ALBERTO S. ACENAS II VS.

COURT OF APPEALS, 1995

FACTS:

This case arose from a complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money and
Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Attachment filed by private
respondent Rodrigo S. Ligon against Evelyn L. Guanzon (also known as
Evelyn Lalic or Evelyn Acenas) before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.

It is undisputed from the foregoing that Evelyn Guanzon had already

gone abroad when private respondent Ligon filed the aforementioned
complaint. Notwithstanding such fact and in spite of the in personam
character of the case, respondent Deputy Sheriff Edgardo T. Tanangco made
a substituted service of the summons and the complaint by serving copies of
the same to the daughter-in-law of Evelyn Guanzon., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, on August 9, 1990.
Shortly thereafter, on August 13, 1990, petitioner Acenas filed a motion
for leave to intervene in Civil Case No. Q-90-6250. In his bid to justify
intervention, petitioner alleged that the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
44209 which was sought to be attached by private respondent Ligon is his
exclusive property as Evelyn Lalic (a.k.a. Evelyn Guanzon, Evelyn Acenas)
does not have any interest to one-half (1/2) thereof, petitioner not being
married to her.
To petitioners chagrin, an order dated August 14, 1990 was issued
granting private respondent Ligons prayer for the issuance of a writ of
attachment upon posting the P815,000.00 attachment bond. This was
compounded by the fact that on August 23, 1990, petitioners motion for
leave to intervene was denied.
Meanwhile, Evelyn Guanzon was declared in default on August 31,
1990 for failure to answer. Consequently, private respondent Ligon was
allowed to present his evidence ex-parte.

On September 20, 1990, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering

Evelyn Guanzon to pay private respondent Ligon the sum of P815,000.00
plus legal interest thereon from date of filing of complaint until fully paid;
P25,000.00 as moral damages; P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P15,000.00 attorneys fees and the costs of the suit.
To prevent the possibility of execution over his property, petitioner filed
an affidavit of third party claim on November 8, 1990. In so doing, petitioner
reiterated absolute ownership over the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
44209, thus denying Evelyn Guanzons one-half (1/2) interest thereon. After
hearing was conducted on the third party claim, an order dated April 24,
1991 was issued denying the said claim and petitioners prayer to discharge
the attachment.
On August 28, 1991, private respondent filed an ex-parte omnibus
motion for the process server to serve Evelyn Guanzon with a copy of the
decision, which was granted in the order dated August 29, 1991. Pursuant to
the order, Process Server Edmund R. Raquid served a copy of the decision on
Evelyn Guanzon on October 17, 1991, through a certain Albert Adol, a person
of sufficient age and discretion.
On November 11, 1991, using the return of service as basis, private
respondent filed an urgent ex-parte motion to resolve the pending motion for
execution.
Petitioner then went to the Court of Appeals on certiorariand
prohibition with preliminary injunction to stop the trial court from issuing the
writ of execution. The Court of Appeals dismissed the said petition , without
prejudice to the right of petitioner to vindicate his claim in a proper action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to intervene in the case.

Ruling:
After a careful assessment of the facts of the case, SC are impelled to
allow, as they hereby allow, the intervention of petitioner Acenas in Civil
Case No. Q-90-6250.
Rule 12, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, provides:

"SECTION 2.Intervention. A person may,

before or during a trial be permitted by the
court, in its discretion, to intervene in an
action, if he has legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or when he
is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof.
(a) Motion for intervention. A person
desiring to intervene shall file a motion for
leave of court with notice upon all the parties
to the action.
(b) Discretion of court. In allowing or
disallowing a motion for intervention, the
court, in the exercise of discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties and whether or
not the intervenors rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.
Accordingly, as clearly stated above, to be permitted to intervene in a
pending action, the party must have a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties or an interest against
both, or he must be so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of the property in the custody of the court or an officer
thereof. While petitioner Acenas has not shown any interest in the checks or
in the pieces of jewelry in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties
or an interest against both, he has, however, shown legal interest in the
attached real property covered by TCT No. 44209 which is now under threat
of being levied on execution and sold at public auction.
Hence, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 27566 is SET ASIDE and the court a quo is
hereby ordered to allow herein petitioner to intervene in Civil Case No. Q-906250.

VLASON ENTERPRISES CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Duraproof filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
before the RTC of Manila attacking the actions of the Bureau. PPA, Rep.
SilverioMangaoang and Med LinePhils.
were are named as respondents. Subsequently, Duraproof amended
its petition as to include former District Collector Quiray, PPA Port
Manager Adolfo Amor, Jr., Vlason Enterprises Singkong Trading Company,
Dusit International Co., Inc., Thai-Nan Enterprises Ltd. And Thai-United
Trading Co., Ltd as respondents. In both its petitions, there was failure to
allege against Vlason Enterprises or pray for a relief against it.
Summonses for the amended petition were served to the respondents
and their counsels. Summons by publication were allowed to be served upon
the alien respondents who had no representatives in the country.

The cases against the other respondents were dismissed on the

grounds of litispendentia and lack of jurisdiction despite Duraproof moving to
declare them in default. Duraproof again moved to declare the other
respondents in default. There was no record that these motions were acted
upon.
Thereafter, Duraproof amended again its petition with supplemental
petition. The rest of the respondents were declared in default and Duraproof
was allowed to present its evidence. With regard to VlasonEntreprises, it
was alleged that it exhibited constant intimidation and harassment and
incurred heavy overhead expenses causing irreparable damages. The trial
court rendered a decision in favor of Duraproof.
Hence, Vlason, by special appearance, filed a motion for
reconsideration on the grounds it was not impleaded, served summons or
declared in default. It also filed a special appearance before the CA praying
that the levy be lifted off its properties, or a TRO be issued against the
auction. Its motion was granted and the previous decision was reversed.
However, Duraproof countered that althoughVlason filed the motion for
reconsideration in a timely manner, it has otherwise failed to include a notice
of hearing making its motion a mere scrap of paper.
Duraproof filed a motion to file a supplemental petition impleading
Vlason as one of the respondents. It was granted by the CA. Furthermore, it
was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents to
prevent them from interfering in the transfer of the vessel and its cargo from
the PPA compound.Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Vlason Enterprises was properly served with summons.
HELD:
No.Appeal GRANTED. A corporation may be served summons through
its agents or officers who under the Rules are designated to accept service of
process. A summons addressed to a corporation and served on the secretary
of its president binds that corporation.
This is based on the rationale that service must be made on a
representative so integrated with the corporation sued, that it is safe
to assume that said representative had sufficient responsibility and
discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served and to relay
the same to the president or other responsible officer of the corporation
being sued.

In the present case, Bebero was the secretary of Angliongto, who

was president of both VSI and petitioner, but she was an employee of VSI,
not of petitioner. The piercing of the corporate veil cannot be resorted to
when serving summons.
Petitioner claims that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
it, because the former had not been served summons anew for the
Second Amended Petition or for the Second Amended Petition with
Supplemental Petition.
The SC disagree. Although it is well-settled that an amended
pleading supersedes the original one, which is thus deemed withdrawn and
no longer considered part of the record, it does not follow ipso facto that the
service of a new summons for amended petitions or complaints is required.
Where the
defendants have already appeared before the trial court by virtue of
a summons on the original complaint, the amended complaint may be
served upon them without need of another summons, even if new causes of
action are alleged.
After it is acquired, a courts jurisdiction continues until the case is
finally terminated. Conversely, when defendants have not yet appeared
in court and no summons has been validly served, new summons for
the amended complaint must be served on them. It is not the change of
cause of action that gives rise to the need to serve another summons for the
amended complaint, but rather the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendants. If the trial court has not yet acquired jurisdiction
over them, a new service of summons for the amended complaint is
required.
Accordingly, In this case, the trial court obviously labored under the
erroneous impression that petitioner had already been placed under its
jurisdiction since it had been served summons through the secretary of its
president. Thus, it dispensed with the service on petitioner of new summons
for the subsequent amendments of the Petition. Accordingly, it was ruled,
however, that the first service of summons on petitioner was invalid.
Therefore, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction, and the said court
should have required a new service of summons for the amended Petitions.
AGRIFINA PANGANIBAN VS. SPOUSES ROLDAN
G.R. No. 163053, November 25, 2009
FACTS:

On April 7, 1998, petitioner AgrifinaPanganiban filed a complaint

against herein respondents, spouses Romeo Roldan and Elizabeth Roldan,
for recovery of possession and damages in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC),
Third Judicial Region, Subic , Zamabales. She alleged that she was the
registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 271 square meters,
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-12388, located in Ilwas,
Subic, Zambales; that sometime in 1984, respondents entered the land and
built a small hut on a portion thereof without her knowledge and consent;
that respondents asked permission if they could temporarily reside thereat,
since they came from Bicol and had no place to stay in Zambales; that she
took pity on them and agreed on the condition that they would vacate upon
demand; that in 1997, petitioner asked respondents to vacate the land, as
she would be putting up a fence thereon; that respondents, who were
occupying an area measuring about 103 sq m, refused to vacate; that
because of their obstinate refusal to vacate, she suffered mental anxiety;
and that for being deprived of the use and enjoyment of the land,
respondents should be required to pay a rental of P500.00 per month from
December 1997 until they vacate.
In their defense, respondents denied that they entered into an
agreement with petitioner allowing them to stay on the land. They claimed
that they had been occupying the lot as caretakers of the heirs of
Concepcion dela Paz-Lesaca since 1973, as evidenced by a Kasunduan. They
alleged that the lot was part of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 14884 issued in 1972, registered in the name of Concepcion
dela Paz-Lesaca; and that in December 1997, two (2) men who
were barangay officials went to the premises in order to survey the lot for
purposes of putting up a fence. Respondents thus objected to the intrusion
knowing that petitioner had no right or personality to eject them from the
land. Respondents averred that petitioner was merely a neighbor and that
they were surprised to find out that she was able to secure a new title over
their portion of the land.
On March 23, 2001, the MTC rendered judgmentin favor of petitioner.
The MTC did not admit respondents evidence presented during the trial
consisting of: (1) the TCT of the subject property registered under the name
of Concepcion dela Paz-Lesaca; and (2) the Kasunduan purportedly executed
by Concepcion dela Paz-Lesaca allowing Spouses Roldan to stay on the land
on the ground that these matters were not raised in their Answer or in their
Pre-trial Brief. The MTC discerned a variance of the allegation and proof, and
thus considered the evidence as no proof at all.The MTC stated that in such
situation, the remedy was to amend the Answer to conform to the evidence,
and this, respondents failed to do.
On appeal, the Regional
Trial
Court
of
Olongapo
City
affirmed
the
MTC
Decision in
toto. It,
likewise,
disregarded

the Kasunduan and the TCT, since they were not raised as a defense in
respondents answer, and the same could not be raised for the first time
on appeal.
Aggrieved, respondents went up to the CA.Hence, the Petition is
GRANTED. TheDecision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City ,
Branch 72, is hereby ANNULED AND SET ASIDE.
ISSUE:
1. Who between the contending parties has the better right to
possess the contested property?
2. WON the petition for review on certiorari be granted or not.
RULLING:
The petition is denied.
The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of the appellate
court, admitting as evidence the Kasunduan and TCT No. T-14882. SC
agree with the following justification of the CA:
Accordingly, the CA cannot be faulted for admitting the evidence
because it found them necessary to prove respondents right of
possession. A scrutiny of the records further reveals that there is no
prohibition on the admission of the Kasunduan and the TCT. The evidence
when presented and offered were not actually excluded by the lower
court. In the pre-trial brief, respondents (defendants therein) reserved the
right to present additional documentary exhibits in the course of the trial,
considering that the evidence was not yet available at the time.For the
proper disposition and resolution of the issue as to who has the right of
possession of the subject land, the admission and consideration of the
documents were in order.
In the instant case, given these conflicting claims, the rule that
where two certificates of title purport to include the same land, the earlier
in date prevails.Thus, without any legal or factual basis to lay claim over
the land, petitioner had clearly no right to order respondents eviction from
the land.
Respondents right to occupy the land emanates from the authority
given to them by the registered and rightful owner of the land,
Concepcion dela Paz-Lesaca, as evidenced by the Kasunduan which was
executed on August 8, 1973. From then on, respondents were in actual

possession of the land. As against a written or documentary evidence

giving respondents the authority to occupy the land, petitioners mere
claim that she merely tolerated respondents stay on the land cannot be
given weight. The Kasunduan executed by the rightful owner is sufficient
proof thatpetitioner has no privity of contract with respondents and,
therefore, has no right to evict them from the land. By virtue of the title
and the written agreement which are prior in time, coupled with the actual
possession of the subject land, respondents right to possess the land
should enjoy greater preference under the circumstances.
While it is conceded that respondents right to possess may be
temporary since they are mere caretakers of the land owned by
Concepcion dela Paz-Lesaca, this possession may not be disturbed unless
petitioner successfully proves that her title is superior to that of
Concepcion dela Paz-Lesaca. And such conflict in ownership should be
threshed out in another proceeding.
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31,
2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67696 is AFFIRMED.