P.

Necessary implication
PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILS., INC. V. SECRETARY OF
LABOR, G.R. NO. 96663, 10 AUGUST 1999)
STATCON DOCTRINE:
NECESSARY IMPLICAITON x,y,z necessarily includes a
1. Counters Ejusdem Generis and Noscitur Asociis: Even if not similar to those
enumerated
2. Purpose is to expand

This doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part

thereof as that which is expressed,
FACTS:

In June 1990, the Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (Union) filed a

petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the
exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines, Inc.
(PEPSI).

On July 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter granted the Petition, with the explicit
statement that it was an affiliate of Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas
(federation) together with two (2) rank and file unions, Pepsi-Cola Labor Unity
(PCLU) and Pepsi-Cola Employees Union of the Philippines (PEUP).

On July 23, 1990

PEPSI filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)
a petition to Set Aside, Cancel and/or Revoke Charter Affiliation of the Union
on the grounds that (a) the members of the Union were managers and (b) a
supervisors union cannot affiliate with a federation whose members include the
rank and file union of the same company.

The Secretary of Labor denied the appeal. Pepsi applied for a petition for
certiorari which the Court granted a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a supervisors union can affiliate with the same Federation of
which two rank and file unions are likewise members, without violating Article
245 of the Labor Code.
2.

Whether or not confidential employees can join the labor union of the rank and
file employees.

HELD:
1) As held in Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma, the prohibition on
Article 245 (see below) extends to a supervisorslocal union applying for
membership in a national federation the members of which include local unions
of rank and file employees. What happened in the case at bar was that the
Union withdrew its affiliation with the Federation before the case was even

decided, resulting it to be moot and academic. However, the Court, as it may

validly do so, still rendered a decision.
2)

While Article 245 of the Labor Code (see below) singles out managerial
employee as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization, under the
doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees, even if not included
in the list, are similarly disqualified. In effect, it is as if confidential employees
like Credit and Collection Managers and Accounting Managers are included in
the provision. The reason behind this is that the collective bargaining process,
managerial employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as
representatives, and to see to it that its interests are well protected. The
employers are therefore not protected if case is applied otherwise.
IMPORTANT LAWS/STATUTES/PROVISIONS/SECTIONS

Article 245 of the Labor Code

Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization
of the rank and file employees but may join assist or form separate labor
organization of their own.
Doctrine of necessary implication No statute can be enacted that can provide all
the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not
meet a particular situation. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced.
Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.

Q. Cassus Omissus
PEOPLE V. MANANTAN, 115 PHIL. 657 (1962))
STATCON DOCTRINE:
CASUS OMISUS = x,y,z where a = x,y, or z; like Expressio unius est exclusio,
alterius
1. Purpose is to limit
2. When a certain provision makes an enumeration of applicable cases and
there is an analogous case which stands upon the same reason but have
been omitted inadvertently or was overlooked, the courts cannot supply
those omissions.
FACTS:
An information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan before the

Court of First Instance alleging Guillermo Manantan, the defendant, in violation of

Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation was conducted
by the court and found a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by
the defendant. Manantan filed a motion to dismiss the information saying that he, as
a justice of the peace, is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the said
code. However, the court denied his motion holding that a justice of peace is within
the purview of Section 54. Manantan then filed a second motion in the Court of
Appeals, citing People v. Macaraeg which held that a justice of the peace is excluded
from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Because of the
authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the information against the accused. Hence, the presence of this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code
HELD:
YES, Manantan, as a justice of peace is part of the enumeration in the
prohibition in Section 54 of the said code.
From the history of Section 54 of the REC, such provision was already
present in the first election law in the Philippines (Section 29 of Act No. 1582). The
said section had gone through a lot of revisions and amendments (Section 6 of Act
No. 1709, Section 449 of the Administrative Code, Section 2636 of Act No. 3387,
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code(R.A. No. 180)).
There were two instances wherein the words "justice of the peace" were
omitted effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and Section 54 of the
REC. It was noted that the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not
carry the qualification "of the First Instance." Whenever the word "judge" was
qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance," the words "justice of the peace"
would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the
peace" were omitted.
The above-mentions pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to
justify the conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the
peace" in the REC, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation.
Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader
term "judge." There was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the
enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and
broader term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of judges. A "justice of the peace" is
a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with
judicial authority. This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated
questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even
jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" invoked by the
defendant- appellee is not applicable in the case at bar. Under the said rule, a person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted

intentionally. The maxim can operate and apply only if and when the omission
has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has already been
shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities.
Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges." Also, the
application of this maxim does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal
in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or
thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no
omission but only substitution of terms. The rule that penal statutes are given a strict
construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws;
instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an
aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.
To further support the decision by the court, it can be seen from the
purpose of the statute that the intent of the legislators was to enlarge the officers
within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various
judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old
statute, are now within its encompass.
Lastly, the application by both the trial court and Court of Appeals of the
rule "expressio unius, est exclusio alterius" has been erroneously applied and neither
courts has given the reason for the exclusion. Thus, having no reason for the said
exclusion.
IMPORTANT LAWS/STATUTES/PROVISIONS/SECTIONS:
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code:
"No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer
or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or
rural police force, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any
candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in any election or take part therein,
except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer."

R. Each to each
PEOPLE V. TAMANI, G.R. NO. 22160, 21 JANUARY 1974)
STATCON DOCTRINE:
EACH TO EACH =x or y of a or b where x is to a while y is to b
FACTS:

Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
the notice of appeal was forty-seven days late which appellant's counsel
did not oppose.

Lower court's decision convicting defendant Tamani was served on his

counsel

A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied.

A copy of the order of denial was served by registered mail to defendant's

counsel through his wife.
He had eleven days within which to appeal. He filed his notice of appeal
only on September 10, 1963 or 48 days after.
Defendant's counsel, filed a sworn statement that the court's order was
never brought to his attention and averred that his wife must've lost the
envelope containing the order.
The trial court opined that the wife's affidavit should have been submitted
but the trial court gave due course to the appeal

FACTS (Substantive): *sorry mejo magulo ito*

Two different set of facts were presented to the Court.

Tamani:
o At the time of the murder he was at the house of his cousin
o A confession was forced out of him by NBI Agent Almeda
o According to the father of the deceased, Francisco Siyang, it was
Gaspar Ibarra and Melchor Tumaneng who fired the shots and
killed Jose Siyang
o Ibarra and Tumaneng were hired by Mayor Domingo to kill
Siyang

Prosecution:
o Villamor Tamani, respondent's cousin, functioned as acting
mayor when Domingo was suspended.
o When Domingo came back, Villamor Tamani returned to his
position as Vice Mayor and summoned Tamani and one
Cadawan to liquidate the Mayor.
o Tamani and Cadawan crossed the Mrs. Ibarra's yard, where Mrs.
Ibarra saw Tamani carrying a gun.
o According to Mrs. Ibarra, they were headed to Pua's store where
Mayor Domingo was.
o Tamani fired two volley's hitting Siyang with through and
through gunshot wounds and hitting Mayor Domingo on his
palm
o Tamani signed and thumbarked two sworn statements before the
NBI agent wherein he confessed that he was the one who shot
Siyang and Mayor Domingo
ISSUE:
Procedural:
1.
WoN the appeal should be effected only within the 15-day period after
promulgation
Substantive:
3. WoN Tamani's alibi can be given serious consideration

PROVISION:

Rule 122 of the Rules of Court

o SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.An appeal must be taken
within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the
judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an
appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial
is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have
been served upon the defendant or his attorney.
HELD:
Procedural Issue: The clear terms mentioned in the specific provision in the Rules
of Court leaves no room for doubt that the appeal should be affected within 15 days
from promulgation of the judgment.

In Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court the word "must" is synonymous
with "ought" which connotes compulsion.

The word "promulgation" should be construed in the same section as

referring to "judgment"; "notice" as "order"

The construction is sanctioned by the rule REDDENDO SINGULA

SINGULIS meaning "referring each to each; referring each phrase or
expression to its appropriate object" or "let each be put in its proper place,
that is, the words should be taken distributively"

When the order was served by registered mail on July 13th on appellant's
counsel, he had only 1 day to file his notice of appeal, and not eleven days

That kind of construction is an application by analogy of the rule

governing appeals in civil cases (Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court)

However, considering that appellants right to seek a review of his case was
lost by reason of his counsel's inadvertence and considering further that
the briefs have been submitted, the Court has resolved to review the record
to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice
Substantive Issue: No. It cannot be given serious consideration.

The settled rule is that an alibi, to be tenable, must be such as to preclude

the possibility of the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime or
its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.

Appellant's alibi does not satisfy that basic requirement. Moreover, it was
not corroborated by Vice-Mayor Tamani or by any other person. Its
concocted character is manifest.
Disposition: the appeal is dismissed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

S. Relative and qualifying terms

MAPA V. ARROYO, 175 SCRA 76)
STATCON DOCTRINE:
AD PROXIMUM ANTECEDENS FIAT RELATIO NISI IMPEDIATUR
SENTENCIA
1. Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it be prevented by the
context.
FACTS:
Jose Mapa bought lots 12, 13, 15 and 16 in Barangay Hills Subdivision in
Antipolo, Rizal from Labrador Development Corporation. Mapa undertook a
monthly installment of P2137.54 over a period of 10 years but defaulted in the
payment. Labrador sent Mapa a notarial cancellation of the 4 contracts to sell. Mapa
invoked Clause 20 Subdivision Development of PD 957 which states that all
improvements except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the
government shall be completed within a period of 3 years from the date of the
contract. Failure by the seller to comply with this shall permit the buyer to suspend
his monthly installments without any penalties or interest charges until such time
that the improvements have been made as scheduled.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not PD 957 is applicable to the contracts making the cancellation of the
contracts of the sale incorrect.
HELD:
No. Labrador has the right to cancel the contract because PD 957 does not
apply because it was issued long after the execution of the contracts. There is no
intention to give retrospective application to the provisions of the decree that can be
gathered from its language. Furthermore, the initial non-construction was because
Mapa requested the suspension of its construction since his intention was to
purchase adjoining lots and enclose the same. Mapa stopped payments of his
monthly obligations 5 months after the effectivity of PD 957 or about a year after the
contract execution. Labrador still has 1 and years to comply with its legal
obligation to develop the subdivision under the said PD and 2 years to do so under
the agreement. Hence, it was improper for Mapa to suspend his payments on the
ground of non-development since the period allowed for the developer to undertake
such development has not yet expired.

T. Context and related clauses

PARAS V. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 49)
STATCON DOCTRINE:
Statutes are construed with the context in mind. A clause should be construed with
other related clauses as to determine the legislative intent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Danilo Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,

Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A
petition for his recall as PB was filed by registered voters, and the COMELEC
approved the petition and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. The recall
election got postponed for 3 times until it was finally scheduled on January 13,
1996.
Petitioner argues that the scheduled January 13, 1996 election is barred
because the SK election on the first Monday of May 1996, following Section 74 (b)
of Local Government Code which states that no recall shall take place within one
year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one year immediately
preceding a local election. Petitioner maintains that the SK Election (which is
barely 4 months from the recall election) is considered to be a local election.
ISSUE:
WON Section 74 (b) can be invoked to bar the recall election.
HELD:
No, because Section 74 provides: Limitations on Recall.(a) Any
elective local official may be the subject of a recall election once during his term of
office for loss of confidence; (b) No recall shall take place within 1 year from the
date of the officials assumption to office or 1 year immediately preceding a regular
local election.
The intent of Sec 74 is to subject an elective official to recall election once
during his term of office. Paragraph (B) construed with paragraph (A) merely
designates the period when such local official may be subject of a recall election,
that is, during the second year of his term of office. Following the petitioners
interpretation of regular local election will unduly circumscribe the provision of
LGC on recall.
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment.

U. Use of punctuation marks

U.S. V. HART, 26 PHIL. 149)
STATCON DOCTRINE:
An argument on punctuations mark cannot stand by itself.
FACTS:
The appellants were accused of vagrancy under Act No. 519. Evidence of
prosecution showed that Hart previously pleaded guilty and was convicted on a
gambling charge before his arrest on the vagrancy charge. Hart had been conducting
two gambling games, one in his saloon and the other in another house, every night.
In his defense, he showed that he operated a hotel and saloon, raised imported hogs,
administered and sold several hectares of land, furnished the same property and paid
for the first public school in Tacondo.

Miller, having the reputation of being a gambler, also pleaded guilty and
was also fined prior to the arrest on the charge of vagrancy. Miller was discharged
from the Army having the position of Sergeant and received a rating as Excellent
on discharge. Since then, he had been engaged in tailoring business.
Natividad also pleaded guilty of the charge of gambling prior to the charge
of vagrancy. He is a tailor who earns enough to support his family.
Sec.1 of Act No.519 is divided into seven clauses separated by
semicolons. Each clause enumerates a certain class of persons who, within the
meaning of the statute, are to be considered as vagrants.

are two classes of vagrants under the 2nd clause one whose visible means of
support is a defense, and the other who cannot invoke such defense. Thus, the
absence of visible means of support is necessary under the statute in order to be
convicted for loitering around saloons, dram shops and gambling houses.
In this case, all of the three defendants were earning a living by legitimate methods
in a degree of comfort higher than the average. Their sole offense was gambling, and
they played openly, in a licensed public saloon. Thus, they are acquitted.
Section 1 of Act No. 519

ISSUE:
WON the appellants committed the act of vagrancy

(1) Every person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical
ability to work, and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
(2) every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or
tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support; (3) every
person known to be a pickpocket, thief, burglar, ladrone, either by his own
confession or by his having been convicted of either of said offenses, and having no
visible or lawful means of support when found loitering about any gambling house,
cockpit, or in any outlying barrio of a pueblo; (4) every idle or dissolute person or
associate of known thieves or ladrones who wanders about the country at unusual
hours of the night; (5) every idle peron who lodges in any barn, shed, outhouse,
vessel, or place other than such as is kept for lodging purposes, without the
permission of the owner or person entitled to the possession thereof; (6) every lewd
or dissolute person who lives in and about houses of ill fame; (7) every common
prostitute and common drunkard, is a vagrant.

HELD:

V. Words and Phrases:

No, because the phrase without visible means of support applies to every person
found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses and to tramping
or straying through the country.

1. Proviso
MERCADO ET.AL. V. NLRC, G.R. NO. 79869, 5 SEPTEMBER 1991)

The Attorney General (AG) insists that it was not the intention of the
Legislature to limit the crime of vagrancy to those having no means of support. The
AG relies on the 2nd clause to sustain the guilt of defendants, the AG argues that
visible means of support does not apply to every person found loitering about
saloons or dram shops or gambling houses but is confined entirely to or tramping
or straying through the country, such that loitering in such places is in itself a
crime. It is insisted that had it been intended for "without visible means of support"
to qualify the first part of the clause, either the comma after gambling houses would
have been ommitted, or else a comma after country would have been inserted.

When the meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the

courts to ascertain the true legislative intention, and adopt that construction of the
statute which will give it effect. The construction finally adopted should be based
upon something more substantial than the mere punctuation found in the printed Act.
If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in accord
with the legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the
literal meaning of the words of the statute as thus punctuated. However, an argument
based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to
change the punctuation when necessary, to give the Act the effect intended by the
Legislature.
It would be an illogical classification on the part of the Legislature to say that there

STATCON DOCTRINE:
The proviso outweighs the body of the provision.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners alleged that they were agricultural workers utilized by private
respondents in all the agricultural phases of work on the 7 1/2 hectares of ace land
and 10 hectares of sugar land owned by the latter.
2. Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Leon Santillan worked in the farm of private
respondents since 1949, Fortunato Mercado, Jr. and Antonio Mercado worked since
1972 and the rest of the petitioners worked since 1960 up to April 1979, when they
were all allegedly dismissed from their employment.
3. The petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages,
non-payment of overtime pay and other benefits against the private respondents
before the Regional Arbitration Branch No. III of NLRC in San Fernando,
Pampanga.

4. Private respondent Aurora Cruz in her answer to petitioners' complaint denied that
said petitioners were her regular employees and instead averred that she engaged
their services, through Spouses Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa Mercado, their
"mandarols", that is, persons who take charge in supplying the number of workers
needed by owners of various farms, but only to do a particular phase of agricultural
work necessary in rice production and/or sugar cane production, after which they
would be free to render services to other farm owners who need their services.
5. Respondent Labor Arbiter Luciano P. Aquino ruled in favor of private
respondents, however, granted P10,000 worth of financial assistance to the
petitioners.
The Labor Arbiters contentions:
The nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring reveal that they were required
to perform phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time after which their
services would be available to any other farm owner.
He deemed petitioners contention of working twelve (12) hours a day the whole
year round in the farm, an exaggeration, for the reason that the planting of rice and
sugar cane does not entail a whole year as reported in the findings of the Chief of the
NLRC Special Task Force.
He was also of the opinion that the real cause which triggered the filing of the
complaint by the petitioners who are related to one another was the filing of a
criminal complaint for theft against Reynaldo Mercado, son of the spouses
(Mercado), wherein, in Reynaldos affidavit, stated under oath that petitioners were
never regularly employed by private respondent but were, on-and-off hired to work
and render services when needed.
6. Respondent NLRC affirmed the decision of the respondent Labor Arbiter, with the
modification of the deletion of the award for financial assistance to the petitioners.
The MR filed by the petitioners was likewise denied.
7. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers in relation to
the proviso in the
second paragraph of Art. 280 of the Labor Code, hence, illegally dismissed by the
private respondents
HELD:
NO. Petitioners were not regular and permanent workers of the private
respondents, for the nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring reveal that they
were required to perform phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time
after which their services would be available to any other farm owner.
The first paragraph of Art. 280 answers the question who are employees. It
states that, regardless of any written or oral agreement to the contrary, an employee
is deemed regular where he is engaged in necessary or desirable activities in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except for project employees (seasonal
employees).
A project employee has been defined to be one whose employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of

which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee, or where
the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment and
the employment is for the duration of the season.
Thus petitioners are project/seasonal employees.
The second paragraph of Art. 280 demarcates as "casual" employees, all
other employees who do not fall under the definition of the preceding paragraph.
The proviso, in said second
paragraph, deems as regular employees those "casual" employees who have
rendered at least one year of service regardless of the fact that such service may be
continuous or broken.
The general rule is that the office of a proviso is to qualify or modify only
the phrase
immediately preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of the clause that it
immediately follows. Hence, the proviso is applicable only to the employees who
are deemed "casuals" but not to the "project" employees nor the regular employees
treated in paragraph one of Art. 280.
Also, Policy Instruction No. 12 of the Department of Labor and
Employment discloses that the concept of regular and casual employees was
designed to put an end to casual employment in regular jobs, which has been abused
by many employers to prevent called casuals from enjoying the benefits of regular
employees or to prevent casuals from joining unions. The same instructions show
that the proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280 was not designed to stifle smallscale businesses nor to oppress agricultural land owners to further the interests of
laborers, whether agricultural or industrial.
DISPOSITION:
Petition DISMISSED. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
affirming that of the Labor Arbiter, under review, is AFFIRMED.
PROVISIONS:
Article 280 of the Labor Code:
Article 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of
the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has
been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of
service whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular
employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such actually exists.
Policy Instruction No. 12 of DOLE
PD 830 has defined the concept of regular and casual employment. What determines

regularity or casualness is not the employment contract, written or otherwise, but the
nature of the job. If the job is usually necessary or desirable to the main business of
the employer, then employment is regular. If not, then the employment is casual.
Employment for a definite period which exceeds one (1) year shall be considered re
for the duration of the definite period.
This concept of regular and casual employment is designed to put an end to casual
employment in regular jobs which has been abused by many employers to prevent
so-called casuals from enjoying the benefits of regular employees or to prevent
casuals from joining unions.

2. Including
STERLING SELECTIONS CORPORATION V. LLDA, G.R. NO.
171427, 30 MARCH 2011)
STATCON DOCTRINE:
The word include means to take in or comprise as a part of a whole.
FACTS:
In 1992 and 1998, neighbors of petitioner Sterling Selections Corporationa sterling silver fabrication company operating in a private house-filed a complaint
to the barangay because of the loud noise and toxic fumes emitted by the
manufacturing plant. In 1998, a complaint was also filed to the DENR which the
latter endorsed to respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority Corporation
(LLDA).
Findings of LLDA showed that the petitioner has no permit to operate, so
a Cease and Desist Order was served to them. After the complaint was endorsed to
the Office of the Mayor, the latter issued a closure order against petitioner.
The petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and certiorari at the RTC.
They argued that under R.A. No. 6977 their business was a cottage industry and was
exempt from securing a permit. They were considered a cottage industry because
the total value of the corporation was Php 312,500.00. The petition was denied.
SEC. 3. Small and Medium Enterprises as Beneficiaries. "Small and medium
enterprise" shall be deemed as any business activity or enterprise engaged in
industry, agribusiness and/or services, whether single proprietorship, cooperative,
partnership or corporation whose total assets, inclusive of those arising from loans
but exclusive of the land on which the particular business entity's office, plant, and
equipment are situated , must have value falling under the following categories:
micro : less than P50,000
cottage : P50,001-P500,000
small : P500,001-P5,000,000
medium : P5,000,001-P20,000,000
The Petitioners appeal to the CA was also denied. The CA cited LLDA Resolution
No. 41 which enumerated businesses included in cottage industries. According to the
court, following the principle of ejusdem generis, in an enumeration only businesses

of the same kind should be included.

Section 2. Exemptions. The following activities, projects, and installations are
exempt
from the above subject requirements:
xxx xxx xxx
30. Cottage Industries, including
- stuffed toys manufacturing
- handicrafts, and
- rattan/furniture manufacturing
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Review on Certiorari to the SC.
ISSUE:
1. Is Sterling Selections Corporation considered a cottage industry?
2. Did the CA misinterpret LLDA Resolution No. 41 when it said that only those
enumerated in the law are cottage industries?
HELD:
1.
No, although the prevailing law at that time, R.A. No. 6977, states that
cottage industries include those with value of Php 50,001-500,000. That contention
is misleading because the amount Php 312,500.00 only represents their capital stock
and not the totality of their assets. The total assets of the company amounts to
37,160,340. Therefore, they cannot be considered a cottage industry.
2.
Yes, the provision did not restrict the cottage industry to those activities
mentioned in the Resolution. The enumeration did not tend to be exclusive and was
only there as examples. Further, the use of the word including implies that there
are activities other than those enumerated.

3. Negative vs affirmative words

IN RE MCGEE V. REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. L-5387, 29 APRIL 1954)
STATCON DOCTRINE:
Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the
affirmative are merely directory
FACTS:
Appellee Clyde E. McGee, an American citizen is married to Leonardo S.
Crisostomo by whom he has one child. The minors Maria and Amada, both
surnamed Magpayo are Leonarda's children by her first husband Ernesto Magpayo
who was killed by the Japanese during the occupation. McGee filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to adopt his two minor step-children Maria and
Amada.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner (husband/appellee) having a legitimate child

may adopt a step-child pursuant to Article 335, par. 1 and Article 338, par 3 of the
new Civil Code.
HELD:
NO. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be
regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. In the
case at bar, Article 335, par 1 and Article 338, par 3 of the new Civil Code provides:
ART 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
natural children by legal fiction;
ART 338. The following may be adopted:
(3) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother.
Thus, article 335, par. 1 being phrased in a negative manner, article 338, par 3
(phrased in the affirmative) of the same Code should be confined to the provision of
the former. Also, ordinarily, the word may is directory. Therefore, in the case at
bar, the petitioner cannot adopt the two children from the former marriage of his
wife because he already has a legitimate child with his present spouse.
IMPORTANT LAWS/STATUTES/PROVISIONS/SECTIONS
Article 335, par. 1 and Article 338, par. 3 of the new Civil Code

4. Mandatory v permissive
BERSABAL V. SALVADOR, G.R. NO. L-35910, 21 JULY 1978
STATCON DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, the word may when used in a statute is permissive only and
operates to confer discretion; while the word shall is imperative, operating to
impose a duty which may be enforced.
FACTS:
Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner. The
subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency, the
court issued an order stating that counsels for both parties are given 30 days from
receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be
submitted for decision by the court.
After receipt, Petitioner filed a motion ex parte to submit memorandum
within 30 days from receipt of notice of submission of the transcript of stenographic
notes taken during the hearing of the case which was granted by the court. But the
Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute
Petitioners appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration citing the submitted
ex parte motion but the court denied it.

ISSUE:
W/N the mere failure of an Appellant to submit the mentioned
memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure
to prosecute.
HELD:
The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an
Appellant to submit his memorandum. The law provides that Courts shall
decide cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city
courts: Provided parties may submit memoranda if so requested It cannot be
interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional.

DIOKNO V. REHABILITATION FINANCE CORP., 91 PHIL 608

(1952)
STATCON DOCTRINE:
The word shall is imperative. However, the rule is not absolute; it may be
construed as may when required by the context or by the intention of the statute.
FACTS:
This case is an appeal from a judgement of Court of First Instance (CFI).
Plantiff, Diokno, is the holder of a bacakpay certificate of indebtedness issued under
the provisions of RA 304 of a face value of P75,857.14 dated August 30, 1948. On
January 27, 1950 he contracted an outstanding loan with the defendant,
Rehabilitation Finance Corp., in the total sum of P50,000.00 of which P47,355.28
was still unpaid. He now seeks to compel, through this action, Rehabilitation
Finance Corp. to accept the payment of the balance of his indebtedness with his
backpay certificate. The defendant resists the suit on the following grounds:
o the demand to accept the backpay certificate as payment is not authorized by and,
in fact, contrary to the provisions of section 2 of RA 304;
o the loan was obtained much after the passage of RA 304;
o the law permits only acceptance or discount of backpay certificate, not the
repayment of loans.
The CFI dismissed the case stating that section 2 of RA 304 is permissive merely,
and even if it was mandatory, the case cannot fall thereunder Thus this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not section 2 of RA 304 is mandatory upon the defendant.
No, it is directory merely, not mandatory; appeal DISMISSED.
HELD:

The verb-phrase shall accept or discount has two modifiers, namely, subject
to availability of loanable funds and at not more than two per centum per
annum for ten years.
o There seems to be no question that, as to the second modifier, the
verb-phrase is mandatory. Not only does the law uses at not more
but the legislative purpose and intent can be carried out by fixing a
maximum limit for discounts.

As to the first modifier, the phrase subject would mean that

acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable
funds.

If backpay certificates are to be mandatorily accepted, all, if not most, of the

activities of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation will be suspended taking
into account the available cash balance at the time of the tria. It seems evident
that legislature never could have intended such absurd consequence.

Nonetheless, the Court believes that the Legilature intended that the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation should from time to time set aside some
reasonable amount for the discount of backpay certificates as circumstances
and its resource may warrant. This intention can be inferred from the fact that
Congress itself expressly ordered that all financial institutions accept or
discount backpay certificates in payment of those loans .

The Court cannot compel the corporation to accept the backpay certificate as
acceptance and discount of backpay certificates has been placed within the
sound discretion of the corporation and subject to availability of loanable funds.
STATUTE INVOVLED
BACKPAY Law, Republic Act No. 304

Sec. 2 And provided, also, That investment funds or banks or other financial
institutions owned or controlled by the Government shall, subject to availability
of loanable funds, and any provision of their charters, articles of incorporations,
by-laws, or rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, accept or
discount at not more than two percentum per annum for ten years such
certificate for the following purposes only: (1) the acquisition of real property
for use as the applicants home, or (2) the building or construction or
reconstruction of the residential house of the payee of said certificate:
Creation of Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, Republic Act No. 85

Sec.1 to provide credit facilities for the rehabilitation and development of

agriculture, commerce and industry, the reconstruction of property damaged by
war, and the broadening and diversification of the national economy
o

5. and/or
RMBSA V. HDMF, G.R. NO. 131082, 19 JUNE 2000
STATCON DOCTRINE:
The term and/or means that the effect shall be given to both the conjunctive and
and the disjunctive or.
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
Petitioner was exempted from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage for the period
1 January to 31 December 1995
o Sept 1 1995 HDMF Board of Trustees pursuant to Sec 5 of RA
7742 issued Board Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995,

amending and modifying Rules and Regulations Implementing

RA 7742:

Sec 1 of Rule VII for a company to be entitled to a

waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, it must have a
plan providing for both provident/retirement and
housing benefits superior to those provided under the
Pag-IBIG fund.
o Nov 16 1995 Petitioner filed with the respondent an
application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage because
of its superior retirement plan; petitioner sent a letter supporting
their application explaining that the 1995 Amendments to the
Rules are invlalid
o March 18 1996 Respondent disapproved petitioners
application; Rules implementing RA 7742 did not amend or
repeal Sec 19 of PD 1752 but merely implement the law
o March 31 1997 Petitioner filed a petition for review before the
CA and was dismissed on the ground that
(1) coverage of employers and employees under HDMF are mandatory
(2) petitioner is not a distressed employer to warrant its exemption from Fund
coverage
(3) amendments to the rules and regulations implementing RA 7742 are valid
(4) respondent is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations (rule-making
power)
(5) published in Philippine Star
CONTENTIONS

Petitioner
o 1995 Amendments issued by HDMF are inconsistent with the
enabling law PD 1752 (merely requires as a pre-condition for
exemption from coverage the existence of either a superior
provident/retirement plan or a superior housing plan, not both);
1996 Amendment is also void as they abolish the exemption
granted by sec 19 of PD 1752
o Repeal of such exemption ivolves the exercise of legislative
power
o No public hearing making the amendments void [Sec 9 (1), Ch
2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987]
o Did not file with the UP Law Center 3 Certified copies of every
rule adopted (Sec 3, Ch 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code
of 1987)

Respondent
o Exercising its rule-making power under Sec 13 of PD 1752
(Clarified confusion of and/or by choosing only and in Sec
19 of PD 1752)

Public hearing is only operational or discretionary on the part of

the agency concerned except when the same is required by law
(PD 1752 does not require); it requires PUBLICATION at least
in once in a newspaper of general circulation

ISSUE:
W/N 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA
7742, specifically Sec 1, Rule VII on Waiver or Suspension are valid >>
NO, null and void as recently resolved in China Banking Corp. v. The
Members of the Board of Trustees of the HDMF
HELD:
Legal Signification of the words and/or
o Used interchangeably
o Shall be taken in its ordinary signifcation (e.g. butter and/or eggs
means butter and eggs or butter or eggs)

Effect shall be given to both the conjunctive and and the

disjunctive or
o The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the
disjunctive or alone will exclude the combination of several of
the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive and
willexclude the efficiacy of any one of the alternatives standing
alone
Itseems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Sec 19
of PD 1752 intended that an employer with a provident plan or an
employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption
from coverage.
Rule-making power of HDMF should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency
o Required that the regulation be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
o