms. Consider,forinstance,the following ruling:
It is permitted to work a heathen slave with rigor. Though such is the
rule, it is the quality of piety and the way of wisdom that a man be
merciful and pursue justice and not make his yoke heavy upon the
slave. . . . Cruelty and effrontery are not frequent except with heathen
who worship idols. The children of our father Abraham, however, i.e. the
Israelites, upon whom the Holy One, blessed be He, bestowed the favor of
the Law and laid upon them statutes and judgments, are merciful people
who have mercy upon all. Thus also it is declared by the attributes of the
Holy One, blessed be He, which we are enjoined to imitate: "And His

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Journal of ReligiousEthics

mercies are over all His works" [Maimonides 1951, Laws Concerning
Slaves 9:8].

Maimonidescombinesthe notionof the Torah'slaws as fair andjust

with that of God'smoralvirtues. This combinationis obvious:if God's
laws are intrinsicallygoodandjust, then the Godcommandingthem
is obviouslya goodandjust God. Maimonidesemphasizesthat human
beings are requiredto imitate God'svirtues,ratherthan merelycomply with the formalitiesof halakhiclaw, which would have allowed
them to "worka heathen slave with rigor." Throughimitatio Dei,
humanbeings conformwith the spirit of the Law and with the intentions of God,who gave us the Torah.
Moses Hagiz demonstratesthe combineduse of the principleof
God'sgoodnessand the moralvalue of the Torah'scommands(Hagiz
1886, 12). The context is once again the attitude to gentiles, and
Hagiz rages against those guilty of immoralpracticesagainst them:
"[They]must be from Amalek'sseed, who always persecutedIsrael
and knew not the ways of the Lord,becausethe Lordis righteousin
all His ways, andHe andHis holyTorahguidethe childrenof Israelin
the right path, and gave us just laws and ordinances."
A responsumby R. SolomonHirshSchick(Ha-Rashban)is an interesting example of the halakhicuse of God'smoral image. He was
asked whether to allow the conversionof a gentile womanwho had
marrieda Jewishman in a civil courtandbornehis children,sincethe
Talmud(Yevamot24b) disapprovesof conversionsmotivatedby a desire to marry a Jew rather than by a desire for Heaven. R. Schick
pondersthe merits of the various arguments:"Ifthe prophetHosea
did not want to expel his harlotwife and his childrenby her and the
HolyOne,blessedbe He, agreedto his wishes, as the rabbishave told
us ... how can we ask a shoemakerfromAlthofen[a placenear Budamother? Do we
pest] to do penitenceby expellinghis sons and their
not pray Tity us as a fatherpities his children?'" (Schick1912, 37).
One last instance of the role of God'simage in the shaping of an
halakhicrulingis foundin the workof R. MeirAbulafia,(Ha-Ramah),
who deals with the followingquestion:doesthe rulingon the apostate
city applyto womenand children?R. Meirquotesevidencefromdifferent sourcesto provethat this ruling does not apply to them and
says: "farbe it fromGodto commitevil"(in Lifshitz1968, 1:186),that
is, since He is perceivedas a Godof justice, we cannotinterpretHis
commandsin ways that wouldsuggest He is an evil God.
considerations.
All these examplesrely on explicittheological-moral
We believe that even when these considerationsare merely latent,
they fulfill a central role in shaping the rabbis'halakhic conscious-

Divine CommandMoralityand Jewish Tradition

63

ness. Considerationsrelyingon mercyandjustice are at times raised

withoutexplicitlyalludingto their theologicalsignificance,but we can
reasonablyassume that the wordsof the Midrashecho in the background:"Justas He is graciousand merciful,so be thou also gracious
and merciful"(Mekhiltade-RabbiIsmael, Shirata 3).

6. Summary
The purposeof this paperhas been to examinewhethertheories of
strongdependence,that is, DCMtheories,appearin Jewish tradition.
We analyzedseveral Jewish texts purportingto advocatethis theory
and foundthat most of them could,at best, supportonly a weak version of dependence. DCM features in both Christianityand Islam
and, in religiousterms, offers a highly appealingthesis. In light of
these factors,we viewedits absencefromJudaismas a puzzlingphenomenonrequiringexplanation. In the last section of the paper,we
arguedthat the nature of halakhicactivity,which grants broadlatitude to autonomoushumanjudgmentand acknowledgesthe independenceof moralvalues,couldaccountforit. In line with this argument,
we have endedby dwellingbrieflyon the image of Godembeddedin
Halakha, showing it to be incompatiblewith the one that emerges
fromDCM. The analysis we have suggestedmay shed new light on
several elementsconstitutiveof Judaismand on the systematiclinks
betweenthem. The absenceof DCMtheoriesmay help us gain important insights into Jewish ethics, as well as into centralaspectsof Jewish theologyand anthropology.

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