Syllabus for POS 592: American Political Institutions

Dr. Mark D. Ramirez

School of Politics and Global Studies
Arizona State University
Office location: Coor Hall 6761
Cell phone: 480-965-2835
E-mail: mark.ramirez@asu.edu
Class meets: Monday, 5:40 PM to 8:30 PM in Coor 6761

Course description
This is a course on American Political Institutions. It covers traditional topics such as the
presidency, Congress, Supreme Court, and bureaucratic agencies. It also covers interactions
between institutions. Its diverges from traditional courses on institutions in that its focus
is on institutions and how instituitons matter. Thus, much of the readings will contrast
the sociological approach to studying the behavior of public officials within institutions to
studying the role of institutions within institutions. In short, this instructor believes a great
deal of the behavior of public officials is dictated by institutional structures and norms.
The readings are designed to 1) provide students with the foundational knowledge of the
field of political institutions, 2) provide an introduction to current research on political institutions, and 3) provide insight into how the study of political institutions fits into our
broader understanding of politicsquestions of power and democracy.

Course Organization and Requirements

Course grades: Course grades will be assessed on the basis of:
Course participation (50 points)
Written assignments (50 points)
Late work will not be accepted in this course. Furthermore, taking an incomplete in this
course is not an option. Students undergoing extenuating circumstances should contact me
ASAP and we will discuss the situation during the course of the semester.

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Course calendar
Week 1 (1-9): What is institutionalism
These readings contrast the behavioral approach to studying political institutions to the
institutional approach to the study of political institutions. The behavioral approach has its
roots in sociology and psychology, while the institutional approach derives from economics.
The latter saw a resurgence in research starting around the late 1970s leading to the claim of
a new institutionalism. The new institutionalism criticized the behavioralist approach
for failing to account for the importance of institutions (see North for a definition) in the
study of political governing bodies.
Oppenheimer, Bruce I. Behavioral Approaches to the Study of Congress. in The Oxford
Handbook of the American Congress, eds. Eric Schickler, Frances E. Lee, and George C.
Edwards. Oxford University Press. 11-35.
North, Douglass C. 1991. Institutions. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1): 97112.
March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. The New Institutionalism: Organizational
Factors in Political Life. American Political Science Review, 78(3): 734-749.
Week 2 (1-16): Congress I: Electoral connection
What motivates the behavior of members of Congress and the design of Congress itself?
Mayhew argues its a desire for re-election, while Arnold shows how the policy goals of legislatures fit into the theory.
Mayhew, David R. Congress: The Electoral Connection. Yale University Press.
Arnold, Douglas R. The Logic of Congressional Action. Yale University Press. Chapters 1
and 3.
Week 3 (1-23): Congress II: Distributive politics
What motivates the behavior of members of Congress and the design of Congress? A desire
to pass pork . . . and get re-elected.
Evans, Diana. Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions
in Congress. Cambridge University Press.
Week 4 (1-30): Congress III: Informational perspective
What motivates the behavior of members of Congress and the design of Congress? Organizational structures that reduce the transaction costs of obtaining costly information required
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to make public policy.

Krehbiel, Keith. Information and Legislative Organization. University of Michigan Press.
Week 5 (2-6): Congress IV: Party governance
This week extends the debate on the organization of Congress and what explains the behavior of members of Congress by adding political parties as a potential explanation. Although
some see party influence as the main influence on member behavior (Ansolabehere et al.
and Cox and McCubbins), others note that it might be impossible to disentangle the effect
of party influence from other factors (Krehbiel). Smith provides an overview of the entire
debate noting that even among those that agree parties are important, the theories of party
influence are not homogenous.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart. 2001. The Effects of Party
and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 26(4):
533-572.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. Wheres the Party? British Journal of Political Science, 23(2):
235-266.
Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2002. Agenda Power in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1877-1986. Parties, Procedure, and Policy: Essays on the History of Congress,
David W. Brady and Mathew McCubbins, eds. Stanford University Press.
Smith, Steven S. 2000. Positive Theories of Congressional Parties. Legislative Studies
Quarterly. 25(2): 193-215.
Week 6 (2-13): Presidency I: Presidential power
What power does the president hold? How does the president shape public opinion and
policy? Neustadt takes a pluralistic view of politics where they president must strategically
shape coalitions and factions. This book provides the foundation for most of the modern
work on the presidency. Cane-Wrones provides the most recent test of many of Neustadts
claims regarding the ability of the president to influence public opinion and policy. The
book is noteworthy for its rigorous testing of these questions and highlighting important
methodological problems facing presidency research.
Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents Free Press. Chapters
1-3.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice. Who Leads Whom?: Presidents, Policy and the Public. University
of Chicago Press.

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Week 7 (2-20): Presidency II: Presidential Decision-making

Historic work on presidential decision-making focused on presidential personality and organizational style. Tucker provides an overview of this type of research. Contemporary
research examines how institutions constrain presidential decision-making. Cameron focuses
on the presidential veto to understand how presidents make decisions in relation to Congress.
Cooper and West show how OMB rules influence presidential power. Deering and Maltzman show the limits of presidential use of executive orders to forge policy. Thus, this work
diverges from historical presidency literature by focusing on institutions.
Tucker, Robert C. 1977. The Georges Wilson Reexamined: An Essay on Psychobiography. American Political Science Review, 71(2): 606-618. (Skim)
Cameron, Charles M. Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 3, 4, and 5.
Cooper, Joseph and William W. West. 1988. Presidential Power and Republican Government: The Theory and Practice of OMB Review of Agency Rules. Journal of Politics,
50(4): 864-895.
Deering, Christopher J. and Forrest Maltzman. 1999. The Politics of Executive Orders:
Legislative Constraints on Presidential Power. Political Research Quarterly, 52(4): 767-783.
Week 8 (2-27): Courts I: Attitudinal model
A behavioral approach to Supreme Court decision-making. Justices vote their ideological
preferences.
Segal, Jeffrey A. and Harold J. Spaeth. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited. Cambridge University Press.
Recommended: Epstein, Lee, Valerie Hoekstra, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Harold J. Spaeth.
1998. Do Political Preferences Change? A Longitudinal Study of the U.S. Supreme Court
Justices. Journal of Politics, 60(3): 801-818.
Week 9 (3-5): Courts II: Rational choice model
An institutional approach to Supreme Court decision-making that views justices as strategic
actors making decisions in a complex inter-institutional government.
Knight, Jack and Lee Epstein. The Choices Justices Make. CQ Press.

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Week 10 (3-12): Public policy regulation

The book examines how institutions form and political power is created in response to public
officials, interest groups, citizens, and environmental constraints. It focuses on the importance of agencies in shaping policy outcomes. Its also notable for its mixed-method approach
to the study of public policy.
Meier, Kenneth J. The Politics of Sin: Drugs, Alcohol, and Public Policy M.E. Sharpe.
Week 11 (3-19)
Spring break
Week 12 (3-26): Institutional interactions I: Executive delegation
This week provides an introduction to why political actors will delegate policy-making authority to subordinates. Wood and Waterman use a principle-agent approach to understand
how presidents can control bureaucracies.
Wood. B. Dan, and Richard W. Waterman. Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy. Westview Press.
Week 13 (4-2): Institutional interactions II: Legislative/Judicial delegation
This week continues the discussion of policy delegation. Huber and Shipan present a review
of the various theoretical reasons for delegation in relation to legislatures and bureaucratic
agencies. McCubbins and Schwartz explore oversight mechanisms and ask the question if
congressional oversight of agencies should look like policy patrols or fire alarms. Meier and
Krause note that agencies might not need oversight, while Rogers reviews the literature on
delegation of policy by the Supreme Court.
Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. 2000. The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies,
and Transaction Costs. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25: 25-52.
McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms. American Journal of Political Science, 28(1): 165179.
Meier, Kenneth J. and George A. Krause. Conclusion: An Agenda for the Scientific Study
of Bureaucracy. in George Krause and Kenneth J. Meier, Politics, Policy, and Organizations. University of Michigan Press.
Rogers, James R. Why Expert Judges Defer to (Almost) Ignorant Legislator. in Institutional Games and the Supreme Court, James R. Rodgers, Roy B. Flemming, and Jon R.
Bond, eds. University of Virginia Press.
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Week 14 (4-9): Interests groups

Smith provides an interesting theory and set of empirical findings on when interest groups
are able to influence public policy.
Smith, Mark A. American Business and Political Power. University of Chicago Press.
Week 15 (4-16): Institutions and the economy
Norths nobel prize winning work on how institutions matter in shaping the economyan
important and overlooked aspect of political life.
North, Douglass C. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press.

Statement about students with disabilities

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provides comprehensive civil rights protection for persons with disabilities. Among other
things, this legislation requires that all students with disabilities be guaranteed a learning
environment that provides for reasonable accommodation of their disabilities. If you believe
you have a disability requiring an accommodation, please contact the Department of Student
Life, Services for Students with Disabilities in Room 126 of the Koldus Building, or call 8451637.

Copyright statement
The materials used in this course are copyrighted. By materials, I mean all products generated for this class, which include but are not limited to syllabi, web pages, multimedia files,
presentations, quizzes, exams, lab problems, in-class materials review sheets, and additional
problem sets. Because these are copyrighted, you do not have the right to copy the handouts,
unless I expressly grant permission.

Statement about plagerism

As commonly defined, plagiarism consists of passing off as ones own the ideas, words, writings, etc., which belong to another. In accordance with the definition, you are committing
plagiarism if you copy the work of another person and turn it in as your own, even if you
should have the permission of the person. Plagiarism is one of the worst academic sins, for
the plagiarist destroys the trust among colleagues without which research cannot be safely
communicated. If you have any questions regarding plagiarism, please consult the Texas
A&M University web site, http://aggiehonor.tamu.edu.

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