Atrocities

17
Apologies for Atrocities:

Commemorating the 50th
Anniversary of World War IF s End
in the United States and Japan
Kyoko Kishimoto
The aftermath of the recent terrorist attack on Washington, D.C.
and New York demonstrated the heroism of fire fighters, police officers, emergency medical personnel as well as volunteer workers.
The tragedy also revealed how the imagery of World War II as well
as the racial representation of the "other" are central to American
identity and memory. The national emergency was referred to as
the worst "attack on America" since Pearl Harbor. The site of the
attack was referred to as "ground zero," a phrase used to describe
the center of the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The picture
of fire fighters raising the American flag brought tears to Tom
Brokaw's eyes as it reminded him of the famous American soldiers
from Iwo Jima. The sudden omnipresence of the American flag, the
wave of patriotism, and the unity of America were a phenomenon
described as unheard of since Pearl Harbor. As the American
people's initial shock and sadness about this incident shifted to anger, the World War II rhetoric of "revenge" and "kill'em all" began
to be heard from those who failed to make the distinction between
the alleged perpetrator and the religion and culture associated with
the terrorists. Despite the initially cautious approaches taken by the
Attorney General, the mayor of New York, and the news commenKyoko Kishimoto received a Ph.D. in American Culture Studies from Bowling
Green State University where she currently teaches media and television classes in
the Department of Popular Culture.
American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3
18
tators on selected TV stations to avoid such prejudiced generalizations about Arabs and Muslim-Americans, hate crimes occurred
throughout the country. Such sentiment was represented in President George W. Bush's declaration that not only the perpetrators
but also those nations who harbored them would be held responsible for this terrorist attack.
Why is World War II imagery so vivid in American culture, as
was demonstrated in the media coverage of September 11 and the
nation's struggle to comprehend the attack? Examinations of racial
politics and the interpretation of World War IP in the 1995 media
coverage of the 50* anniversary of the war's end help us understand this question. This article will analyze and compare the controversies surrounding World War II atrocities and how the refusal
or delivery of apologies was influenced by the World War II discourses in the U.S. and Japan. In both countries, the orthodox interpretation of World War II has made the acknowledgement and apology for wartime atrocities difficult. For the U.S., I will analyze the
Enola Gay controversy, the Clinton Administration's (and past administrations') refusal to apologize for the atomic bombings, and
the United States' response to Japan's Diet Resolution (an attempt
at an "apology"^ for Japan's wartime conduct) in ABC, CBS, NBC
television news reports. This will help in understanding the "proAmerican" appraisals and "anti-American" accusations in the fiftieth anniversary of the war's end and the September 11 rhetoric. This
reluctance to re-examine the United States' role in the war also allowed U.S. complicity in Japan's wartime transgression to be ignored.
For Japan, I will analyze the politicians' distortion of history, the
Ministry of Education's censorship of history textbooks, and controversies surrounding the Diet Resolution and "apologies" to "comfort women" in the prominent newspaper Asahi Shimhun? This will
help in understanding Japan's continuing refusal to make formal
apologies (with restitution) for its wartime conduct and how it left
room for contemporary Japan to revert to conservatism and nationalism. Even though this paper will focus on the media coverage of
the apology issues, it does not necessarily imply that the media dictates official history but that the media reflects the dominant interpretation of the war.*
American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 &3
19
The comparative analysis will clarify how the World War II narrative in the apology debate is an essential component of national
and cultural identity in both the U.S. and Japan. It will also reveal
how the World War II narratives are used to serve the present. The
strong presence of the dominant interpretation of the war in the 1995
media in both nations raises the question best articulated by Lisa
Yoneyama: "Is it possible to produce a single and definitive public
history and memory?"^ Although the attempt to silence other histories in the debate over apologies did illustrate the move to perpetuate an official history of the war, the conflicts over what should be
considered dominant history (e.g., the Enola Gay controversy and
the contestation over the Diet Resolution) demonstrated that that is
difficult. Therefore, this paper will focus not only on the dominant
interpretation of the war but also the histories that challenge that.
In the analysis of the Enola Gay controversy, the dichotomy of
"history" and "memory" as well as ""public history" and "commemorative desire" has often been used.^ However, Yoneyama questions that clear-cut distinction:
To subscribe to the distinction between factual history and
imaginary commemorationan opposition enabled by
simple trust in the power of facticity is problematic precisely because it can prove debilitating when trying to prevail over those who adhere to diametrically opposed understandings of history. Moreover, as observed in the
Smithsonian dispute, to rationalize the demand for representation in the public sphere by grounding one's legitimacy on factual authenticity alone may unwittingly help
perpetuate the myth that the subaltern history is more
partial, conjectural, and constructed than mainstream history. The recovery and accumulation of knowledge about
the pastwhat Walter Benjamin called the "additive"
method of universal historydo not themselves automatically produce new knowledge and perceptions. What matters is not how much we know about the past but rather through
what structural access, and under what personal, social, andhistorical conditions, we come to an awareness of it.'' [my empha-
sis]
20
Thus, I will focus beyond the conflict over whose history gets represented and analyze how and why the dominant interpretation became the official history in both nations.^
The Enola Gay Controversy
The most prominent example of how the reinterpretation of atrocities created heated debate was manifested in the Enola Gay controversy. As the numerous references to World War II in the September
11 media coverage illustrated, in the United States, the notion that
World War II was a "good war" and that the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki helped save a million American lives has
been widespread. However, various studies since the war have been
challenging this orthodox interpretation of World War 11.^ The fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war also provided a perfect opportunity to reexamine such traditional interpretations of the war. The
Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum's attempt to
contextualize the decision to use the atomic bombings was part of
such an effort. However, contestation over the contents of the exhibition, widely known as the Enola Gay controversy, became one of
the prominent fiftieth anniversary events in the U.S. that demonstrated how the orthodox interpretation of the war was still widely
supported.
Previous exhibitions by the Smithsonian Institution had dealt with
controversial topics such as the reinterpretation of the American frontier, the Japanese American internment, or Columbus's arrival, and
this was expected to be another exhibition in which contested issues
were approached critically.^" However, when the script of the exhibition was shown to veteran organizations (the Air Force Association and the American Legion) and subsequently leaked to the media, the attempt to contextualize the dropping of the atomic bombs
was met with criticism and accusation of being anti-American. The
critical approach toward the atomic bombings, the usage of certain
phrases in the exhibit, and the lower estimate of the casualty numbers in the event of the U.S. invasion of Japan, were accused of being "politically correct," "un-American" and "unpatriotic."" For
example, CBS news (1/20)^^ focused on the criticism of the exhibit
by singling out the deleted scripts that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
bombings were "American vengeance" for Pearl Harbor, that the
American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol, XLII, Nos, 2 &3
21
Japanese were "defending their unique culture," and that the atomic
bombings were "racially motivated." The news report emphasized
these phrases to be the main reason for the veterans' and conservative congressmen's opposition.^^ A former veteran was quoted in
the same news report, saying that the exhibition's organizers could
go to Japan and worship the en\peror, thus reiterating what he considered the "un-American" and "pro-Japanese" tendencies of the
Smithsonian scripts. In another CBS report (1/30), when introducing a historian who was critical of the veterans and politicians' pressure, the reporter said, "Stanford historian Barton Bernstein, who
helped write the original offending script, said the loser today was
free speech."^* According to yet another CBS news report (5/2),
"many critics felt it portrayed the U.S. as the aggressor and Japan as
a victim," but the report did not discuss the movement by historians who were struggling against the veteran groups and politicians
pressuring the museum.
The veterans and congressn\en's protests against the atomic bomb
exhibition in the museum had started earlier, but intensified as the
opening day of the exhibition approached.^^ The media's participation in the attack on the National Air and Space Museum also heightened the controversy and eventually led to congressional hearings,
the resignation of the director of the museum, and finally the cancellation of the exhibition.^^ CBS news (1/20) reported that the Enola
Gay controversy "has prompted calls for the museum director's firing and congressional hearings into the role of the Smithsonian itself." The May 2 CBS report explained how the protests towards
the original exhibit analyzing the fiftieth anniversary of the U.S.
bombings of Japan resulted in the resignation of the museum's planning director. Much of the American media accepted the claims of
the veteran groups and was critical of the Smithsonian's supposedly "unpatriotic" and "un-American" approach to the atomic bomb
exhibition.^'' Although historians only joined in the controversy later
by voicing their protest against the censoring of the exhibition, the
media (CBS, 1/20) failed to acknowledge their presence and perpetuated the notion that it was the Smithsonian who was distorting
history. Thus the existence of the long running debates over the
controversial nature of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
22
were ignored and dismissed. The opportunity for the public to leam
about this ongoing debate which challenged the orthodoxy was lost.
However, not all news reports fed into the criticism of the
Smithsonian. For example, ABC news took a more balanced approach and discussed both sides of the controversy. The January 28
report discussed how "veterans have gone ballistic" and also how
scholars, peace and anti-nuclear activists have "joined the fray." A
member of Physicians for Social Responsibility was quoted discussing how the nuclear age began as a result of the atom bomb. He also
criticized the whole controversy (the pressure from conservative
politicians and veterans) as "shades of 1950s stuff [McCarthyism]."
On January 30, ABC reported how the "Smithsonian Institution caved
into pressure" from veterans and some politicians who accused the
museum for suggesting that "the Japanese were the victims of unwarranted American aggression and that the U.S. government exaggerated projected American casualties in the event of an invasion
to help justify the bombing." While CBS did not discuss the ramifications of the cancellation of the exhibit, ABC reported that the exhibit would have no historical context. There would be "no pictures
of Hiroshima after the bombing, no artifacts from the devastated
city, perhaps not even casualty figures, and absolutely no analysis
of President Truman's decision to drop the world's first atomic
bomb."
Thus in general, CBS portrayed a more one-sided discussion of
the controversy whereas ABC tried to be more balanced. The evenhanded approach of ABC is important, especially when the atomic
bombing is concerned. ABC's documentary, "Hiroshima: Why the
bomb was dropped" (July 27,1995) which challenged the decision
of the bombing, stirred much controversy in an otherwise conservative mood of American society in 1995 when the orthodox interpretation of the end of the war was being reinforced.^^ Nevertheless,
overall, there was not as much focus on the Enola Gay controversy in
the 1995 American TV media as there was in American and Japanese print media."
There has been consistent criticism by some military officials, civilians, and historians, towards Truman's decision since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.^" The fiftieth aimiversary was not
the first time the orthodoxy was challenged, and the Enola Gay con-
23
troversy demonstrated the presence of this continuing struggle over

the meaning of the bombings. However, the fiftieth anniversary
seemed to have been less tolerant of such dissenting opinions, which
resulted in the cancellation of the atomic bomb exhibition at the
Smithsonian. Why was the attempt to contextualize the atomic
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the Smithsonian Institution met with criticism and protest? What made the fiftieth anniversary less critical of the reinterpretation of the end of the war?
The Enola Gay controversy, in the United States, has received much
attention in acadenc as well as non-academic circles as it symbolized the tension between critical history and memory. This split
between history and memory cannot be drawn simply between the
government's official interpretation of history and popular memory
of the public. It is a more complicated division in that there is a
discrepancy between what revisionist historians say and what conservative politicians, veterans, and segments of the public want to
believe in. If "history" is the critical and scholarly interpretation of
the past and "memory" is the personal or collective remembrance
of an event, what if there is a discrepancy between history and
memory?^^ If so, then which becomes official history: critical history or memory? And even more important than the facticity and
accurateness of history or memory, how is the dominant interpretation perpetuated and why?
Despite the fiftieth anniversary, a time in which new discoveries
in history and the passing of time could have offered an opportunity to face history critically, the surviving World War II veterans
and the backlash against liberalism which took advantage of these
veterans' viewpoints enabled the popular myth to prevail. According to the U.S. government, despite the existence of dissenting views
by some historians and segments of the public, the official interpretation of World War II justified the atomic bombings for saving many
American lives and shortening the war. Therefore, any questioning
of the legitimacy of the bombings would have challenged the interpretation of World War II as the "good war," which at the same time
contested the very meaning and identity of American culture. Thus,
the atomic bomb exhibition was met with protests, and the critical
stances labeled as "unpatriotic," "anti-American," "politically correct," and "pro-Japanese." The contextualization of the atomic bomb-
24
ing was not welcomed as re-examining the meaning of the war but
was accused of being disloyal to the United States. The exhibition
was forcefully dismissed by those who used their powerful positions in government and their role as financial supporters of the
Smithsonian Institution to pursue their political agenda and to perpetuate the official interpretation of the war. The media, which tends
to reflect the ideology of the dominant culture,^ was not exceptional
in the coverage of the Enola Gay controversy. As Mohan argues:
The media reflected and reinforced a number of obstacles
to critical historical examination of the Second World War
in 1994-95: the desire for commemoration; the traditional
reluctance to question Hiroshima; and the absence of the
counter-memory of dissenting World War Two era lites.
Furthermore, veterans' memories were transformed by the
media into ideological weapons in the culture
Thus, the Enola Gay controversy demonstrated how the notion of
World War II as a justifiable war was central to "official" American
history.
Refusing to Apologize
The justification of the atomic bombings in the official World War
II narrative denied the possibility of apology for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Both in the United States and Japan, the debates about whether the atomic bombs should have been
dropped on these two cities received much attention in the fiftieth
anniversary reports.^* John W. Dower, who argues that World War
II was a race war,^ states that the bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki has long been burned into Japanese people's minds as the
memory of World War II. Thus, historically Japan has long used the
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to portray itself as the victim
of the Second World War and to converuently forget (or cover up)
the aggression and colonization it had committed in Asia.^*" The
questioning of the atomic bombings in Japan only began after the
American Occupation ended in 1952, as the occupation forces had
been censoring the investigation of atomic bombs. Since then, the
Japanese government and people have been very active in antinuclear weapons campaigns, represented in the slogan, "No More
25
Hiroshimas."^^ Some Japanese have demanded an apology from

the U.S. government, but others argued that there would be no apology from the U.S. unless the Japanese government apologized for
the attack on Pearl Harbor. There are also arguments that without
the Japanese government's apology for the Japanese Imperial Army's
wartime aggression and atrocities, the cry for "No More Hiroshimas"
and "No More Nagasakis" will not be taken seriously. This has been
the case since the 1980s when increasing international (Asian) pressure on the Japanese government to acknowledge its wartime imperialism and colonization became strong. Reflecting that viewpoint,
on August 6 and 9, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki made
apologies in their speeches to the countries that suffered under
Japan's aggression.^^ Even if there was no consensus on whether
there should be an apology for the bombings, the fiftieth anniversary provided an opportunity for these various debates to take place
in the public. This awareness for the need to acknowledge the atrocities committed by the Japanese Imperial Army was represented in
the Diet Resolution passed by the Japanese government. Unfortunately, it is debatable whether the outcome of the resolution was an
apology.
On the other hand, even if there were some factions questioning
the decision to use the bombs, the debate surrounding whether the
U.S. government should apologize for the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were less intense in the U.S. For example,
the questions raised for President Bill Clinton in a press interview
confirmed the U.S. government's stance of supporting the atomic
bombings.^' NBC news (8/5) reported an incident at a press conference when President Clinton was asked whether the U.S. should
apologize for the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and whether
President Truman had made a right decision. To the two questions,
Clinton answered, "No. And based on the facts before him, yes."^"
Even if the Japanese government did not request that the U.S. apologize for the bombings, it still preferred that the U.S. government did
not officially justify the tragedy. Therefore, some Japanese reacted
badly to President Clinton's remark that no apology was needed for
the bombings, and the Prime Minister of Japan, Murayama
Tomiichi,^^ accused Clinton of ignoring Japanese feelings (CBS, 4/
8).
American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol, XLII, Nos, 2 &3
26
Thus, even the fiftieth anniversary could not create an opportunity for the rvaluation of the decision, despite the many studies
now^ that demonstrate that there were alternatives to the bombing
that would have ended the war with Japan.^^ According to Mohan
and Maley's analysis:
During the past five decades, criticism of the decision to
use atomic bombs against Japan has never quite abated in
the media, as some wartime leaders had hoped it would.
Yet while the history of media coverage and commentary
reveals some striking instances of establishment dissent,
these very moments of occasional yet recurrent rupture
tellingly reveal the opportunities largely ignored by the
media, in favour of comforting but simplistic narrative of
the Second World
The U.S. government endorsed the orthodox interpretation of the
decision to drop the atomic bon\bs, despite the controversial nature
of the issue. The Clinton Administration, which was very careful to
maintain good diplomatic relations with Japan and had made many
compromises,^ could not bend on this question that would have
otherwise challenged the orthodox narrative of World War II.
The American Response to Japan's Apology
Although there was less room for the contextualization, let alone
an apology, for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings in the United
States, the opposite was the case in Japan. In Japan, the issue of
apology has caused great controversies. The orthodox interpretation of the war has been that it was a "defensive war" against Westem imperialism and a liberatory war of Asian nations from Western
colonial powers. However, in response to international (mostly
Asian) pressure and mounting evidence of historical data concerning the Japanese Imperial Army's atrocities, the Japanese government decided to issue a Diet Resolution acknowledging Japan's aggression and colonization during the war. Also the fact that in 1995,
the Socialist Party was in power, breaking the long reign of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), also gave hope that the Japanese government would finally acknowledge its responsibilities in the war.
In commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary, the Socialist Party
(led by the Prime Minister of Japan) aspired to make a forn\al apol-
American Studies Intemational, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3
27
ogy for Japan's imperial and atrocious conduct in Asia during World
War 11. However, the Diet Resolution resulted in political divisiveness as well as international criticism. The conservative parties, represented by the Liberal Democratic Party, denied the necessity of an
apology as well as any reference to Japan's past imperial activities,
which some deemed "damaging to the interest of the nation." Others argued that it was more important to focus on the future than
dwell on the past. Some found the non-war clause (in the original
draft of the Diet Resolution) as problematic since it implied that Japan would not defend itself in an attack. Yet others did not think
that Japan was necessarily involved in criminal acts during the war.
For the family and bereaved members, an apology would tarnish
the memory of their loved ones who gave their lives for their country.^
This was the context in which the Japanese government, after
much controversy, decided to make an apology in the form of the
Diet Resolution. The conservative parties in the government refused
to include words such as "colonization" and "aggression" in the
resolution and also did not find the apology necessary. However,
the Socialist Party (which was represented by Prime Minister
Murayama) foimd it necessary to refer to the Japanese government's
acts of colonization and to make an explicit apology. After many
negotiations, the Diet Resolution used compromised language and
only used the words "deeply regret."
The conflict over the words "aggression," "colonization," and
"apology" (or "regret") reflects the continuing struggle over how
Japan's role in World War II should be interpreted. The transformation of the naming of the resolution itself demonstrated the conflicts
between different political parties over ideologies and interpretation of history. As the struggle over what words to use in the resolution intensified, and as more compromise was made to maintain the
coalition party, the naming of the resolution became more vague
and less political. The resolution initially was called the "No-war
Resolution." However, the LDP and some other members of the
Diet felt that the term "no-war" would give the false impression
that Japan would not fight even when attacked, therefore, proposing the use of "Peace Resolution." However, since "Peace Resolution" placed too much focus on the future and overshadowed the
28
need for apologies for past atrocities, it was rejected. Finally, the
name settled on was "Postwar Fifty Year Resolution." The fact that
the term "past war" or "recent war" was used also indicated the
government's ambivalence in defining the role of Japan in the war.
Such conflict between the two factions almost resulted in the rejection of the Diet Resolution. This controversy received international attention, especially from Asian countries who suffered under Japanese imperialism during the war. When the language and
the apology in the Diet Resolution resulted in a compromise between
the two conflicting parties, the disappointment in Asian countries
turned into rage towards Japan's unwillingness to apologize. Part
of the Diet Resolution passed on June 9,1995 reads:
Extending our thoughts to the [instances of] colonial domination and acts of aggression [that took place] through the
world in modem history, and recognizing acts of this nature engaged by our country in the past and the pain caused
citizens of other countries, particularly of the various Asian
countries, we express a sense of deep reflection.^*
What makes this Diet Resolution interesting, besides the controversy over whether to accept this as an apology, was the United
States' response, which was manifested in the differential treatment
of Japan and Germany (another former Axis power) in the U.S. media. The U.S. media focused on the Diet Resolution as an important
step in Japan's postwar resolutions. According to ABC (6/5), the
Japanese government attempted to come up with a war resolution,
in the form of an apology or "a public acknowledgment that Japan
invaded China, colonized Korea and committed atrocities." However, despite Prime Minister Murayama's eagerness to make an apology, the opposition from conservative politicians resulted in a compromised statement. After extensive political negotiations between
the two factions, "Japan's political leaders have finally agreed to
apologize for World War II" and "Japan expresses deep remorse for the
unbearable pains inflicted by Japan," (ABC, 6/6). Similarly, NBC
(6/6) reported that "the Japanese government today expressed deep
remorse for Japan's aggression during the war. This appears as a
major Japanese government controversy." CBS (6/9) referred to the
Diet Resolution in more detail and stated that "Japan's Parliament
29
ended a long and bitter struggle today, passing a resolution of regret, though not an apology, for Japan's actions in World War II. It
says Japan, among other nations, carried out acts of aggression and
regrets the suffering it brought upon other countries." Later CBS
news (6/10) reported that "almost fifty years after World War II's
end in the Pacific, Japan is still agonizing over what to say about it.
The upper house of parliament votes next week on a lower house
resolution that has just left everyone unhappy." This controversy
resulted in an unsatisfying resolution: "Despite compromised language, when Japan's w^ar resolution came to a vote in parliament,
several factions staged a boycott. The result: a half-empty chamber
that yielded, say critics, a half-hearted gesture. To its neighbors,
especially Korea and China, Japan during World War II was a brutal
aggressor; invading, colonizing, even forcing women into government sponsored brothels. The resolution offers 'condolences to war
victims' and expresses regret, but carefully avoids an apology."
Thus, the response of the media towards the Diet Resolution was
mixed. Some TV stations accepted the Diet Resolution as an apology, whereas others criticized it as simply expressing remorse. This
ambiguity could be attributed to at least two factors; one being the
interpretation of a complex word hansei, and the other being the lack
of restitution associated with the so-called apology. The inconsistency in translation demonstrates the ambiguity of the original Japanese word, hansei, which could mean regret or apology. "Regret"
and "apology" connote different levels for acknowledging guilt.
"Apology" implies full acknowledgement of a wrongdoing and
willingness to take responsibility, whereas "regret" recognizes the
wrongdoing but does not necessarily take responsibility.^^ As a result of the conflict between the conservative parties and the Socialist Party over the necessity of the apology, it was not an accident
that the meaning of this word was ambiguous. The conservative
parties (represented by the Liberal Democratic Party) opposed the
usage of words such as "aggression," "colonization," and "apology"
in the Diet Resolution, whereas the Socialist Party insisted on their
inclusion. After much contestation, the compromise was to include
the words "aggression" and "colonization." However, the word
hansei (remorse), instead of shazai (apology), was used to satisfy the
opposition parties. Choosing an equivocal word, which was at the
30
same time difficult to translate, was a political move, which demonstrated the struggle over the mearng of the war in Japan.
The difference in translation of the word hansei demonstrated the
struggle over the interpretation of war in the U.S. as well, where
some welcomed the Diet Resolution as a positive move ("apology")
whereas others did not ("remorse," "regret"). Nevertheless, it was
interesting how Japan's "apology," which was referring to the Imperial Army's colonization and atrocities and was predominantly
meant for Asian countries who suffered under Japanese domination, was welcomed by some American media as an expression of
regret for aggression towards former Allies in general, including the
U.S. Thus, this demonstrates that even after fifty years since the end
of the war, there is still conflict in the U.S. over how to interpret the
Japanese postwar resolutions: between those who thought the Diet
Resolution was an important step towards Japanese restitution and
those who thought it was not enough.
The U.S. TV networks interpreted the conflict in different ways
and attempted to understand the reasons behind the strong opposition towards a formal apology in the Diet Resolution. According to
ABC (6/5), "many Japanese still insist that Japan went to war to liberate Asia from Western colonialism; that it was forced into fighting
the U.S. because of a crippling trade embargo." Unfortunately, this
report did not identify the source of this "survey" or which group of
Japanese (politicians, veterans, or people in general) they were referring to. CBS (6/10) also reported on "Japanese veterans' groups"
who "say there's nothing to apologize for, that it was wartime and
Japan did not do worse than other countries." Also, "some conservative politicians claim Japan was fighting to liberate Asia from white
colonialism." Others said, "though Japan was defeated, other Asian

countries were able to gain independence."^^ According to the CBS re-
port, "that kind of talk still incites tempers in South Korea, which
Japan occupied for 35 years. And when Japanese leaders visit China,
which suffered hundreds of thousands of deaths, including many
civilians in the rape of Nanking, there's still an unspoken air of mistrust."
Despite the existence of such strong opposition towards the Diet
Resolution among some politicians and veterans, and "while the
Prime Minister is having trouble selling an apology to other politi-
American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol, XLII, Nos, 2 & 3
31
cians," ABC news (6/5) concluded the report saying that "recent
public opinion polls show a majority of Japanese now believe their
country should atone for its wartime aggression."^' This shows the
disparity between the public and government and how the voices
of the majority were not being represented in the Diet Resolution.
Contrary to ABC's hopeful commentary on the Diet Resolution that
Japan could possibly express a stronger atonement in the future, the
overall comment by CBS news (6/10) was very pessimistic: "Japan's
resolution was to be the centerpiece of commemorations marking
the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II. But now, instead
of helping to heal old wounds, it's threatening to inflame them."
Distorting History
The pessimism of the CBS news is well judged when, while there
was a movement to make an apology in the form of the Diet Resolution, some politicians have blatantly made comments, which justified the war or denied the facts of Japan's wartime atrocities. Several politicians before 1995 had created upheaval for denying the
history of Japan's aggression and colonization, leading to their resignations.* However, even amid the controversies surrounding
whether the Japanese government should make an apology in the
Diet Resolution, there were instances of politicians denying Japan's
wartime colonization or aggression. For example, in March 1995,
Okuno Seisuke*^ (the president of an organization opposing the Diet
Resolution) claimed that "it was the British and the Americans that
invaded [during the war]. It was the British and the U.S. that we
fought against, not Asia . . . Japan did make mistakes but why is
Japan always the villain?" This comment denying Japan's acts of
invasion and aggression was made at a time when the relationship
between Japan and Korea was improving. This resulted in many
Korean protests as well as Korea's opposition to Japan's permanent
membership into the United Nations Security Council. However,
since Okuno was not a government official at this point, the Japanese government could not take strong actions against him.
As if to make matters worse, in June 1995, Watanabe Michio
(former Vice Prime Minister and former Foreign Minister) commented on the Japanese-Korean Annexation Treaty, in which he said
that "Japan ruled Korea for 36 years, but there is no word such as
32
'colonial rule' included [in the treaty]." He also stated that the annexation was not colonization and that the treaty was signed peacefully and not forcefully by the military. This comment angered Korea, where many protest movements took place. In the end, Watanabe
apologized and withdrew the word "peacefully" but never acknowledged that Japan's rule of Korea was colonization.
Reflecting these irresponsible comments by politicians, w^hen the
new cabinet reshuffled in August, Prime Minister Murayama gave
each cabinet member a copy of his statement from 1994 that colonization caused great suffering to the Asian neighbors. He asked the
members to comply and restrict their comments within the confine
of his interpretation of history. With the government officials making numerous blunders defending Japan's actions during the war,
Murayama hoped to avoid international incidents.^^ However, soon
after his request, Shiman\ura Yoshinobu (Minister of Education)
made a comment that, "it depends whether one can define the last
war [the Asia Pacific War] as invasion or not." He also questioned
whether it was useful to "apologize every me something from the
past came up." As a result of pressure from Korea and within the
Japanese government, Shimamura finally issued a written statement,
in which he said, "my explanation caused misunderstanding and I
retract it." Around the same time, some cabinet members paid a
visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, where the World War II veterans were
enshrined.
However, again in November 1995, Eto Takami (head of the Management and Coordination Agency) made a comment that "Japan
did some good things during colonization." He also criticized Prime
Minister Murayama's position that the Japan-Korean Treaty was
forcefully signed. Such statements, of course, caused a huge uproar
within and outside Japan, which finally led to Eto's resignation.
According to Asahi Shimbun, the reaction of the Japanese was that
Eto's comment happened at "very bad timing."*^ No regrets were
expressed over how "racist" or problematic the comment was.
These incidents in which politicians made historically distorted
comments reveal that there are many in the Japanese government
who still are not willing to acknowledge or apologize for the Japanese aggression and atrocities committed during the war.*^ In fact,
the blunders by politicians occurred so often that some Japanese
33
goverrunent officials were annoyed that every time they had to "resign" the politician who made the comment. The "inconsiderate"
attitudes of these individuals were criticized for upsetting Asian
nations which suffered under Japanese aggression. However, the
political and racist nature of these "careless" and "inconsiderate"
remarks was not analyzed in the newspapers. This demonstrates
the unawareness of the racism hidden behind the denial of wartime
colonization. The presence of such politicians also stood in the way
of apology for wartime atrocities (i.e.. Diet Resolution).
Thus the struggle over whether Japan should apologize for their
wartime conduct resulted in a situation similar to the Enola Gay controversy, where conflict occurred between groups who chose to perpetuate the orthodox interpretation of the war and those who chose
to contextualize history and provide a more critical analysis of the
war. However, the U.S. media did not refer to these parallel events.
Much of the U.S. media coverage (especially CBS) of the Enola Gay
controversy sided with the veterans and accused the museum of
being un-American and unpatriotic. At least ABC news provided
information about historians who were criticizing the veteran groups
for conducting censorship. However, most of the U.S. television
news coverage of Japan's apology, instead of focusing on the struggle
over the Resolution, emphasized how much opposition there was
against the apology for Japan's wartime aggression. Therefore, the
U.S. media, which in many instances supported their own orthodox
interpretation of the war (as in the Enola Gay controversy), were critical of groups in Japan that upheld their orthodoxy, creating a double
standard.
Thus, within both countries, the veterans' and orthodox point of
view triumphed in the "culture war," demonstrated in the cancellation of the atomic bomb exhibition at the National Space and Air
Museum and in the compromised language in the Diet Resolution.
However, the perpetuation of orthodox interpretations has different meanings in the U.S. and Japan. There is no excuse for the Japanese government, being the aggressor and defeated in the war, to
continue to refuse to apologize and deny the atrocities committed in
Asia. This has been the case since the 1980s when international criticism forced the Japanese government and Japanese history textbooks
to admit histories that have long been ignored. However, the United
34
States, being the victor in the war, does not face any serious opposition to perpetuating the orthodox official history because there is
less external pressure and domestic urgency to question it. Thus
the U.S. media was able to support the veterans' orthodox interpretation in the Enola Gay controversy but was critical of the Japanese
government for their failure to apologize in the Diet Resolution,
Censoring History Textbooks
It is not only a faction of Japanese politicians that denies the need
for apology for the colonization and aggression in Asia and the Pacific. The denial of the Japanese Imperial Army's aggression and
colonization is evident in how the history textbooks for Japanese
elementary, junior high, and high schools are censored by the Ministry of Education. The lack of perspective is also reflected in how
the textbooks fail to contextualize the atomic bombings.
The issue of what is determined official history relates to the issue of how history is being taught in textbooks. For example, in the
United States, the atomic bombing is taught as an important step in
ending the Second World War and preventing further deaths not
only of the Americans but also the Japanese, despite scholarly work
which suggests that there were other alternatives.^^ The image of
the mushroom cloud is usually deprived of any graphic or descriptive details of what actually happened underneath,*^ thus creating a
sense of indifference to the huge amount of death. There are several
reasons for this uncritical stance of the war. One is the status of the
United States as victor (in fact, in all the wars except for the Vietnam
War), which allows Americans to be less critical of their history. The
other is the fact that no war (except for the Civil War) has taken
place on American soil, which makes it easier to remain ignorant of
the atrocities that take place. This holds true in the analysis of the
Vietnam War (for which some still do not admit the U.S.'s defeat)
where American atrocities and the political reasons for the start of
the war as well as its ramifications are ignored in American history
This is interesting in comparison to how the atomic bombing and
the Second World War are taught in Japanese textbooks. Concerning Hiroshima and Nagasaki, no cause and effect (i.e., reference to
Japan's wartime atrocities and colonization in Asia and the Pacific)
35
is explained in the bombings, only that the bombs were dropped

and the war ended. The horrific details of what happened under
the mushroom clouds are taught from a very young age (despite the
graphic and violent nature of the material).^ Interestingly, the message was not to hate the Americans (whereas in the United States,
the message of the atomic bombings was that the hated Japanese
deserved to be bombed because of Pearl Harbor, as in "Remember
Pearl Harbor"), but to prevent the tragedies in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki from ever happening again (symbolized in the slogan "No
More Hiroshimas"). At first glance, it seems as if the World War II
education in Japan is more progressive in its avoidance of promoting hatred. However, John Dower argues that this is a result of the
"victim consciousness." In other words, the Japanese aggression
and atrocities in Asia that led to the tragic dropping of the atomic
bombs are ignored, and the bombs imagined as if they had fallen on
the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki suddenly and without context.*^
In Japan, textbooks are "screened" (i.e., censored) by the Ministry of Education to ensure that the subject matter is "suitable" to be
taught in elementary, junior high, and high schools.^" However,
during that process, some historical facts are "tweaked." For example, for many years, it was not permitted to use words such as
"aggression," "invasion," or "colonization" to describe the Japanese
"progression" into Asia. The inclusion of the Nanking Massacre is
recent. There are still debates over whether to include the "comfort
women" and Unit 731, which created biological weapons and experimented on humans (POWs and other Asians). For example,
according to Asahi Shimbun, even recently, reference to "comfort
women"^^ disappeared from a sixth grade social study textbook after the screening by the Ministry of Education.^^ In this case, one
textbook company had written descriptions of the "comfort women"
intentionally abstract enough to be discussed in the classroom, but
not detailed enough to cause the Ministry of Education eliminate
the section. Despite the intricate maneuvering to get around the
"screening," the Ministry of Education cut out the offending section
arguing that the issue of "comfort women" is connected to sex issues which are difficult for elementary school students to understand, and also that the descriptions were too abstract. This is just
36
one example of how much the Japanese atrocities in Asia have been
ignored.^^ However, because of intemational and external pressure,
Japanese history textbooks now discuss Japanese atrocities and aggression more clearly (which, according to Dower, non-Japanese
media have failed to report).^ Also, in response to the Ministry's
screenings. Professor Ienaga Saburo sued the Ministry of Education
for changing the content of his history textbooks, which recognized
Japan's aggression and colonization and for requesting the omission of certain historical facts and the use of less harsh words.^^ Pressure from other Asian countries also resulted in various segments of
Japanese society to realize the Japanese Imperial Army's aggression
in Asia and the Pacific. On the other hand, there has been a rise of
conservative forces in Japanese society, for example, the popularity
of "revisionist" comic books of Japan in the Pacific War,^^ the various movements in Japan to "correct" history,^^ and the enforcement
of the national anthem and the Japanese flag in schools.^*
Reflecting the increasing awareness of Asian interpretation of the
Asian-Pacific War, Asahi Shimbun did a series called "From Asian
classrooms" which analyzed how history was taught in textbooks
and classes in Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia.^' There was also an article mentiorng the exhibition of Asian
textbooks that looked at descriptions of Japan in Asian textbooks.^
In Japan, because so much time is spent on teaching the earlier part
of Japanese history, history classes often run out of time to teach
World War II and simply skim over it." However, in most of the
Asian history textbooks, contrary to the situation in Japan, more
pages dealt with the Second World War. Moreover, more classes
were spent on discussing the aggression and atrocities of the Japanese Imperial Army during the war. The realization that Asian coiontries do not interpret the war the same way as Japan has helped the
Japanese rethink the war.
Comfort Women Controversies
The compromised attitude toward "comfort women" also demonstrated how the government was divided on the issue of apology.
During the war. Imperial Japan committed various atrocities in Asia,
for example, the colonization of Taiwan, Korea, and other Asian countries; the Nanking Massacre; the brutal treatment of POWs; the
37
Bataan Death March; the creation of biological weapons by Unit 731;

"comfort women"; forced labor of Chinese, Koreans, etc. Norma
Field provides a detailed and concise history of apologies and reparations made by Japan for these transgressions since World War 11.*^
The San Francisco Treaty in 1952 obligated Japan to pay compensation after its economic recovery. Some payments made to Asian
countries were loans and credits "that paved the way for the products of reemergent Japanese industry"^ and much of the money did
not trickle down to the people. Many of the apologies were expressions of "regret for unfortunate events" or "deep reflection upon
the vmfortunate period" with no reparations. However, two events
changed this trend and increased disclosures of Japan's war atrocities in Asia as well as demands for reparation and stronger apologies. One was the "textbook incident" in 1982,** when South Korea,
China, Taiwan, and other Asian countries protested the lack of reference to Japanese atrocities in Asia and the whitewashed descriptions of Japanese imperialism in Japanese history textbooks. The
other was the death of Emperor Showa in 1989. In 1993, even though
he did not refer to war aggression or reparation. Prime Minister
Hosokawa Morihiro expressed "apology" instead of "regret" for the
first time.*^ Reflecting the government's slow but steady acknowledgment of the atrocities of the war, the Murayama cabinet in 1995
also made an effort to solve some post-war issues.'''' One of the main
issues was to make a clearer apology in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War 11. Some examples of the
postwar resolutions were the special aids to atomic bomb victims,*^
the Postwar Diet Resolution, and public funding for the "comfort
women." However, despite the government's apology for the atrocities in the Diet Resolution and the Prime Minister's statement on
August 15, the government remained passive about reparation for
individuals who suffered under Japanese colonization and aggression. Some politicians argued that such compensation was dealt
with in the San Francisco Treaty signed after the war and that it was
impossible now for the government to provide state reparation for
individuals.*^
Thus complying with this logic, the government denied reparation to the former "comfort women."*' However, in light of domestic and international criticism/protests,''^ the government decided
38
to come up with a public donation fund, the "Asian Women's Peace

Foundation," to compensate the women who were forced to serve
the Japanese military and soldiers.^ According to Asahi Shimbun,
the Foreign Ministry of Korea welcomed this, saying that it reflected
some of the requests of the people concerned.''^ However, this caused
a huge protest from the "comfort women" and their supporters, who
were against the idea of taking the responsibility out of the
government's hands and placing the burden on the public. For example, Asahi Shimbun reported on how a non-governmental organization criticized this public donation at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights because the Japanese government was
not admitting responsibility.^ This caused conflict among the government party as well: the Liberal Democratic Party and New Party
Sakigake argued that the compensation between countries was settled,
but the Socialist Party claimed that individual compensation by the
Japanese government was necessary. On the other hand, the controversy over public funds created a split within the "comfort
women" as well.^* Some were offended by the fact that the Japanese
government was escaping apology and responsibility and refused
to accept the money, whereas others were willing to accept the money
in order to survive.^
Despite such protests and controversy, the funds for "comfort
women" started in July 1995.^* A seminar on "comfort women" criticized the crime against humanity and international law, and the sexist
and racist use of the San Francisco Treaty to avoid individual compensation. Public forums were held where people discussed the
problematic nature of the "public fund." Many demonstrations and
sit-ins by former "comfort women" and Japanese organizations that
supported their cause demanded a formal apology and individual
compensation from the Japanese government. Some "comfort
women" demonstrators argued that Japan should not be granted
Permanent Membership in the United Nations Security CounciF
until Japan paid for their war crimes during World War 11.^^ What
they wanted was not sympathy but acknowledgment of the
government's responsibility. In response, the Prime Minister did
apologize to the "comfort women" but did not refer to individual
reparation. ^^
39
The fact that the euphemism "comfort women" is used, as opposed to "sex-slaves," demonstrates the less critical stance of the
Japanese newspapers. However, much attention had been devoted
to the issue, especially on the politics and controversies surrounding it, also in connection with the history textbook issue. Some of
the articles' headlines read, "Reference to 'comfort women' disappears from textbooks after screening," "Former 'comfort woman'
says public fund is 'unreasonable money,'" "Criticisms increase on
public fund," "Cannot allow public fund: demonstrations by former
'comfort women,'" "Requests to retract the public fimd," "No reparation: no healing of their wounds," etc. Most of the articles reported on the problems and criticisms of the public fund, clearly
indicating that the "comfort women" issue was far from settlement.
Thus, the controversy over whether to apologize and compensate
for the "comfort women" demonstrates how the orthodox interpretation of war is still prevalent.^" This could be attributed to varying
views of fear of flooding requests for monetary compensation, to
the notion that all necessary compensation was arranged in the Treaty
of San Francisco.^^ The notion is also ideological in the sense that
there is still no consensus on how to interpret the war. However,
what is missing from the discussions between the Korean and Japanese governments about the reparations for "comfort women" is
the subjectivity of the women as well as the healing of their pain
and suffering.^^
Such an ambivalent attitude of the Japanese government towards
apologies also, partly, contributed to the U.S. media's racial representation of Japan. An analysis of Germany and Japan in the fiftieth
anniversary reports reveals the differential treatment of the two countries and their peoples. Some of the most prominent cases of the
differential treatment of Germans and Japanese were the portrayals
of Japan as a nationalistic and militaristic nation compared to Germany. For example, the fiftieth anniversary reports on Germany
did not use the Nazi or contemporary German flag in the insets, but
used the Imperial and Rising Sun flag to report on Japan. Many of
the news reports failed to question the legitimacy of the bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but did with Dresden. And emphasis
was placed on the savage and brutal nature of Japan's atrocities compared to the German wartime aggression. In those reports, distinc-
40
tions were made between Germans and Nazi Germany but not between the Japanese and the Japanese Imperial Army. The atrocities
of the Japanese Imperial Army were reported, in many instances,
with direct reference and commentaries on how brutally they treated
American and European prisoners of war. However, even in firstperson account interviews of the victims of Japanese aggression, few
referred to the victimization of Asian peoples. Even the interview
with the "comfort woman" was with a Dutch woman, despite the
fact that the majority of the victims were Korean women (CBS, 7/
27). This is more prominent in comparison with the German atrocities, which were reported as Nazi Germany or Nazi atrocities and
emphasis was placed on historical facts rather than emotional anger.
Part of this differential treatment of Germany and Japan has to
do with the fact that Germany as a nation has acknowledged its role
in committing atrocities, made an official apology, made restitution
to victims, and has made efforts, especially in education, to avoid
another reoccurrence of tragedy of such magnitude. On the other
hand, Japan has not made an official apology (whether the Diet Resolution was an apology is still in question) as a nation, made restitution to victims, nor made efforts in preventing this from happening
again. (If anything, the country, in conjunction with the long-lasting and worst economic depression since World War II, is returning
to a militaristic and nationalistic path).^^ Thus, there was continuing reason to vilify the Japanese as a nation and as a people. However, that did not justify the media's perpetuation of racism parallel
to that of World War 11.** Thus, whether a defeated country had
embraced and apologized for its past conduct affected w^hether the
former Allies showed more sympathy and reconciliation to the bombing victims. This also led to the issue of whether the legitimacy of
the bombing of the cities was questioned or not.
Media Coverage in 2001
Did the passage of time since the fiftieth anniversary make the
issue of apology easier? Compared to the fiftieth anniversary of the
end of World War II, the sixtieth anniversary of the attack on Pearl
Harbor did not receive wide media coverage in the U.S. nor Japan.
In the U.S., there was minimal coverage on ABC, CBS, and NBC on
41
how September 11 could be understood within the context of the

attack on Pearl Harbor. The reference to Pearl Harbor and September 11 in the 60* armiversary reports was to exalt U.S. patriotism.
As the aftermath of September 11 still dominated the news in early
December, the most visible reference to Pearl Harbor on overall television was the promotion of the DVD version of the Hollywood film
Pearl Harbor released to coincide with the sixtieth anniversary. On
the other hand, the media coverage of the sixtieth anniversary of the
Pearl Harbor attack in Japan was almost non-existent. Most of the
media coverage focused on the birth of the long-awaited first child
of Crown Prince Naruhito, the second in line for succession in the
imperial family. The birth of a girl raises the possibility of changes
in the succession procedures, which currently only allows the male
to succeed to the imperial throne. However, considering how Pearl
Harbor and the Asia-Pacific War had taken place with the strong
involvement of the emperor, it is ironic and problematic that in the
year 2001, when the Japanese public should have been re-examining their nation's role in the war, the Japanese public was again celebrating and worshipping the imperial family. However, this fits
with the current trend in Japan where nationalistic, conservative,
and militaristic forces are on the rise again. (This is also a phenomenon in other parts of the world.)
Conclusion
The analysis of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II
demonstrates that there are many events that are ignored and excluded from the official narrative of the war. Because these events
were often brutal and atrocious, they contradicted the clear cut and
simplified understanding of the war that makes the nation involved
appear the good and the just party. Thus the possibility of apology
for the aggression and colonization caused huge controversy as it
challenged the very righteousness of the nation.
It is convenient to keep using the unchallenged World War II narrative that pictures the U.S. or Japan as the hero. Especially focusing on the U.S., that is why we continue to see the World War II
rhetoric in our everyday media coverage, especially exemplified in
the reports of September 11. The World War II narrative is convenient and functional in promoting American patriotism. However,
42
as was the case during the war, this patriotism and the notion of
America as a free nation is delivered at the expense of untold sacrifices, some of which were the Japanese-American internment, the
refusal of entry of European Jews escaping Nazism, and whether
justified or not, the use of the atomic bomb. The United States as
victor in the war has not faced strong pressure to re-examine its role
in the war, especially its complicity in Japan's war amnesia. The
Tokyo Trial was Eurocentric and did not address the victimization
of Asian nations.^^ The role of the emperor in the war was not questioned in the trials in order to maintain the imperial system (even
though its abolishment was included in the unconditional surrender clause). Urut 731, which conducted biological experiments, was
not charged in exchange for providing the U.S. their data and findings.** The system of "comfort women" was not exposed because a
similar organization was implemented for the U.S. military under
Occupied Japan.^'' The road to democratization and demilitarization under occupation was overturned as the Cold War intensified,
which allowed Japan to "reverse course."
Or in the case of Japan, the perpetuation of the picture that Japan
was only saving Asia from Western imperialism was delivered by
some politicians at the expense of the oppression and colonization
of many Asian people, such as in the Nanjing Massacre, the organized system of "comfort women," and the colonization of Korea
and other nations. The "victim consciousness" symbolized with the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings permeated postwar Japan, keeping them ignorant of their own aggression, only to be awakened
from the amnesia when pressured by Asian countries after the textbook incident and the death of Emperor Showa. This is not to say
that the urgency of re-examination or apology for the U.S. and Japan is the same. Japan has more reasons to re-examine because of
its role as aggressor in the Asia-Pacific War and as the vanquished
in the war.
But the denial of apology is closely affected by the already constructed World War II narrative which, as the analysis of the fiftieth
anniversary reports has demonstrated, has many problems. For
example, within the World War II rhetoric are the continuing problematic racial representations as well as the conflict between history
and memory that was maintained even at the fiftieth anniversary. It
43
was World War II that perpetuated the notion in the U.S. that just
cause equals just war. However, Howard Zinn makes a very convincing argument when he makes the distinction between a just cause
and a just war when analyzing the September 11 attack and the subsequent raid on Afghanistan.^* He agrees that there may be causes
that are justified in starting a war, but he states that there is no just
war because it involves the mass death and destruction of innocent
people. Here, the unchallenged use of the World War II narrative is
justifying the mass killing and destruction of innocent people, all in
the name of the "war against terrorism."
Not only did September 11 see a plethora of reports using World
War II rhetoric, but the attack on September 11 and the war following that day also parallels what happened during World War 11. Instead of questioning and analyzing the specific reasons why some
groups or nations may feel resentment toward the United States,
the attack was interpreted as an attack against freedom, democracy,
and the American way of life. In the immediate aftermath of the
attack, there was fear that Arabs or Muslim-Americans would be
interned like Japanese Americans. Although this roimding up of
people did not take place in a blatant way, many who fit certain
profiles are being held without warrant. Without exposing the
undiscussed events in World War II, the World War II narrative and
parallel situation will be perpetuated, leading to the violation of the
powerless. Therefore, it is more important than ever to understand
the deeper meanings embedded/constructed behind the World War
II narrative.
It seems that the once divided country (literally, as was demonstrated in the 2000 presidential election) needed a national tragedy
to realize their patriotism, unity, and American-ness (whatever that
means) as was the case in the U.S. emergence from the Great Depression though World War 11. Looking at how the World War II
narrative (and issues of apology) are being used to serve the present,
it is important to understand where this is taking us in the future.
As Geoffrey White points out when analyzing the Enola Gay controversy, "it is dealing with an intensely international subject in an intensely national site" that is creating the difficulty over how to interpret the war.*^ It is in this context that we need transnational
histories of war that do not reflect ory one single narrative.^" This
American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII Nos. 2 & 3
44
will force both the U.S. and Japan to reflect on their wartime atrocities and their complicity in denying the responsibilities. Such reexamination and reconstruction of the World War II narrative will
also affect the way we will make sense of the current "war against
terrorism."
' I realize the problematic use of "World War 11/' commonly used in the American media, as
it only focuses on battles on the European front. The "Pacific War" is also problematic as it
only focuses on the war between the United States and Japan and ignores the Asian and
Pacific nations. "The Greater-East Asia War" is obviously problematic in that it reflects the
"imperial ambition and liberatory fantasy of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere"
[p, 408, Norma Field, "The Stakes of Apology," Japan Quarterly, XLII (4): 405-418], "The past
war" used frequently in Japanese media is evading the aggressive role of Japan in the war,
"Asia-Pacific War" is now used to more accurately describe the nature of the war. Acknowledging the politics of naming. World War II is used in this paper as it is the most common
term describing the, hopefully, last world war,
^ This is in quotation marks because it is debatable whether Japan has really acknowledged
acts of aggression and colonization and accepted responsibilities for them,
^ The comparison of Japanese newspapers and American television news may have produced different results from comparing the same form of media in the U,S, and Japan, However, the unavailability and inaccessibility of Japanese television news prevented me from
analyzing the same form of media in these two countries. Noting this limitation, this article
focuses on the analysis and comparison of the research themes.
* The dominant interpretation of history does not necessarily reflect the viewpoints of the
majority of the population. Often times it reflects the viewpoint of those who have the power
to dictate social and political policies. As will be demonstrated later, the dominant interpretation by the government, politicians, powerful veterans groups, etc, was often at odds with
the public,
' P, 323 in Lisa Yoneyama, "For Transformative Knowledge and Postnationalist Public Spheres:
The Smithsonian Enola Gay Conti-oversy," in Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s), ed. T.
Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama (Duke University Press: Durham and London, 2001), 323-346.
' Ibid., 324-331,
' Ibid., 331.
' My dissertation, "Race and history wars in the 50* anniversary of the end of World War II:
A comparative analysis of the U.S. and Japanese media," addressed the racial politics and the
conflict between history and memory in the media coverage of the 50"' armiversary.
' For the history/transformation of the scholarship on the atomic bombings, see Barton J.
Bernstein, "The Struggle Over History: Defining the Hiroshima Narrative," in Judgment at the
Smithsonian, ed, Philip Nobile (Marlowe & Company: New York, 1995), 127-256,
'" See pp. 22-23 in Edward T, Linenthal, "Anatomy of a Controversy," in History Wars: The
Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past, ed, Edward T, Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt
(Metropolitan Books, 1996), 9-62. Pp. 58-59 in Yui Daizaburo, "Between Pearl Harbor and
Hiroshima/Nagasaki," in Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Confiicts in the
Nuclear Age, ed, Laura Hein and Mark Seiden (An East Gate Book: M,E, Sharpe, 1997), 52-72,
" The un-Americanness of the committee members became a political issue, Michael Hogan
discusses how the fact that some of the members of the exhibit advisory committee were
foreign-bom may have been one of the reasons for this accusation. For example, Martin
Harwit was bom in Prague and later became an American citizen. There were others on the
committee who were Japanese and Canadian citizer\s. See pp, 212-213 in Michael J, Hogan,
"The Enola Gay Controversy: History, Memory, and the Politics of Presentation," in Hiroshima
in History and Memory, ed, Michael J, Hogan (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 200-232,
'^ Throughout the manuscript, this denotes (month/day). The year is 1995 unless indicated
otherwise.
45
" Similarly, various analyses by historians have established how the print media's
(ir)responsibility in overplaying these words had enhanced the criticism of the exhibition.
See: Edward T. Linenthal, "Anatomy of a Controversy," in History Wars, 9-62; Hogan, "The
Enola Gay Controversy," Hiroshima in History and Memory, 200-232; Uday Mohan, "History
and the News Media," in Cultural Difference, Media Memories; Anglo-American Images of Japan,
ed. Phil Hammond (Cassell: London and Washington, 1997), 175-200; Martin Harwit, An Exhibit Denied: Lobbying the History of Enola Gay (Springer-Verlag, 1996); Tony Capaccio and Uday
Mohan, "How the U.S. Press Missed the Target," in Hiroshima's Shadow, ed. Kai Bird and
Lawrence Lifshultz (The Pamphleteer's Press, 1998), 364-376.
" "Smithsonian Agrees to Modify Exhibition of the Enola Gay" (CBS Evening News, 6:30 pm
ET), Lexis-Nexis, 30 January 1995.
'^ For a detailed chronology of the Enola Gay controversy, see Harwit, An Exhibit Denied, and
Nobile, Judgment at the Smithsonian,
'* The original script and visual images of the atomic bomb exhibition can be found on the
internet: "The Cyber Exhibit: Enola Gay and the Atomic Bomb-The Canceled Exhibition at
the Smithsonian Institution," http://www.nhk.or.Jp/nuclear/e/test.sumiso.htm. This site
is created and maintained by NHK (Nihon Hoso Kyokai), a Japanese TV station, with the
permission from the Smithsonian. The original script is also included in Nobile, Judgment at
the Smithsonian,
''' Some veterans and conservative politicians against the exhibition argued that the anniversary was a time to commemorate and not to challenge or re-examine the orthodox interpretation of the war. See Yoneyama, "For Transformative Knowledge," Perilous Memories, 323-346.
" CBS's "Victory in the Pacific" (August 3,1995) perpetuated the orthodox interpretation of
the war.
" In the context of cross-cultural analysis, the differential interpretation of the controversy
between the U.S. and Japan reveals the struggle over the meaning of the atomic bombing.
Interestingly, in the U.S. this incident was called the "Enola Gay controversy," after the plane
that supposedly shortened the war according to popular myth, whereas in Japan it was called
the "Atomic Bomb Exhibition controversy," demonstrating the different interpretation each
country has towards the war. In other words, in the United States, the Enola Gay is seen as the
hero that shortened the Second World War. Everybody, even those who disagree with the
decision to drop the bombs, is expected to know what Enola Gay represents. On the other
hand, in Japan, the plane that dropped the bomb is only known as a "B-29" and not as Enola
Gay, More important than the actual name of the plane, of course, is what the plane dropped
(the atomic bomb) and the outcome. Therefore, it makes sense that this whole controversy
was known as the "Atomic Bomb Exhibition Controversy" rather than the "Enola Gay Controversy" in Japan.
^ Bernstein, "The Struggle Over History," Judgment at the Smithsonian, 127-236. For how the
media reported the struggle between the orthodox interpretation and its dissent, see Uday
Mohan and Leo Maley III, "Orthodoxy and dissent: The American news media and the decision to use the bomb agair\st Japan, 1945-1995," Cultural Difference, Media Memories, 139-174.
^' P. 202 in Notoji Masako, "Rekishi tenji wo meguru tabunka poritikusu" (Multicultural
Politics Surrounding Exhibitions of History), in Tabunkashugi no Amerika: Yuragu nashonaru
aidentiti (Multicultural America: Rethinking the National Identity), ed. Yui Daizaburo and
Endo Yasuo (University of Tokyo Press, 1999), 187-208, and p. 1091 in Martin J. Shenvin,
"Hiroshima as Politics and History," The Journal ofAmerican History 82, no. 3 (December 1995):
1085-1093.
^ The media coverage was not representative of public opinion: the 1995 Gallup poll indicated that only 51% of the public were in support of the use of the atomic bombs. Mohan,
"History and the News Media," Cultural Difference, Media Memories, 193.
23 Mohan, "History and the News Media," 193-194.
" For the U.S. media's approach to the atomic bombing over the last fifty years, see Mohan
and Maley, "Orthodoxy and Dissent," Cultural Difference, Media Memories, 139-174.
^ John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (Pantheon Book, 1986);
John W. Dower, "Race, Language, and War in Two Cultures: World War II in Asia," in The War
46
in American Culture: Society and Consciousness During World War II, ed. Lewis A. Erenberg and
Susan E. Hirsch (University of Chicago Press, 1996), 169-201.

^ John W. Dower, "The Bombed: Hiroshimas and Nagasakis in Japanese Memory," in Hogan,
Hiroshima in History and Memory, 116-142.
^'' The city of Hiroshima also put a full-page ad against nuclear bombings in the August 6,
1995 Washington Post (p. C5). The ad did not criticize the U.S. or ask for an apology. Instead,
it gave facts about human suffering (still continuing) and about the horror of nuclear weapons. It also clearly apologizes for Japan's fonner colonization and atrocities towards people
in Asia and the Pacific.
^ For the speech by Hiroshima's mayor Hiraoka Atsushi, see 7 August 1995 Asahi Shimbun, p.
2. For the speech by Nagasaki's mayor Ito Kazunaga, see 9 August 1995 Asahi Shimbun evening
edition, p. 2. Even the Hiroshima Peace Park Museum could not ignore the challenge to the
orthodox interpretation of the war in Japan. The museum began an exhibition of Japanese
aggression during the war in 1994, the year of the Olympic Games. Until then, the focus was
only on the bombing of Hiroshima without any historical context. The naming of the museum itself, which emphasizes the peace in the future, obscured taking responsibilities for the
past. Moreover, the memorial to the atomic bomb victims within the park compound only
included the Japanese. The memorial for Korean victims, who were coerced from Korea after
the annexation to participate in the war effort, was kept separate and outside of the park
despite protests from Korean residents in Japan. It was only recently that the numbers of
Korean, Chinese, American POW bomb victims became included in the casualty estimates. It
was only in 1999 that the memorial for Koreans was finally moved inside the park compound. On the other hand, in 1996, when the Nagasaki Bomb Museum attempted to include
a brief description of the Nanjing Massacre, it was met with protests and was forced to remove photographs of Chinese victims (p. 68 in Daqing Yang, "The Malleable and the Contested: The Nanjing Massacre in Postwar China and Japan," Perilous Memories, 50-86).
" According to a CBS poll (7/31/1995), to the question of whether the U.S. owes Japan an
apology, 17% of Americans said yes, 76% said no. Of the people over age 65,9% said yes, 84%
said no.
In the orthodox interpretation of the war in the U.S., the atomic bombings of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki are discussed as if they were part of a single event or a single decision. The
most obvious differences between these two cities are the types of bombs dropped (uranium
and plutonium,respectively)and the dates they were dropped (August 6,1945 and August 9,
1945, respectively). More importantly is the issue of whether it was necessary to bomb two
cities. Bernstein discusses how his and Martin J. Sherwin's works have shifted scholarly
consensus in the late 1970s, from either complete advocacy of or opposition to the decision to
drop the bombs to a middle-ground of these positions. According to that consensus, there
were alternatives to end the war without the bombing and "the Nagasaki bombing was undoubtedly imnecessary, whatever one concludes about the Hiroshima bombing." In Bernstein,
"The Struggle Over History," Judgment at the Smithsonian, 167.
'' Japanese names are written in the order of family name and given name, following the
Japanese tradition.
'^ Bernstein, "The Struggle Over History," Judgment at the Smithsonian, 127-256; J. Samuel
Walker, "The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographie Update," Hiroshima in History and
Memory, 11-37; Barton J. Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed Opportunities, Little-known Disasters, and Modem Memory," Hiroshima in
History and Memory, 38-79; Mohan and Maley, "Orthodoxy and Dissent," Cultural Difference,
Media Memories, 139-174.
^^ Mohan and Maley, "Orthodoxy and Dissent," Gutural Difference, Media Memories, 164.
^ In 1995, political negotiations were being made between the U.S. and Japan regarding the
fiftieth anniversary events. The Japanese government requested that the U.S. avoid putting
Japan in a position where it would be forced to apologize for wartime aggression. Thus the
U.S., on some occasions, used the term "the end of the Pacific War" instead of "V-J Day" or
toned down the victorious nature of the V-J celebrations (which displeased veterans). The
U.S. also complied by not inviting the Japanese prime mirster to the Hawaii celebrations.
Japan in turn avoided making official statements against Clinton's support of Truman's deci-
47
sion of dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki or the Enola Gay controversy.
For the fiftieth anniversary event at Iwo Jima, where the battle between the U.S. and Japan
wasfierce,the focus was shifted from victory celebration to the commemoration of the dead.
However, there were instances in which Japan and the U.S. asserted their positions. For
example, the Japanese government made an official protest against the atomic bomb design
on U.S. postage stamps and the sale of atomic bomb earrings in a New Mexico museum. The
United States, by trying to avoid domestic opposition by accommodating Japan on every
occasion, avoided referring to the reconciliation and friendship with Japan in the Hawaii
celebrations and instead emphasized the contribution of the veterans. Although the U.S.
knew that the legitimacy of the atomic bombings was questioned in Japan, President Clinton
still stated that there was no need for an apology and that the decision was correct.
'^ For more discussions on the factions that deny Japan's wartime imperialism and colonialism and/or refuse to make apologies for those acts, see pp. 59-69 in Yui Daizaburo, "Between
Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima/Nagasaki," in living zvith the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age, ed. Laura Hein and Mark Seiden (An East Gate Book, 1997),
52-72.
^ Norma Field's translation in "The Stakes of Apology," Japan Quarterly, 415. For the original
in Japanese, see 10 June 1995, Asahi Shimbun, p. 1.
'^ For a more complex discussion of the meaning of apology, see Field, "The Stakes of Apology," Japan Quarterly, 405-418, and Norma Field, "War and Apology: Japan, Asia, the Fiftieth,
and After," positions 5, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 1-49.
^ For more discussions on the recent rise in nationalism and conservatism, see Yui "Between
Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima/Nagasaki," in Living with the Bomb, 52-72; Gavan McCormack,
"The Japanese Movement to 'Correct' History," in Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory
in Japan, Germany, and the United States, ed. Laura Hein and Mark Seiden (An East Gate Book,
2000), 53-73; Aaron Gerow, "Consuming Asia, Consuming Japan: The New Neonationalistic
Revision in Japan," in Censoring History, 74-95.
^' According to a V)95 Asahi Shimbun survey (January 1, pp. 24-25), 90% of Japanese think that
they should not forget the past war, whereas 7% said that it is of the past and they have no
interest. 26% said that Japan has made enough reparations for the past war, whereas 62%
said that Japan had not done enough.
"' For example, in August 1994, the Minister of Environment, Sakurai Shin, dered Japan's
intention of invasion in the Asia-Pacific War. He also said that Japanese aggression in World
War II actually benefited Asia. These comments created an uproar, which eventually led to
his resignation. A month later, the Minister of Justice, Nagano Shigeo, called the Nanking
Massacre a fictitious event. {Asahi Shimbun, 3 January 1995, p. 1).
*" Okuno has occupied important positions in the cabinet in the past, including the Minister
of Education and Minister of Justice. In 1988, while he was the Director-General of the National Land Agency, his controversial comment regarding the Sino-Japanese War led to his
resignation.
^ Despite all these controversies regarding the interpretation of the war, a number of ministers (including the new Minister of Education) visited the Yasukuni Shrine, where the people
who fought in the Asia-Pacific War are enshrined. The government officials paying respect to
the Yasukuni has long been a controversy as it violates the separation of state and religion
declared in the Japanese constitution. Moreover, the Shintoist Shrine is seen as a symbol of
conservatives and nationalists who support Japan's action during the war.
^ Asahi Shimbun, 9 November 1995, p. 2.
" Another incident that demonstrates the lack of consensus regarding the interpretation of
the Asia-Pacific War is the controversy over a historical museum. Commemorating the fiftieth anniversary, the Japanese government decided to establish a museum and research center
that would provide an explanation for what led to the war and what happened during the
war. One was to become "Showakan" (the first national war museum in Japan) and the other
the "Asian History Document Center." Although the government constructed both, the ideologies embedded in these buildings were completely opposite from each other. Initially,
Showakan was to be a memorial for those who were killed defending their coimtry. However, reflecting the changing public view on the war, the Ministry of Health and Welfare
48
decided to articulate Japan's responsibility as victimizer by including an exhibit of Japanese

colonization and "comfort women." This angered those who thought that such an exhibition
would incriminate those who fought in the war. After much controversy (and, as a result, a
delay in construction), Showakan ended up having displays of everyday items during the
war, which were ahistorical, apolitical, and from a victim's perspective. To appease the claims
that the museum should provide historical context and Japan's role as aggressor, the Asian
History Document Center was designated to deal with politics and provide historical context
as well as research Japan's role as aggressor during the war. For more details on the early
historical background of the Showakan, see Ellen H. Hammond, "Commemoration Controversies: The War, the Peace, and Democracy in Japan," Living with the Bomb, 100-121.
^ Bernstein, "The Struggle Over History," Judgment at the Smithsonian, 127-256; Walker, "The
Decision to Use the Bomb," Hiroshima in History and Memory, 11-37; Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb," Hiroshima in History and Memory, 38-79; Mohan and Maley, "Orthodoxy and Dissent," Cultural Difference, Media Memories, 139-174.
^ J. Samuel Walker, "History, Collective Memory, and the Decision to Use the Bomb," Hiroshima
in History and Memory, 187-231; Hein and Seiden, Censoring History.
" James W. Loewen, "The Vietnam War in High School American History," Censoring History,
150-172; David Hunt, "War Crimes and the Vietnam People: American Representations and
Silences," Censoring History, 173-200.
'" I viewed black and white films that were taken immediately after the bombing when I was
still in elementary school. A comic book called Barefoot Gen, which gives graphic details of
the aftermath of the Hiroshima bombing, was also available for all children to read.
" Dower, "The Bombed: Hiroshimas and Nagasakis in Japanese Memory," Hiroshima in History and Memory, 116-163; Dower, "Triumphal and Tragic Narratives," The Journal ofAmerican
History 82(3): 1124-1135.
Ienaga Saburo, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education," International Security
18(3): 113-33; Aaron Rick Garriss, Japanese Junior High School TextbooJcs and the Teaching of the
Pacific War (Master's thesis. University of Kansas, 1999); Sean Matthew Reedy, Mechanisms of
State Control: An Historical Study of the Treatment of the Pacific War in Japanese High School History Textbooks from 1945 to 1995 (Thesis, University of San Francisco, 1999); Hein and Seiden,
Censoring History.
^' "Comfort women" is a euphemism for women and girls who were kidnapped or deceived
by the Japanese Imperial Army to work as sex slaves for the Japanese soldiers. Most of these
women were from Korea, but others were from China, the Dutch East Indies, Taiwan, Malaysia, Burma, and the Philippines. According to Karen Parker and Jennifer F. Chew, "only
about 25 percept survived this treatment. Of these postwar survivors, possibly only two
thousand, now about sixty-five to eighty-five years old, are still alive" (p. 95). Karen Parker
and Jennifer F. Chew, "The Jugun Ianfu ["comfort women"] System," in When Sorry Isn 't Enough:
The Controversy Over Apologies and Reparations for Human Injustice, ed. Roy L. Brooks (New
York University Press: New York & London, 2000), 95-100. For more details on the controversies surrounding the "comfort women," see chapters 11-20 in When Sorry Isn't Enough.
'^ Asahi Shimbun evening edition, 31 May 1995, p. 14.
^ Mainichi Shimbun asked people (salaried men in their twenties and thirties) where they
learned about World War II and most said that they learned about Japan's history as victimizer outside of class (15 August 1995, p. 25).
^ Dower, "Triumphal and Tragic Narratives," Journal of American History, 1131.
'' Nozaki Yoshiko and Inokuchi Hiromitsu, "Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga
Saburo's Textbook Lawsuits," Censoring History, 96-126.
^ According to NBC news (August 4,1995), a comic book in which Japan warns the United
States in the Pearl Harbor attack and wins the war, sold 3 million copies. Aaron Gerow discusses Kobayashi Yoshinori's comic book, Sensoron (On war), which not only justified Japan's
role in the war but was also very popular among young people (half a million copies were
sold). Aaron Gerow, "Consuming Asia, Consuming Japan: The New Nationalist Revisionism
in Japan," Censoring History, 74-95.
^' McCormack discusses the various movements by conservative politicians and scholars
who attempted to write "correct" history that justified Japan's role in the war. Gavan
American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII Nos. 2 &3
49
McCormack, "The Japanese Movement to 'Correct' History," Censoring History, 53-73; Gerow,
"Consuming Asia, Consuming Japan," Censoring History, 74-95,

^ After the war, many Japanese protested the national anthem because it sings for the longevity of the emperor. There has also been opposition to the raising and saluting to the Japaneseflagbecause of the atrocities and tragedies committed in the name of Japan (as the rising
sun) and the emperor. There were cases where teachers who refused to play the national
anthem on the organ were fired, but until 1999 the raising of the flag and singing of the
national anthem was not compulsory in schools,
5' "Korea," Asahi Shimbun, 17 July 1995, pp, 8-9; "Taiwan, " Asahi Shimbun, 24 July 1995, pp,
10-11; "Singapore," Asahi Shimbun, 31 July 1995, pp, 10-11; "The Philippines," Asahi Shimbun,
7 August 1995, pp. 10-11; "Indonesia," Asahi Shimbun, 13 August 1995, pp, 18-19,
" Asahi Shimbun, 22 September 1995, p. 31.
*' A young student pointed out that the last fifty years of history is not covered enough in
school (Asahi Shimbun, 17 July 1995, p. 9),
" See pp, 412-414 in Field, "the Stakes of Apology," Japan Quarterly, 405-418.
'^ Ibid., 412.
" Hein and Seiden, Censoring History. Ienaga, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education," International Security, 113-33; Garriss, Teaching of the Pacific War, Reedy, Mechanisms of
State Control; Field, "The Stakes of Apology," Japan Quarterly, 405-418.
^ Field, "The Stakes of Apology," 405-418; Dower argues that Hosokawa's "unequivocal
apology" was "generally ignored by the non-Japanese media" (p. 1131, n. 14). Dower, "Triumphal and Tragic Narratives," Journal ofAmerican History, 1124-1135,
** The tragedy of these laws was that most were applicable only to the Japanese, thus excluding the Koreans, Chinese, and other Asians who lost their Japanese citizenship after the 1952
San Francisco Treaty (Asahi Shimbun, 12 October 1995, p, 29), There have also been more than
25 lawsuits against the Japanese government and companies by Korea, China, Taiwan, the
Philippines, Britain, Holland, and Australia on issues of forced labor, former soldiers who
fought as Japanese, "comfort women" and POWs {Yomiuri Shimbun evening paper, 15 August 1995, p, 14), For examples on post-war issues that were dealt with by the Murayama
cabinet, see Asahi Shimbun, 15 August 1995, p, 2; Mainichi Shimbun, 16 August 1995, p, 2,
" Dower, "The Bombed," Hiroshima in History and Memory, 116-163, Dower discusses how,
despite the fact the atomic bombing symbolizes the victimization of Japan in World War II,
the actual victims of the bombs had been long ignored. The truth about the destruction was
strictly censored under occupation and it was only after its end in 1952 that the Japanese
government had begun extending aid to the survivors of the bomb. However, the victims
still face discrimination socially and institutionally.
** For the politics surrounding individuals demanding state reparations, see Tetsuo Ito, "Chapter 18: Japan's Settlement of the Post-World War II Reparations and Claims," When Sorry Isn't
Enough, 135-140; Karen Parker and Jennifer F. Chew, "Chapter 19: Reparations: A Legal Analysis," When Sorry Isn't Enough, 141-145.
*' For more discussion and the history on the controversy surrounding the "comfort women,"
see Chapters 11-20 in Brooks, When Sorry Isn't Enough.
For the history of the "comfort women" redress movement, see George Hicks, "The Comfort Women Redress Movement," When Sorry Isn't Enough, 113-125,
" For the Japanese government's responses to the "comfort women" issue, see "Chapter 17:
Japan's Official Responses to Reparations," When Sorry Isn't Enough, 126-131,
" Asahi Shimbun, 15 June 1995, p, 3, There are problems with the Korean government agreeing with how the Japanese government is evading the "comfort women" controversy. To
maintain economic ties with Japan, Korea's patriarchy is complicit with Japan, ignoring the
issues of Korean women. See Chungmoo Choi, "The Politics of War Memories Toward Healing," Perilous Memories, 395-409,
" Asahi Shimbun, 2 September 1995, p, 38,

" Asahi Shimbun, 4 July 1995, p, 26,
'^ Interestingly, Yomiuri Shimbun did not discuss any of the controversies surrounding the
"public funds" for comfort women, simply stating that such a fund was created.
50
The fund was initially called "Asia Peace and Friendship Fund for Women" which was
changed into "Asian Peace and Friendship People's Fund for Women." The word "People's"
was included to emphasize the apology of the people.
"" The entry into United Nations Permanent Membership was a big goal for Japan in 1995.
However, the controversy over the "comfort women" funds and the distorted comments made
by government officials led South Korea and other Asian countries who suffered under Japan's
aggression to oppose Japan's entry.
Asahi Shimbun, 2 September 1995, p. 38.
" This happened on August 15 at a "Postwar Fifty Years Meeting" held by the Socialist Party.
LDP had opposed the government's holding a "Meeting to Commemorate Postwar Fifty Years"
so Prime Minister Murayama (who is from the Socialist Party) attended this meeting. Although Murayama did apologize to the "comfort women," tension did arise between him
and the women because there was no mention of individual reparation. Asahi Shimbun provided information on the conflict whereas Yomiuri did not refer to it at all.
*" For more discussion on the politics of apology and the importance of healing, see Hyunah
Yang, "Re-membering the Korean Military Comfort Women: Nationalism, Sexuality, and Silencing," in Dangerous Women, ed. Elaine Kim & Chungmoo Choi (Routledge, 1998), 123-139,
and Chimgmoo Choi, "The Politics of War Memories toward Healing," Perilous Memories,
395-409.
*' It is important to question the U.S. complicity in this manner. In many of the apology
controversies, it is not simply the racism and lack of self-repentance of Japan that prevents
them from making a formal apology. It is the U.S. and other former Allies that have created a
situation which allowed Japan to avoid facing wartime aggressions. We have to realize that
U.S. complicity has been conveniently taken out of An^erican World War II narratives.
'^ Pp. 415416 in Field, "The Stakes of Apology," Japan Quarterly, 405-418, Yang, "Re-membering
the Korean Military Comfort Women," Dangerous Women, 123-139; and Choi, The Politics of
War Memories toward Healing," Perilous Memories, 395-409.
'' Yui, "Between Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima/Nagasaki," Living with the Bomb, 52-72;
McCormack, "The Japanese Movement to 'Correct' History," Censoring History, 53-73; Gerow,
"Consuming Asia, Consuming Japan," Censoring History, 74-95.
** On the discussion of World War II as a "race war," see Dower, War Without Mercy; Dower,
"Race, Language, and War in Two Cultures," The War in American Culture, 169-201.
^^ Dower, "Victor's Justice, Loser's Justice," in Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World
War II (W.W. Norton & Company/The New Press, 1999), 443-484.
** P. 258, note 4 in Dower, "Three Narratives of Our Humanity," History Wars, 63-96; pp. 239240, 244 in Gavan McCormack, "Remembering and Forgetting: The War, 1945-1995," in The
Emptiness of Japanese Affluence (An East Gate Book, M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 225-284.
' Ibid,
^ Howard Zinn, "A Just Cause, Not a Just War," in Phi Kappa Phi Forum 82(2): 34-37.
*' Geoffrey White, "Memory Wars: The Politics of Remembering the Asia/Pacific War,"
AsiaPadfic Issues 21(July 1995): 1-8.
^ Yoneyama, "For Transformative Knowledge," Perilous Memories, 323-346.
Copyright of American Studies International is the property of American Studies International and its content
may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express
written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

Atrocities

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Atrocities

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

17

Apologies for Atrocities:

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 &3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol, XLII, Nos, 2 &3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

troversy demonstrated the presence of this continuing struggle over

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 &3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

Hiroshimas."^^ Some Japanese have demanded an apology from

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol, XLII, Nos, 2 &3

American Studies Intemational, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 &3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

colonialism." Others said, "though Japan was defeated, other Asian

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol, XLII, Nos, 2 & 3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

is explained in the bombings, only that the bombs were dropped

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol, XLII, Nos, 2 & 3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

Bataan Death March; the creation of biological weapons by Unit 731;

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 &3

to come up with a public donation fund, the "Asian Women's Peace

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 &3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol, XLII, Nos, 2 & 3

how September 11 could be understood within the context of the

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII Nos. 2 & 3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol, XLII, Nos, 2 & 3

Susan E. Hirsch (University of Chicago Press, 1996), 169-201.

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 &3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

decided to articulate Japan's responsibility as victimizer by including an exhibit of Japanese

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII Nos. 2 &3

"Consuming Asia, Consuming Japan," Censoring History, 74-95,

" Asahi Shimbun, 2 September 1995, p, 38,

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol. XLII, Nos. 2 & 3

American Studies International, June-October 2004, Vol, XLII, Nos, 2 & 3

Você também pode gostar