Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
339
Hermeneutik
der frhchristlichen
Wundererzhlungen
Geschichtliche, literarische und
rezeptionsorientierte Perspektiven
Herausgegeben von
Mohr Siebeck
Bernd Kollmann; 1989 Promotion, 1995 Habilitation in Gttingen; 19962000 Vertretungsprofessuren in Aachen und Siegen; seit 2000 Professor fr Neues Testament an der
Universitt Siegen.
Ruben Zimmermann; 1999 Promotion in Heidelberg; 2003 Habilitation in Mnchen;
2004 Vertretungsprofessur in Hamburg; 200509 Professur in Bielefeld; seit 2009 Professor fr Neues Testament an der Johannes Gutenberg-Universitt Mainz.
ISBN 978-3-16-152465-3
ISSN 0512-1604 (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament)
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Natio
nalbibliographie; detaillierte bibliographische Daten sind im Internet ber http://dnb.dnb.
de abrufbar.
2014 Mohr Siebeck Tbingen. www.mohr.de
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papier gedruckt und von der Grobuchbinderei Spinner in Ottersweier gebunden.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Vorwort .................................................................................................. V
I. Grundfragen
Bernd Kollmann
Von der Rehabilitierung mythischen Denkens und
der Wiederentdeckung Jesu als Wundertter.
Meilensteine der Wunderdebatte von der Aufklrung bis zur Gegenwart .. 3
Ruben Zimmermann
Von der Wut des Wunderverstehens.
Grenzen und Chancen einer Hermeneutik der Wundererzhlungen ......... 27
Craig S. Keener
Miracle Reports: Perspectives, Analogies, Explanations ........................ 53
Gerd Theien
Wunder Jesu und urchristliche Wundergeschichten.
Historische, psychologische und theologische Aspekte .......................... 67
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Manfred Clauss
Wunder und Kaiserkult ........................................................................ 153
Erkki Koskenniemi
Apollonius of Tyana, the Greek Miracle Workers in the
Time of Jesus and the New Testament .................................................. 165
Eric Eve
Jesus Miracles in their Historical and Cultural Context ....................... 183
Graham H. Twelftree
Exorcism in Early Christianity ............................................................. 205
Reinhard von Bendemann
Elementar feurige Hitze.
Zur Krankheitshermeneutik frhjdischer, hellenistisch-rmischer
und frhchristlicher Fieberheilungen .................................................... 231
Pieter F. Craffert
What Actually Happened?
Miracle Stories in Anthropological Historical Perspective ................... 263
Marco Frenschkowski
Antike kritische und skeptische Stimmen zum Wunderglauben
als Dialogpartner des frhen Christentums ........................................... 283
Inhaltsverzeichnis
XI
Wendy J. Cotter
The Function of the Outrageous Petitioner in Pre-Markan
Miracle Anecdotes ............................................................................... 395
Cornelis Bennema
Character Analysis and Miracle Stories in the Gospel of Mark ............. 413
Paul Borgman
Pattern and Purpose in Johns Gospel: the Seven Miracle Stories ......... 427
Kristina Dronsch
In Wunder verstrickt: eine medio-theologische Pointe der Wundergeschichten im Markusevangelium .......................................................... 445
Ruben Zimmermann
Phantastische Tatsachenberichte?!
Wundererzhlungen im Spannungsfeld zwischen
Historiographie und Phantastik ............................................................ 469
IV. Rezeptionsperspektiven
Christian Mnch
Erzhlung und Ereignis.
Zur theologischen Deutung der Wundergeschichten .............................. 497
Stefan Alkier
Das Kreuz mit den Wundern oder Wunder ohne Kreuz?
Semiotische, exegetische und theologische Argumente wider die
formgeschichtliche Verkrzung der Wunderforschung ......................... 515
Istvn Czachesz
How to Read Miracle Stories with Cognitive Theory.
On Harry Potter, Magic, and Miracle ................................................... 545
Susanne Luther
Die ethische Signifikanz der Wunder.
Eine Relecture der Wundererzhlungen der apokryphen Thomasakten
unter ethischer Perspektive .................................................................. 559
Eugen Drewermann
Tiefenpsychologische Hermeneutik von Wundererzhlungen ............... 589
XII
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Ulrike Metternich
Wunderdeutungen in der Feministischen Theologie
und Bibelwissenschaft .......................................................................... 607
Markus Schiefer Ferrari
Gestrte Lektre.
Dis/abilitykritische Hermeneutik biblischer Heilungserzhlungen
am Beispiel von Mk 2,112 ................................................................. 627
Reinhold Zwick
Die Wunder Jesu im Film.
Grenzfall der sthetik und (film-)theologische Herausforderung ......... 647
Annike Rei
Mit Kindern und Jugendlichen ber Wunder theologisieren ................. 663
Autorenverzeichnis ............................................................................... 679
Stellenregister ...................................................................................... 683
Autorenregister .................................................................................... 692
Namen- und Sachregister ..................................................................... 709
1. Mental Candy
As the first Harry Potter books appeared in the late nineties, I happened to
visit a congregation in rural Hungary. On the shelf where hymnals, bibles,
and devotional literature were displayed for sale I spotted a pamphlet, next
to the weekly of the Reformed Church, entitled Why Harry Potter is
against Christian Faith. I became curious and inquired the minister about
his opinion on the books and the threat he thought they would pose for
Christian readers. At some point of the conversation I asked him straightforward, Do you really believe in people flying around on broomsticks?
Of course not, he answered with some indignation. Then what really is
the problem? I countered. Indeed, when confining Harry Potter strictly to
the realm of fiction, his harmful effects seemed less imminent.
However, the problem is not so easy to dismiss. If people cannot fly on
broomsticks, perhaps they cannot walk on water either. This way of thinking leads us to question the world-view of the first Christians. And if that
world-view proves to be untenable, we will have to purge the Christian
message from the outdated elements. But perhaps we should not move too
rapidly in that direction. As I will show in this chapter, Harry Potters
dealings, together with biblical miracle stories, are here to stay for the reason that they are mental candies. Why are miracles so alluring? Why do
people who do not confess religious faith nevertheless immerse themselves
in narrative worlds of mystery and miracle? And why has the allure of
miracles remained unbroken since antiquity allowing us to be fascinated
by the very same narratives that attracted ancient people?
From the perspective of modern Western readers, miracle stories (often)
go against modern scientific knowledge. According to modern common
sense, illness can be healed by killing off pathogens with the help of antibiotics, removing damaged tissue and mending broken bones, not by prayer and the laying on of hands, let alone by words uttered from a distance.
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This is, however, hardly the full story. Without knowing bacteria, Newtonian mechanics, and Copernican cosmology, ancient intellectuals expressed skepticism about miracles. The most famous among them is probably Lucian of Samosata, who especially reprimanded the use of miracle
stories in historical narratives (Luc., Philops.; Ver. Hist. 14). Long before
Lucian, arguing probably against Herodotus, Thucydides in his History of
the Peloponnesian War required that no fables, however entertaining,
should be included in a work of history (Thuc. 1.22). Both Josephus and
Philo, while zealously dedicated to Jewish religion, were reserved when it
came to miracles.1 It is obvious that some ancient elite thinkers had a sense
of skepticism or at least reservation about miracle stories, in spite of holding a world-view in which the supernatural played an important role.
Again, attitudes toward the miraculous (this time skepticism) seem to depend on more than just modern or pre-modern world-views. I will suggest
that the dynamics of intuitive and reflective thinking largely determine the
reception of miracle stories.
In order to understand what attracts us to miracles intuitively, we have
to take a step back and think about learning and culture from a psychological perspective. Human culture is made possible by the accumulation of
knowledge across generations. But our cumulative tradition comes at a
price: we cannot test every piece of wisdom we learn from our parents and
teachers. Even modern Western education, assumedly nurturing critical
thinking, is based on believing things on authority in first instance. Although we do question tradition and occasionally revise beliefs we learned,
there are more general and automatic strategies in place to optimize learning: we tend to follow individuals whom we perceive as successful and we
do what the majority of people do around us.2
This does not mean that the content of ideas that we learn does not matter. It has been demonstrated that ideas mixing common sense and strangeness optimally are remembered better and therefore have an advantage in
cultural transmission. When we use the expression common sense we are
referring to what is more technically called maturationally natural ontological expectations.3 Maturationally natural ontology develops in children
under a wide range of external circumstances and enables people to re1
G. DELLING, Josephus und das Wunderbare, NT 2 (1958): 291309; H.R. MOEHRationalization of Miracles in the Writings of Flavius Josephus (Berlin 1973);
D.C. DULING, The Eleazar Miracle and Solomons Magical Wisdom in Flavius Josephuss Antiquitates Judaicae 8.4249, HThR 78 (1985):125, see 912; E. E VE, The
Jewish Context of Jesus Miracles (Sheffield 2002), 385.
2
P.J. RICHERSON and R. B OYD, Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution (Chicago 2005), 162164.
3
R.N. MCCAULEY, Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not (New York 2011),
3182.
RING,
547
spond to information in the environment quickly and efficiently. For example, we know that animals move, humans speak, and tools are designed
for some purpose and we can interact with them accordingly, without testing those features in every instance of them. It is important to note that
such ontological divisions are not necessarily identical with categories that
people use to describe the world when we ask them (or categories that philosophers use). Maturationally natural ontological categories include human, animal, plant, artifact, and (natural) object.4 A donkey that talks
(e.g., Acts of Thomas 3941 and 6881) or a statue that hears what people
speak violates expectations about animals and artifacts, respectively. Such
ideas will be remembered longer than common-sense ideas. However, if
the violations are multiplied, the advantage diminishes. As a consequence,
minimally counterintuitive ideas are passed on across generations at higher
rates than either ordinary or maximally counterintuitive items.5 Empirical
evidence suggests that the advantage is most pronounced in the long-term
retention of ideas.6
As I have shown elsewhere, the development of early Christian theological concepts was influenced by the selective transmission of ideas. For
example, the formation of the mainstream idea of Jesus death and resurrection can be explained by the selection of a minimally counterintuitive
version, whereas ebionite and docetic alternatives were too ordinary or
excessively counterintuitive, respectively. 7 Miracle stories are often minimally counterintuitive. Consider the following two hypothetical alterna4
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Istvn Czachesz
tives to the resuscitation of Eutychus in Acts 20:912. (a) The boy fell out
of the window and broke his leg. Paul hurried downstairs, lifted him up,
and laid him on a bed. He took a piece of wood and cloths and secured the
broken leg by splints. (b) The boy fell out of the window and died. Paul
did not go down but prayed to God. The boy came back to life, turned into
an owl and flew back to the third floor. From that day he could remember
everything he heard. In terms of the theory of minimal counterintuitiveness, the first narrative would not be especially memorable and would be
forgotten. The second, in contrast, contains too many counterintuitive details (rising from the dead, turning into an animal, remembering everything) to be transmitted accurately. One counterintuitve detail, the boy
coming back to life (which violates the ontological expectation that death
puts an end to biological life),8 is necessary but also enough so that the
episode would be memorable and transmitted.
In some miracles, identifying the counterintuitive element is rather
straightforward. For example, the multiplication of bread in Mark 6:3944
and parallels violates maturationally natural expectations about artifacts.
We do not expect natural objects or artifacts (such as bread) to multiply
spontaneously, which we only attribute to living things. We mentioned the
case of Eutychus above, to which we can add other resurrection miracles.
Dead bodies and decomposing corpses (John 11:3844) are not expected to
resume biological function. Another food miracle, the changing of water
into wine (John 2:211), implies a crossing of ontological boundaries.
Whereas water is a natural substance, wine is an artifact. Arguably, we do
not expect natural objects to transform into artifacts without human labor:
artifacts are produced by investing time and energy.
Many other miracles, however, lack a strictly counterintuitive element.
For example, catching extraordinary amounts of fish (Luke 5:111) at an
unusual time of the day is unexpected but does not violate innate ontological categories. Healing with saliva (e.g., Mark 7:33) is an intuitive technique that relies on demonstrable physiological effects: saliva contains
healing substances. Many therapies in biblical literature change intuitive
healing processes (which might or might not comply with modern scientific theory) into paradoxical (but not strictly counterintuitive) events by
adding extraordinary difficulties. For example, the man healed in John 9
has been blind since birth and the one at the pool of Bethsaida (John 5:1
20) had been crippled for thirty-eight years.
8
Whereas the continuation of psychological functions after death is intuitively plausible, biological functions are believed to stop. Cf. J.M. B ERING, Intuitive Conceptions
of Dead Agents Minds: The Natural Foundations of Afterlife Beliefs as Phenomenological Boundary, Journal of Cognition and Culture 2 (2002): 263308; IDEM, The Folk
Psychology of Souls, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (2006): 453462.
549
Healings and other miracles often receive a counterintuitive edge because they are attributed to divine intervention (as is the rule in biblical
literature) or because the condition that necessitates them (such as illness)
is explained by divine punishment or demonic influence. Gods and spirits
are always counterintuitive because they combine human psychological
and other features with elements that contradict expectations about humans: being invisible, being present at more than one physical location at a
time, transforming themselves into different shapes, having infinite
knowledge etc.9 The involvement of counterintuitive agency in miracles
(as opposed to featuring objects that change shape or levitate, for example)
makes a difference. Counterintuitive agents matter more than other counterintuitive concepts because they have minds, are capable of social interaction, and make moral judgments.10
Yet another factor that contributes to the salience of miracle stories in
human tradition is their emotional content. Empirical research demonstrated that if such elements are added to a story, they increase the memorability of all details of the narrative.11 In miracle stories we can read about
people who are seriously ill and desperately seek healing (e.g., Mark 2:1
12), parents who seek help for their sick or already dead children (e.g.,
Mark 1:2143), as well as extreme (e.g., lameness, blindness), repulsive
(e.g., leprosy), or spectacular (e.g., demoniacs) symptoms and diseases. Many of the vivid details in the stories are likely to elicit empathy,
fear, and disgust, which are archaic emotions (in terms of evolutionary
history) and are triggered quickly and automatically. Further, after such a
start, miracle stories are likely to evoke emotions of relief when difficulties are miraculously overcome in the end.
In sum, miracles attract attention and remain in memory for psychological reasons. First, by violating maturationally natural expectations just
enough to make them salient and memorable but not too much so they can
be remembered and transmitted accurately. Second, by engaging some ancient and vital mental functions that respond to relevant information rapid9
For the cognitive analysis of divine qualities see I. P YYSIINEN, Supernatural
Agents: Why We Believe in Souls, Gods, and Buddhas (Oxford 2009); I. CZACHESZ, God
in the Fractals: Recursiveness as a Key to Religious Behavior, Method and Theory in
the Study of Religion 24 (2012): 328; IDEM, The Grotesque Body in Early Christian
Literature: Hell, Scatology, and Metamorphosis (Durham 2013), 141180.
10
B OYER, Religion Explained (n. 5), 155231; P YYSIINEN, Supernatural Agents
(n. 9), 95136.
11
L. CAHILL and J.L. MCGAUGH, A Novel Demonstration of Enhanced Memory Associated with Emotional Arousal, Consciousness and cognition 4 (1995): 410421; C.
LANEY et al., Memory for Thematically Arousing Events, Memory and Cognition 32
(2004): 11491159; N ORENZAYAN and ATRAN, Cognitive and Emotional Processes (n.
6).
550
Istvn Czachesz
551
has been shown, for example, that experts do not mobilize their learned
skills when making judgments in everyday situations, making the same
mistakes as lay people do.15 Theological incorrectness has also been observed in a Christian context: when people have to make judgments about
situations that involve theological elements (without being tested on doctrines formally) their answers are based on intuitive, anthropomorphic notions of God.16 The lesson from these experiments is that complex ideas
acquired by cultural learning (in this case, official theology or scientific
theory) are useful only under certain conditions. Minimally counterintuitive ideas are intuitive in the sense of being better remembered and easily transmitted. Anthropomorphic ideas of dead persons and God will take
over whenever the situation permits.
Another approach to understanding the influence of culture on the success of minimally counterintuitive expectations is to manipulate culturally
postulated categories and see how ideas involving such tweaks are remembered as compared to minimally counterintuitive items. In an experiment,
ideas that stretched the limits of innate ontological categories without violating them (such as a man who knows every fairytale) were remembered just as well as technically counterintuitive items (see above).17 However, counterintuitiveness had a further advantage when the violation included agency (such as a car that likes to watch movies) but no difference was detected between counterintuitiveness and mere strangeness
when agency was not involved in the violation (a man who has no shadow or a car that is weightless). In other words, someone or something
doing something counterintuitive was found to stick in the memory better
than simply doing something strange, but there was no significant difference if the counterintuitive detail was not about doing something. In a
somewhat different experimental design, strangeness could be manipulated to contradict clearly culture-specific expectations to find out about
the difference between violating culturally postulated and maturationally
natural expectations, respectively.
It can be argued that a human being flying in the air is a strictly counterintuitive idea. Indeed, flying is the ultimate miracle that Simon Magus performs in the Acts of Peter (chs. 4 and 32). In Apuleiuss Metamorphoses,
Lucius landlady uses witchcraft to turn herself into an owl and fly at
15
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553
tive ideas but what kind of contexts they mobilize to make sense of them.
It has been shown that a context that makes the appearance of an idea less
surprising also makes it less memorable, whereas a context that justifies or
explains the idea after its appearance makes it more memorable.20 That is,
providing an explanation or justification for a counterintuitive miracle will
support its transmission: it does not really matter whether the context is
theological, rationalizing, or psychological. Whereas such interpretative
frameworks were both easily available and culturally consistent in antiquity, they are often sub-culturally defined or entirely idiosyncratic in the
modern Western world. In spite of their decreasing membership, the theological understanding of miracles provided by mainstream Christian
churches is still the most widely available framework of interpretation in
this culture. It is important to bear in mind that such a framework is a
mismatch when it comes to understanding miracle in antiquity and in other
cultures across space and time.
M.A. UPAL, L.O. GONCE, R.D. T WENEY and D.J. SLONE, Contextualizing Counterintuitiveness: How Context Affects Comprehension and Memorability of Counterintuitive Concepts, Cognitive Science: A Multidisciplinary Journal 31 (2007): 415439.
Unfortunately, the long-term retention of ideas was not examined in the study.
21
For a short survey, see F. GRAF, R.L. FOWLER and .M. NAGY, Magische Rituale, in Thesaurus cultus et rituum antiquorum (Vol. 3; eds. V. Lambrinoudakis and J.C.
Balty; Los Angeles 2005), 283301, see 283286.
22
E.g., J. BRAARVIG, Magic: Reconsidering the Grand Dichotomy, in The World of
Ancient Magic: Papers From the First International Samson Eitrem Seminar At the Norwegian Institute at Athens, 48 May 1997 (ed. D. Jordan, H. Montgomery and E.
Thomassen; Bergen 1999), 2154; E. T HOMASSEN, Is Magic a Subclass of Ritual?, ibid
5566; I. P YYSIINEN, Magic, Miracles and Religion: A Scientists Perspective (Walnut
Creek and Lanham 2004), 2154; J.N. BREMMER, Greek religion and culture, the Bible,
and the ancient Near East (Leiden and Boston 2008), 347352.
23
For ancient legislation against magic, see U. LUGLI, La magia a Roma (Genova
1989), 34f.; D. COLLINS, Magic in the ancient Greek world (Malden, MA 2008), 132
164.
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Istvn Czachesz
cept to analyze a pattern of thought and behavior from the emic use of the
word as a derogatory rhetorical tool in antiquity, applied by both Christians and non-Christians. Below I will use the concept of magic in a broad,
non-pejorative sense, including what is called performing a miracle in theological parlance.
As I have argued elsewhere, the heroes of early Christian literature rely
on the power of the Holy Spirit or Jesus name (after receiving baptism)
much in the same way as magicians in general relied on a parhedros, a
supernatural helper with which they were connected by an initiation process.24 This technique has been distinguished from the coercive approach
to gaining control over a spirit or deity.25 However, the use of the term
coercive () in the magical papyri can be misleading. For
example, the coercive spell in PGM IV.25202567 could be called a
petitionary prayer to Selene. The claim of the papyrus about the efficiency
of the spell can be compared to Jesus promise of whatever you ask for in
prayer, believe that you have received it, and it will be yours (Mark
11:24). It is beyond doubt that magic involved a number of techniques to
influence supernatural powers, such as using secret knowledge or gaining
control over spirits with the help of higher gods.26 But these aspects have
to be examined on a case-by-case basis and do not allow us, in my opinion,
to establish clear-cut boundaries either between magic and miracle or between Christian and pagan practice.
I have also argued that magical practice across human cultures is rooted
in behavioral learning and supported by a number of cognitive mechanisms.27 The ties between magical manipulations and certain forms of operant conditioning (in which associations are made between ones behavior
and a stimulus) have been recognized and demonstrated by B.F. Skinner,
24
I. CZACHESZ, Magic and Mind: Toward a Cognitive Theory of Magic, With Special Attention to the Canonical and Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles, Annali di Storia
dellEsegesi 24 (2007): 295321; IDEM, Explaining Magic: Earliest Christianity as a
Test Case, in Past Minds: Studies in Cognitive Historiography (ed. L.H. Martin and J.
Srensen; London 2011), 141165. For the parhedros, see recently E. P ACHOUMI, Divine Epiphanies of Paredroi in the Greek Magical Papyri, GRBS 51 (2011): 155165.
25
A. SCIBILIA, Supernatual Assistance in the Greek Magical Papyri: The Figure of
the Parhedros, in The Metamorphosis of Magic from Late Antiquity to the Early Modern
Period (ed. J.N. Bremmer and J.R. Veenstra; Leuven 2002), 7186, see 7275.
26
E.g., W. FAUTH, Gtter- und Dmonenzwang in den griechischen Zauberpapyri,
ZRGG 50 (2008): 4060.
27
For a more extended discussion, considering a broader range of cognitive components, see I. CZACHESZ, A Cognitive Perspective on Magic in the New Testament, in
Mind, Morality, and Magic: Cognitive Science Approaches in Biblical Studies (ed. I.
Czachesz and R. Uro; Durham 2013), 164179.
555
K. Ono, S.A. Vyse, and others.28 The basic form of magic is thus embodied, based on associations encoded in implicit memory and possibly not
accessible to conscious reflection.
The explicit belief that magical acts influence the state of affairs is supported by a number of cognitive mechanisms. In an experiment, participants were instructed to perform a voodoo ritual with a doll.29 They were
introduced to a confederate who behaved either offensively or neutrally,
and who later played the role of the victim of magic. Then participants
were asked to generate vivid and concentrate thoughts about the victim
(who was in the neighboring room) and prick the doll in particular ways.
Finally, the victim came back and reported having a slight headache. It
turned out that participants who had ill thoughts about their victims (because of the victims offensive behavior) were likely to think that they
caused the victims headache, whereas participants meeting neutral victims
were less likely to think so. Students interpretations of the events probably relied on agentive reasoning, that is, the use of concepts of agents to
make sense of various kinds of information. Although we do not call them
demons any longer, we find it easy to accept that there are different
agencies acting in us, such as illnesses, emotions, desires, will, Jungian
agents populating our psyche etc. Without thinking about it, the participants seem to have believed that a similar agency (possibly connected to
their strong emotions) acted invisibly and caused damage in other people.
Another important underlying mechanism of magic is reasoning about
contagion. In a series of experiments conducted by C. Nemeroff, P. Rozin,
and their collaborators, participants avoided contact with objects that were
previously in contact with disgusting insects or substances, even after the
objects were carefully sterilized.30 An even more surprising finding was
that objects that were in contact with morally condemned people elicited
the same response.31 Theories about the origins of contagion avoidance
28
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assume that originally it had some evolutionary benefit, although the precise explanation remains unclear.32 There is also a tendency to prefer
touching objects that belonged to morally valued people, which seems to
be one of the underlying motivations to collect memorabilia or venerate
relics.33 In sum, there is a cross-culturally attested human intuition that
positive and negative qualities (including abstract, moral features) can be
transmitted by contact.
It is to be expected that whereas low-level, intuitive thoughts about
magic are universal (or cross-culturally recurrent), elaborate theological
concepts are more time-bound. In a different cultural context, theories of
magic can assume radically different forms, while the intuitive cognitive
mechanisms underlying first-hand reactions remain the same. For example,
a fanatic UFO believer can explain changes in his or her mental or physical
condition by abduction by aliens, while the same changes would be attributed to a favorable response to a sacrifice, demonic attack, or the influence of evil eye (depending on the positive or negative nature of the experience) in an ancient context.
Already from a very early period there is evidence of magical activity
among Jesus followers. In 1 Corinthians 12:710, Paul writes about magical specialists: healers, miracle workers, and possibly exorcists, who are in
the company of teachers, prophets, and other Church officials.34 This passage is interesting also because the epistle predates extant texts about the
miracles of Jesus and the apostles. What was the relation between magical
practice and miracle stories in earliest Christianity? One can argue that
traditions about Jesus and the apostles could have circulated in oral transmission before Pauls time but such a hypothesis is difficult to test. It is
also possible that it was magical practice that inspired the miracle stories
about Jesus and the apostles. Christianity could have incorporated already
existing magical lore. Magical specialists who converted to Christianity
could be among the healers and miracle workers mentioned in 1 Corinthians. The relation of magic and miracle was dialectical, in which miracle
stories generated belief in magic, and magical practice created an interest
in miracle stories. The interaction of magic and miracle can occur in the
22 (1994): 158186; H.L. LENFESTY, Adults Implicit Reasoning about Moral Contagion (Dissertation; Queens University Belfast 2011).
32
Cf. W. MCCORKLE, Ritualizing the Disposal of the Deceased: From Corpse to
Concept, (New York 2010), 107131.
33
H.L. LENFESTY, Adults Implicit Reasoning (n. 31); R. URO, From Corpse Impurity to Relic Veneration: New Light from Cognitive and Psychological Studies, in Mind,
Morality and Magic (n. 27 ), 180196.
34
For the possibility of 1 Cor 12:10 referring to exorcists, see E. SORENSEN, Possession and Exorcism in the New Testament and Early Christianity, (WUNT II/157;
Tbingen 2002), 156f.
557
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4. Conclusion
This chapter showed how scientific knowledge from evolutionary theory,
cognitive science, and experimental psychology helps us read early Christian miracle stories. In addition to highlighting and analyzing crosscultural patterns of thought and behavior that support the popularity of
miracle stories, making them mental candies for people with different
cultural backgrounds and convictions, we also paid attention to the cultural
factors that provide different contexts for the reception of miracle stories
in ancient times and Western modernity, respectively. Most importantly,
we have seen that it is not the belief in the factual truth of miracles (or
the lack of such faith) that determines their success. The question is rather
what a certain culture or subculture makes of the attractive power of miracle stories. Already in antiquity, a miracle story could be thought of as a
poetic device or entertaining fiction, or the miracle performed in it could
be interpreted as harmful magic. Miracle stories and magical practice
formed a symbiotic bond. For the modern reader, the options of contextualizing miracle are even more diverse, ranging from pre-modern literalism
to ideological deconstruction and psychoanalytical symbolism. In the end,
however, each of those interpretative frameworks adds to the success of
miracles.