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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.L19012October30,1967
VICTORIAJULIO,plaintiffappellant,
vs.
EMILIANODALANDANandMARIADALANDAN,defendantsappellees.
PedroMagsalinandO.M.Herreraforplaintiffappellant.
CornelioR.Magsarilifordefendantsappellees.
SANCHEZ,J.:
Disputingthecorrectnessofthelowercourt'sorderofApril29,1961dismissingthecomplaint,plaintiffelevatedthe
case1tothisCourtonappeal.
Plaintiff's complaint which defendants, by a motion to dismiss, successfully overturned in the court below is
planteduponadocumentAnnex"A"ofthecomplaint,labeledinthenationallanguage"SALAYSAY"(Statement).It
wasintheformofanaffidavitsubscribedandsworntobyoneClementeDalandanonSeptember8,1950.Bythe
terms of this writing, Clemente Dalandan, deceased father of defendants Emiliano and Maria Dalandan,
acknowledgedthatafourhectarepieceofricelandinLasacknowledgedthatafourhectarepieceofricelandinLas
Pias, Rizal belonging to Victoriana Dalandan, whose only child and heir is plaintiff Victoria Julio, was posted as
securityforanobligationwhichhe,ClementeDalandan,assumedbut,however,failedtofulfill.Theresultwasthat
Victoriana'ssaidlandwasforeclosed.Thekeyprovisionsofsaiddocumentare:2
3.NaanglupangpalayangitonapagaariniVICTORIANADALANDANatsakasalukuyanaywalangibang
tagapagmana kung di si VICTORIA JULIO, ay napafianza sa akin nuong bago pa dumating ang huling
digmaan at dahil sa hindi ako nakatupad sa aking pananagutang na sasagutan ng bukid niyang ito ay
naembargoangnasabiniyanglupa
[ThatthisricelandownedbyVICTORIANADALANDANwhosesoleheirisVICTORIAJULIOwaspostedas
security for an obligation assumed by me even before the outbreak of the last war and because I failed to
fulfilltheobligationsecuredbyhersaidfarmthesamewasforeclosed]
4.Nadahilditoayakosamakatuwidaynanagotsakanya(VICTORIAJULIO),sapagkakaembargonglupa
niyang iyong kung kaya't nagkasundo kami na ako ay nanagot sa kanya sa pagkaembargong iyon at
ipinangako ko sa kanya na ang lupa niyang iyon na naembargo ng dahil sa aking pananagutan ay aking
papalitanngbukiddinnamaymahigitnaAPAT(4)nahectarea(ohumigitkumulangsaAPATNAKABANG
BINHI)
[Thatbecauseofthis,andasagreeduponbetweenus,IaccordinglyheldmyselfliabletoVictoriaJulioforthe
foreclosureofhersaidland,andIpromisedherthatIwouldreplaceheraforesaidlandwhichwasforeclosed
because of my obligation with another farm of more than four (4) hectares, that is, one planted to four
cavanesofseedlings,moreorless]
5. Na hindi maaring pilitin ang aking mga anak (EMILIANO AT MARIA DALANDAN), na hingin ang ani ng
bukidnanabangitsaitaasngsalaysaynaito
[Thatmychildren(EMILIANOANDMARIADALANDAN)maynotbeforcedtogiveuptheharvestofthefarm
hereinabovementioned]
6. Na hindi rin maaring hingin kaaggad sa lalong madaling panahon ang kapalit ng bukid na may apat na
kabangbinhi

[That neither may the land which was exchanged for the farm with four cavanes of seedlings be
demandedimmediately]
VictoriaJulio,inturn,joinedClementeDalandanintheexecutionof,andalsosworeto,thesaiddocument,inthis
wise:
Na, ako VICTORIA JULIO, na binabanggit sa itaas nito sa salaysay ni CLEMENTE DALANDAN, ay
nagpapatunaynatutoonglahatangkanyangsalaysaynaiyonattinatanggapkoangkanyangmgasinasabi.
[ThatI,VICTORIAJULIO,mentionedintheabovestatementofCLEMENTEDALANDAN,attesttothetruth
of,andaccept,allthathestatedtherein.]
Backtothecomplaintherein.PlaintiffwentontoaverthatthelandofClementeDalandansetforthinthedocument,
Annex"A"ofthecomplaint,referredtosixsmallparcelsdescribedinparagraph4thereofwithatotalareaofbarely
two hectares "the only land owned by Clemente Dalandan at the time of the execution of the document"
exceptfiftyplotsor"banigan"(saltbeds),whichwerepreviouslyconveyedtoplaintiff'smotherbymeanofpactode
retrosaleandtitletowhichhadalreadybeenvestedinthelatterthatafterthedeathofClementeDalandan,plaintiff
requestedfromdefendants,Clemente'slegitimateandsurvivingheirswhosucceededinthepossessionoftheland
thus conveyed, to deliver the same to her that defendants "insisted that according to the agreement", neither
delivery of the land nor the fruits thereof could immediately be demanded, and that "plaintiff acceded to this
contentionofdefendantsandallowedthemtocontinuetoremaininpossession"thereofthatdemandshave"been
madeupondefendantstofixtheperiodwithinwhichtheywoulddelivertothehereinplaintifftheabovedescribed
parcelsoflandbutdefendantshaverefusedanduntilnowstillrefusetofixaspecifictimewithinwhichtheywould
delivertoplaintifftheaforementionedparcelsofland."Predicatedupontheforegoingallegations,plaintiffprayedfor
judgmentagainstdefendants:
(a)Adjudgingthehereinplaintiffasownerofthelanddescribedinparagraph4hereof
(b)Fixingatimewithinwhichdefendantsshoulddeliverthesaidparcelsoflandtothehereinplaintiffaswell
asthefruitsthereof
(c)Adjudgingthatupontheexpirationofthesaidtimedefendantsconveyanddelivertothehereinplaintiffthe
saidparcelsoflandaswellasthefruitsthereof
(d)OrderingthedefendantstopaytheplaintiffthesumofP2,000.00asattorneys'fees
(e)Orderingthedefendantstopaythecostsofthesuitandgrantingsuchotherreliefandremedyasmaybe
justandequitableinthepremises.
Defendants met the complaint with a motion to dismiss grounded on: (1) prescription of plaintiff's action (2)
pendencyofanothersuitbetweenthesamepartiesforthesamecauseand(3)releaseand/orabandonmentofthe
claimsetforthinplaintiff'scomplaint.
By its order of April 29, 1961, the lower court ruled that plaintiff's suit, viewed either as an action for specific
performanceorforthefixingofaterm,hadprescribed.Reason:the10yearperiodfromthedateofthedocument
hadelapsed.Thelowercourtfounditunnecessarytopassupontheothergroundsforthemotiontodismiss.Hence,
thisappeal.
1.Thethresholdproblem,basictoanunderstandoftheissueshereininvolved,isthemeaningtobeattachedtothe
document now under review. Undoubtedly, bad more felicitous terms been employed, the intention of the parties
couldeasilyberead.Unfortunately,ineptnessofexpressionexactsofusanexaminationofthedocument.Familiar
rules of interpretation of documents tell us that in ascertaining the intention of the parties, the contents thereof
shouldnotbeinterpretedpiecemealallparts,provisionsortermsaretobeconsideredeachparagraphclauseor
phrasemustbereadnotinisolation,butinthelightoftheentirewritingdoubtfulonesshouldbegiventhatsense
whichmayresultfromallofthem,consideredasawhole.Suchconstructionwillbeadoptedaswillresultfroman
overallviewofthedocumentitself.
Itis,inthisperspectivethatwenowlookintothewriting.Advertingtoparagraph4ofthedeed,defendantstakethe
positionthatthedeceasedClementeDalandansimply"promised"toVictoriaJulioafarmofaboutfourhectaresto
replacethelandofVictorianaDalandan(motherofVictoriaJulio)whichwasforeclosed.Butthisviewlosessightof
the later provisions thereof. By paragraph 5, Clemente's children may not be forced to give up the harvest of the
farmmentionedinthedeed.Thiswasfollowedbyparagraph6whichstatesthatVictoriaJuliomaynotimmediately
demandthesubstitute(kapalit)fortheforfeitedland.Theselasttwostatementsinthedeedexpressthedominant
purposeoftheinstrument.Theyconveytheideathatthenakedownershipofthelandinsubstitutionwas,indeed,
transferred to Victoria Julio. Else there would have been no sense in the proviso that the fruits as well as the
physicalpossessionofthelandcouldnotimmediatelybedemandedbyVictoriaJuliofromClemente'schildren,the

herein defendants. For, the right to demand fruits and physical possession of property has been known to be
attributesofownership.
Thedisputedcomplaintinparagraphs6and7thereof,inessence,aversplaintiff'srequestforthedeliveryofthereal
propertydefendants'answerthat"accordingtotheagreement"neitherlandnorfruitsthereofcouldimmediatelybe
takenawayfromthem,andplaintiff'sconformitytheretoandplaintiff'sdemandsthattheperiodfordeliverybefixed
anddefendants'refusal.
Theallegationsofthecomplaintjustnotedcarryustoanotheraspectofthedocument:defendants'rightsoverthe
landvisavisplaintiff's.Whatrightsweretransmittedtodefendantsbytheirfather,ClementeDalandan?Paragraphs
6and7ofthedocumentsupplytheanswer.Theyareusufructuariesforanundeterminedlengthoftime.Forsolong
asthatperiodhasnotbeenfixedandhasnotelapsed,theyholdtheproperty.Theirsistoenjoythefruitsoftheland
and to hold the same as trustees of Victoria Julio. And this because, by the deed, Clemente Dalandan divested
himself of the ownership qualified solely by withholding enjoyment of the fruits and physical possession. In
consequence,ClementeDalandancannottransmittohisheirs,thepresentdefendants,suchownership.3Nemodat
quodnonhabet.Andthen,thedocumentisadeclarationbyClementeDalandan,nowdeceased,againsthisown
proprietaryinterests.Suchdocumentisbindinguponhisheirs.4
2.But,defendantsaverthatrecognitionofthetrustmaynotbeprovedbyevidencealiunde.Theyarguethatbythe
expresstermsofArticle1443oftheCivilCode,"[n]oexpresstrustsconcerninganimmovableoranyinteresttherein
may be proved by parol evidence." This argument overlooks the fact that no oral evidence is necessary. The
expresstrustimposedupondefendantsbytheirpredecessorappearsinthedocumentitself.For,whileitistruethat
saiddeeddidnotindefinitivewordsinstitutedefendantsastrustees,adutyisthereinimposeduponthemwhen
thepropertimecomestoturnoverboththefruitsandthepossessionofthepropertytoVictoriaJulio.Notthat
thisviewiswithoutstatutorysupport.Article1444oftheCivilCodestatesthat:"Noparticularwordsarerequiredfor
thecreationofanexpresstrust,itbeingsufficientthatatrustisclearlyintended."Inreality,thedevelopmentofthe
trustasamethodofdispositionofproperty,sojurisprudenceteaches,"seemsinlargepartduetoitsfreedomfrom
formalrequirements."5ThisprincipleperhapsaccountsfortheprovisionsinArticle1444justquoted.For,"technical
orparticularformsofwordsorphrasesarenotessentialtothemanifestationofintentiontocreateatrustortothe
establishmentthereof."6Norwouldtheuseofsomesuchwordsas"trust"or"trustee"essentialtotheconstitutionof
atrustaswehaveheldinLorenzovs.Posadas,64Phil.353,368.Conversely,themerefactthattheword"trust"or
"trustee"wasemployedwouldnotnecessarilyproveanintentiontocreateatrust.Whatisimportantiswhetherthe
trustormanifestedanintentiontocreatethekindofrelationshipwhichinlawisknownasatrust.Itisunimportant
thatthetrustorshouldknowthattherelationship"whichheintendstocreateiscalledatrust,andwhetherornothe
knowstheprecisecharacteristicsoftherelationshipwhichiscalledatrust."7Here,thattrustiseffectiveasagainst
defendantsandinfavorofthebeneficiarythereof,plaintiffVictoriaJulio,whoaccepteditinthedocumentitself.8
3.Plaintiffisnottobehandicappedbyalackofaclearstatementastotheactualdescriptionofthelandreferredto
in the trust deed, basis of plaintiff's cause of action. Obviously, the document was not prepared by a learned
scrivener. It imperfectly speaks of a "farm of more than four (4) hectares." But averment in the complaint is not
lacking to clear the uncertainty as to the identity of the land mentioned in that document. Plaintiff points out in
paragraph4ofhercomplaintthatwhilesaiddeeddoesnotspecificallydefineitsboundaries"thepartiestothesaid
document actually refer" to the land which was "the only land owned by Clemente Dalandan at the time of the
execution" thereof, and which is set forth in small parcels under said paragraph. This allegation in the complaint
does not add any new term or stipulation to the writing. Rather, it explains an obscurity occasioned by lack of
precisioninaclumsilyprepareddocument.Thusitis,thatauthoritiesarenotwantinginsupportoftheviewthat"in
so far as the identity of land involved" in a trust is concerned, "it has also been held that the writings, in being
considered for the purpose of satisfying the statute of frauds, are to be considered in their setting, and that parol
evidenceisadmissibletomakeclearthetermsofatrusttheexistenceofwhichisestablishedbyawriting,..."9
4.Thiscasehavingbeenbroughtbeforeusonamotiontodismiss,weneedbutstressthatwearetobeguided
solelybytheavermentsofthecomplaint.Soguided,wemustsaythatthereissufficientshowinginthecomplaint
thatthereisanacknowledgmentonthepartofdefendantsthattheyholdthepropertynotastheirown,butintrust.
There is no statement in the complaint intimating disavowal of such trust the complaint alleges refusal to deliver
possession. In the sense in which we understand the complaint to be, it cannot be said that plaintiff's action to
recoverthepropertythusheldintrusthasprescribed.Giventhefiduciaryrelationwhichaccordingtothecomplaint
isrecognizedbydefendants,thelattermaynotinvokethestatuteoflimitationsasabartoplaintiff'saction.10
5.Evenontheassumptionthatdefendantshavenotbeenconstitutedastrusteesunderthedocumentinquestion,
stillwearriveatthesameconclusion.For,plaintiff'sactionisaimed,byanallegedownerofrealpropertyatrecovery
of possession thereof, conditioned upon the fixing of the period therefor. Since plaintiff claims ownership,
possession,inthewordsofthisCourt"isamereconsequenceofownership."11Itmaynotbesaidthatplaintiff'ssuit
isbarredbythestatuteoflimitations.SheisprotectedbyArticle1141oftheCivilCode,whichreads:"Realactions
overimmovablesprescribeafterthirtyyears."Wetakethisviewfortheobviousreasonthatdefendants'motionto
dismissonthisscoreisdirectedattheprescriptionofplaintiff'sactionnotonacquisitiveprescription.

6.Defendantsintheirbriefdrawattention,bywayofcounterassignmentoferror,totheirclaimthatthiscaseshould
alsobedismisseduponthegroundthatthereexistsanotheractionpendingbetweenthesamepartiesforthesame
cause,andonthefurthergroundofreleaseand/orabandonment.
Thefactsbearingonthisissueare:InLandRegistrationCaseN706,G.L.R.O.RecordNo.N7014,CourtofFirst
Instance of Rizal, defendants are applicants. That case so defendants aver covers the very same land set
forthinplaintiff'scomplaint.Intheiroppositiontothatapplication,hereinplaintiffprayedthatthesamelandthe
subject of this suit (covered by Plan PSU 129514) be registered "in the names of the herein applicants and
oppositor with the specific mention therein that the herein oppositor owns fifty salt beds therein and having an
absoluterighttotheuseofthedepositories."Defendantsarguethatifplaintiffwastherealowneroftheentirearea,
oppositionshouldhavebeenpresentedonthewhole,notmerelyastofiftysaltbeds.
Parenthetically,thequestionofownershipovertheportionoffiftysaltbedshadalreadybeenresolvedbythisCourt
inadecisionpromulgatedonFebruary29,1964inL19101(EmilianoDalandanandMariaDalandan,plaintiffs,vs.
VictoriaJulio,etal.,defendants).There,thisCourtaffirmedtheorderdismissingthecomplaintfiledbydefendants
herein, plaintiffs therein, for the repurchase of fifty salt beds which were the subject of a sale with pacto de retro
executedonSeptember24,1932byClementeDalandaninfavorofVictorianaDalandan,predecessorofplaintiff.
There is no point in the argument that an action is pending between plaintiff and defendants. Because, with the
exceptionofthefiftysaltbedswhichaccordingtothecomplaintisnotincludedinthedeedplaintifffiledno
opposition to defendants' application for land registration. Failure to so object in reference to the registration of a
biggerportionoftheland,simplymeansthatthereisnocasebetweenthepartiesinreferencetheretointheland
registrationproceeding.
Notthatplaintiffreleasedorabandonedtheclaimtothatbiggerportion.For,thereisanavermentinthecomplaint
thatanagreementexistsbetweenplaintiffanddefendantstodeferdeliverythereofandthatdefendantsthereafter
refusedtofixtheperiodforsuchdelivery.Sothat,ontheassumptionthatdefendantsshouldsucceedinobtaining
titletothepropertyinthelandregistrationcase,suchwouldnotbarVictoriaJuliofromrequiringthemtoexecutea
conveyance of the property in her favor, in the event she (plaintiff herein) prevails in the present case. And this,
becausedefendantscouldherebedeclaredasmeretrusteesofplaintiff,iftheavermentsofthecomplaintarefound
tobetrue."12
Forthereasonsgiven,theorderoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofRizaldatedApril29,1961dismissingthecomplaint
isherebyreversedandsetaside,withinstructionstoremandthecasetothecourtbelowforfurtherproceedings.
Costsagainstdefendantsappellees.Soordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes
1 Civil Case No. 324R of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, entitled "Victoria Julio, plaintiff, vs. Emiliano

DalandanandMariaDalandan,defendants."
2AllEnglishtranslationsoftheprovisionsofthisdocumentareours.
3Articles774,775,776,781,CivilCode.
4Section32,Rule130,RulesofCourt.
554Am.Jur.,p.50.
6Id.
7SeeScottonTrustsVol.I.pp.146147,citedinIVTolentino,CivilCodeofthePhilippines,1962ed.,p.612.
8Article1446,CivilCode.
989C.J.S.p.766emphasissupplied.SeealsoVMoran,CommentsontheRulesofCourt,1963ed.,pp.

110114.
10"Thejuridicalconceptofatrust,whichinabroadsenseinvolves,arisesfrom,oristheresultof,afiduciary

relationbetweenthetrusteeandthecestuiquetrustasregardscertainpropertyreal,personal,fundsor

money,orchoosesinactionmustnotbeconfusedwithanactionforspecificperformance.Whentheclaim
tothelotsinthecadastralcasewaswithdrawnbytherespondentsrelyingupontheassuranceandpromise
madeinopencourtbyDr.MarianoYuloinbehalfofJoseYuloyRegalado,thepredecessorininterestofthe
petitioners,atrustorafiduciaryrelationbetweenthemarose,orresultedtherefrom,orwascreatedthereby.
The trustee cannot invoke the statute of limitations to bar the action and defeat the right of the cestui que
trustent."Pachecovs.Arro,85Phil.505,514515.
"Theactionbroughtbytheplaintiffsisclearlyanactionforthespecificconveyanceofthepropertyregistered
inthenameofdefendants'predecessorininterest.Thedeceasedvendorwasissuedthecertificateoftitlefor
andinbehalf,andintrustforthebenefit,oftheplaintiffs.Theactionisonetocompelatrusteetoconveythe
property registered in his name in trust for the benefit of the cestui que trust, and the same does not
prescribe."Manalangvs.Canlas,94Phil.776,777778,citingcases.
"Prescriptioncannotbesetupasadefenseinanactionthatseekstorecoverpropertyheldintrustforthe
benefit of another. Neither could laches be set up as a defense in the case at bar, it being similar to
prescription."Cuisonvs.Fernandez,56O.G.No.33,pp.5162,5164.
"And while implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years, the rule does not apply where a fiduciary
relationexistsandthetrusteerecognizesthetrust.Continuousrecognitionofaresultingtrustprecludesany
defenseoflachesinasuittodeclareandenforcethetrust."DeBuencaminovs.Matias,L19397,April30,
1966.
11Atunvs.Nuez,97Phil.762,764.
12Manalangvs.Canlas,supra.
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