I.

II.
III.

IV.

SHORT TITLE: Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.

FULL TITLE: Salvacion A. Monsanto vs. Fulgencio S. Factoran Jr. GR. No.
78239
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Sandiganbayan convicted Monsanto (assistant treasurer of Calbayog City)
of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document and
sentenced the petitioner to be imprisoned and indemnify the government the
balance that the petitioner defrauded.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently affirmed
the same. Afterwards, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but while
the said motion was pending, the petitioner was extended on December 17,1984,
by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December
21,1984.
By the reason of said pardon, the petitioner wrote a letter-request that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still
vacant. The letter was referred to the Ministry of Finance. However, the letter
was further referred to the Office of the President for further review and action.

V.

ISSUE
Whether or Not Monsanto, a public officer, that has been granted an absolute
pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment

VI.

HELD
No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the
Pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly
untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing
power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a
poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification
from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that.
To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and
undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

VII.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

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Ruling:


YES. In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the amnesty proclamation, it is not necessary that
he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act of offense with
which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the
complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a
plea of confession and avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may
be declared by the court or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or
not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should,
if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the
complainants and the accused on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to
the enemy , or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the
benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the
nation," or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is
a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms
of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or
jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence
presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.


SALVACION A. MONSANTO V. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.
G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989, FERNAN, C.J.


Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited
by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that
office.

Facts:


Salvacion A. Monsanto, then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City, and three other accused were
convicted before the Sandiganbayan of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents.
Monsanto appealed her conviction to the Court which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a
motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos
absolute pardon. By reason of said pardon, Monsanto wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she
be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. The Finance
Ministry ruled that Monsanto may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment
not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Issue:


Whether a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled
to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.

Ruling:


NO. Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities
and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot
bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we
lose track of the true character and purpose of the privilege. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of
a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly
untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing

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appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of
the pardoned conviction.


The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the
authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular
disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, Monsanto may apply for reappointment to the office which was
forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post,
the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine
ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted
to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go
beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment.


VICENTE GARCIA V. THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, ET. AL
G.R. No. 75025 September 14, 1993, BELLOSILLO, J.


The bestowal of executive clemency on Garcia in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the
administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service.

Facts:


Vicente Garcia was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. He was summarily dismissed from the service on the ground of
dishonesty. A criminal case for qualified theft was filed against him however the trial court acquitted him.
Consequently, Garcia sought reinstatement to his former position in view of his acquittal in the criminal case.
However the same was denied. Hence, he pleaded to the President of the Philippines for executive clemency,
which was granted. Garcia thereafter filed with COA a claim for payment of back salaries but the same was
denied on the ground that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide for the payment of back
salaries and that he has not been reinstated in the service. He was recalled to the service but the records do
not show whether petitioner's reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising Lineman. Garcia again
filed a claim to recover his back salaries when he was reinstated. The same was denied again.

Issue:


Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the
grant of executive clemency.

Ruling:


YES. Garcia's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is
meant to afford relief to Garcia who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has
suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded to
those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of
the charges against them.


Further, it is worthy to note that the dismissal of petitioner was not the result of any criminal
conviction that carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public office, but is the direct consequence of an
administrative decision of a branch of the Executive Department over which the President, as its head, has the
power of control. The President's control has been defined to mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to the

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.
*

G.R. No. 78239. February 9, 1989.

SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner, vs. FULGENCIO

S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.
Criminal Law Pardon, Effects of Administrative Law Public
Officers Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to
public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of such
conviction.Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual
from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all
his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the persons
innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept
in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of the
privilege. Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive
language of the Garland case, we are in full agreement with the
commonlyheld opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a
convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or
forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon
undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
Same Same Same Same Same The pardon granted to
petitioner resulted in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment, but to regain her former post, she must reapply
and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute
disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru
falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities
referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by
her pardon, this
_______________
*

EN BANC.

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191

Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.

particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner

may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by
reason of her conviction. And in considering her qualifications and
suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense
must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to
determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted
with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to
petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To
regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must
reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.
Same Same Same Civil Liability, Extinction Of The pardon
granted to herein petitioner did not extinguish the civil liability
arising from the crime she has been convicted of.Finally,
petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot
oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the
Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of
sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon,
amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioners civil liability
may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the
Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of
the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation.
Same Same Same Acceptance of Pardon Petitioner is
deemed to have abandoned her appeal when she accepted the
pardon granted to her.The 1981 amendments had deleted the
earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final
conviction, implying that clemency could be given even before
conviction. Thus, petitioners unconditional pardon was granted
even as her appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth
mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former
limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it may,
it is our view that in the present case, it is not material when the
pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the

result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon,

petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her
unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the
character of finality.

PADILLA, J., Separate opinion:

Criminal Law Pardon, Effects of Administrative Law Public
Officers A public officer, like herein petitioner, who has been
convicted of Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents,
though
192

192

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.

subsequently pardoned, is deemed to have lost her right to public

office, unless such right is expressly restored by the pardon.An
examination of the presidential pardon in question shows that,
while petitioner was granted an absolute and unconditional
pardon and restored to full civil and political rights, yet, nothing
therein expressly provides that the right to hold public office was
thereby restored to the petitioner. In view of the express exclusion
by Art. 36, R.P.C., of the right to hold public office,
notwithstanding a pardon unless the right is expressly restored by
the pardon, it is my considered opinion that, to the extent that the
pardon granted to the petitioner did not expressly restore the right
to hold public office as an effect of such pardon, that right must be
kept away from the petitioner. It is a recognized principle in
public lawhopefully to be honored more in its compliance rather
than in its breachthat a public office is a public trust. The
restoration of the right to hold public office to one who has lost
such right by reason of conviction in a criminal case, but
subsequently pardoned, cannot be left to inference, no matter how
intensely arguable, but must be stated in express, explicit,
positive and specific language. To require this would not be
asking too much.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

Criminal Law Pardon, Effects Of Administrative Law
Public Officers The pardon granted to herein petitioner is

ineffective to restore her right to hold public office.In other

words, the mere grant of a pardon to a public officer or employee
who has been unfaithful to the public trust and sentenced to
disqualification from voting and from holding such office, does not
create the presumption that the recipient of the pardon has
thereby suddenly become morally eligible once more to exercise
the right to vote and to hold public office. In my view, the pardon
extended to petitioner was ineffective to restore to her the right to
hold public office and on this ground, I vote to DENY the Petition
for Review and to AFFIRM the assailed Resolution of the then
Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.

PETITION to review the resolution of the Deputy

Executive Secretary.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The principal question raised in this petition for review is
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Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.

whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an

absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the
Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto
(then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other
accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of
public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500.
They were further ordered to jointly and severally
indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50
representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to
pay the costs proportionately.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this
Court which subsequently affirmed the same. She then
filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion