Brillantes v.

Yorac
Associate Commissioner Yorac designated by the President as Acting Chairman of COMELEC. The
Constitution specifically proscribes acting and temporary and acting appointments to the
COMELEC. Respondents designation comes within the prohibition, thus: The lack of a statutory
rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the
void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. This is still a
government of laws and not of men. The problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed
at all, did not call for presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the members
of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President, however
well-meaning. In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on
Elections would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would
have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the
President to make. Respondents designation is declared unconstitutional.
Funa v CSC
Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the
independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or
multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions?
RULING: Yes. The Court partially grants the petition. The Court upholds the constitutionality of
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the
designation of Duque in an ex officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees
of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although their
respective functions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the
President of the Philippines in the discharge of such functions. Each of the Constitutional
Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in
the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on
certiorari by the Court as provided by Section 7, Article IXA of the 1987 Constitution. To
safeguard the independence of these Commissions, the 1987 Constitution, among others,
imposes under Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution certain inhibitions and disqualifications
upon the Chairmen and members to strengthen their integrity, to wit: (a) Holding any other
office or employment during their tenure; (b) Engaging in the practice of any profession; xxx The
issue herein involves the first disqualification abovementioned, which is the disqualification from
holding any other office or employment during Duques tenure as Chairman of the CSC. The
Court finds it imperative to interpret this disqualification in relation to Section 7, paragraph (2),
Article IX-B of the Constitution and the Courts pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary. Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency xx Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet
position (i.e., President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants), Duque was thus covered by the general rule enunciated under Section 7, paragraph
(2), Article IX-B. He can hold any other office or employment in the Government during his
tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. Section 3,
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution describes the CSC as the central personnel agency of the
government and is principally mandated to establish a career service and adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity,responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil
service; to strengthen the merit and rewards system; to integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and ranks; and to institutionalize a management climate
conducive to public accountability.
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC Chairmans membership
in a governing body is dependent on the condition that the functions of the government entity
where he will sit as its Board member must affect the career development, employment status,
rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees. Based on this, the Court
finds no irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 because matters
affecting the career development, rights and welfare of government employees are among the
primary functions of the CSC and are consequently exercised through its Chairman. The CSC
Chairmans membership therein must, therefore, be considered to be derived from his position
as such. Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is
upheld.
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters with various
powers and functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and
functions associated with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career
development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and
employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform other corporate

powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions, whether
personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing
Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions,
which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as imposing interest on
unpaid or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care
providers, or approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations. The
Court also notes that Duques designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional compensation
that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of
the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes
against the principle behind an ex officio position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duques designation as
member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the
independence of the CSC. Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not
under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch.
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of a government
corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of Health and the Department of
Labor, respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office of the President.
The corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are exercised through their
governing Boards, members of which are all appointed by the President of the Philippines.
Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their respective
governing Boards are under the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a
member of a government entity that is under the control of the President without impairing the
independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.
In view of the application of the prohibition under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution,
Duque did not validly hold office as Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
concurrently with his position of CSC Chairman. Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a de
jure officer while he served his term as Director or Trustee of these GOCCs. A de jure officer is
one who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has
not expired.That notwithstanding, Duque was a de facto officer during his tenure as a Director or
Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office
is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of
an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an
appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the
acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or
third persons who are interested therein are concerned.

In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Duque as a Director or
Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, were presumed valid, binding and effective as
if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office.

SEVILLA v COMELEC
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat,
Muntinlupa City during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
Proclaimed Sevilla as the winner. So filed an election protest with the MeTC on the ground that
Sevilla committed electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities in all the protested precincts. So
pinpointed twenty percent (20%) of the total number of the protested precincts. He also prayed
for a manual revision of the ballots. Following the recount of the ballots in the pilot protested
precincts, the MeTC issued an Order dated May 4, 2011 dismissing the election protest. On May
9, 2011, So filed a motion for reconsideration from the dismissal order instead of a notice of
appeal he also failed to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period. On May 17, 2011,
the MeTC denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 6 of A.M. No. 070415SC. 5. In response, So filed a petition for
certiorari on May 31, 2011 with the Comelec, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the MeTC Judge. So faults the MeTC for its nonobservance of the rule that in the appreciation of
ballots, there should be a clear and distinct presentation of the specific details of how and why a
certain group of ballots should be considered as having been written by one or two persons. In its
May 14, 2012 Resolution, the Comelec Second Division granted So's petition. In its May 14, 2012 Resolution, the
Comelec Second Division granted So's petition., ruled that the assailed Order was fraught with infirmities and
irregularities in the appreciation of the ballots, and was couched in general terms: "these are not written by one
person observing the different strokes, slant, spacing, size and indentation of handwriting and the variance in
writing. The Comelec en banc, by a vote of 33, 8 affirmed the Comelec Second Division. Respondent judge is
directed to conduct another revision of the contested ballots.
RULING: We resolve to DISMIS and remand the case to the COMELEC for its appropriate action.
The October 6, 2012 Comelec en banc's Resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a majority decision

required by the Constitution and by the Comelec Rules of Procedure Section 7, Article IXA of the Constitution
requires that "each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members, any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution." We have previously ruled
that a majority vote requires a vote of four members of the Comelec en banc.
Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion,
or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached ,
the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission in appealed cases, the
judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall
be denied.In Juliano v. Commissi on on Elections, A "reconsultation" is definitely not the same as a "rehearing."
A consultation is a "deliberation of persons on some subject" hence, a reconsultatio n means a second
deliberation of persons on some subject.same rule applies. In Belac v. Comelec, when the voting of the
Comelec En Banc on therein petitioner's motion for reconsideration was equally divided, the Com elec En Banc
first issued an order setting the case for hearing and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda
before voting anew on therein petitioner's motion for reconsideration. This should have been the proper way for
the Comelec En Banc to act on herei n petitioner's motion for reconsideration when the first voting was equally
divided. Its own Rules of Procedure calls for a rehearing where the parties would have the opportunity to
strengthen their respective positions or arguments and convince the members of the Comelec En Banc of the
merit of their case.

Gaminde v. Commission on Audit

Gamindes appointment was issued on June 11, 1993. It was to end on Feb. 2, 1999. However,
upon confirmation with the Office of the President, she was told her term would end on Feb. 2,
2000.
In this case, the Court declared that the first appointments under the 1987 Constitution should
be deemed to have started on Feb. 2, 1887: Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at
bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to
the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987
Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In
case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the term and
the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter. In concluding that
February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the
Constitutional Commissions of a staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we considered the
plain language of Article IX (B), Section 1 (2), Article IX (C), Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D),
Section
1 (2) of the 1987 Constitution that uniformly prescribed a seven-year term of office for Members
of the Constitutional Commissions, without re-appointment, and for the first appointees terms of
seven, five and three years, without re-appointment. In no case shall any Member be appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. There is no need to expressly state the
beginning of the term of office as this is understood to coincide with the effectivity of the
Constitution upon its ratification (on February 02, 1987).

De Guzman v. Comelec G.R. No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)

FACTS: Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to Section 44 of the Voters
registration act. The act prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular city or
municipality for more than 4 years. Petitioners claim that the act violated the equal protection
clause because not all election officials were covered by the prohibition. Petitioners contend that
RA 8189 Section 44 is unconstitutional as it violates the equal protection clause enshrined in the
constitution; that it violates constitutional guarantee on security of civil servants; that it
undermines the constitutional independence of comelec and comelecs constitutional authority;
that it contravenes the basic constitutional precept; that it is void for its failure to be read on 3
separate readings
Whether or Not section 44 of RA 8189 is unconstitutional? The law does not violate the equal
protection clause. It is intended to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing
them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment. Large-scale
anomalies in the registration of voters cannot be carried out without the complicity of election
officers, who are the highest representatives of Comelec in a city or municipality
No, RA 8189 Sec 44 is not unconstitutional. It has not violated the equal protection clause. It is
intended to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing
familiarity with the people of their place of assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the registration
of voters cannot be carried out without the complicity of election officers, who are the highest
representatives of Comelec in a city or municipality.
FACTS: Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act provided that no election officer shall hold
office in a particular municipality or city for more than 4 years. In accordance with it, the
Comelec reassigned petitioners, who were election officers to other stations. Petitioners argued
that the provision was not expressed in the title of the law, which is An Act Providing for a
General Registration of Voters, Adopting a System of Continuing Registration, Prescribing the
Procedures Thereof and Authorizing the Appropriation of Fund Thereof.HELD: The contention is
untenable. Section 44 is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the

integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the Comelec to follow in the
reassignment of election officers.
LAzo v CSC
On November 11, 1988 the Civil Service Commission received a letter reporting that petitioner
Dennis C. Lazo had boasted to him that he had bought his career service (subprofessional)
eligibility from the Civil Service Commission for P7, 000.00, P4, 500.00 of which had been paid to
the examiner.The CSC ordered the examination answer sheets of petitioner to be retrieved
and hand-checked by the Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement. The rechecking
disclosed that petitioner's actual score was 34.48%, not 76.46% as indicated in his certificate of
eligibility. The CSC filed, but later dismissed the administrative charges against petitioner for
lack of evidence linking petitioner to the irregularity. However, it revoked his eligibility for being
null and void. When the CSC denied his motion for reconsideration, he filed a petition for
certiorari alleging that the CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion and denied petitioner's right
to due process by unilaterally revoking petitioner's eligibility without a formal investigation or an
opportunity given to him to examine and go over his answer sheet in the Civil Service
Examination
Issues: 1.W/N petitioners right to due process was violated when his certificate of eligibility was
revoked without notice or hearing
Held/Ratio:1.NO, While it is true as a general proposition that the CSC cannot motu propio revoke
a certificate of eligibility without notice and hearing to the examinees concerned, in the context
of this case, which simply involves the rechecking of examination papers and nothing more than
a reevaluation of documents already in the records of the CSC according to a standard answer
key previously set by it, notice and hearing was not required. Instead, what applied was the rule
of res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) 2.Petitioner could have shown that his actual
score was 76.46%, and not 34.48%, but instead, he argues in his petition that he should not be
made to answer for an irregularity in which he had no participation and, on this basis, asked the
CSC for a formal investigation. 3.The fact is that he failed the civil service examinations. This
fact is not affected by the fact that his participation in the grade-fixing has not been proven. The
certificate being void, it did not confer upon him any vested right to be appointed to a position in
the government service. DISMISSED
RODELA D. TORREGOZA, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT
The petitioner has been working as Staff Aide position in the Legal Office, Office of the President,
Malacanang, Manila, since January 18, 1978, to the present. His original appointment was for
only six months. On June 5, 1978, less than five months after the first appointment, petitioner
was given another appointment to the same position effective "as of June 18, 1978" and with a
notation that "This appointment is declared confidential." Then on March 5, 1990, respondent
Commission issued the "Rules Implementing Republic Act No. 6850, enabling the petitioner to
file her application for the appropriate eligibility to the position she has been occupying for the
last thirteen (13) years and having accordingly rendered efficient service. The petitioners
request returned unacted for the reason that the position held was declared confidential. After
the Salary Standardization Law (Republic Act No. 6758) was passed, the same position was
reclassified as Clerk II in July 1989. Subsequently, Deputy Executive Secretary Mariano
Sarmiento sent a letter to the respondent dated November 7, 1990, requesting that based on
the present certified function and actual duties of the petitioner, the position be restored to the
career service and that said petitioner be granted the civil service eligibility under R.A. No. 6850.
Respondent commission denied the request stating the position was declared confidential in
nature by the Office of the President. The respondent however restored the position of Clerk II
to career service but still denied the petition for reconsideration of the petitioner.
Whether or not the writ of mandamus may be issued by the Court to compel the
respondent Commission to grant the petitioner the privilege of securing an
appropriate civil service eligibility under Republic Act No. 6850. The court cannot
compel the commission to grant the privilege of civil service eligibility under RA 6850. The
simple reason being that under the law granting the privilege to government employees, there is
a wide latitude of discretion given to the Commission which determines in Section 1 thereof,
"who are qualified to avail themselves of the privilege granted under this Act." With such
discretion, Section 2 of the same law requires the Civil Service Commission to promulgate the
rules and regulations to implement this Act using certain standards. Besides what the law
granted is a privilege and not a right, therefore the discretion lies with the commission itself. As
provided by Sec 1 of RA 6850 ; "The Civil Service Commission shall formulate performance
evaluation standards in order to determine those temporary employees who are qualified to
avail themselves of the privilege granted under this Act.
"The civil service eligibility herein granted may apply to such other positions as the Civil Service
Commission may deem appropriate. Petition was hereby dismissed due to lack of merit.

National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988) The civil service does not include
Government
owned or controlled corporations (GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the
general
corporation law.
F: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she was
illegally dismissed.
NLRC ruled ordering her reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order
her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation by virtue of its being a subsidiary of
the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil.
National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms and conditions of employment of its employees
are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco.
ISSUE: W/N employees of NASECO, a GOCC without original charter, are governed by the Civil
Service Law.
HELD: NO. The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that
arose before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and
other employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Consti but prior to the ruling in NHC
v Juco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving
terms and conditions of employment in GOCC's, among them NASECO.
In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Consti starkly differs from the
1973
consti where NHC v Juco was based. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned
or controlled corporation with original charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service
does not include GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general
corporation law. Adapted.
Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) VS. NHA, 173 SCRA 33
F: Respondent NHC is a corporation organized in 1959 under the Uniform Charter of Government
Corporations. Its shares of stock have been 100% owned by the Government from its
incorporation. Petitioner TUPAS is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC. TUPAS
filed a petition for certification election with DOLE. It was denied.
HELD: The civil service now covers only govt owned or controlled corporations w/ original or
legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress of by special law, and not those
incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. xxxThere is, therefore, no impediment
to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are
covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a govt owned and/ or controlled corp. w/oan original
charter.
ISSUE: W/N employees of NHC have undoubtedly the right to form unions.
HELD: The right to unionize is now explicitly recognized and granted to both employees in both
governmental
and the private sectors. There is no impediment to the holding of a certificate of election among
the workers of
NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, for NHC is a GOCC without an
original charter. Statutory implementation of the Consti (par 5 sec 2 art IXB) is found in Art 244
of the Labor Code.
>>> TUPAS is a labor organization comprised of NHC employees. It filed a petition for the
conduct of a certification election with the
DOLE Regional Office which dismissed the petition on the ground that government employees
cannot unionize.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations. It held, first, that
while the NHC is a GOCC, it
does not have a original charter: Respondent National Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred
to as NHC) is a corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399,
otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations, dated January 1, 1951. Its
shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from
its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its
shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the
Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation
and the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation. Thus, with the advent of the 1987
Constitution, employees of GOCCs without original charters are governed by the provisions of
the Labor Code. The Court declared that there was no impediment to the conduct of a
certification election.
Alliance of Government
Workers v Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 (1983)

F: Petitioner is a federation of unions in govtowned corps. and in govt schools. It petitioned the
SC for a ruling that
PD 851, requiring "all employers... to pay their employees receiving a basic salary of not more
than P1,000 a month... a
13th month pay," applies to govt employees. HELD: NO. It is an old rule of statutory
construction that restrictive statutes and acts w/c impose burdens on the public treasury or w/c
diminish rights and interests, no matter how broad their terms do not embrace the Sovereign,
unless the Sovereign is specifically mentioned. The Republic of the Phil. as a sovereign cannot be
covered by a general term like "employer" unless the language used in the law is clear and
specific to that effect.
ISSUE 2: May government employees act through a labor federation which uses the collective b
argaining power to secure increased compensation for its members?
HELD: NO. The
terms and conditions of employment in the Government including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof are governed by law. And this is effected through statutes or
administrative circulars, rules and
regulations and not through Collective Bargaining agreements.
Under the present constitution, (1973), GOCC's are now part of the civil service, thus, not allowe
d to use concerted activities to get other benefits or higher salaries different from that provided
by law and regulation. Adapted.
HELD: The dismissal of this petition should not, by any means, be interpreted to imply that
workers in govtowned or controlled corporations or in state colleges and universities may not
enjoy freedom of association. These workers whom the petitioners purport to represent have the
right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law. But they may not join
associations w/c impose the obligation to engage in concerted activities in order to get salaries,
fringe benefits, and other emoluments higher than or different from those provided by law and
regulation.
OVERRULED:Governmentowned or controlled Corporations, Considered and Defined.
National Housing Corp. v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985)
F: Juco was an employee of the NHA. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE but his
case was dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govtowned corp. and
jurisdiction over its employees is vested in the CSC. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision
and remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further
proceedings. NHA in turn appealed to the SC. ISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing
Corporation, a GOCC without original charter, covered by the Labor
Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service?
HELD: Sec. 11, Art XIIB of the Constitution specifically provides: "The
Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the
Government, including every government owned and controlled
corporation. The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate
effort at the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full
consequences of the civil service system. All offices and firms of the government are covered.
This consti provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that personnel of
GOCC belong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements. "Every" means each
one of a group, without exception. This case refers to a GOCC. It does not cover
cases involving private firms taken over by the government
in foreclosure or similar proceedings. Xxx For purposes of coverage in the Civil Service,
employees of govt owned or controlled corps. Whether created by special law or formed as
subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service Law, not the Labor Code, and the fact that pvt.
corps. owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special charter does not mean that
such corps. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service.
Xxx The infirmity of the resp's position lies in its permitting the circumvention or emasculation of
Sec. 1, Art. XIIB [now Art IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] of the Consti. It would be possible for a regular ministry of govt to cr
eate a host of subsidiary corps. under the Corp. Code funded by a willing legislature. A govtowned corp. could create several subsidiary corps. These subsidiary corps. would enjoy the best
of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict
accountability required by the Civil Service Dec. and the regulations of the COA. Their incomes
would not be subject to the competitive restraint in the open market nor to the terms and
conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all govtowned or controlled corps. could be
created, no longer by special charters, but through incorp. under the general law. The
Constitutional amendment including such corps. in the embrace of the civil service would cease
to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed.
CSC v SOJOR

Respondent Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as president of the Central
Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC). In 1997, R.A. No. 8292, or the "Higher Education
Modernization Act of 1997" was enacted which mandates that a Board of Trustees (BOT) be
formed to act as the governing body in state colleges. The BOT of CVPC appointed Sojor as
president, with a four-year term until September 2002. He was appointed president of the
institution for a second term, expiring on September 24, 2006. On June 25, 2004, CVPC was
converted into the Negros Oriental State University (NORSU). A Board of Regents (BOR)
succeeded the BOT as its governing body. Meanwhile, three (3) separate administrative cases
against respondent were filed by CVPC faculty members before the Civil Service Commission
regional office. Respondent moved to dismiss the first two complaints on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction. The CSC denied his motion to dismiss. Thus, respondent was formally charged with
three administrative cases. He appealed to CSC proper, arguing that since the BOT is headed by
the Committee on Higher Education Chairperson who was under the Office of the President , the
BOT was also under the OP. Since the president of CVPC was appointed by the BOT, then he was
a presidential appointee. On the matter of the jurisdiction granted to CSC by virtue of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 80714 enacted in October 1975, respondent contended that this
was superseded by the provisions of R.A. No. 8292, a later law which granted to the BOT the
power to remove university officials.
Issues:1. Does the Civil Service Commission have jurisdiction over presidents of state
universities or schools with governing boards exclusively granted by their charters the corporate
powers of administration?
2. Does the power to remove faculty members, employees, and officials of a state university
exclusive to the Board of Regents?
3. Does the assumption by the Civil Service Commission of jurisdiction over a president of a
State University violate academic freedom?
4. Does respondent's appointment to the position of president of NORSU, despite the pending
administrative cases against him, served as a condonation by the BOR of the alleged acts
imputed to him?
Held:1. The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. As
defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the
government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. It is further classified
into career and non-career service positions.
The Non-Career Service shall include:
1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff; (2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who
hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal or confidential staff(s); (3) Chairman and
members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential staff; (4)
Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to
undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the
specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring
agency; and (5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.

Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing
board of trustees of the university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by the
chairman and members of the governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is
a non-career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
ANWER 2: No, the president of a State University is still within the reach of the disciplinary
jurisdiction constitutionally granted to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). As explained by the
court, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the CSC shall have the final
authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in
the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such
officers and employees. In the case at bar, it is clear that while the Board of Regents (BOT) of
the Negros Oriental State University (NORSU) has the sole power of administration over the
university, such power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its employees.
Instead, such power is concurrent between the BOT and the CSC.
Hence, herein respondent Henry Sojor, the president of NORSU, is within the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the CSC.

2. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove faculty members, employees, and
officials of the university is granted to the BOR "in addition to its general powers of
administration." Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to
discipline its employees and officials, there is no showing that such power is exclusive. When the
law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific
matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another
body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter. In this case, the CSC also has jurisdiction to discipline all members

of the civil service, career or non-career. Hence the CSC has concurrent jurisdiction with the BOR
of the university in the discipline and removal of its officials.
3. The principle of academic freedom finds no application to the facts of the present case.
Contrary to the matters traditionally held to be justified to be within the bounds of academic
freedom, the administrative complaints filed against Sojor involve violations of civil service rules.
He is facing charges of nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. These are classified as
grave offenses under civil service rules, punishable with suspension or even dismissal.This Court
has held that the guaranteed academic freedom does not give an institution the unbridled
authority to perform acts without any statutory basis. For that reason, a school official, who is a
member of the civil service, may not be permitted to commit violations of civil service rules
under the justification that he was free to do so under the principle of academic freedom.
ANSWER 2: While it is certain that academic institutions and personnel are granted with wide latitude of
academic freedom, such freedom does not give an institution the unbridled authority to perform acts without any
statutory basis. For that reason, as the court explained in its ruling, a school official, who is a member of the civil
service, may not be permitted to commit violations of civil service rules under the justification that he was free
to do so under the principle of academic freedom. In the case at bar, the respondent is facing charges of grave
offenses punishable with suspension or even dismissal. And evidently, these cases have not been acted upon by
the university officials based on the re-appointment they have given to respondent. And according to the law, in
complaints against civil service officials and employees which are not acted upon by the agencies and such
other complaints requiring direct or immediate action, in the interest of justice the CSC may take over. Hence,
the assumption of the CSC of jurisdiction over herein respondent State University president is only deemed
proper and not in violation of academic freedom.

4. The doctrine this Court laid down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Aguinaldo v. Santos are
inapplicable to the present circumstances. Respondents in the mentioned cases are elective
officials, unlike respondent here who is an appointed official. Indeed, election expresses the
sovereign will of the people. Under the principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election of
a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot be said
of a re-appointment to a non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of
when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university president.

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602
Facts: A case was filed against the MWSS before an arbitration branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) on charges of failure to pay wage differentials, allowances and
other monetary benefits to its contractual employees numbering 2,500 or so. MWSS asserted:
1.it is a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), and therefore the NLRC has no
jurisdiction over the case2.assuming the contrary arguendo, the terms and conditions of the
complainants who are all contractual employees are governed by their respective contracts
Hernandez, the Labor Arbiter, ruled against MWSS, observing that:1.If the complainants were
regular employees, the NLRC would have no jurisdiction; but since the complainants were nonregular or contractual employees, the NLRC has jurisdiction.2.The Civil Service Decree applies to
employees in government corporations in all matters except monetary claims, which is
governed by the Labor Code.
MWSS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition at the Supreme Court to invalidate the
decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Issue: Are contractual employees of the MWSS covered by the Labor Code or by laws and
regulations governing the civil service?Decision: The decision and order of the Labor Arbiter,
having been rendered without jurisdiction, are declared void and set aside.National Housing
Corporation vs. Juco: employees of the GOCCs are governed by civil service law, rules and
regulations; the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over them.
It is uncontested that MWSS is a GOCC; therefore, employment in the MWSS is governed by the
civil service law, rules and regulations; and controversies arising from or connected with that
employment are not cognizable by the NLRC.
There is no legal or logical justification for the distinction made by the Labor Arbiter between
regular and non-regular employees of the MWSS in order to justify its jurisdiction. Positions in the
civil service are classified into career and non-career service, the latter of which includes
contractual personnel.
Secondary notes: arguments rejected by the Supreme Court
1.Patently illogical and deserves no confutation: the Labor Arbiters claim that the Civil Service Law governs
employment in the MWSS in all aspects, except monetary claims, which is governed by the Labor Code.
2.Contention that does not merit refutation: the claim of the contractual employees that they are not employees
of the MWSS, so the case is within the jurisdiction of NLRC through Arbiter Hernandez.
3.Absurd and undeserving of response: the claim that Existence of employer-employee relationship (between
the MWSS and an individual) is not per se equivalent to being a government employee.

Quimpo v Tanodbayan
Quimpo filed a complaint w/ the Tanodbayan (TB) charging G. Dimaano and D. Remo, manager a
nd analyst of

Petrophil, w/ viol. of RA 3019 for their refusal to pay Quimpo's fees as surveyor. The TB dismissed
the complaint,
however, on the ground that his jurisdiction extended only to govt owned corps. organized under
a special law. Petrophil is a corp. organized under the Gen. Corp. Code; it was acquired by the
govt to carry out its oil and gasoline
programs.Quimpo filed a petition for certiorari, questioning the decision of the TB. The new TB c
onfessed judgment.
ISSUE: WON PETROPHIL is a government owned or controlled corporation whose employees fall
within the jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for purposes of the Antigraft and
Corrupt Practices Act?
HELD: YES. Uphold the Tanodbayan jurisdiction. While it may be that PETROPHIL was not
originally "created" as a GOCC, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shedoff its private status. It is now funded and owned by the government as in fact, it was acquired
to perform functions related to governmental programs and policies on oil. It was acquired not
temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform essential government related functions.
xxxThe meaning thus given to "govtowned or controlled corps." for purposes of the civil service
provision [Art. IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] should likewise apply for purposes of the TB and SB provisions
[Art. XI, Secs. 4 and 12], otherwise, incongruity would result; and a govtowned corp. could create
as many subsidiary corps. Under the Corp. Code it wishes, w/c would then be free from strict
accountability and could escape the liabilities and responsibilities provided by law. Xxx [T]here
can be no gainsaying that as of the date of its acquisition by the Govt, utilizing public funds,
PETROPHIL, while retaining its own corporate existence, became a govtowned or controlled corp.
w/in the constitutional precept. Its employees, therefore are public servants falling
w/in the investigatory and prosecutory jurisdiction of the TB for purposes of the RA 3019.
(1) In NHA v. Juco, 134 S 172 (1984), it was held that for purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of
govt owned or controlled corps. whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the CS
law, not the Labor Code, and the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special
charter does not mean that such corps. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil
Service. (This ruling has since been overruled.)

Carandang vs. Disierto G.R. no. 148076, January 12, 2011

The RPN-9 was sequestered by the Government.On July 28, 1998, Carandang assumed office as
general manager and chief operating officer of RPN.8. On April 19, 1999, Carandang and other
RPN officials were charged with grave misconduct before the Ombudsman. The charge alleged
that Carandang, in his capacity as the general manager of RPN, had entered into a contract with
AF Broadcasting Incorporated despite his being an incorporator, director, and stockholder of that
corporation; that he had thus held financial and material interest in a contract that had required
the approval of his office; and that the transaction was prohibited under Section 7 (a) and
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees), thereby rendering him administratively liable for grave misconduct.Carandang
sought the dismissal of the administrative charge on the ground that the Ombudsman had no
jurisdiction over him because RPN was not a government-owned or -controlled corporation.9 In
its decision dated January 26, 2000,11 the Ombudsman found Carandang guilty of grave
misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service. Carandang moved for reconsideration on
two grounds: (a) that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over him because RPN was not a
government-owned or -controlled corporation; and (b) that he had no financial and material
interest in the contract that required the approval of his office.12
Issue:Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the herein petitioner.
Held:A public office "is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which for
a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the state to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public." Also it includes elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption
service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in Sec. 2 (b) of
Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the
individual is not a public officer.
The Court was constrained to conclude that, indeed, the herein petitioner (Antonio M.
Carandang) is a public officer.
Precisely, since he (Antonio M. Carandang) was appointed by then President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada as general manager and chief operating officer of RPN-9 (page 127 of the Rollo). As a
presidential appointee, the petitioner derives his authority from the Philippine Government. It is
luce clarius that the function of the herein petitioner (as a presidential appointee), relates to
public duty, i.e., to represent the interest of the Philippine Government in RPN-9 and not purely
personal matter, thus, the matter transcends the petitioners personal pique or pride. On March
2, 1986, when RPN-9 was sequestered by the Government on ground that the same was
considered as an illegally obtained property, RPN-9 has shed-off its private status. In other

words, there can be no gainsaying that as of the date of its sequestration by the Government,
RPN-9, while retaining its own corporate existence, became a government-owned or controlled
corporation within the Constitutional precept. Government-owned or controlled corporation
"refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions
relating to public needs whether government or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the
case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock;
Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by the
department of Budget, the Civil Service, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the
exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to
such corporations." The Court is of the view and so holds that RPN-9 perfectly falls under the
foregoing definition. For one, "the governments interest to RPN-9 amounts to 72.4% of RPNs
capital stock with an uncontested portion of 32.4% and a contested or litigated portion of
40%."Jurisdiction of Courts
Issue:Whether or not RPN is a GOCC, which in turn renders Carandang subject to the
administrative authority of the Ombudsman and the criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Ruling:No. RPN is not a GOCC. The law defines what GOCC are. Section 2 of PD 2029 states that
a GOCC is a stock or a non-stock corporation, whether performing governmental or proprietary
functions, which is directly chartered by a special law, or if organized under the general
corporation law is owned or controlled by the government directly or indirectly through a parent
corporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding
capital stock or of its outstanding voting capital stock. Section2 (13) of EO 292 also gives a
definition of such corporations. Due to the inability to resolve the issue regarding the actual
shares owned by the PCGG, the conclusion that the government held majority shares finds no
factual or legal basis. Hence, Carandang is not subject to the administrative authority of the
Ombudsman and the criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) and
ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO,
During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.
Orlando M. Tiape, a relative of Villapandos wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan
del Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando designated
Tiape as Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan. On February 2000,
Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for violation of
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
The complaint was resolved against Villapando and Tiape and the two were charged for violation
of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Sandiganbayan. Upon arraignment on
September 3, 2002, Villapando pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile, the case against Tiape was
dismissed after the prosecution proved his death which occurred on July 26, 2000. Villapando
filed his Demurrer to Evidence the Sandiganbayan found with merit and acquitted him of the
crime charged. The Ombudsman filed a petition through the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
ISSUE:Whether or not Villapando can be prosecuted despite of his acquittal before the
Sandiganbayan.
RULING: Yes, because the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Although this Court held that once a court grants the demurrer to
evidence, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would
violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy, this Court held in the same case that
such ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.
The Office of the Ombudsman argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code does not complement the provision on the one-year
prohibition found in the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code, particularly Section
6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution which states no candidate who has lost in any election
shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any
government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Section 94(b) of the
Local Government Code of 1991, for its part, states that except for losing candidates in barangay
elections, no candidate who lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or
in any of their subsidiaries. Petitioner argues that the court erred when it ruled that temporary
prohibition is not synonymous with the absence of lack of legal qualification.
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the qualifications for a position are provided by
law and that it may well be that one who possesses the required legal qualification for a position
may be temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the one-year
prohibition imposed on losing candidates. However, there is no violation of Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code should a person suffering from temporary disqualification be appointed so
long as the appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in the law.

>In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory
construction, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal
disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal
disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt
therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991.
Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility.
ANS 2: In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory construction,
acted withgrave abuse of discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal disqualification in Article 244 of the
Revised PenalCode defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary
disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991.We reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Basic is the rule in statucon that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There
should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated. Further, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division denied Villapando's Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence yet accommodated Villapando by
giving him five days within which to inform it in writing whether he will submit his demurrer to evidence for
resolution without leave of court.

CITY MAYOR ROGELIO R. DEBULGADO AND VICTORIA T. DEBULGADO, PETITIONERS, VS. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION,
Petitioner Rogelio R. Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros
Occidental. On 1 October 1992, petitioner Mayor appointed his wife, petitioner Victoria T.
Debulgado, as head of the Office of General Services of the City Government of San Carlos. The
appointment came about after considering three (3) other employees of the City Government.
Before the said promotion, she had been in the service of the City Government for about 32
years. She joined the City Government on 3 January 1961 as Assistant License Clerk, before she
was married to Rogelio. Through the years, she rose from the ranks until finally on 1 October
1992, she assumed the new post, and commenced discharging the functions, of General
Services Officer of San Carlos City and receiving the regular salary attached to that position.>On
16 December 1992, public respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) received a letter from
Congressman Tranquilino B. Carmona of the First District of Negros Occidental, calling attention
to the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in favor of his wife. The CSC directed
its Regional Office No. 6-Iloilo City to submit a report on the appointment of petitioner Victoria.
The CSC then resolved to recall the approval of the promotion by Director Escobia of the Bacolod
City CSC-Field office after a report was made by Director Caberoy of the Iloilo City CSRO No. 6
affirming the fact the relation of the petitioners as husband and wife. >Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, contending that the statutory prohibition against nepotism was not applicable
to the appointment of Victoria as General Services Officer. Petitioners also asserted that the CSC
had deprived petitioner Victoria of her right to due process by unilaterally revoking her
appointment. The motion for reconsideration was denied on 21 July 1993. >In this petition for
Certiorari, the basic contention of petitioners is that the prohibition against nepotic
appointments is applicable only to original appointments and not to promotional appointments.
They believe that because petitioner Victoria was already in the service of the City Government
before she married petitioner Mayor, the reason behind the prohibition no longer applied to her
promotional appointment. Petitioners also affirm that the promotion was not motivated by
personal reasons of petitioner Mayor since petitioner Victoria deserves to be promoted to
General Services Officer, considering her long and faithful service to the City Government.
Petitioner Mayor also claimed that the promotion was of honest intention having been concurred
by the Sanggunian and after an informal consultation with one Gregorio C. Agdon, a supervising
personnel specialist in CSCs Bacolod Office, affirmed that promotional appointment is not
covered by the prohibition against nepotism.
Issue/s:Whether a promotional appointment is covered by the legal prohibition against nepotism,
or whether that prohibition applies only to original appointments to the Civil Service; and
Whether the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in recalling and disapproving the
promotional appointment given to petitioner Victoria after the Commission, through Director
Escobia, had earlier approved that same appointment, without giving an opportunity to
petitioner Victoria to explain her side on the matter.
Ruling:Section 59, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 defines nepotism as all
appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor
of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office,
or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him. The word "relative" and members
of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of

affinity. The definition shall be read in conjunction with Section 1 Rule V of the Omnibus
Implementing rules which says that all appointments in the career service shall be made only
according to the merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive
examinations. It further provides that all original appointments and personnel actions shall be in
accordance with these Rules and with other regulations and standards that may be promulgated
by the Commission. The same section defines personnel action any action denoting movement
or progress of personnel in the civil service which includes promotion, transfer, reinstatement,
reemployment, detail, secondment, reassignment, demotion and separation. The definition of
personnel action is reiterated in Section 1 Rule VII of the same rules.
>While the appointee may in fact be quite loyal and efficient and hardworking, that
circumstance will not prevent the application of the prohibition certainly in respect of the original
appointment. The Court is aware of the difficulties that the comprehensive prohibition against
nepotism would impose upon petitioner Victoria and others similarly situated. The prohibition is
not intended by the legislative authority to penalize faithful service. The purpose of the law
which shines through the comprehensive and unqualified language in which it was cast and has
remained for decades is precisely to take out of the discretion of the appointing and
recommending authority the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative.
>The court concluded that Section 59, Book V, E.O. No. 292 means exactly what it says in plain
and ordinary language: it refers to all appointments whether original or promotional in nature.
The public policy embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court
has neither authority nor inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a
qualification here or a distinction there. It follows, therefore, that the appointment of Victoria is
within the prohibited class of appointments. >On the second issue, the court ruled that the
action taken by the CSC was not of a disciplinary measure upon petitioners. The CSC, in
approving or disapproving an appointment, only examines the conformity of the appointment
with applicable provisions of law and whether the appointee possesses all the minimum
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The action of the CSC was only in
implementation of Sec. 59 Book V of EO No. 292. Because the promotional appointment in favor
of petitioner Victoria was a violation of Section 59, it was null and void as being contra legem. A
void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of such
appointment. The CSC is empowered to take appropriate action on all appointments and other
personnel actions, e.g., promotions. Such power includes the authority to recall an appointment
initially approved in disregard of applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations.
Section 20 of Rule VI of the Omnibus Implementing Rules makes this clear that notwithstanding
the initial approval of an appointment, it may be recalled if it is in violation of other existing civil
service law, rules and regulations. >The recall or withdrawal by the Commission of the approval
which had been issued by one of its Field Officers, Director Escobia, was accordingly lawful and
appropriate, the promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria being void from the beginning.
The approval issued by Director Escobia did not, as it could not, cure the intrinsic vice of that
appointment. Therefore, that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the CSC. DISMISSED
CLU v Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
F: The petitioner challenged Ex. Order No. 284 which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their
undersecretaries and asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the Executive
Department to hold other positions in the govt., albeit, subject of the limitations imposed
therein. The respondents, in refuting the petitioners' argument that the measure was
violative of Art. VIII, Sec. 13, invoked Art. IXB, Sec. 7, allowing the holding of multiple positions
by the appointive official if allowed by law or by the pressing functions of his positions.
HELD: By ostensibly restricting the no. of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
asst. secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in
the govt. and GOCCs, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in
direct contravention of the express mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. If maximum benefits are to be derived
from a dept. head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and
responsibilities without the distraction of other govt. offices or employment.
Xxx The stricter prohibition applied to the Pres. and his official family under Sec. 13, Art. VII as
compared to the prohibition applicable to appointive officials in general under Art. IX, B, Sec. 7,
par. 2 are proof of the intent of the 1987 Consti. to treat them as a class by itself and to impose
upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the govt during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so
only when expressly authorized by the Consti. itself. Xxx However, the prohibition against
holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Art. VII, Sec. 13 must not be construed as
applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein w/o addition compensation

in an exofficio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said
official's office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office" w/in the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties
and function on said officials. Adapted.
Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568 (1993)
F: Mayor Richard Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) under Sec. 13, par (d) of RA 7227 "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992.
ISSUE: W/N proviso in Sec 13 par (d) of RA 7227 which states, "Provided, however that for the
first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall
be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the
constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts.
HELD: YES. Sec 7 of Art IXB of the Consti provides:
"No elective official shall be legible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office
or position during his tenure." In the case at bar, the subject proviso directs the President to
appoint an elective official, i.e. Mayor of Olongapo City, to other governmental post. Since this is
precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the
imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, 1st par of Art IXB. While the second
par. authorizes the holding of multiple offices by an appointive position, there is no exception to
the first paragraph except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself. Futhermore,
the proviso is a legislative encroachment on appointing authority to only one eligible i.e. the
incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. The conferment of the appointing power is a perfectly valid
legislative act but the proviso limiting his choice to one is an encroachment to his prerogative.
Thus, Mayor Gordon is ineligible for appointment throughout his tenure but may resign first from
his elective office before he may be considered for appointment. He has a choice.
FRANCISCO LORENZANA, complainant, vs. ATTY. CESAR G. FAJARDO, respondent.
COMPLAINANT: Francisco Lorenzana, complainant, charges respondent Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo
with violation of the Civil Service Law and Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
seeks his disbarment from the practice of the law profession. Complainant alleged that
respondent, while employed as Legal Officer V at the Urban Settlement Office in Manila, until his
retirement on May 15, 2002, was a member of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) of
Quezon City, receiving a monthly honorarium of P4,000.00. He was also a member of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Novaliches Proper, also receiving a monthly allowance/ honorarium.
Complainant also alleged that respondent was engaged in the private practice of law, receiving
acceptance fees ranging from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00. He lives in a house and lot owned by
complainants family without paying any rental and refuses to leave the place despite the
latters demands.
RESPONDENT: Complainant also alleged that respondent was engaged in the private practice of
law, receiving acceptance fees ranging from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00. He lives in a house and
lot owned by complainants family without paying any rental and refuses to leave the place
despite the latters demands. As regards his designation as a member of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, the same is authorized under Section 406 of the Local Government Code of
1991; and his monthly allowance/honorarium is allowed under Section 393. While he received
allowances, honoraria and other emoluments as member of the PLEB and of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, even as he is in the government service, the same is authorized by law. Hence,
there was no double compensation. He admitted having appeared as private counsel in several
cases. However, his clients were his relatives and friends, among them were complainants
father and brother Ricardo. He emphasized that his services were pro bono. >Respondent denied
that the lot on which his house is built belongs to complainants family. In fact, it is now the
subject of an "Accion Publiciana" filed against him by one Dionisio delos Reyes before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 100.
IBP: found that respondents appointment as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay Town Proper, Novaliches, Quezon City, while concurrently employed as a legal officer
of the Manila Urban Settlements Office is not unlawful. Such appointment is in accordance with
the Local Government Code of 1991. Nor could respondent be found liable for receiving
honoraria as a Lupon member, since the Local Government Code of 1991 authorizes Lupon
members to receive honoraria, allowances, and other emoluments. With respect to respondents
appointment as PLEB member, IBP Commissioner Aguila stated that the same is not an
exception to the prohibition against dual appointments or employment of government officials or
employees.>IBP Commissioner Aguila found that respondents court appearances as counsel for
litigants do not constitute private practice of law since complainant failed to show that he
received compensation. However, respondent should still be held liable for violation of Civil

Service Rules and Regulations since he failed to show that he was permitted by his Office to
appear as counsel for his clients. >the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex
"A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and in view of respondents accepting appointment as Board Member
of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board of Quezon City while he was still employed as Legal
Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) month and hereby REPRIMANDED with stern WARNING for
failing to obtain written permission from his superiors to appear as counsel to certain relatives
and friends as required by Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.
HELD: Respondent also failed to establish that his primary functions as Legal Officer of the
Manila Urban Settlements Office allow his appointment as PLEB member, an exception to dual
appointment prohibited by the Constitution and the statutes. Indeed, respondent, in accepting
such appointment, has transgressed the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the
Local Government Code of 1991. Being contra leges, respondent also violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Attorneys Oath.>Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND,
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.These duties are further enshrined in the
Attorneys Oath, which every lawyer in this jurisdiction has to take before he is allowed to
practice law. The Attorneys Oath states in part that every lawyer "shall support the Constitution
and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities>The lawyers
paramount duty to society is to obey the law. For of all classes and professions, it is the lawyer
who is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws, for he is their sworn servant.6 Sadly, respondent
failed to fulfill this exacting duty.
>On respondents appointment as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Novaliches Proper, while serving as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlements Office, we
agree with the IBP Investigating Commissioner that the same is in order, being allowed by law.
ISSUE: whether respondent engaged in the practice of law while employed as Legal Officer V in
the Manila Urban Settlement Office.HELD: YES. Private practice of law contemplates a succession
of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action a
succession of acts of the same kind. The practice of law by attorneys employed in the
government, to fall within the prohibition of statutes has been interpreted as customarily
habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services.In the case at bar, respondents appearance as counsel is not merely isolated. Evidence
presented by complainant shows that he had an extensive practice of law. While employed as a
Legal Officer in the Urban Resettlement Office of Manila, he maintained a law office. The
pleadings he signed as "counsel" for his clients filed with the courts indicate his office address as
"Room 201 7 JA Building, 244 Gen. Luis St., Novaliches, Quezon City." Following is the letter head
appearing on the letters and envelopes9 sent to his clients:"Cesar G. FajardoAttorney and
Counsellor-at-LawRoom 201 7 J & A Building244 Gen. Luis St., Novaliches
Quezon City."
Respondent cannot justify his practice of law by claiming that his office (the Manila Urban
Resettlement) is "not really strict when it comes to appearing in some private cases as they
(employees) were sometimes called to render service even on holidays without additional
compensation." At most, he should have asked written permission from his chief as required by
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules that "(n)o officer or employee shall
engage directly in any private business, vocation or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of the Department." >As to respondents alleged unlawful stay on complainants property
affecting his conduct as a member of the Bar, suffice it to state that any discussion on this issue
is premature since the case is still pending in the RTC, Branch 100, Quezon City.
>Anent the penalty to be imposed, as mentioned earlier, the IBP Board of Governors
recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) month for accepting a prohibited
appointment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City and be reprimanded for failing to obtain a
written permission from his "superiors" to appear as counsel "for certain friends and relatives."
We believe that a heavier penalty should be imposed upon him for he transgressed not only the
statutes but the very fundamental law itself, in violation of his Attorneys Oath and Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. >Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
reads:SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which is he is required to take before admission to practice, for a willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court or for corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney for a

party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice (Stress
supplied).WHEREFORE, for accepting employment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City while concurrently

disqualification: Members of the armed forces are servants of the State and not the agents of
any political group. Adapted.

employed as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office, in violation of the Constitution and the
statutes, which in turn contravene his Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility; and by engaging
in the illegal practice of law, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months effective from notice and is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that any repetition of similar acts would
be dealt with more severely.

Santos v. Yatco, 59 0G 548 (1959)

F: This is petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the order of Judge Yatco
disallowing then
Secretary of Defense Alejo Santos from campaigning personally for Governor Tomas Martin in the
province of Bulacan.
The petition was granted for the ff. reasons: The position of department secretaries is not
embraced and included within the terms officers and employees in the Civil Service; When
Santos, a Nacionalista campaigned for Gov. Martin, a candidate of the Nacionalista Party, he was
acting as a member of the Cabinet in discussing the issues before the electorate and defending
the actuations of the Administration to which he belongs; The question of impropriety as distinct
from illegality of such campaign because of its deleterious influence upon the members of the
armed forces, who are administratively subordinated to the Secretary of National Defense and
who are often called upon by the COMELEC to aid in the conduct of orderly and impartial
elections, is not justiciable by the court.
>>>Defense Secretary Santos seeks a writ of prohibition to restrain Judge Yatco from enforcing
his decision disallowing him from campaigning for Gov. Tomas Martin in the province of Bulacan.
The petition was granted for the following reasons:
1. The position of department secretaries is not embraced and included within the terms officers
and employees in
the Civil Service; 2. When Santos, a Nacionalista campaigned for Gov. Martin, a candidate of the
Nacionalista Party, he was acting as a member of the Cabinet in discussing the issues before the
electorate and defending the actuations of the Administration to which he belongs;
3. The question of impropriety as distinct from illegality of such campaign because of its
deleterious influence upon the members of the armed forces, who are administratively
subordinated to the Secretary of National Defense and who are often called upon by the
COMELEC to aid in the conduct of orderly and impartial elections, is not justiciable by the court.

Santos v. Court of Appeals

Fact: Santos, an appointed judge of the MeTC of Quezon City, retired in 1992 and acquired his
retirement gratuity under RA 910. In 1993, he was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation
Center of the MMA. In 1995, the MMA was reorganized and renamed as MMDA. Santos, in 1996,
was voluntarily separated from the service and was entitled to separation benefits equivalent to
1 monthly salary for every year of service as provided under Sec. 11 of the MMDA Law.w/n
Santiago is entitled to a separation benefit computed from the years of service as
Metc judge to Director III because the retirement gratuity he received under RA 910
is not considered as double compensation? The retirement benefits which Santiago had
received or has been receiving, under RA 910, do not constitute double compensation. But, to
credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under RA
7924 would be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same services.
VICENTE D. TRINIDAD, Ex-Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan, complainant, vs. JUDGE GABRIEL O. VALLE,
JR., CFI (FULLTXT)
Vicente D. Trinidad, former mayor of Iguig, Cagayan, in his affidavit of August 6, 1979, charged
Judge Gabriel O. Valle, Jr. of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte (a native of Baggao,
Cagayan) with having delivered a speech at a conference of barangay captains in the house of
Mayor Proceso Maramag at Iguig, advising them to support the leadership of Maramag and
Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile.
The charge was supported by the affidavits of Caridad D. Trinidad, Pablo Calagui, Peregrino
Abana, Santos Mina and Felipe Banatao. Judge Valle happened to be in Iguig at that time
because he was rendering rural service, He admitted that he delivered a speech in Ilocano but
he denied that he favored Maramag. According to his version, he told the barangay captains that
because former Mayor Trinidad was allegedly his cousin and Maramag had been his colleague in
the fiscal's office, he had no comment to make, He said that he enjoined the barangay captains
to "follow the doctrine of the New Society" and to "vote honestly." We find that it was improper
or indecorous for Judge Valle to have taken part in the political meeting held in Maramag's
house. He should have realized that his mere presence there would be construed as an
endorsement of Maramag as against complainant Trinidad and that such behavior would render
him vulnerable to the charge of electioneering. The Constitution provides that "no officer or
employee in the Civil Service, including members of the armed forces, shall engage directly or
indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote" [Sec. J, Art.
XII(B)]. That prohibition is repeated in section 36(b)(26) of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines As rightly observed by the complainant, a sense of delicadeza
should have deterred Judge Valle from attending that political meeting. Notwithstanding
respondent's disclaimer, the record contains strong indications that he was engaged in partisan
political activity when he attended the political meeting in the house of Mayor Maramag.
WHEREFORE, a fine equivalent to his compensation for seven days is imposed on respondent
judge.
Cailles v. Bonifacio, 65 Phil 328 (1938)
F: This is a quo warranto petition to oust respondent Bonifacio from the office of Provincial
Governor of Laguna. It
is contended that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy and was elected to office,
respondent was a Captain in the Philippine Army and for this reason, is ineligible to that office.
HELD: Section 2, Art. XI of the 1935 Const. (similar to the 1987 provision) prohibits members of
the Armed Forces from engaging in any partisan political activity or otherwise taking part in any
election except to vote, but it does not ex vi termini grant or confer upon them the right of
suffrage. As Section 431 of the Election Law, as amended disqualifies from voting only members
in the active service of the Philippine Army and no claim is made that this discrimination is
violative of the Constitution, it follows that the respondent, being in the reserve force, is not
disqualified from voting. The respondent being a qualified elector and the possession by him of
the other qualifications prescribed for an elective provincial office not being challenged, he is not
ineligible to the office of provincial governor to which he has been elected. The constitutional
provision mentioned contemplates only those in the active service otherwise it would lead to
widespread disqualification of the majority of the able bodied men who are part of the reserve
corps of the armed forces from voting and from being voted upon. Raison d' etre for the

De los Santos v Mallare, 87 Phil 289

F: Eduardo de los Santos, petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on 7/16/46 by the
Pres. He then began the exercise of the duties and functions of the position. On 6/1/50, Gil
Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the Pres. to the same position, after w/c, on
6/3, the Undersec. of the DPW & Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of
Public Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City
Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's codefendants ignored him and paid Mallare the
salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings.
HELD: The provision of Sec. 2545 of the Rev. Admin. Code that the Pres. may remove at pleasure
any of the said appointive officers is incompatible w/ the constitutional inhibition that "No officer
or employee in the Civil
Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." We therefore
declare Sec. 2545 of the RAC as repealed by the Consti. and ceased to be operative from the
time that instrument came into effect.
For cause as provided by law. The phrase "for cause" in connection w/ removals of public officers
has acquired a welldefined concept. "It means for reasons w/c the law and sound public policy
recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes w/c the
appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may
not be removed at the mere will of those vested w/ the power of removal, or w/o any cause.
Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must be
restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the
public."
Three specified classes of positions policydetermining, primarily confidential and highly
technical are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and
employees appointed therein is allowed by the Consti. xxx
The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policydetermining, nor highly
technical. Primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of
the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy w/c insures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state. Policydetermining. Nor is the position of city engineer policydetermining. A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for the govt or any of its

subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. Highly technical. Finally, the position of
city engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to
posses a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, w/c is the sense in w/c
"highly technical" is, we believe, employed in the Consti. RAM.
Corpuz v Cuaderno
F: Mariano Corpus was the Special Assistant to the Governor, In Charge of the Export
Department of the Central
Bank, a position declared by the President of the Philippines as highly technical in nature. He
was administratively charged by several coemployees in the export department with dishonesty,
incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of internal regulations of the Central Bank. He was
suspended from office while an investigation was being conducted over his complaint. The
investigating committee found no basis upon which to recommend him for disciplinary action,
hence, recommended that he be immediately reinstated to his office. Despite such
recommendation, the Monetary Board approved a resolution dismissing Corpus from Office on
the ground that the latter's continuance in office is prejudicial to the best interests of Central
Bank. Corpus moved to reconsider said resolution but the same was denied. He filed an action
with the RTC which declared the resolution null and void.
Central Bank appeals and alleges that officers holding technical positions may be removed at
any time for lack of confidence by the appointing power and that such removal is implicit in Sec.
1 Art. XII of the Constitution which provide
that : "x x x Appointments in the Civil Service, EXCEPT as to those which are policydetermining,
primarily confidential
or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness. " CB also argues
that for the three classes of positions referred to in the Constitution, lack of confidence of the
one making the appointment constitutes sufficient and legitimate cause of removal.
ISSUE: W/N the removal of Respondent by resolution of the Monetary Board on the ground of loss
of confidence was valid despite the fact that the committee which investigated the charges
against him found no basis for his removal HELD: NO. The removal of respondent on the ground
of loss of confidence is a clear and evident afterthought resorted to when the charges subject
matter of the investigation were not proved or substantiated. It was a mere pretext to cure the
inability to substantiate the charges upon which the investigation proceeded. The court therefore
dismissed the reason of "loss of confidence" for the dismissal of Corpus. That being so, the
constitutional mandate that No officer in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause as provided by law must be applied. Persons holding positions which are highly
technical in nature must be afforded the Constitutional safeguard requiring removal to be for
cause as provided by law, and if the dismissal for "loss of confidence" be allowed, it must have
basis in fact, which does not exist in the case at bar.
The exemption of the three positions adverted to earlier from the rule requiring APPOINTMENTS
to be made on the basis of Merit and fitness DOES NOT EXEMPT such positions from the
operation of the rule that no officer in the Civil Service shall be removed except for cause as
provided for by law. This rule is absolute, in fact, the CB Charter provided for the same absolute
rule. Furthermore, the Civil Service Law which classified Corpus' position as noncompetitive
provides that such positions are protected by the Civil Service Law and that his removal must
only be for cause recognized by law (Garcia v Exec. Secretary.)
While the tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence,
the tenure of officials holding highly technical posts does not end upon mere loss of confidence.
The Consti. Clearly distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to
apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the
differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter. Officers holding highlytechnical
positions hold office on the basis of their special skills and qualifications. The court also said that
if mechanics and engineers enjoy security of tenure with more reason should a highly technical
officer, as Respondent Corpus, be protected by the Constitutional provision on security of tenure.
RAM.
Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171 (1968)
F: Plaintiffs herein are civil service eligibles, holding positions under the Offi ce of the President.
About the second
week of January, 1962, plaintiffs received a communication from Executive Sec. Mutuc advising
them that their services in the government were terminated. They appealed to the President but
said appeal was denied. They filed an action against the Exec. Sec. alleging that they had been
removed from office without just cause and without due process. Defendant, on the other hand,
averred that the positions which plaintiffs were then occupying were primarily confidential in
nature and therefore, their appointments were subject to removal at the pleasure of the
appointing power.

ISSUE: W/N plaintiffs are occupying positions which are primarily confidential and therefore are
subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
HELD: NO. The fact that the plaintiffs held office for the "president's Private Office" under
subdivision entitled "private secretaries" and that they handled "confidential Matters" even if
they only performed clerical work do not make them officers and employees occupying highly
confidential offices. There is nothing in the items of the plaintiffs (who were clerks and
secretaries) to indicate that their respective positions are "primarily confidential" in nature. The
fact that they handled at times "confidential matters" does not suffice to characterize their
positions as primarily confidential. No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed
or suspended except for cause as provided for by law and since plaintiffs positions were
protected by this provision, their removal without cause was therefore illegal. Adapted.
Xxx Officer holding position primarily confidential in nature; Statement in De los Santos v.
Mallare declared as mere obiter. The assumption that an officer holding a position w/c is
primarily confidential in nature is "subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power," is
inaccurate. This assumption is evidently based upon a statement in De los Santos v. Mallare to
the effect that "three specified classes of positions policydetermining, primarily confidential and
highly technical are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and
employees appointed therein is allowed by the Consti. xxx. This was, however, a mere obiter,
bec., the office involved in said case that of City Engineer of Baguio did not belong to any of the
excepted classes, and, hence, it was not necessary to determine whether its incumbents were
removable or not at the pleasure of the appointing power. What is more, said obiter, if detached
from the context of the decision of w/c it forms part, would be inconsistent w/ the constitutional
command to the effect that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law" and it is conceded that one holding in the Govt
a primarily confidential position is "in the Civil Service."
Meaning of "term merely expires"; Distinguished from "removal" and "dismissal." When an
incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure of the appointing
power, and that pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or "dismissed"
from office his term merely "expires," in much the same way as an officer, whose right thereto
ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for w/c he had been appointed or elected, is not and
can not be deemed "removed" or "dismissed" therefrom, upon the expiration of said term. The
main difference bet. the former primarily confidential officer and the latter is that the latter's
term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is not prefixed, but indefinite, at the time of
his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power
expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this event takes
place, the latter is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office his term merely "expired." RAM.
[NOTE: The Court in this case ruled that the one holding in the government a primarily confidential position is "in
the Civil Service" and that "officers in the unclassified as well as those in the classified service" are protected by
the provision in the organic law that "no officer shall be removed from office without cause as provided by law".
While incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power and
such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed or dismissed" but that his term, merely
expires.]

Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175 A Civil Service Employee is Not Barred by Laches if before
Bringing Suit
He Continuously Pressed His Claim for Reinstatement.
F: Cristobal, a thirdgrade civil service eligible, was employed as a private Secretary in the Office
of the President of the Philippines. In January 1962, he and some others were given notice of
termination of their services effective January 1,
1962. On March 24, 1962, five of the employees concerned filed an action with the CFI, which
culminated in an SC ruling ordering their reinstatement (Ingles v Mutuc). Cristobal, however, was
not a party to the case because during the pendency of such case, he sought reinstatement and
in fact, the Exec. Secretary and several other Exec. secretaries promised to look for placement
for him. After the Supreme Court rendered the decision in the Mutuc case, Cristobal wrote the
President requesting reinstatement. This request was denied in five successive letters from the
Office of the President, the last letter declared the matter "definitely closed". Cristobal filed an
action in the CFI (now RTC) of Manila. The dismissal was based on Rule 66 of the Rules of Court
(Quo Warranto) which provides that an action for quo warranto may not be filed unless
commenced within one year after the cause of the ouster. Since Cristobal did not bring the
action until after the lapse of nine years, his case was barred by laches.
HELD: Cristobal is not guilty of laches. He sought reconsideration of his separation from the
service and although he did not join in the Ingles court action, he continued to press his request
for reinstatement during the pendency of the case. In fact Secretary Mutuc assured him that he
would work for his reinstatement. The continued promise not only of Mutuc but of the
subsequent Secretaries led Cristobal to wait but depite waiting for such a long time, his
reinstatement never came about. It would be the height of inequity if after Cristobal relied and
reposed his faith and trust on the word and promises of the former Exec. Secretaries, the court

would rule that he had lost his right to seek relief because of the lapse of time. Cristobal, just like
the Plaintiffs in the Ingles v Mutuc case, was not holding an office characterized as "highly
confidential", he was performing purely clerical work although he handled "confidential matters"
occasionally. He is therefore protected in his tenure and may not be therefore removed without
just cause. He is entitled to backwages for five years although he had been dismissed for nine
years, applying by analogy the award of backwages in cases of unfair labor practice. Adapted.
PAGCOR vs Anggara
Respondents Beatriz T. La Victoria (La Victoria) and Marita A. Angara (Angara) were Slot Machine
Roving Token Attendants (SMRTAs) of petitioner Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) assigned at its casino in Davao City. The PAGCOR Board of Directors dismissed them
from service, effective June 28, 1997, for loss of trust and confidence. It appears that respondent
La Victoria was dismissed for alleged short selling of tokens while respondent Angara was
dismissed for alleged token passing and condoning or actively assisting La Victoria in covering
up her shortage. Respondents filed their appeal memorandum with the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). CSC directed PAGCOR Chairman Alicia Ll. Reyes to submit her comment. Instead of filing
a comment, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that the appeal was filed out of
time.CSC issued Resolution, reversed the respondents dismissal and ordered their
reinstatement.
1.) W/N (CSC) ERRED IN DECLARING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DISMISSAL is WITHOUT CAUSE AND
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS EVEN WITHOUT AWAITING THE COMMENT OF THE PETITIONER AND THE
COMPLETE RECORDS OF THE CASE, WHERE THE MERIT OF THE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN FAIRLY
AND IMPARTIALLY ASSESSED
2.) W/N LA VICTORIA AND ANGARA HOLD CONFIDENTIAL POSITIONS WHOSE REMOVAL FROM
THE SERVICE CAN BE JUSTIFIED THROUGH LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.
1.No. The CSC did not err in ruling that respondents were not dismissed for cause and after due
process since loss of trust and confidence is not one among the grounds for disciplinary action
and there was no formal investigation conducted but a summary proceeding.
2. No.It is the nature of the position which determines whether a position is primarily
confidential, policy-determining or highly technical. From the nature of respondents functions,
their organizational ranking, and their compensation level, occupying one of the lowest ranks in
petitioner, cannot be considered confidential employees.
Petitioner, therefore, cannot justify respondents dismissal on loss of trust and confidence since
the latter are not confidential employees. Moreover, the petitioner cannot claim it was deprived
of due process of law when the CSC granted respondents appeal without the comment of the
petitioner or the records before it. Petitioner was directed to file its comment but chose instead
to move for the dismissal of the appeal.
It must be remembered that the CSC, being an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers,
is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence in the adjudication of cases,
subject only to limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process
CASE TITLE: THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE vs. BEATRIZ O. GONZALES
TOPIC: THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SECURITY OF TENURE Both career and non-career service
employees have a right to security of tenure they cannot be removed from office except for cause
provided by law and after procedural due process. The concept of security of tenure, however, operates
under a different rule for primarily confidential employees due to the nature of a primarily confidential
position.
Furthermore, security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not
be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after due process. It cannot be
expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in the nature of the office held.
FACTS:Gonzales was appointed as provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte by thenGovernor Roy Padilla on April 1991, with her appointment on a permanent capacity. After almost 8
years, on March 1999, the then-Governor Jess Pimentel sent Gonzales a memorandum to explain why
administrative charges should not be filed against her for gross insubordination/discourtesy in the
course of official duties and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. After
Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation Committee found her guilty of the charges
against her. Therefore, on September 1999, Gov. Pimentel dismissed Gonzales.
>This decision of Gov. Pimentel was subsequently appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
which issued a Resolution, which modified the earlier decision, found Gonzales guilty of insubordination
and suspended Gonzales for 6 months. A subsequent appeal from Gov. Pimentel was denied by the CSC.
Upon motion for execution, CSC through a Resolution directed the reinstatement of Gonzales upon
clarification of service of the 6-month suspension. Gov. Pimentel reinstated Gonzales, however she was
dismissed the next day for lack of confidence. Gov. Pimentel then wrote to the CSC of his compliance
to the CSCs order and Gonzales subsequent dismissal as a confidential employee, citing an earlier CSC
Resolution where the CSC held that the position of provincial administrator was highly confidential and
coterminous in nature.
>The CSC responded with another Resolution which directed Gonzales reinstatement, stating that while
the LGC (RA 7160) made the position of provincial administrator coterminous and highly confidential in

nature, the conversion cannot operate to prejudice officials who were already issued permanent
appointments as administrators prior to the effectivity of the LGC. Gonzales had acquired a vested right
to her permanent appointment and is entitled to continue holding the office despite its subsequent
classification. The conversion should not jeopardize Gonzales security of tenure guaranteed to her by
the Constitution. Therefore, as a permanent appointee, Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after
due notice and hearing. Loss of trust and confidence is not among the grounds for a permanent
appointees dismissal or discipline under existing laws. >However, in a letter dated February 2005,
Gonzales wrote to the CSC alleging that the then incumbent Governor, Jesus Typoco, Jr., refused to
reinstate her. Hence, the CSC made another Resolution which ordered Gonzales reinstatement to the
provincial administrator position, or to an equivalent position.
>As a result, the Province, through Gov. Typoco, filed a petition for review with the CA. However, the CA
sided with CSC and Gonzales, citing Aquino v. Civil Service Commission, which stated that an appointee
acquires a legal right to his position once he assumes a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment. This legal right is protected both by statute and the Constitution, and he cannot be
removed from office without cause and previous notice and hearing. Appointees cannot be removed at
the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. The CA then enumerated
the list of valid causes for a public officers removal under Section 46, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the
Revised Administrative Code, and noted that lack of confidence was not in the list. The CA concluded
that Gonzales dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence violated her security of tenure, and that she
has the right to be reinstated with payment of backwages. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari to
the SC.
WON Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator of
Camarines Norte.
NO. Decision of the CA reversed and set aside.A. The Court supported the CAs conclusion that the
position of provincial administrator has been re-classified into a primarily confidential, non-career
position upon the passage of RA 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) which took effect in January
1992. In making the position mandatory for all provinces, the LGC also amended the qualifications for
the position. Further to this, the LGC made the provincial administrator position co-terminous with its
appointing authority, reclassifying it as a non-career service position that is primarily confidential. Upon
this, the Court took note of the argument that Gonzales has acquired a vested legal right over the
position of provincial administrator the moment she assumed her duties in April 1991, hence the
argument that she cannot be removed from office except for cause and after due hearing.>According to
the SC, the arguments reflect a conceptual confusion between the nature of the position and an
employees right to hold a position. The nature of a position may change by law according to the
dictates of Congress. The right to hold a position, on the other hand, is a right that enjoys constitutional
and statutory guarantee, but may itself change according to the nature of the position. Congress has
the power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the provincial administrator position and
to reclassify it as a primarily confidential, non-career service position. When done in good faith, these
acts would not violate a public officers security of tenure, even if they result in his removal from office
or the shortening of his term. Modifications in public office, such as changes in qualifications or
shortening of its tenure, are made in good faith so long as they are aimed at the office and not at the
incumbent.>B. The Court also pointed out that Gonzales reliance on the case of Gabriel v. Domingos
dissenting opinion (which stated that a permanent employee remains a permanent employee unless he
is validly terminated) was misplaced. First of all, the factual differences were pointed out to be dissimilar
to the case of Gonzales, and even granting that they were the same, the cited case (in Gabriel) of Civil
Service Commission v. Javier actually proposes that corporate secretaries in GOCCs cannot expect
protection for their tenure and appointments upon the reclassification of their position to a primarily
confidential position. These officers cannot rely on the statutes providing for their permanent
appointments, if and when the Court determines these to be primarily confidential. >Further to this,
said dissenting opinion in Gabriel cited EO 503, which provided safeguards against termination of
government employees affected by RA 7160s implementation. According to the dissenting opinion, EO
503 is an obvious indication of the executive departments intent to protect and uphold both the
national government and the local government employees security of tenure. However, the Court
emphasized that EO 503, however, does not apply to employees of the local government affected by RA
7160s enactment, as it only applies to National Government Agencies whose functions are to be
devolved to LGUs.>C. Finally, the Court noted that both career and non-career service employees have
a right to security of tenure. All permanent officers and employees in the civil service, regardless of
whether they belong to the career or non-career service category, are entitled to this guaranty; they
cannot be removed from office except for cause provided by law and after procedural due process. The
concept of security of tenure, however, operates under a different rule for primarily confidential
employees due to the nature of a primarily confidential position. Serving at the confidence of the
appointing authority, the primarily confidential employees term of office expires when the appointing
authority loses trust in the employee. When this happens, the confidential employee is not removed
or dismissed from office. The term merely expires and the loss of trust and confidence is the just
cause provided by law that results in the termination of employment. In the case of Gonzales, where
the trust and confidence has been irretrievably eroded, Gov. Pimentel only exercised his discretion
when he decided that he could no longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales. >Security of tenure in
public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not be suspended or dismissed except
for cause, as provided by law and after due process. It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public
office despite a change in the nature of the office held. The CSC might have been legally correct when it
ruled that the petitioner violated Gonzales right to security of tenure when she was removed without

sufficient just cause from her position, but the situation had since then been changed. In fact, Gonzales
was reinstated as ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated under the law prevailing at
the time of the termination of her service. She was then already occupying a position that was primarily
confidential and had to be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the
appointing authority. Thus, Gonzales termination for lack of confidence was lawful. She could no longer
be reinstated as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other comparable position. This,
however, is without prejudice to Gonzales entitlement to retirement benefits, leave credits, and future
employment in government service.

GRINO VS. CSC

Sixto Demaisip was the provincial attorney of Iloilo. He resigned and recommended Arandela as
his replacement. This was approved by the governor. Grino was elected as the new governor.
When he took over, he terminated Arandela, and re-appointed Demaisip as provincial attorney.
Apparently, there was loss of trust and confidence. Also terminated were other subordinates of
the provincial attorney.Arandela appealed the action taken by Governor Grino to the Merit
Systems Protection Board of the CSC. The MSPB declared the termination illegal, and ordered
they Arandela be immediately restored to their positions, with backwages. This was affirmed by
the CSC. Gov. Grino now filed a petition for review assailing the decision of the MSPB and CSC.
He relied on the case of Cadiente, which ruled that a city legal officer was a primarily
confidential position. He argued that since a provincial atty and a city legal officer has similar
functions, then a provincial atty is also a primarily confidential position, one requiring utmost
confidence on the part of the mayor to be extended to said officer. Arandela on the other hand
contends that the CSC has already classified the position of Provincial Attorney as a career
position, and that the same is permanent, and can be removed only for a cause.
ISSUE: Is the position of Provincial Attorney primarily confidential? How about the
other subordinates (such as Legal Assistants)?
SC: PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL. The positions of city legal officer and provincial attorney were
created under RA5185, which categorized them together as positions of trust. Both the provincial
attorney and the city legal officer serve as a legal adviser and legal officer for the civil cases of
the province and the city that they work for. Their services are precisely categorized by law to be
trusted services.>A comparison of these 2 positions under the LGC would reveal the close
similarity of the 2 positions. Said functions clearly reflect the highly confidential nature of the 2
offices and the need for a relationship based on trust between the officer and the head of the
LGU he serves. >The fact that the position of Arandela as provincial attorney has already been
classified as under career service, and certified as permanent by the CSC cannot conceal or alter
its highly confidential nature. Since in the Cadiente case the city legal officer was declared by
this Court to be primarily confidential, the Court must also hold that the position of provincial
attorney is also primarily confidential. To rule otherwise would be tantamount to classifying 2
positions with the same nature and functions in to incompatible categories. >Arandelas
termination valid. The tenure of an official holding a primarily confidential position ends upon
loss of confidence. He was not dismissed or removed from office, his term merely expired. >Note
also that the atty-client relationship is strictly personal because it involves mutual trust and
confidence. As such, the personal character of the relationship prohibits delegation in favor of
another attorney without the clients consent. However, the legal work involved, as distinguished
from the relationship, can be delegated. The practice of delegating work of counsel to his
subordinates is apparent since the Provincial Attorney is granted power to exercise
administrative supervision and control over acts and decisions of his subordinates. >It is
therefore possible to distinguish the positions in the civil service were lawyers act as counsel in

confidential / and non-confidential positions simply by looking at the proximity of the position in
relation to that of the appointing authority. >With respect to the legal assistants and
subordinates of the provincial attorney (who were also terminated along with Arandela), they
have been employed due to their technical qualifications. Their positions are highly technical in
character and not confidential. Thus they are PERMANENT EMPLOYEES and they belong to the
category of CLASSIFIED employees under the CSL. Thus, the positions are permanent and they
enjoy security of tenure. >There is no need to extend the professional relationship to the legal
staff and subordinates which assist the confidential employer. Since the positions occupied by
these subordinates are REMOTE from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust
between them is no longer predominant. The importance of these subordinates now lies in the
contribution of their legal skills to facilitate the work of the confidential employee.
Samson v. CA, 145 SCRA 654 (1986)
Facts: Feliciano Talens was Assistant Secretary to the Mayor of Caloocan. The newly-elected
mayor, Marcial Samson, released an Administrative Order qualifying the services of Talens as
non-competetive and terminating his employment on the ground of lack and loss of
confidence. He appointed Liwas as replacement. Petitioner justifies that as Assistant Secretary,
like the Secretary, renders non-competitive service which is primarily confidential and highly
technical in nature where termination may be made due to lack and loss of confidence. However,
respondent contends that he is not a non-competitive employee and thus, can only be removed
for cause and after due process has been observed. Thus, he filed with the Court of First Instance
of Caloocan to annul the disputed administrative order, to enjoin the petitioner mayor, treasurer,
and auditor from enforcing the same, and to compel all the said public officials to pay private
respondent the salaries and emoluments due to him. The CFI, as well as the CA, ruled in favor of
Talens.
Issue: Is the termination without cause or due process of Talens services as Assistant Secretary
to the Mayor legal on the ground of lack or loss of confidence?
Ruling: NO. The position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor cannot be classified as noncompetitive. Since the position is not enumerated nor does it qualify as Secretary or Head of
Departments under Section 5 of the Civil Service Law, then the position is classified as
competitive. Employees of competitive classification cannot be terminated on the ground of lack
or loss of confidence, rather only for cause and agter due process.
Samson v. Court of Appeals
Fact:AO No. 3, issued by Mayor Samson of Caloocan City, summarily terminated the services of
respondent Talens who held position of Asst. Sec. to the Mayor on the ground of lack and loss of
confidence and appointing Liwag to the position.RA No. 2260 declares the position of
secretaries to city mayors non-competitive and this was interpreted by Mayor Samson as to
include the position of Asst. Sec. to the Mayor.
Issue:Legality of Administrative Order No. 3Secretary to the Mayor and Asst. Secretary to the
Mayor are two separate and distinct positions. One is of higher category and rank than the other.
The functions strictly attributable to a secretary, is not automatically vested or transferred to
an assistant secretary, because the latter simply assists or aids the former in the
accomplishment of his duties.
#48 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. SALAS REYES
DOCTRINE: The nature of the position, as may be ascertained by the court in case of conflict,
which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly
technical.
1.Respondent Salas was appointed by PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff [ISS] member
and assigned to the casino at Manila Pavilion Hotel. 2.His employment was terminated for loss
of confidence after a covert investigation of the Intelligence division of PAGCOR.
a.From affidavits of 2 customers of PAGCOR who were used as gunners by the respondent, the
latter was allegedly engaged in proxy betting. b.2 polygraph tests show corroborative and
unfavorable results. 3.Salas submitted a letter of appeal to the Chairman and the Board of
Directors of PAGCOR requesting for reinvestigation since he was not given an opportunity to be
heard. It was DENIED. 4.The appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board was denied on the
ground that as a confidential employee, respondent was not dismissed from service but his term
of office expired. CSC affirmed the decision of MSPB. 5.CA- Salas is not a confidential employee,
hence he may not be dismissed on the ground of loss of confidence. a.CA applied proximity
rule b.Sec. 16 of PD 1869 has been superseded and repealed by Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the
Constitution.
ISSUE/S: WON respondent Salas is a confidential employee. NO.
1.The power to declare a position as policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical
as defined therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in Section 12(9), Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987.a.Serves to bolster the validity of

the categorization made under Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869. Such classification is
not absolute and all encompassing.
2.Two recognized instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential:
a.When the President, upon recommendation of the CSC, has declared the position to be
primarily confidential;
b.In the absence of such declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the office there
exists close intimacy between the appointee and the appointing power which insures freedom
of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom of misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state.
3.It would seem that the case falls under the first category by virtue of Sec. 16 of PD 1869, but
the second category shows otherwise.
4.Since the enactment of Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the nature of the position which finally
determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy determining, or highly technical.
Executive pronouncements [like PD 1869] are merely initial determinations that are not
conclusive in case of conflict.
5.Piero doctrine -- notwithstanding any statutory classification to the contrary, it is still the
nature of the position, as may be ascertained by the court in case of conflict, which finally
determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical -is still controlling with the advent of the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987,
Book V of which deals specifically with the Civil Service Commission, considering that from these
later enactments, in defining positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical, the phrase "in nature" was deleted a.Submission that PAGCOR employees have
been declared confidential appointee by operation of law must be rejected.
6.The primary purpose of the framers of the Constitution in providing for declaration of a
position as policy determining, highly confidential, or highly technical is to exempt these
categories from competitive examination as a means for determining merit and fitness. a.These
positions are covered by security of tenure although they are considered non-competitive only
un the sense that appointees do not have to undergo examinations to determine merit and
fitness.
7.CA Correctly applied proximity rule. Where the position occupied is remote from that of the
appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant. a.Position of
the private respondent does not involve such close intimacy between him and the appointing
authority. FACTORS:
i.Routine duties of Salas [check full text]ii.ISS members do not directly report to the
office of the chairman in the performance of their official duties. Subject to the
control and supervision of an Area Supervisor.
iii.Position of ISS belongs to the bottom level salary scale of the corporation, being in
pay class 2 level only [pay class 12 being the highest] CA order affirmed. Salas not a
confidential employee.
OTHER DIGEST

1.Whether Salas is a confidential employee?

2. Whether the Pinero doctrine is still applicable?
HELD:Every appointment implies confidence, but more more than ordinary confidence is reposed in theoccupant
of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office,but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom frommisgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of the State.
In Pinero, et. al. V. Hechanova, et. al. since the enactment of RA 2260: the 1959 Civil Service Act, it is the nature
of the position which finally determines whether a position is:a.)primarily confidential,b.)policy determining
orc.)highly technical.Senator Tanada: in the 1st instance, it is the appointing power that determines the nature of
the position.In case of conflict, then it is the Court that determines whether the position is primarily confidential
ornot.-Employees occupying various positions in the Port Patrol Division of the Bureau of Customs, whichis part
of the Customs police force, is not in itself sufficient indication that there positions areprimarily confidential.
1. No.Salas position is the lowest in the chain of command. His job description isordinary, routinary and
quotidian in character. His pay is only P2,200 permonth.He does not enjoy that primarily close intimacy which
characterizes aconfidential employee.Where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing
authority,the element of trust between them is no longer predominant.Citing Case Tria V. Sto. Tomas, the fact
that sometimes, private respondentmay handle ordinarily confidential matters or papers which are
somewhatconfidential in nature does not suffice to characterize his position as primarilyconfidential.
2. Yes. PD 1869 can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive incases of conflict.1986
Constitutional Commission Records The primary purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in providing
forthe declaration of a position asa.)primarily confidential,b.)policy determining orc.)highly technicalis to exempt
these categories from competitive examinations as a means fordetermining merit and fitness.It must be stressed
further that these positions are covered by the security of tenure, although they are considered non-competitive
only in the sense thatappointees thereto do not have to undergo competitive examinations forpurposes of
determining merit and fitness.CSC Resolution 91-830 does not make PAGCOR employees confidential,merely
reiterates exemption from civil service eligibility requirement.In reversing the decision of the CSC, the CA opined
that the provisions of Section 16, PD 1869 may no longer be applied in the case at bar because thesame is
deemed to have been repealed in its entirety by Section 2 (1), ArticleIX-B of the 1987 COnsti. This is not
completely correct. On this point, we approve the more logicalinterpretation advanced by the CSC to the effect
that Section 16 of PD 1869insofar as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of the CivilService Law &

Rules has been amended, modified or deemed repealed by the1987 Consti & EO 292: Administrative Code of
1987.
However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section16 which provides that All
employees of the casinos and related servicesshall be classified as Confidential appointees. While such
executivedeclaration emanated merely from the provisions of Implementing Rules of the Civil Service Act of
1959 Rule XXSection 2 The power to declare a position as:a.)primarily confidential,b.)policy determining
orc.)highly technical,as defined therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in EO 292:
Administrative Code of 1987Book V. Civil Service CommissionSection 12. The Commission shall have the ff
powers and functions: (9). Declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be primarilyconfidential, highly
technical or policy determining. This later enactment only serves to bolster the validity of the
categorizationmade under Section 16 PD 1869.Be that as it may, such classification is not absolute and allencompassing.Prior to the passage of the Civil Service Act of 1959, there were 2recognized instances when a
position may be declared primarilyconfidential: 1:when the President, upon recommendation of the
Commissioner of CivilService, has declared the position to be primarily confidential;2:in the absence of such
declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists close intimacy between the
appointing powerwhich ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment of freedomfrom misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of the State.
RA 2260: Civil Service Act (June 19, 1959) Section 5.The non-competitive or unclassified service shall be
composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive orunclassified service or those
which are policy determining, primarilyconfidential or highly technical in nature.General Rules Implementing PD
807: Civil Service RulesSection 1. appointments to the Civil Service, except as to those which are policy
determining, primarilyconfidential, or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and
fitness to bedetermined as far as practicable by competitive examinations.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
VITUG, J ., concurring:
- Highlighted the phrase, "without prejudice to the filing of administrativecharges against (Salas) if warranted,"
found in the dispositive portion of thedecision of the appellate court. It would seem to me that the adverse
findingsarrived at by the Intelligence Division of PAGCOR which the Board of Directors relied upon to terminate
the services of Salas on ground of loss of confidence could well be constitutive of the administrative infractions
thatthe appellate court must have had in mind. The case should be remanded to the CSC to specifically meet
head-onPAGCOR's foregoing findings and to thereby fully ventilate, as well as passupon, the appeal to it (CSC) on
the basis with an opportunity for a hearingadequately accorded to Salas

Pat-og v CSC
On Sept. 13, 2003, Bang-on, then a 14 year old second year school student of Antadao National
High School in Sagada, Mountain Province, filed an affidavit of complaint against Pat-og, a third
year high school teacher of the same school, before the CSC Cordillera Adm. Region.
Bang-on alleged that on the morning of Aug. 26, 2003, he attended his class at the basketball
court of the school, where Pat-og and his third year students were holding a separate class, that
he and some of his classmates joined Pat-ogs third year students who were practicing
basketball shots. Bang-on was not able to follow an instruction on falling in line and was punched
by Pat-og. As a result, he suffered stomach pain for several days and was confined in a hospital
from Sept. 10-12, 2003, as evidenced by a medico-legal certificate, which stated that he
sustained a contusion hematoma in the hypogastric area. Bang-on filed a criminal case against
Pat-og for the crime of Less Physical Injury with the RTC of Bontoc, Mountain Province.>Taking
cognizance of the administrative case, the CSC-CAR directed Pat-og to file a counter-affidavit. He
denied the charges hurled against him.>On June 1, 2004, the CSC-CAR found the existence of a
prima facie case for misconduct and formally charged Pat-og.>While the proceedings of the
administrative case were ongoing, the RTC rendered its judgment in the criminal case and found
Pat-og guilty of the offense charged against him.> Meanwhile, in the administrative case, a prehearing conference was conducted after repeated postponement by Pat-og. With the approval of
CSC-CAR, the prosecution submitted its position paper in lieu of a formal presentation of
evidence and formally offered its evidence, which included the decision in the criminal case. The
decision of CSC-CAR found Pat-og guilty. >The CSC-CAR believed that the act committed by Patog was sufficient to find him guilty of Grave Misconduct. It, however, found the corresponding
penalty of dismissal from the service too harsh under the circumstances. Thus he was adjudged
for Simply misconduct (suspension for 6 months). An MR was filed by Pat-og but was denied .
Pat-og appealed but was denied and the judgment was modified to grave misconduct
(dismissal).>After evaluating the records, the CSC sustained the CSC-CARs conclusion.>Pat-og
filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning for the first time the jurisdiction of CSC over the
case. He contended that the administrative charges against a public school teacher should have
been initially heard by a committee pursuant to the Magna carta for Pulblic School Teachers. The
MR was denied. >The CA affirmed the resolution of the CSC.
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that
petitioner is estopped form questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC to hear and decide
the administrative case against him?The court cannot sustain his position. The petitioners
argument that the administrative case against him can only proceed under R.A. no. 4670 is
misplaced. Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the
establishment and administration of a career civil service which embraces all branches and

agencies of the government.Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government,
has the inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including
public school teachers.Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties
or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows
upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it
is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is
likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter. Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body
that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of others.
In this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was
filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the
DepED and the Board of Professional Teachers.
TITLE: UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO DE TORRES VS. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
FACTS: Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is a Professor of the UPLB who went on a vacation leave of
absence without pay from September 1, 1986 to August 30, 1989. During this period, he served
as the Philippine Government official representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural
Development for Asia and [the] Pacific (CIRDAP).When the term of his leave of absence was
about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an extension of said leave, but was denied. He
was advised to report for duty and that if he failed to report within 30 days he would be dropped
from the rolls of personnel. Dr. De Torres did not report to work.>After almost five years of
absence without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the Chancellor of UPLB that he was reporting back to
duty. However De Torres was informed that in the absence of any approved application for leave
of absence, he was considered to be on AWOL. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with UPLB. Dr.
De Torres then sought for reconsideration with regard to said decision. Chancellor Villareal
reversed his earlier stand and notified De Torres that since records at UPLB did not show that he
had been officially dropped from the rolls he may report for duty. Members of Academic
Personnel Committee, ACCI-UPLB, requested the Civil Service Commission regarding the
employment status of Dr. De Torres.>The Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 stating
that De Torres was already on AWOL beginning September 1, 1989 since his request for
extension of leave of absence for one year was denied. De Torres' absence from work was not
duly authorized by UPLB. Despite the advice of Chancellor De Guzman to him that he should
report for duty on or before September 5, 1989, De Torres failed to do so. Thus, his failure to
assume duty as ordered caused his automatic separation from the service.>The CA upheld CSC.
ISSUE: WON the automatic separation of Dr. Alfredo de Torres from the civil service due to his
prolonged absence without official leave is valid. HELD: The CSC predicated its ruling on Section
33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which was in effect at the time. The provision
states:"Under no circumstances shall leave without pay be granted for more than one year. If an
employee who is on leave without pay for any reason fails to return to duty at the expiration of
one year from the effective date of such leave, he shall be considered automatically separated
from the service; Provided, that he shall, within a reasonable time before the expiration of his
one year leave of absence without pay, be notified in writing of the expiration thereof with a
warning that if he fails to report for duty on said date, he will be dropped from the service."UPLB
Chancellor had advised petitioner of the possibility of being dropped from the service, if he failed
to return and report for duty. This action constituted sufficient notice. The pivotal issue herein,
however, is whether petitioner was indeed dropped from the service by the University. In the
case at bar, however, Petitioner De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP. He
remained in the UPLB's roll of academic personnel, even after he had been warned of the
possibility of being dropped from the service if he failed to return to work within a stated period.
UPLB records show that no notice or order of dropping Dr. de Torres from the rolls was ever
issued by the UPLB Chancellor. On the contrary, UPLB records show Private petitioner was not
only retained in the roll of personnel; his salary was even increased three times. Moreover, he
was promoted in rank with the explicit approval of the Board of Regents, the highest governing
body of UP. All these circumstances indubitably demonstrate that the University has chosen not
to exercise its prerogative of dismissing petitioner from its employ.Thus, we hold that by opting
to retain private petitioner and even promoting him despite his absence without leave, the
University was exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or, more precisely, who may
continue to teach in its faculty. Even in the light of the provision of the Revised Civil Service Law,
the Respondent CSC had no authority to dictate to UP the outright dismissal of its personnel. The
former could not have done so without trampling upon the latter's constitutionally enshrined
academic freedom. Moreover, in Chang v. Civil Service Commission, the Court stressed that "the
CSC is not a co-manager, or surrogate administrator of government offices and agencies. Its
functions and authority are limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine their
concordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Law." In short, on its own, the CSC does
not have the power to terminate employment or to drop workers from the rolls.Consequently,

there is no need for the issuance of a new appointment in favor of Dr. De Torres. His service in
UP is deemed uninterrupted during his tenure at CIRDAP.
Carbonel vs Civil Service Commission
Facts: On May 21, 1999, petitioner went to the CSCRO IV to secure a copy of the result of the
Computer Assisted Test (CATS) Career Service Professional Examination given on March 14,
1999, because she lost the original copy of her Career Service Professional Certificate of Rating
(hereafter referred to as certificate of rating). Petitioner was directed to accomplish a verification
slip. The Examination Placement and Service Division noticed that petitioners personal and
physical appearance was entirely different from the picture of the examinee attached to the
application form and the picture seat plan. It was also discovered that the signature affixed on
the application form was different from that appearing on the verification slip. Because of these
discrepancies, the Legal Affairs Division of the CSCRO IV conducted an investigation.>In the
course of the investigation, petitioner voluntarily made a statement before Atty. Rosalinda S.M.
Gepigon, admitting that, sometime in March 1999, she accepted the proposal of a certain
Bettina J. Navarro (Navarro) for the latter to obtain for petitioner a Career Service Professional
Eligibility by merely accomplishing an application form and paying the amount of P10,000.00.
Petitioner thus accomplished an application form to take the CATS Career Service Professional
Examination and gave Navarro P5,000.00 as down payment. Upon receipt of the original copy of
the certificate of rating from Navarro, petitioner gave the latter the remaining P5,000.00.
Petitioner, however, misplaced the certificate of rating. This prompted her to secure another
copy from the CSCRO IV.
Hence, the formal charge against petitioner.>Denying her admissions in her voluntary statement
before the CSCRO IV, petitioner, in her Answer, traversed the charges against her. She explained
that after filling up the application form for the civil service examination, she asked Navarro to
submit the same to the CSC. She, however, admitted that she failed to take the examination as
she had to attend to her ailing mother. Thus, when she received a certificate of eligibility despite
her failure to take the test, she was anxious to know the mystery behind it. She claimed that she
went to the CSCRO IV not to get a copy of the certificate of rating but to check the veracity of
the certificate. More importantly, she questioned the use of her voluntary statement as the basis
of the formal charge against her inasmuch as the same was made without the assistance of
counsel.>After the formal investigation, the CSCRO IV rendered its March 25, 2002 Decision No.
020079 finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official
documents. The penalty of dismissal from the service, with all its accessory penalties, was
imposed on her. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by CSCRO IV on November
14, 2003.>Petitioner appealed, but the CSC dismissed the same for having been filed almost
three years from receipt of the CSCRO IV decision. The CSC did not give credence to petitioners
explanation that she failed to timely appeal the case because of the death of her counsel. The
CSC opined that notwithstanding the death of one lawyer, the other members of the law firm,
petitioners counsel of record, could have timely appealed the decision. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied in Resolution No. 072049 dated November 5, 2007.>Unsatisfied,
petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. On November 24, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed
decision affirming the decisions and resolutions of the CSCRO IV and the CSC. Petitioners motion
for reconsideration was denied by the CA on April 29, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
Issue: Serious error of fact and law amounting to grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision dated November 24, 2008
because petitioners finding of guilt was grounded entirely on her unsworn statement
that she admitted the offenses charged and without the assistance of a counsel.
Ruling: The petition is without merit. Petitioner faults the CSCs finding because it was based
solely on her uncounselled admission taken during the investigation by the CSCRO IV. She claims
that her right to due process was violated because she was not afforded the right to counsel
when her statement was taken. It is true that the CSCRO IV, the CSC, and the CA gave credence
to petitioners uncounselled statements and, partly on the basis thereof, uniformly found
petitioner liable for the charge of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official
document.
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under
paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
>While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may
or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioners
capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are

facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and
employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.>As such, the
admissions made by petitioner during the investigation may be used as evidence to justify her
dismissal. We have carefully scrutinized the records of the case below and we find no compelling
reason to deviate from the findings of the CSC and the CA. The written admission of petitioner is
replete with details that could have been known only to her. Besides, petitioners written
statement was not the only basis of her dismissal from the service. Records show that the
CSCRO IVs conclusion was reached after consideration of all the documentary and testimonial
evidence submitted by the parties during the formal investigation.
SSS Employees Association v CA, 175 SCRA 690 [Public Sector LaborManagement has
jurisdiction ofdispute concerning terms and conditions (of employment) but not damages arising
from acts of a union.]
F: SSS filed w/ the RTCQC a complaint for damages w/ a prayer for a writ of prel inj. against
petitioners SSSEA, alleging
that the officers and members of the latter staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances
to the SSS building
preventing nonstriking employees from reporting to work and SSS members from transacting
business w/ SSS. The Public Sector LaborManagement Council ordered the strikers to return to
work but the strikers refused to do so. The SSSEA went on strike bec. SSS failed to act on the
union's demands. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, w/c
motion was denied. The restraining order w/c was previously issued was converted into an
injunction after finding the strike illegal. Petitioners appealed the case to the CA. The latter held
that since the employees of SSS are govt employees, they are not allowed to strike. HELD:
Employees in the Civil Service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work
stoppages, like workers in the private sector, in order to pressure the Govt. to accede to their
demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the
Exercise of the Right of Govt. EEs to SelfOrganization which took effect after the initial dispute
arose, the terms and conditions of employment in the Govt, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof and govt. owned and controlled corporations with original charters, are
governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes
thereof. The statement of the court in Alliance of Govt Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment (124 SCRA 1) is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing bet. workers
in the private sector and govt employees w/ regard to the right to strike? Since the terms and
conditions of govt. employment are fixed by law, govt. workers cannot use the same weapons
employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The
principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured
through compulsion of law. Relations bet. private employers and their employees rest on an
essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor
and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector
are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In govt employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of govt w/c fix
the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative
circulars, rules, and regulations, not through CBA's. EO 180, w/c provides guidelines for the
exercise of the right to organize of govt employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has,
however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment
involved are not among those fixed by law. Govt employees may, therefore, through their unions
or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of
employment which are w/in the ambit of legislation or negotiate w/ the appropriate govt
agencies for the improvement of those w/ are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved
grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector LaborManagement Council for
appropriate action.
Issue: W/N the RTC can enjoin the SSSEA from striking. Held: Yes. EO 180 vests the Public Sector
LaborManagement Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labordisputes involving government
employees. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute. The RTC was not precluded, in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction under BP 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction
over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike
the NLRC, the PSLM Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in
labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council and the NLRC that has
jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to general courts of law for the issuance of a
writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, 200 SCRA 323 (1991)
F: On September 17,1990, Monday, at least 800 public school teachers proceeded to the national
office of the DECS and aired their grievances. The mass action continued into the week despite
the DECS Secretary's RETURN TO WORK order. The Secretary filed administrative charges

against the protesting teachers. The Secretary rendered the questioned decisions in the
administrative proceeding. He dismissed some teachers and placed others in under suspension.
Two separate petitions were filed to assail the validity of the return to work order and his
decisions in the administrative proceeding.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MASS ACTIONS ARE CONSIDERED AS STRIKES? HELD: Yes. The
mass actions constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from work,
which it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS CAN STRIKE? HELD: No. Employees of the
public service do not have the right to strike although they have the right to self organization
and negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of working conditions.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DUE PROCESS WAS OBSERVED DURING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS? HELD: This court is a court of last resort. It resolves questions of law where there
is no dispute of the facts or that the facts have been already determined by the lower tribunals.
It is not a trier of facts. It can not resolve the issue which requires the establishment of some
facts. The remedy is for the petitioners to participate in the administrative proceedings. If they
lost, they may appeal to the Civil Service Commission. If pending said administrative
proceedings, immediate recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary, recourse is with
the RTC where there would be opportunity to prove relevant facts. Adapted.

provisions.Terminated employees filed this case. There is no question that the admin may
validly carry out a government reorganization. The issue of the parties are as to the nature and
extent. Argument of Mison: Transitory Provision in Article XVIII, Section 16 explicitly authorizes
the removal of career civil service employees not for cause but as a result of reorganization
pursuant to Proclamation 3. Thus, the reorganization under EO 127 may continue even after the
ratification of the Constitution, and employees may be separated from service without cause as
a result of the reorganization.
ISSUE: WON transitory provision in 1987 Constitution allows the government to remove career
public officials it could have validly done under an automatic vacancy authority and without
rhyme or reason. (since 1935 transition periods have been characterized by provisions for
automatic vacancies)
HELD: NO.RATIO:The 1987 Constitution is silent on the matter. This is restraint upon the govt to
dismiss public servants at a moments notice. The other constitutions were express/clear in the
matter of automatic vacancy, unlike the present constitution. The authority to remove public
officials under the provisional constitution ended on February 25, 1987 (Feb 2, 1987). Even
1987 Consti deliberations confirm this. Esguerra and Palma-Fernandez cases: After Feb 2, 1987,
incumbent officials and employees acquired security of tenure, which is not a deterrent against
separation by reorganization under quondam fundamental law Also, state is concerned to
ensure that reorganization is no purge.

Manalansang v. CSC, , 203 SCRA 797 (1991)

F: This is a resolution of the Court en banc denying petitioner's second motion for
reconsideration. The Court wishes, however, to devote a few words to one issue raised by the
petitioner w/c appears of sufficient importance to merit separate treatment and disposition: that
concerning the effect of the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision, or final order or
resolution of the CSC on the 30day period prescribed for taking an appeal therefrom. Adapted.
HELD: The Court holds that the thirty day period prescribed by Sec. 7, Part A, Art. IX of the
Consti. shall be interrupted from the time a motion for reconsideration is timely and properly
filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the accused or
his counsel. In other words, in computing the period of appeal from the CSC, the time during w/c
a motion for reconsider or set aside its judgment, order or resolution has been pending shall be
deducted, unless such motion fails the requirements set therefor. RAM.

ISSUE: WON Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a license upon the Government to
remove career public officials it could have validly done under an "automatic"-vacancy-authority and to remove
them without rhyme or reason. (NO)
RATIO: The State can still carry out reorganizations provided that it is done in good faith. Removal of career
officials without cause cannot be done after the passing of the 1987 Constitution. Section 16 Article XVIII, of the
1987 Constitution: Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a
result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization
following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and
other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation. In
lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the Government or in
any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the
existing policy. The above is a mere recognition of the right of the Government to reorganize its offices,
bureaus, and instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article XVI, of the 1935 Constitution. Transition periods are
characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from
the old to the new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process and security of tenure. Since 1935,
transition periods have been characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. We take the silence of the
1987 Constitution on this matter as a restraint upon the Government to dismiss public servants at a moment's
notice. If the present Charter envisioned an "automatic" vacancy, it should have said so in clearer terms. Plainly
the concern of Section 16 is to ensure compensation for "victims" of constitutional revamps - whether under the
Freedom or existing Constitution - and only secondarily and impliedly, to allow reorganization. >In order to be
entitled to the benefits granted under Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two requisites, one
negative and the other positive, must concur, to wit: 1. The separation must not be for cause, and 2. The
separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned. By its terms, the authority to remove public
officials under the Provisional Constitution ended on February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February
2, 1987. It can only mean, then, that whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present
Charter, and necessarily, upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it cannot be legitimately
stated that we are merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary Government had
started. We are through with reorganization under the Freedom Constitution - the first stage. We are on the
second stage - that inferred from the provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic document.
>After February 2, 1987, incumbent officials and employees have acquired security of tenure. >The present
organic act requires that removals "not for cause" must be as a result of reorganization. As we observed, the
Constitution does not provide for "automatic" vacancies. It must also pass the test of good faith. As a general
rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the
position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may,
if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to
defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition"
is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of
positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. >The Court finds that
Commissioner Mison did not act in good faith since after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the
Customs hierarchy - except for the change of personnel - has occurred, which would have justified (all things
being equal) the contested dismissals. There is also no showing that legitimate structural changes have been
made - or a reorganization actually undertaken, for that matter - at the Bureau since Commissioner Mison
assumed office, which would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees. >With respect to Executive
Order No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits that under Section 59 thereof, "Those incumbents whose positions
are not included therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service." He submits
that because the 394 removed personnel have not been "reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin
with, the Commissioner's appointing power is subject to the provisions of Executive Order No. 39. Under
Executive Order No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs may "appoint all Bureau personnels except those
appointed by the President." Thus, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr.,
Commissioner Mison could not have validly terminated them, they being Presidential appointees. >That Customs
employees, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 had been on a mere holdover status cannot mean that
the positions held by them had become vacant. The occupancy of a position in a holdover capacity was
conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional

Mancita v. Barcinas, 216 SCRA 772 (1992)

F: On 10/15/90, Mayor Divinigracia, Jr., who had succeeded Mayor Prila, informed pvt. resp.
Nacario that her services as MPDC would be terminated effective 11/16/90 to pave the way for
the reinstatement of petitioner (w/c CSC ordered.)
Xxx Meanwhile, on 11/8/90, pvt. resp. Nacario filed w/ the RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur, a petition
for declaratory relief and prohibition w/ prel. inj. against CSC xxx As prayed for by the petitioner
(now pvt. resp. Nacario), the resp. Judge issued on the same day a temporary restraining order
and set the hearing of the application for a writ of prel. inj. on 11/22/90. Petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss the petition on the ground that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to rule, pass upon
or review a final judgment, order or decision of the CSC. On 2/25/91, resp. Judge issued an order
denying the motion. MFR was also denied Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: The CSC, under the Consti., is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service
and as such,
its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this Court's certiorari jurisdiction. (Lopez v.
CSC, et. al, 195 SCRA 777.) Since the decision, order, or ruling of the CSC is subject to review
only by this Court on certiorari under
Rule 65, ROC, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the civil case, an action w/c seeks a review of a
decision of the
CSC. RAM.
DARIO vs MISON
FACTS: P. Cory Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 in 1986. It provided for priority for the
reorganization of the government, eradication of unjust and oppressive structures, and all
iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime. 3 days later, she issued EO 17, prescribing the
rules and regulations for the implementation of section 2, article III of the freedom constitution.
This recognized the unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the deserving officials and
employees and prescribed grounds for separation/replacement of personnel. EO 127:
Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance.Commissioner Mison issued Memorandum Guidelines on
the Implementation of Regorganization Orders. Mison sent notices to several customs
officials, stating that those incumbents whose positions are not carried in the new reorganization
pattern are deemed separated from service, and that they have been terminated. CSC ordered
reinstatement. In 1988, RA 6656 was enacted: an act to protect the security of tenure of civil
service employees in the implementation of government reorganization. It mandated the
reinstatement/reappointment of officers/employees whose separation violated its

Constitution), but advanced to February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective. After the said
date the provisions of the latter on security of tenure govern.
<DISPOSITIVE: Resolutions of the CSC are affirmed. Petitions of employees are GRANTED. Petitions of Mison are
DISMISSED. Commissioner of Customs is ordered to REINSTATE employees he removed and those he appointed
as replacements are ordered to VACATE their posts subject to payment of lawful benefits.

Barrozo v. CSC, 198 SCRA 487

F: On 11/10/88, David Borja retired as City Engineer of Baguio. At that time, petitioner Teodoro
Barrozo was a
Senior Civil Engineer of DPWH assigned to the office of the City Engineer of Baguio and resp. V.
Julian was the Asst. City Engineer of Baguio. On 12/27/88, Mayor Labo extended to Barrozo a
permanent appointment as City Engineer of
Baguio. On 2/16/89, after his protest was rejected by Mayor Labo, pvt. resp. Julian appealed to
the MSPB of the CSC, claiming that as a qualified nextinrank officer, he had a preemptive right
over Barrozo. The CSC Cordillera Admin.
Region, to w/c the appeal was referred, declared Barrozo's appointment void for being violative
of Civil Service promotion rules. MFR was denied. CSC, on appeal, affirmed the decision.
Adapted.
HELD: The CSC has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have
the authority
to review the appointments made by other officers except only to ascertain if the appointee
possesses the
required qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory
qualifications
should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the CSC. It cannot disallow an
appointment bec.
it believes another person is better qualified and mush less can it direct the appointment of its
own choice. xxx
The law does not absolutely require that the person who is next in rank shall be promoted to fill
a vacancy. In fact, the vacancy may be filled not only by promotion but "by transfer of present
employees in the govt service, by reinstatement, by reemployment of persons separated
through reduction in force, or by appointment of persons w/ the civil service eligibility
appropriate to the position. What the Civil Service Act provides is that if a vacancy is filled by
promotion, the person holding that position nextinrank thereto "shall be considered for
promotion."xxxOne who is next in rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to
the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed.
The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the
appointing authority to promote such person to the nexthigher position. RAM.
ANGEL ABAD VS. HERMINIO DELA CRUZ
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Angel Abad assailing the Court of
Appeals Decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Civil Service Commission Resolution. This
Resolution affirmed the permanent appointment of Herminio Dela Cruz as City Government
Department Head III. Mayor Jaime R. Fresnedi appointed (Dela Cruz) as City Assessor of the City
Government of Muntinlupa in a permanent capacity on December 28, 2006.The City Assessor is
given the item of City Government Department Head III. In Resolution No. 06-361, majority of
the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City Government of Muntinlupa concurred in
the appointment of Dela Cruz as City Government Department Head III. Pursuant to Civil Service
Commission Resolution No. 02-1235 granting the City Government of Muntinlupa the power to
take final action on its appointments, the appointment of Dela Cruz was considered attested to
by the Civil Service Commission. (Abad), Local Assessment Operations Officer V in the Office of
the City Assessor, wrote the Civil Service Commission and expressed the disapproval of Dela
Cruz's appointmen alleging that the position of City Government Department Head III
corresponded to Salary Grade 27, nine (9) salary grades higher than Dela Cruz's former position
as Local Assessment Operations Officer III with Salary Grade 18. According to Abad, Dela Cruz's
appointment violated Item 15 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 3, Series of
2001, which prohibits the promotion of an employee to a position more than three (3) salary
grades above his or her former position. Abad added that being a qualified next-in-rank, he
applied for the position of City Government Department Head III. However, he and three (3)
other qualified applicants were allegedly excluded from the selection process, in violation of Item
10 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 3, series of 2001. According to Abad,
the appointment of Dela Cruz caused "demoralization within [their] ranks." Due to a fire, the City
Government of Muntinlupa, therefore, failed to act on Abad's Letter. Abad filed with the Mayor's
Office the letter-complaint reiterating his request for disapproval of Dela Cruz's permanent
appointment as City Government Department Head III. Mayor San Pedro referred Abad's lettercomplaint to the City Government of Muntinlupa's Personnel Department The Grievance
Committee recommended the invalidation of Dela Cruz's permanent appointment as City

Government Department Head III. Mayor San Pedro's approval to this recommendation was then
referred to the CSC-NCR. CSC-NCR invalidated Dela Cruz's permanent appointment as City
Government Department Head III. CSC reversed this decision on dela Cruzs appeal. CSC ruled
that Dela Cruz's appointment was an exception to the three-salary-grade rule. Dela Cruz
underwent a deep selection process rendering his appointment "very meritorious[.]" CA
dismissed petition for review and affirmed the appointment. CA held that the three-salary-grade
rule "only gives preference to the person occupying the position next in rank to a vacancy, but
does not by any means give [the employee next in rank] [the] exclusive right to be appointed to
the said vacancy." As long as the employee appointed to the position possesses the minimum
qualifications for the position, the appointment is valid. SC found that the present petition must
be denied.
DOCTRINE: Appointments in the civil service are made fundamentally on the basis of merit. Both the Constitution
and law ensure that those appointed are fit for the position. While those who are next in rank to a vacant
position may be given some preference, no one has a vested right to a government position. Seniority and salary
grades should be given their due weight but should not trump the public interest. The Civil Service CommissionNational Capital Region and the Civil Service Commission agree that respondent possesses the minimum
qualifications under the law for the position of City Government Department Head III. Moreover, the appointment
of Dela Cruz was confirmed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Muntinlupa in Resolution No. 06-361. The nextin-rank rule is a rule of preference on who to consider for promotion. The rule does not give employees next in
rank a vested right to the position next higher to theirs should that position become vacant. Appointment is a
discretionary power of the appointing authority. So long as the appointee possesses the qualifications required
by law, the appointment is valid. Petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proving that he was a qualified nextin-rank. Re 3-salary-grade rule, case falls under one of the exceptions (deep selection process).

Luego v CSC
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by
Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was described as permanent
but the Civil Service Commission approved it as temporary. On 22 March 1984, the Civil
Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the
contested position and accordingly directed herein private respondent in place of petitioners
position. The private respondent was so appointed on 28 June 1984, by the new mayor; Mayor
Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment as well as to
question the Civil Service Commissions order and the private respondents title.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent
appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on
the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered
to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its
authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commissions resolution is set
aside.
ANS 2> No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was
therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent,
as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it
temporary.
Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia
the power to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the
civil service .and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate
eligibility or required qualifications.The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature
of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving
or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the
appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws. CSC is without
authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better
qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
Aquino vs Civil Service Commission; [208 SCRA 240; GR 92403, April 22, 1992]
Facts: Petitioner was designated as Officer-in-charge of the Division Supply Office by the DECS
Regional Director in view of the retirement of the Supply Officer I. >Two years thereafter, the
Division Superintendent of City Schools issued a promotional appointment to private respondent
as Supply Officer I in the DECS division. The Civil Service Regional Office IV approved her
appointment as permanent.>Petitioner filed a protest with DECS Secretary questioning the
qualification and competence of private respondent for the position of Supply Officer I. >Finding
the petitioner better qualified than the respondent, the DECS Secretary in a decision sustained
the protest and revoked the appointment of private respondent, and petitioner was issued a
permanent appointment as Supply Officer by the DECS Regional Director. Said appointment was

approved by the Civil Service Regional Office IV. >In an appeal to the CSC, public respondent
CSC found the appeal meritorious, thus revoking the appointment of petitioner and restoring
private respondent to her position under her previously approved appointment. >In the case at
bar, petitioner assailing the revocation of his appointment, invokes the rulings in previous
jurisprudence that the CSC has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position for that would have constituted an
encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority.
Issue: Whether or not appointment of the respondent can be revoked. Held: No. It is
well settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes
position, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right, which is protected not only by statute,
but also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the
appointment, or by removal, except for cause and with previous notice and hearing. Said
appointment cannot also be revoked on the ground that the protestant is more qualified than the
first appointee. The protest must be for a cause or predicated on those grounds provided for
under Sect 19 (6) of the Civil Service Law (PD 807), namely:
1) that the appointee is not qualified; 2) that the appointee is not the next in rank; and 3) in case
of appointment transfer, reinstatement, or by original appointment, that the protestant is not
satisfied with the written special reasons or reason given by the appointing authority.Note: for a
cause means for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient
warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in
the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at
the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover, the
cause must relate to and affect the administration of office and must be restricted to something
of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public.
LUEGO
FACTS
Feb. 18, 1983 - Felimon LUEGO was appointed Administrative Officer II for the Office of the
Mayor, Cebu City by then-Mayor Florentino Solon. oThe appointment was described as
PERMANENT. oBut the CSC approved it as TEMPORARY because of a protest filed by Felicula
TUOZO and another employee against Luegos appointment. Mar. 22, 1984 CSC found that
Tuozo was better qualified for the Administrative Officer II position. Luegos appointment was
revoked. June 28, 1984 Then-Mayor Ronald Duterte appointed Tuozo to the position. Luego
filed the present petition to assail the CSC order revoking his appointment.
ISSUE (HELD): W/N the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on
the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the
basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter? (NO)
LUEGOS APPOINTMENT WAS PERMANENT IN NATURE OSG: Luegos appointment was
temporary and could thus be withdrawn at will. By accepting temporary appointment, Luego
should be deemed to have waived his security of tenure.SC: While the OSG correctly stated the
rule on temporary appointments, the rule has no application here since Luegos appointment is
PERMANENT. The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the
character of the appointment, which was clearly described as "Permanent" in the space provided
for in Luegos appointment paper (CS Form 33). What was temporary was the approval of the

appointment, not the appointment itself. And what made the approval temporary was the fact
that it was made to depend on the condition specified therein and on the verification of the
qualifications of the appointee to the position.
CSC NOT EMPOWERED TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF AN APPOINTMENT
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind of nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the
light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the
other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. The approval is more appropriately
called an attestation of the fact that the appointee is qualified for the position to which he has
been named. Such attestation is required merely as a check to assure compliance with Civil
Service laws. (In re Arcega) The power of the CSC to approve and disapprove appointments
under Art. V, 9(h) of the old Civil Service Decree only pertains to the function of the CSC to
check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the
required qualifications. If the appointee has the qualifications, his appointment is approved if
not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission
when it acts on or as the Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment made by the
proper authorities. In this respect the provision is rather misleading. Appointment is an
essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground
that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide.oEXCEPTION: When the Constitution or the law subjects the appointment to the approval
of another office or body, e.g., the Commission on Appointments. In such cases, the appointment
is completed only after confirmation or approval from the approving entity. oThe CoA can even
review the wisdom of the appointment and can refuse to concur even of the appointee has all
the requisite qualifications under the law. oThe CSC has no such power under the Civil Service
Decree. Its authority is limited to a non-discretionary one, i.e., to determine if the appointee
meets all the conditions required by the law. CAB: By admitting that Luego and Tuozo were both
qualified for the Administrative Officer II position, the CSC has rendered itself functus officio. It
had nothing else to do but affirm the validity of Luegos appointment. CSC had no authority to
revoke Luegos appointment simply because it thinks Tuozo is more qualified. That would
constitute encroachment of the discretion vested in the City Mayor.
Rule V, Section 9 , of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies is inapplicable
because neither Luego nor Tuozo is next-in-rank. Moreover, the rule is not absolute and the Civil
Service Decree allows vacancies to be filled by transfer of present employees, reinstatement,
reemployment, or appointment of outsiders who have the appropriate eligibility. The political
detachment of the civil service will be impaired if the security of tenure clause in the
Constitution is emasculated and appointments in the civil service are revoked and changed at
will to suit the motivations and even the fancies of whatever party may be in power. GRANTED