Set 9

Subject: Constitutional Law 1
Topic: Power of Appointment

Citation: The Government of Philippine Islands vs. Springer, G.R. No.
L-26979
April 1, 1927
Facts:
This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of the
Government of the Philippine Islands against three directors of the National
Coal Company who were elected to their positions by the legislative
members of the committee created by Acts. Nos. 2705 and 2822. The
purpose of the proceeding is to test the validity of the part of section 4 of Act
No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, which provides that "The
voting power of all such stock (in the National Coal Company) owned by the
Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a
committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate,
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created
by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that:
The voting power shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of
the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37

which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker
in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged
in the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at
that time was considered the head of state but does not manage
government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate
President and the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President
as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection
of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as
Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of
the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of
their election into the Board of NCC.
Issue:
Whether or nor EO no. 37 is invalid.
Rulings:
No. E.O. No 37 is valid.
It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The
Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but
it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing
persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government
owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the

power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the
House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of
executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are
exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill
public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the
legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch this
exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.

Topic: No Need of Commission on Appointments Confirmation
Citation: Sarmiento vs. Mison, G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987
Facts:
Petitioners contend that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the
other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment
without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. There are four
(4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers
lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments.The second, third and fourth groups of officers
are the present bone of contention.
Issue:
Whether or not the President can appoint Mison without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments
Ruling:
Yes, the President can appoint Mison without submitting his nomination
to the Commission on Appointments.
Appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs,
without
submitting
his
nomination
to
the
Commission
on
Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full

authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.
Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for
presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article
VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress
and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and
Election).
Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other

government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as
observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to
provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner
for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.
By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory
construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions
expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935
Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose
appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the
1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of
"heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation)
of the Commission on Appointments.
(3) In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and
expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments
from
confirmation
by
the
Commission
on
Appointments,
except
appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16,

Art. VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of
Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing
that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in
the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
because the power to appoint officers whom he (the president) may be
authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need
of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence
of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.

Citation: Conception- Bautista vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439. April 13,
1989.
Facts:
On August 27, 1987, President Cory Aquino appointed petitioner
Bautista as permanent Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR).
Bautista took her oath of office on December 22, 1988 to Chief Justice
Marcelo Fernan and immediately acted as such.
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments
(CoA) wrote a letter to Bautista requesting for her presence along with
several documents at the office of CoA on January 19. Bautista refused to be
placed under CoA's review hence this petition filed with the Supreme Court.
While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino appointed
Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights" but he was not able to sit in his appointive office because of
Bautista's refusal to surrender her post. Malilin invoked EO 163-A which

provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR
should be at the pleasure of the President thus stating that Bautista shall be
subsequently removed as well.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
the
President's
appointment
is
considered
constitutional
Ruling:
No, the Presidents appointment is considered constitutional.
The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned
in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that
the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA.Sec.
16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:The President shall nominate
and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower
in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the
departments, agencies, commissions or boards. The President shall have the
power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
The Court held that it is within the authority of the President, vested
upon her by the Constitution, that she appoint Executive officials. The second
sentence of the provision Section 16, Article VII provides that the President is
authorized by law to appoint, without confirmation of CoA, several
government officials. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the
positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides the appointments which are to be made with
the confirmation of CoA. It therefore follows that the appointment of the
Chairman of CHR by the President is to be made and finalized even without
the review or participation of CoA. Bautista's appointment as the Chairman of
CHR, therefore, was already a completed act on the day she took her oath as
the appointment was finalized upon her acceptance, expressly stated in her
oath.
Furthermore, the Court held that the provisions of EO 163-A is
unconstitutional and thus cannot be invoked by Mallillin. The Chairman of
CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the President for it is

constitutionally guaranteed that they must have a term of office.
To hold, as the Court holds, that petitioner Bautista is the lawful
incumbent of the office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights by
virtue of her appointment, as such, by the President on 17 December 1988,
and her acceptance thereof, is not to say that she cannot be removed from
office before the expiration of her seven (7) year term. She certainly can be
removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right to due
process properly safeguarded.
It is to the credit of the President that, in deference to the rule of law,
after petitioner Bautista had elevated her case to this Tribunal, Her
Excellency merely designated an Acting Chairman for the Commission on
Human Rights (pending decision in this case) instead of appointing another
permanent Chairman. The latter course would have added only more legal
difficulties to an already difficult situation.
Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and the lawful incumbent
thereof, entitled to all the benefits, privileges and emoluments of said office.
The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by the Court against
respondent Mallillin enjoining him from dismissing or terminating personnel
of the Commission on Human Rights is made permanent.

Citation: Rufino vs. Edriga, G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006
Facts:
On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive
Order No. 30 (EO 30) creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust
governed by a Board of Trustees of seven members to preserve and promote
Philippine culture.
On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law,
President
Marcos issued PD 15, the CCPs charter, which converted the CCP under EO
30 into a non-municipal public corporation free from the pressure or
influence of politics. PD 15 increased the members of CCPs Board from
seven to nine trustees.
Later, Executive Order No. 1058, issued on 10
October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11.

After the People Power Revolution in 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino
asked for the courtesy resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and
appointed new trustees to the Board.
Eventually, during the term of
President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP Board included Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison,
Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A. Cabili (Cabili), and Manuel T. Maosa
(Maosa).
On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed

seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the
Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. Except for Tantoco,
theRufino group took
their
respective oaths of office and assumed the
performance of their duties in early January 1999.

On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto
before this Court questioning President Estradas appointment of seven new
members to the CCP Board. The Endriga group alleged that under Section
6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled by election by a
vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting x xx.
In
case only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the
surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the
[CCP].
The Endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is
entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies,
acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.
The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada
appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was vacant due to the expiration
of Maosas term. The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent trustees.
The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the
supervision and control of the President. The Endriga group cited Section 3
of PD 15, which states that the CCP shall enjoy autonomy of policy and
operation x xx.
On 14 May 1999, the Court of Appeals granted the quo warranto petition.
The Court of Appeals declared the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold
office as CCP trustees.
On the other hand, the appellate courts Decision
ousted the Rufino group from the CCP Board.

In their motion for reconsideration, the Rufino group asserted that the
law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower
in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may not validly confer on the
CCP trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the
latter would be officers of equal rank and not of lower rank.
Section 6(b) of
PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be

declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of officers lower in rank
than the appointing power.
On 3 August 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the Rufino groups

motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals also denied the Endriga
groups motion for immediate execution of the 14 May 1999 Decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 is constitutional and CCP trustees
have the authority to appoint and elect their fellow trustees when there is
vacancy.
Ruling:
No, Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional and CCP trustees have no
authority to appoint and elect their fellow trustees when there is vacancy.
The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 as amended
which authorizes the remaining trustees to fill by election vacancies in the
Board of Trustees of CCP is unconstitutional.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP
Board to fill vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the Presidents power of
control under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The intent of
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence
and pressure, specifically from the President. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the
President. Such a public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987
Constitution.
Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP shall enjoy
autonomy of policy and operation x xx. This provision does not free the CCP
from the Presidents control, for if it does, then it would be unconstitutional.
This provision may give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and
formulating policies and undertaking activities, but ultimately these policies
and activities are all subject to the Presidents power of control.
The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the Presidents
control over the CCP in the guise of insulating the CCP from the Presidents
influence.
By stating that the President shall have control of all the
executive x xx offices, the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not

only to influence but even to control all offices in the Executive branch,
including the CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.

Topic: Limitations to Appointment Power
Citation: Aytona vs. Castillo, G.R. No. L-19313, January 19, 1962
Facts:
On December 29, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia appointed
Dominador R. Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. On the
same day, the latter took the corresponding oath.
On December 30, 1961, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal
assumed office; and on December 31, 1961, he issued Administrative Order
No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointment made
by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, (date when he, Macapagal,
had been proclaimed elected by the Congress). On January 1, 1962,
President Macapagal appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of

the Central Bank, and the latter qualified immediately.
On January 2, 1962, both appointed exercised the powers of their
office, although Castillo informed Aytona of his title thereto; and some
unpleasantness developed in the premises of the Central Bank. However, the
next day and thereafter, Aytona was definitely prevented from holding office
in the Central Bank.
So, he instituted this proceeding which is practically, a quo warranto,
challenging Castillo's right to exercise the powers of Governor of the Central
Bank. Aytona claims he was validly appointed, had qualified for the post, and
therefore, the subsequent appointment and qualification of Castillo was void,
because the position was then occupied by him. Castillo replies that the
appointment of Aytona had been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 of
Macapagal; and so, the real issue is whether the new President had power to
issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by the
past President, even after the appointees had already qualified.1wph
Issue:
Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post
Ruling
No, Aytone should not remain in his post.
Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would
have the right to continue office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to
remain in his post as he is competent enough, his appointment can
nevertheless be revoked by the president. Garcias appointments are hurried
maneuvers to subvert the upcoming administration and is set to obstruct the
policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a person is qualified his
appointment should not be revoked but in here it may be since his
appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In
public service, it is not only legality that is considered but also justice,
fairness and righteousness.
It should be stated that the underlying reason for denying the power to
revoke after the appointee has qualified is the latter's equitable rights. Yet it
is doubtful if such equity might be successfully set up in the present
situation, considering the rush conditional appointments, hurried maneuvers
and other happenings detracting from that degree of good faith, morality and
propriety which form the basic foundation of claims to equitable relief. The
appointees, it might be argued, wittingly or unwittingly cooperated with the
stratagem to beat the deadline, whatever the resultant consequences to the
dignity and efficiency of the public service. Needless to say, there are
instances wherein not only strict legality, but also fairness, justice and
righteousness should be taken into account.

Citation: Jorge vs. Mayor G.R. No. L-21776, February 28, 1964
Facts:
Nicanor G. Jorge, is a career official in the Bureau of Lands. He started
working there as a Junior Computer in the course of 38 years service, from
February 1, 1922 to October 31, 1960, and attained the position of Acting
Director, through regular and successive promotions, in accordance with civil
service rules. On June 17, 1961, he was designated Acting Director of the
same Bureau, and on December 13, 1961 was appointed by President Carlos
Garcia ad interim Director. He qualified by taking the oath of office on the

23rd December of 1961. His appointment was on December 26, 1961,
transmitted to the Commission on Appointments, and on May 14, 1962,
petitioner's ad interim appointment as Director of Lands was confirmed by
the Commission.
Petitioner discharged the duties as Director until on November 14, 1962 he
received a letter from Benjamin Gozon, then Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources of the Macapagal administration, informing him that
pursuant to a letter from the Assistant Executive Secretary Bernal, served on
petitioner on November 13, his appointment was among those revoked by
Administrative Order No. 2 of President Diosdado Macapagal; that the
position of Director of Lands was considered vacant; and that petitioner Jorge
was designated Acting Director of Lands, effective November 13, 1962. Upon
learning that respondent Mayor, an outsider, had been designate by the
President to be Acting Director of Lands Jorge protested (in a letter of
November 16, 1962) to the Secretary of Agriculture informing the latter that
he would stand on his rights, and issued office circulars claiming to be the
legally appointed Director of Lands. Finally, on September 2, 1963, he
instituted the present proceedings.
The answer of respondent pleads that the ad interim appointment of
petitioner and its confirmation were invalid having been duly revoked by
President Macapagal by Administrative Order No. 2 dated December 31,
1961; that petitioner voluntarily relinquished his position and accepted his
designation as Acting Director, issuing press statements to said effect, and
voluntarily accompanying and introducing respondent to meet officials of the
Bureau as the new acting Director of Lands.
Issue
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal
operated as valid revocation of Jorge's ad interim appointment
Ruling:
No, Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal operated as
invalid revocation of Jorge's ad interim appointment.
The petitioner Nicanor G. Jorge is declared to be the duly appointed,
confirmed, and qualified Director of Lands, the respondent, Jovencio Q.
Mayor, is required to turn over said office to the petitioner and to desist from
holding self out as "Acting Director of Lands". Respondents pay the costs.
Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but there is no
evidence on record that it was made and released after the joint session of
Congress that ended on the same day. It is a matter of contemporary history,
of which this Court may take judicial cognizance that the session ended late
in the night of December 13, 1961, and, therefore, after regular office hours.
In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed
that the appointment of Jorge was made before the close of office hours, that
being the regular course of business. The appointment, therefore, was not
included in, nor intended to be covered by, Administrative Order No. 2, and
the same stands unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly confirmed by the
CoA and thereafter, the office never became vacant.

Citation:
De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002,
March 17, 2010

Facts:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10,
2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to
Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section
15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously
agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably
with
its
existing
practice,
the
JBC
automatically
considered for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the
Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio;
Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination
through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next
Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had
the
framers
intended
the
prohibition
to
apply
to
Supreme
Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,

which
explains
why
the
prohibition
found
in
Article
VII
(Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that
the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations
on the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to
ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from
political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President
shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC
properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the
oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has
occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the
JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the
President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
Issue:
Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief

Justice Puno upon his retirement
Ruling:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments
to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the
Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section
15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4.
(1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three,
five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character,
in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that
Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive

Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the
Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that
every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to
assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14
and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely
inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.

Citation: Guevara vs. Inocentes, G.R. No. 25577, March 15, 1966
Facts:
Petitioner was extended an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary
of Labor by the former Executive on November 18, 1965, having taken his
oath of office on November 25 of the same year, and considering that thead
interim appointment for the same position extended to respondent by the
incumbent Executive on January 23, 1966 is invalid in spite of Memorandum
Circular No. 8 issued by the latter on the same date declaring all ad interim
appointments made by the former Executive as having lapsed with the
adjournment of the special session of Congress at about midnight of January
22, 1966,
petitioner
brought before
this
Court
the instant
petition
forquowarranto seeking to be declared the person legally entitled to said

office of Undersecretary of Labor.
The petition is predicated on the following grounds: (1) under Article
VII, Section 10(4) of the Constitution, petitioner's ad interim appointment is
valid and permanent and may only become ineffective either upon express
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or upon the adjournment of
the regular session of Congress of 1966; (2) here there has been no express
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments because the same has
never been constituted during the special session called by President Marcos
in his Proclamation No. 2, series of 1966; and (3) there has been no
adjournment of the Congress as contemplated in the Constitution because
(a) the aforesaid special session was suspended by the House on Saturday,
January 22, 1966 at 10:55 p.m. to be resumed on Monday, January 24, 1966
at 10:00 a.m.; (b) the resolution approved by the Senate on January 23, 1966
at past 2:00 a.m. for adjournment sine die is not the adjournment
contemplated in Article VII, Section 10(a) of our Constitution; (c) the
suspension by the House or the adjournment by the Senate to resume the

session on January 24, 1966 at 10:00 a.m. meant the end of the special
session and the start of the regular session as a continuous session without
any interruption; and (d) the phrase "until the next adjournment of the
Congress" must be related with the phrase "until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments" so that the adjournment contemplated should
refer to a regular session during which the Commission on Appointments
may be organized and allowed to discharge its functions as such.
Respondent, on the other hand, set up the following defenses: (1)
petitioner's ad interim appointment lapsed when Congress adjourned its last
special session called under Proclamation No. 2 of President Marcos; (2) an
ad interim appointment ceases to be valid after each term of Congress and
so petitioner's appointment must have lapsed as early as December 30,
1965; (3) petitioner's ad interim appointment as well as others made under
similar conditions, is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy, and
hence null and void; and (4) petitioner's appointment is void in the light of
the doctrine laid down in Rodriguez, Jr. vs. Quirino, G.R. No. L-19800 October
28, 1953.
Issue:
Whether the ad interim appointment of Onofre P. Guevara is valid
Ruling:
Art. VII, Sec. 10, Subsection 4 of the 1935 Constitution: "the President
shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress"
The validity of an ad interim appointment shall be allowed when (a) until
disapproval of the Commission on Appointments and (b) adjournment of
Congress, whether special or regular session. In this case, the second mode
of termination took effect when the Congress adjourned sine die at about
midnight of January 22, 1966 which made the appointment of petitioner
Guevara ineffective. The contention that the Commission on Appointments
should be first organized before the second mode can be made effective is
untenable
because
they
are
two
different
and
separate
modes
of
termination.
Since the termination of ad interim appointment cannot be separated, the
well-known maxim in statutory construction applies.

Citation: Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

Facts:
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as
Acting Director IV of the EID. On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet
O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV of EID in
a Temporary capacity. On February 15, 2001, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier
renewed again the appointment of petitioner to the same position in a
Temporary capacity.
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad
interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC
Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on February
2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the position of
COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths of office and
assumed their positions as COMELEC Commissioners. The Office of the
President submitted to the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001
the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmation.
However,
the
Commission
on
Appointments
did
not
act
on
said
appointments.
On
June
1,
2001,
President
Arroyo
renewed
the
ad
interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and for
the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008.[7] They took
their oaths of office for a second time. The Office of the President transmitted
on June 5, 2001 their appointments to the Commission on Appointments for

confirmation.
Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on
their appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo
renewed again thead interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to
the
same
positions.
The
Office
of
the
President
submitted
their
appointments for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments.
They
took their oaths of office anew.

In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum
dated April 11, 2001 addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to
Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of
the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department. COMELEC EID
Commissioner-in-Charge
Mehol
K.
Sadain
objected
to
petitioner's
reassignment in a Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 12 addressed to the

COMELEC en banc. Specifically, Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayo's
failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in the reassignment
of petitioner.
Petitioner also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law
Department
against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated
Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No.
3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent
administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner
filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain
in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of
the
COMELEC,
respectively.
Petitioner
claims
that
the
ad
interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional

provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the
prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman
and members. Petitioner also assails as illegal her removal as Director IV of
the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. Simultaneously,
petitioner challenges the designation of Cinco as Officer-in-Charge of the EID.
Petitioner, moreover, questions the legality of the disbursements made by
COMELEC Finance Services Department Officer-in-Charge Gideon C. De
Guzman to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason by way of salaries and other
emoluments.
In the meantime, on September 6, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo
renewed once again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo as COMELEC
Chairman and Borra and Tuason as Commissioners, respectively, for a term
of seven years expiring on February 2, 2008. They all took their oaths of
office anew.
Issue:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts
to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the

Constitution.
Ruling:
No, assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of
the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
The ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the
Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period
from the time thead interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is
neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean
that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the
running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the
confirming power of the Commission on Appointments.
The phrase "without reappointment" applies only to one who has been
appointed
by
the
President
and
confirmed
by
the
Commission
on
Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office.

There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To
hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the President's power to
make ad interim appointment.
The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of

Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments
because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. A reappointment presupposes a previous
confirmed appointment. The same ad interim appointments and renewals of
appointments will also not breach the seven-year term limit because all the
appointments and renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
are for a fixed term expiring on February 2, 2008. Any delay in their
confirmation will not extend the expiry date of their terms of office.
Consequently, there is no danger whatsoever that the renewal of the ad
interim appointments of these three respondents will result in any of the
evils intended to be exorcised by the twin prohibitions in the Constitution.
The continuing renewal of the ad interim appointment of these three
respondents, for so long as their terms of office expire on February 2, 2008,
does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article IXC of the Constitution.

Citation: De Rama vs. CA, G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner de Rama justified his recall request on the allegation that the
appointments of the employees were "midnight" appointments of the former
mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the
1987 Constitution.
While the matter was pending before the CSC, three of the abovenamed employees, namely: Elsa Marino, Morell Ayala, and FlordelizaOriazel,
filed with the CSC a claim for payment of their salaries, alleging that
although their appointments were declared permanent by ConradoGulim,
Director II of the CSC Field Office based in Quezon, petitioner de Rama
withheld the payment of their salaries and benefits pursuant to Office Order
No. 95-01, which was issued on June 30, 1995, wherein the appointments of
the said fourteen (14) employees were recalled.
Based on the documents submitted by Marino, Ayala and Oriazel, the
Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division of the CSC issued an Order 2 finding that
since the claimants-employees had assumed their respective positions and

performed their duties pursuant to their appointments, they are therefore
entitled to receive the salaries and benefits appurtenant to their positions.
Citing Rule V, Section 10 of the Omnibus Rules 3 which provides, in part, that
"if the appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled
to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his
appointment by the Commission," the CSC Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division
ruled that the said employees cannot be deprived of their salaries and
benefits by the unilateral act of the newly-assumed mayor.
On April 30, 1996, the CSC denied petitioner's request for the recall of the
appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC also
cited Rule V, Sections 9 and 10 of the Omnibus Rules, and declared that the
appointments of the said employees were issued in accordance with
pertinent laws. Thus, the same were effective immediately, and cannot be
withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority until disapproved by the
CSC. The CSC also dismissed petitioner's allegation that these were
"midnight" appointments, pointing out that the Constitutional provision relied
upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing
President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. Thus, the
CSC opined, "the appointing authority can validly issue appointments until
his term has expired, as long as the appointee meets the qualification
standards for the position."
The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that
they had already been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in
Lucena City, and for petitioner's failure to present evidence that would
warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CSC's Resolution, as well as
the Order of the CSC Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division, averring that the CSC
was without jurisdiction: (1) to refuse to revoke the subject appointments;
and (2) to uphold the validity of said appointments, even assuming that
there was failure to present evidence that would prove that these
appointments contravened existing laws or rules. He also posited that the
CSC erred in finding the appointments valid despite the existence of
circumstances showing that the same were fraudulently issued and
processed.On November 21, 1996, the CSC denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals, arguing that the CSC arrived at the erroneous conclusion after it
ignored his "supplement to the consolidated appeal and motion for
reconsideration" wherein he laid out evidence showing that the subject
appointments were obtained through fraud.
After reviewing the facts and issues raised by petitioner, the Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution dated May 16, 1997 which held that there was no abuse
of the power of appointment on the part of the outgoing mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are
forbidden under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution
Ruling:
No, the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are not forbidden
under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution.
The CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved,
but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard
of applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations. Rule V,
Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised
Administrative Code specifically provides that an appointment accepted by
the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority
and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be
recalled
on
the
following
grounds:
(a)
Non-compliance
with
the
procedures/criteria provided in the agencys Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure

to pass through the agencys Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the
existing collective agreement between management and employees relative
to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and
regulations.

Topic: Power of Removal
Citation: Gonzalez vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231,
September 4, 2012
Facts:
A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery
extortion and physical injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila
Police District SeniorInspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others.
Private complainant, Christian M.Kalaw, before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said cases were still pending, the
Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC)
turned over, upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant
documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently a
case for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza
and his fellow police officers in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was
dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by the
complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant
the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the
Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the
dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against the same
police officers, for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3)
consecutive
hearings
despite
due
notice.
However,
upon
the
recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp.

Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct
was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a
motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for
final approval, in whose office it remained pending for final review and action
when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful
day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in
the police service. In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which
ended in the tragic murder of eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury
of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando
Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government
officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review
Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident

through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions.
The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and
inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by
allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine
(9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman
prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative
disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission.
The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The
prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking.
Petitioner was dismissed from service.
Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman
chargedMajor General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons
Ian Carl Garcia, Juan PauloGarcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several
unknown
persons
with
Plunder
and
Money
Laundering
before
the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent

petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against
the grant of bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner,
Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulitand sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of
a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. The
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and
the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia
to get off the hook with nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the
prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public
offenses, the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted
public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings,
the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No.
3,recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit
from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies
and Assistants before the appropriate government office for having
committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under
the Ombudsman Act.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the President has Jurisdiction to exercise
administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally created office of the
Ombudsman
Ruling:
Yes, the Office of the President has Jurisdiction to exercise
administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally created office of the

Ombudsman.
While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive
and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the
exception only of those officials removable by impeachment such authority is
by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely
and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For,
while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary
authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand,
grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two apparently
conflicting provisions in R.A. No.6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that
Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise
concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of
Congress in enactingboth provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the
same Organic Act was to provide for anexternal authority, through the
person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative
discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the
least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman
over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is
simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the
lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may
try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap
inthe law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly
provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of
the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly
dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special
Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress
simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the
Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section
2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers,
including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not
subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor is Implied from his Power to Appoint. In giving the President the
power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress
simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from
the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in
the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and
irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the
military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's

own role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be
incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent
disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other
law enforcement offices. Granting the President the Power to Remove a
Deputy Ombudsman does not Diminish the Independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
He claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No.6770 granting the President the power
to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not
resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is
tenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested
with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its
constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution
secures
for
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman
is,
essentially,
political
independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the
salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are
"reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."
Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned
acts, falling short of constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of
public trust.
Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case
to the Ombudsman without citing any reason therefore cannot, by itself,
beconsidered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would

amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases
upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel
of the constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the
"champion of the people."The factual circumstances that the case was
turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that
administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even
without the private complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that
the decision was immediately implemented; or that the motion for
reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot
be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case
considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or
business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have
impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of any
bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable
motivation. The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against
petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of
dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty
or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence,
the President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the
removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional
wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public
trust.
The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed

administratively against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence
of any of the grounds for her removal from office as provided for under the
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.

Topic: Pardoning Power
Citation: Llamas v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99031, [October 15, 1991], 279
PHIL 920-949
Facts:
Rodolfo D. Llamas is the incumbent Vice-Governor of the Province of

Tarlac and, on March 1, 1991 he assumed, by virtue of a decision of the
Office of the President, the governorship. Private respondent Mariano
UnOcampo III is the incumbent Governor of the Province of Tarlac and was
suspended from office for a period of 90 days. Public respondent Oscar Orbos
was the Executive Secretary at the time of the filing of this petition and is
being impleaded herein in that official capacity for having issued, by
authority of the President, the assailed Resolution granting executive
clemency to respondent governor.
Sometime in 1989, petitioner, together with Tarlac Board Members
Marcelino Aganon, Jr. and Arnaldo P. Dizon, filed on June 13, 1989 a verified
complaint dated June 7, 1989 against respondent governor before the then
Department of Local Government (DLG, for short), charging him with alleged
violation of Sections 203(2) (f), and 203(2) (p), and 208(e), 208(f), and
208(w), of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, and other appropriate laws, among them, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Prior to that, petitioner filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a verified complaint dated November 10, 1988 against
respondent governor for the latter's alleged violation of Section 3-G of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
Petitioner maintains that sometime in August, 1988, respondent

governor, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of Tarlac, entered into
and executed a Loan Agreement with the LingkodTarlac Foundation, Inc., a
non-stock and non-profit organization headed by the governor himself as
chairman and controlled by his brother-in-law as executive director, trustee,
and secretary; that the said Loan Agreement was never authorized and
approved by the Provincial Board, in direct contravention of the provisions of
the Local Government Code; that the said Agreement is wholly one-sided in
favor of the Foundation and grossly inimical to the interest of the Provincial
Government (because it did not provide for interest or for any type of
security and it did not provide for suretyship and comptrollership or audit to
control the safe disbursement of said loans); that a total amount of
P20,000,000.00 was disbursed to the aforesaid Foundation; that the
transactions constitute a fraudulent scheme to defraud the Provincial
Government; and that the said Agreement is wholly unconstitutional, illegal,
and immoral.
On the other hand, it is the contention of respondent governor that
"the funds were intended to generate livelihood projects among the residents
of Tarlac and the use of the LingkodTarlac Foundation, Inc. was authorized by
law and considered the best alternative as a matter of judgment." (pp. 12-13,
Appeal Memorandum); that he resigned from the said Foundation in order to
forestall any suspicion that he would influence it; that it is not true that the
Loan Agreement did not provide for continuing audit by the Provincial
Government because the Memorandum of Agreement provides otherwise;

and that the Agreement is not manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
Provincial Government and respondent governor did not and would not profit
thereby because it provided sufficient safeguards for repayment.
Subsequently, and pursuant to Sec. 66, Chapter 4 of BP. Blg. 337, to
the effect that the decision of the Office of the President in administrative
suspension of local officials shall be immediately executory without prejudice
to appeal to appropriate courts, petitioner, on March 1, 1991, took his oath of
office as acting governor. Under the administrative suspension order,
petitioner had up to May 31, 1991 as acting governor. On the same date
(March 1, 1991), respondent governor moved for a reconsideration of the
Executive Secretary's Resolution, to which petitioner filed an opposition.
From the allegations of the petitioner in his petition, respondent governor
accepted his suspension and turned over his office to petitioner.
Petitioner posits that the issuance by public respondent of the May 15,
1991 Resolution was "whimsical, capricious and despotic, and constituted
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction," (p. 6, petition)
basically on the ground that executive clemency could be granted by the
President only in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books or
even in the Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative
cases. Petitioner also contends that since respondent governor refused to
recognize his suspension (having reassumed the governorship in gross
defiance of the suspension order), executive clemency cannot apply to him;

that his rights to due process were violated because the grant of executive
clemency was so sudden that he was not even notified thereof; and that
despite a finding by public respondent of impropriety in the loan transaction
entered into by respondent governor, the former failed to justify the
reduction of the penalty of suspension on the latter. Petitioner further alleges
that the executive clemency granted by public respondent was "the product
of a hocus-pocus strategy" (p. 1, Manifestation with Motion, etc.) because
there was allegedly no real petition for the grant of executive clemency filed
by respondent governor.
Issue:
Whether or not pardon is applicable to administrative case
Ruling:
Yes, Pardon is applicable to administrative case.
It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
therefore, that the President's executive clemency powers may not be
limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the Constitution,
that is, "no pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation
of election laws, rules and regulations shall be granted by the President
without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC" (Article IX, C,
Section 5, Constitution). If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court
may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively should likewise be

extended the same benefit.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual
is proof beyond reasonable doubt, but the Constitution grants to the
President the power to pardon the act done by the proved criminal and in the
process exempts him from punishment therefor. On the other hand, in
administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial
evidence to support a decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility of
evidence, administrative bodies are not bound by the technical and rigid
rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will therefore be unjust
and unfair for those found guilty administratively of some charge if the same
effects of pardon or executive clemency cannot be extended to them, even
in the sense of modifying a decision to subserve the interest of the public.
It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases,
with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative
cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

Citation: Torres vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987
Facts:
This case is an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of the
petitioner Wilfredo Torres.Sometime before 1979 petitioner was convicted by
the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts) and
was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from eleven (11) years, ten
(10) months and twenty-two (22) days to thirty-eight (38) years, nine (9)
months and one (1) day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75. These
convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence
would expire on 2 November 2000.
On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by
the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would not again
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be
violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law.
Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released
from confinement.
On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the Board)
resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional
pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its recommendation to the
President, the Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs.
Director of Prisons (68 Phil. 154 [1939]) and Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden
of Bohol (108 Phil. 356 [1960]). The evidence before the Board showed that
on 22 March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged with
twenty counts of estafa.
On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President of
the Philippines informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending
cancellation of the conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner. On 8
September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the
petitioner. On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued by
authority of the President an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against
petitioner.
The
petitioner
was
accordingly
arrested
and
confined
in
Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.

Issue:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is
necessary before Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for
violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence.
Ruling:
Yes, the conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary
before Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the
terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his
original sentence
The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions
of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to
judicial scrutiny.
The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon,
and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely
executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for
and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of
a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the
violation of his conditional pardon.
Because due process is not semper etubique judicial process, and
because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded
judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he
was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned
and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the
Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against
him
under Article
159
of
the RPC which imposes
the penalty of
prisioncorreccional, minimum period, upon a convict who having been

granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the
conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to proceed
against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code. That choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and
is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

Citation: Barroquinto vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 1278, January 21, 1949
Facts:
This is a special action of mandamus instituted by the petitioners
against the respondents who composed the 14th Guerrilla Amnesty
Commission, to compel the latter to act and decide whether or not the
petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty.
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged
with the crime of murder. As the latter had not yet been arrested the case
proceeded against the former, and after trial the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life imprisonment. Before the period for
perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of
the Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946, which grants amnesty in
favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the
Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the
period from December 8, 1941, to the date when each particular area of the
Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from
enemy control and occupation, and said Jimenez decided to submit his case
to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission presided by the respondents herein,
and the other petitioner Loreto Barrioquinto, who had then been already
apprehended, did the same.
After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commission,
presided by the respondents, issued on January 9, 1947, an order returning
the cases of the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga,
without deciding whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the said
Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto
nor Jimenez have admitted having committed the offense, because
Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the
victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
The Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, issued by the
President with the concurrence of Congress of the Philippines, reads in part
as follows:WHEREAS, since the inception of the war and until the liberation
of the different areas comprising the territory of the Philippines, volunteer
armed forces of Filipinos and of other nationalities operated as guerrillas and
other patriotic individuals and groups pursued activities in opposition to the
forces and agents of the Japanese Empire in the invasion and occupation of
the Philippines;WHEREAS, members of such forces, in their determined
efforts to resist the enemy, and to bring about his ultimate defeat,
committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code;WHEREAS, charges
have been presented in the courts against many members of these
resistance forces, for such acts;WHEREAS, the fact that such acts were
committed in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy is not a valid
defense under the laws of the Philippines;WHEREAS, the persons so accused
should not be regarded as criminals but rather as patriots and heroes who
have rendered invaluable services to the nation; and.WHEREAS, it is
desirable that without the least possible delay, these persons be freed from
the indignity and the jeopardy to which they are now being subjected;NOW,
THEREFORE, I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, in accordance with
the provisions of Article VII, section 10, paragraph 6 of the Constitution, do
hereby declare and proclaim an amnesty in favor of all persons who
committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of
the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war effort of the
enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941 to the date
when each particular area of the Philippines was actually liberated from the
enemy control and occupation. This amnesty shall not apply to crimes
against chastity or to acts committed from purely personal motives.
It is further proclaimed and declared that in order to determine who
among those against whom charges have been filed before the courts of the
Philippines or against whom charges may be filed in the future, come within
the terms of this amnesty, Guerrilla Amnesty Commissions, simultaneously
to be established, shall examine the facts and circumstances surrounding

each case and, if necessary, conduct summary hearings of witnesses both
for the complainant and the accused. These Commissions shall decide each
case and, upon finding that it falls within the terms of this proclamation, the
Commissions shall so declare and this amnesty shall immediately be
effective as to the accused, who shall forthwith be released or discharged.
The Amnesty Commission returned the cases of the petitioners to the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding on the case saying
that since the Barrioquinto and Jimenez deny having committed the crime,
they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
Issue:
Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty
Ruling:
Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which
must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts
take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the President with
the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should
take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty
is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of
political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and
relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has

been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or
the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of
the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (art 36, RPC). While
amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense
itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged
that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or
sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which
he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the
evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense
committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is
not correct to say that invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature
of a plea of confession and avoidance. Although the accused does not
confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the
Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether
or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is
charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the
interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the
complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in

furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the
war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of
amnesty and to be regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered
invaluable services to the nation, or not, in accordance with the terms of the
Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the
courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take
notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted
therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded
or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence
presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.

Citation: Vera vs. People G.R. No. 18184, January 31, 1963
Facts:
In the Court of First Instance of Quezon, petitioners Gaudencio Vera,
RestitutoFigueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Florido, PaulinoBayran, and 92
others, as John Does, were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping
with murder of AmadeoLozanes, alias Azarcon. Upon petitioners' motion,
invoking the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation of the President, series of
1946, the case was referred to the Eighth Guerrilla Amnesty Commission,
which actually tried it.
During the hearing, none of the petitioner-defendants admitted having
committed the crime charged. In fact, Gaudencio Vera, the only defendant
who took the witness stand, instead of admitting the killing of the deceased
Lozanes categorically denied it. Hence, the Commission, in its decision of

January 12, 1956, held that it could not take cognizance of the case, on the
ground that the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, could be invoked only
by defendants in a criminal case who, admitting the commission of the
crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance
movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the
Japanese occupation. Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case
be remanded to the court of origin for trial. A motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioners was denied by the Commission in its order dated January 11,
1957, which partly reads:
The Commission is convinced that the motive for the kidnapping and killing
of Lt. AmadeoLozanes of the Hunters was the keen rivalry between the Vera's
Guerrilla Party and the Hunter's ROTC Guerrilla organizations. It is
noteworthy that the Hunters were driven away by General Vera from Pitogo
in December, 1944, and that after said kidnapping and killing on February 13
and 14, 1945, Mayor Ramon Isaac of Unisan, was in turn kidnapped by the
Hunters. Leopoldo Miciano, secretary of Col. de Luna of the Vera's Guerrilla
Party, testified that General Vera told him of his (Vera's) suspicion that Mayor
Isaac was kidnapped by way of reprisal as he, Vera, had ordered the
liquidation of Lt. Lozanes (dinispatcha).
In any event, since it is an established fact that when Lozanes was
kidnapped, tortured, and later killed, he was actually a lieutenant of the
Hunter's ROTC Guerrilla Organizations then engaged in the resistance

movement, it may not be said with any amount of truth that the aforesaid
killing was to further the resistance movement at the time, as the defense
intimate. Rather, the killing of Lt. Lozanes of the Hunters ROTC Guerrilla
would tend to weaken commensurately the resistance movement against the
Japanese invaders.
The Commission noted, however, that nowhere in the evidence of
record has it been shown that defendant Jaime Garcia had any participation
in the complex crime charged. Neither does the evidence reveal that he
admitted or disclaimed any role therein. Consequently, there would be no
room, either for his conviction, or for the application of the provisions of the
aforementioned amnesty proclamation.
For
all
foregoing
considerations,
this
Eighth
Guerrilla
Amnesty
Commission denies the defendants motion for reconsideration and maintains

its order contained in its decisions, to return the case to the Court of First
Instance of Quezon for the latter to act on it accordingly, not only because of
lack of jurisdiction, but also because, even if it has jurisdiction, the
defendants are not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty proclamation.
When Vera appealed, the amnesty commission denied the appeal,
adding that the facts of the case showed that the victim was a member of
another guerilla group and that the murder seemed to have stemmed from a
rivalry between the two groups.
Vera brought the case to the Court of Appeals, asking the CA to also rule, one
way or another, of the murder case. But the CA ruled that amnesty applies
only to those who had admitted the fact but said they should not be
punished for the crime done was in pursuance of resistance to the enemy. It
also said it could not take cognizance of the murder case because that came
from the amnesty commission, which had no jurisdiction over the murder
case. The case was brought to the Court on appeal, which cited People vs
Llanita, which said that it was inconsistent for an appellant to justify an act or
seek forgiveness for something which he said he has not committed.
Issue:
Whether or not an accused of the crime must admit the crime before
amnesty can be granted to him
Ruling:
Yes, an accused of the crime must admit the crime before amnesty can
be granted.
Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when the
accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any
use
for
amnesty.
Where
an
amnesty
proclamation
imposes
certain
conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the

existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a
plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the
allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of

intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the
scope of the amnesty proclamation.

Citation: Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989
Facts:
This is a petition for review raising the question on whether or not a
public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of
a new appointment.
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan

convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of
Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prisioncorreccional as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum,
and to pay a fine of P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly and
severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing
the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
Petitioner
Monsanto
appealed
her
conviction
to
this
Court
which
subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration
but while said motion was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984
by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December
21, 1984.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer
requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer
since the same was still vacant.
Petitioners letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for
resolution in view of the provision of the Local Government Code transferring
the power of appointment of treasurers from the city governments to the
said Ministry. In its 4th Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the Finance
Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended
the absolute pardon. It also directed the city treasurer to see to it that the
amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had required to be
indemnified in favor of the government as well as the costs of the litigation,
be satisfied.
The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President
and Factoran denied Monsantos request averring that Monsanto must first
seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former
position. Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the pardon, she should no
longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about by her
acts.
Issue:
Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post
Ruling:
No, Monsanto should not be reinstated to her former post.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no
amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense has been
established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered
while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain why
petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost
earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability arising from crime is
governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for
any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation
of sentence. Petitioners civil liability may only be extinguished by the same
causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due,
remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation.
In the case of State v. Hazzard, we find this strong observation: To
assume that all or even a major number of pardons are issued because of
innocence of the recipients is not only to indict our judicial system, but
requires us to assume that which we all know to be untrue. The very act of
forgiveness implies the commission of wrong, and that wrong has been
established by the most complete method known to modern civilization.
Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant
upon a conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of bad character, which
has been definitely fixed.
Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are
historical facts which, despite the public manifestation of mercy and
forgiveness implicit in pardon, ordinary, prudent men will take into account
in their subsequent dealings with the actor.
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the
penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But
unless expressly grounded on the persons innocence (which is rare), it
cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for
the collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They
cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic
reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A
pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from
refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor
moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.

Citation: Torres vs. Director of Bureau of Prisons, G.R. No. 122338,
December 29, 1995
Facts:
In this original petition for habeas corpus, the wife and children of
convicted felon Wilfredo Sumulong Torres pray for his immediate release
from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to determine the
occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of
pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of
innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First
Instance of Manila some time before 1979. These convictions were affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on November
2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the
President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. 5" Petitioner accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. 6
On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to
recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon
granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of
estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. On September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional
pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A.
Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and

Recommitment 7 against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested
and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
Torres impugned the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment in the
aforecited case of Torres v. Gonzales 8. There we ruled that:
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been
conditional pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of
his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against
him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, or (ii) to
proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code . . . Here,
the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the
President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. 9
Now, Torres, apparently through his wife and children, seeks anew
relief from this court. Unfortunately, there is no adequate basis for us to
oblige him.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a judicial pronouncement before the accused
can be convicted
Ruling:
We ruled consistently, viz., in Tesoro v. Director of Prisons, 1 Sales v.

Director of Prisons 2 Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol 3 and Torres v.
Gonzales, 4 that, where a conditional pardonee has allegedly breached a
condition of a pardon, the President who opts to proceed against him under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code need not wait for a judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for his conviction therefor
by final judgment, in order to effectuate the recommitment of the pardonee
to prison. The grant of pardon, the determination of the terms and conditions
of the pardon, the determination of the occurrence of the breach thereof, and
the proper sanctions for such breach, are purely executive acts and, thus, are
not subject to judicial scrutiny. We have so ruled in the past, and we so rule
now.
A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign
power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the
former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not
comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to
serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. 10 By the
pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has
thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his
delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the
terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest
and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to
comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension

of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this
exercise
of
presidential
judgment
is
beyond
judicial
scrutiny.
The
determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in

the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having
consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of
the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however
erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.
11
It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been
acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed against him subsequent to
his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains pending for thirteen
(13) years in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial.
Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has
been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the
incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the
grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach
thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would
have served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000.
Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was
the exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the
corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the
acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him,
warrants the same. Courts have no authority to interefer with the grant by
the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified
ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not
a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been
a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for
the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by
the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely
lodged in his office.
.

Topic: Who may Avail Amnesty
Citation: Macaga-an vs. People, G.R. No. 77317-50, July 29, 1987
Facts:
In a decision on July 15, 1981, the 22 petitioners were charged and
convicted in 33 cases for estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents. The total amount of government funds (treasury
warrants) involved was over 2.7 million.
Petitioners moved to close their cases on ground that they had been
given amnesty by former President Marcos on January 28 1986. The
Sandiganbayan required them to submit originals or authenticated copies of
their amnesty papers, which they were unable to produce. Petition was
denied.
According to the petitioners, they were given conditional amnesty on
February 2, 1985 through the 3rd and 11th amnesty commission (sic) of
Lanao del Sur and Marawi city, subject to the approval or final action of the
president of the Philippines pursuant t PD 1082.
The amnesty commission recommended the approval of their amnesty
or grant of executive clemency.
January 22, 1986: Former governor Governor Mohammed Ali Dimaporo made
written representations with Marcos concerning the applications during a
political rally of the KilusangBagongLipunaan. Marcos apparently wrote the
following on the upper right hand corner of Dimaporos letter:Approved and
signed the same with a partly illegible date.
Petitioners also state that the original copies of the amnesty papers
were lost or destroyed at Malacanang during the February 1986 Bloodless
Military Revolution and could not be located.
In a MR, petitioners sought to present secondary evidence of the
amnesty, but the Sandiganbayan did not allow it. Court also even if the
petitioners were to succeed in proving or authenticating the alleged amnesty
papers through secondary evidence, petitioners would nonetheless not be
entitled to discharge from the convictions rendered by that court. The
respondent court held that the benefits of amnesty were never available to
the petitioners under P.D. No. 1182.
Issue:
Whether or not PD 1082 applies to the petitioners
Ruling:
No, PD 1082 does not applies to the petitioners

Their acts were not offenses f rebellion.The offenses for which amnesty
may be granted under the provisions of PD 1082 are acts which were done in
furtherance of resistance to the Republic by members and supporters if the
MNLF and Bangsa Moro Army and other anti-government groups with similar
motivations and aims.
resistance= offenses of rebellion/insurrection/ sedition under crimes
against public order.
There is nothing in the case to indicate that the acts of the petitioners
were convicted were in the furtherance of resistance to the duly constituted
authorities of the Republic f the Philippines. On the contrary, the acts of
which the accused were convicted, the acts of which the accused were
convicted were ordinary crimes (albeit carefully plotted and systematically
carried out by numerous accused) without any political complexion and
consisting simply of diversion of public fund to private profit.
Petitioners fall under persons expressly disqualified from amnesty,
stated in section 2 paragraph A of PD 1182, which repealed PD 1082.
Petitioners applications for amnesty were also filed beyond the limit provided
in PD 1182.
PD 1182 sec 2 (a) Persons Disqualified: those who have promoted,
maintained or headed a rebellion office or employment took part therein,
engaged in war against the forces of the government, destroyed property or

committed violence, exacted contributions or diverted public funds from the
lawful purpose for which they had been appropriated; provide, that persons
who have been arrested and/or charged with having merely participated or
executed the commands of others in a rebellion may be granted amnesty.
Those who have been arrested and/or charged with murder, homicide,
serious physical injuries, crimes against chastity, robbery, piracy, arson,
hijacking, violations of the Firearms and Explosives Law, and assault upon
and resistance and disobedience to persons in authority and their agents,
except if such crime or offense was committed in furtherance of subversion
or crimes against public order as a mere participant/affiliate/member.
SEC. 4.Conditions for the grant of amnesty. Any person applying for
amnesty pursuant to this Decree must satisfy the following requirements: a.
If under arrest or charged as of the date of this decree, he must submit his
application not later than September 30, 1978 in the prescribed form hereto
attached as Annex A; If not under arrest, he must submit such application
within six months after his arrest or surrender;b. He must renew his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and swear or affirm to support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines; and c. He must surrender
whatever unlicensed firearms and/or explosives and ammunition he may
have in his possession."
As pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, under the very legislation

authorizing the amnesty,(a) The crimes to be amnestied must have been for
violations of subversion laws or those defined and proscribed under crimes
against public order under the Revised Penal Code; and(b) The applications
for amnesty must have been filed not later than September 30, 1978 or six
months after the arrest or surrender of the applicant for amnesty." (Emphasis
supplied).
In the instant case, the petitioners were charged with and convicted of
defrauding the Republic by diverting public funds from their intended public
uses to private and personal use and gain, under Article 315 in relation to
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 315 is found in Title 10,
Chapter 6, of that Code which defines Crimes against Property. The estafa
was committed through the falsification of documents described in Article
171, entitled classification by Public Officer, Employee or Notary or
Ecclessiastical Minister" found in Title 4, entitled Crimes Against Public
Interest, of the Revised Penal Code. Clearly, petitioners fall under Section 2
(a) as persons expressly disqualified from amnesty under P.D. 1182, as
amended. Petitioners' applications for amnesty were also filed way beyond
the time limit established under P.D. 1182, as amended, since petitioners
were convicted by the Sandiganbayan on 15 July 1981; their applications for
amnesty were filed only in 1984
The instant case therefore presents the issue of what effect, if any,
may be given to supposed acts of the former President which were in conflict
with or in violation of decrees issued by that same former President. So
viewed, this Court has no alternative save to declare that the supposed acts
of the former President done in 1985 in clear conflict with the restrictions
embodied in the very decrees promulgated by that same former President,
cannot be given any legal effect. It may be supposed that the former
President could have validly amended Presidential Decrees Nos. 1082 and
1182 so as to wipe away the restrictions and limitations in fact found in those
decrees. But the former President did not so amend his own decrees and he
must be held to the terms and conditions that he himself had promulgated in
the exercise of legislative power.
It may be we do not completely discount the possibility that the former
President did in fact act in contravention of the decrees here involved by
granting the amnesty claimed by petitioners, and that by such acts, he may
indeed have aroused expectations (however unjustified under the terms of
existing law) in the minds of the petitioners. If such be the case, then the
appropriate recourse of the petitioners is not to this Court, nor to any other
court, but rather to the Executive Department of the government.

Topic: Military Powers
Citation: Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora G.R. No.
141284, August 15, 2000
Facts
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of
the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief
to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of
the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anticrime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period
only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a
petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and
void and unconstitutional.
Issue
Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy
over the military and the civilian character of the PNP
Ruling:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless
violence,
invasion
or
rebellion,
he
necessarily
exercises
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may
review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such
equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents
action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out
power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the
framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers
and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers
highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest
discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser
and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which
involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and
review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full

discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed
forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents
decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to
discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the
Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of
Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not
constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the
operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not
with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as
members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to
speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols
does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

Citation: Lacson vs. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001
Facts:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation
No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and
the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several
alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected.
Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with
an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of

preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and
the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners
furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against
them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition
is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending
warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders
were issued against them.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless

arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effect by the same
Ruling:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May
6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and
academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the
police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts
for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests
of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the
circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on

Proc. No. 38. Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at
this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate
remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary
investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period
in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper
judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be
penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal
ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not
prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners
were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor
were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To
declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the
proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for relief
regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being
that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore,
the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve
unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their
undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives,
and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting
Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in
relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.

Citation: David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the EDSA People Power I, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in a move to
suppress alleged plans to overthrow the government, issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of national emergency.
She cited as factual bases for the said issuance the escape of the Magdalo
Group and their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day; the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine Marines; and the reproving statements

from the communist leaders. On the same day, she issued General Order No.
5 (G.O. No. 5) setting the standards which the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) should follow in the
suppression and prevention of acts of lawless violence. The following were
considered as additional factual bases for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5: the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan
and Bataan; the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of
three soldiers; and the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines
ordering its front organizations to join5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000
more from the provinces in mass protests. Immediately, the Office of the
President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to
the 20th People Power I anniversary celebration. It revoked permits to hold
rallies .Members of the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and the National Federation
of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), who marched from various
parts of Metro Manila to converge at the EDSA Shrine, were violently
dispersed by anti-riot police. Professor Randolf David, Akbayan
party-list
president Ronald Llamas, and members of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU were
arrested without a warrant. In the early morning of February 25, 2006,
operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) raided
the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and confiscated news stories, documents,
pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen were stationed
inside the editorial and business offices, as well as outside the building. A
few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the
police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper,
Malaya,
and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante .The PNP warned that it would
take over any media organization that would not follow standards set by the
government during the state of national emergency.On March 3, 2006,
exactly one week from the declaration of a state of national emergency and
after all the present petitions had been filed, President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 1021 (PP 1021), declaring that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist and lifting PP1017. These
consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.
It is contended that respondent officials of the Government, in their
professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually
trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the
Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing
Ruling:
Yes, the petitioners have legal standing in view of the transcendental
importance of the issue involved.
It has been held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. Taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue,
provided that the following requirements are met: (a)the cases involve
constitutional issues; (b)for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(c)for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election law in question; (d)for concerned citizens, there must be a
showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must
be settled early; and (e)for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Being a mere procedural technicality, however, the requirement of
locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. The
question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper
exercise of judicial power. Undoubtedly, the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O
No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino
people. In view of the transcendental importance of this issue, all the
petitioners are declared to have locus standi.

Citation: Fortun vs. GMA, G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012
Facts:
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling
Ampatuan family of Maguindanao gunned down and buried under shoveled
dirt 57 innocent civilians.
In response to this carnage, President Arroyo
issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of emergency in

Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress.
On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to review the
validity of the Presidents action. But two days later, or on December 12,
2009, before Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial
law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and
restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, render the issues moot
and academic?
Ruling:
YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
[privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, rendered the issues moot and
academic.
Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government

dictate that the Court should be cautious in entertaining actions that assail
the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative
department.
The issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v.
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, must be the very issue of the case, that
the resolution of such issue is unavoidable. The issue of the constitutionality
of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons: One.
President
Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress
could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the
same.
Under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in
tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only
sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the
proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same
based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the
President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme

Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must
allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather
than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the
Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its
final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political
question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the
hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint
houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same.
Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court
has nothing to review.
The lifting of martial law and restoration of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening

event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days,
they have not been meaningfully implemented.
The military did not take
over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao.

The President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that
should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had
been reported.
Those who were arrested during the period were either
released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus

had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days.
The point is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising
in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the
rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined
and amply armed government presence. . In a real sense, the proclamation
and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without
touching the matter, it having become moot and academic.

Citation:
Buscayno
vs.
Military
Commission,
G.R.
No.
58284,
November 11, 1981

Facts:
Petitioners BernabeBuscayno Jose Ma.Sison and Juliet Sison, were
charged with subversion by the Military Commission in different charge
sheets on different dates for acts committed prior to the effectivity of P.D NO.
885 on May 11, 1976 amending Republlic Act No. 1700, the anti-subversion
law. The three petitioners were all charged with rebellion in an amended
charge sheet but only the subversion and murder cases against Buscayno
were decided by the Military Commission with the penalty of death by firing
squad although the decision is still subject to review.
Bernabe Buscayno alias Commander Dante and Jose Ma.Sison alias
Amado Guerrero, alleged subversives classified as PKP/HMB/CPP/MAMAO
and Traditional Armed Group personalities were wanted by the authorities
since 1971.
Buscayno and Sison were included in the so called National Target
List of active participants in the conspiracy to seize political and state power
and to take over the government by force whose arrest was ordered under
General Order No. 2 dated September 22, 1972. The list was prepared by
Colonel Hamilton B. Dimaya.
On October 2, 1981, Buscayno and the Sison spouses filed the instant
omnibus, catchall petition for habeas corpus, prohibition and mandamus
couched in repetitious, involutes and obfuscator verbiage.
They prayed that the decision of Military Commission No. 2 dated May
4, 1981, convicting Buscayno of subversion and murder and sentencing him
to death by firing squad, be declared void because he was denied his
constitutional right to present evidence and that he be released from
detention.
They also prayed that the charges of rebellion and subversion be
dismissed for being in contravention of the rule on double jeopardy, that
Military Commission No. 1,6 and 25 be enjoined from proceeding with the
trial of the petitioners and that the petitioners be released. They also prayed
that they be granted bail.
The petitioners also asked for issuance of temporary restraining order,
enjoining the three Commissions from trying the petitioners, enjoining
Military Commission No. 1 from continuing with perpetuation of testimonies
and from requiring the petitioners to attend the perpetuation proceedings
and enjoining the Review Board AFP from reviewing the decision in the
subversion and murder cases.
Petitioners contended that criminal liability for subversion was

extinguished when Presidential Decree No. 885 (which took effect on May 11,
1976, 72 OG 3826) repealed Republic Act No. 1700.
Issue:
Whether or not criminal liability for subversion be extinguished for acts
committed prior to the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 885 amending
Republic Act No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law
Ruling:
Habeas corpus and the petitioners release on bail. The ultimate issue is
whether they are legally detained. We find that they have not been illegally
deprived of their liberty and that there is no justification to order their
release. Proclamation No. 2045 explicitly provides that persons, like
petitioners who are detention for rebellion and the capital offense of
subversion, cannot enjoy the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus because
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to them, they are
not entitled to bail.
Review of rulings of the military commission. This court cannot review
the rulings and proceedings of the military commission. The National
Security Code, Presidential Decree No. 1498, which was issued on June 11,
1978 (74 OG 11066), provides in its sections 86 (f) and 87(e) that what this
court can review are the decision of the court of military appeals in cases
appealed to it from the military commission.
The propriety of the perpetuation proceedings in the rebellion case and
the conduct of the trial in the commission cannot at this stage be passed
upon by this court. We have definitively ruled that the petitioners can be
tried by the military commissions and that their cases are within the
jurisdiction and competence of military tribunals.
Legal issue the alleged repeal of the Anti-Subversion Law may be

resolved in the interest of justice, to dissipate any uncertainty and for the
guidance of the parties.
Revised Anti-Subversion Law, in repealing or superseding Republic Act
No. 1700, expressly provides in its section 7 that acts committed in
violation of the former law before the effectivity of said decree shall be
prosecuted and punished in accordance with the provisions of the former
Act Republic Act No. 1700. That saving or transitory clause is reenacted in
section 14(i) of the National Security Code.
The fact that PD No. 885 does not mention the CPP does not mean that
the party is no longer regarded as subversive organization.

Topic: Emergency Power vs Declaration of State of Emergency
Citation: Ampatuan, et.al vs. Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011
Facts:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57
men
and
women,
then
President
Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo
issued
Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan

Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed
the AFP and the PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the
Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in the named places. Under AO 273, she also delegated to the DILG
the supervision of the ARMM.
The petitioners claimed that the Presidents issuances encroached the
ARMMs autonomy, that it constitutes an invalid exercise of emergency
powers, and that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of
emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of
Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. They want Proc. 1946
and AO 273 be declared unconstitutional.
The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to deprive the
ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places. It is
pursuant
to
her
calling
out
power
as
Commander-in-Chief.
The
determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.
The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM
to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. The delegation was
necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings.
Issue:
Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers
when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato
City
Ruling:
No, President Arroyo validly exercised emergency powers when she
called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
Such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as
understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides:
SECTION 23. x xx (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of

emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to
any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary
powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the
President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, which provides.
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. x xx
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the
Presidents exercise of the above power,it would generally defer to her
judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Hon. Zamora,it is clearly to the President that the Constitution
entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to
prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such
determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will
accord respect to the Presidents judgment.

Topic: Diplomatic Power
Citation: Nicolas vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009
Facts:
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the
United States Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape
committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on November 1,
2005 and was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape in
the RTC of Makati. The court ordered Smith detained at the Makati City Jail
until further orders.
On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of
the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents,
purportedly acting under orders of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government, and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the
United States government, provided for under new agreements between the
Philippines and the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney
Agreement of December 19, 2006 which states:
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government

of the United States of America agree that, in accordance with the
Visiting Forces Agreement signed between our two nations, Lance
Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to
U.S. military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.
And the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states:
The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines
and the Embassy of the United States of America agree that, in accordance
with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between the two nations, upon
transfer of Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, from
the Makati City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG)
Building, U.S. Embassy Compound in a room of approximately 10 x 12 square
feet. He will be guarded round the clock by U.S. military personnel. The
Philippine police and jail authorities, under the direct supervision of the
Philippine Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) will have
access to the place of detention to ensure the United States is in compliance
with the terms of the VFA.
Petitioner JovitoSalonga, et al. challenged the validity of the said
agreements contending that the Philippines should have custody of Smith
because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional since it violates Art.
XVlll, Sec. 25 of the constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the VFA is constitutional and the Romulo-Kenney
Agreements in accordance with the provisions of the VFA itself
Ruling:
Yes, the VFA is constitutional and the Romulo-Kenney Agreements in

accordance with the provisions of the VFA itself.
The SC ruled The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February
10, 1998, is constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December
19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA.
VFA is Constitutional. The SC ruled that the VFA was duly concurred in
by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United
States, and the fact that (it) was not submitted for advice and consent of
the United States does not detract from its status as a binding international
agreement or treaty recognized by the said State.
Section 25, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution provides that foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
The issue, the Court said, is whether or not the presence of the US
Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State. It is, the Court ruled. The VFA, which is the
instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is
simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty, the Court held. The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951
was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine
Senate and the United States Senate.
The Court however ruled that the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of
December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the
accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself
because such detention is not by Philippine authorities. Article V, Section
10 of the VFA provides that the confinement or detention by Philippine
authorities of the United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities
agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities.

Citation: Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000
Facts:
The instant petitions for c e r tio r a ri and prohibition assailed the
agreement forged between the RP and the USA THE VISITING FORCES
AGREEMENT , which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the
Philippine territory by the US military personnel to strengthen their defense
and security relationship. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada
ratied the VFA, and then transmitted to the Senate his letter of ratication and
the VFA for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution. The Senate subsequently approved the VFA by a 2/3 vote of its
members. From these consolidated petitions, petitioners as legislators,
non-governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers assailed the
constitutionality of the VFA and imputed to respondents grave abuse of

discretion in ratifying the agreement.
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The
agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was
ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the
total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further
defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
Issue:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of
Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?
Ruling:
Yes, The VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or
of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or

facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently
met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred
in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of
the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as
a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the
case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution
No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the
provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has
not required it.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a
treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United
States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate
for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to
the phrase.
Well-entrenched
is
the
principle
that
the
words
used
in
the
Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical

terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in
common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the
VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA
possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
The records reveal that the United States Government, through

Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States
government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as
long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a
treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty,
there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

Citation: Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6,
2005
Facts:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the
Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to
transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which
shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most
serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to
the national criminal jurisdictions.[1] Its jurisdiction covers the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression
as defined in the Statute.[2] The Statute was opened for signature by all
states in Rome on July 17, 1998 and had remained open for signature until
December 31, 2000 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. The
Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge d
Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations.[3]
Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance
or approval of the signatory states.
According to the petitioner under the domestic law and international
law it is the duty of the exec. department to transmit it to senate for the
senate to exercise its discretion to ratify treaties.
Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification
unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the
treaty.
Office of the Solicitor General, questioned the standing of the
petitioners to file the instant suit. It also contended that the petition at bar
violates the rule on hierarchy of courts. On the substantive issue raised by
petitioners, respondents argue that the executive department has no duty to
transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.
We have held that to be given due course, a petition for mandamus
must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of
any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said
party from the enjoyment of a legal right. The petitioner in every case must
therefore be an aggrieved party in the sense that he possesses a clear legal
right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed.
[7] The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is
brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the
constitutional or legal question. Legal standing means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is being
challenged.
The petition at bar was filed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. who
asserts his legal standing to file the suit as member of the Senate;
Congresswoman
Loretta
Ann
Rosales,
member
of
the
House
of
Representatives and Chairperson of its Committee on Human Rights; the

Philippine Coalition for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court
which is composed of individuals and corporate entities dedicated to the
Philippine ratification of the Rome Statute; the Task Force Detainees of the
Philippines, a juridical entity with the avowed purpose of promoting the
cause of human rights and human rights victims in the country; the Families
of Victims of Involuntary Disappearances, a juridical entity duly organized
and existing pursuant to Philippine Laws with the avowed purpose of
promoting the cause of families and victims of human rights violations in the
country; Bianca Hacintha Roque and Harrison Jacob Roque, aged two (2) and
one (1), respectively, at the time of filing of the instant petition, and suing
under the doctrine of inter-generational rights enunciated in the case of
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.;[9] and a group of fifth year working law students from
the University of the Philippines College of Law who are suing as taxpayers.
We find that among the petitioners, only Senator Pimentel has the
legal standing to file the instant suit. As regards Senator Pimentel, it has
been held that to the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate
in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Thus,
legislators
have
the
standing
to
maintain
inviolate
the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office

and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which
they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators. The petition at bar

invokes the power of the Senate to grant or withhold its concurrence to a
treaty entered into by the executive branch, in this case, the Rome Statute.
The petition seeks to order the executive branch to transmit the copy of the
treaty to the Senate to allow it to exercise such authority. Senator Pimentel,
as member of the institution, certainly has the legal standing to assert such
authority of the Senate.
Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign
Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the
Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United
Nations even without the signature of the President
Ruling:
No, the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs
have no ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome
Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations
even without the signature of the President.
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is

regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the
countrys sole representative with foreign nations.[12] As the chief architect

of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect
to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to
deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition,
maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the
business of foreign relations.[13] In the realm of treaty-making, the President
has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine
representative with ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of
the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the
treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily
intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the
good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the states authorized
representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is
the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a
treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive
act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government.
Executive Order No. 459 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 25,
1997 provides the guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements
and its ratification. It mandates that after the treaty has been signed by the
Philippine representative, the same shall be transmitted to the Department
of Foreign Affairs. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall then prepare the
ratification papers and forward the signed copy of the treaty to the President
for ratification. After the President has ratified the treaty, the Department of
Foreign Affairs shall submit the same to the Senate for concurrence.
Petitioners submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and
international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The
signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the
ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome
Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states
be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.
Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally
confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf,
a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty.
After the treaty is signed by the states representative, the President, being
accountable to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty
to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not
inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has
the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine
representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this
power of the head of states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of
treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no
legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its
plenipotentiaries.[18] There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it

goes without saying that the refusal must be based on substantial grounds
and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would
be justified in taking offense.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is

vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of
the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification.[20] Hence, it is within the authority of the
President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its
consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it.[21] Although the refusal of a
state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step
that should not be taken lightly,[22] such decision is within the competence
of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of
mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official duties.[23] The Court, therefore,
cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is
beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to
transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
Citation: Vinuya vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 162230, July 19, 2010
Facts:
The Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as it barred future claims such
as those asserted by plaintiffs in these actions, exchanged full compensation
of plaintiffs for a future peace. History has vindicated the wisdom of that
bargain. And while full compensation for plaintiffs' hardships, in the purely
economic sense, has been denied these former prisoners and countless other
survivors of the war, the immeasurable bounty of life for themselves and
their posterity in a free society and in a more peaceful world services the
debt.
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Secretary of the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, nonprofit organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by
Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese
army attacked villages and systematically raped the women as part of the
destruction of the village. Their communities were bombed, houses were
looted and burned, and civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and
slaughtered. Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women and held them in
houses or cells, where they were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused by
Japanese soldiers. As a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the
petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries,
pain and disability, and mental and emotional suffering.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive
Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a
claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. However,
officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and
took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for
compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the
Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of
discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other
forms of reparations against Japan
Ruling
No, the Executive Department did not committed grave abuse of
discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other
forms of reparations against Japan.
From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the

exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims
against Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign
relations. It is well-established that the conduct of the foreign relations of
our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislativethe politicaldepartments of the government, and the propriety
of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those
directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and
courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and
executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine
government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the
political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already

decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its
nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the
conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in
time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents
in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause
would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt
our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in
this region. For the to overturn the Executive Departments determination
would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate
political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been
constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general
principle, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the
treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given
ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a
claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the
petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies
are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for

individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been
when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the
individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by
resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of
its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise
diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit,
for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal
person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not
adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can
do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering
their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the
province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations
will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes
committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time
the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of
international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of
jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international

law has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States
towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be
drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international
community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field
of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of
all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be
held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga
omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that
command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom.
Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are
mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general
international norms of equivalent authority

Citation: Go Tek vs. Deportation Board, G.R. No. 23846, September
9, 1977
Facts:
This is a deportation case. On March 3, 1964 the chief prosecutor of
the Deportation Board filed a complaint against Go Tek a Chinaman residing
at Ilagan, Isabela and 1208-B, Misericordia Street, Sta. Cruz Manila.
It was alleged in the complaint that in December, 1963 certain agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) searched an office located at 1439
O'Donnel Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila believed to be the headquarters of a
guerilla unit of the "Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the United
States" and that among those arrested thereat was Go Tek an alleged sector
commander and intelligence and record officer of that guerilla unit.It was
further alleged that fake dollar checks were found in Go Tek's possession and
that, therefore, he had violated article 168 of the Revised Penal Code and
rendered himself an undesirable alien.
The prosecutor prayed that after trial the Board should recommend to
the President of the Philippines the immediate deportation of Go Tek as an
undesirable alien, "his presence in this country having been, and will always
be and a menace to the peace , welfare, and security of the community
Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was
premature bemuse them was a pending case against him in the city fiscal's
office of Manila for violation of article. He contended that the board had no
jurisdiction to try the case in view of the obiter dictum in Qua Chee Gan vs.
Deportation Board.
The Board, composed of Manuel A. Concordia, Arturo A. Alafriz and
Manuel V. Reyes, in its resolution of April 21, 1964 denied Go Teks motion.
The Board reasoned out that a conviction is not a prerequisite before the
State my exercise its rights to deport an undesirable alien and that the Board
is only a fact finding body whose function is to make a report and
recommendation to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive power to
deport an alien or a deportation proceeding.
In view of the denial of his motion to quash, Go Tek on June 10, 1964 filed in
the Court of First Instance of Manila a prohibition action against the Board.
On July 8, 1964 the court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
the board from hearing Go Tek's case.After hearing, the trial court (Judge
Federico C. Alikpala presiding) in its decision of 31, 1964 granted the writ
prohibition and the Board to desist from taking cognizance of the Go Tek.
The court, citing the said obiter dictum in the Qua Chee Gan case, held
that mere ion of forged dollar checks is not a ground for deportation under
the Immigration Law; that under section 37(3) of the law before an alien may
be deported for having been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a
term of one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude a conviction is
and that since Go Tek had not been convicted of the offense punished in
article 168, the deportation was premature.
The Board appealed to this Court on the ground that the decision is contrary
to law. The Solicitor General contends that the trial court erred in assuming
that
the
President
may
deport
undesirable
aliens
only
to
grounds
enumerated by law; in holding that mere possession of forged dollar checks

is not a ground for deportation and that a criminal conviction is necessary,
and in not finding that the Board has jurisdiction over Go Tek's case.
The parties stipulated that the Deportation Board is an of the President
of the Philippines charged with the investigation of undesirable aliens and to
report and recommend proper action on the basis of its findings therein."
Issue:
Whether or not the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation
proceeding based on a ground which is not specified in section 37 of the
Immigration Law and although the aliens has not yet been convicted of the
offense imputed to him.
Ruling:
We hold that the Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek for illegal
possession of fake dollar checks (as well as his alleged "guerilla" activities) in
spite of the fact that he has not yet been convicted of illegal possession
thereof under article 168 of the Revised Penal Code and notwithstanding that
act is not the grounds for the deportation of undesirable aliens as
enumerated in section 37 of the Immigration Law. The charge against Go Tek
before- the Board was not premature.
The aforementioned obiter dictum the Qua Chee Gan case invoked by
Go Tek and relied upon by the trial court, is not of this case. In the Qua Chee
Gan case the aliens were with economic sabotage which is a ground for
deportation under Republic Act No. 503.
The ratio decidendi of the Qua Chee Gan case is that the provision of
Executive Order No. 398, of 1951, the Deportation Board to issue a warrant
of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien, is "illegal" or
unconstitutional because it is contrary to the provinsion in section 1(3),
Article III of the 1935 Constitution that warrants shall issue upon to be de by
the judge after e under oath the t and the witness he may produce. (Note
that under section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution cause may be
determined "by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law".
On the other hand, section 37 of the Immigration Law Provides that
certain aliens may be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and
deported upon the Commissioner's warrant - "after a determination by the
Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien." Thirteen classes of aliens who may be deported
by the Commissioner are specified in section 37.
So, under existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be
effected (1) by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to
section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner
of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under
section 37 of the immigration Law.
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens
(ChuocoTiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125).
That power may be exercise by the Chief Executive "when he deems such
action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation Justice
Johnson's is that there the Chief Executive rinds that there are aliens whose
continued in the country is injurious to the public interest he may, even in
the absence of express law, deport them.
As observed by Justice Labrador, there is no legal nor constitutes
provision defining the power to deport aliens because the intention of the
law is to grant the Chief Executive "full discretion to determine whether an
alien's residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the
security welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which
deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive whose

decision is final and executory." (Tan Tong vs. Deportation Board 96 Phil. 934,
936; Tan Sin vs. Deportation Board, 104 PhiL 868, 872).
It has been held that the Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive
judge of the existence of facts which warrant the deportation of aliens as
disclosed in an investigation conducted in accordance with 69. No other
tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or to controvert the sufficiency of the
evidence on which he acted "It is fundamental that an executive order for
deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a case" (Ang
Bong vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 100 Phil. 801, 803). Thus, it was held
that the fact that an alien has been acquitted in a of the charge does not
prevent the deportation of such alien based on the same charge. Such
acquittal does not constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings.
Conviction of a crime is not n to warrant deportation. (3 C.J.S. 743, note 40,
citing Lewis vs. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 58 L. Ed. 967 and U.S. ex..Mastoras vs.
McCandless 61 F. 2nd 366; Tama Miyake vs. U.S. 257 F. 732).
And in the Tan Tong case, supra, it was ruled that the Deportation
Board could take cognizance of the charge of illegal importation against an
alien as a ground for deportation, even if he of the Deportation Board is
merely recommendatory. The Chief Executive has to approve the board's
recommendatory Abuses or rents committed by the prosecutor or by the
Board should first be brought to his attention..

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Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: Power of Appointment

In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37

owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full

Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other

appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16,

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Bautista's refusal to surrender her post. Malilin invoked EO 163-A which

CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the President for it is

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

seven to nine trustees.

Later, Executive Order No. 1058, issued on 10

October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11.

Eventually, during the term of

On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed

respective oaths of office and assumed the

performance of their duties in early January 1999.

On the other hand, the appellate courts Decision

ousted the Rufino group from the CCP Board.

PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be

On 3 August 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the Rufino groups

The Court of Appeals also denied the Endriga

groups motion for immediate execution of the 14 May 1999 Decision.

By stating that the President shall have control of all the

executive x xx offices, the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

President Macapagal appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Garcia ad interim Director. He qualified by taking the oath of office on the

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002,

March 17, 2010

appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,

Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief

Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

forquowarranto seeking to be declared the person legally entitled to said

suspension by the House or the adjournment by the Senate to resume the

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Citation: Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

on June 5, 2001 their appointments to the Commission on Appointments for

appointments for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments.

took their oaths of office anew.

reassignment in a Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 12 addressed to the

against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated

appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional

to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the

Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office.

The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

since the claimants-employees had assumed their respective positions and

procedures/criteria provided in the agencys Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp.

Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident

Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent

Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally created office of the

military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's

beconsidered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would

The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed

Subject: Constitutional Law 1