Macalintal vs COMELEC

[G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003]

Facts:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo Macalintal, a memer of the Philippine Bar,
seeking a declaration that certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. He claimed
that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it
that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed this petition as
a taxpayer and as lawyer. R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas
Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor,
and for Other Purposes, appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a
supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law
shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Petitioner raises three
principal questions for contention:
That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters, who are immigrants or
permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing
their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of
the Constitution
That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates
for national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the VicePresident,
violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning
candidates for President and VicePresident shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress and
That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate,
violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IXA, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. V, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution.
No, Sec 5(d) is valid. The Court has relied on the discussions of the members of the
Constitutional Commission on the topics of absentee voting and absentee voter qualification, in
connection with Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution, which reads: Sec. 2. The Congress shall
provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It was clearly shown from the said discussions
that the Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino
citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the Philippines. The
Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose
parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first
time. That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement
found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No.
2104, which later became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, further
weakening petitioners claimon the unconstitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189.
Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the
Constitution.
Yes, Section 18.5 is unconstitutional. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it
necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vicepresidency, granting merit to petitioners contention that said Section appears to be repugnant
to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the
authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the
positions of President and VicePresident.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to
it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the votes
for President and VicePresident and the power to proclaimthe winners for the said positions.
Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. IXA, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution
Yes, Section 25 creating the JCOC is unconstitutional. The Commission on Elections is a
constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of
government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that
would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission on
Elections, because of its factfinding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its
knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a
peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions. The Court has no general
powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body except those specifically
granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same
vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact
election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising

supervisory powers over its rulemaking authority. In line with this, this Court holds that Section
25 of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be stricken off from the said law.
Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210
F: Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's
alleged lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari
and prohibition.
ISSUE: W/N MONSOD HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR 1O YEARS?
HELD: YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other
works where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.)
The records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the term
practice of law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as
engaged in the practice of law provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in their
respective work.
The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers
nowadays have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because
of the demands of their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them.
These days, for example, most corporation lawyers are involved in management policy
formulation.
Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 19631970, then worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986,
and also became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990, can be considered to have been
engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.
ISSUE: W/N THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
CONFIRMING MONSOD'S APPOINTMENT? HELD: NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the
nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the president is mandated by the constitution. The
power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the
only condition that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. From the
evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA. Adapted
Nacionalista Party v. Angelo Bautista, 85 PHIL 103 (1949)
F: President Quirino designated the Solicitor-General as Acting member of the Comelec in
November, 1949. The Nacionalista Party filed this prohibition on the following grounds: (1) the
SG did not resign from the office of the SolicitorGeneral; (2) there is no vacancy in the Comelec
because the retirement of the Comelec member causing the vacancy, was accepted by the
President in bad faith; and (3) the functions of a Solicitor-General are incompatible with those of
a Comelec member.
ISSUE: W/N THE DESIGNATION WAS VALID? HELD: NO, it was not. By the nature of the Comelec's
functions, the Comelec must be independent. Members are not allowed to perform other
functions, powers and duties to preserve its impartiality. The Solicitor-General's duties also
require an undivided time and attention for efficiency. Furthermore, when there is a vacancy,
appointment is preferred to designation.
ISSUE: W/N PROHIBITION WOULD LIE? HELD: NO. The case is by nature a quo warranto
proceeding because it questions the legality of the respondent's designation or his right to office.
The proceeding is instituted by the other party claiming the position occupied and/or the
Solicitor-General. Prohibition however, has a different purpose, which is to prevent the
usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court. Although there is no other party who claims a
right over the position occupied nor will the SG file a case against himself, the court must grant
the remedy of a quo warranto proceeding because the SG'scontinuedoccupancy as member of
the Comelec is illegal. Adapted.

Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 (DEC. 18, 1990)

F: Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac was appointed by Pres. Aquino as Acting Chairman of
the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario Davide, who had been named
chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the Dec. 1989 coup d'tat attempt.
ISSUE: WON the appointment is unconstitutional HELD: NO. Art. IX-A, Section 1, of the
Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as "independent". Although
essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines
in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own

proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion.
Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by the SC as provided by
the Constitution in Art. IXA, Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that
discretion.
That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the
Philippines.
NP v. Vera, 85 Phil 149
F: This is an action brought by the Nacionalista Party against De Vera on the ground that his
appointment as Chairman of the COMELEC is a violation of the Constitution particularly Art. X,
Sec. 1 of the 1935 Constitution which provides that the members of the COMELEC shall hold
office for nine years without reappointment.
Held: The prohibition against reappointment comes as a continuation of the requirement that the
Commission shall hold office for a term of nine years. Reappointment is not prohibited provided
his term will not exceed nine years in all. In July 1945, three Commissioners were appointed. De
Vera was appointed for three years. If he were to succeed himself, he cannot be reappointed to
do so because that would preclude the appointment of a new member after 3 years and would
furthermore increase his term to 12 years since upon the expiration of his term, his successor
must be appointed for nine years. But in this case, de Vera's appointment was by virtue of the
death of the Chairman in 1947 and he was promoted to occupy the chairmanship of the
Commission for the unexpired term only. Thus, this is not offensive to the Constitution because it
does not increase de Vera's term of office to more than nine years nor does it preclude the
appointment of a new member upon the expiration of the first term of three years. Adapted.
Republic v. Imperial, 96 Phil 770
F: This is a quo warranto proceeding to test the legality of the continuance in office of Imperial as
Chairman and Perez as member of COMELEC.When Chairman de Vera died in August 1951,
before the expiration of the maximum term of nine years of theChairman of the Commission,
Imperial was appointed Chairman to succeed de Vera. His appointment provided for a term
expiring July 12, 1960. The SG contended that the term for which he will legally serve as
Chairman legally expired on July
12, 1954, the expiration of the 9 year term for which the first Chairman was appointed. Comelec
member Perez on the other hand, was appointed for a term of 9 years expiring on 24 November
1958.
The SG contended that his term legally expired on July 12, 1951, the expiration of the term of 6
years for which Commissioner Enage, his predecessor was appointed.
Held: The terms cannot begin from the first appointments made in July 12, 1945 but from the
date of the organization of the COMELEC under CA 657 on June 21, 1941. Thus, the term of office
of the first Chairman, Lopez Vito began on June 21, 1941 and ended June 20, 1950. That of
member Enage began on June 21, 1941 to June 20, 1944 (but this was not filled). Since the first
3 year term had already expired in 1944, the appointment of De Vera on June 12, 1945 must be
for the full term of nine years (June 1944 to June 1953). The first vacancy occurred by the
expiration of the term of Enage. His successor, Perez, was named for a full 9 year term which
shall have started on June 1947 to June 1956. The second vacancy happened upon the death of
Lopez Vito on May 1947. To succeed him, de Vera appointed and lasted only up to June 1950, the
unexpired period of Lopez Vito's term. Thus, on June 1950, a vacancy occurred which De Vera
could no longer fill because his appointment was expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thus,
the next Chairman was respondent Imperial whose term of 9 years must be deemed to have
began on June 21, 1990 to expire on June 20, 1959. Adapted.

*Matibag v. Benipayo
Matibag questions the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, et al. for being violative of the
constitutional prohibition against reappointment. Respondents counter that the constitutional
claim is barred, not having been raised at the earliest opportunity. According to them, it is only
when they have been reappointed for the third time that Matibag raised the issue. HELD: The
constitutional issue was timely raised. It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines
whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity
to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can
resolve the same, such that, if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the
trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. Here, Matibag raised
the constitutional question immediately upon filing the petition with the SC.
Jalosjos v COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Jalosjos ran for mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Oriental in the May 2010
Elections. She was proclaimed winner, but even after her proclamation, COMELEC cancelled her
Certificate of Candidacy because they found out that she was not able to meet the one-year
residency requirement for candidates in local government positions. This petition is a motion for
reconsideration as COMELEC ordered the qualified candidate with the highest number of votes to
take the position. ( Not Jalosjos; her failure to reach the one year residence requirement led
COMELEC to rule her as unqualified.)
In the previous case, the Court held that the petitioners witnesses presented inconsistent
statements. According to the witnesses: oJalosjos has been a resident of Brgy. Tugas, Baliangao,
Misamis Occidental since 2008. oDuring that same period, her house was being constructed, so
at times, when Ms. Jalosjos is in Baliangao, she used to stay in the house of Mrs. Lourdes Yap at
Sitio Balas Diut, Brgy. Punta, Miray, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental.( Witnesses claim that
Jalosjos stayed in Mrs. Yaps house when she is in Balangiao, i.e., not necessarily residence.)
Petitioners registration as a voter in the municipality of Baliangao was approved. oAccording to
the petitioner, this proves that she has been a resident to the said municipality for six months
prior to the filing of the said registration, which would effectively allow her to meet the one year
residency requirement for candidates.
WON COMELEC erred in nullifying Jalosjoss Certificate of Candidacy NO Jalosjos was
not able to establish residence. oThe mere purchase of a parcel of land does not make it ones
residence. She could not have established residence while her house was under construction.
There was no proof presented that the house was done in time for her to meet the residence
requirement to be a candidate in the elections. oA temporary stay in a strangers house cannot
amount to residence. Her stay in Mrs. Yaps residence was intermittent and temporary. It was
never the intention of the petitioner to stay in that barangay, as she only stayed there at times
when she was in Baliangao while her house was being constructed. There was no proof
presented that her stay in Mrs. Yaps residence was permanent in nature. oVoter registration is
not proof that she has been residing in the municipality for six months; one can be granted
registration even without residing in an area for six months as it is presumed that the person will
be able to meet the six month requirement after the registration. (Note that the date of
reference for the residency requirement for voters is six months before the elections, not before
registration. Therefore, petitioners argument does not hold.)Jalosjos misrepresented facts in
her COC in a deliberate attempt to deceive the electorate. oPetitioner clearly did not meet the
residency requirement, yet she issued a sworn declaration that she is eligible to run for public
office. oWhen a candidates claim to eligibility is proven false, it is deemed as an attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide the fact of ineligibility. COMELEC can still cancel COC even after the
candidate was proclaimed as winner oWinning the election does not suspend proceedings
against a candidate. oFailure to meet the residency requirement means that the candidate was
ineligible from the very beginning, and therefore, cannot win the elections. All votes for the said
candidate are considered stray votes.
Ruling: Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied with finality. Agne V. Yap Sr. is
the duly elected mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental in the 2010 Elections
Bankers Association of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206794, November 26, 2013
This was a petition for the issuance of a status quo to enjoin the implementation of the Money
Ban Resolution issued by COMELEC. The said ban prohibits the withdrawal of cash, encashment
of checks and conversion of any monetary instrument into cash from May 8 to 13, 2013
exceeding 100,000 or its equivalent in any foreign currency, per day in banks, financial
companies, pawnshops, etc. However, all other non-cash transactions are not covered. For this
purpose, BSP and other financial agencies of the govt are deputized to implement w/ utmost
dispatch strict compliance with RA 1405, as amended by RA 6426.
W/N the said resolution was exercised in excess of duty? The Court held to dismiss the
case as it became moot and academic. TheCourt has issued a status quo ante on May 10, 2013
thus the Money Ban Resolution was not in force during the most critical period of the elections.
While the Court has recognized exceptions in applying the moot and academic principle, these
exceptions relate only to situations where: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2)
the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (3) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The Comelecs
Money Ban Resolution lacks the fourth requirement. We note that the Comelec did not make any
parallel move on or about the May 13, 2013 elections to address the evil that its Money Ban
Resolution sought to avoid and, in fact, it did not issue a similar resolution for the October 28,
2013 barangay elections. If the May 13, 2013 elections had come and gone without any need for
the measures the assailed Resolution put in place and if no such measure was necessary in the
elections that immediately followed (i.e., the October 28, 2013 barangay elections), we believe
that it is now premature for the Court to assume that a similar Money Ban Resolution would be

issued in the succeeding elections such that we now have to consider the legality of the Comelec
measure that is presently assailed.
Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by herein petitioners Kabataan
Party-List, assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. (RA) 10367, entitled An Act
Providing for Mandatory Biometrics Voter Registration, as well as respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto. RA 10367
mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new
voters in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through the
adoption of biometric technology.
RA 10367 likewise directs that [r]egistered voters whose biometrics have not been captured
shall submit themselves for validation. Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the
last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 [E]lections shall be
deactivated
A month later, or in May 2014, the COMELEC launched the NoBio- NoBoto public information
campaignwhich ran concurrently with the period of continuing registration Recognizing that the
petition is hinged on an important constitutional issue pertaining to the right of suffrage, the
Court views the matter as one of transcendental public importance and of compelling
significance.
Consequently, it deems it proper to brush aside the foregoing procedural barriers and instead,
resolve the case on its merits Essentially, the present petition is a constitutional challenge
against the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, including COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013. As noncompliance with the same results in the penalty
of deactivation, petitioners posit that it has risen to the level of an unconstitutional substantive
requirement in the exercise of the right of suffrage. They submit that the statutory requirement
of biometric validation is no different from the unconstitutional requirement of literacy and
property because mere non-validation already absolutely curtails the exercise of the right of
suffrage through deactivation. Further, they advance the argument that deactivation is not the
disqualification by law contemplated as a valid limitation to the exercise of suffrage under the
1987 Constitution. Properly speaking, the concept of a qualification, at least insofar as the
discourse on suffrage is concerned, should be distinguished from the concept of registration,
which is jurisprudentially regarded as only the means by which a persons qualifications to vote
is determined. With these considerations in mind, petitioners claim that biometrics validation
imposed under RA 10367, and implemented under COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and
10013, must perforce fail. To reiterate, this requirement is not a qualification to the exercise of
the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the
right to reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to the limitations of the 1987
Constitution and is a mere complement to the existing Voters Registration Act of 1996.

There are dates which the law allots for the registration of voters. Any person, under 136, during
this period may challenge the registration of voters on the grounds of the qualifications and
disqualifications in the exercise of the right of suffrage.
Qualifications (Articles 5, 117)
a) Filipino citizen
b) 18 years old
c) Resident of the Phils., for one year and of the municipality where he proposes to vote for 6
months.
Disqualifications (Art. 118)
a) Those convicted by final judgment and have been sentenced to imprisonment for at least one
year and such disqualifications has not been removed by absolute pardon or amnesty. This
disqualification lasts for 5 years unless restored by absolute pardon or amnesty. (Cristobal v
Labrador)
b) Those convicted of crimes involving the national security, or disloyalty to the government,
rebellion, sedition, subversion, etc.
c) Insanity or incompetency
Inclusion Proceedings
If the Board of Registration cancels the name of a voter, he can file in the MTC a petition for an
order to include his name in the list of voters or to reinstate him. Action must be filed within 20
days form the last day of registration. Appeal can be made to the RTC within 5 days, and the
decision shall be final and unappealable and no motion for reconsideration shall be allowed.
Exclusion Proceedings (Articles 138, 139, 142)
A petition for exclusion must be filed with the MTC within 20 days from the last day of
registration.
BP Blg. 881, Sec. 265
Sec. 265. Prosecution.-- The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have
the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of
other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however,
That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his
filing the complaint, he may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of
Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
EO 134, Sec. 11, February 27, 1987
Sec. 11. Prosecution.-- The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable as
provided for in the preceding section, and to prosecute the same: Provided, That in the event
that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within two (2) months from filing, the
complainant may file the complaint with the Office of the Fiscal or with the Department of Justice
for proper investigations and prosecution, if warranted. The Commission may avail of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760
In De Jesus v People, 120 SCRA 760 (1983), it was ruled that a government official (COMELEC
Registrar) who violated the election law ( tampering with returns to make it appear that there
were more registered voters) must be prosecuted by the COMELEC, before the RTC, not the
Sandiganbayan. The 1978 Election Code is clear that the COMELEC shall have the power to
conduct preliminary investigations of all election offenses, and that the RTC has exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide such cases. It is not the character or personality of the
offender (public official) but the crime committed (violation of election law) that determines
jurisdiction. This provision of the 1978 Election Code has been integrated in the 1987
Constitution. Adapted.

Omnibus Election CodeRight to Vote

The right to vote may be challenged in the MTC by:
a) a proceeding challenging the right of a voter to be registered;
b) an action instituted by a voter for reinstatement;
c) proceeding filed by an individual to exclude any voter whose name appears in the list of
voters.

Corpuz v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281

F: The complaint for electioneering against the Director of Trade et. al., filed before the Comelec
was withdrawn and later on refiled with the Tanodbayan. The Comelec Legal Assistance Office
moved to enter its appearance for the complainants. The Tanodbayan denied the motion on the
ground that it has exclusive authority to prosecute the election offenses of public officials.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TANODBAYAN HAS EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE
ELECTION OFFENSES?HELD: NO. There is no constitutional provision granting the Tanodbayan,
either explicitly or implicitly, authority to prosecute, investigate and hear election offenses.
Instead the constitution granted such power exclusively to the Comelec in order to insure a free,

orderly and honest elections. It is the nature of the offense that determines the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Comelec regardless of who the offender is, whether a private individual or a
public officer. Adapted.
People v. Basilia, 179 SCRA 87
F: Three complaints were filed with the provincial fiscal alleging violations of the Omnibus
Election Code. After conducting preliminary investigation, the fiscal filed the information with the
RTC. The judge, motu proprio, dismissed the information on the ground that the Comelec has the
exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute election offenses. Hence
this review.
ISSUE: W/N FISCALS MAY CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTE ELECTION
OFFENSES? HELD: YES, they may. Although the Comelec is granted the exclusive authority to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute election offenses, it is also authorized by the
Omnibus Election Code to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of government.
To ensure credible elections, the Comelec may deputize law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities, whether before or after elections. Pursuant to such authority granted by law,
the Comelec issued Resolution no 1862 providing that fiscals may conduct preliminary
investigations and prosecute election offenses. Adapted.
People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788(1990)
*EN BANC F: In 1988, Mrs. Barba filed a letter complaint against OIC- Mayor Regalado of Tanjay,
Negros Or. with the COMELEC, for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, in
the office of the Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or
clearance from the COMELEC as required by law. The COMELEC directed the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Dumaguete City (Atty. Lituanas) to, among others, conduct the preliminary
investigation of the case. Said directive was pursuant to a COMELEC resolution which in turn, is
based on the constitutional mandate that the COMELEC is charged with the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections. After a preliminary investigation,
Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, he filed with the respondent RTC of Dumaguete
City a criminal case against the OIC-Mayor. The RTC issued a warrant of arrest against the
accused which was later cancelled on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to
determine probable cause pursuant to Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution. The court stated
that it "will give due course to the information filed if the same has the
written approval of the Provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall be under
the supervision and control of the latter."
Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the condition. Hence the RTC quashed the information. A
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving
election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal, before the RTC may take
cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists.
HELD: NO. The Court emphasizes the important features of the constitutional mandate that "xxx
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge xxx." (Art. III, Sec. 2, Constitution) First, the determination of probable
cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Prov'l Fiscal nor for the Election Supervisor to
ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination. Second, the preliminary
inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him to make the
determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor
presents to him. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, and all
other suppporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification w/c are material in assisting
the judge to make his determination.Third, judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the
preliminary inquiry w/c determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from
the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for
trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable
cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper-whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and, therefore whether or not he should be subjected to trial--is the function of the
prosecutor. Article IX-C, Sec. 2 of the Constitution provides: "Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections
shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. xxx xxx xxxx (6) File, upon a verified complaint, or
on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of votes, investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omission constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices." In effect, the 1987 Constitution mandates the
COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This
means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving

election offenses for the purpose of helping the judge determine probable cause and for filing an
information in court. This power is exclusive with the COMELEC. Hence, the Prov'l Fiscal, as such,
assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. If the Fiscal files an information charging
an election offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized
by the COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of his office. It is only after a
preliminary examination conducted by the COMELEC through its officials or its deputies that Sec.
2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so, because, when the application for a
warrant of arrest is made and the information is filed with the court, the judge will then
determine whether or not a probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Adapted.
People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715 (1990)
F: Upon recommendation of the provincial election supervisor, who conducted a preliminary
investigation of the alleged election offenses of Delgado, et. al, the Comelec filed an information
against the latter. The respondents moved for reconsideration and the suspension of the
warrants of arrests on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. The trial
court ordered for reinvestigation. The Comelec opposed the order on the ground that only the SC
may review the decisions, orders, resolutions of the Comelec. The trial court denied the Comelec
motion. Hence this certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N THE COMELEC ACTION MAY BE REVIEWED ONLY ON CERTIORARI BY THE SC?
HELD: NO. According to the constitution, the Comelec has the following functions: (1)
enforcement of election laws; (2) decision of election contests; (3) decision of administrative
questions; (4) deputizing law enforcement agencies; (5) registration of political parties; and (6)
improvement of elections. What are reviewable on certiorari by the SC are those orders,
decisions, etc., rendered in actions or proceedings before the Comelec in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Thus decisions of the Comelec on election contests or on
administrative questions are subject to judicial review only by the SC. In this case, no Comelec
adjudicatory power is exercised. As a public prosecutor, the Comelec has the exclusive authority
to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute offenses punishable under the election code
before the competent court. But when the Comelec files the information, the subsequent
disposition of the case is subject to the court's approval. The Comelec can't conduct
reinvestigation unless so ordered by that court nor refuse its order of reinvestigation.
Adapted.
National Press Club V. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 84
F: Petitioners herein were representatives of mass media which were prevented from selling and
donating space or air time for political advertisements under RA 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of
expression. RULING: NO. The Comelec has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation
of media of communication and information. The fundamental purposes of such power are to
ensure "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform and
reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public
information campaigns and forums amoong candidates."
Of course, the law limits the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates
themselves. The limitation however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the objective
set out in the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio
and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a
crucial difference.
Charo.Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712
F: Petitoner, Adiong, a 1992 senatorial candidate, assails Comelec Resolution No. 2347 insofar as
it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limits their
location or publication to authorized postiing areas.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is constitutional.
RULING: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech.
There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this
case. The posting of decals amd stickers in mobile places does not endanger any substantial
government or public interest.
Under the clear and present danger rule, not only must the danger be patently clear and
pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided, must be so substantive as to justify a
clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. Significantly, the freedom of
expression curtailed by the prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party.
The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by
displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a

candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehichle, the
expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else.
Morever, The restriction is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property,
which in this case is a privately owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another
cardinal right guaranteed under the Constitution is violated which is that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due proocess of law. Charo.

penalties to petitioner. When it issued the Resolutions which petitioner violated, it was not
exercising its quasi-judicial functions but a ministerial function for they merely concern the
procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia. The
power to hold people in contempt is inherent in courts of justice. The COMELEC is not such a
court. It is an administrative body vested with quasi-judicial functions. Its power of contempt is
limited to only as far as is needed to elicit testimony from a witness.

RA 7166, Sec. 22
Sec. 22. Election Contests for Municipal Offices.-- All election contests involving municipal offices
with the Regional Trial Court shall be decided expeditiously. The decision may be appealed to the
Commission within five (5) days from promulgation or receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved
party.
The Commission shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days after it is submitted for decision,
but not later than six (6) months after the filing of the appeal, which decision shall be final,
unappealable, and executory.
"Contests" Prior to the proclamation of the winning candidate, the case is deemed to be still in
its administrative stage, and so is to be resolved by the COMELEC under its power to administer
all election laws, and not under its authority as the sole judge of election contests. Only after a
winner has been proclaimed can there be a "contest", with a contestant who seeks not only to
oust the intruder but also to have himself installed into office.
Under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), a pre-proclamation controversy concerns the regularity
of proceedings of a board of canvassers. It includes the questions of: i) the legality of the
composition of the Board of Canvassers, and ii) questions of fraudulent election returns.
Candidates for public office usually grab the proclamation to be able to take the office, and thus
anyone filing an electoral contest against the person would now find himself at a disadvantage
because his opponent is now enjoying the power of the office. (Lagumbay v COMELEC). Thus, the
purpose of a pre- proclamation contest is to prevent the proclamation of his opponent.
i. Municipal - original with the RTC; appeal to the COMELEC
II. Barangay - original with inferior court; appeal to COMELEC

Ty-Delgado v HRET
September 16, 2008, Pichay was convicted by final judgement four counts of libel October 9,
2012, Pichay filed his CoC, for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.
February 18, 2013, Petitioner filed petition for disqualification on the grounds of Sec. 12, as the
5-year ban has not yet elapsed.
March 18, 2015, HRET held that being the president of the
company, that was the only participation that he had. Thus, his conviction for libel showed that
the crime he committed did not involve moral turpitude. Hence, this petition.
Issue and Holding: W/N libel, as committed by Pichay, constitute crime involving
moral turpitude Yes, libel, as committed, meets the essential elements for Pichay to incur
criminal liability. Pichay, being the president of the company, is essential for the consummation
of the crime. As without him, publication would cease to exist.
W/N Pichay made a false representation for his eligibility when he filed his CoC
Yes. His disqualification under Section 12 is a material fact involving his eligibility as a
candidate. He misrepresented his eligibility in his CoC because he knew that he committed a
crime of moral turpitude.
W/N HRET erred in failing to declare that Pichay should be deemed to have never
become a candidate
Yes, Since his ineligibility existed when he filed his CoC, he was never a valid candidate for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives. Therefore, votes cast for him were
considered stray votes, and the qualified candidate for the position is the one who received the
highest number of valid votes, the petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado
Ruling: we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated 18 March 2015
and Resolution dated 3 August 2015 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET
Case No. 13-022. Respondent Philip A. Pichay is ineligible to hold and serve the office of Member
of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur. Petitioner
Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado is DECLARED the winner for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections

Lagumbay v. Commission on Elections

All candidates of Liberal Party got the same number of votes while Nacionalista candidates got
exactly zero.
The Court denied prima facie recognition to the returns because of the statistical improbability of
the results therein. It stated that that such results were highly improbable and incredible,
considering all the Nacionalista candidates did not get a single vote despite the fact that there
was an inspector in every precinct. However, the effect of this declaration on the winners of the
election must still be threshed out before the proper venuethe Senate Electoral Tribunal: At
any rate, fraud or no fraud, the verdict in these fifty precincts may ultimately be ascertained
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal.4 All we hold now, is that the returns show prima facie
that they do not reflect true and valid reports of regular voting. The contrary may be shown by
candidate Climacoin the corresponding election protest.
Bayatan v. Commission on Elections
The provincial election supervisor recommended the filing of information against petitioners for
double registration and this was affirmed by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioners impute GAD to
COMELEC for finding cause to file an information against them since they had no intention to
commit the violation (their first registration was because they were led to the wrong registration
station by the barangay captain. Haha). They also assail the act of COMELEC en banc of
assuming jurisdiction in violation of the Constitution. Held: No GAD on the part of COMELEC. The
information was filed based on the election supervisors finding of probable cause of an election
violation. Also, the offense is malum prohibitum and does not require intent. The provision that
COMELEC must refer cases brought before it first to any of its Divisions and will decide en banc
only on MRs applies only to COMELEC when it is exercising its adjudicatory or quasijudicial
powers, specifically in Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C. Where COMELEC exercises administrative powers as
provided in Sec. 2(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9), which includes the prosecution of
violations of election laws, the rule does not apply.
Masangcay v. Commission on Elections
Petitioner opened three ballot boxes not in the presence of the division superintendent of
schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista
Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens Party.
COMELEC ordered petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt on the
basis of the charges against him. He entered a plea of not guilty and was sentenced to three
months imprisonment and a fine of P500. He assails the authority of the COMELEC to punish him
in contempt. The Court held that the Commission exceeded its authority when it meted out the

Aruelo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals

Aruelo lost to Gatchalian, filed election protest before RTC. Gatchalian filed Answer more than 5
days later and also moved for a bill of particulars, in violation of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
Petitioner claims that Gatchalians Answer was filed out of time, that is, beyond the 5-day
reglementary period prescribed by the COMELEC Rules. CA disagreed. It thus directed the trial
court to continue hearing the election protest.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court. It declared that the COMELEC Rules do not
apply to election contests initiated with the regular courts. Proceedings in the civil courts are
governed by the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court. Section 2, Rule I, Part I, of
the Rules specifically states that the rules shall be applicable to all actions and proceedings
brought before the Commission. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Rules cannot and
should not be made applicable to election-related proceedings brought before the regular courts.
LOKIN v COMELEC
20 November 2009, two different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted their
Manifistation of Intent to the COMELEC. One was signed by Pia B. Derla as acting secretarygeneral, and the other by Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose as the partys vice-president
and secretary-general, respectively.
15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8744 giving due course to the
determination of the official representative of the said party-list. 19 January 2010, respondents,
led by President and Chairperson Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted the Certificate of
Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law Department, which was certified by Villanueva and
San Jose. 26 March 2010, Pia Derla submitted a second Certificate of Nomination, including
petitioners as party-list nominees. Respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify
and nullify the Certificate by Derla. They contend that Derla was not even a member of CIBAC.
5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution denying the Certificate of
Nomination which included herein petitioners as representatives of the party-list group known as
Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC).
Issue and Holding: 1.W/N the COMELEC erred in granting the petition for
disqualification an recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of

CIBAC party-list. No. COMELEC has jurisdiction over cases pertaining to party leadership and
nomination of party-list representatives. More specifically, COMELEC is tasked to register, after
sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government. This singular power to
rule upon questions of party identity and leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident
to its enforcement powers. Ruling: Petition DISMISSED. This Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the
COMELEC
EO 144, Sec. 2, March 2, 1987 Sec. 2. Board of Canvassers.-- The Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Elections sitting en banc shall be the National Board of Canvassers for the
election of Senators. It shall canvass all certificates of canvass coming from and prepared by the
district, provincial, and city boards of canvassers (of those cities which comprise one or more
legislative districts.)
Furthermore, there shall be a board of canvassers for each province, city, municipality and
district of
Metropolitan Manila, as follows:
(a) Provincial board of canvassers.-- The provincial board of canvassers shall be composed of the
provincial election supervisor or a senior lawyer in the regional office of the Commission, as
chairman, the provincial fiscal, as vice-chairman, and the provincial superintendent of schools,
as members.
This board shall canvass certificates of canvass from the municipalities and the cities which do
not comprise at least one legislative district. It shall proclaim as elected the candidates for the
House of Representatives who obtained the highest number of votes in the respective legislative
districts.
With respect to the election of senators, the provincial board of canvassers shall prepare in
duplicate a certificate of canvass supported by a statement of votes received by each candidate
in each municipality/ city, and transmit the first copy thereof to the Commission on Elections for
canvassing. The second copy shall be kept by the provincial election supervisor.
(b) City Boards of Canvassers for cities comprising one or more legislative districts.-- The city
board of canvassers for cities comprising one or more legislative districts shall be composed of
the city election registrar or lawyer of the Commission, as chairman, the city fiscal, as vicechairman, and the city superintendent of schools as member. This board shall canvass election
returns coming from the polling places within the jurisdiction of the city, and shall proclaim as
elected the candidate or candidates for the House of Representatives who obtained the highest
number of votes in the legislative district or respective legislative districts. With respect to the
election of senators, this board shall prepare in duplicate certificate of canvass supported by a
statement of votes received by each candidate in each polling place and transmit the first copy
to the Commission on Elections for canvassing. The second copy shall be kept by the city
election registrar.
(c) District Board of Canvassers.-- The district board of canvassers shall be composed of a lawyer
of the
Commission, as chairman, and a ranking fiscal in the district, as vice-chairman, and the most
district school supervisor in the district, as member, to be appointed by the Commission upon
consultation with the Department of Justice and the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports respectively.
This board shall canvass election returns coming from the polling places within the jurisdiction of
the district and shall proclaim as elected the candidate for the House of Representatives who
obtained the highest number of votes in the legislative district. With respect to the election for
senators, the same procedure shall be followed by this board as that observed by the city board
of canvassers for cities comprising one or more legislative districts.
(d) City/ Municipal Board of Canvassers.-- The city (for cities not comprising at least one
legislative district)or municipal board of canvassers shall be composed of the city/ municipal
election registrar, as chairman, the city fiscal/ municipal treasurer, as the case may be, as vicechairman, and the city superintendent/ district supervisor or in his absence any public school
principal, as the case may be, as member. The board shall canvass election returns coming from
the polling places within its jurisdiction, but shall not proclaim any winner in the election for
Members of the House of Representatives or for Senators. This board shall prepare in triplicate a
certificate of canvass supported by a statement of votes received by each candidate in each
polling place, and transmit the first copy thereof to the provincial board of canvassers for
canvassing. The second copy shall be transmitted to the Commission for record purposes and
the third copy shall be kept by the city/ municipal election registrar.
Flores v. COMELEC, 184 S 484 (1990)
F: RF was proclaimed as punong barangay. His election was protested by NR. The Municipal
Circuit Trial Court sustained NR & installed him as punong barangay. RF appealed to the RTC w/c
affirmed the challenged decision. RF then went to the COMELEC but his appeal was dismissed on

the ground that the COMELEC had no power to review the decision of the RTC based in Sec. 9 of
RA 6679 (Local Gov't Code)
Issue: W/in the COMELEC has jurisdiction Held: Under Art IX-C, Sec 2(2) of the Consti, the
COMELEC shall have jurisdiction, hence, Sec. 9 of RA 6679 insofar as it provides that the decision
of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay case should be appealed to the RTC must
be declared unconstitutional. P had a right to presume the law as valid. Hence his appeal to the
RTC would be considered as anappeal to the COMELEC. Decisions of the COMELEC on election
contests involving municipal & barangay officer shall be final & unappealable with respect to
questions of fact & not of law. Art IX-6 Sec 2(2) of the Consti was not intended to divert the SC of
its authority to resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the
Consti. Adapted.
Sarmiento v. Commission on Elections
The case consolidates Rule 65 certiorari petitions seeking to set aside the COMELEC resolutions
to exclude the election returns from certain polling precincts for having been. The contention
was that said resolutions were not referred first to the COMELEC divisions. Held: The COMELEC
en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion when it resolved the appeals of the petitioners in
these special cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. The resolutions are
therefore null and void and the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper
referral to a division. However, Sec. 16 of RA 7166 provides that all pre-proclamation cases
pending before it shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved
and the ruling of the board of canvassers shall be deemed affirmed without prejudice to the
filing of a regular election protest. Since the term of office involved has already commenced, the
issue is now moot.
Milla v. Balmores-Laxa
Respondent sought to challenge the proclamation of Petitioner due to an error in the tabulation
of votes. Petitioner contends that COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the respondents petition for
correction at bar as it was filed beyond thereglementary period of 5 days pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Held: The petition is in the nature of a preproclamation contest and not an electoral contest and the applicable Constitutional provision is
Art. IX-C, Sec.3 of the 1987 Constitition. The petition is granted not on the grounds posited by
petitioner but because the COMELEC resolution is null and void for not having first been referred
to a division thereof. In any case, the COMELEC could suspend its own Rules of Procedure (with
respect to the 5-day period, assuming it was applicable) so as not to defeat the will of the
electorate.
Galido v. COMELEC, 193 S 78 (1991)
F: In an election contest involving the elected mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. The COMELEC
declared Galeon as the duly elected mayor. Fifteen ballots in the name of his rival, Galido, was
invalidated for being marked ballots. Galido filed the petition for certiorari & injunction w prayer
for a restraining order. Galeon moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that
according to the Consti, Art IX (C) Sec 2 (2), final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in
election contests involving elective municipal offices are final & executory & not appealable.
Galido cited Art IX (A) Sec. 7 w/c said that the decision may be brought to the SC.
Issue: W/n decisions of the COMELEC are appealable Held: Yes. The fact that decisions, final
orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving executory & not appealable does not
preclude a recourse to the SC by way of a special civil action of certiorari. A study of the case
would however show that the COMELEC committed NO grave abuse of discretion in rendering
the questioned decision. Adapted.
Rivera v. COMELEC, 199 S 178 (1991)
F: Petitioner Rivera & private respondent Garcia were candidates for the position of mayor during
the local elections in Jan 1988. In an election contest between, Garcia was proclaimed mayor.
Rivera appealed the said decision but said decision was affirmed by the COMELEC. R filed a
petition with the SC seeking annulment of the COMELEC decision.
He contends that the decision has not yet become final & executory. G however contends that
the decisions of the
COMELEC on election contests involving elective municipal & barangay officials are final,
executory & not appealable.
Issue: W/n decisions of the COMELEC on election contests involving elective municipal &
barangay officials are unappealble Held: No. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the
COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal & barangay officials are final, executory and
not appealable does not preclude a recourse to the SC by way of a special action of certiorari.
(Galido v. Comelec.) Adapted.

Goh v Bayron
March 17, 2014 Goh filed a recall petition (procedure of removing elected official from office
through a direct vote before their term ends) against Puerto Princesa Mayor Bayron due for
violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials, Incompetence April 1, 2014 COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9864 certifying
the sufficiency of the recall petition but suspended the voting procedures due to lack of funds
Mayor Bayron filed an omnibus motion for the dismissal of the recall petttition which Goh
countered by filing a Comment/Opposition with Motion to deny Bayronss omnibus motionMay
27, 2014 COMELEC promulgated Resolution No 9882 suspended any proceeding relative to
recall as the recall process, as stated in said Resolution, does not have an appropriation in the
General Appropriations Act of 2014 (2014 GAA)5 and the 2014 GAA does not provide the
COMELEC with legal authority to commit public funds for the recall process COMELEC reasoned
that it could not proceed with the recall because: oAll expenses incident to recall elections shall
be shouldered by the commission but oA review of COMELECs budget under the 2014 GAA
reveals that it does not have any appropriation of line item budget to serve as contingency fund
to conduct recall elections oAugmentation is not possible because there is no existing line item
in the Commissions budget and recall elections is not one of the specific purposes and priorities
for Augmentation under the 2014 GAA . oThe use of the Commissions current funds for recall
elections is unconstitutional and would open the responsible officials to possible personal and
criminal liabilities oThe conduct of elections may adversely affect the commisions preparation
for the 2016 NAional and Local Elcetions oThe only solution is the enactment of a law that will
pappropriate funds for the Conduct of Recall Elections the Commission resolved not to continue
with any proceedings relative to recall as it does not have a line item budget or legal authority to
commit public funds for the purposeJune 6, 2014 - Goh filed a petition for annulment and
reversal of Resolution Nos 9864 and 9882:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution
Nos 9684 and 9882 -Yes, COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. The 2014 GAA
provides the line item appropriation to allow COMELEC to fulfil its constitutional mandate of
conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize COMELEC
to conduct recall elections in 2014.
Whether or not there is no budget for the conduct of recall election in the 2014 GAA
preventing the COMELEC from conducting recall election -The 2014 GAA expressly
provides for the line item appropriation to allow COMELEC to conduct recall elections. This is
found in the Programs category of its 2014 budget, which the COMELEC admits in its Resolution
No. 9882 is a line item for the Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes
and plebiscites. In addition, one of the specific constitutional functions of the COMELEC is to
conduct recall elections. When the COMELEC receives a budgetary appropriation for its Current
Operating Expenditures, such appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional
functions, including the conduct of recall elections. Thus, in Socrates v. COMELEC, recall
elections were conducted even without a specific appropriation for recall elections in the 2002
GAA.
Whether or not COMELEC can tap its 10.7 billion savings to fund the conduct of recall
elections -Yes it can augment from its saving its appropriations for personnel services,
maintenance and their operating expenses. Under the special provisions for COMELEC, the
Commission through its president is authorized to use savings from its appropriations to cover
actual deficiencies incurred for the current year. Since the COMELEC admits that it does not have
sufficient funds from its current line item appropriation, then there is therefore an actual
deficiency in its operating funds for the current year. GRANTED Resolution 9864 is partially
reverse and set aside

MAQUILING vs. COMELEC & ARNADO (2013)

Petitioners: Casan Maquiling (2nd placer in Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte 2010 Elections) Respondents: COMELEC,
Rommel Arnado (assailed as an ineligible candidate), Linog Balua (the candidate who initially assailed Arnados
eligibility)

Facts: Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of

naturalization as a citizen of the U.S., he lost his citizenship. July 10, 2008 Arnado applied for
repatriation under R.A. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco,
USA and took the Oath of Allegiance. April 3, 2009 Subsequently, he retook his Oath of
Allegiance to the PH and executed an affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship:oI
divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States
of America. April 14, 2009 He used his U.S. passport to travel. In between April 3, 2009 and
Nov 30, 2009, he uses his American passport 4 times presenting himself as a FilipinoAmerican. Nov 30, 2009 Arnado filed his COC for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte: oI
am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.Dec 3, 2009 Arnado uses his U.S. Passport
to travel once again. April 28, 2010 Balua (opposing candidate) filed a complaint to the
COMELEC to disqualify Arnado because of his residency and citizenship. However, this petition
was soon dismissed.Arnado justifies his use of his U.S. passport was that he was not informed
that his Philippine passport had already been issued on June 18, 2009, and once he acquired it,
he used it 4 times in place of his American passport before the elections. Balua files a motion
for reconsideration to the COMELEC, while petitioner Maquiling intervenes. Both attempts at
disqualifying Arnado were dismissed. Hence, SC petition.
1)WoN intervention is allowed in a disqualification case. YES.
2)WoN the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones
qualifications to run for public office. (WoN it amount to the undoing of the
renunciation earlier made) oYES. oHis repatriation does not divest his reacquired Filipino
citizenship but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for public office.
oWhen Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced hi
American Citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he absolutely and perpetually
renounces all allegiance and fidelity to the United States of America and that he divests
himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America. oThe use of the U.S. passport constitutes the availing of an American citizens
privileges. It was a positive act of retraction of his renunciation. oHe was only effectively a pure
Filipino for 11 days. (April 3-14, 2009) oWhen he filed his COC on Nov 30, 2009, he went back to
being a dual citizen; thus, he wasnt eligible and his COC was void from the beginning. oA dual
citizen cannot hold public office until he renounces his foreign citizenship; this ascertains his
loyalty to the Republic and entitles him to public trust. oHad he used his American passport after
being declared the winner, it still wouldve amounted to a retraction of his renunciation; thus,
earning him a ground for disqualification.
3)WoN the rule on succession the Local Government Code is applicable to the case.
oNO. oArnados COC was void ab initio. He wasnt a legitimate candidate to begin with.
Therefore, he can neither run and much less win, despite garnering the most votes. oThere is
nothing to succeed. Maquiling is the winner by virtue of garnering the second most number of
votes. o[I.e. the votes that went to the ineligible candidate are wasted votes.
Ruling: Petition granted. Rommel Arnado is disqualified from running for any local elective
position and Casan Maquiling is declared the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for having
garnered the second most number of votes.